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IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT

MONGOMERY COUTY, OHIO
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WELLS FARGO BANK N.A. as TRUSTEE
Case No. 2008 CV
01936
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Plaintiff
(Judge John D. Schmidt for Judge

Timothy N. OConnell by assignment)
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v.
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JOHN L. REED, et al.,
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO VACATE A VOID

JUDGMENT and Quiet Title
Now comes Defendant John A. Reed (Defendant), who Motions this

Court to vacate as VOID this Courts previous judgment dated November
13th 2008 granting Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank NA. as Trustee for Securitized
Asset Backed Receivables LLC 2006-OP1 Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006 OP1s (Plaintiff) foreclosure action, and in law
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[Pleading Title] - 1
and equity to render through rectification a judgment of VOID in this
action.1
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see supplement attached Authorities I, Void Judgments.
INTRODUCTION
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Plaintiff brought this action to foreclose on an alleged mortgage,
dated June 9th, 2005, which they alleged secured a loan of $100,000 issued
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a judgment rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void ab initio. Consequently, the authority to
vacate a void judgment is not derived from Civ. R. 60(B), but rather constitutes an inherent power possessed by Ohio
courts. See Staff Notes to Civ. R. 60(B); Lincoln Tavern, Inc. v. Snader (1956), 165 Ohio St. 61, 59 O.O. 74, 133
N.E.2d 606, paragraph one of the syllabus; Westmoreland v. Valley Homes Corp. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 291, 294, 71
O.O. 2d 262, 264, 328 N.E.2d 406, 409.
PATTON v. DIEMER No. 86-1867. 35 Ohio St. 3d 68 (1988)
Void judgments are those rendered by a court which lacked jurisdiction, either of the subject matter or the parties,
Wahl v. Round Valley Bank 38 Ariz. 411, 300 P. 955 (1931); Tube City Mining & Milling Co. v. Otterson, 16 Ariz. 305,
146 P. 203 (1914); and Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 2d 278 (1940).
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23 A void judgment which includes judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the subject
matter, or lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or an order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any
time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the court, Long v. Shorebank
Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 ( C.A. 7 Ill. 1999).
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34 Void judgment under federal law is one in which rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over dispute or
jurisdiction over parties, or acted in manner inconsistent with due process of law or otherwise acted unconstitutionally in
entering judgment, U.S.C.A. Const. Amed. 5, Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 452 n.e.2D 1383 (Ill. App. 5 Dist. 1983).
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45 A "void judgment" as we all know, grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken there under, and is vulnerable
to any manner of collateral attack (thus here, by ). No statute of limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters
thought to be settled thereby are not res judicata, and years later, when the memories may have grown dim and rights
to the Defendant by H&R Block Mortgage Corporation, a Massachusetts
Corporation, (H&RB). On June 9th, 2005, Plaintiff alleges H&RB
assigned the note and mortgage to Option One Mortgage Corporation,
(Option One). Option One then allegedly assigned the note and mortgage
to Plaintiff by assignment executed March 7th, 2008. Plaintiff is the trustee
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for a securitized trust entitled Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC

2006-OP1 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006 OP1s, (the
Trust).
The Trust was formed as a vehicle for purchasing mortgage backed
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securities. The Trust is subject to the terms of the trust indenture
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memorialized in a document titled the Pooling and Servicing Agreement,
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(the PSA). The PSA was signed by the Depositor, Securitized Asset Backed
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Receivables LLC (SABR), by the Servicer, Option One, and by the Trustee,
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WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, and is dated January 1, 2006.The PSA sets forth
the manner in which mortgages would be purchased by the trust, as well as
the duties of the trustee and the servicer.
long been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen the old wound and once more probe its depths. And it is
then as though trial and adjudication had never been. 10/13/58 FRITTS v. KRUGH. SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN, 92
N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich. 97. On certiorari this Court may not review questions of fact. Brown v. Blanchard, 39 Mich 790. It is
not at liberty to determine disputed facts (Hyde v. Nelson, 11 Mich 353), nor to review the weight of the evidence. Linn v.
Roberts, 15 Mich 443; Lynch v. People, 16 Mich 472. Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to get rid of a void judgment, one
which there is no evidence to sustain. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Hunt, 39 Mich 469. Emphasis mine
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5 Void judgment is one entered by court without jurisdiction to enter such

judgment,
State v. Blankenship
675 N.E. 2d 1303, (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1996).
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Section 2.01, subsection 1 of the PSA requires that transfer and
assignment of mortgages must be effected by hand delivery, for deposit with
the Trustee with the original note endorsed in blank.
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Section 2.05 of the PSA requires that the Depositor transfer all right,
title, interest in the mortgages to the Trustee, on behalf of the trust, as of
the Closing Date. The Closing Date as provided in the PSA is January 26th,
2006.
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Option One alleges to have assigned Defendants mortgage loan to the

Plaintiff, as the Trustee, on March 7th, 2008, approximately twenty six
months after the trust had closed.
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Plaintiff commenced this action on February 27th, 2008, and alleged
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that it possessed the Note with an allonge on the date that this foreclosure
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action was commenced. Defendant filed an answer containing a general and
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specific denial.
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Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on July 25th, 2008. After
Defendant answered, he exhaustively interviewed 22 separate Attorneys
who, when asked, could not explain the mortgage securitization process. In
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desperation and with no qualified legal representation Defendant opposed
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Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment himself.
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Defendant states that in fact this courts previous decision is, void for
reason(s) explained infra.
Defendant states that Plaintiff was/is not and can never be in fact the
owner or holder of the alleged note because;
1.) Plaintiff alleges to have obtained the note and mortgage after the
date which all deposits to the trust had closed which is in
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violation of the terms of the PSA, and therefore the acquisition of
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the note and mortgage itself is void.

2.) Plaintiff alleges to have obtained the alleged mortgage and note
without an intervening assignment, which again is in direct
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violation of the terms held within the trusts PSA which makes such
action void ab inito.
3.) Plaintiff lacks the capacity to act in contravention to the articles
and rules contained within the PSA, as is evidenced by both the
language contained within the PSA and by controlling law as it
applies to the trust at Bar.

4.) Plaintiff lacked standing to invoke the jurisdiction of this court
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because Plaintiff lacked the capacity necessary to invoke the
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jurisdiction of this court at the time of foreclosure initiation as is
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proved by Plaintiffs alleged Assignment of the alleged Note &
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Mort. which was not even created until days after Plaintiffs
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foreclosure initiation.
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Defendant states that since this courts previous decision in this
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matter, the Ohio Supreme Court, in an on-point decision has ruled in a
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controlling decision that is in contravention of this courts ruling of this

matter.
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs alleged ownership of the alleged
note & mort. is not just an issue of standing but an element of its cause of
action which it must plead and prove.
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Defendant argues that as is explained in greater detail infra, that the
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sole authenticated and Robo-Signed (explained infra) document that
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Plaintiff offers as to their proof of their ownership as Holder of the alleged
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note and mortgage is a forged and fabricated fraudulent impossibility upon
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this court that by the controlling laws and contractual agreements could
never have had, nor ever can they have any authority and as such is void by
law.
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Equity will not allow a statute to be used as a cloak for fraud.
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Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacked the capacity to invoke the

jurisdiction of the court and as such renders this courts previous judgment
in the case at Bar to be void ab initio.
Defendant submits new evidence in this case in the form of an
Affidavit attesting to the Robo-signing (explained infra) of both Plaintiffs
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Assignment of Mortgage and Plaintiffs Affidavit of Status of Account and
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Military Status.
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Defendant submits new and previously unobtainable evidence in this
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case of Plaintiff Wells Fargo Banks recently published in house manual
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titled Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Foreclosure Attorney Procedure
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Manual, Version 1 proving scienter through a pattern and practice of
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Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs Counsel in the creation of fraudulent documents

created solely to allow Plaintiff and Plaintiffs Counsel to fraudulently take
homes from homeowners when they lacked the right because they lacked
the proof to accomplish it legally.
Further, every U.S. Govt. report issued to date confirms Defendants
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position that Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank routinely used fabricated and/or
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falsified documents in their successful acquisition of properties (free
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houses) through foreclosure actions throughout the entire United States.
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This snippet from the Office of Inspector General, Region IV, Dept. of
Housing and Urban Development, dated March 12, 2012 (Internet
http://www.hud.gov/oig/ MEMORANDUM NO. 2012-AT-1801):
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On February 9, 2012, DOJ and 49 State attorneys general announced a proposed settlement of $25
billion with Wells Fargo and four other mortgage servicers for their reported violations of foreclosure
requirements.
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From the same above report as it pertains to Plaintiff Wells Fargos

criminal use of Robo-Signers the report states:
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RESULTS OF REVIEW
Wells Fargo did not establish effective control over its foreclosure process. This failure permitted a control
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environment in which The affiants routinely signed and certified that they had personal knowledge of the
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contents of documents, including affidavits, without the benefit of supporting documentation and without
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reviewing the source documents referred to in the affidavits and verifying the accuracy of the foreclosure
information stated in the affidavits.
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A number of affidavit signers admitted having signed up to 600 documents per day. A number of employees
engaged as robosigners had little or no education beyond high school and little or no experience in banking
or real estate.
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Work histories (when available) showed a lack of qualifications to hold the titles held by affiants; for
example, vice president of loan documentation. Moreover, interviews disclosed that the titles were given
for the sole purpose of allowing the individual to sign documents and came with no other duties or
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authority. Employees who notarized documents, including affidavits, routinely did not witness the signature
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of the documents and notarized up to 1,000 documents per day.
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This flawed control environment resulted in Wells Fargos filing improper legal documents, thereby
misrepresenting its claims to HUD, and may have exposed it to potential liability under the False Claims
Act.
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A FRAUD UPON THE COURT
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An intentional fraud upon the Montgomery County Court of Common
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Pleas in 2008 has haunted Defendant John A. Reed for over 6 years. On that
fateful day February 27, 2008, Plaintiff filed for foreclosure against Reeds
home with actual knowledge that Plaintiff did not own Reed's note and
mortgage for multiple reasons.6
On or about June 9, 2005, as the evidence of record shows;
a. Mr. Reed's alleged original lender, H&R Block Mortgage Corp.,
claims that through the use of:

1. an unattached, incomplete, non-authenticated by affidavit,
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unexecuted Pay to the Order(as in existing distinctly
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separate under law from bearer paper), allonge dated

June 9, 2005 and the use of,
2. an alleged assignment of mortgage (exhibit J) which
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states:
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By these presents does convey, bargain, sell, assign, transfer and set over to:
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Option One Mortgage Corporation (OOMC)
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that HR&B allegedly did transfer their interests in the entirety to OOMC
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who then, we are led to believe through Plaintiffs unauthenticated
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document submissions, sold their interests in the entirety in the alleged
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Citing BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mapp, 2013-Ohio-2968 { 12} In a recent decision involving a
foreclosure action, the Ohio Supreme Court held that standing is jurisdictional, and that because standing
to sue is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court, standing is to be determined
as of the filing of the complaint. Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012Ohio-Butler CA2013-01-001 5017, 22, 24, 27. The court emphasized that Civ.R. 17(A), which requires
actions to be prosecuted in the name of the real part in interest, does not address standing but rather, simply
concerns proper party joinder. Id.at 33. Accordingly, "a lack of standing at the outset of litigation cannot
[subsequently] be cured by receipt of an assignment of the claim." Id.at 41. Likewise, "a common pleas
court cannot substitute a real party in interest for another party if no party with standing has invoked its
jurisdiction in the first instance." Id.at 38.
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mortgage and note, as is allegedly memorialized within the presented
evidence, to:
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3. Barclays Bank PLC who, through more of Plaintiffs

unauthenticated document submissions, then allegedly
bundled the alleged Mortgage Loan with thousands of
others and who then again, allegedly represented through
more of Plaintiffs submitted unauthenticated document
submissions, allegedly sold the entire bundle of loans to,
4. the Plaintiff Trusts Depositor, specifically, Securitized
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Asset Backed Receivables LLC ("SABR") for deposit, once
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again represented through Plaintiffs unauthenticated
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document submissions, into a REMIC trust titled

Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC 2006-OP1
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006 OP1 (The
Plaintiff Trust).
On March 7, 2008, the law firms Plunkett Cooney and/or Lerner,
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Sampson & Rothfuss along with document production mill, Lender
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Processing Services, perpetrated a fraud upon this Court when it prepared
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(forged) and delivered into evidence in this case, months after initiation, an
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assignment of mortgage representing a fraudulent transfer from the
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lender, OOMC (who had already previously sold the alleged mortgage &
note but is now alleging to be the Servicer to the trust7 8) to Plaintiff.9
In the case at Bar, the note and mortgage were purportedly assigned
from Option One to the Plaintiff, without having been transferred to, and
then from, the Depositor.10 Within the trusts controlling document, the PSA,
this action in and of itself is void ab initio.
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7 15 U.S. Code 1641 - Liability of assignees (f) Treatment of servicer

(1) In general
A servicer of a consumer obligation arising from a consumer credit transaction shall not be treated as an assignee of
such obligation for purposes of this section unless the servicer is or was the owner of the obligation.
(2) Servicer not treated as owner on basis of assignment for administrative convenience
A servicer of a consumer obligation arising from a consumer credit transaction shall not be treated as the owner of the
obligation for purposes of this section on the basis of an assignment of the obligation from the creditor or another assignee to the
servicer solely for the administrative convenience of the servicer in servicing the obligation. Upon written request by the obligor,
the servicer shall provide the obligor, to the best knowledge of the servicer, with the name, address, and telephone number of the
owner of the obligation or the master servicer of the obligation.
(3) Servicer defined For purposes of this subsection, the term servicer has the same meaning as in section 2605
(i)(2) of title 12.
(4) Applicability This subsection shall apply to all consumer credit transactions in existence or consummated on or
after September 30, 1995.
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8 12 U.S.C. 2605 - Servicing of mortgage loans and administration of escrow accounts (i) Definitions
For purposes of this section: (2) Servicer The term servicer means the person responsible for servicing of a loan
(including the person who makes or holds a loan if such person also services the loan).
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9 18 U.S. Code 4 - Misprision of felonyWhoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or
other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both.
The submitted (Robo-Signed) assignment of the note and mortgage to
Plaintiff from Option One, rather than from the Depositor SABR, violates
section 2.01of the trusts own PSA which requires that the Depositor deliver
to and deposit the original note, mortgage and assignments to the Trustee.
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The above assignment of the Defendants alleged note and mortgage,

having skipped being assigned TO the Depositor from the Aggrigator
(Barclays Bank) and then FROM Depositor to the Trust, is therefore void as
it is in direct contravention of the PSA.
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The evidence submitted by Plaintiff in this case shows only that the
alleged note & mort. was allegedly acquired after the contractual closing
date of the REMIC trust (a legal impossibility) and that the assignment of
note & mort. was not made by the Depositor (another legal impossibility),
and the trusts own publicized closing date for deposits is long past, is
sufficient proof that the Plaintiff cannot legally EVER have owned the note
and mortgage, nor can the Plaintiff Trust, at this late date, EVER own them.
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10 Acceleration Standing and Statute of Limitation; One who lacks standing to

bring a foreclosure action, lacks the capacity to accelerate the entire note and thus
cannot start the running of the statute of limitations to bar the later payments due
on the installment note. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 94 A.D.3d 980, 943
N.Y.S.2d 540 (Second Dept. 2012) 2
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Below I explain in great detail why Plaintiffs assignment of mortgage
is a forged and fraudulent document that as such was created to serve just
one purpose to steal Defendant Reeds house and property by making a
fool of this court.
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There is no compelling evidence that what is detailed infra was not

and is not to this day the common business practice of Plaintiff Wells Fargo
Bank as is evidenced in this previously unavailable and only recently
publicly released, Wells Fargos confirmed internal instruction manual
published by Plaintiff and made available to Plaintiffs Attorneys titled
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Foreclosure Attorney Procedure
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Manual, Version 1 attached hereto as Exhibit M in which Plaintiff Wells
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Fargo Bank schools their foreclosure attorneys on the art of creating or
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having created, fraudulent documents forged and fabricated.
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The above referenced manual gives step by step instructions to
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Plaintiffs Attorneys and employees in the art of creating and/or making
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unauthorized changes to Bank documents allowing the Banks to foreclose
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on homes which they otherwise could not.
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This is also evidence of a World Bank that has designed and

implemented specific paperwork and procedures for the processing and/or
creation of mortgage notes without endorsements, and then illegally
creating endorsements, assignments of mortgage, conclusory affidavits and
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unexecuted allonges when the Banks foreclosure processes were impeded
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by those same missing documents which without, Plaintiff could not prove
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they were the legal note & mortgage loan holder. In essence, more proof
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that Plaintiff Bank is still taking peoples homes using false, forged,
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fraudulent, incomplete and missing documents.
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This manual shows Wells Fargo violated those rules not only on an
informal case by case basis, but through a specific, documented, broadly
applicable procedure and which also clearly shows scienter11.
And again, EVERY U.S. Govt. report released to date concerning
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Plaintiffs participation in fraudulent document creation in its efforts to steal

the homes of millions of Americans confirms Defendants position that
Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank routinely used fabricated and/or falsified
documents in their successful acquisition of properties (free houses)
through foreclosure actions throughout the entire United States while
making fools of the courts Nationwide.
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The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, whose judgment
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was clearly clouded by Plaintiffs submission of the fraudulent & forged
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assignment of mortgage12, eventually, essentially altered the original
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mortgage loan documents, finding John A. Reed as the original mortgagee,
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Blacks Law Dictionary defines scienter as [a] degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the
consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an acts having been done knowingly, esp. as a ground for civil
damages or criminal punishment. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1463 (9th ed. 2009).
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12 Plaintiffs solely authenticated document showing legal possession of

the alleged note & mortgage..
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in contravention to ORC 5301.0113 and then granted judgment to Plaintiff
and John A. Reed's home, , 2005 appraised value of $137,000 which then
received over $60,000 in expansion, renovation and improvements was later
sold at Sherriffs Auction to Plaintiff for $28,000 who then subsequently
sold it to a Ms. Leann McLaughlin for $10,000.
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To give standing to the Plaintiff Trust on future, unattainable rights,

was erroneous and respectfully, the Court needed to look no further than
the late assignment of mortgage CREATED on March 7, 2008 and recorded
on March 27th, 2008 in the Montgomery County Recorders Office.
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At the time Plaintiff initiated its foreclosure suit against Mr. Reed (Feb
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27th, 2008), Plaintiff was not the true holder or owner or agent, had no real
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interest in the subject matter of the action or was even a representative of
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the true owner or holder (Person Entitled To Enforce (PETE))R.C. 1303.31
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for reason of:

a. not acquiring assignment from the true holder for multiple
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reasons explained infra and supra and
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Complaint to Reform Mortgage - In Delfino v. Paul Davies Chevrolet, Inc. (1965), 2 Ohio St2d 282, the Ohio Supreme
Court addressed whether a court may reform an instrument defectively executed in contravention of O.R.C. 5301.01.
The court explained that the purpose of reformation is to cause an instrument to express the intent of the parties as to
the contents thereof, i.e., to establish the actual agreement of the parties, and is not meant to create an obligation.
Defino, 2 Ohio St.2d at 286, citing 47 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 1120, Reformation of Instruments, Section 2. The court
also explained that reformation presupposes the existence of a valid instrument. Thus, the court found that a court of
equity under its power of reformation cannot validate or give life to an invalid instrument as to do so would require the
court to re-execute an improperly executed instrument and create a new agreement. Accordingly, the court concluded
that, where a statute such as O.R.C. 5301.01 requires certain formalities for the execution of an instrument, a court of
equity under its powers of reformation cannot supply these formalities to validate a defectively executed instrument.
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b. the bogus assignment was not created until days after the
foreclosure initiation.14
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Therefore, at foreclosure initiation, Plaintiff lacked the capacity to
invoke the jurisdiction of the Courts rendering the court without jurisdiction
to hear the case as set forth more fully infra. A judgment entered without
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subject matter jurisdiction is void ab initio which means Reed still has title
to his home.
"Thus, if a common pleas court proceeds in an action in which the plaintiff lacks standing, the
court violates Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.
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Article IV requires justiciability, and justiciability requires standing. These constitutional

requirements cannot be bent to accommodate Sheward" ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, Slip
Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-2382
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14 "Standing is a preliminary inquiry that must be made before a trial court may consider the merits of a
legal claim." Bank of New York Mellon v. Blouse, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2013-02-002, 2013-Ohio-4537, 5,
quoting Kincaid v. Erie Ins. Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 322, 2010-Ohio-6036, 9. Whether standing exits is a question of
law that an appellate court reviews de novo. Fifth Third Mtge. Co. v. Bell, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2013-02-003,
2013-Ohio-3678, 13.
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15 Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the issue of standing in a foreclosure action. Federal Home Loan Mtge.
Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017. In Schwartzwald, the Court determined the plaintiff lacked
standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court because "it failed to establish an interest in the note or mortgage
at the time it filed suit." Blouse at 8, quoting Schwartzwald at 28. "It is an elementary concept of law that a party lacks
standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the
subject matter of the action." (Emphasis sic.) Schwartzwaldat 22. Accordingly, the court found that a plaintiff must have
standing at the time the complaint is filed and the lack of standing cannot be cured by "receipt of an assignment of the claim or by
substitution of the real party in interest" pursuant to Civ.R. 17(A). Id.at 26, 41
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As is explained in more specific detail below, because of the very
nature of the laws governing and the structure of REMIC securitized trusts,
and the contractual agreements held within the trusts contractual
controlling document, the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA), Plaintiff
was never and can never be the PETE for this alleged mortgage & note. No
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court can on the basis of contract law change a trust which is specifically
governed by its business indenture.
The short story is that every securitizationincluding Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac securitizationsrequires the creation and funding of a
securitization trust that must, by law and by contract take physical
possession and control of the trust property on or before the closing date of
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the trust. This transfer of the trust property, the legal res, to the trust at or
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around the loan origination is a necessary condition precedent to a valid
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securitization. It is necessary for several reasons.
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First, someone must be the legal owner of the mortgage loan. Only
the legal owner of the loan has the legal right to sell mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) to investors. Second, actual physical transfer of
ownership is necessary because the cash flows that go from the homeowner
through the securitization trust to the MBS purchasers are tax exempt. If
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the trust does not perfect legal title by taking physical possession of the
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notes and mortgages, the Internal Revenue Code, specifically 26 U.S.C.
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860G(d)(1), provides for a 100 percent tax penalty on those non-complying
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cash flows. Third, the legal ownership of the loans must be bankruptcy
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remote that is, because bankruptcy trustees have the right to reach back
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and seize assets from bankrupt entities, the transfer to the trustee must be
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clean and no prior transferee in the securitization chain of title can have
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any cognizable interest in the loans. For this reason, all REMIC
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securitization trusts are special purpose vehicles (SPVs) created for the
sole purpose of taking legal title to securitized loans and all securitization
trustees represent and certify to the MBS purchasers that the purchase is a
true sale in accordance with FASB 140.
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The "owner of rights or interest in property is a necessary party to a foreclosure action.
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Thus, if plaintiff has offered no evidence that it owned the note and
mortgage when the Complaint was filed, it would not be entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Duvall, 2010-0hio-
6478,14 citing Wells Fargo Bank, NA. v. Jordan, 2009-0hio-l092

"Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiff had no standing to file a foreclosure action
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against defendants on October 15, 2007, because, at that time, Wells Fargo owned the mortgage.
Plaintiff failed in its burden of demonstrating that it was the real party in interest at the time the
complaint was filed. Plaintiffs sole assignment of error is overruled. "U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v,
Duvall, 2010-0hio-6478,~15.
14
15
Defendant submits that it was an Error of Law to determine standing
16
without first considering and determining if delivery and acceptance of the
17
18
19
20
21
Asset perfected and dominion and control over the Assets was relinquished
by the giver of the Asset pursuant to the controlling Law thereby giving the
Trust control over the Asset and to consider the future contractual rights of
Plaintiff trustee Wells Fargo, the Lender Option One or the Trust itself.
To give standing on a future, unattainable right that is Expressly
22
Prohibited by Local law, by the trusts contractual controlling document
23
titled the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA), the trusts parties
24
contractually agreed ruling law (NY EPTL) and the IRS Code, was
25
erroneous.
26
27
28
If there were a legal assignment of the Asset to the Plaintiff Trust on

January 1st, 2006 then the need to create one on March 7th, 2008, over 2
years later, would not have been required. Most telling is that in the
mortgage assignment of March 7TH, 2008, it is Lender, Option One Mort.
Corp. that assigns the Note, clearly indicating, the Plaintiff Trust never
legally possessed [it] on or before March 7th, 2008. See Assignment of
Mortgage (AOM) Exhibit E. Also telling is the necessity for Plaintiff to
6
7
8
9
10
11
travel all the way across country to Minnesota to have another company,
Lender Processing Services, create and authenticate an assignment for
them. The fact that Wells Fargo had to go to Minnesota to find someone to
sign the 3/7/08 AOM when it is headquartered in San Francisco is powerful
and dispositive evidence that it did not acquire legal title to the loan prior to
March 7th, 2008 and in fact as is explained in greater detail below, could not
then and cannot now ever acquire legal title to the alleged mortgage loan.
12
13
In the case at bar, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, as Trustee of the Trust,
14
claims to be the sole and exclusive owner or Holder of the securitized
15
note & mortgage. If Wells, as Trustee for the Trust is in fact the true and
16
legal owner, it must have acquired legal title to the loan within 90 days of
17
January 1, 2006 (the trusts closing date).
18
19
20
21
22
In explanation of the above; New York law states that transfers to a

REMIC trust after the closing date of the trust are void. N.Y. Estates,
Powers and Trusts Law 7-1.18, 7-2.4. Glaski v. Bank of America, N.A.,
218 Cal.Rptr.4th 1079 (2013). See also, Saldivar v. JPMorgan Chase,
2013 WL 2452699 (Bky. SD Tex. 6/5/13) (holding that trustee mortgagees
23
position is void if notes and assignments of mortgage not delivered within
24
90 day of closing of trust); Wells Fargo v. Erobobo, 2013 WL 1831799 (NY
25
Slip Op. 4/29/13) (holding that NY trust law governs securitization (not Ohio
26
law) and that notes and assignments of mortgage must be physically
27
delivered to trustee within 90 days of closing for trustee to have claim of
28
ownership). The Internal Revenue Code provides for 100 percent tax
penalties for asset transfers to the trust after the closing date of the trust
and the Trusts controlling document, the PSA, specifically forbids all
participants in the securitization of the assets of the trust to perform any
action in contravention to the IRS code.
Since Wells Fargo Bank as Trustee for the Trust cannot show
6
7
8
9
10
physical receipt of the note and mortgage AND/OR has failed to produce
any legal authenticated documentation proving its chain of title to the
rights and interests of the note and mortgage (PETE) prior to April 1st,
2006, (the Jan. 1, 2006 trust closing date + 90 days) under governing law
(NY EPTL) its claim to the note, mortgage and ultimately the home is void.
11
12
Similarly, if the only evidence Wells Fargo has of ownership is a
13
document executed after April 1st, 2006, (Jan 1 closing date + 90 days), then
14
that document is a legal impossibility and again its claim of ownership is
15
void.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
In the case at bar the assignment of mortgage produced by Plaintiff

was executed on March 7th, 2008 (3/7/08 AOM) and was signed by a
known Robo-Signer Ms. Topaka Love. Ms. Love is an employee of Lender
Processing Services in Dakota County, Minnesota and as such the AOM was
also fraudulently signed by a person who has no authority to sign. It is
patently fraudulent. It was executed two years after the Plaintiff trust
closed. Every fraudulently securitized mortgage foreclosure has this
smoking gun. There are millions of these recorded throughout the country.
24
25
26
27
28
These fraudulent assignments of mortgage exist in almost every

securitized mortgage foreclosure. They are always executed years after the
closing of the securitization trust and typically by someone who has no idea
what they are signing (Robo-Signer). They are also always executed in a
state a long distance from, and outside the subpoena power of, the state in
which the foreclosed property is located.
3
4
5
6
The significance of the too late assignment of mortgage is this. Wells

Fargo, the Plaintiff Trust, never acquired legal title to the securitized
loan. This is an unfixable error. It also exposes the MBS holders to 100
percent tax penalties. Because of this, Wells Fargo, according to the
Erobobo, Salidivar and Glaski cases cited above, does not and cannot ever
have legal capacity or legal standing to make a claim to the property. In
short, the 3/07/08 AOM is irrefutable evidence that the Plaintiff Trust is a
10
11
12
13
14
busted trust with no identifiable owner of the alleged mortgage.

Because Defendants alleged loan securitized in 2006 - it must stand
that when the Plaintiff Trust filed, they filed as the purported legal owner
and holder of the note and alleged a legal right to enforce the mortgage.
The Plaintiff Trust is not the originator of the mortgage, it was not and is
15
not the servicer of the mortgage loan, nor is it even an actual bank. Instead,
16
this entity is a New York Common Law Trust created by an agreement
17
known as the "Pooling and Service Agreement" (PSA) and governed by the
18
Law of the State in which it was created. Purportedly, the Reed loan, along
19
with thousands of other loans, were pooled into a specific type of trust
20
known as a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC)Trust which
21
separated the income streams generated from those notes and converted
22
23
24
25
26
them into residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) that are bought

and sold by investors - a process known as securitization - as certificates.
Defendant Reed merely points out that the Plaintiffs are contractually
bound by the Trust Indenture, its Instrument's and must adhere to those
Instrument's and if it does not, then IRS & New York Law, inter alia, deems
27
the Party's action void. The rights and duties bestowed on the Parties of the
28
Trust are only derived from the Trust Instrument's and to shed light on
whether these Rights exist, we must refer to the Instruments, the Indenture
of the Trust.
3
4
5
6
7
The Plaintiff Trust in the instant action, through their use of the
fraudulently created AOM only solidified their lack of rights in the Asset
when they violated IRS & New York Law, inter alia, and therefore, had no
capacity or standing to invoke the jurisdiction in the Ohio Land Court.
8
9
THE APPLICABLE LAW IS NOT ENTIRELY OHIO CONTRACT LAW
10
11
12
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
13
14
At the risk of being repetitious let me repeat again. Defendants
15
position is simple. Momentarily setting aside the Ohio legal standing issue
16
presented by the AOM was created after foreclosure initiation issue held
17
within Ohios law (the OSC Schwartzwald decision expounded on infra)
18
19
20
21
22
another issue in the entirety is that under IRS & New York law, the
applicant in this case is not the holder of the alleged note and /or owner of
the alleged mortgage loan and this is not a matter of privity of contract but
of the application of the contractually agreed controlling law, NY EPTL
(Estates Powers and Trusts Law) and the case law applicable to it at the
time of foreclosure filing.
23
24
Moreover, the full property of the Trust (Trust Funds) is required by
25
the controlling Law to be delivered on the closing date of the trust, and
26
because of that, the AOM is a conveyance that is void because it violates the
27
Trusts Indenture, the PSA. EPTL 7-2.4
28
To explain: An express life trust in New York, as is the Plaintiff Trust
at Bar, is governed by New York Law (EPTL) which requires the property,
the intention to create a trust, the beneficiaries and the actual delivery of
the property to the trust. Defendant submits that by the language of the
preliminary statement (page # l) of the PSA, the PSA designated the
6
7
8
9
10
property for the Trust which was the Trust Fund that upon delivery to the
designated trustee created the trust. What is property or not of the trust is
governed by the PSA. It is not a matter of the Defendants not having privity
to enforce the PSA.
What matters is if under the applicable controlling law that governs
11
this trust and trustee, the trust was a real party in interest at the time that
12
the foreclosure action was filed. Defendant submits that Plaintiff was not,
13
that it remains not and that by controlling law it can never be the real party
14
in interest and therefore it lacked, at the time of foreclosure initiation and
15
forever forward in time, the capacity to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
In New York, the mere intention to create a trust without delivery of

the trust assets to the trustee has not legal consequences; it does not create
a trust, if the Settler is the sale trustee, the transfer of Title assets is
completed by recording the DEED or registering the securities or accounts
in the name of the trust. If the trust names a third party as a trustee, the
property, titled assets, documents evidencing ownership of the property
must be formally transferred to the trustee. A transfer is not effected by
23
mere recital of assignment, but the written assignment and all documents of
24
property must be actually delivered to the trustee ( EPTL 7-1.8). As stated
25
above the property is passed to the trustee with the intention to pass legal
26
title thereto to it as trustee. Brown v. Spehr, 180 N.Y. 201 (N.Y. 1904).
27
There is no valid trust until actual delivery of the assets to the trust. Riezel
28
v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co..,_266 App. Div. 586.
1
2
3
There is no trust if the trust fails to acquire the property. Kermani v.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 4 A.D. 2d 603 (N.Y. App. Div. sa Depart. 1957).
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
The delivery of the property must be done to the trust as designated

in the instrument creating the Trust ( EPTL 7.2.1(c)). The PSA prescribes
the specific method of transfer. This is not subject to variation because it is
set in the instrument. No court can ignore and create contractual remedies
that were omitted in the PSA. Schmid v. Magnetic Head Corp., 468 NYS
2d 649 (NY App. Div. 1983). However, the court can enforce the
prescription of the PSA. Morlee Corp. v. Manufacturer Trust Co., 172
11
N.E. 2d 280 ( N.Y. l96l). But no court can on the basis of contract law
12
change a trust which is specifically governed by its business indenture.
13
14
What is valid delivery to the trustee is governed by the corporate
15
business indenture, because the Trustee in the present case is a corporate
16
trustee. Under a corporate indenture the right of the trustee are not
17
governed by fiduciary relationship but by the term(s) of the agreement (the
18
PSA). The cases that do not see that it is not simply a matter of privity fail to
19
20
21
22
23
see that if the property is not received in the manner prescribed by the
indenture, then the property is not property of the trust, and if not delivered
as prescribed and delivered in violation of it, there is not trust because
there has not been complete and perfected delivery of the property to the
trust. AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co.,
2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 5766; Hazard v. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc.
24
57, 287 N.Y.S. 541 (Sup Ct 1936) affd 257 A.D. 950 14 N.Y.S. 147 (1 st
25
Dept.) affd 282 N.Y. 652 cert. de. 311 U.S. 708 (1940). The duties and
26
power of the trustee are set by the agreement (PSA). In RE IBJ Schroeder
27
Bank and Trust Co., 271 A.D. 2d 322 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2000).
28
The PSA is also the agreement that creates the trust, it is a mistake to
think that under New York Law you can create a trust without complete
delivery of the designated property of the trust and in the manner specified
by the document that creates it. Without the delivery of the property
designated to it, there is not trust.
6
7
8
9
10
The delivery under the PSA requires, under the corporate indenture,
strict compliance with the mandatory terms of the trust indenture, because
the property has to be delivered as prescribed and the securities
ascertained if not, no right to beneficiaries arise. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
v. Farmer, 2008 N.Y. Slip OP. 51133 U 6 ( N.Y. Sup. Ct 2008) and no
11
right in the trust arises without consideration paid (in this case the
12
depositor to the sponsor).
13
14
The delivery necessary to consummate a gift must be perfected as to
15
the nature of the property. There must be actual surrender and control and
16
authority over the things surrendered must be intended. It is the
17
consummation that completes the transaction, intention alone is not
18
sufficient. Vincent v. Putnam, 248 N.Y. 76 (N.Y. 1928). The
19
20
21
22
Consummation Act of the delivery of all the property and documents is

necessary. Phillipsen v. Emigrant Inds. Saving Bank, 86 N.Y.S. 2nd 133
( N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948). Therefore, if the note and the mortgage and the
interim assignment were not delivered by the closing date (of the trust) they
are not property of the trust.
23
24
25
26
27
The delivery rule requires that the delivery necessary to consummate

a gift must be perfected as to the nature of the property and the
circumstances permit. Vincent v. Rix, 248 N.Y. 76 as cited in Gruen v.
Gruen, 68 N.Y. 2d 48 ( N.Y. 1986). See also Sussman v. Sussman, 61
28
A.D, 2d 838 ( N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept, 1978); Riegel v. Hanover Bank
TrustCo., 266 App. Div. 586 there must be a change of dominion over
the thing intended to be given. Vincent v. Putnam, 248 N.Y. 76, 82-84
( N.Y. 1928).Undelivered note and assignments after the closing date if not
contemplated in the PSA are not property of the trust. Any act, sale, and
6
7
8
conveyance by the trustee in violation of the PSA is void under NY EPTL

law 7-2.4.
Four essential elements for valid trust property must be present:
9
10
1) A designated beneficiary
11
2) A designated trustee
12
3) A fund or property, sufficiently designated or identified to enable
13
title to pass to the
14
trustee
15
4) Actual delivery of the fund or property or the legal assignments.
16
17
18
19
20
21
In the present case, the transfer did not comply with the PSA because
in each step of the entire mortgage securitization process there are no
authenticated documents proving legitimate transfer of the Note &
Mortgage and also because the only proffered assignment of mortgage &
note occurred after the date of the closing of the trust. In fact the
assignments from Option One Mortgage Corporation (Lender) occurred
22
years after the closing date. In addition, there is no specific endorsement
23
from Lender Option One Mortgage Corp. (Lender), to anyone, only an
24
incomplete, non-authenticated by affidavit, unexecuted Order (not Bearer)
25
Instrument (Allonge) left blank to anyone.
26
27
28
The chain of delivery for the acquisition of the property by plaintiff,

as per the PSA was not followed, the note and the mortgage were not
endorsed and assigned from Originator to Seller to Sponsor to
Depositor, to the Trust , all of which are in violation of the PSA. There
was not a single iota of proof offered that this is the case in the present
application.16
Moreover, the actual chain of Plaintiffs assignment was from Option
6
7
8
9
One Mort. Corp. (who allegedly had previously relinquished ownership of

the note & mortgage to Barclays Bank) to the Trustee, is not the prescribed
path of the PSA agreement. All of this was done years after the closing date
of the trust and even after the filing of the foreclosure complaint.
10
11
Any act of the trustee contrary to the trust agreement (PSA) is void
12
( NY EPTL 7-2.4). Therefore, the acceptance of the assignment from
13
Option One to Plaintiff, by both rule of law and by contractual agreement is
14
void.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
In order to prove injury in fact the plaintiff has to prove that it has
legal standing by showing that it is a real party in interest. If the plaintiff
cannot prove that the loan became an asset of the trust under New York
Law EPTL (Trust Law) and the trusts controlling document, the PSA, then it
can never be able to prove standing.
16 The Ohio Constitution expressly requires standing for cases filed in common pleas courts. Article IV, Section 4(B) provides
that the courts of common pleas shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters. (Emphasis added.) A matter is
justiciable only if the complaining party has standing to sue. Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 OhioSt.3d 13,
2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 41 (It is fundamental that a party commencing litigation must have standing to sue in order
to present a justiciable controversy). Indeed, for a cause to be justiciable, it must present issues that have a direct and
immediate impact on the plaintiffs. Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., Dept. of Liquor Control,34 Ohio St.2d 93,
97-98, 296 N.E.2d 261 (1973). Thus, if a common pleas court proceeds in an action in which the plaintiff lacks standing, the
court violates Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. Article IV requires justiciability, and justiciability requires standing.
25
26
27
28
1
2
In the PSA Section 2.01 stipulates that as promptly as practicable
subsequent to such transfer and assignment in any event within 120 days
after such transfer and assignment the trustee shall cause such assignment
to be recorded in the appropriate public office for real property records for
6
7
8
9
10
assignments of the mortgages. This is because assignments of the

mortgages under New York laws are required to be filed in order to affect as
a lien on the property. N.Y. RPL Section 417 (New York Real Property
Law) and Section 418.
Moreover, the documents that affect the transfer (assignments) of the
11
property must be completely registered in the name of the trustee or the
12
trust for the property to become property of the trust. EPTL 7-1.18, the
13
law applicable as to what becomes property of the trust, is New York law.
14
The negotiable instrument(s) that are the property of the Trust when they
15
become such property as per the PSA are in New York regardless that the
16
collateral may be anywhere in the world, and the PSA is clear that New York
17
law applies to all substantive issues and it is New York Law that governs the
18
mandatory requirements to effectively transfer an asset to a trust. There
19
20
21
22
23
has been no contest by Plaintiff that securitization trusts such as the one for
which Plaintiff is the trustee are subject to New York Common Law.
New York Law is a venerable and ancient law. Under New York law
whether an asset is trust property is determined under the law of gifts. In
order to have a valid inter vivos gift there must be delivery of the gift. Since
24
at least 1935 in Burgoyne v. James, 282 N.Y.S. 18,21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935),
25
the New York Supreme Court recognized that business trusts are deemed to
26
be common law trust. In Re Estate Plotkin , 290 N.Y.S. 2d 46, 49
27
(N.Y.Sur. 1968) other jurisdictions agreed. Mayled v. First Natl Bank
28
of Chattanooga, 137 F.2 d10l3 (6th' Cir. 1943). Therefore, all of the
conditions stated above for the transfer of property to a trust and the
ownership of the trust of such property apply also to business trust so called
Massachusetts Trusts In Re Plotkin Supra.
4
5
6
7
8
The Securitized Trust

Securitization is the legal apotheosis of form over substance
17
9
10
11
12
The Notice of Default indicates that the original creditor is

Wells Fargo Bank NA., as Trustee for Securitized Asset Backed
Receivables LLC 2006-OP1 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
13
2006 OP1 (Plaintiff). The Trust is a New York common law REMIC trust
14
created through a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the PSA). Under the
15
PSA, loans were purportedly pooled into a trust and converted into
16
mortgage-backed securities. The PSA provides a closing date for the
17
Trust of January 1, 2006. As set forth infra, this was the date on
18
which all assets were required to be deposited into the Trust. The PSA
19
20
21
22
23
24
17 Quoting: Written Testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center, Associate Professor of Law, Before the House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Housing and
Community Opportunity Robo-Singing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing November 18,
2010Securitization is the legal apotheosis of form over substance, and if securitization is to work it must adhere to its proper,
prescribed form punctiliously. The rules of the game with securitization, as with real property law and secured credit are, and
always have been, that dotting is and crossing ts matter, in part to ensure the fairness of the system and avoid confusions
about conflicting claims to property. Close enough doesnt do it in securitization; if you dont do it right, you cannot ensure that
securitized assets are bankruptcy remote and thus you cannot get the ratings and opinion letters necessary for securitization to
work. Thus, it is important not to dismiss securitization problems as merely technical; these issues are no more technicalities
than the borrowers signature on a mortgage. Cutting corners may improve securitizations economic efficiency, but it
undermines its legal viability.
25
26
27
28
provides that New York law governs the acquisition of mortgage assets for
the Trust.
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
The Plaintiff trust is organized as a Real Estate Mortgage Investment

Conduit (REMIC). As a REMIC, the trust's investors receive significant tax
benefits, but to receive those benefits, the trust must comply with the US
Treasury regulations governing REMICS. [*8]26 USCA 860-D-1. The terms
of the PSA require that the trust does not operate or take any action that
would jeopardize its REMIC status. The PSA, Article III section (c) (ii)(B)
states:
10
11
12
13
14
(c) Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, the Servicer may not
make any future advances with respect to a Mortgage Loan . and the Servicer
shall not . (ii) permit any modification, waiver or amendment of any term of any
Mortgage Loan that would both . (B) cause any Trust REMIC to fail to
qualify as a REMIC under the Code or the imposition of any tax on "prohibited transactions" or
"contributions after the startup day" under the REMIC Provisions,..
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Conveyance from the Depositor to the Trust

Notwithstanding any other law, the Final Authority as it relates to the
assignment of a note and the conveyance of a mortgage to the Securitized
Trust created under the Laws of New York are New York Laws and the
Pooling & Servicing Agreement (PSA) dated January 1, 2006. See PSA
2.01(c) Establishment of the Trust: which reads;
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(c) The Depositor does hereby establish, pursuant to the further provisions of this
Agreement and the laws of the State of New York, an express trust (the "Trust") to be known,
for convenience, as "Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-OP1" and Wells
Fargo Bank, National Association is hereby appointed as Trustee in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement. The parties hereto acknowledge and agree that it is the policy and
intention of the Trust to acquire only Mortgage Loans meeting the requirements set forth in
this Agreement, including without limitation, the representation and warranty set forth
in paragraph (50) of Schedule III. The Trust's fiscal year is the calendar year.
See also PSA 10.03. Governing Law:
1
2
3
4
Section 10.03 Governing Law. THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE CONSTRUED IN

ACCORDANCE WITH AND GOVERNED BY THE SUBSTANTIVE LAWS OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPLICABLE TO AGREEMENTS MADE AND TO BE
PERFORMED IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND THE OBLIGATIONS, RIGHTS
AND REMEDIES OF THE PARTIES HERETO AND THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS
SHALL BE DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUCH LAWS. emphasis theirs
5
6
The PSA specifically requires the Depositor (SABR) to have
transferred all of the interest in the mortgage notes to the Trustee on behalf
of the trust as of the closing date. PSA Article II, Section 2.01.
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
The PSA requires the Trustee to acknowledge acceptance of the

Mortgage Loans on behalf of the trust as of the closing date. PSA Article II,
Section 2.02
Under New York Trust Law, every sale, conveyance or other act of the
trustee in contravention of the trust is void. EPTL 7-2.4. The alleged
Assignment of Mortgage dated March 7th, 2008, to the Plaintiff Trust was/is
16
an Unlawful Assignment. There is no legal, valid, enforceable assignment of
17
the alleged note and conveyance of the alleged mortgage to the Plaintiff
18
Trust, unless it complies with the mandates of Trust Instruments, IRS
19
860A-G and New York Law as explained more fully infra and supra.
20
Therefore, the purported acceptance of the alleged note and mortgage by
21
the trustee after the date the trust closed, is void.
22
23
24
25
26
27
The Plaintiff Trust was created by the terms set forth in the Trust
Instruments, Pooling & Servicing Agreement (PSA) Plaintiffs exhibit
18, dated January 1st, 2006, with the "closing date" of January 1st, 2006.
According to this contractual document signed by all of the participants of
the trusts creation, management and servicing, including Plaintiff, all the
28
Assets must have been assigned to the Trust on the Closing Date. See PSA
Article II Section 2.01.
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
The evidence is clear that the above-mentioned assignment was not

created and executed within the permitted period. Accordingly, no rights
derived from the Plaintiff Trust and as a result, the Plaintiff Trust has no
rights in the note and mortgage and therefore, no standing whatsoever in
any action at law.18
Contrary to New York Law and IRS 860 the Plaintiff Trust exercised a
prohibited act on March 7th, 2008 and the above assignment was contrary
11
to the Trust Instruments and therefore Void pursuant to IRS 860A-G and
12
New York Estates, Powers & Trusts - Part 2 - 7 2.4.
13
14
15
16
"Any action which deviates from the Trust documents is void. 7-2.4 Act of trustee in
contravention of trust If the trust is expressed in the instrument creating the estate of the trustee,
every sale, conveyance or other act of the trustee in contravention of the trust, except as
authorized by this article and by any other provision of law, is void".
17
18
No possession of the Asset exists until there has been a delivery and
19
an acceptance of the Asset and the giver of the Asset has relinquished all
20
dominion and control over the Asset signifying a true sale of the Asset to the
21
22
23
24
18 Acceleration Standing and Statute of Limitation; One who lacks standing to

bring a foreclosure action, lacks the capacity to accelerate the entire note and thus
cannot start the running of the statute of limitations to bar the later
25
payments due on the installment note. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 94 A.D.3d 980,
26
943 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Second Dept. 2012) 2
27
28
Plaintiff Trust thereby making the Asset, inter alia, bankruptcy remote and
securely within the Trust Vault.
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
The failure of the Parties of the Trust to timely assign the alleged
Asset to the Plaintiff Trust and the Plaintiff Trust to discover this Fact,
makes any future attempts after the "closing date" had past, void pursuant
to New York Law, and the alleged late assignment was also a prohibited act
pursuant to IRS 860G as not being a qualified mortgage. Moreover, the
parties knew they had no authority to alter the composition of the Trust as
demonstrated infra and supra and the late alleged assignment further
violated O.R.C 2913.01 (each and every one) again showing scienter.
11
12
A threshold matter to determine that the Plaintiff Trust had standing
13
in the Land Court was to determine whether the Plaintiff Trust legally
14
possessed the Asset. Clearly, the record dictates the Trust did not, as
15
evidenced by the unlawful alleged and impossible assignment two plus
16
years after the "closing date" of the Trust.19
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Mere recital of assignment, holding or receipt of an asset is

insufficient to transfer an asset to a trust. The grantor must actually
transfer the asset. EPTL 7 -1.18.
19
Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the issue of standing in a foreclosure action. Federal Home Loan
Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017. In Schwartzwald, the Court determined the
plaintiff lacked standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court because "it failed to establish an
interest in the note or mortgage at the time it filed suit." Blouseat 8, quoting Schwartzwald at 28. "It is an
elementary concept of law that a party lacks standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an
individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the subject matter of the action." (Emphasis sic.)
Schwartzwaldat 22. Accordingly, the court found that a plaintiff must have standing at the time the complaint
is filed and the lack of standing cannot be cured by "receipt of an assignment of the claim or by substitution
of the real party in interest" pursuant to Civ.R. 17(A). Id.at 26, 41
26
27
28
The Trust is a REMIC Trust
2
3
4
5
The Trust was formed as a REMIC trust.20 Under the REMIC

provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) the closing date of the
Trust is also the startup day for the Trust. The closing date/startup day is
significant because all assets of the Trust were to be transferred to the
Trust on or before the closing date to ensure that the Trust received
its REMIC status. The IRC provides in pertinent part that:
Except as provided in section 860G(d)(2), if any amount is contributed to a
10
11
12
REMIC after the startup day, there is hereby imposed a tax for the taxable year of the REMIC in
which the contribution is received equal to 100 percent of the amount of such contribution.
26 U.S.C. 860G(d)(1).
13
14
The alleged assignment of the note and the mortgage which affected
15
the transfer was dated March 7th, 2008, however, pursuant to the terms of
16
the PSA the trust closed on January 1st, 2006.
17
18
20
The Internal Revenue Code provides that the terms
real estate mortgage
19
investment conduit and REMIC mean any entity(1) to which an election to be
20
treated as a REMIC applies for the taxable year and all prior taxable years,
21
(2) all of the interests in which are regular interests or residual interests,
22
(3) which has 1 (and only 1) class of residual interests (and all
23
distributions, if any, with respect to such interests are pro rata), (4) as of
24
the close of the 3rd month beginning after the startup day and at all times
25
thereafter, substantially all of the assets of which consist of qualified
26
mortgages and permitted investments.
27
28
1
2
Defendant asserts that the transfer of the alleged note herein is void
because the alleged note is represented to have been acquired after the
trusts closing date which is in violation of the terms of the PSA.
5
6
7
8
9
Section 9.02 of the PSA specifically prohibits the acquisition of any

asset for a REMIC fund after the closing date unless the party permitting
the acquisition and the NIMS (net interest margin securities) Insurer have
received an Opinion letter from counsel, at the party's expense, that the
acceptance of the asset will not affect the REMIC's status. No such letter
10
has been provided to show compliance with the requirements of the PSA.
11
Plaintiff has provided no evidence that the trustee had authority to acquire
12
the alleged note and mortgage herein after the trust had closed.
13
14
A trusts ability to transact is restricted to the actions
15
authorized by its trust documents. Defendant Reed alleges that
16
here, the Trust documents permit only one specific method of
17
transfer to the Trust as set forth Article II within section 2.01 of the
18
19
20
21
PSA. Section 2.01 (b)(i) requires the Depositor to provide the Trustee
with the:
original Mortgage Note bearing all intervening endorsements showing a complete
chain of endorsement from the originator to the last endorsee, endorsed "Pay to the order of
22
_____________, without recourse" and signed (which may be by facsimile signature) in the
23
name of the last endorsee by an authorized officer.
24
25
26
Further, section 2.01 (b)(vi) states:

the originals of all intervening assignments of Mortgage (if any) evidencing a complete
27
chain of assignment from the applicable originator to the last endorsee with evidence of
28
recording thereon,
As such, all prior and intervening endorsements must show a
2
3
complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the Trustee.
4
5
6
7
8
Since the trustee alleges to have acquired the subject note and
mortgage after the closing date, the trustee's act in acquiring them
exceeded its authority and violated the terms of the trust. The acquisition of
ANY mortgage after 90 days is not a mere technicality but a material
violation of the trust's terms, which jeopardizes the trust's REMIC status.
9
10
Section 9.01(f) of the PSA provides that neither the Trustee, the
11
Servicer nor Holder of the Certificates shall cause any REMIC formed under
12
the PSA, by action or omission, to endanger the status of the REMIC or
13
cause any imposition of tax upon the REMIC.
14
Since the trust was organized as a REMIC, the investors received
15
16
17
18
19
certain tax benefits on the income that passed through the trust to them.
Section 26 U.S.C.A. 860D(a)(4) defines a REMIC as an entity that as of the
close of the 3rd month beginning after the startup day and at all times
thereafter, substantially all of the assets of which consist of qualified
mortgages and permitted investments.
20
21
22
Section 26 U.S.C.A. 860G (a)(3)(i,ii) defines a qualified mortgage as

[*9]
23
24
25
26
(A) any obligation (including any participation or certificate of beneficial ownership

therein) which is principally secured by an interest in real property and which (I) is transferred to
the REMIC on the startup day in exchange for regular or residual interests in the REMIC, (ii) is
purchased by the REMIC within the 3-month period beginning on the startup day if, except as
27
provided in regulations, such purchase is pursuant to a fixed -price contract in effect on the
28
startup day.
Thus to qualify for the REMIC status tax benefits, the mortgages upon
2
3
4
which the securities are based must be acquired by the Trust within three
months of its start up date.
5
6
7
8
9
10
While section 26 U.S.C.A. 860D(a)(4) permits a REMIC to contain

some portion of non qualified mortgages, it is unclear how many unqualified
mortgages are permitted without losing tax status. It is clear, however, that
the late acquisition violates the terms of the PSA not only by the late
submission of the note and mortgage, but also by the acceptance of the
trust of an unqualified (defaulted) alleged note and mortgage.
11
Under New York Estates Powers and Trusts Law 7-2.1(c), property
12
13
must be registered in the name of the trustee for a particular trust in
14
order for transfer to the trustee to be effective. Trust property cannot
15
be held with incomplete endorsements and assignments that do not
16
17
indicate that the property is held in trust by a trustee for a specific

beneficiary trust.
18
19
20
21
The proferred assignment of the alleged note and the mortgage which
allegedly affected the transfer was created and dated March 7, 2008,
however, pursuant to the terms of the PSA the trust closed on January 1,
2006.
22
23
Defendant Reed alleges that the alleged Note was not even allegedly
24
transferred to the Trust until 2008, resulting in an invalid assignment of the
25
Note to the Trust. Reed alleges that this defect means that Plaintiff is not,
26
has never been nor can it ever be the valid Note Holder and therefore was
27
not ever the Party Entitled To Enforce (PETE).
28
As the trust's alleged assignment was void, ab initio, for reasons
stated infra & supra and because it also occurred after the closing date,
Defendant Reed has a valid argument that Plaintiff is not and could not ever
be the valid Note Holder (PETE).
5
6
Under 28 U.S.C. 1652, this Court has the duty to apply New York law
in accordance with the controlling decision of the highest state court.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
In a recent decision from the US Bankruptcy Court S. District Texas

case 12-1010 - Saldivar et al v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al, and in a
case not dissimilar to this the Court in their decision stated:
While the Court finds no applicable New York Court of Appeals decision, a recent
New York Supreme Court decision is factually similar to the case before the Court. See Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Erobobo, et al., 2013 WL 1831799 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 29, 2013). In
Erobobo, defendants argued that plaintiff (a REMIC trust) was not the owner of the note
because plaintiff obtained the note and mortgage after the trust had closed in violation of the
terms of the PSA governing the trust, rendering plaintiffs acquisition of the note void. Id. at *2.
The Erobobo court held that under 7-2.4, any conveyance in contravention of the PSA is
void; this meant that acceptance of the note and mortgage by the trustee after the date the trust
closed rendered the transfer void. Id. at 8.
Based on the Erobobo decision and the plain language of N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law
7-2.4, the Court finds that under New York law, assignment of the Saldivars Note after
the start up day is void ab initio.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
In addition, the alleged promissory note attached to the complaint is

payable to H&R Block Mortgage Corp., see Plaintiff's Exhibit B.
Defendant Reed has a meritorious defense to foreclosure because there is
no indorsement on the promissory note."If an instrument is payable to an
identified person, negotiation requires transfer of possession of the
instrument and its indorsement by the holder." O.R.C.1303.21 (8). Since the
promissory note is payable to H&R Block Mortgage Corp. and there is no
25
indorsement on the note then there has been no valid negotiation to the
26
Plaintiff.
27
28
The same fact pattern as was found in Erobobo above is present in
Reed's situation. Shortly after the time the complaint was filed by WFB, as
is evidenced by the assignment, OOMC (assignor) certifies to have owned
Reed's alleged note and mortgage. It was error to grant a judgment against
Reed. WFB is not here representing OOMC, they are here as the Trustee for
6
7
8
9
10
a Trust.
Further, as of the closing date of the trust, January 1, 2006, and the
contractual agreement (the Pooling and Servicing Agreement) which lists
the signed as legal participants of the Trust, Option One Mortgage Corp.
had previously sold in its entirety, all of its alleged interest in the note and
11
mortgage to Barclays Bank PLC
12
Mortgage Corp. had no legal right to assign the mortgage from itself to
13
Wells Fargo or even to the Trust.
21
, therefore and thereafter Option One
14
ARGUMENT
15
16
17
18
19
20
Plaintiff argues it is entitled to judgment to foreclose because it was in

possession of the note and mortgage at the time the action was filed.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff, in fact as the record and docket
represent, was not in possession of the note and mortgage at the time the
21
action was filed, that, as the docket record shows, came more than 6
22
months later.
23
24
25
26
21
See plaintiffs exhibit #25 Purchase Price and Terms Agreement
27
28
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is not, was not and it can never in
fact be the true owner or holder of the note. Defendant argues that because
Plaintiff alleges to have obtained the alleged note and mortgage after the
trust had closed in direct violation of the terms of the trusts own
controlling document, the PSA and in direct contravention of controlling
6
7
8
9
10
law, N.Y. E.P.T.L. as is previously stated, that the acquisition and any
representation thereof of Plaintiff being the legal Holder the note and
mortgage is void. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff alleges to have
obtained the alleged mortgage and note without any intervening
assignments, which is also in direct violation of the PSA and Defendant
argues that Plaintiffs alleged assignment of mortgage to WFB was not even
11
in existence when WFB initiated this foreclosure suit. All of the above is
12
explained in even greater detail below.
13
14
15
Defendant states the he has raised this issue repeatedly from his very
first Answer to Foreclosure and in every single pleading since.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
On or about mid 2005, Reeds property was appraised for $127,000.

In the following 2 years (2005 2007) the property received the addition of
a new bedroom, a new barn, a new outdoor theatre, a 40 X 15 stainless
steel covered deck and more.
On April 26th 2011 Defendant Reeds property was unlawfully sold at
Public Auction to the Buyer Wells Fargo Bank for $28,000 and on or about
23
July 9, 2012 a new owner of record appeared in the County records of
24
property as being one Ms. Leann McLaughlin. For the record, it is shown
25
within the County records that Ms McLaughlin did purchase this property
26
from Wells Fargo Bank for the amount of $9,900.00.
27
28
The time has come to rectify this fraud by ejecting the trespassing Ms
McLaughlin from Reed's home. Ms McLaughlin is not a victim. She
attempted to profit from the misfortune of a victim of fraud by buying a
foreclosed home. On or about July 14th, 2010 Defendant filed with the
Montgomery County Property and Land Records Department and the
6
7
8
9
10
Circuit Court of Montgomery County a Lis Pendins as notification to the

world of this ongoing litigation, a copy of which is hereto attached as
Exhibit G.
Ms McLaughlin knew or should have known that unless the seller had
valid title through the foreclosure proceeding that Ms McLaughlin would
11
have to vacate the home when asked. In Reed's case the filing of a
12
foreclosure complaint without ownership of the mortgage, and the
13
assignment of mortgage to WFB from an entity that did not own Reed's
14
mortgage, were both frauds upon this court.
15
Further, Defendant states that Ms McLaughlin has legal redress in
16
this matter against Wells Fargo Bank as is expressed within Ohio Code >
17
Title 53 > Chapter 5303 > 5303.02 - Vendee may recoup
18
In actions to recover the purchase money of real estate by vendor against vendee, the vendee,
19
notwithstanding his continued possession, may by way of counterclaim set up any breach of the
20
covenants of title acquired by him from the plaintiff, and make any person claiming an adverse
21
interest therein a party to the action. Upon the hearing, he may recoup against the plaintiffs
22
demand the present worth of any existing lien or encumbrance thereon. If the adverse interest of
23
24
25
the claimant is an estate in reversion or remainder, or contingent upon a future event, with his
assent, the court of common pleas may order the vendee to surrender possession to his vendor
upon the repayment of so much of the purchase money as has been paid, with interest, or direct
26
27
the payment of the purchase money claimed in the action, upon the plaintiffs giving bond in
28
double its amount with two or more sureties to be approved by the court, for the payment thereof
with interest, if by reason of the defect the defendant or his privies are subsequently evicted.
3
4
5
6
7
8
Effective Date: 10-01-1953
Plaintiffs fraud and misrepresentation prevented the Court from

having subject matter jurisdiction and rendered the Judgment of foreclosure
void ab initio. Reed is entitled to prevail on his actions for civil trespass and
ejectment, wrongful foreclosure, damages, quiet title, etc.
THE TRUST and the PSA
10
1.
11
12
The Trust was formed as a vehicle for purchasing mortgage backed

securities.
13
14
2.
15
3.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
The Trust is subject to the terms of a Pooling and Servicing Agreement,

("the PSA").
The PSA was signed by the:
a. Depositor, Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC
("SABR"),
b. by the Servicer, Option One Mortgage Corporation,
c. and by the Trustee, WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, and is dated
January 1, 2006.
24
25
4. 26
27
The PSA sets forth with specificity the manner in which mortgages can
legally be purchased by the trust, as well as the duties of the trustee.
28
5.
Section 2.01, subsection 1 of the PSA requires that transfer and assignment
of mortgages must be effected by hand delivery, for deposit with the Trustee
with the original note endorsed in blank.
4
5
6.
6
7
8
Section 2.05 of the PSA requires that the Depositor transfer all right, title,
interest in the mortgages to the Trustee, on behalf of the trust, as of the
Closing Date. The Closing Date as provided in the PSA is January 26, 2006.
9
10
7.
11
12
13
As is alleged and apparent on the face of Plaintiffs proffered assignment of

mortgage, Option One Mortgage Corp. assigned Defendant's mortgage loan
to the Plaintiff, as the Trustee, on March 7th, 2008, approximately twentyfive months after the trust had closed.
14
15
8.
16
17
18
Plaintiff commenced this action on February 27, 2008, and alleged that it
possessed the Note with an incomplete allonge (Order paper not Bearer
paper) on the date that this foreclosure action was commenced. Defendant,
19
filed an answer containing both a general denial and a specific denial of
20
Plaintiffs lack of standing to initiate suit because of the Assignment of
21
Mortgages Post date and other issues.
22
23
Standing and Real Party in Interest
24
9. 25
26
27
28
Standing - The doctrine of standing operates to ensure actual adversity

between a plaintiff and defendant. To satisfy the requirement of standing,
a plaintiff must establish (1) that is has suffered an injury in fact that is
concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. The existence of these
three elements proof of injury in fact, causation and redressability is
determinative of the issue of whether the plaintiffs interests are sufficiently
6
7
8
9
10
adverse to the defendants interests in order to create an actual controversy

capable of judicial resolutions. Standing is not jurisdictional because
standing challenges the capacity of a party to bring an action, not the
subject matter of the court. Although a court may have subject matter
jurisdiction over an action, if a claim is asserted by one who is not the real
party in interest, then the party lacks standing to prosecute the action. The
11
lack of standing may be cured by substituting the proper party so that a
12
court otherwise having subject matter jurisdiction may proceed to
13
adjudicate the matter. State ex rel Tubbs Jones v. Suster (1998), 84 Ohio
14
St.3d 70.
15
16
17
18
19
20
(a) The Assignment of the Mortgage

Just as the mortgage must be recorded to create a valid legal encumbrance on the
mortgaged real estate, the assignment must be recorded to invest the assignee with the legal
status of the mortgage holder with the power to enforce the lien. ORC Section 5301.31
states in relevant part: The assignment, whether it is upon the original mortgage, upon the
margin of the record of the original mortgage, or by separate instrument, shall transfer not
21
only the lien of the mortgage but also all interest in the land described in the mortgage.
22
Emphasis theirs
23
24
25
(b) Right to Enforce the Note

(1) Holder R.C. 1301.01
26
27
28
(T)(1) Holder with respect to a negotiable instrument

means either of the following:
1
2
3
4
(a) If the instrument is payable to bearer, a person

who is in possession of the instrument; emphasis mine
(b) If the instrument is payable to an identified person,
the identified person when in possession of the instrument.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
(2) PETE (Person Entitled to Enforce) R.C. 1303.31

(A) Person entitled to enforce an instrument means any
of the following persons:
(1) The holder of the instrument;
(2) A nonholder in possession of the instrument who has
the rights of a holder;
(3) A person not in possession of the instrument who is
15
entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to section 1303.38
16
or division (D) of section 1303.58 of the Revised Code.
17
18
19
(B) A person may be a person entitled to enforce the

instrument even though the person is not the owner of the
instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.
20
21
10.
22
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on July 25. 2008. On August
23
15, 2008 Defendant answered, requested trial by Jury and opposed
24
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
25
26
27
28
11. 1
Plaintiff argued it was entitled to summary judgment to foreclose because,
it was a big Bank and Defendant had quit making his house payments and
then rambled on libeling Defendants good name and reputation stating
Defendant was a forger, a thief and a Brigand and shouldnt receive the
windfall profit of benefitting by forging his fathers name on a contract.
6
7
12. 8
9
10
11
Defendant argued (and still maintains) that Plaintiff is not in fact the owner
or holder of the note because it purports to have obtained the note and
mortgage, by assignment, after the filing of the foreclosure and not before.
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio5017,
12
13
13.
14
15
16
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is not in fact the owner or holder of the
note because it purports to have obtained the note and mortgage after the
trust had closed in violation of at least 5 of the terms of the PSA, and IRS,
17
REMIC code. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Erobobo (2013 NY Slip Op 50675(U)) 5/2/2013 ,
18
IRS tax code 26 USC 860 A thru F, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
19
v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017
20
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_50675.htm
21
22
and therefore any true acquisition by Plaintiff of the note and mortgage is
void.
23
24
14.
25
26
27
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff purports to have obtained the alleged
mortgage and note without any intervening assignments, in violation of the
trusts Controlling Document, the PSA. UCC 9
28
1
2
15.
3
4
5
6
None of Plaintiffs, Defendants or even the Courts previous actions

however, change the fact that the Plaintiff in this case never had the
capacity to invoke the courts jurisdiction and therefore this Court did not
have jurisdiction (subject matter or any other kind of jurisdiction) to hear
this matter on February 27th, 2008, the date Plaintiff filed the foreclosure
complaint, or at any point thereafter, without Plaintiff having first been
properly and legally assigned the alleged mortgage and note in question.
22
16. 10
11
12
13
14
Further, the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio in Rufo Fed. Home Loan
Mortg. Corp. v. Rufo, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2012-A-0011, 2012-Ohio5930 held that, pursuant to Schwartzwald , courts of common pleas have
subject-matter jurisdiction over justiciable matters and that standing to sue
22
15
In the instant case, the evidence clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff had no
16
interest in the subject note and mortgage at the time the complaint was filed,
17
and as such lacked standing to bring this action. Civ. R. 17 only permits two
18
means of curing an action not initially brought in the name of the real party
19
in interest: (1) joinder or substitution of the real party in interest; or (2)
20
ratification of the actions commencement in the name of the real party in
21
interest. Plaintiffs subsequent assignment of the interest that was held by
22
the real party in interest at the time the complaint was filed constitutes
23
neither. A bank that was not the mortgagee when suit was filed cannot cure its
24
lack of standing by subsequently obtaining an interest in the mortgage. Wells
25
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Byrd (Sept. 12, 2008) Ohio App. 1 Dist. 2008, 2008 WL
26
4182439 2008-Ohio-4603.
27
28
is required to make a justiciable case. Rufo at 28. Thus, without standing,
a case is not justiciable and the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
When the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, its final judgment is
void. This is a threshold requirement that is codified and expanded by
common law in all 50 states. Lacking standing, all other points Plaintiff tries
17.
to raise are mute, void of substance and non-considerable.
Blacks 8th defines void judgment as A judgment that has no legal force or
effect, the invalidity of which may be asserted by any party whose rights
are affected at any time and any place, whether directly or
10
collaterally. From its inception, a void judgment continues to be absolutely
11
null. It is incapable of being confirmed, ratified, or enforced in any
12
manner or to any degree. One source of a void judgment is the lack
13
of subject-matter jurisdiction. [Cases: Federal Civil Procedure 2392;
14
15
18.16
Judgment 527, 346, 486. C.J.S. Judgments 45, 1328, 30, 4346,
48, 73, 75, 82, 201, 203205, 207, 307, 403, 499, 512, 546, 548549.]
So whats the issue? In plain speak.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
It has been 5 years since Defendants house was sold at auction to

Plaintiff debt collector for around $28,000 who then turned around and
quickly sold it again for $9,900. In that 5 years there has been public
revelation after public revelation, U.S. Govt. report after U.S. Govt. report
exposing this Plaintiff of exactly the same issues concerning illegal
foreclosures that I have been espousing to this court, concerning this case,
since 2008.
24
25
26
27
28
In that same 5 years, Defendant, a man permanently disabled since

1978, was forced into homelessness and had it not been for the much, much
appreciated help of friends who let him live in his 200+ year old hay barn,
no water, no elec, no heat for the first 14 months, until being caught living
there by the County authorities and being again made homeless (what a
helpful Govt. we have)(sarcasm!) again until yet another friend put him up
for several months until yet another friend put him up Defendant
would have seemingly made Plaintiff, especially lying Plaintiffs Counsel and
this court, very happy by dying. Sorry, but Im not dead yet. And, as I
6
7
8
9
explain in legal speak with proper reference to precedent and state of Ohio
Supreme Court rulings above and below, since there is no res judicata on
void judgments and especially on cases where plaintiffs lacked standing at
the initiation of suit to invoke the jurisdiction of the court then neither is
this case.
10
Plaintiff Wells Fargo themselves have been found guilty in courts all
11
12
across this Nation, including Ohio, and found by our Federal Govt. to have
13
lied, manipulated, cheated, fabricated and forged documents all over this
14
15
16
Nation to steal homes, with the help of the courts, from millions of people.
Yep, thats what Ive been repeatedly saying since my very first answer in
2008 And this court ignored me.
17
And understand, its not the homes they want for the value of the
18
homes they only want the homes so they can force the court to launder
19
their money and more specifically launder their illegal transactions for
20
them.
21
22
By using these same tactics and techniques, which I have repeatedly

shown to this court, this court assisted them in stealing my home (collusion)
23
that home the court was so careful and afraid not to give freely to a
24
citizen, it gave blindly to a common Debt Collector (by CFPB Definition) who
25
could not then and cannot ever prove a right to it. I want my house back.
26
27
28
As is referenced above and below, at the time Plaintiff initiated this

foreclosure suit they did not have the right to. In fact they have never had
the right to and also in fact they will NEVER have the right to because of
the very rules contained within the very same documentation this court
(although whos vision admittedly was probably (hopefully only) clouded by
the forged and fraudulent docs presented to it by Plaintiff and also
probably because of the perception that a Big World Bank always does
6
7
8
9
10
things the right, just and legal way), allowed them to take my house with in
the first place.
When I showed the courts within my pleadings all of the
inconsistencies, all of the broken chain of title issues and that the
documents Plaintiff was using in this court to justify an alleged transaction
11
worth millions of dollars which didnt even have signatures on them, not
12
bearer paper mind you, but legal contracts this court ignored me.
13
14
When it took Plaintiff months after initiating foreclosure to obtain the
15
alleged original note & mortgage, one which bears a signature
16
representing to be my own but one which is signed in red ink contrary to
17
every other purported original document allegedly signed at closing
18
19
20
21
22
which which were all signed in black ink, and which is missing any
indentation of paper under that same signature and which, in my own
opinion was applied using an ink jet printer is absolute proof that they
had yet to even procure their alleged ownership and or even a rudimentary
holdership of the alleged Note and Mortgage, which I brought to the
attention of the court this court ignored me.
23
24
When I properly petitioned this court for a Jury trial I was told in
25
pre trial conference that I had not asked for one soon enough so I was not
26
entitled to one a lie as it had been demanded by myself in several previous
27
pleadings.
28
After I, an innocent, was dragged into this action unwillingly by
Plaintiff, slandered, liabled and threatened with imprisonment by the court
in pre trial conference, then it was I who was forced to prove to the court
that Plaintiff had not the standing or rather the capacity to invoke the
jurisdiction of this court which I did again, and again, and again, and
again and this court ignored my rights.
7
8
9
Whatever happened to: The burden of proof lies on him who

asserts the fact, not on him who denies it, because from the very
nature of things a negative cannot be proof.
10
But to continue, when Plaintiff, several months after initiating
11
foreclosure, introduced into the court record a forged and fabricated, back
12
dated and Robo-Signed23 document titled Assignment of Mortgage that
13
could, by the very terms within the controlling document of the Trust (PSA)
14
itself, never possibly exist, an impossible document, this one document
15
16
17
18
19
being THE only signed document presented as alleged actual evidence by

Plaintiff (excepting also the conclusory affidavit exhibit I signed by the
very same known Robo-Signer Ms. Love) alleging to prove they actually
had standing to initiate this suit, and Defendant informed court of same
inconsistencies between fact/law and this document this court ignored
me.
20
When I raised these defenses in court transcript, lines 104 227.
21
22
This court ignored me.
23
23
24
we now have a legal definition of "Robo-signer" from the U.S.C.O.A. for the 5th Circuit (TX) in the case of REINAGEL v.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, No. 12-50569 (5th Cir. Oct. 29, 2013). The court defined "Robo-signing"
as follows;
25
26
27
28
"Robosigning is the colloquial term the media, politicians, and consumer advocates have used to describe an array of
questionable practices banks deployed to perfect their right to foreclose in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis, practices
that included having bank employees or third-party contractors: (1) execute and acknowledge transfer documents in large
quantities within a short period of time, often without the purported assignors authorization and outside of the presence of the
notary certifying the acknowledgment, and (2) swear out affidavits confirming the existence of missing pieces of loan
documentation, without personal knowledge and often outside of the presence of the notary."
Are we seeing a pattern and practice yet?
2
3
4
5
6
If I seem angry then Im incorrectly representing my position. I am

furious. This pleading has taken me over 5 years of my life to create for only
1 reason. That reason being the mental injury that was forced upon me,
through no action of my own, by Plaintiff, Plaintiffs lying Counsel and by
the court. Mornings waking to screaming to a judge, years spent staring at
a computer screen and not being able to remember what I wrote 2
sentences ago. The actual term for my condition is Legal Abuse Syndrome
a recognized form of PTSD. You might want to self educate yourself on it,
10
but then again it may well have been your intention, unconscionable
11
decisions of those in authority are the cause.
12
13
14
Still in plain speak I want my house back and I want it back just the
way I left it and I want it filled with what I had it filled with and I have
pictures of everything. I want the hot-tub area rebuilt or reimbursed for. I
15
built it for a reason and I should not have to suffer rebuilding it myself
16
again just because the court colluded with a debt collector to rob me.
17
18
19
20
21
I want the basement finished. I had dug it out by hand, hard, never
disturbed clay, which took me 3 years because of my disability, that I can
only imagine now has refilled itself with miserable silt.
The new owner has made changes to the property. I want them
22
reversed! I built this house from the footers to the roof peaks by hand and
23
all by myself over a 7 year time frame. It is as much an art project to me as
24
it was my home.
25
26
27
I want the inventory I had acquired and stored in my various out

buildings either replaced or reimbursed for. I want the equipment I had to
abandon replaced or be reimbursed for.
28
As I am accomplished in and have made my living doing metal work,
wood work, plumbing, electrical work, HVAC, automotive, motorcycle and
truck work, including everything (engines, transmissions, elec., AC, body
work and even custom painting) and yes, I also spent over a year in the
Rhodes Office Tower in Columbus on the 38th floor where I helped architect
6
7
8
9
10
and develop the State of Ohios Computing system My computing Library

alone was over 15 ft. wide and my automotive library matched it. I had a
LOT of diverse inventory pieces and equipment for working this was my
retirement and I want reimbursed for it all, every piece.
I want reimbursed because after interviewing 22 Attorneys, and
11
finding NONE who understood mortgage loan securitization, I had to quit my
12
own life and spend the next 8 years dedicating 100% of my time and
13
attention to defending myself against a Plaintiff who had no right to BE a
14
15
Plaintiff!
I want reimbursed because Plaintiffs Counsel did liable my good name
16
and credit rating and destroyed my good name and reputation for the
17
remaining years of my working Professional life. I want reimbursed for the
18
mental cruelty that Ive had to endure. I want reimbursed because I will
19
never ever be able to return to a state of mind thats devoid of the
20
experience of having to deal with this crap and I want reimbursed for every
21
single legal remedy that possibly exists and especially for the ones I know
22
23
24
25
nothing about! I want to be made whole again and I have lost 8 years of my
life which has put me at an age and physical condition that I could hardly
stand to lose.
But mostly I want reimbursed huge because itll hurt Plaintiff Wells
26
Fargo Bank NA. for what they did to me and what theyre doing Nationwide
27
and maybe garner enough attention that another judge in another place will
28
see the error of their own way and quit siding with low life debt collectors
who have to stoop to felony crimes (forging docs) just to cover up their own
massive lying and fraud that has infected the world economy.
3
4
5
6
And I want sanctions against both law firms Plunkett Cooney and
Lerner Sampson Rothfuss which are definitely in order too if for nothing
else than bad faith abuse of the judicial system, as has already been done by
other courts. As it is my understanding that the Court retains any monies
generated through sanctions, my only request of the court is to get em
good.
9
10
11
12
I am furious. I am furious with Plaintiff WF Bank, I am furious with

Plaintiffs Counsel and I am furious with the unlawful actions of the court.
That said, back to being legally civil
13
14
15
16
17
18
In the following, once again you will find the facts, the fraud, the proof
and fraud upon the Court along with the proof of fraud upon the Court. The
exact, to the letter same kind of fraud that was brought to light to Congress
by Professor Adam Levitin in his Written Testimony to Congress of 2010
concerning Robo-Singing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues
in Mortgage Servicing24
19
It is axiomatic that in order to bring a suit, like a foreclosure action, the plaintiff
must have legal standing, meaning it must have a direct interest in the outcome of the
20
21
22
24
23
24
25
26
27
28
See GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER
Written Testimony of Adam J. Levitin,
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Before the House
Financial Services Committee Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity RoboSinging, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing
November 18, 2010,
10:00 am.
pg. 2.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
litigation. In the case of a mortgage foreclosure, only the mortgagee has such an interest
and thus standing. Many of the issues relating to foreclosure fraud by mortgage
servicers, ranging from more minor procedural defects up to outright counterfeiting
relate to the need to show standing. Thus problems like false affidavits of
indebtedness, false lost note affidavits, and false lost summons affidavits, as well as
backdated mortgage assignments, and wholly counterfeited notes, mortgages, and
assignments all relate to the evidentiary need to show that the entity bringing the
foreclosure action has standing to foreclose. Emphasis mine
As an initial matter, Plaintiff debt collector filed this frivolous and

fraudulent lawsuit in Feb. 27, 2008 and much litigation has since ensued,
including an appeal and motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ. R.
60(B) and previous Motions to Vacate as Void. Plaintiffs claim the right to
file suit is evidenced by plaintiffs proffered Assignment of Mortgage
one of those Tah Dah! documents, presented to the court months after
foreclosure initiation and even dated as being created after foreclosure
initiation. The same as the Schwartzwald case mentioned infra & supra.
14
15
16
17
18
As stated above, at the time this suit was initiated Plaintiff debt
collector lacked standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. This same
and exact issue has been identified and brought to the attention of the court
by Defendant since the inception of this action.25
19
Res Judicata Does Not Apply
20
21
22
23
If John Reed argued today what he argued in 2008 he would win.

WFB, according to the binding case law in the State of Ohio and
25
24
26
See Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment filed August 15th 2008 2. See
Defendants JOINT PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT filed Sept. 29th, 2008 page 5 a.) its Assignment of Mortgage was not
filed prior to commencement of this action.
See Defendants MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT filed on or around August 22nd 2008 4
27
See Defendants Post Trial Submission of Evidence, Facts & Submissions filed October 15 th, 2008 1.
25
28
Montgomery County, was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
judgment is void ab initio. Res judicata cannot be a bar to judgment that is
void ab initio.
4
5
6
The foreclosure judgment is void ab initio because it was based on the
2008 assignment to WFB which was executed post foreclosure initiation, too
late according to Wells Fargo Bank, NA. v. Jordan, 2009-0hio-1092 (the bank
9
10
11
was not the real party in interest when the mortgage was assigned to it three weeks after the complaint
was filed so the bank lacked standing to bring a foreclosure action ); see also Wells Fargo Bank,
NA. v. Byrd, 178 Ohio AppJd285,2008-0hio-4603 at 16 ("We hold that in a

foreclosure action, a bank that was not the mortgagee when suit was filed cannot cure its lack of standing
12
by subsequently obtaining an interest in the mortgage. "); see also Federal Home Loan
13
Mortgage Corporation v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017,Id. at para. 41.
14
(Plaintiff lacked standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, because it had not yet been assigned
15
the alleged mortgage, and it could not cure this lack of standing through the later filing of the mortgage
16
assignment)
17
18
19
20
The 2008 assignment to WFB is a fraud on the court because;

a. it was created post the foreclosure filing date, as is
described in greater detail infra & supra,
b. it was created in contravention and in violation of the rules
21
held within the controlling document of the trust, the Pooling
22
and Servicing Agreement (PSA) which states that;

i. no deposits can be accepted into the trust from anyone
23
24
BUT the legal Depositor for the trust and

ii. no deposits are allowed to be accepted into the trust
25
past the trusts own cut-off date (which are also
26
explained in infra and supra) and

iii. no non-performing loans are allowed to be included
27
28
into the trust,
iv. it would be impossible for OOMC (Lender) to transfer
interest to Plaintiff when it is clear from the case
caption that this alleged loan is part of a pool of loans.

v. It would be impossible for OOMC to transfer interest to
3
4
Plaintiff when Plaintiffs own exhibits show OOMC
transferred all of its alleged rights and interests in the
alleged trust to Barclays Bank years ago.
All of these actions contradict the proffered alleged 2008 assignment
8
9
to Plaintiff from OOMC. A "court of general jurisdiction such as the Common
10
Pleas Courts of Ohio has the inherent right and power to protect itself
11
against the perpetration of a fraud" by vacating a prior judgment. Jelm v.
12
Jelm (1951), 155 Ohio ST. 226, 240.
13
Collateral estoppels only acts as a bar to future claims when there has
14
not been fraud or collusion. See Gutierrez v. Mika Metal Fabricators, 2006-
15
0hio-4818; Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 383, 1995 - Ohio-
16
33I. In Reed's case, his alleged note and mortgage was allegedly and
17
impossibly assigned to Plaintiff on March 7, 2008. Therefore, when Plaintiff
18
filed for foreclosure on February 27, 2008, Plaintiff did not own Reed's
19
alleged note and/or mortgage. The judgment was procured by fraud and
20
cannot be the bar future claims based on res judicata.
21
22
23
24
In addition to the presence of fraud, Reed's claims are not barred

because the elements for res judicata are not satisfied. The doctrine of res
judicata acts to bar a claim only when the following four elements are met:
(I)
there is a final, valid decision on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction;
25
26
27
(2)
there is a second action that involves the same parties, or their

privies, as the first action;
28
(3)
litigated in the first action; and
2
3
4
5
6
the second action raises claims that were or could have been
(4)
the second action arises out of a transaction or occurrence that

was the subject matter of the first action.
Silver v. Krulak, 201l - 0hio -1666 at II citing Portage Cty. Ed. Of
Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio SUd106, 123,2006-0hio-954,846N.E.2d478.
Defendant John A. Reed's claims are not barred by res judicata
because the very first element fails there has been no final, valid decision
on the merits.
10
11
12
13
The elements for res judicata were not satisfied and Reed's claims
were not barred.
Defendant Reeds claims are not barred by res judicata because the
foreclosure judgment was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation.
14
15
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED JUDGMENT in favor of
16
Plaintiff BECAUSE Reed had a legal right to his property since the
17
foreclosure judgment was VOID ab initio.
18
Plaintiffs completely missed the mark with their standing arguments.
19
20
Wells Fargo Bank NA. did not own Reed's alleged note and mortgage
21
on February 27, 2008 when the complaint was filed. This lack of ownership
22
is not due merely to the Robo-Signed alleged assignment of mortgage being
23
executed after the filing of the complaint- the problem is that Reed's
24
mortgage was allegedly sold by Option One Mortgage Corp. in 2005, which
25
is memorialized in Plaintiffs unsigned/unauthenticated exhibit #25 dated
26
27
June 10, 2005 and titled Purchase Price and Terms Agreement to Barclays
Bank, PLC. Which reads:
28
Barclays Bank, PLC (Purchaser) hereby confirms it agreement to purchase and Option One
Mortgage Corporation (the Seller) hereby confirms its agreement to sell, on a mandatory
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
delivery basis, two pools of fixed and adjustable rate, first and second lien, residential mortgage
loans described herein (the Mortgage Loans) on a servicing retained basis, on the terms and
conditions set forth below.
.. the Seller (a) shall remain a seller under this transaction and all related letters and
agreements, .
. The Mortgage Loans will be conveyed by the Seller to the Purchaser on each Closing Date
(as defined below) pursuant to an Assignment and conveyance, to be dated as of the related
Closing Date (each, an Assignment and Conveyance).
The conveyance of Reeds alleged Mortgage Loan is also referenced

within (also unsigned/unauthenticated) Plaintiffs exhibit 26 (Execution
Copy Flow Amended And Restated Mortgage Loan Purchase And Warranties
Agreement) which, in section 6.01 states:
14
15
16
17
In consideration of the Purchasers payment of the Purchase Price, each Seller, simultaneously
with the delivery of the Mortgage Loan Schedule with respect to the related Mortgage Loan
Package to be purchased in each Closing Date, shall execute and deliver an Assignment and
Conveyance Agreement..
18
19
20
21
Continuing, Plaintiffs (also unsigned/unauthenticated) exhibit 27

titled Assignment and Conveyance , also marked Execution Copy and
dated August 19th, represents the alleged final sale and acceptance Reeds
alleged Mortgage loan from OOMC to Barclays Bank.
22
23
Next we see Plaintiffs proffered exhibit # 28 titled Bill Of Sale in
24
which Barclays Bank allegedly sells the bundled Notes and Mortgages to
25
the Purchaser Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC (Purchaser)
26
stating in part:
27
28
Barclays Bank PLC (Seller), in consideration of. To be paid immediately available
funds by Securitized Asset Backed receivables LLC (Purchaser). Dated as of January 1,
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2006 (the Pooling and Servicing agreement), among the Purchaser, as Depositor, Option One
Mortgage Corporation, as servicer and responsible party.
It is at this point that Plaintiff fails to produce evidence that the now
bundled Mortgage Loans were actually deposited and accepted into the
Plaintiff trust named 2006-OP1 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006 OP1 (the Trust).
It is also at this point that I once again request the Courts judicial
10
notice that the above named documents which represent to transfer
11
thousands of Mortgage Loans including the alleged mortgage loan of Mr.
12
Reed are all unsigned/unauthenticated and as such are not even legally
13
binding contracts.
14
15
If we therefore assume they are legal documents as Plaintiffs proffer,
16
and as the court under the cloud of fraud previously agreed, then the next
17
essential step in the securitization process would be for the Depositor to
18
19
20
21
22
actually deposit the bundled Mortgage Loans into the trust. Again, Plaintiff
proffered no evidence of this event.
So again though, still assuming the bundled Mortgage Loans were
actually deposited into Plaintiffs trust, the owner of Reeds alleged
mortgage loan would then be the trust and not Option One Mortgage Corp.,
23
which alleges to be the original Lender who the evidence shows sold the
24
alleged mortgage loan to Barclays Bank PLC.
25
26
27
Thus, the assignment of mortgage prepared by the law firm Plunkett

Cooney and/or Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss executed March 7, 2008 from
28
Option One Mort. Corp. to Plaintiff was a legal impossibility and a fraud
upon the court.
Even pre-Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jordan, 2009-Ohio-I092 this was
4
5
6
7
8
9
unacceptable because the Plaintiff in the foreclosure case did not own
Reed's alleged note and mortgage and lacked a justiciable controversy with
Reed.
The Ohio Constitution in Article 4 only grants the Common Pleas
Courts of Ohio jurisdiction over justiciable matters. See Section 4(B), Article
10
4, Ohio Constitution. A justiciable matter involves an actual controversy.
11
When the foreclosing Plaintiff does not own the note and mortgage at the
12
time the complaint is filed there is no justiciable controversy between the
13
plaintiff and the defendant homeowner, and thus no subject matter
14
jurisdiction.
15
16
17
18
"Subject-matter jurisdiction is fundamental. It defines the court's power to decide cases.

Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived; any decision entered without subject-matter
jurisdiction is void." Francis David Corp. v. Scrapbook Memories & More, 2010-0hio-82,~17
Citing Pratts v. Hurley, 102 OhioSUd81,2004-0hio-1980,~Il.
19
20
The lack of a justiciable controversy renders the judgment void ab
21
initio. Reed is still the true owner of the property and has the legal right to
22
bring claims against Plaintiff for wrongful foreclosure, trespass, slander of
23
title, reparations and damages.
24
25
26
The Court Lacks Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court of the State of Ohio has consistently and
repeatedly held that when a Court lacks jurisdiction, any judgment issued
27
by that court is void. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14, Barger's Lessee v.
28
Jackson, 9 Ohio 163, 164-165 (1839); Lincoln Tavern, Inc. v. Snader, 165
Ohio St. 61, 64, 133 N.E.2d 606 (1956); Westmoreland v. Valley Homes Mut.
Hous. Corp., 42 Ohio St.2d 291, 294, 328 N.E,2d 406 (1975); .Patton v.
Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 71, 518 N.E.2d 941 (1988). "`The effect of
determining that a judgment is void is well established. It is as though such
proceedings had never occurred; the judgment is a mere nullity and the
6
7
8
9
10
parties are in the same position as if there had been no judgment.'" State v.
Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, , 27,
quoting State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961,
, 12, quoting Romito v. Maxwell, 10 Ohio St.2d 266, 267-268, 227 N.E.2d
223 (1967). "As one Texas appellate court so aptly stated concerning a void
judgment, `it is good nowhere and bad everywhere. "' Cincinnati School.
11
Dist. Bd. of Edn. v, Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 87 Ohio St.3d 363, 367,
12
2000-Ohio-452, 721 N.E;2d 40, quoting Dews v. Floyd, 413 S.W.2d 800, 804
13
(Tex.Civ.App. 1967).
14
15
16
17
18
Further, The Supreme Court of the State of Ohio in Rufo Fed. Home
Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Rufo, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2012-A-0011, 2012Ohio-5930 held that, pursuant to Schwartzwald , courts of common pleas
have subject-matter jurisdiction over justiciable matters and that standing
to sue is required to make a justiciable case. Rufo at 28. Thus, without
19
standing, a case is not justiciable and the court lacks subject-matter
20
jurisdiction. Id. When the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, its
21
final judgment is void. Id . at 15. In any event, it is well settled that
22
[p]arties may not, by stipulation or agreement, confer subject-matter
23
jurisdiction on a court, where subject-matter jurisdiction is otherwise
24
lacking. Fox v. Eaton Corp ., 48 Ohio St.2d 236, 238 (1976), overruled on
25
other grounds by Manning v. Ohio State Library Bd. , 62 Ohio St.3d 24, 29
26
27
(1991). Further, this court has held that the lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and can be raised
28
for the first time on appeal. Smith v. Dietelbach, 11th Dist. Trumbull No.
2011-T-0007, 2011-Ohio-4308, 14.
3
4
Further, as was articulated in Bank of NY Mellon Trust Co. v. Shaffer,

2013-Ohio-3205 31
5
6
since the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and its
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
default judgment was therefore void, Shaffer was not required to comply with
the time requirements of Civ.R. 60(B) in order to be entitled to an order vacating the
judgment.
A courts authority to vacate a void judgment is not derived from the Rules of
Civil Procedure, but rather is an inherent power possessed by courts. Hoffman v. New
Life Fitness Centers, Inc . 116 Ohio App.3d 737, 739 (3d Dist.1996), appeal not
allowed by Supreme Court of Ohio at 78 Ohio St.3d 1464 (1997). Further, a judgment
rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void ab initio, and may be
vacated by virtue of the courts inherent power independent of the grounds for
vacation of judgments set forth in Civ.R. 60(B). Falk v. Wachs, 116 Ohio App.3d 716,
721 (9th Dist.1996). Thus, a motion to vacate a void judgment need not comply with
the requirements of Civ.R. 60(B). Id
Therefore, a common law motion to vacate a void judgment need not meet the
standards applicable to a Civ.R. 60(B) motion. State ex rel. DeWine at 7.
16
17
In the case at bar, since Plaintiff lacked the capacity to invoke the
18
courts jurisdiction, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and its
19
judgment was therefore void and there are therefore no time limits on the
20
Defendant to comply with.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
The Difference Between Standing And Real Party In Interest.

Proposition of law No. 1: a lack of standing may not
be cured or ratified pursuant to Civil Rule 17. 5
A. Standing Requires Injury In Fact Traceable To The
Defendant's Unlawful Conduct.
B. A Real Party In Interest Status Is Limited To The Person
Entitled To Enforce The Right Sued Upon.
28
1
2
C. A Lack Of Standing May Not Be Cured Or Ratified Pursuant

To Civil Rule 17.
Standing Is A Necessary Component Of The Jurisdiction Of Ohio's
Common Pleas Courts.

Proposition Of Law No. 2: In Order To Invoke The
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Of The Common Pleas Court,

A Plaintiff Must Have Standing At The Time The
Complaint Is Filed.
A. Standing Is Necessary To Render A Dispute Justiciable.
B. To Invoke The Jurisdiction Of A Common Pleas Court In Ohio
A Plaintiff Must Present A Justiciable Controversy Over
Which The Court Has Statutory Jurisdiction.
C. Standing May Be Based Only on The Plaintiffs Rights.
D. In Order To Invoke The Subject Matter Jurisdiction Of The
Common Pleas Court, A Plaintiff Must Have Standing At The
Time The Complaint Is Filed.
15
To Have Standing To Enforce A Negotiable Instrument A
16
Plaintiff Must Be A Person Entitled To Enforce The Note Under R.C.
17
1303.31. 17
18
Proposition Of Law No. 3: In Order To Have Standing
19
To Sue On A Defaulted Note, The Plaintiff Must Be A
20
Person Entitled To Enforce The Instrument When The
21
Complaint Is Filed. 17
A. To Have Standing To Enforce A Negotiable Instrument, The
22
23
24
Plaintiff Must Be A Person Entitled To Enforce The

Instrument
B. In Order To Have Standing To Sue On A Defaulted Note, The
25
Plaintiff Must Prove A Complete Chain Of Title To The
26
Instrument
27
28
C. In Order To Have Standing To Sue On A Defaulted Note, The
Plaintiff Must Be A Person Entitled To Enforce The
Instrument When The Complaint Is Filed.
Assignment Of The Mortgage After Suit Is Filed Is Not A "Cure"
Recognized Under Civil Rule 17(A). 20

Proposition Of Law No. 4: A Plaintiff May Not Cure A
6
7
8
9
10
Real Party In Interest Defect Pursuant To Civ. R. 17 By

Acquiring An Interest In The Subject Of The Litigation
After The Complaint Is Filed
No statute of limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the
matters thought to be settled thereby are not res judicata.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Proposition of Law No 5: There is no statute of

limitations, res judicata, on a Motion for Void Judgment.
a judgment rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void
ab initio. Consequently, the authority to vacate a void judgment is not derived from
Civ. R. 60(B), but rather constitutes an inherent power possessed by Ohio courts.
See Staff Notes to Civ. R. 60(B); Lincoln Tavern, Inc. v. Snader (1956), 165 Ohio St. 61,
59 O.O. 74, 133 N.E.2d 606, paragraph one of the syllabus; Westmoreland v. Valley
Homes Corp. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 291, 294, 71 O.O. 2d 262, 264, 328 N.E.2d 406,
409.
PATTON v. DIEMERNo. 86-1867. 35 Ohio St. 3d 68 (1988)
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In October 2012 the State of Ohios Supreme Court (OSC) released its
decision (see Schwartzwald decision below) in an on point, actually a
mirror image, of Defendants case striking at the very heart of the same
exact standing issues raised numerous times by Defendant in this case. This
courts present ruling in the case at bar stands in direct contravention to
this States Supreme Court decisions.
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Hence, in accordance with the State of Ohios Supreme Court
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2
decision, when Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on February 27th 2008 Plaintiff did
not have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, because it
had not yet been assigned the alleged mortgage, and it could not
cure this lack of standing through the later filing of the mortgage
6
7
assignment (as explained below) on March 27th, 2008. Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017,Id. at para. 41.
Therefore, this Courts November 13th 2008 decision granting a
foreclosure action in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant is now and has
10
forever been VOID, Stare decisis .
11
So now comes the Defendant who motions this Court to deliver a
12
VOID JUDGEMENT in rem ruling in this matter which would be consistent
13
with the on point Decisions rendered by the State of Ohios Supreme
14
Courts unanimous October 31, 2012 holding in Federal Home Loan
15
Mortgage Corporation v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017, in the 11th
16
Districts Appellate Courts Decision rendered in the Federal Home Loan
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Mortgage Corp. v. Rufo, 11th Dist. No. 2012-A-0011, 2012-Ohio-5930, and
18
the 9th Districts Appellate Court Decision rendered in the Wells Fargo Bank
19
N.A. v. Horn, 2013-Ohio-2374 and in Bank of NY Mellon Trust Co. v. Shaffer,
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2013-Ohio-3205. Decisions which are all on point and authoritative cases

and which mirror exactly the facts supported in Defendants case ie.,
Plaintiff trust/trustee did not ever establish an interest, nor can it now
establish an interest in the mortgage or promissory note in order to have
standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court before doing
so!
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Subject matter jurisdiction is a court's power to hear and decide a case on the merits." Morrison
v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86 (1972), paragraph one of the syllabus. "Because subject-matter
jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to adjudicate the merits of a case, it can never be
waived and may be challenged at any time." Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-
1980, 11. When the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, its final judgment is void. Id. at
12
In the context of a mortgage foreclosure action, the mortgage holder must establish an
interest in the mortgage or promissory note in order to have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of
the common pleas court. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, Ohio St.3d, 2012Ohio-5017, 28.
2
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4
5
Relevant Factual Background
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8
9
On February 27th, 2008 (Ex A) , Plaintiff filed the foreclosure

complaint in this action. No Assignment of Mortgage was attached to the
filing.
10
As of March 6th, 2008 the alleged mortgage at issue had not been
11
assigned allegedly from whoever the previous unproven and alleged
12
holder/owner was, to Plaintiff herein. falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.
13
On August 26th, 2008 (182 days after foreclosure initiation) Plaintiff
14
filed a Notice of Assignment of Mortgage (ExD), which contained a,
15
Robo-Signed26 copy of both a conclusory affidavit titled AFFIDAVIT OF
16
STATUS OF ACCOUNT AND MILITARY AFFIDAVIT Ex I (Love affidavit)
17
and a back dated recorded alleged assignment of Defendants mortgage to
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Plaintiff. (The Assignment, attached hereto as Ex E). Both are signed by

one Topaka Love.
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26
Georgetown Law, The Scholarly Commons. Adam J. Levitin, Tara Twomey 2011,pg 29. More generally, servicers attempts
to improve efficiency when dealing with defaulted loans have led them (and their attorneys) to cut corners in terms of legal
proceduremost notably in the form of robosigning. In the fall of 2010, depositions taken in foreclosure cases by
homeowners attorneys indicated that major servicers were routinely filing fraudulent affidavits with courts. There are
numerous types of affidavits that can be filed in a foreclosure case, but the most common are those attesting to the status of
the loan, namely its default status and the amount owed, and lost note affidavits that attest to the original mortgage note
being lost. Absent personal knowledge by the affiant of the facts alleged in the affidavit, such affidavits would be
hearsay. Thus, such affidavits typically claim personal knowledge. Yet, in depositions it emerged that major servicers had
professional affiants who signed perhaps as many as 10,000 affidavits a month (roughly one a minute, assuming a forty-hour
work week), claiming personal knowledge of facts about which they had absolutely no knowledge. Robosigning is a practice
borne out of the attempt to automate the management of defaulted loans in the name of efficiency, but it collides squarely with
the legal procedures required by statute and which are priced into the cost of the mortgage. Available for free at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324023
Plaintiff recorded the Assignment on March 27th, 2008 or 29 days
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2
after the foreclosure lawsuit filing.
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5
On Sept. 8th, 2008 Plaintiff filed notification to the Court that it now
finally had in its possession the original Note and Mortgage at issue
ex H. A Full 194 days after initiating this foreclosure action.
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8
On November 13th, 2008 the Court granted Plaintiffs judgment and

entered a decree of foreclosure against Defendant.
On February 9, 2012, DOJ and 49 State attorneys general announced
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a proposed settlement of $25 billion with Wells Fargo and four other
mortgage servicers for their reported violations of foreclosure
requirements.
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Now comes the Defendant to motion this Court to VOID its previously
released decision in this matter as is mandated by State Law and Law in
equity.
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17
On November 16, 2010 the United States Congress published a report
18
that analyzed the legal consequences of failing to comply with the Pooling
19
and Servicing Agreements of the trusts.
20
"In order to convey good title into the trust and provide the trust with both good title to
21
the collateral and the income from the mortgages, each transfer in this process required particular
22
steps. Most PSAs are governed by New York law and create trusts governed by New York law.
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New York trust law requires strict compliance with the trust documents; any transaction by the
24
trust that is in contravention of the trust documents is void, meaning the transaction cannot
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Report by the OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Titled: Wells Fargo Bank Foreclosure and Claims Process Review Fort Mill, SC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF AUDIT REGION IV ATLANTA, GA
MEMORANDUM OF REVIEW MEMORANDUM NO. 2012-AT-1801
MARCH 12, 2012
actually take place as a matter of law. Therefore, if the transfer for the notes and mortgages did
not comply with the PSA, the transfer would be void, and the assets would not have been
3
4
transferred to the trust. Moreover, in many cases the assets could not now be transferred to the
trust. PSAs generally require that loans transferred to the trust not be in default, which would
prevent the transfer of any non-performing loans to the trust now. Furthermore, PSAs frequently
have timeliness requirements regarding the transfer in order to ensure that the trusts qualify for
favored tax treatment." Congressional Oversight Panel, Examining the Consequences of
Mortgage Irregularities for Financial Stability and Foreclosure Mitigation, November16, 2010
8
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10
page 19.
Section 11.04 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement states that the
governing law for the trust is the substantive laws of the State of New York.
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Under New York Trust Law "every sale, conveyance or other act of the
trustee in contravention of the trust...is void."New York Estates, Powers
andTrusts7-2.4.
The Pooling and Servicing Agreement is the governing document for
16
the trust and is has a particular cutoff date. Any assignment in
17
contravention of the cut-off date is void.
18
In addition, Defendant John Reed's alleged note does not have an
19
indorsement. Not only was the assignment of mortgage executed two plus
20
years after the trusts own cut-off date, but Defendant's alleged note does
21
not have any indorsement to the trust. Plaintiff clearly does not own
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Defendants' alleged note and mortgage.
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A Fraud Committed On The Court
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"He who comes into equity must come with clean hands."
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On August 26th, 2008 (when) Plaintiff and Plaintiffs Counsel (who)(who
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have a duciary and condential relationship )
& where)
copy of a recorded, alleged assignment of Defendants mortgage to Plaintiff.
(what) (The Assignment, attached hereto as Ex E). Plaintiff recorded the
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7
filed into this courts records (how
a Notice of Assignment of Mortgage (ExD), which contained a
alleged Assignment on March 27th, 2008 or 29 days after the foreclosure

lawsuit filing.28 29
Once a fraud, always a fraud
Blacks Legal Dictionary defines forge as:
10
To fabricate, construct, or prepare one thing in imitation of another thing, with the
intention of substituting the false for the genuine, or otherwise deceiving and defrauding by
the use of the spurious article. To counterfeit or make falsely. Especially, to make a spurious
written instrument with the intention of fraudulently substituting it for another, or of
passing it off as genuine; or to fraudulently alter a genuine instrument to anothers
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prejudice; or to sign another persons name to a document, with a deceitful and

fraudulent intent. Emphasis mine
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Be it known to this court that through each and every of Defendants
16
pleadings he has repeatedly shown and proved to this Court that Plaintiff
17
and Plaintiffs Counsel have brought fraudulent and forged documents into
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28
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Claims sounding in fraud are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which
requires that a plaintiff alleging fraud must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud. See Kearns v. Ford
Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009). To satisfy Rule 9(b), a pleading must identify the who, what, when, where, and
how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false or misleading about [the purportedly fraudulent] statement, and why it is
false. United States ex rel Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc. , 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011)
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The above mentioned Affidavit and
Assignment of Mortgage are the solely signed
documents Plaintiff presented to the court in their case to establish their ownership
of the alleged Note & Mortgage and their subsequent right to initiate foreclosure suit
against Defendant
this court in their alleged delivery of truth to this court30 which constitute
criminal actions against Defendant as described in ORC 2913.01 (A), (B),
(C)(2)(3), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (K), (1)(2)(3)(4), (L), (M), (N), (O), (R), (T),
(W), (X), (Y), (DD), (II) (1)(a) (b) (d) which constitute fraudulent
concealment.
Blacks Legal Dictionary defines fraudulent concealment as;
The affirmative suppression or hiding, with the intent to deceive or defraud, of a
material fact or circumstance that one is legally (or, sometimes, morally) bound to reveal.
Also termed hidden fraud. [Cases: Fraud 16.]
On February 9, 2012, DOJ and 49 State attorneys general announced
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a proposed settlement of $25 billion with Wells Fargo and four other
mortgage servicers for their reported violations of foreclosure
requirements.
31
As reported within the Report by the OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN

DEVELOPMENT Titled: Wells Fargo Bank Foreclosure and Claims Process
Review Fort Mill, SC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF
16
AUDIT REGION IV ATLANTA, GA MEMORANDUM OF REVIEW
17
MEMORANDUM NO. 2012-AT-1801 MARCH 12, 2012, and attached to this
18
pleading, is a U.S. Govt. Report referencing the illegalities Plaintiff has
19
already previously been found guilty of concerning the falsification and
20
fabrication of forged and fraudulent documentation Plaintiff routinely
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30
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MOTION TO APPEAL THE DECISION, ORDER AND ENTRY OVERRULING DEFENDANTS EMERGENCY
AMENDED MOTION TO VACATE A VOID JUDGMENT at 17
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31
Report by the OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Titled: Wells Fargo Bank Foreclosure and Claims Process Review Fort Mill, SC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF AUDIT REGION IV ATLANTA, GA
MEMORANDUM OF REVIEW MEMORANDUM NO. 2012-AT-1801
MARCH 12, 2012
created to enable themselves to unjustly foreclose not only on Defendants
home but on homes Nationwide. In the section titled
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RESULTS OF REVIEW
on page 4 we find:
Wells Fargo did not establish effective control over its foreclosure process. This failure
permitted a control environment in
which The affiants routinely signed and certified that they had personal knowledge of the
contents of documents, including affidavits, without the benefit of supporting documentation and without
reviewing the source documents referred to in the affidavits and verifying the accuracy of the foreclosure
information stated in the affidavits. A number of affidavit signers admitted having signed up to 600
documents per day.
A number of employees engaged as robosigners had little or no education beyond high school
and little or no experience in banking or real estate.
Work histories (when available) showed a lack of qualifications to hold the titles held by affiants;
for example, vice president of loan documentation. Moreover, interviews disclosed that the titles were
given for the sole purpose of allowing the individual to sign documents and came with no other duties or
authority.
Employees who notarized documents, including affidavits, routinely did not
witness the signature of the documents and notarized up to 1,000 documents per day. An
affiant is a person who signs an affidavit and attests to its truthfulness before a notary
public.
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This flawed control environment resulted in Wells Fargos filing improper legal
documents, thereby misrepresenting its claims to HUD, and may have exposed it to
potential liability under the False Claims Act.
And on page 5 under the heading Questionable Affidavit and

Foreclosure Document Processes we can find yet even more proof of
Plaintiffs callous disregard for the rule of law;
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Wells Fargo failed to follow HUD requirements for properties it foreclosed

upon in judicial foreclosure jurisdictions. These provisions required it to obtain and
convey to the Secretary of HUD good and marketable title to properties. Wells Fargo
may have conveyed improper titles to HUD because it did not establish a control
environment which ensured that affiants performed a due diligence review of the facts
submitted to courts and that employees properly notarized documents.
Based upon the results of our review, Wells Fargos practices may have exposed
it to liability under the False Claims Act for submitting the claims for insurance benefits
to FHA without following HUD requirements. We provided our preliminary findings to
DOJ for its assessment and determination on any potential liability issues.
28
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Judicial foreclosures were processed through the court system beginning with
Wells Fargos filing a complaint or petition regarding a mortgage purportedly in default.
The formal legal document stated what the debt was and why the default should allow
Wells Fargo to foreclose on the property. In many judicial foreclosures, an affidavit was
part of the foreclosure documentation. Generally, a representative of Wells Fargo swore
in a notarized affidavit that Wells Fargo owned or held the mortgage in question and that
the borrower was in arrears. As judicial jurisdictions routinely resolved foreclosures
through summary judgment, the accuracy and propriety of the documents were essential
to ensure the integrity of the foreclosure process.
Wells Fargo used a flawed process to submit FHA conveyance claims for
judicially foreclosedupon properties during the review period and received FHA claim
payments of more than $1.7 billion.
But wait theres more! On page 5 as it concerns Robo signed
11
documents under the heading titled oddly enough Affiants Robo
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signed Foreclosure Documents we find more evidence of the creation of
13
fraud where the report states:
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We interviewed a total of 22 affidavit signers and reviewed a sample of 14 loan

foreclosure files with FHA-paid claims and titles conveyed to HUD. In all 14 cases, the
affidavits were robosigned. Overall, the interviews indicated that the affidavit signers
signed the great majority of the judgment affidavits without personal knowledge of or
otherwise verifying the data and information contained in the affidavits they signed.
Affidavit signers signed hundreds of foreclosure affidavits per day, and most only verified
that their name was properly typed on the document as the signer of the affidavit. Many
said that they did not read the affidavits. Many told us that a notary was not present
when they signed the affidavits. These persons did the vast majority of the affidavit
signing. A few affidavit signers who told us that they did verify the data in the affidavits
did not routinely sign affidavits and reported signing very few affidavits during
our scope.
We also reviewed personnel files and questioned whether these individuals
possessed the qualifications (education, work experience, or training) and expertise
typically required to verify the content of the affidavits before signing them. Reviews of
personnel files and the interviews also raised concerns that Wells Fargo may have hired
and designated unqualified persons as vice president of loan documentation, with the
sole responsibility as vice president being to sign affidavits. For example, immediately
before Wells Fargo hired an individual to be vice president of loan documentation, the
person worked at a pizza restaurant and as a bank teller. Another had been a department
store cashier and daycare worker, while another had worked on the production line in a
factory. These same persons also often worked in other positions at Wells Fargo,
generally without a direct relationship to foreclosure affidavits. These persons told us
that Wells Fargo gave them the title vice president of loan documentation for the sole
purpose of having them sign affidavits. Most affidavit signers told us that they did not
have the related education or work history to prepare them to sign the affidavits. They
also told us that Wells Fargo did not provide them training when they began signing
affidavits. It wasnt until October
2010 that training began and then only as result of our review.
2
3
4
5
Affidavit signers and midlevel managers responsible for the affidavits told us
that Wells Fargo management was aware that they did not read or verify the information
in the affidavits that they signed. Several persons we interviewed said that they had
expressed concerns about signing the affidavits (such as swearing that they had personal
knowledge of the loan and had verified the documents content when they had not).
Affidavit signers informed upper management that they could not handle the workload.
Wells Fargo management did not correct the problem and, instead, in a March 2008
email, reduced the timeframes for processing the affidavits from 5 to 7 days to 24 to 48
hours, and the affidavit signers were required to sign the affidavits they received each
day at 9 a.m. by 12 p.m. that same day, often signing in excess of 100 affidavits during
that time. The following are excerpts from the email:
The Doc executable team is working very hard to obtain a 48 hour
turnaround time for our docs. Due to attorney feedback and our wonderful
challenging environment, this 48 hour turnaround time is critical.The doc
Executable team will deliver all docs to you for signature by 9:00 EST. We need
the docs signed by 12:00. In order to accommodate this schedule I want to
encourage you to schedule 30 minutes in your calendar each day so that we can
accomplish this turntime. (Name intentionally withheld) will work with each group to
develop a pickup location for each group at 12:00.
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For the case at Bar the time frames listed above are of critical
19
importance as,
Plaintiffs conclusory Affidavit of Status (Ex I) was allegedly
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23
created on Feb. 28th, 2008

Plaintiffs untimely created and submitted Assignment of
Mortgage (Ex E) was allegedly created on March 8th, 2008.

The above mentioned report states that its investigation:
Our review generally covered Wells Fargos foreclosure and claims
processes for its FHA claims initially processed by HUD between October 1,
2008, and September 30, 2010, including its procedures for signing and
notarizing sworn judgment affidavits. The review included judicial foreclosure
States and jurisdictions, which provided a broad overview of Wells Fargos
practices and compliance with requirements.
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26
27
28
And also:
Wells Fargo management did not correct the problem and, instead, in a
March 2008 email, reduced the timeframes for processing the affidavits from 5 to
1
2
7 days to 24 to 48 hours, and the affidavit signers were required to sign the
affidavits they received each day at 9 a.m. by 12 p.m. that same day, often
signing in excess of 100 affidavits during that time.
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5
6
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The report continues on in the section titled Notaries Did Not

Witness Signatures to explain how:
Wells Fargo did not establish a control environment which ensured that its
notaries met their responsibilities under State laws that required them to witness affiants
signatures of documents they notarized. We also interviewed 11 notaries, and they
reported notarizing documents without seeing the person sign the affidavit. Some
notaries told us that they let others use their notary stamp to notarize affidavits. Some
notaries also told us that they notarized documents that were unsigned. Notaries told us
that Wells Fargo did not initially provide them training when they began notarizing
affidavits. It wasnt until October 2010 that training began and then only as result of our
review. Wells Fargo management, in a March 2008 email, established procedures for the
notaries not to witness the affiant signing the affidavits. The following is an excerpt from
the email:
Notaries: - Docs will be delivered to you by 12:30 pm each day and we will
need these docs notarized by 2:00pm EST each day. I want to encourage each of you
to schedule time in your calendar to accomplish this task.
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Because this type of deficiency undermined the integrity of the control

environment, the affidavits and other foreclosure documents submitted by Wells Fargo
were unreliable and inauthentic, exposing it to potential False Claims Act liability.
And finally the Report states in its CONCLUSION:

Wells Fargo did not establish an effective control environment to ensure the
integrity of its foreclosure process. Because it failed to establish proper policies and
procedures to ensure compliance with laws and regulations, its affiants robosigned
foreclosure documents, and its notaries failed to authenticate signatures. As a result of its
flawed control environment, Wells Fargo engaged in improper practices by not fully
complying with applicable foreclosure procedures when processing foreclosures on FHAinsured loans. This flawed control environment resulted in Wells Fargos filing improper
legal documents, thereby misrepresenting its claims to HUD.
During the period October 1, 2008, through September 30, 2010, Wells Fargo
submitted 14,420 conveyance claims for payment in the 23 States and jurisdictions
totaling about $1.7 billion. DOJ used our review and analysis in negotiating the
settlement agreement.
28
Once the settlement agreement is approved by the court, OIG will issue a
separate summary memorandum to HUD containing recommendations to correct
weaknesses discussed in this and the other four memorandums. Accordingly, this
memorandum contains no recommendations.
2
3
4
Further, Plaintiffs submission of the above same mentioned
fraudulent documents also constitutes Plaintiffs exhibition of Defendants
identity theft as is outlined in ORC 2913.49 (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (H), (I).
Plaintiff also violates ORC 2913.43 Securing writings by deception
2913.43 (A), (B)., 2913.42 Tampering with records 2913.42 (A)(1)(2), (B)
(1)(4). , 2921.13 Falsification 2921.13 (A)(1)(2)(3)(7)(8)(9)(11)(12)(13),
10
11
12
(E), (F)(1)(2)(3).
These acts and those above prove theft as is described in ORC
2913.02.
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14
The fraudulent nature (several aspects) of the above referenced post
15
foreclosure initiation of Plaintiffs submission of a forged and fraudulently
16
created, Assignment of Mortgage & Plaintiffs above referenced conclusory
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32 33 34
, to which this court was given judicial notice35
36
Affidavit
raise serious aspersions as to the validity of the truthfulness of Plaintiffs
representations, also to which this court was given judicial notice37 they,
along with now common knowledge made by the Public admissions of guilt
and/or payment of criminal penalties by Plaintiff in actions related as same
6
7
8
9
to the case at Bar, clearly shows scienter38 and the necessity for Sanctions
against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs Counsel. And Defendant motions this court
for same. O.R.C. 1336.04 A. & B. falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.
32
10
Answer of Defendant John Reed (5/26/2008) 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and throughout the rest
of the pleadings.
11
12
more than
33
13
14
Answer of Defendant John A. Reed Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment and
Request For Trial By Jury (filed Aug, 15th, 2008) The opening statement Firstly, You Honor, the plaintiff hasnt even
proven that it owned or held the promissory note which is the subject of the complaint 1, 2,
15
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17
34
18
Each and every other pleading and/or paper submitted by Defendant and already a part of this legal actions record.
19
20
35
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MOTION FOR WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE at 6, 11 15.
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36
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AMENDED MOTION TO VACATE A VOID JUDGMENT at 4.
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27
37
28
Be it also known to this court that Plaintiffs have also brought libel39
unto the Defendant in this case and that Defendant has previously brought
this and more counterclaims and defenses to the attention of this court and
by this pleading does reaffirm each and every other defense and
counterclaim raised by Defendant throughout the entirety of his pleadings.
Law and Argument
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9
A Thing is void which was done against Law at the very Time of the
doing it, and no Person is bound by such an Act; but a Thing is only
10
voidable which is done by a person who ought not to have done it, but who
11
nevertheless cannot avoid it himself after it is done; though it may by some
12
Act in Law be made void by his Heir, etc. MATHEW BACON, A NEW
13
ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 337 (His Majestys Law-Printers) (1766),
14
available at;
15
16
17
18
Defendants Answer to Plaintiff Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant J. A. Reeds

Motion to Vacate at 14.
38
19
Blacks Law Dictionary defines scienter as [a] degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the
consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an acts having been done knowingly, esp. as a ground for civil
damages or criminal punishment. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1463 (9th ed. 2009).
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22
39
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ANSWER OF DEFENDANT pg. 11 para., 3, pg 12 para. 1, AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT pg. 15, para. 1,
DEFENDANTS Motion for Reconsideration pg. 4 at 5., DEFENDANT JOHN A. REEDS MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT JOHN A. REEDS MOTION TO
VACATE pg., 13, at 3. DEFENDANT JOHN A. REEDS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT JOHN A. REEDS MOTION TO VACATE pg. 14, Amended Motion to
Vacate a Void Judgment and Appeal on questions of law and fact, pg. 7 at 6, pg 8, 9. & throughout each and every pleading and or
paper Defendant has brought into this court.
28
1
2
3
http://www.archive.org/stream/ newabridgementof05baco#page/336/mode/2up
(emphasis added)
In Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Schwarzwald, et al.,
(attached as Auth.1) a case recently decided by the Ohio Supreme Court,
plaintiff bank brought a foreclosure lawsuit before it had obtained an
assignment of mortgage securing defendant homeowners loan. Defendants
maintained that plaintiff lacked standing to sue (same as Defendant
previously contended in this case) because the assignment of mortgage had
not been recorded, prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Plaintiff was assigned
10
the mortgage via formal assignment, as here, only after the filing of the
11
lawsuit. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff, and the
12
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14
Second District Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that standing is a jurisdictional
requirement that must be satisfied to even initiate a foreclosure lawsuit:
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20
We recognized that standing is a jurisdictional requirement in State ex rel.

Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1973), 35 Ohio St. 2d 176, and we
stated: It is an elementary concept of law that a party lacks standing to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some
real interest in the subject matter of the action. (Emphasis added by the Court).
(Schwarzwald, attached hereto as Auth. 1 at para. 22).
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Further, the Court stated;

Because standing to sue is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common
pleas court, standing is to be determined as of the commencement of suit. Id. At para.
24. Invoking jurisdiction of the court, thus, depends on the state of things at the time the
action is brought, and not after. Id. At para. 25.
In reversing the Second District, the Supreme Court included:

The lack of standing at the commencement of a foreclosure action requires
dismissal of the complaint[.] Id. At para. 40 (Emphasis added).
28
Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution confers upon courts of
common pleas original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and, as the
Ohio Supreme Court made clear in Schwartzwald, there is no justiciable
matter when a plaintiff lacks standing to sue. Schwartzwald at 20-21. That
holding conformed to the tenet of the United States Supreme Court:
6
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8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Standing to sue is part of the common sense understanding of what it takes to

make a justiciable case." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102,
118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed2d 210 (1998). Standing involves a determination of whether a
party has alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to ensure the dispute
will be presented in an adversarial context. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys. v. Petry,
11th Dist. No. 2008-P-0016, 2008-Ohio-5323, 18. A personal stake requires an injury
to the plaintiff. Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that standing is jurisdictional in
nature. State ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 35 Ohio St.2d
176, 179 (1973).
Whether standing exists is a matter of law that is reviewed de novo. Cuyahoga
Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. State, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, 23.
Without standing, a case is not justiciable, and courts of common
15
pleas have no authority to decide a case on its merits if the plaintiff has not
16
presented it with a justiciable matter.
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28
By bringing into the Court the fraudulently created and forged

documents above described Plaintiffs and their Counsel did violate in truth
and in spirit the letter of the law at section O.R.C. 1336.04 A. & B. titled
When transfer or obligation incurred is fraudulent as to a creditor. Which states:
(A) A transfer made or an obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to
a creditor, whether the claim of the creditor arose before, or within a reasonable time
not to exceed four years after, the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred,
if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation in either of the following
ways:
(1) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor;
(2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer
or obligation, and if either of the following applies:
(a) The debtor was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a
transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction;
(b) The debtor intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have
believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's
ability to pay as they became due.
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2
3
4
5
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14
(B) In determining actual intent under division (A)(1) of this section,

consideration may be given to all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the
following:
(1) Whether the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(2) Whether the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred
after the transfer;
(3) Whether the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(4) Whether before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, the
debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;
(5) Whether the transfer was of substantially all of the assets of the debtor;
(6) Whether the debtor absconded;
(7) Whether the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(8) Whether the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation
incurred;
(9) Whether the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(10) Whether the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial
debt was incurred;
(11) Whether the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a
lienholder who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
Amended by 129th General Assembly File No.201,HB 479, 1, eff. 3/27/2013.
Effective Date: 09-28-1990
15
16
17
18
The trial court erred by granting Judgment to the benefit of the

Plaintiff where the Plaintiff failed to sustain its burden to prove that it had
standing to sue by providing evidence that it had both (1) possession of an
endorsed Note on the date the Complaint was filed and (2) ownership of the
19
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24
25
26
27
28
Mortgage on the date the Complaint was filed, as was articulated by
Defendant in each and every pleading offered in this case by same.
40 41 42
3
4
Further, Defendant has not only his right to defend this action but
Defendant is merely exercising his contractual duty as per the alleged
mortgage contract itself which states under the heading (1st page)
BORROWER COVENANTS;
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby
conveyed and has the right to mortgage, grant and convey the Property and that the Property is
10
unencumbered, except for encumbrances of record. Borrower warrants and will defend
11
generally the title to the Property against all claims and demands, subject to any encumbrances
of record.
12
13
Especially, when more recently, it has come to light that there are
14
potentially fatal irregularities in the mortgage origination and securitization
15
pooling process. The impact of these irregularities are far broader, affecting
16
a vast number of investors in the residential mortgage-backed securities
17
40
18
19
20
21
22
Answer of Defendant John Reed (5/26/2008) 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23, and throughout the rest of the entirety of his pleadings.
41
23
24
25
26
Answer of Defendant John A. Reed Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment and Request For
Trial By Jury (filed Aug, 15th, 2008) The opening statement Firstly, You Honor, the plaintiff hasnt even proven that it owned
or held the promissory note which is the subject of the complaint 1, 2,
42
27
28
Each and every other pleading submitted by Defendant and already a part of this legal actions record.
(RMBS) market. These irregularities would affect already completed
foreclosures, properties currently in foreclosure, delinquent borrowers and
current homeowners that are in the modification process.
In order for the securitization pooling process to work, banks
purchasing the mortgages had to physically convey the promissory note and
the mortgage into the trust. The note had to be endorsed (the way an
individual would endorse a check), and handed over to a document
custodian for the trust, with a mortgage assignment confirming the
transfer of ownership. And this had to be done before a 90-day cutoff date,
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14
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18
19
with no grace period beyond that.

Georgetown Law professor Adam Levitin spelled this out in testimony
before Congress in 2010:
To this sad state of affairs, there now come a variety of additional problems: faulty
foreclosures due to irregularities ranging from procedural defects (including, but not
limited to robosigning) to outright counterfeiting of documents; predatory servicing
practices that precipitate borrower defaults and then overcharge for foreclosure services that
are ultimately paid for by investors; and questions about the validity of transfers in private-label
mortgage securitizations. While the extent of these problems is unknown at present, the
evidence is mounting that they are not limited to one-off cases, but that there may be
pervasive defects throughout the mortgage servicing and securitization processes. If
mortgages were not properly transferred in the securitization process, then mortgage-backed
securities would in fact not be backed by any mortgages whatsoever. 43
20
21
43
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
See GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER
Written Testimony of Adam J. Levitin,
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Before the House
Financial Services Committee Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity RoboSinging, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing
November 18, 2010,
10:00 am
Opening of Executive Summary.
The lawful and enforceable transfer of interests in real estate depends
on parties to the transaction being able to answer three simple questions:

1. who owns the property?
2. How did they come to own it?
3. And is there another party that can make a competing claim to it?
The documentary irregularities in securitized mortgage transactions
2
3
and perhaps the securitized mortgage business model itself have the
potential to make these three seemingly simple questions extremely
complex.
Even outside a foreclosure scenario, in order for a possessor of an
10
interest in real property to be able to lawfully affect title, that person or
11
entity must have an interest under color of law. This means that parties
12
seeking to transfer, subordinate, encumber, satisfy, modify or bring an
13
action pursuant to their interest in real property must be able to prove that
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they are in fact the possessor of those rights. This is a threshold

requirement that is codified and expanded by common law in all 50 states.
With reference to foreclosure of mortgages, a party seeking to enforce
the rights associated with a mortgage must prove that it is a real party in
interest to have standing in court. The Restatement of Property (Third)
states:
Only the proven mortgagee may maintain a foreclosure action. The requirement
that a foreclosure action be brought only by the actual mortgagee is at the heart of the
issues with foreclosure irregularities. If the homeowner or the court challenges the claim
of the party bringing a foreclosure action that it is the mortgagee (and was when the
foreclosure was filed), then evidentiary issues arise as to whether the party bringing the
foreclosure can in fact prove that it is the mortgagee. The issues involved are highly
complex areas of law, but despite the complexity of these issues, they should not be
dismissed as mere technicalities. Rather, they are legal requirements that must be
observed both as part of due process and as part of the contractual bargain made
between borrowers and lenders. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
MORTGAGES 5.4(c) (1997).
Mortgages may be enforced only by, or on behalf of, the entity that is
entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage secures. The underlying
28
obligation in all cases is a promissory note. The mortgage is the security
instrument that secures the indebtedness created by the note to the real
property.
Additionally, due solely to the now common knowledge (it was even on
60 Minutes!) matter of what has been unaffectionately termed Robo-
Signing44
Public admissions (and payment of fines concerning same) of participation
in the that very same illegal action on a daily, monthly and yearly basis,
Defendant submits and requests the Courts Judicial Notice of the
10
11
45
AND now common knowledge of Plaintiff Wells Fargo Banks
recently and previously unavailable Affidavit and accompanying letter

attached hereto as Exhibit F stating in part;
12
In an attempt to provide you with more assistance, I have enclosed, an affidavit signed by me,
13
as Register of the Southern Essex District Registry of Deeds, attesting to the presence of a robo-
14
signed signature on your document as listed on McDonnell Property Ana1ytics Approved Robo-
15
signers List. If you are currently being foreclosed upon, this affidavit may be presented to your
attorney, the lender, or the court to show that your chain of title has been corrupted.
16
17
The above referenced Affidavit attests to the unlawful and known
18
Robo-Signer signature status of Plaintiffs Assignment of Mortgage (Ex
19
E) as well as signature status of Plaintiffs sole proffered and alleged legal
20
conclusory Affidavit titled STATUS OF ACCOUNT AND MILITARY STATUS
21
44
22
23
The term "robosigning" does not accurately describe the pattern and practice. The pattern and practice are more accurately
described as contract perjury, contract forgery, evidence fabrication, fraud upon the Court, and theft in which families are
rendered homeless as a result of criminal behavior.
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45
The practice from investopedia, "In the third and fourth quarters of 2010, a robo-signing scandal emerged in the United States
involving GMAC Mortgage and a number of major U.S banks. Banks had to halt thousands of foreclosures in numerous states
when it became known that the paperwork was illegitimate because the signers had not actually reviewed it. While some robosigners were middle managers, others were temporary workers with virtually no understanding of the work they were doing."
AFFIDAVIT (Ex. F) which are signed by one Topaka Love, as was
previously articulated to this Court by Defendant in all of Defendants
previous pleadings. The above mentioned conclusory Affidavit and
Assignment of Mortgage are the solely signed documents Plaintiff
presented to the court in their case to establish their ownership of the
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14
alleged Note & Mortgage and their subsequent right to initiate foreclosure
suit against Defendant.
The above Love conclusory affidavit represents that it is based on
Loves familiarity with Defendants account stating Affiant has access of
and has personal knowledge of the accounts of said company, and
specifically with the account of John L. Reed, defendant herein. Love also
avers that said account is in default and that plaintiff has elected to call
the entire balance of said account due and payable... While the Love
Affidavit states that Loves personal knowledge is limited to her review of
Option One Mortgage Co. as Servicing Agent for Plaintiff, Love fails to
15
identify, describe or annex the particular business records upon which her
16
limited knowledge is based.
17
18
Significantly, the Love Moving Affidavit makes the conclusory

representation that plaintiff has been in continuous possession of the note
19
and mortgage since prior to the commencement of this action without
20
providing any factual details, or the source of Loves knowledge. In addition
21
to a lack of foundation, the Love Moving Affidavit fails to provide evidence
22
that the originating lender, H&R Block Inc., indorsed and physically
23
delivered the Reed Note to the Asset Backed Receivables Trust.
24
Defendant has repeatedly denied plaintiffs motion on the ground that
25
Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank as Trustee for trust lacks standing to foreclose.
26
Specifically, Defendant contends and has always contended that Love lacked
27
actual authority to execute the Option One Assignment.
28
The above referenced affidavit of John Obrien, combined with the
1
2
several other factual inconsistencies the Defendant has previously
articulated to this Court46
position, a position which is completely void of legal standing to have
initiated this foreclosure action against Defendant, could not have been
6
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8
47 48 49
, prove beyond any doubt that Plaintiffs
accomplished without the use of, and even with this court and opposing
Counsel having been given judicial notice by Defendant of same,50 forged
and fraudulently created documents, created specifically by and delivered
46
10
11
12
Answer of Defendant John Reed (5/26/2008) 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20,
13
21, 22, 23, and throughout the rest of the pleadings.
14
47
15
16
Answer of Defendant John A. Reed Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment and Request For
Trial By Jury (filed Aug, 15th, 2008) The opening statement Firstly, You Honor, the plaintiff hasnt even proven that it owned
or held the promissory note which is the subject of the complaint 1, 2,
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19
48
Each and every other pleading submitted by Defendant and already a part of this legal actions record.
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49
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AMENDED MOTION TO VACATE A VOID JUDGMENT in its entirety
50
MOTION TO APPEAL THE DECISION, ORDER AND ENTRY OVERRULING DEFENDANTS EMERGENCY AMENDED
MOTION TO VACATE A VOID JUDGMENT at 4 thru 16, 35, 45, 46, 47,48, 50, 52, 58, 60, 67, 239, 240, 241, 242, .
into this Court by Plaintiff and Plaintiffs Counsel for the sole purpose of
blinding this Court to the legal realities of their position and situation which
then lead to the ultimate theft of Defendants home, loss of Defendants
personal and business inventory and possessions, forced homelessness upon
Defendant and became the cause of Defendants mental injury while
6
7
allowing Plaintiffs own unjust enrichment.

Once again, I would bring to this courts attention that Plaintiff is in
reality a REMIC Trust and as such its legal actions are bound in their
entirety within a legally controlling document titled the Pooling and
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14
Servicing Agreement (PSA) (publicly available at www.SEC.gov) and found

within that same PSA at Section 10.03 is an election by the parties to the
Trust for the Trust to be governed under the laws of the State of New York.
This Court would be required to consider the impact of the actions of any
party to the Trust agreement which violated the Trust agreement under
New York Law. Section 10.03 of the trusts own PSA states:
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19
Section 10.03 Governing Law. THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE CONSTRUED IN

ACCORDANCE WITH AND GOVERNED BY THE SUBSTANTIVE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK APPLICABLE TO AGREEMENTS MADE AND TO BE
PERFORMED IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND THE OBLIGATIONS, RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES OF THE PARTIES HERETO AND THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS SHALL BE
DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUCH LAWS.
Emphasis (BOLD) theirs
20
21
Relevant Mortgage Securitization History
22
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24
As stated in the NYSBA NY Business Law Journal |Summer 2012 |Vol.

16 |No. 1 pg. 77;
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The Mortgage Securitization Transaction In 1986, Congress changed the tax code. One
of these changes was the creation of the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC). A
REMIC or special purpose vehicle (SPV) is an entity that is created for the specific purpose of
being a tax-free pass-through for interest income generated by pooled mortgages. This allowed
investors to purchase shares or certificates in a mortgage pool that was only taxed once at the
investor level. The REMIC rules allowed the mortgage pools to collect interest income from the
pool and disburse that income to the certificate holders tax-free at the pool level. Prior to the
REMIC, interest income from pooled mortgage investments were taxed twice, once at the pool
level and again at the investor level.
REMIC rules are very specific,51 and to qualify as a REMIC under
federal and state tax codes, the SPV had to meet very stringent requirements. With respect to
RMBS the controlling trust document is known as the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA).
One function of the PSA is to establish the rules governing the trust such that the trusts
activities and management conform to IRC 860. If the trust did not conform, it could lose its
REMIC status and its tax-free pass-through status. 52
NYSBA NY Business Law Journal |Summer 2012 |Vol. 16 |No. 1 pg. 77
2
3
4
5
6
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9
The Trust agreement (known as the Pooling and Servicing Agreement

(PSA)) sets forth in its entirety how the trust acquires and is allowed to
10
acquire its assets and the Trust agreement sets forth both powers and the
11
limits of the powers of the Trust.
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51
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IRC 860 requires that, among other things, the REMIC trust be a closed entity and
bankruptcy remote. New Yorks Estate Powers & Trust laws were chosen by RMBS
sponsors (in the PSAs) as the controlling statutes to govern REMIC trusts, as the
EPTLs rules and concomitant common law establish common
22
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24
law trusts that conform
the REMIC tax free pass-through requirements. NYSBA NY Business Law Journal |Summer
2012 |Vol. 16 |No. 1 end note 7
52
25
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27
If a tax-free pass-through trust lost its REMIC status, the tax penalties to an investor that purchased certificates would be
devastating. It would also trigger an event called a put back. There was considerable argument over whether these trusts were
business trusts or common law trusts, but the trend appears to be a judicial recognition that they are in fact common law trusts.
NYSBA NY Business Law Journal |Summer 2012 |Vol. 16 |No. 1 end note 8
28
The PSA53 requires that each party to the sale of the mortgage loans
1
2
endorse each promissory note to the next party in the chain of title until
the promissory note is endorsed to the Trustee for the benefit of the Trust.
This requirement is included in the PSA and is found at Section 2.10.
5
6
According to the requirements set forth in the Trust Agreement (PSA)
7
8
there must be a series of endorsements of the promissory note reflective of
each party who had an ownership interest in the promissory note
10
11
culminating with a blank endorsement from the depositor at the very

minimum.
12
This chain of endorsements, or rather the lack thereof, in order to
13
comply with this PSA, would have had to be complete on or before the
14
closing date of the trust specified within the PSA of this securitization but
15
in no event more than 90 days from the closing date of the trust pursuant to
16
section 2.02(a). The absence of these endorsements on this promissory note
17
is not only very compelling proof of lack of note holder status, but also proof
18
19
20
of Plaintiffs fraud in producing the Assignment of Mortgage (Exhibit E)

which by the terms of the trusts own governing document (PSA) cannot and
does not legally exist.
21
Under either the terms of the trust, the contracts between the parties
22
23
24
25
or UCC 9 it requires the chain of title by the foreclosing entity to be

qualified as a PETE (person entitled to enforce). In other words, single
53
26
27
28
The Trusts Pooling and Servicing Agreement is a Public Document available here
http://www.secinfo.com/dRSm6.v8h.d.htm
endorsements in blank, and claiming that any party in possession of a note,
can enforce a note, even a thief, does not work.
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
The evidence in the collateral file shows an utter and complete failure
of the parties to this alleged securitization to actually convey this alleged
promissory note to this Trust as was articulated by the Defendant in each
and every previous pleading. The plaintiff Trust has offered no proof of
ownership and the collateral file offered by the defendant Trust clearly
demonstrates that this loan was not securitized nor was it ever transferred
to this Trust.
10
11
The Court should also be aware that Sections 2.07 d., e., h., 3.01 c.,
12
3.17 (h), 5.02, c, 8.11 of the PSA are all specific to the case at bar which set
13
forth further explicit restrictions on the powers of the Trustee, Depositor
14
and the Servicer of the trust and which prohibits the Trustee, Depositor
15
and the Servicer from taking any action which would jeopardize the REMIC
16
status of the Trust. These types of limitations are common and are present
17
in this or a similar form in every pooling and servicing agreement which
18
19
20
21
22
seeks to create a securitized trust that can claim the tax benefits of REMIC
status under the US Tax Code.
Any attempt to accept a transfer of this alleged Promissory note after
the January 26, 2006, 90 day closing date of the trust would have violated
both SEC code 424 & 1122 and the REMIC provisions of the IRS tax code 26
USC 860 A thru F -for a number of reasons.
23
24
a. First, the alleged loan is in default at this time. Therefore
25
the alleged loan cannot be a qualified mortgage loan under the
26
IRS tax code because a qualified mortgage loan is a performing
27
mortgage loan.
28
b. Second, an attempted transfer to the trust is now at a
point in time after the closing day of the Trust and after the
certificates were issued, in effect, the Plaintiff would be claiming to
have transferred an asset to a trust that had by its own terms been
closed for more than 2 years at the time the alleged transfer took
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7
place.
c. Third, the alleged promissory note was never endorsed to
the trust by the depositor and as such is devoid of the required
chain of endorsements required within the PSA and which any
10
reasonable market participant would expect to be present for the
11
purposes of establishing the series of true sales set forth in the
12
PSA to establish a whole and complete chain of title of the
13
promissory note for the purposes of bankruptcy remoteness.
14
d. Fourth, The claim that the alleged note has been
15
transferred to the Trust when it is endorsed in blank simply flies in
16
the face of the mandatory terms of the PSA and is an extreme
17
deviation from the industry standards, customs and practices
18
which prevailed at all times material to this transaction and which
19
prevail today.
20
21
22
e. Fifth, any transfer allowed to be accepted into the trust

past the trusts own cut-off date of deposits invokes the rather
draconian IRS mandate of taxing the REMIC trusts assets not at
23
the favorable rate of 0% that they now enjoy, but at the rate of
24
100% of the value of their assets causing, massive financial
25
losses to the Certificate Holder Investors.
26
27
28
Equally, by allowing a Deposit into the trust after the trusts closing
date as Plaintiffs Assignment of Mortgage alleges, Plaintiff Wells Fargo
Bank as Trustee again violates the plain language found within the PSA at
section 8.11 titled Tax Matters section (j) para. 6 which reads in part;
3
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5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Neither the Servicer nor Trustee shall (i) permit the creation of any interests in any
Trust REMIC other than the regular and residual interests set forth in the Preliminary
Statement, or (iii) otherwise knowingly or intentionally take any action, cause the
Trust Fund to take any action or fail to take (or fail to cause to be taken)any action reasonably
within its control and the scope of duties more specifically set forth herein, that, under the
REMIC Provisions, if taken or not taken, as the case may be, could (A) endanger the status of
any Trust REMIC as a REMIC or (B) result in the imposition of a tax upon any Trust REMIC
or the Trust Fund (including but not limited to the tax on "prohibited transactions" as defined
in Section 860F(a)(2) of the Code and the tax on contributions to a Trust REMIC set forth in
Section 860G(d) of the Code, or the tax on "net income from foreclosure property") unless the
Trustee receives an Opinion of Counsel (at the expense of the party seeking to take such
action or, if such party fails to pay such expense, and the Trustee determines that taking such
action is in the best interest of the Trust Fund and the Certificateholders, at the expense of the
Trust Fund, but in no event at the expense of the Trustee) to the effect that the contemplated
action will not, with respect to the Trust Fund or any Trust REMIC created hereunder,
endanger such status or, unless the Trustee determines in its sole discretion to indemnify the
Trust Fund against such tax, result in the imposition of such a tax).
14
15
To Summarize, (The closing date of this trust was January 26, 2006.
16
The creation date of Plaintiffs Assignment of Mortgage is March 7, 2008
17
or 25+ Months past the trusts closing date) in violation of the trusts own
18
controlling document, the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA),
19
20
21
Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs counsel clearly show scienter by having acted in

contravention to the trust by;
1. creating or manufacturing, (forgery with intent to defraud)
22
2. attempting the use of (distribution) and (intent to fraud)
23
3. actually submitting (selling) false, forged and fraudulent
24
documents within this very Court of Law and Equity, evidenced
25
not only by their late creation date as it concerns legal standing
26
to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court, but also in contravention
27
of IRS REMIC Law as explained above and again with section
28
Section 8.11 Tax Matters (g) which reads;
(g) not knowingly or intentionally take any action or omit
to take any action that would cause the termination of the
REMIC status of any Trust REMIC created hereunder;
4
5
4.
6
7
8
9
10
Making false statements to the Court
In so doing the above, and in violation of the law, codes, rules &
regulations articulated above, Plaintiff also acted in violation of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act. The allegations above are re-alleged and
incorporated herein by reference.
11
Defendant John A. Reed incorporates by reference all of the
12
13
proceeding and foregoing allegations in the entirety of Defendants answers
14
& pleadings as in regard to the Complaint in its entirety and from its
15
inception.
16
SUMMARY OF ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED
17
18
1) Whether a self proclaimed or actual Trustee for a REMIC Trust is
19
empowered to bring a foreclosure action or any action to enforce the note
20
and mortgage contrary to the terms of the Trust document i.e., the
21
Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) which New York law declare to
22
23
24
be actions that are VOID not VOIDABLE; specifically if the Trust document
empowers only the servicer to bring enforcement actions against
borrowers.
2) Whether this Court has the right to alter the terms of a trust
25
26
document created in another state and bound by the rules of that other
27
state.
28
3) Whether any Trustee for the Trust can bring any enforcement
1
2
action for the debt including foreclosure, assignment of rents or any other
relief.
4
5
6
7
4) Whether the assignment of mortgage is void on its face as a

fabrication because it refers to an event that occurred long after the
allowable date for deposit (cut-off date) into the trust which is shown in the
trusts indenture, the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.
8
9
10
11
12
5) Whether the assignment of mortgage is void on its face as a

fabrication because it was not even created until after the initial foreclosure
was initiated.
6) Whether the creditor, under the debt obligation of the Defendant
13
borrowers can be allowed to receive more than the amount due as
14
principal , interest and expenses. In this case borrower payments, non stop
15
servicer advances, insurance, credit default swap proceeds and other
16
payments by co-obligors who paid without subrogation or expectation of
17
receiving refunds from the Trust Beneficiaries.
18
7) Whether a new debt arises by operation of law as a result of receipt
19
of third party defendants in which a claim might be made by the party who
20
advanced payment to the creditor, resulting in a decrease in the account
21
receivable and a corresponding decrease in the borrowers account (loan)
22
payable.
23
24
25
26
8) Whether the new debt is secured by the recorded mortgage that

the Plaintiff relies upon without the borrower executing a security
instrument in which the real property is pledged as collateral for the
advances by third parties.
27
28
9) Whether sanctions should apply against opposing counsel for
failure to disclose essential facts relating to the security of the alleged
creditor.
Violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U,S,C. 1692e
5
6
FDCPA
Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
8
9
COUNT ONE
10
11
12
13
14
1. This is an action on behalf of named Defendant John A. Reed.

Defendant does allege that Wells Fargo Bank and its Counsel violated the
Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e, by making
false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with the
15
collection of debts, and engaged in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation
16
of the Ohio Corrupt Activities statute, Ohio Rev. Code 2923.32 [hereinafter
17
cited as R.C.].
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
2. Defendant John A. Reed incorporates by reference all of the

inception.
3. Federal Law prohibits the use of any false, deceptive, or
misleading, representation or means in connection with the collection of any
25
debt including the false representation of the character, amount, or
26
legal status of any debt and the threat to take any action that cannot
27
legally be taken 15 U.S.C. 1692e.
28
1
2
4. Foreclosing on Defendants home, the Plaintiff:

A made false, deceptive and misleading representations
concerning Wells Fargo Banks standing to sue the Defendant and
its interest in the debt;
5
6
7
8
9
10
B. falsely represented the status of the alleged debt, in

particular, that it was due and owing to Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank
at the time of suit initiation;
C. falsely represented or implied that the alleged debt was
owing to Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank as an innocent purchaser of
11
value, when in fact, such an assignment had not been
12
accomplished;
13
14
D. threatened to and did take action, namely engaging in
15
collection activities and collection and foreclosure suits as trustee
16
that cannot legally be taken by them; and
17
18
19
20
21
22
E. used this action to obtain access to Ohio State and Federal

courts to collect on notes and foreclose on mortgages under false
pretenses, namely that Wells Fargo Bank NA. was duly authorized
to engage in such activities in Ohio when in fact it was not.
F. Plaintiff did involve, at length, Defendant John A. Reeds
Father in the course of trying to collect this alleged debt, causing
23
both his father and mother mental anguish and degraded health,
24
while the mother was dying and in fact caused the alienation of
25
Defendant from his Father from the date of the inception of this
26
case until his death in January 2014.
27
28
G. The Plaintiff has sought collection fees or interest charges
not permitted by the Mortgage and Note or State law ($107,000
supersedeas bond based on $98,000 (approx.) debt).
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
H. Plaintiff Publicly, through printed documents, defamed

and libeled Defendants good nature and Character.
Upon information and belief, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank did not obtain
and/or file an assignment of the alleged note or mortgage of the named
Defendant until after the alleged note was in default, for no consideration
and also until after it had filed suit in its own name as the holder and/or
11
owner of the note and mortgage; and that same alleged assignment came
12
not from the true and actual holder in due course of ownership of the
13
alleged Mortgage and Note, thereby making same assignment nothing more
14
than a forged, fraudulent and worthless misrepresentation of authority and
15
ownership. In essence a felony.
16
17
18
19
These violations of the FDCPA entitle Defendant to recover the actual

damages they have sustained as a result of the improper filing of
foreclosure suits, or alternative damages as are permitted by law, and costs
and reasonable attorney fees.
20
21
Action Against Mortgage Servicer for an Accounting and for Violation of
22
FDCPA
23
I. FIRST CLAIM: WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE
24
25
As a proximate result of the willful blindness and conscious disregard
26
for both the Defendants rights and this courts authority, the negligent
27
and/or reckless conduct of Plaintiff, has caused the Defendant/Consumers
28
credit to be been impaired and Defendant has suffered the loss of their
property and professional inventory, and

Defendant has suffered irreparable emotional and mental harm and
3
4
will now not ever have a totally adequate remedy at law.54
5
6
7
55
As a proximate result of the negligent actions of Plaintiffs, the

Defendant/Consumers has suffered extensive consequential damage and
will continue to suffer additional damage.
8
9
II. SECOND CLAIM: SLANDER OF TITLE
10
11
12
13
14
15
The plaintiffs have caused to be recorded various documents

including a Notice of Trustee Sale, Notice of Sale and Deed transfer to
present occupant of Defendants home which has impaired the Consumers
title which constitutes slander of title and the Consumers should be
awarded resulting damages and relief IN REM to assist in making
defendant once again at least partially whole.
16
III. THIRD CLAIM: SLANDER OF CREDIT
17
18
19
The Defendant/Consumer allege that the actions and inactions of the

Plaintiffs have impaired through slander and liable their credit causing
20
21
54
22
23
24
25
26
First Answer of Defendant 7/27/08 24,
55
27
28
Amended Motion to Vacate a Void Judgment and Appeal on questions of law and fact 1/20/09 pg 9. Line 1.,
them to lose the ability to have good credit entitling them to damages,
including statutory punitive damages pursuant to state and federal law.
3
4
5
IV. INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The Defendants have intentionally or negligently taken actions which
have caused the plaintiffs severe mental and emotional distress in essence
forcing Defendants into, at present, 3 years + of mental Health counseling
with no clear end in sight.
9
10
V. THEFT OF PROPERTY THROUGH FRAUD
11
Plaintiffs have not only caused Defendants loss of property and loss
12
of use of property, plaintiffs also caused Defendants loss of use of his own
13
personal and professional time in defending himself against Plaintiff
14
action. Plaintiff is a world class Bank and Defendant is a pro se litigant. As
15
a pro se litigant defendant, resources were meager to scant to nonexistent
16
at best. Whereas plaintiff world Banks resources were greater than
17
probably the resources of every State in the United States combined
18
19
20
21
especially when you consider the US Govt. is standing in the shadows ready
to bail them out. again and again and again and again presently to the
tune of around $84 Billion a month in perpetuity (and thats just whats
publicly disclosed).
22
It is important for the court to understand that Plaintiff, in wrecking
23
Defendants Credit Rating and by including into public documentation that
24
Defendant was a forger, destroyed Defendants ability to ever again
25
obtain another Top Secret Govt. Security Level Rating, one he had
26
previously held twice in his careers both as an electronic technician and
27
again as the State of Ohios Creator and Director of the State of Ohios own
28
file backup and recovery dept, Founding Member of the State of Ohios
Emergency Disaster Recovery Plan Team and more. ODHS/BNS 1997-1998.
3
4
5
6
7
As Defendant had obtained a previous (1978) permanent physical

disability which in essence cost him the profession he had previously
distinguished himself in, that of Class A Gas & Diesel Mechanic, Defendant
had gone on to train himself, as schooling availability was at that moment in
time non-existent in the multiple fields of computers and computer
networking. In essence, through Defendants own hard work and personal
initiative, Defendant was performing the duties of an MCSE (Microsoft
10
Certified Systems Engineer) a CNE (Certified Novell Engineer) and a host of
11
other computer engineering degrees long before those degrees had ever
12
been invented.
13
14
15
16
17
18
With Plaintiffs assertion and allegations made public, Plaintiff

successfully destroyed handicapped Defendants chances for any gainful
employment in the only field Defendant was qualified to be employed from
2008 to present while forcing Defendant to defend himself in an area of law
that even the judicial system is still only now recognizing the validity of.
The arena of fraudulent foreclosures.
19
20
COUNT TWO
21
Violations of the Ohio Rico Act
22
23
24
Ohio RICO, R.C. 2923.32

25
26
27
inception.
28
Defendant John A. Reed alleges that:
A. Wells Fargo Bank NA., acting as trustee for holders of
mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, has filed thousands
of foreclosure actions under false pretenses, without standing
and without complying with Ohio law.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
B. Defendant alleges an improper taking of their real property

through the Plaintiff use of intentional nondisclosure, material
misrepresentation, and the creation of fraudulent loan
documents in violation of the RICO Statute, and continuing
injury and damages including the auction of their homes and
future overpayment of fraudulent charges.
C. These activities are a pattern of corrupt and illegal activity and
in violation of Ohio RICO law.
12
13
Wells Fargo Bank N.A., has received millions, most likely Billions of
14
dollars in distributions from the sale of foreclosed properties without
15
possessing properly perfected and recorded assignments/transferences of
16
the mortgages. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. 's pattern and practice of seeking
17
and obtaining foreclosure judgments in state and federal courts without a
18
19
20
21
22
23
duly perfected and recorded assignment, without a true and accurate

evidence of a chain of assignment/transference of these alleged notes and
mortgages, and without the right to engage in the trust business in Ohio"
constitutes a "false, deceptive and/or misleading representation or means"
in connection with the collection of a debt; a violation of the Federal Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act as is referenced within the above two quotes,
15 USC Sec 1692e. 51.
24
25
In addition, this suit alleges Wells Fargo Bank NA has failed to comply
26
with Ohio requirements for a trust company or national bank to do business
27
in Ohio. That the two named Ohio foreclosure law firms have also violated
28
the FDCPA and RICO by acting on behalf of and colluding with Wells Fargo
Bank NA in the foreclosure process.
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Defendant John A. Reed is seeking unspecified actual and statutory

damages and IN REM relief including treble damages under Ohio RICO law,
as well as attorney's fees and costs.
Defendant John A. Reed also seeks the appointment of a receiver to
recover from Wells Fargo Bank NA all charges it has collected from
Defendant John A. Reed and any interests in real property it acquired
illegally, and to collect fees that Wells Fargo Bank NA.s law firms obtained
from illegal foreclosures.
12
13
The suit also names two Ohio foreclosure law firms as defendants:
14
Plunkett Cooney 300 E. Broad St., Columbus, Ohio 43235 & Lerner
15
Sampson & Rothfuss P.O. Box 5480, Cincinnati, Ohio 45201.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
The action stems from foreclosure of Defendant John A. Reeds

property located at 7940 Guilford Dr., Dayton, Ohio 45414 whose alleged
mortgage had been allegedly sold, securitized, divided and then pooled
without Defendants permission.
Ohio RICO states that No person, through a corrupt pattern of corrupt activity shall
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in, or control of, any real property. R.C
2923.32(A)(2).
24
25
26
Corrupt Activity includes engaging in a violation of section 2921.03

of the Revised Code.
27
28
Section 2921.03 of the revised Code states that No person,
knowingly and by filing, recording, or otherwise using a materially false
or fraudulent writing in a wanton or reckless manner, shall attempt to
influence a public servant in the discharge of the persons duty.
5
6
7
8
9
10
Defendant states the Plaintiff has violated Section 2921.03 by

knowingly filing complaints which do allege Wells Fargo Banks ownership
of promissory notes and mortgages when in fact it does not own the alleged
notes or mortgages, and by knowingly filing multiple complaints (see
Exhibit D,) as trustee in reckless disregard of the fact that Plaintiff Wells
Fargo Bank was not authorized to engage in such activities both as trustee
11
in Ohio and for lack of standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. These
12
filings were made in a wanton and reckless manner in an attempt to
13
influence state and federal judges and judicial officers in Ohio to enter
14
judgments against Defendant(s) on the alleged mortgage and Note,
15
including for principal, interest, late fees, penalties, costs and attorney
16
fees, and to foreclose on Defendants property in a wanton attempt at unjust
17
enrichment.
18
19
20
21
22
"RICO provides a cause of action for those injured in business or

property by reason of prohibited racketeering activities." Bixler v. Foster,
596 F.3d 751, 756 (10th Cir. 2010). Under 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), it is unlawful
"for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise . . . to
conduct or participate . . . in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
23
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." A
24
1962(c) claim thus has four elements: "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3)
25
through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." Bixler, 596 F.3d at 761
26
(quotations omitted).The fourth elementracketeering activity"is
27
defined . . . as any `act which is indictable' under federal law," Tal v. Hogan,
28
453 F.3d 1244, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B)), and
includes extortion, mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. An act of
extortion under state law punishable by more than one year in prison also is
a racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(A). "These underlying acts
are referred to as predicate acts, because they form the basis for liability
under RICO." Tal, 453 F.3d at 1261 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).
6
7
8
9
10
11
A plaintiff must prove that a defendant engaged in at least two predicate

acts to satisfy the "pattern" element of a RICO claim. See id. at 1267.
The Plaintiffs conduct constitutes a pattern of corrupt activity,
because they have maintained more than two lawsuits under the fraudulent
and misleading circumstances described in the foregoing paragraphs. On
information and belief, the defendants have filed thousands of foreclosure
complaints in violation of R.C. 2923.32 see Exhibits Q, T, S.
12
13
Through the filing of foreclosure actions under false pretense and in
14
violation of U.S. Law, U.C.C., SEC and Ohio Law, and/or any other applicable
15
and\or Local Laws, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, with the active assistance
16
and participation of the plaintiff law firms herein named, has acquired an
17
interest in real property, including obtaining a foreclosure action against
18
Defendants property.
19
20
21
22
As a result of Plaintiff and Plaintiffs Counsels conduct, the Defendant

has been injured in many various ways, including loss of time to conduct
Defendants Profession of choice due to Defendants lack of ability to obtain
knowledgeable and available Legal Counsel and Defendants forced
23
placement into Defending himself pro se, through penalties and court costs
24
and attorney fees charged against their account(s) on lawsuit(s) filed under
25
false and misleading circumstances, and from other incidental and
26
consequential costs and expenses attendant to the defending of their
27
property.
28
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Section 2923.34 of the Revised Code entitles Defendant John A.

Reed who has established the elements of Ohio RICO violation to an order
divesting Wells Fargo Bank NA of its interest in Defendants real property
and to actual damages Defendant has sustained, which may be tripled if
proved by clear and convincing evidence, and to costs and reasonable
attorney fees.
8
9
10
11
12
13
The Defendant further states, and does move the Court, pursuant to
sec. 2929.34(B)(1) of the Ohio RICO Statute, to order Wells Fargo Bank
NA divestiture in any interest in Defendants real property and also moves
the court, pursuant to sec. 2929.34(D) of the Statute, for an order of
injunctive relief and a temporary injunction.
14
15
It is without dispute or issue that a claim under the Ohio RICO statute
16
was not presented by Defendant John A. Reed or litigated in the civil-court
17
foreclosure action, because of Plaintiffs misrepresentation of both true
18
owner AND of true maker of mortgage and note, Defendant could have not
19
brought such claim in civil court. Defendants have properly brought the
20
claim as part of this action herein pursuant to the doctrine of Pendent or
21
22
23
24
Supplemental jurisdiction, 28 USC sec. 1367(a). The Ohio RICO statute

is a state law, which authorizes the specific relief requested by the
Defendant. As such, Defendants claims which attack the foreclosure are not
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Smith v Encore Credit 4:08-cv1462 USDC, N. Oh. W. Dist Judge McHargh
25
26
27
28
1
2
3
COUNT THREE
Violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act

(Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681n and 1681o)
5
6
Civil liability for Willful and Negligent Noncompliance
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

inception.
1681n. Civil liability for willful noncompliance
(a) In general.
14
Defendant states Plaintiff , through improper filings, pleadings
15
and motions, filed fraudulently, in bad faith, and with the purpose of
16
harassment, necessitated entirely by their own lack of Due Diligence
17
and other stated actions, did in fact cause harm to Defendant by
18
willfully committing negligent enablement of Identity fraud and as
19
such did fail to comply with the requirements imposed under this title
20
and is liable to Defendant in an amount equal to the sum of

(1) any actual damages sustained by Defendant as a result of
21
the failure or damages.
22
23
24
25
26
27
(2) such amount of punitive damages as the court may allow;

and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability
under this section, the costs of the action together with
reasonable attorney' s fees as determined by the court.
(c) Attorney's fees.
28
Upon a finding by the court that an unsuccessful pleading,
motion, or other paper filed in connection with an action
under this section was filed in bad faith or for purposes of
harassment, the court shall award to the prevailing arty
attorney' s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended
6
7
8
in responding to the pleading, motion, or other paper.

COUNT FOUR
Violations of the Universal Commercial Code
9
10
11
Violation of U.C.C 3-203
Defendant states that as is required in U.C.C. - 3-203 ( c) and
12
evidenced by Plaintiffs exhibits, throughout each and every proposed
13
change of ownership of the alleged mortgage & note Plaintiff exhibits no
14
evidence whatsoever of proper and final Indorsement of note from or to any
15
other person or entity. Defendant states that throughout the entirety of the
16
purported passage of this alleged mortgage and note from any one entity to
17
another, there is not one signature properly indorsing any of the documents
18
thereby voiding any and all purported transference of same to any and/or all
19
of Plaintiffs assigns and even to Plaintiff themselves. Plaintiffs act of
20
21
22
23
delivering into the Court these fraudulent documents constitutes

misrepresentation and fraud and in Defendants knowledge and belief
Plaintiff has constituted this same fraud upon the Courts in thousands if not
tens of thousands of cases and as such Plaintiffs callous and repeated
action does fall within the guidelines of the RICO (racketeering) act.
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank N.A., has brought fraud into the Court with
its allegations of ownership of Mortgage & Note through its disassembly
and subsequent division of Note between the varying entities, Option One
Mortgage Corp., Mortgage Ramp Inc., the Trust and Wells Fargo Bank is
in violation of U.C.C. - 3-203 (d) which reads;
If a transferor purports to transfer less than the entire instrument, negotiation of
the instrument does not occur. The transferee obtains no rights under this Article and
has only the rights of a partial assignee.
Defendant states the very act of splitting the alleged Original Note &
10
Mortgage, so that the alleged maker Bank, Option One, insures to
11
investers by guaranteeing to replace the note in the event of a Credit
12
event as described and required in section 2.03 of The Pooling & Servicing
13
Agreement titled;
14
15
Section 2.03 Representations, Warranties and Covenants of the Responsible Party and the
Servicer; Remedies for Breaches of Representations and Warranties with Respect to the Mortgage
Loans.
16
17
18
19
20
21
did effectively act to bifurcate, void and destroy the alleged original
note and mortgage, as it was created between Defendant and Original
Lender, and as such does render it, from that point forward, to become null
and void and Defendant moves the court IN REM to find same.
The above does indeed show that, If Plaintiffs representation of
22
chain of ownership would have occurred as represented, the alleged
23
mortgage and note would have had the risk removed and/or separated at
24
the time of placement of the alleged Note into The Trust by Option One.
25
This would have been done in the promise that said Risk would be retained
26
by Option One, in their attempt at warranting or guaranteeing the Note.
27
Such actions constitute a violation of agreement between the Defendant (as
28
maker of the alleged note) and Plaintiff, and in fact, do bifurcate and note
and the mortgage from the risk of same and in so doing would also void the
alleged note in its entirety, as to its ownership to the trust, by the terms
found within the PSA and also clearly demonstrate insurance fraud being
practiced by a Corporation that is not licensed to practice insurance.
5
6
7
Additionally plaintiff makes allegations in its complaint that conflict

with the documents attached thereto as to who owned the subject note and
at which particular time.
8
9
When exhibits are inconsistent with the plaintiff s allegations of
10
material fact as to whom the real party in interest is, such allegations
11
cancel each other out.
12
Because the facts revealed by Plaintiff s exhibit are inconsistent with
13
Plaintiff s allegations as to its ownership of the subject note and mortgage,
14
those allegations are neutralized and Plaintiff s complaint is rendered
15
objectionable.
16
17
18
The Plaintiff in this action meets none of the required criteria.

Because the exhibit attached to Plaintiff s complaint is inconsistent with
Plaintiff s allegations as to ownership of the subject alleged promissory
19
note and mortgage, Plaintiff has failed to establish itself as the real party in
20
interest and has failed to state a cause of action.
21
22
The Defendants recognize the precedent set in regarding the
23
assignment of a mortgage. However as the Second District Court of Appeals
24
has noted, standing requires that the party prosecuting the action have a
25
sufficient stake in the outcome and that the party bringing the claim be
26
27
28
recognized in the law as being a real party in interest entitled to bring the
claim as of the date of the commencement of the action. The plaintiff s
failure to meet the standing requirements as of the commencement of this
foreclosure action renders the complaint fatally defective and, therefore
constitutes misrepresentation as to who the Plaintiff really is. The
assignment cannot post date the filing of this action if assignment does not
relate back to the commencement of the litigation.
5
6
7
8
9
10
The Plaintiff, in its complaint alleges that it owns the Note and
Mortgage however it has failed to produce the material evidence required
to support its claim. In the absence of this evidence the Plaintiff is clearly
and fraudulently misrepresenting themselves as the real party in interest
and the holder in due course with legal standing to bring this cause of
action against the defendant.
11
12
The Plaintiff alleges that it is the holder in due course on the subject
13
alleged mortgage and note, yet it is the belief of the Defendant that the note
14
was part of a larger securitizations process and sold to several un-named
15
parties and beneficial owners, and any claims by Plaintiff, in the absence of
16
17
18
19
true, just, legal and convincing evidence that proves Plaintiff is the true
holder in due course of the Mortgage and Note AND holds the original
alleged Mortgage and Note, endorsed to Plaintiff, are a clear
misrepresentation of the material facts and are fraud brought into the
Court.
20
21
It is the position of the Defendant that if the courts were to allow a
22
Plaintiff to bring a cause of action in a scenario where the Plaintiff alleges
23
that it owns a certain note and mortgage but fails to provide the statutorily
24
required evidence to the courts that this, in fact is true, the courts would
25
be forced to open the door to incredible harm to any homeowner whose
26
home is secured by a mortgage.
27
28
If the court were to allow the Plaintiff in this case to prevail in light of
serious misrepresentation and fraud upon the court, it would result in a
major and unconscionable injustice to the Defendant. The Court should not
and cannot be in a position of enabling Plaintiff and its attorneys to commit
material misrepresentation or felony crimes.
COUNT FIVE
Violations of Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act
8
9
10
11
12
R.C. CHAPTER 4165: DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES

13
14
inception.
15
16
Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank Na. and/or their assigns/co-conspirators
17
have damaged Defendant while violating chapter 4165: Deceptive Trade
18
Practices Act by;

A. passing off the services of others as if they were of their
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
own,
B. causing a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding
as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods
or services;
C. causing likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding as
to affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by,
another;
D. using deceptive representations or designations of
geographic origin in connection with goods or services;
28
E. representing that goods or services have sponsorship,
approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or
quantities that they do not have or that a person has a
sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that the
person does not have;
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
F. representing that goods or services were of a particular

standard, quality, or grade, or that goods were of a particular
style or model, if they are of another;
G. disparaging the goods, services, or business of another
by false representation of fact
H. advertising their goods or services with intent not to
sell them as advertised
F. making false statements of fact concerning the reasons
for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Defendant states Plaintiff, through misrepresentation and deception in

the creation of the alleged mortgage and in the subsequent improper filings,
pleadings and motions, which are fraudulently filed in bad faith, and filed
with the purpose of harassment, and necessitated entirely by their own lack
of Due Diligence and other stated actions, has damaged Defendant by
willfully violating chapter 4165.01 (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F) and (G) of the
Deceptive trade practices Act, and as such, Defendant is entitled to an
21
award of injunctive relief as is stated in R.C. 4165.03. Plaintiff did fail to
22
comply with the requirements imposed under this title and is liable to
23
Defendant to an award of damages and of attorneys fees and pursuant to
24
R.C. 4165.03 C, The civil relief provided in this section is in addition to civil
25
or criminal remedies otherwise available against the same conduct under
26
the common law or other sections of the Revised Code.
27
28
COUNT SIX
Violations of Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act
3
4
R.C. Chapter 1345, the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (CSPA)
Violations
6
7
8
9

10
11
inception.
12
13
14
Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank NA. did violate Defendant John A. Reeds
rights under the Ohio Sales Protection Act (CSPA) specifically;
15
16
a. Plaintiff has caused injury to Defendant by committing an
17
unconscionable act within the definition of ORC 1345.03 (A)
18
by bringing this foreclosure suit against Defendant while
19
20
21
22
lacking legal standing to do so.

b. Plaintiff has caused injury to Defendant by committing an
unconscionable act within the definition of ORC 1345.03(B)
(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6). Further, as in 2005-0331. Whitaker
23
24
25
26
27
28
v. M.T. Automotive, Inc. 2006-Ohio-5481, which states;

a consumer who is harmed by a supplier's
unfair or deceptive trade practices is entitled to
recover not only actual economic losses, but also
non-economic damages that result from the CSPA
violations. In a 5-1 decision, the Court held further
that actual damages proven by a consumer, whether
economic or non-economic, are subject to trebling
when the offending practice had previously been

identified as deceptive or unconscionable by rule or
in a court decision.
1
2
3
c. Defendants state that treble damages are warranted in this
case as this is one of thousands of publicly known instances
of same and as such I attach exhibit L & Y titled Previous
Sanctions against Wells Fargo Bank N.A. and exhibits, P,
Q, T, U titled Recent Rulings Against Wells Fargo
Bank N.A..
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Plaintiff has forced Defendant to endure thousands of hours of

research and defense document preparation time, thus depriving Defendant
of his most valued possession, that of his time, which he then could have
and would have converted to the pursuit of maintaining his daily normal and
routine lifestyle.
And also the degradation of Defendants emotional, mental,
16
psychological and physical health through the enormous stress and
17
emotional strain of fighting a predatory giant such as Wells Fargo N.A..
18
COUNT SEVEN
19
20
Violation of O.R.C 1345.0
21
22
23

24
25
inception.
26
27
28
Plaintiff has caused injury to Defendant by committing an
unconscionable act within the definition of ORC 1345.03 (A) by bringing this
foreclosure suit against Defendant while lacking legal standing to do so.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Plaintiff has caused injury to Defendant by committing an

unconscionable act within the definition of ORC 1345.03(B)(1), (2), (3), (4),
(5), (6). Further, as in 2005-0331. Whitaker v. M.T. Automotive, Inc. 2006Ohio-5481, which states;
a consumer who is harmed by a supplier's unfair or deceptive trade practices
is entitled to recover not only actual economic losses, but also non-economic damages
that result from the CSPA violations. In a 5-1 decision, the Court held further that
actual damages proven by a consumer, whether economic or non-economic, are
subject to trebling when the offending practice had previously been identified as
deceptive or unconscionable by rule or in a court decision.
Defendants state that treble damages are warranted in this case as

this is one of thousands of publicly known instances of same and as such I
attach exhibit L & Y titled Previous Sanctions against Wells Fargo Bank
N.A. and exhibits, P, Q, T, U titled Recent Rulings Against Wells
Fargo Bank N.A..
17
18
19
COUNT EIGHT
20
21
22
23
24
Violation of U.S. Constitution Article III

Because Plaintiffs did not demonstrate, nor could they demonstrate,
that their members suffered or were likely to suffer an injury in fact, they
fail to meet U.S. Const. Article III standing requirements which read; a
25
plaintiff must show: (1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete
26
and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or
27
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of
28
the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. (Lexis-Nexus Headnotes)
Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, National Association As Trustee For Securitized
Asset Backed Receivables LLC-2006-OP1 Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2006-OP1, as its name (Mortgage Pass-Through) states,
is merely a conduit that suffers no loss or injury as required. A Conduit can
6
7
8
9
10
never suffer a loss or be injured as it must immediately pass gains or

losses to Investors who are (if there are to be any at all) the true injured
partynot the Servicer, not the Trustee and not the Pass-Through Trust
itself. (NOTE: lack of standing, fraud on the Court & unclean hands)
.
Without standing, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Lack of
11
jurisdiction may not be waived and may be raised, by a party or sua sponte
12
by the court, at any time. Without jurisdiction, the court must grant
13
Defendants Motion.
14
15
16
COUNT NINE
Violations of Ohio Corrupt Activities statute O.R.C. 1315.55 (A)(1-5110.
17
18
19
20
21
inception.
22
23
24
25
26
In the course of Plaintiffs actions and through their Counsel Plaintiff

has caused injury to Defendant and have violated O.R.C. 1315.53 by;
a. Failing to comply with reporting requirements: Section
1315.53 (F)(1)(a)
b. Giving false information to a money transmitter with intent to
27
conceal or disguise that the money or payment instrument is
28
the proceeds of unlawful activity (such activity would be the
fraudulent foreclosure and that information being placed
upon courts in the form of the alleged Assignment of
Mortgage, (Exhibit E) with the intent and purpose of
promoting of carrying out unlawful activity. Section 1315.53
(F)(1)(b)
c. Structuring a transaction with the intent to avoid the filing
requirements: Section 1315.53 (F)(1)(c) ie. The Creation of
and recordation of same fraudulent Assignment of Mortgage,
(Exhibit E), in the land records of Montgomery County,
Ohio. Promoting and carrying out an unlawful activity:
10
Section 1315.53 (F)(1)(c)
11
d. By concealing and/or disguising the fact of Duty To Report
12
Transaction: Section 1315.53 (F)(1)(c)
13
14
COUNT TEN
15
Violations of Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act)
16
17
18
19

inception.
20
21
In the course of these foreclosure proceedings, Wells Fargo Bank
22
through their Counsel, has caused injury to Defendant and have perpetrated
23
unlawful unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Practices previously listed
24
involving fraud, misleading conduct, misrepresentations and/or material
25
omissions of information concerning costs, risks, and/or other terms and
26
27
28
conditions that do violate the prohibition against deception. Under relevant

precedents, this prohibition is violated by misrepresentations,
representations, omissions, acts, and/or practices that are material and/or
are likely to mislead a reasonable consumer in the audience targeted by the
advertisement or other practice.
3
4
5
6
7
8
Plaintiffs unsigned, un-authenticated, un-recorded, un-intelligible,

and post dated documentation, have revealed the engagement of
themselves in the unlawful act of money laundering by attempting to
conceal, disguise the location, source, nature, ownership or control of
property derived from either unlawful and/or corrupt activity in an attempt
to either and/or to simply to make illegally gained money appear to be from
a legal source or to avoid a reporting requirement as are represented in
10
O.R.C. Title 13: Commercial Transactions Chapter 1315, Transmitters of
11
Money, sections 1315.53, 1315.54, 1315.55 and 1315.99 and as such show a
12
pattern of either and/or corrupt or unlawful activity as defined within O.R.C.
13
2923.31 (1)(1,2,a-f) and State of Ohio Criminal Law.
14
15
16
COUNT ELEVEN
Violations of FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTE FOR MAIL FRAUD
18 U.S.C. 1341
17
18
19
20
21
inception.
22
In the course of these foreclosure proceedings, Wells Fargo Bank and
23
their Counsel, has caused injury to Defendant and have perpetrated
24
unlawful unfair, unlawful or deceptive acts or practices those practices
25
being previously listed and to include each and every charge outlined within
26
the U.S. Code section 1341 (18 U.S.C. 1341) (2012) using and/or the US
27
Post Office, FedEx and or UPS and without which their wrongful and
28
fraudulent foreclosure action could not have been committed, and which
states the following:
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish
or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other
article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or
spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do,
places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial
interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly
causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the
place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such
matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both. If the violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized, transported,
transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, a presidentially declared
major disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a
financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not
more than 30 years, or both.
COUNT TWELVE
15
16
Violations of Federal Wire Fraud Crimes 18 U.S.C. 1343
17
18
19
20
21
22

inception.
In the course of these foreclosure proceedings, Wells Fargo Bank and
23
their Counsel, has caused injury to Defendant and have perpetrated
24
unlawful unfair, unlawful or deceptive acts or practices those practices
25
being previously listed to include each and every charge outlined within
26
27
Title 18 of the United States Code Section 1343 (18 U.S.C. 1343) (2013)
using and/or the Internet, telephone services and or faxing services and
28
without which their wrongful and fraudulent foreclosure action could not
have been committed, and which states the following:
3
4
5
6
7
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,

or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio,
8
9
10
or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals,

pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under
11
this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation occurs in relation to,
12
or involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or
13
paid in connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as those
14
terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
15
16
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined
not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
17
18
19
20
SUMMARY OF DEFENDANT REQUESTS TO THE COURT
21
Prayer for Relief
22
23
WHEREFORE Defendant prays for relief as follows:
24
25
26
27
28
This is just one more cause of persecution of an ordinary citizen by an

alliance of organizations using deliberately-deceptive criminal and
predatory sales practices meant to unjustly enrich themselves while forcing
homeowners into foreclosure.
For the reasons stated above, and based on the case law previously
2
3
submitted to this Court in Defendants Motion to Dismiss and accompanying
pleadings, exhibits and memorandum, the Defendant, John A. Reed
respectfully asks this Court to support the other judges who have set
6
7
precedents by deciding against such predatory plaintiffs, including this one,

with prejudice.
8
9
10
I ask you humbly and respectfully to dispense justice against such

predatory victimizers by finding compensatory and punitive damages for the
Defendant. Since previous sanctions in similar cases seem not to
11
have altered this Plaintiffs conduct, sanctions in this case are
12
absolutely necessary if a strong message is to be sent to financial
13
institutions such as this one, which have brought our country to
14
ruin.
Nosek v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 386 B.R. 374 (Bankr. D. Mass
15
16
2008)
17
18
19
SUMMARY OF DEFENDANTS REQUESTS OF COURT

The defendant John A. Reed requests the following from the court:
20
21
(1) Under Count One, violations of the Federal Fair Debt
22
Collection Practices Act, award of damages IN REM in law and in equity
23
and other compensatory relief as the Court deems proper in the maximum
24
amount allowed by law.
25
26
(2) Under Count Two, violations of the Ohio RICO Statutes,
27
e. an order divesting Plaintiff of any presumed, assumed, past or
28
present alleged interest in Defendants real property,
1
2
f. an award of damages IN REM and other compensatory relief as the

Court deems proper, and
g.
tripling such damages,
h.
and to costs and reasonable

attorney fees and
5
6
7
8
i. also moves the court, pursuant to sec. 2929.34(D) of the Statute,

for an order of injunctive relief and a temporary injunction.
j. an order that the Plaintiff must divest any interest in
Defendants real property that it previously represented it had
acquired through this entire foreclosure action, from inception
10
of action to present and be ordered by the court not to transfer
11
any said interest in the property to any entity other than the
12
Defendant John A. Reed, in an attempt to circumvent the
13
purpose of such divestiture.
14
l.
an order that Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank must make whole the
15
Credit Rating of John A. Reed as to the removal of and any
16
mention of this alleged transaction from his Credit rating with
17
each and every one of the Credit Rating Agencies in use, in the
18
19
20
21
22
public and private arenas, solely as it relates to the alleged

mortgage & note and for a further order awarding Defendant
John A Reed an additional amount of $5,000.00 (five thousand
dollars) per each and every day that such information is
displayed upon his credit report beginning some 30 days from
the ruling of the courts in his favor. In the event of future
23
occurrences of same alleged information reappearing on
24
Defendants Credit Report(s), then same award to again be
25
deemed just, and awarded for each and every event, from each
26
and every Credit reporting Agency, from date of inception till
27
date of removal, and that this same awarding shall last in
28
perpetuity.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
(3) Under Count Three, Fair Credit Reporting Act, an award of

attorneys fees as if tried singly and damages, both substantive and
punitive, economic and non-economic and in addition to any civil or criminal
remedies otherwise available against the same conduct under the common
law or other sections of the Revised Code and any and all other
compensatory relief as the Court deems fit and proper in the maximum
8
9
(4) Under Count Four, Universal Commercial Code violations, an
10
award of attorneys fees as if tried singly and damages, both substantive
11
and punitive, economic and non-economic and in addition to any civil or
12
criminal remedies otherwise available against the same conduct under the
13
common law or other sections of the Revised Code and any and all other
14
compensatory relief as the Court deems proper in the maximum amount
15
allowed by law.
16
17
18
19
20
21
(5) Under Count Five, Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act,

Defendant is entitled to an award of injunctive relief as is stated in R.C.
4165.03, an award of reasonable attorneys fees as if tried singly and any
and all relief pursuant to R.C. 4165.03 C, which states The civil relief
provided in this section is in addition to civil or criminal remedies otherwise
available against the same conduct under the common law or other sections
of the Revised Code.
22
23
24
(6) Under Count Six, Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act
25
violations, an award of attorneys fees as if tried singly and damages, both
26
substantive and punitive, economic and non-economic and in addition to any
27
civil or criminal remedies otherwise available against the same conduct
28
under the common law or other sections of the Revised Code and any and
all other compensatory relief as the Court deems proper in the maximum
3
4
5
6
7
(7) Under Count Seven, O.R.C. 1345.0 violations, an award of

attorneys fees as if tried singly and both economic and non-economic
damages, both substantive and punitive and any and all other compensatory
relief as the Court deems fit and proper in the maximum amount allowed by
law and Defendant states that treble damages are warranted as this is one
of thousands of publicly instances of this same behavior and as such I attach
exhibit K titled Previous Sanctions against Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
10
11
12
(8) Under Count Eight, Article III violations, an award of
13
attorneys fees as if tried singly and damages, both substantive and
14
punitive, economic and non-economic in addition to any civil or criminal
15
remedies otherwise available against the same conduct under the common
16
17
18
law or other sections of the Revised Code and any and all other
allowed by law.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
(9) Under Count Nine, Truth In Lending Act (TILA) 15 U.S.C

1601 violations, an award of attorneys fees as if tried singly, an award of
actual damages, 15 U.S.C. 1640(a)(1), declaratory relief, establishment of
criminal liability on any and all persons the Court finds who did willfully and
knowingly violate the statute, 15 U.S.C. 1611, statutory damages, which
may be assessed in addition to any actual damages awarded. 15 U.S.C.
1640 (a)(2)(A), see Section 130(a) of TILA, an amount equal to the sum of all
finance charges and fees paid by the consumer 15 U.S.C. (a)(4), and under
15 U.S.C. - Liability of assignees (d)(2)(B)(i),(ii) the amount of all
28
remaining indebtedness; and the total amount paid by the consumer in
connection with the transaction with the all above trebled within the scope
and jurisdiction of the Law to the maximum amount allowed by the Law.
4
5
(10) Under Count Ten, Home Owners Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA) (or "Regulation Z", 12 CFR 226), 15 U.S.C. 1602(aa), 1639
since all remedies available to borrowers where a HOEPA violation is
present include all those under TILA, Defendant seeks an award duplicative
of each and every award listed in the above TILA violations listed within this
10
complaint. Additionally, since Plaintiffs engaged in the pattern or practice
11
of extending Defendant a loan without regard to Defendants ability to repay
12
13
14
15
from sources other than the encumbered property in violation of 12 CFR

226.32, Defendant also seeks an additional award of all finance fees paid,
and a duplicative award, in the entirety, against each and every entity
within Plaintiffs representation as their chain of holder In Due Course of
the alleged Mortgage and Note. 12 CFR 226.32.
16
17
(11) Under Count Eleven Real Estate Settlement and
18
Procedures Act (RESPA) violations, an award of attorneys fees as if tried
19
singly and damages, both substantive and punitive, economic and non-
20
economic and in addition to any civil or criminal remedies otherwise
21
available against the same conduct under the common law or other sections
22
of the Revised Code and any and all other compensatory relief as the Court
23
deems proper in the maximum amount allowed by law.
24
25
26
27
28
(12) Under Count Twelve, Ohio Corrupt Activities Statute, an

award of attorneys fees as if tried singly and damages, both substantive
and punitive, economic and non-economic and in addition to any civil or
criminal remedies otherwise available against the same conduct under the
common law or other sections of the Revised Code and any and all other
allowed by law.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
(13) Under Count 13 Violations of Federal Trade Commission

Act (FTC), an award of attorneys fees as if tried singly and damages, both
substantive and punitive, economic and non-economic and in addition to any
civil or criminal remedies otherwise available against the same conduct
under the common law or other sections of the Revised Code and any and
all other compensatory relief as the Court deems proper in the maximum
11
12
(14) Count 14 for Defamation of Character & Libel, for
13
previously named and referenced instances of Libel se and Defamation of
14
Character se, an award against Plaintiff and Plaintiffs Counsel, in
15
recompense for the loss of Defendants chosen career (in perpetuity),
16
damages (both statutory and punitive) for Libel, Defamation of Character,
17
emotional, mental, psychological and physical damages in the maximum as
18
the Law and Court is allowed and deems just, fit and reasonable and with
19
20
21
22
23
extreme prejudice. Also, an award of Attorneys fees, and any and every
other possible fine/sanction/injunction possible and available to the
Defendant in the Law and to which the Courts may allow.
(13) On all Counts, as a direct and proximate consequence, Reed,
lost money, property, incurred extra charges, expenses, his credit was
24
damaged and his ability to use his home as collateral for other credit
25
purposes, his property title was slandered, his good name and reputation
26
was stolen and he was rendered homeless and as such Reed seeks an award
27
for Defendants pre-judgment and post-judgment interests, as well as well
28
as reasonable attorneys fees and other costs and disbursements of this
litigation, and an award for any and all other relief as this Court deems just,
fit and proper, plus an award for any and all Tax encumbrances that would
be incurred by Defendant on same previously mentioned awards. Given that
(a) this Case has cost me inestimable damage to my reputationwhich has
destroyed my chosen career, (b) six-year-plus of my all-day, every-day time
6
7
8
9
10
to refute this case which cost me approximately $2,500,000+ or more in

possible loss of compensation in that pursuit, (c) degradation of my health
through the enormous stress of fighting a predatory giant such as Wells
Fargo N.A., and (d) the additional strain on Defendants mental,
psychological and physical health and well being while simultaneously
having to help, consult, console and reiterate over and over again not only
11
my own innocence, but also their own lack of culpability and consequence,
12
to my parents, through this ordeal, at a time when my 81-year-old mother
13
and father were worried not only about my Mothers fatal bought with
14
cancer day and night (she passed away March 18th, 2008. 1 month after
15
foreclosure initiation) but also worrying about the threat of losing their own
16
home and everything they owned because of Plaintiffs allegations against
17
them. Defendant also requests all charges made against Plaintiff, not
18
19
20
21
sustained, to be addressed and explained with specificity.

(14) Defendant retains all rights and remedies to prosecute any and
all other violations against Plaintiff and their Counsel as they become
apparent and available.
22
23
24
Wherefore, having set forth various causes of action against

the defendants, the plaintiffs pray for the following relief:
25
26
27
28
1. That the actions of Plaintiff be determined to be unfair and
deceptive business practices in violation of 1321.45 Prohibited debt
collector communications and conduct.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2. That the Consumers be awarded punitive damages provided for in

each separate count including costs;
3. That the Consumers be awarded consequential damages.
4. That the Consumers be awarded their fees and costs pursuant to
any written loan agreements which might bind the defendants; and
5. That the Court grant any other relief that may be just or equitable.
Check out The Brief 47 for a full list of torts!!!
11
12
For reasons articulated above and throughout the entirety of
13
Defendants pleadings in this case, Defendant prays this Court to vacate this
14
Courts current judgment in this foreclosure action, and in law and equity to
15
render a new judgment of VOID to the case at bar which would then be
16
consistent with the Decision rendered by the State of Ohios Supreme
17
Courts unanimous October 31, 2012 holding in Federal Home Loan
18
19
20
21
22
Mortgage Corporation v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017, in Federal Home

Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Rufo, 11th Dist. No. 2012-A-0011, 2012-Ohio-5930,
U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Perry , 2013-Ohio-3814, a case which mirrors
exactly the facts supported in Defendants case.
Further Defendant prays this Court record a DEED OF
RECONVEYANCE to re-convey unto Defendant all right, title and interest
23
which was heretofore acquired by Plaintiff and recorded with the
24
Montgomery County Recorder as instrument No. _________________ on
25
____________.
26
27
28
Defendant prays this Court for an Order stating that all adverse
claims against property know as 7940 Guilford Dr., Dayton, Ohio 45414 are
quieted.
The legal description of said property is:
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
When a holder of a negotiable instrument, in this case a promissory
19
note, files a claim in the Montgomery County, Ohio Civl Court requesting
20
the court grant them a judgment they are in essence negotiating the
21
promissory note in exchange for a judgment of the court. A judgment has
22
commercial value, judgments are bought and sold in the marketplace, and
23
therefore a promissory note and a judgment are fungible.
24
As was articulated in Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 16 Wall. 271 271 (1872)
25
26
27
28
If one of two innocent persons must suffer by a deceit, it is more consonant to reason
that he who "puts trust and confidence in the deceiver should be a loser rather than a stranger.
In the case at bar the court is clearly the entity which has been
deceived by Plaintiff through Plaintiffs introduction of documentation that;
1
2
3
4
5
6
1. cannot possibly exist within the terms of the trust found within the
controlling document of the Trust itself, the PSA, as explained
above,
2. did not transfer neither the note not the mortgage before the
initiation of this action,
3. was signed and authorized by a known Robo-Signer and
7
8
9
10
11
12
4. was Plaintiffs only allegedly authenticated evidence introduced

used to create their fiction of standing to invoke the jurisdiction of
this court from its inception.
CONCLUSION
Defendant John A. Reed respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the decision to grant judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs Wells Fargo Bank
13
NA. With each passing day the Courts become more and more aware of
14
foreclosure fraud. The judgment is void ab initio so Reed still has title to his
15
home and has the legal right to bring claims for civil trespass and
16
ejectment.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Finally, I sincerely thank Your Honor for his/her time and patience in
reviewing this lengthy document and I ask you humbly and respectfully, not
only for justice for myself, but for the necessary sanctions and/or damages
and/or injunctions and/or other actions that would serve to prevent further
predatory practices, such as those used against me, to be utilized against
other unsuspecting home owners.
Respectfully,
24
_______________
25
John A. Reed
40 Maple Ave.
Centerville, Ohio
26
27
28
45459
937-890-2576
Yotraj@Yahoo.com
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
SERVICE
A true and exact copy of the foregoing has been served this 14st day of April, 2009 as
follows:
8
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1

IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT

WELLS FARGO BANK N.A. as TRUSTEE

Case No. 2008 CV

(Judge John D. Schmidt for Judge

JOHN L. REED, et al.,

DEFENDANTS MOTION TO VACATE A VOID

Now comes Defendant John A. Reed (Defendant), who Motions this

and equity to render through rectification a judgment of VOID in this

see supplement attached Authorities I, Void Judgments.

Plaintiff brought this action to foreclose on an alleged mortgage,

to the Defendant by H&R Block Mortgage Corporation, a Massachusetts

Corporation, (H&RB). On June 9th, 2005, Plaintiff alleges H&RB

assigned the note and mortgage to Option One Mortgage Corporation,

to Plaintiff by assignment executed March 7th, 2008. Plaintiff is the trustee

for a securitized trust entitled Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC

securities. The Trust is subject to the terms of the trust indenture

memorialized in a document titled the Pooling and Servicing Agreement,

5 Void judgment is one entered by court without jurisdiction to enter such

675 N.E. 2d 1303, (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1996).

Section 2.01, subsection 1 of the PSA requires that transfer and

assignment of mortgages must be effected by hand delivery, for deposit with

the Trustee with the original note endorsed in blank.

Option One alleges to have assigned Defendants mortgage loan to the

Plaintiff commenced this action on February 27th, 2008, and alleged

action was commenced. Defendant filed an answer containing a general and

desperation and with no qualified legal representation Defendant opposed

Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment himself.

violation of the terms of the PSA, and therefore the acquisition of

the note and mortgage itself is void.

and rules contained within the PSA, as is evidenced by both the

language contained within the PSA and by controlling law as it

applies to the trust at Bar.

because Plaintiff lacked the capacity necessary to invoke the

jurisdiction of this court at the time of foreclosure initiation as is

proved by Plaintiffs alleged Assignment of the alleged Note &

Defendant states that since this courts previous decision in this

matter, the Ohio Supreme Court, in an on-point decision has ruled in a

controlling decision that is in contravention of this courts ruling of this

Defendant argues that as is explained in greater detail infra, that the

sole authenticated and Robo-Signed (explained infra) document that

Plaintiff offers as to their proof of their ownership as Holder of the alleged

note and mortgage is a forged and fabricated fraudulent impossibility upon

Equity will not allow a statute to be used as a cloak for fraud.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacked the capacity to invoke the

Assignment of Mortgage and Plaintiffs Affidavit of Status of Account and

Defendant submits new and previously unobtainable evidence in this

case of Plaintiff Wells Fargo Banks recently published in house manual

titled Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Foreclosure Attorney Procedure

Manual, Version 1 proving scienter through a pattern and practice of

Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs Counsel in the creation of fraudulent documents

falsified documents in their successful acquisition of properties (free

houses) through foreclosure actions throughout the entire United States.

Housing and Urban Development, dated March 12, 2012 (Internet

http://www.hud.gov/oig/ MEMORANDUM NO. 2012-AT-1801):

From the same above report as it pertains to Plaintiff Wells Fargos

of the documents and notarized up to 1,000 documents per day.

A FRAUD UPON THE COURT

An intentional fraud upon the Montgomery County Court of Common

mortgage for multiple reasons.6

On or about June 9, 2005, as the evidence of record shows;

a. Mr. Reed's alleged original lender, H&R Block Mortgage Corp.,