People v.

Galit
(GR No. L-51770, 20 March 1985)
Facts: Francisco Galit was picked up by the Montalban police on suspicion for the killing of
Mrs. Natividad Francisco, a widow. After he was taken by the Montalban police, the case was
referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the
Montalban police station. Accordingly, Galit was brought tothe NBI where he was
investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. The following day, Galit
voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime, also
implicating Juling and Pabling Dulay as his companions in its commission. As a result, he was
charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide before the Circuit Trial Court of Pasig.
During trial, a witness stated that he overheard Galit quarrelling with his wife about his
intention to leave their residence immediately because he and his two companions robbed
and killed Natividad Fernando. On the other hand, Galit denied participation in the
commission of the crime and also assailed the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession
extracted from him through torture, force and intimidation. He recounted that he was
mauled and tortured by the NBI officers by covering his face with a rag and pushing his face
into a toilet bowl full of human waste. He had no counsel when the confession was extracted
from him. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed
the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his
investigators, purporting it to be a re-enactment. This notwithstanding, the trial court found
Galit guilty and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty.
Issue: W/N Francisco Galit should be acquitted on the ground that his extrajudicial
confession is inadmissible.
Ruling:
YES. The evidence presented by the prosecution does not support a conviction. In
fact, the findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not
supported by competent evidence. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from
the accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of
the crime. The only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. The alleged
confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence
because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law. Galit acquitted.
Issue: How is the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession shown?
Ruling:
Through the statement itself. The first question was a very long Tagalog question
followed by a monosyllabic answer. It does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the
accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead, there
should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple
words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. The
accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at
the time of his arrest, the accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been
brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed

the Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even
contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted
by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by the counsel of his
choice. These constitute gross violation of his rights.
The correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a
custodial investigation, according to Morales v. Ponce Enrile
: At the time the person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason of the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statementhe might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient meansby telephone if possibleor by letteror messenger. It shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to see that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any
person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself
or by anyoneon his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation
of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole
or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

[G.R. No. L-17465. August 31, 1964.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NICOMEDES CASTRO, ET
AL., Accused-Appellants.
Eligio A. Manto and Jose V. Alcantara for Accused-Appellants.
Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

MURDER; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS; NOT INVOLUNTARY WHEN REPLETE WITH DETAILS

FURNISHABLE ONLY BY ACCUSED. The presence of details contradicting the allegations of
torture, coupled with the evident firmness and speed with which the signatures to the
confessions were written, the failure to complain to the justice of the peace before whom
they were sworn to, the written denials of force, intimidation or promise appended thereto
by the accused, and the improbability that the details narrated were concocted by the
police, all impel the Court to reject the claim that said confessions are involuntary.
SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR JUDGES SWEARING IN CONFESSANTS. Judges, justices of
the peace and fiscals, to whom persons accused are brought for swearing to the truth of
their statements, would do well to adopt the practice of having the confessants physically
and thoroughly examined by independent and qualified doctors before administering the
oath, even if it is not requested by the accused. Or, if no doctor is immediately available, the
swearing officers should themselves examine the entire bodies of the confessants for marks

of violence, particularly the portions covered by their clothing. Such examination, if regularly
required, and the results officially noted, would not only deter attempts to secure
confessions through violence, but ultimately shorten and speed up criminal trials (where
accused persons almost invariably repudiate their confessions) by precluding future
controversies on whether the statements were obtained through torture or not.
CONSPIRACY SHOWN BY CONCERTED ACTION. The concerted action of the accused in
going armed and together to their victims house, and there, while one stayed as a lookout,
the other two entered and shot the mayor and his wife, leaving again together afterwards,
admits no other rational explanation but conspiracy (People v. Upao, L-6771, 28 May 1957
cases cited).

People v. Chaw Yaw Shun, 23 SCRA 127 (1968)

A case where accused appellant was maltreated to confess that he is in conspiracy

with the other 2 accused.

From the foregoing facts and circumstances set forth, it is clear that the mere absence of
external injury in appellant's body does not destroy or rule out appellant's claim of
maltreatment by the use of other scientific modes or forms of torture. Appellant's injuries,
certified by a private physician and constabulary doctors, were telltales corroboration of the
charge of torture and maltreatment.
It is now settled that a confession which is induced or extorted by torturing the accused or
by personal violence or abuse directed against the accused for the purpose of obtaining a
confession, is an involuntary one and is not admissible in evidence against him, unless found
to be true. (People vs. Tipay, 70 Phil. 615.
conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the confession. The
admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case, must relate
to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or
during its existence) and in furtherance of its objects, and not to a confession made, as in
this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
It must be proved as the crime itself, independent from the confession. But in the case at
bar, the trial court admitted the conflicting confession of Alvarez which are not binding on
the appellant for being hearsay, aside from having been repudiated by Alvarez himself
during the trial. There is, therefore, no inter-locking confession so to say, for there being no
independent evidence establishing an overt act of appellant Chua connected to the crime,
conspiracy must necessarily be discarded.
Court finds that the guilt of the appellant Chaw Yaw Shun @ George Chua has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt, and he is hereby acquitted of the offense charged

Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator. The act ordeclaration of a conspirator relating

to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.
When does conspiracy exists?
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Art. 8, RPC). Onceconspiracy is proven, the
act of one is the act of all. The statement therefore of one may be admitted against the
other co-conspirators as an exception to the rule of res inter alios acta.
Requisites for admissibility For the exception to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
(a) The declaration or act be made or done during the existence of the conspiracy;
(b) The declaration or act must relate to the conspiracy; and
(c) The conspiracy must be shown by evidence other than the declaration or act.

Madsali vs People

RTC rendered a Decision7 finding Sajiron and Maron guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of abduction with rape. Egap and Sajiron were also found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention which the CA affirmed.

The Court does not agree with the findings of the CA affirming the trial court's judgment
finding Sajiron and Maron guilty of abduction and rape in Criminal Case No. 12281. An
appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not
raised by the parties30 Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code spells out the elements of the
crime of forcible abduction, thus: (a) that the person abducted is a woman, regardless of her
age, civil status, or reputation; (b) that the abduction is against her will; and (c) that the
abduction is with lewd designs.
A reading of the Information in Criminal Case No. 12281, for abduction with rape, would
readily show that the allegations therein do not charge the accused with forcible abduction,
because the taking, as alleged, was not with lewd designs. The only act that was alleged to
have been attended with lewd design was the act of rape. Upon further perusal of the
allegations in the information, it appears that the crime charged was actually the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape, defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

Aticle 267 of the Revised Penal Code34 are:

(1) the offender is a private individual;

(2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.35
In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who are private individuals, forcibly took and dragged
AAA, a minor, to the forest and held her captive against her will. The crime of serious illegal
detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of detaining him or
depriving him in any manner of his liberty. 36 For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the
victim is restrained from going home.37 Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's
liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such
deprivation.38 In the present case, although AAA was not actually confined in an enclosed
place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty, because she was tied up and
her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag her to
the forest away from her home.
The crime of rape was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case. Sajiron succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force and intimidation. For fear of
losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give in to Sajiron's beastly and lustful assault.
Clearly, conspiracy between Sajiron and Maron attended the commission of forcible
abduction and the subsequent rape of AAA. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it.
The last paragraph of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed
or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
(a) In Criminal Case No. 12281, accused Sajiron Lajim and Maron Lajim are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with rape under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo

G.R. No. 180906
07 October 2008
PONENTE: Puno, C.J.
PARTIES:
1.
PETITIONERS: SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES
2.
RESPONDENTS: RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
1.
Supreme Court: Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order

2.

Supreme Court: Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to treat their Existing Petition as Amparo
Petition
3.
Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily heard the
Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment which is the subject of the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
FACTS:
On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter referred to as Raymond) and Reynaldo
Manalo (hereafter referred to as Reynaldo) were abducted by military men belonging to the Citizen Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the New
Peoples Army (NPA). After eighteen (18) months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on 13 August
2007.
On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of
their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a Resolution dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered
the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and further enjoined them
from causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion
to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final
Amparo Reliefs.
While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007.
Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing peti
tion as amparo petition.
On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as a petition under the
Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and remanded the petition to the
Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the petition.
On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The Court of
Appeals ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos
and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the custody of Raymond and Reynaldo,
confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical
reports and records of Raymond and Reynaldo while under military custody.
Aggrieved, the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP filed an appeal with the
Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
1.
2.

Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for amparo petitions.
Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a person may be
invoked.
ANSWER:
1.
It depends on the credibility and candidness of the victims in their statements.
2.
No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS

Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of evidence required
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during
detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the
victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their
written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical
evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify
against them comes as no surprise.
2. ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION
Permutations of the Right to Security A closer look at the right to security of person would yield
various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear.
In its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in
which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. Some scholars postulate that freedom from
fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the
right to security of person as the word security itself means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the UDHR
provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
xxx
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article
III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or
invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment,
physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to
life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because
they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.
xxx
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in
this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under
Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security,
the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection
to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and
bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
Freedom from fear as a right In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the
right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being
baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another
with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the
stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually the
freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of

Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the
provision.
Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security may be invoked While the right
to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled
that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need
not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked.

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Razon v. Tagitis
G.R. No. 182498
03 December 2009
PONENTE: Brion, J.
PARTIES:

NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
Court of Appeals: Petition for the Writ of Amparo
FACTS:
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for
the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an
IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga
City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for
his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no
longer around. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latters Manila-based
secretary, who advised Kunnong to simply wait for Tagitis return.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and
Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. More
than a month later, or on December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean Tagitis, through her attorney-in-fact,
filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding
General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M.
Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police
Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben
Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet (collectively referred to as petitioners), with the Court of
Appeals (CA). On the same day, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo and set the case for hearing
on January 7, 2008.
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an enforced
disappearance under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP
(CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance.
Hence, the CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the petitioners to
exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation
to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against
the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding
that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.

On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its
Resolution dated April 9, 2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts, i.e. complete in
every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights, is indispensable in an
amparo petition.
2.
Whether or not the presentation of substantial evidence by the petitioner to prove her allegations is
sufficient for the court to grant the privilege of the writ.
3.
Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the alleged
enforced disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ.
ANSWERS:
1.
No. However, it must contain details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while
presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through
State or private party action.
2.
Yes.
3.
No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. REQUIREMENTS IN AN AMPARO PETITION
The requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts must be read in light of the
nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty The framers of
the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or
actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the
ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition,
however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which
addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim
exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is
detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the
petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial
concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court
requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition
should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances,
while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security
through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms
of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the
State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are
present.
2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AN AMPARO PETITION
Burden of proof of Amparo petitioner [T]he Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the
substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations
by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and
prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show
that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victims
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to
appropriately respond.
Substantial evidence required in amparo proceedings The [characteristics of amparo proceedings]
namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to
the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) reveal the
clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit
judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required the duty of public
officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence point, too, to the extraordinary measures

expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs
only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed
above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The
rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances
showing a violation of the victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part
of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to
arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. The statute provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and
equity shall not be controlling. The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative
boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed
incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a
desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force.
Minor inconsistencies in the testimony should not affect the credibility of the witness As a rule,
minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend to
strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every
detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were
integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story.
3. ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES in relation to THE WRIT OF AMPARO
The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance, rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability , for the enforced
disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance
[The writ of amparo is] a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to
life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to undertake
specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N.
Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it
determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing
the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have
been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to
file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the
level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the
life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points
remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that
Congress may promulgate [T]he unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the
considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the same as the
standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work
in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through
the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.

The concept of enforced disappearances is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. We note that although the writ specifically covers enforced
disappearances, this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction.
The records of the
Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule
initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance: x x x In the
end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives and in the Senate
on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual definition
of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its
power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may
intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts. As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts
undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the
determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry
are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the countrys
constitutional scheme and power structure. Source of the power of the Supreme Court to act on extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act
under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, since extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional
rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Courts power is strictly procedural and as such
does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can
be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby
directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To
state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference even if only procedurally in a situation when
the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of
constitutional rights.
DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under
the following terms:
1.
Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
2.
Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the
government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for the
enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
3.
Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
4.
Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible for
the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations using
extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this Court;
5.
Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with
the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his assets in relation with the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
6.
Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the
monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the PNP
and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further investigation,
periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action;

7.

Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations,
copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the first
report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
8.
The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the Court of
Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter
counted from the finality of this Decision;
The abovementioned directives and those of the Court of Appeals made pursuant to this Decision were
given to, and were directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine
National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from the Supreme
Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary
diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand.
Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, the aforementioned
directives particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA are specific to this case and are not
standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander
Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force
Comet, Zamboanga City.

Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 189155
07 September 2010
PONENTE: Perez, J.
PARTIES:
1. PETITIONER: MELISSA ROXAS
2. RESPONDENTS: PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR IBRADO,
P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, PC/SIPT/ LEON NILO DELA CRUZ, MAJ.GEN.
RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, DEX, RC, and ROSE
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
1.
Supreme Court: Petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data
2.
Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily heard the
Original Action for Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment which is the
subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
FACTS:
Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the United States, enrolled in an exposure
program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYANUSA) of which she is a member.
On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her companions rested in the house of Mr.
Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her companions were resting, 15 heavily armed men in
civilian clothes forcibly entered the house and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted from the van,
she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New

Peoples Army (CPP-NPA). She was then separated from her companions and was brought to a room, from
where she could hear sounds of gunfire, noise of planes taking off and landing, and some construction bustle.
She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to abandon her communist beliefs. She
was informed by a person named RC that those who tortured her came from the Special Operations
Group and that she was abducted because her name is included in the Order of Battle.
On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone with a sim card. She was sternly
warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her
family. After her release, Roxas continued to receive calls from RC thru the cell phone given to her. Out of
apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim card.
Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before
the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of military and Philippine National Police (PNP), on
the belief that it was the government agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued the writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for
hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action. The Court of Appeals granted the privilege of writs of
amparo and habeas data. However, the court a quo absolved the respondents because it was not convinced
that the respondents were responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas.
Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition.
2.
Whether or not circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators
is enough ground for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo.
3.
Whether or not substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim is necessary before the privilege of the writ may be extended.
ANSWERS:
1.
No.
2.
It depends. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable must be preferred over mere circumstantial
evidence.
3.
Yes.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents is legally inaccurate The use
of the doctrine of command responsibility as justification in impleading the respondents in her amparo
petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. Such doctrine is a rule of substantive law that establishes
liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo
petition.
The Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy As held in the case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, the writ of
amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial
measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of
violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. It does not fix liability for such disappearance,
killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more
aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding.
However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility does not preclude impleading military

or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their
direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded not actually on the basis of
command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS
In amparo proceedings, direct evidence of identity must be preferred over mere circumstantial
evidence In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence
of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that
has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of
identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators.
3. EVIDENCE REQURED IN HABEAS DATA PROCEEDINGS
Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim is an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be
extended An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing,
at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim. In the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual or threatened violation
of such right. Hence, until such time that any of the respondents were found to be actually responsible for
the abduction and torture of Roxas, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of
the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. The Court must, at least in the
meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.

Guazon vs DeVilla
G.R. No. 80508
30 January 1990
PONENTE: Gutierrez, Jr., J.
PARTIES:
1.
PETITIONERS: EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES, VIOLETA SEVILLA,
QUERUBIN BILLONES, ESTELITA BILLONES, GORGONIA MACARAEG, LAUREANA JOAQUIN, CRESTITA
LICUP, SOLIDAD ABURDO, ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA HOBALANE, ERLINDA RESTORAN,
VERIDIAN FLORA, ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO, ROSALINA DOMINGO,
ARESTIO YANGA, MILAGROS GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES, BONIFACIA ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES,
ERLINDA LEE, MELANIO GAROFIL, ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO, ANATALIA PESIMO,
LOSENDO GARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO, LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA. RECHILDA SABALZA,
EDITHA MAAMO, ELENIETA BANOSA, ALEXANDER LABADO, ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO REYES,
ROSARIO SESPENE, ROSA MARTIN and JAIME BONGAT
2.
RESPONDENTS: MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN.
RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS GARCIA
NATURE: Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
Supreme Court: Original Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
FACTS:
The forty one (41) petitioners, claiming to represent the citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests
and are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before th[e] Court, filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police officers from conducting Aerial
Target Zonings or Saturation Drives in Metro Manila. In their petition, they claim that the saturation
drive or aerial target zoning that were conducted in Tondo, Manila were unconstitutional. To support such

claim, they specifically alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search
warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without
nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely roused from their sleep by banging on the walls
and windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows.
Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The petitioners
claim that in all these drives, the following acts were committed:
1.

Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early morning hours, police and
military units without any search warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one
residence and sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most of them are in
civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards.
2.
These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their
homes, shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some in the process), and then ordering the
residents within to come out of their respective residences.
3.
The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like cows, the men are ordered to strip
down to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks and other imagined marks.
4.
While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted by the raiders, some of the
members of the raiding team force their way into each and every house within the cordoned off area
and then proceed to conduct search of the said houses without civilian witnesses from the
neighborhood.
5.
In many instances, many residents have complained that the raiders ransack their homes, tossing
about the residents belongings without total regard for their value. In several instances, walls are
destroyed, ceilings are damaged in the raiders illegal effort to fish for incriminating evidence.
6.
Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasing frequency that their
money and valuables have disappeared after the said operations.
7.
All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcome intrusions are arrested on
the spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that take them to detention centers where they are
interrogated and verified. These arrests are all conducted without any warrants of arrest duly issued
by a judge, nor under the conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest. Some hooded men are
used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.
8.
In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration of the period wherein they can
be legally detained without any charge at all. In other instances, some arrested persons are released
without charge after a few days of arbitrary detention.
9.
The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at the residents during these
illegal operations.
10. Many have also reported incidents of on-the-spot beatings, maulings and maltreatment.
11. Those who are detained for further verification by the raiders are subjected to mental and physical
torture to extract confessions and tactical information. (Rollo, pp. 2 -4)
In their defense, the respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, alleged that the accusations of the
petitioners were total lies. Respondents contend that the Constitution grants to government the power to
seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning
were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said
drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the
actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the saturation drives performed by respondents involved acts which violated human
rights.
2.
Whether or not the original action for prohibition is the proper remedy.
ANSWER:

1.
Yes.
2.
No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. ON SATURATION DRIVES AND VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
When saturation drives may be conducted without having to secure search warrants and without
violating the Bill of Rights Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military
may go out in force to the combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels
and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without violating
the Bill of Rights.
Duty of the court to stop the transgression and encroachment upon the rights of the individual
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of
the court to stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state may not encroach
upon the rights of the individual. It is the duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the
present petition where the petitioners do not complain they were victims of the police actions, where no
names of any of the thousands of alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a general one to stop all
police saturation drives, as long as the Court is convinced that the event actually happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is so inspite of the
alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents to submit themselves voluntarily for
character and personal verification. We cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude described in the
petitions and admitted by the respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined soldiers and
policemen committing certain abuses. However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the
essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled
areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A
show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. A
blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one-on-one
confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals are easily procured.
Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices because all concerted
drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited.
2. ON VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND REMEDY
The present petition is an improper remedy The remedy is not an original action for prohibition
brought through a taxpayers suit. Where not one victim complains and not one violator is properly charged,
the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for the executive departments and for
trial courts. Well-meaning citizens with only second-hand knowledge of the events cannot keep on
indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme Court as if we
are the repository of all remedies for all evils. The rules of constitutional litigation have been evolved for an
orderly procedure in the vindication of rights. They should be followed. If our policy-makers sustain the
contention of the military and the police that occasional saturation drives are essential to maintain the
stability of government and to insure peace and order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior of soldiers and
policemen must not only be evolved, they should also be enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights
abuses and identifying violators is necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level conference should bring
together the heads of the Department of Justice, Department of National Defense and the operating heads of
affected agencies and institutions to devise procedures for the prevention of abuses.
No permanent relief can be given Under the circumstances of this taxpayers suit, there is no erring
soldier or policeman whom we can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an
orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners
charges and a hard look by administration officials at the policy implications of the prayed for blanket
prohibition are also warranted.

In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably committed and
could be committed during future police actions, we have to temporarily restrain the alleged banging on
walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo
marks, the violation of residences even if these are humble shanties of squatters, and the other alleged acts
which are shocking to the conscience.

Milo vs. Salanga

FACTS
An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private respondent (accused Barrio
Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez by hitting him
with butts of their guns and fist blows. Immediately thereafter, without legal grounds and with
deliberate intent to deprive the latter of his constitutional liberty, accused respondent and two
members of the police force of Mangsat conspired and helped one another in lodging and locking
petitioner inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.
Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute the elements of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not
sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an
opposition thereto. Consequently, averring that accused-respondent was not a public officer who can
be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash in an
order. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary
Detention.
HELD
Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order
the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with
Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse
of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors
would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his
territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be
and are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private

respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could
have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.