You may have a different take on the question or a different presentation of the underlying premises.
contempt power and exercise it beyond legal
bounds, especially the limitations found in the Bill of Rights.
The most important consideration here is you
should be able to justify your answers and to offer plausible arguments and legal bases for your responses.
In this case, the Senate argued that as a
continuing body, it can detain Strongwill indefinitely. There is no dispute on the first part of the argument (Senate as continuing body). However, the second part (indefinite detention) is not correct as this amounts to deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In other words, the Senate, although a continuing body, would be violating the Bill of Rights, especially the due process clause, if it detains Strongwill indefinitely.
1. No, the argument of Beauty is not
meritorious. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Lower House (17, Art. VI). To be considered a member of the Lower House, a Congressmanelect must have been validly proclaimed, has taken oath and has assumed office (Reyes v. Comelec). Her assumption of office coincides with the beginning of her term at noon on the 30th day of June next following the election (4, Art. VI). In this case, the actions of the COMELEC in the disqualification case from the decision to the declaration that the decision had become final were done prior to noon of June 30, 2013, the beginning of the 2013-2016 term. During this period, it was the COMELEC and not the HRET that had jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the argument meritorious.
of
Beauty
is
not
2. The claim is only partially correct.
The Senate is a continuing body. It does not cease to exist upon the periodic dissolution of Congress (Arnault v. Nazareno). The Senate as an institution is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members. (Neri v. Senate Committee). However, even if it is a continuing body, the Senate may not abuse its
Thus, the claim of the Senate is only partially
correct. 3. No, Rosebud is not disqualified to run by reason of citizenship. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he/she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Meanwhile, a woman that marries a foreigner, whose national law automatically deems her as its own citizen, does not thereby lose her natural-born Filipino citizenship. Her being considered a citizen of the country of her husband is by operation of law and not because of her renunciation of her Filipino citizenship. In this case, there is no indication that Rosebud renounced her Filipino citizenship. From the point of view of Philippine law, she is still considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. Therefore, she is not disqualified to run by reason of citizenship. 4. No, the Preamble neither confers rights nor imposes duties. It merely indicates the authorship of the Constitution, enumerates the aims and aspirations of its framers and the people that ratify it, and serves as an aid in constitutional construction.
Thus, the Preamble of the Constitution is not a
source of a positive right that may be invoked as constitutional basis of the position of the religious groups. 5. Bayad Muna may still run as a party-list group in the 2016 elections. No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. In the context of the party-list system, the word member refers to the nominee of the party-list group that sits as its representative in the House, not to the group itself. Thus, although the party-list representative sitting as member of the House may not serve for more than three consecutive terms, the party-list group itself may continually join the party-list elections. In this case, Bayad Muna participated and won a party-list seat in the election of 2007, 2010 and 2013 elections. In order to be able to join the 2016 elections, its nominees must not have served for three consecutive terms. Thus, subject to the foregoing condition, Bayad Muna may still run as a party-list group in the 2016 elections. 6. No, the Senate may not validly modify the SET rule. The Electoral Tribunals of each House of Congress shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members (17, Art. VI). This power, including the authority to promulgate its rules of procedure, is exclusive and may not be shared or exercised by the concerned House (Angara v. Electoral Commission). In this case, the Senate majority modified a rule of the SET, not a rule of the Senate itself. Therefore, the Senate may not validly modify the SET rule.
7. No, the contention of AA is not correct.
The Constitution provides that the state shall prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law (26, Art. II). This provision is not selfexecuting; it requires an implementing legislation. In this case, AA contends that BBs candidacy violates the constitutional policy against political dynasties. AA fails to consider, however, that as of now there is yet no law defining political dynasties. Ergo, the contention of AA is not correct. 8. I will tell YY that he cannot anymore run as Senator in the 2016 elections. The Constitution provides that no Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. A senatorial term lasts for six years beginning at noon on the 30th day of June next following the election (4, Art. VI) and ends at the start of the immediately succeeding term. In this case, YY served as Senator for two consecutive terms the 2004-2010 and 20102016 terms. Although his tenure during the 2004-2010 term was only for a few months before the 2010 elections, he is deemed to have served that term as his first senatorial term. If he runs and wins again in 2016, this will already be his third consecutive term. Hence, I will tell YY that he cannot anymore run as Senator in the 2016 elections. 9. Chan Sings submission is not correct. During a belligerent occupation, there is no such thing as suspended allegiance. Sovereignty remains vested with the de jure government even if the occupant has established a de facto government. Corollarily, the people continue to owe their allegiance to the rightful government (Laurel v. Misa). In this case, Chan Sing, a Filipino, argued that he did not commit treason because his
allegiance to the rightful Philippine
government was suspended during the occupation. This argument had been rejected by the Supreme Court in Laurel v. Misa. Ergo, Chan Sings submission is not correct. 10. No, Congressman XX may not validly move for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of parliamentary immunity. The Constitution provides that no member of Congress shall be questioned or be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof (11, Art. VI). However, each House may punish its members for disorderly behavior [16(3), Art. VI]. In other words, the privilege of speech and debate which is the parliamentary immunity invoked by Congressman XX may only be invoked in any other place, but not in the concerned Chamber itself, which has disciplinary power over its members. In this case, the allies of the President filed a complaint against Congressman XX before the Ethics Committee of the House, not in any other place. Hence, Congressman XX may not validly move for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of parliamentary immunity. 11. No, this does not violate the constitutional requirement that revenue bills must originate exclusively from the House of Representatives. The Constitution provides that the Senate may propose or concur with amendments to the bills that are supposed to originate exclusively in the Lower House (24, Art. VI). It is not the law but the revenue bill that is required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. The phrase originate exclusively merely means that the initiative for filing the specified bills must come from the Lower House. But a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in
the Senate (or in the conference committee)
that the result may be a rewriting of the whole (Tolentino v. Secretary). In this case, the version of the Upper House has significant variance from the version of the Lower House and the final version signed into law by the President. However, although the problem is silent on which House the initiative for filing the bill originated, it can be presumed from the tenor of the problem that it came from the Lower House. Thus, as long as the initiative for filing the bill originated in the Lower House, there is no violation of the requirement that revenue bills must originate exclusively from the House of Representatives. 12. No, the NLIA may not validly invoke the immunity of the state from suit. For incorporated government entities, their respective charters must be examined to determine whether state immunity from suits applies in a case filed against them. If the charter provides that the entity may sue or be sued, state immunity is waived and the entity may be sued. In this case, the charter of NLIA authorized it to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Code. Among the powers of a corporation in the Corporation Code is to sue and be sued. In effect, therefore, the charter of NLIA allows it to sue and be sued. Consequently, the NLIA may not validly invoke the immunity of the State from suit. 13. Yes, the grant of authority to impose the alternative penalty (of imprisonment) in the discretion of the court is an undue delegation of legislative power. There are two tests to determine whether there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz.:
(1) the completeness test; and (2) the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves Congress so that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and to prevent the delegation from running riot. In this case, 32 of R.A. 4670 is incomplete because it gives the judiciary absolute discretion to determine the duration of the penalty of imprisonment. In other words, the Congress vested in the judiciary the power to determine what the law is, i.e., the duration of the applicable imprisonment. Thus, the grant of authority to impose the alternative penalty (of imprisonment) in the discretion of the court is an undue delegation of legislative power. 14. No, I will not dismiss the counterclaim. State immunity from suits may be waived either expressly or impliedly. There is implied waiver for instance when the state commences litigation and prays for the grant of an affirmative relief from the court. In this case, the Republic of Indonesia filed an action for specific performance (i.e., to perform the balance of its obligations under the contract) and for damages. It is asking the court for affirmative reliefs; thus, it impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from suits. Accordingly, if I were the trial judge, I will not dismiss the counterclaim. 15. No bill shall become a law unless (1) it has passed 3 readings on separate days, and (2) printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to the members of the House concerned 3 days before its passage.
These requirements do not apply it the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. During the last reading, no amendment shall be allowed, and the votes shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. The bill will then be presented to the President. If he approves the bill, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return it with his objections to the House where it originated. The House shall enter the objections in its Journal and proceed to reconsider the bill. If 2/3 of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House where it shall also be reconsidered. If approved by 2/3 of all the Members of that House, the bill shall become a law. The President shall communicate his veto to the House where the bill originated within 30 days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become (lapse into) a law as if he had signed it. Generally, laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. Publication is a condition sine qua non to the effectivity of laws.