I.

A.
(granting na entire vessel yung chinarter, this is my answer. The
cited jurisprudence below kasi yung case na nahanap ko na pinakaapt sa facts. Difficult question)
Coca-Colas appeal will not prosper.
As decreed by the Supreme Court in Home Insurance
Company v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc. (G.R. No. L-25599
April 4, 1968) a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo
or chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. As a
private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the
negligence of its agent is not against public policy, and is deemed
valid. The Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not be
applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier.
The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from liability
for loss due to the negligence of its agent would be void only if the
strict public policy governing common carriers is applied. Such policy
has no force where the public at large is not involved, as in the case
of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party.
B. The applicable prescriptive period is ten years under the Civil
Code. The one-year prescriptive period under the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act applies in cases of loss or damages to the cargo. The
term "loss" as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Mitsui O.S.K.
Lines Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 366 (1998), contemplates a
situation where no delivery at all was made by the carrier of the
goods because the same had perished or gone out of commerce
deteriorated or decayed while in transit. In the present case, the
shipment of ladies' wear was actually delivered. The "loss of value" is
not the total loss contemplated by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
II.
A. OB is an insider as defined in Subsection 3.8(3) of the
Securities Regulation Code since she is an employee of t h e
B a n k , t h e f i n a n c i a l a d v i s e r o f D O P, a n d t h i s
r e l a t i o n s h i p gives her access to material information about the
issuer
and
the
latters
securities
which
information is not generally available to the public
A c c o r d i n g l y,
OB
is guilty of insider trading under Section
9 o f t h e S e c u r i t i e s R e g u l a t i on C o d e wh i c h r e q u i r e s
disclosure when trading in securities. OB is also liable

for d a m a g e s t o s e l l e r s o r bu ye r s wi t h wh o m s h e
traded.
Under Subsection 63.1 of the Securities Regulation Code, the
damages awarded could be an amount not exceeding triple the
amount of the transaction plus actual damages. Exemplary damages
may also be awarded in case of bad faith, fraud, malevolence or
wantonness in the violation of the Securities Regulation Code or its
implementing rules. The court is also authorized to award
attorneys fees not exceeding 30% of the award.
B. Yes, CX can recover from the bank. Under Section 23 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, forgery is a real defense. The forged
check is wholly inoperative in relation to CX. CX cannot be held liable
thereon by anyone, not even by a holder in due course. Under a
forged signature of the drawer, there is no valid instrument that would
give rise to a contract which can be the basis or source of liability on
the part of the drawer. The drawee bank has no right or authority to
touch the drawer's funds deposited with the drawee bank.
III.
(didnt answer the objective parts na dear ah)
IV.
The Corporation may be compelled by mandamus to register
the shares of stock in the names of the assignees.
(Rural Bank of Salinas, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 96674 June 26, 1992)
Under Section 63 of the Corporation Code, to wit:
Sec. 63. . . . Shares of stock so issued are personal
property and may be transferred by delivery of the
certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his
attorney-in-fact or other person legally authorized to make
the transfer. No transfer, however, shall be valid, except
as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in
the books of the corporation . . .
The right of a transferee/assignee to have stocks transferred to
his name is an inherent right flowing from his ownership of the stocks.
Thus:

Whenever a corporation refuses to transfer and register

stock in cases like the present, mandamus will lie to
compel the officers of the corporation to transfer said
stock in the books of the corporation" (26, Cyc. 347, Hyer
vs. Bryan, 19 Phil. 138; Fleisher vs. Botica Nolasco, 47
Phil. 583, 594).
The corporation's obligation to register is ministerial.
In transferring stock, the secretary of a corporation acts in
purely ministerial capacity, and does not try to decide the
question of ownership. (Fletcher, Sec. 5528, page 434).
The duty of the corporation to transfer is a ministerial one
and if it refuses to make such transaction without good
cause, it may be compelled to do so by mandamus. (See.
5518, 12 Fletcher 394)
At all events, the registration is without prejudice to the
proceedings in court to determine the validity of the Deeds of
Assignment of the shares of stock in question.

V.
(didnt answer the objective)
VI.
(didnt answer the objective)
VII.
(objective part na)
VIII.
(objective part na rin)
IX.
As judge, I will hold as correct the contentions of the
assignee.The payment made by Edzo to Integrity Bank was a
fraudulent preference or payment, being made within thirty (30) days

before the filing of the insolvency petition, as prohibited by the

Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act.
X.
XI.
XII.
The grounds of the motion to dismiss are both untenable. EOL is not
doing business in the Philippines,and it did not violate the Securites
Act, because it wasnot selling securities in the
country. The contention of EOL is correct, because it never didany
business in the Philippines. All its transactions in question were
consummated outside the Philippines.
XIII.
Yes. The opposition is valid. GP is not a public official. The
investigation does not involve one of the exceptions to the prohibition
against disclosure of any information concerning bank deposits under
the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits. The Committee conducting the
investigation is not a competent court or the Ombudsman authorized
under the law to issue a subpoena for the production of the bank
record involving such disclosure.
XIV.
Company X violated the Bulk Sales Law when it sold its entire
business to Company Z furtively to avoid the prying eyes of its
creditors. Its manufactured goods are sold wholesale to distributors
and dealers. The sale of allor substantially all of its stocks, not in the
ordinary course of business, constitutes bulk sale. The transaction
being a bulk sale, entering into such transaction without complying
with the requirements of the Bulk Sales Law,Company X violated said
law.
XV.
No. I do not agree with the contention of W. The stipulation that W
would not be responsible for the loss of all or any portion of the
hardware materials coveredby the receipt even if such loss is caused
by the negligence of W or his representative or employees
is void. The law requires that a warehouseman should exercise due
diligence in the care and custody of the things deposited in
his warehouse.

XVI.
KR is right. The promissory note is not negotiable. It is not issued to
order or bearer. There is no word of negotiability containing therein. It
is not issued inaccordance with Section 1 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law
XVII.
XVIII.
A member of the MILF or the Abu Sayyaf may be insured with a
company licensed to do business under the Insurance Code of the
Phils. What is prohibited to be insured is a public enemy. A public
enemy is a citizen or national of a country with which the Philippines
is at war. Such member of the MILF or the Abu Sayyaf is not acitizen
or national of another country, but of the Philippines.
XIX.
XX.
Starbrite is correct with respect to the insurance coverage on the
property of IS. The beneficiary in the property insurance policy or the
assignee thereof must have insurable interest in the property insured.
BX, a mere friend-companion of IS, has no insurable interest in the
residential house of IS. BX is not entitled to receive the proceeds
from ISs insurance on his property.
As to the insurance coverage on the life of IS, BX is entitled to
receive the proceeds. There is no requirement that BX should have
insurable interest in the life of IS. It was IS himself who took the
insurance on his own life.
XXI.