Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would
indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national
existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman
and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
-elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age
and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes
practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice
of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an
attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for
services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is
also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under
the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in
such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the
law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under
the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting
of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to
clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of
the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc.
v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for
new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even
broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of
the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines
of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within
the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of
the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make
a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of
the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be
allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
public entities but with each other often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making
within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate
lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance
through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations.
( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental
policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New
collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional
forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are
lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world
famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the
Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial
structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both longterm and temporary groups within organizations has been found to
be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction
such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external
activities are better predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate
lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are
challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate
also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a
quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and
public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.
(pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to
be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a
team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of
the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as
an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it
lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus,
the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five
(5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5)
events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L.
Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency
for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14,
1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated
by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a
term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for
five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say
that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern
concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly
what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require
generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a
year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in
my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means
nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people
ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way
of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase
by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on
what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we
should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different
from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or
petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed
disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings
on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in
the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise
of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant
the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and
thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the
U.S. Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would
be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the
U.S. Senate.
EN BANC
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO,
Complainant,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Promulgated:
Respondent. March 31, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition
against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago (complainant) is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special
Administratrix of his estate.[1] Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former
President of Taggat Industries, Inc.[2]
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio (respondent) was the former Personnel Manager and
Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. [3] until his appointment as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.[4]
Taggat Industries, Inc. (Taggat) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
operation of timber concessions from the government. The Presidential
Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986,[5] and its
operations ceased in 1997.[6]
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat (Taggat employees) filed a
criminal complaint entitled Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago,
docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 (criminal complaint).[7] Taggat employees alleged that
complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death
of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause
from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.[8]
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didnt think he would do it,
Madam Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my fathers friend and he was working
with my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by my father. And he
came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. [26]
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not
representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely
performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.[27] Respondent
argues that complainant failed to establish that respondents act was tainted with
personal interest, malice and bad faith.[28]
Respondent denies complainants allegations that he instigated the filing of
the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this
accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of
the employees or present them for cross-examination.[29]
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as
government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. [30] Respondent contends that
the fees were paid for his consultancy services and not for representation.
Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that
rendering consultancy services is not prohibited.[31] Respondent, in his ReplyMemorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid
voluntarily by Taggat without the respondents asking, intended as token
consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These
payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of conflict of interest.
Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the abovementioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees.[32]
Respondent insists that complainants evidence failed to prove that when the
criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant.[33]
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by
respondent to file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside
by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999.
[34]
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the
IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 (IBP Resolution)
dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification[39] IBP Commissioner Funas
Report and Recommendation (Report) finding respondent guilty of conflict of
interests, failure to safeguard a former clients interest, and violating the prohibition
against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years
suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of
Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in
deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the
test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former
position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for Violation
Code (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office,
Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago,
accused as having the management and control of
2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
of Labor
Annex B of
was being
Taggat (p.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided
under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[41] of the Rules of Court.
that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis
alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential
information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in
resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained
Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was laborrelated is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting
interests. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions
that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law
is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on
matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that
arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her
allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
of
specific
provisions
of
the
Code
of
Professional
of
Rule
1.01,
Canon
of
the
Code
of
Professional
EN BANC
Father RANHILIO C. AQUINO,
LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA C.
LOZADA,
POLICARPIO
L.
MABBORANG, DEXTER R.
MUNAR,
MONICO
U.
TENEDRO, ANDY R. QUEBRAL,
NESTOR T. RIVERA, EDUARDO
C. RICAMORA, ARTHUR G.
IBAEZ, AURELIO C. CALDEZ
and DENU A. AGATEP,
Complainants,
PUNO, C.J.
QUISUMBING,
**
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
*
- versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel
Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of
the above entries appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry
therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and that,
therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on
December 10, 1998.
Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and
Recommendation partly reproduced as follows:
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe the utmost care to
comply with the formalities and the basic requirement in the
performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).
Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such
register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing
to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to
each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a
number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on
the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is
recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries (Sec. 246, Article V,
Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative Code).
Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in
his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by
law is a ground for revocation of his commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).
In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents
allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua were not recorded in
his notarial register.
Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due
to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot
escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the
documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his
part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.
The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far
from true.
The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry
which he notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on
Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly
notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214,
respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the
other complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that
Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned
affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary
Public, but also as a member of the Bar.
This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the
claim of inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own
secretary which is hardly credible since the latter cannot be considered a
disinterested witness or party.
of the offense and his previous misconduct for which he was suspended
for six months from the practice of law.
It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months may
be considered enough penalty for him as a lawyer. Considering that his
offense is also a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same
should also be imposed upon him.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended
that the notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still
existing, be REVOKED and that he be SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months.[3]
After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the
findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find
Atty. Pascuaguilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to
register
in
the
affidavit-complaints
of
Joseph
wherein Atty. Joel A.Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some
of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act constitutes
misconduct and thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for six months, this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de
Rosales v. Ramos,[7] we revoked thenotarial commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos
and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for violating
the Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale
he
lesser
penalty
of one
month suspension from the practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian
G. Rubiafor making a false declaration in the document she notarized.
In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascuas first offense, we
believe that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law
upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation
of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.
SO ORDERED.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
EN BANC
Re: Non-disclosure Before the
Judicial and Bar Council of
the Administrative Case Filed
Against Judge Jaime V.
Quitain, in His Capacity as
the then Asst. Regional
Director of the National
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 22, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City on May 17, 2003.[1] Subsequent thereto,
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that
administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his
capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM), Regional Office 11, Davao City, as a result of which he was
dismissed from the service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April
10, 1995.
In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)[2] submitted to the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain declared that there were five
criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439, 22812, 22813, and 22814)
filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No
administrative case was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS.
On even date, letters[4] were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for certified
In a letter[8] dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock, Judge Quitain
denied having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC. He alleged that
during his interview, the members thereof only inquired about the status of the
criminal cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and not about
the administrative case simultaneously filed against him. He also alleged that he
never received from the Office of the President an official copy of A.O. No. 183
dismissing him from the service.
Thereafter, DCA Lock directed Judge Quitain to explain within ten (10) days
from notice why he did not include in his PDS, which was sworn to before a notary
public on November 22, 2001, the administrative case filed against him, and the
fact of his dismissal from the service.[9]
In his letters[10] dated March 13, 2004 and June 17, 2004, respondent
explained that during the investigation of his administrative case by the
NAPOLCOM Ad HocCommittee, one of its members suggested to him that if he
resigns from the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that
following such suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable resignation from
NAPOLCOM on June 1, 1993[11] which was immediately accepted by the Secretary
of the Department of Interior and Local Governments; that he did not disclose the
case in his PDS because he was of the honest belief that he had no more pending
administrative case by reason of his resignation; that his resignation amounted to
an automatic dismissal of his administrative case considering that the issues raised
therein became moot and academic; and that had he known that he would be
dismissed from the service, he should not have applied for the position of a judge
since he knew he would never be appointed.
name, the only legacy that I can leave to my children, Quitain said in his
statement.
It is my constitutional right to be present in all proceedings of the
administrative case, he also said.
Quitain was appointed Assistant Regional Director of Napolcom
in 1991 by then President Corazon Aquino upon the recommendation of
Secretary Santos. He was later designated Napolcom acting regional
director for Region XI.
Mindanao Daily Mirror:
Quitain vows to clear name
Thus, the OCA recommended that: (1) the instant administrative case against
respondent be docketed as an administrative matter; and (2) that he be dismissed
from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.
In compliance
with
the Courts
Resolution
respondent
filed
his
Comment[14] contending that before he filed his application for RTC Judge with the
JBC, he had no knowledge that he was administratively dismissed from the
NAPOLCOM service as the case was secretly heard and decided. He averred that:
1. Being a religious lay head and eventually the Pastoral Head of
the Redemptorist Eucharistic Lay Ministry in Davao City and the
surrounding provinces, he was recruited as one of the political followers
of then Mayor Luis T. Santos of Davao City, who later became the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
and was instrumental in his appointment as Assistant Regional Director
of the National Police Commission, Region XI;
2. After Secretary Luis T. Santos was replaced as DILG Secretary,
the political followers of his successor, who were the same followers
involved in the chain of corruption prevalent in their department, began
Respondents Comment was submitted to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation.[15]
OCA submitted its Memorandum[16] dated August 11, 2005 stating therein
that it was adopting its earlier findings contained in its Memorandum
dated September 3, 2004. Based on the documents presented, it can not be denied
that at the time Judge Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of
A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from government service. Considering that Judge
Quitains explanations in his Comment are but mere reiterations of his allegations
in the previous letters to the OCA, the OCA maintained its recommendation that
Judge Quitain be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to
any position in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits.
The Court fully agrees with the disquisition and the recommendation of the
OCA.
cases filed against him were dismissed onAugust 2, 1995 and July 17, 2000, and
considering the fact that he resigned from office, his administrative case had
become moot and academic.
reveal
that
Commissioner
Alexis
C.
Canonizado,
Chairman Ad
HocCommittee, sent him summons on March 19, 1993 informing him that an
administrative complaint had been filed against him and required him to file an
answer.[19] Then on March 29, 1993, respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Pedro
Castillo, filed an Answer.[20] In administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain ones side
or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.[21] Furthermore, as we have
earlier mentioned and which Judge Quitain ought to know, cessation from office by
his resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed
against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative
case moot and academic.[22] Judge Quitain was removed from office after
investigation and was found guilty of grave misconduct. His dismissal from the
service is a clear proof of his lack of the required qualifications to be a member of
the Bench.
More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately misled the JBC
in his bid to gain an exalted position in the Judiciary. In Office of the Court
Administrator v. Estacion, Jr.,[23] this Court stressed:
x x x The important consideration is that he had a duty to
inform the appointing authority and this Court of the pending
criminal charges against him to enable them to determine on the
basis of his record, eligibility for the position he was seeking. He did
not discharge that duty. His record did not contain the important
information in question because he deliberately withheld and thus
effectively hid it. His lack of candor is as obvious as his reason for the
suppression of such a vital fact, which he knew would have been
taken into account against him if it had been disclosed.
We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of
all those who are in the service of the Judiciary.[27] We have often stressed that the
conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk
of court, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the
Judiciary. We condemn, and will never countenance any conduct, act or omission
on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish
the faith of the people in the Judiciary.[28]
However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from Judge Quitain
addressed to the Chief Justice stating that he is tendering his irrevocable
resignation effective immediately as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 10, Davao City. Acting on said letter, the Court Resolved to accept the
irrevocable resignation of Judge Jaime V. Quitain effective August 15, 2007,
without prejudice to the decision of the administrative case.[29]
Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court
without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant administrative
case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by
his resignation and its consequent acceptance without prejudice by this Court, has
ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its
authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges
against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with
dreadful and dangerous implications.[30] Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official
merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he
has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding
censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.[31]
SO ORDERED.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
RODOLFO M. BERNARDO,
Complainant,
- versus -
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA,
August 31, 2007
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with plea
for reinstatement in the practice of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is
already seventy-one years old and barred from the practice of law for fifteen years.
On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession. Fifteen
years had already elapsed since Mejias name was dropped from the Roll of
Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness and pleading
for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he has suffered
enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and
redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.
After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his
religious and social writings. He also organized a religious organization and named
it El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind.
The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since
Mejia was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court
does not lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes
to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner
and the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are
not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes
cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other
transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he
has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long
enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring
officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has
already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not
to punish but to correct offenders.
We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege
burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the
rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the
privilege to practice law.[4]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll
of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
versus -
x-------------------------x
IN THE MATTER OF THE
REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S.
DE VERA FROM THE IBP BOARD
OF GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE
VICE
PRESIDENT
GOVERNOR
AND
PANGANIBAN, C. J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA and
VELASCO JJ.
Promulgated:
DECISION
Per Curiam:
The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an
investigation, report and recommendation on subject case, [1] summarized the
antecedents thereof as follows:
In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio
Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty.
Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:
1)
2)
respondents
alleged
misrepresentation
in
concealing the suspension order rendered against
him by the State Bar of California; and
respondents alleged violation of the so-called
rotation rule enunciated in Administrative Matter
No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989
IBP Elections).
As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Veras letterrequest to this Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M.
No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP
National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this
Court with the IBPs Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as
member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP
Board and the IBP in general.[2]
The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the
regular meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said
meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the
withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al.
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108. The Petition
was intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase
filing fees.[3]
The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the
withdrawal of the above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and
EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez.[4]
On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken
by the IBP Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter
was a copy of the IBP Boards 14 January 2005 Resolution.[5]
On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Veras request for
oathtaking as National President, was filed. The same was subsequently
consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.[6]
On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10 th National IBP Convention
at the CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum
where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and
blatant lies in connection with the IBP Boards Resolution to withdraw the Petition
questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.[7]
On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
enjoining Atty. de Vera from assuming office as IBP National President.[8]
On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President
Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the
IBP Board for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the
IBP.[9]
On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the
Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty.
de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice
President.[10] Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said Resolution:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY
RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a
member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for
committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to
wit:
1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and
blatant lies in public about the Supreme Court and
members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the
Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of
Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center
on 22 April 2005, making it appear that the decision of the
IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION
docketed as Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines,
et al., Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer
for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or Writ
On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing
the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as Urgent Plea
to Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to
the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of
Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the
2.
3.
to answer the
The complaint
4.
5.
6.
7.
On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of
Atty. de Vera.[14] In their Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their
decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to
protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated
by the IBP Board were the following:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Rather than pacify the already agitated solicited speakers (at the
plenary session), Atty. de Vera fanned the fire, so to speak, and
went to the extent of making untruthful statements, innuendos and
blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of the
IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so
to provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage
him in an acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of
Governors to public ridicule.
(iv)
The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Veras actuation during the Plenary
Session was the last straw that broke the camels back. He committed acts inimical
to the interest of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to
remove him.
On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions
and a position paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his
expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.[16]
On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in
a special meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June
2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP
brought about by Atty. de Veras removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica
Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.[17]
On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty.
Santiago.[18] On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP
position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board.[19] Thus, on 25 June 2005,
during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of
IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.
To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President
and the EVP die, resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only
provides for the election of an Acting President and that no mention for an election
for EVP was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to
the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP,
his replacement should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other
region, due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the
IBP By-Laws.
In response to Atty. de Veras averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through
its counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern
Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not
be enforced if the same will not be practicable, possible, feasible,
doable or viable; and, finally, that
(vii)
Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should
now be allowed to take his oath as IBP National President. [25]
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE
TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052][27]
The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of
the fourth issue. Consequently, we will start with the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the
present administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment
against respondent Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:
1)
2)
the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Veras
alleged violation of lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case,
the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP
Governor forEastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in
his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Veras suspension or
disbarment.
The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was
resolved on the basis of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP Bylaws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as
Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions
the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed
that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the
complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP Bylaws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file
with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The Courts
statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he
was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not
allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be
disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the
State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three years. We
held in that case that
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one
must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this
is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the
individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed,
based on each member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and
elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements
under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate
involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final
judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude. [30]
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme
Court in a proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the
position of IBP Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to
disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition
for disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension
proceeding against the lawyer concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his
petition is sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the
prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is
whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the
case and the evidence submitted by complainant.
The recommendation of the hearing officer of the
State Bar of California, standing alone, is not
proof of malpractice.
In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of
Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera,[31] we were confronted with the question of
whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney
in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said
foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the
same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.
We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de
Vera who was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of
California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his
practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final
judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a
recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to
practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.
In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a
Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his
suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension
are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of
suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of
suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes
any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise
held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence
of unethical acts as lawyer.
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of
Court which provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
xxxx
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the
public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.[34] The statutory enunciation of the grounds for
disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of
courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its
officers cannot be restricted.[35]
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty
committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the
term Malpractice.[36]That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that
the practice of law is a profession, not a business.[37]
An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar
of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an
insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured
in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder
Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the
case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the
release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check
in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal account;[39]
2.
The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty.
de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years;[40] and
3.
Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was
accepted by the Supreme Court of California.[41]
Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he
misappropriated his clients funds as the latters father (the elder Willis) gave him
authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not
consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified
under oath that he expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.
Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his clients funds is highly
unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about
this, thus:
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS
AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and
apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he himself
supplied.
In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis
to use the funds intended for the latters son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he
had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the
administrative case against him in the State Bar of California.[46]
Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find
anywhere in the records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly
authorized to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera[47] we declared
that
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough
that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the
elder Willis had indeed testified that he expected de Vera might use the money for
a few days. As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the
document containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying
thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis expected de Vera might use the money for a
few days was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de
Vera of his clients funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de
Vera might, indeed, use his clients funds, which by itself did not speak well of the
character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.
In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his clients money
without the latters acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and
propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account
and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to
the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect
of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the
profession betrays their trust and confidence.[48] Respondent violated his oath to
conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from
the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.
[49]
Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should
not be decreed.
In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[50] we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years
suspension from his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to
his personal account without the latters knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;
[51]
meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to their clients monies in the
amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them
for their clients without the latters permission.In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,[54] we
indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount of
the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ
of execution. Considering the amount involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that
the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.
To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the
following issues must be addressed:
I.
II.
We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested
with the power to remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of
the IBP By-Laws, which states:
Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should
determine after proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or
otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the
Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may
declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme
Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be
removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board
meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by twothirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court.
Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for
cause by resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the
Board, subject to the approval of this Court.
In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of
Governors on procedural and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied
very basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in
administrative cases like the right to answer formally or in writing and within
reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair
hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the
complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera
voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at
the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially
inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his inhibition
resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be
mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to
support his own motion.
The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the
plenary session, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Veras actuations, an
evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed
and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to refute
and answer all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de
Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the Board
Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the
agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de
Vera did argue his case.
We are in agreement with the IBP Board.
First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards
life, liberty and property.[55] It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is
property within the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security
of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of
the board of governors for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining
members of the board.
Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in
administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
explain ones side.[56] At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term due process
of law as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due to the
very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather
than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than one general statement.
[57]
circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation.
[59]
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for
a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a
matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings
since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no
particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain
proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are not
essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met
For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for
Atty. de Veras expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including
Atty. de Vera).
Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed
for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings
without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of
the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a
resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase remaining
members refers to the members exclusive of the complainant member and the
respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are interested
parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This
being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off which
means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the
seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two voted against it
which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.
The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP
Governor for just and valid cause
All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for
the removal of an IBP Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP ByLaws albeit it includes three consecutive absences from Board meetings without
justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested with sufficient
power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member whose removal
was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts
committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in
particular and the IBP in general.
Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with
the Resolution of the Board during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid
cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors
and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or
the right to dissent is not recognized by the IBP Board.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the
fundamental objective of the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was not
capricious or arbitrary.
Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if
not animosity, are inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of
the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree.
However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the
conflicts are brought outside its governing body for then there would be the
impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not
and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly
diminish the IBPs prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general
public.
Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of
Governors. Atty. de Veras removal from the Board of Governors, automatically
disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
The Court will not interfere with the Resolution
of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it
was rendered without grave abuse of discretion
While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of
supervision over the IBP,[64] it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised
prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not
preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the
administration of its internal affairs governed by the provisions of its By-
Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define
the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational
structure, and govern relations and transactions among its officers and
members. With these By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that
the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Courts
interference.
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has
been vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and
representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws.
[65]
The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of
the majority.The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board
acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of its individual members. Hence,
the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable
presumption[66] of validity, which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by
substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the
absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted
without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not
be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Boards action or resolution.
There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as
provided in Article VI, Section 44[67] of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to
whether the IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove
Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has been previously
established herein, Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was in accordance
with due process and the IBP Board acted well within the authority and discretion
granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the Boards resolution to remove
Atty. de Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as
IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was
In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the
2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the
vacant post resulting from the removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the
same is a purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of discretion, and
implemented without violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.
With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP
Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP;
thus, there was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.
Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the
authority to fill vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the
provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule, [68] and Section 11 (Vacancies),
[69]
48 (other officers),[72] and Section 49 (Terms of Office) [73] of the By-Laws. The IBP
Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to
fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and
confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining
members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of
the IBP Rules and By-Laws.
The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who
will assume the Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority
and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII,
Section 47, which provides that [t]he EVP shall automatically become President
for the next succeeding term.The phrase for the next succeeding term necessarily
implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next
succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the 20032005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now
IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President
because we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz
from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.
Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP
EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon
the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.
Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that,
assuming his removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP
EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set
forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.
According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be
chosen by the Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as
much as practicable, on a rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in
Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:
ORDER
xxxx
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive VicePresident elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the
governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as
provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be
restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive VicePresident to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term
(which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in
Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive VicePresident shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The
incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive VicePresident from among themselves. The position of Executive VicePresident shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions .One who
has served as president may not run for election as Executive VicePresident in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the
presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed;
whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)
In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is
actually rotated among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to
the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP
to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of
IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The
rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic
succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the
election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already
produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that
the supervening event of Atty. de Veras removal as IBP Governor and EVP
rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains,
however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by
Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the
spirit and purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in
harmony with the latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership
transition seamless and enables the new IBP National President to attend to
pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable time for the usual
adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends
assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable
and indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It should also be pointed
out that this wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected
from among the members of the IBP Board of Governors, who are serving in a
national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP ByLaws that one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP must have been
exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic
succession rule for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By
electing the replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of
Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 in
this case, Governor Salazar who would have served in a national capacity prior to
his assumption of the highest position.
It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic
succession rule if the EVP for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by
the members of the House of Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This
Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month
before the expiration of the term of office of the 2003-2005 Board of
Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been able to serve in
a national capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.
In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase as much as
practicable to clearly indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule
as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances.
3)
4)
SO ORDERED.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
FERDINAND A. CRUZ,
Petitioner,
- versus -
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
ALBERTO MINA,
HON. ELEUTERIO F
GUERRERO and HON.
ZENAIDA LAGUILLES,
Respondents.
x----------------------
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 27, 2007
------------------x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay
City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court ( MeTC),
Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705; [ 1 ] and the RTCs
Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No
writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court .
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before
the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
of
Criminal
Case
No.
00-1705,
is
one
that
can
be
prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that
therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally
tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law
provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last,
petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which
expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the
inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without
the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration
before
the
RTC,
the
petitioner
filed
Second
Motion
for
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the
petitioners Second Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold
in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied
the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the
instant Petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE
PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF INJUNCTION OF THE
HEREIN PETITIONER DESPITE PETITIONER HAVING
ESTABLISHED THE NECESSITY OF GRANTING THE
WRIT;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS
OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;
III.
However, in Resolution [ 6 ] dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730,
the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student
appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law
student may appear in his personal capacity without the
supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of
Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction
exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term
"Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of
Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a nonlawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed,
while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as
an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave
Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is
not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had
been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the injunctive
court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil
liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records
of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that
therefore, petitioners appearance as private prosecutor appears to be
legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in instances when no
actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of
neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular
representation. [ 9 ] The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action. [ 1 0 ]
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation,
waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No.
00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is
deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private
prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the
Resolution
and
Order
Petition
of
the
is GRANTED.
Regional
Court,
Branch
Trial
The
assailed
Court,
Branch
ASIDE. The
Metropolitan
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.
EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short)
Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative
Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which
reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June
29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the
continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for
the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail
to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the
resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February
23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of
Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a
joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the
parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral
arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show
that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are
in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of
Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with
which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of
the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the
Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar
shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute
an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as
a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which
he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP ByLaws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name
from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the
justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature
pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to
constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface
whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions
of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal
profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous
case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the
Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al.,
Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in
its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated
on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it
was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all
the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative
materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme
Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it
shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court
in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the
President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through
Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public
welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and
regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity
and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin
maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme
law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into
anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the
State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of
Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise
power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution
of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro.
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of
the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free
to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court
Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)
which power the respondent acknowledges from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying
the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to
raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions
would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence
infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to
practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that
under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to
the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before
the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize,
then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent
Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the bar." The Court did not
use the phrase "in facie curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt,"
though we are aware that courts in the United States have sometimes used that
phrase in speaking of "direct contempts' as "contempts in the face of the courts."
Rather, the court sought to convey that it regarded the contumacious acts or
statements (which were made both in a pleading filed before the Court and in
statements given to the media) and the misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as
serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a frontal
assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through the Court, the entire judicial
system. What the Court would stress is that it required respondent, in its
Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to explain "why he should not be punished for
contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions" and in respect of
which, respondent was heard and given the most ample opportunity to present all
defenses, arguments and evidence that he wanted to present for the
consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily impose punishment
upon the respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider respondent's acts as
constituting "direct contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for
this Court to charge respondent under Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of
the Revised Rules of Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised
Rules of Court pointing out that:
[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory
upon the Supreme Court such reference to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive
procedure under the terms of Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of
Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the
Supreme Court.
The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion
for referral of this case either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise, there would have been no need to
refer to Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point out that under the old rule,
Rule 139, referral to the Solicitor General was similarly not an exclusive
procedure and was not the only course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is
well to recall that under Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139,
"Proceedings for the removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion, or (2) upon the complaint under oath of
another in writing" (Parentheses supplied). The procedure described in Sections
2 et seq. of Rule 139 is the procedure provided for suspension or disbarment
proceedings initiated upon sworn complaint of another person, rather than a
procedure required for proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court on its own
motion. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would initiate motu
proprioproceedings for which it did not find probable cause to proceed against an
attorney. Thus, there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which
referral is made "for investigation to determine if there is sufficient ground to
proceed with the prosecution of the respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the
Court itself has initiated against the respondent. The Court may, of course, refer
a case to the Solicitor General if it feels that, in a particular case, further factual
investigation is needed. In the present case, as pointed out in the per
curiamResolution of the Court (page 18), there was "no need for further
investigation of facts in the present case for it [was] not substantially disputed by
respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to
him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to
present his defense: his defense is not that he did not make the statements
ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part,
having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which
thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the
Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for
Reconsideration is from a dissentingopinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v.
United State. 1 It may be pointed out that the majority in Green v. United States,through Mr. Justice
Harlan, held, among other things, that: Federal courts do not lack power to impose sentences in excess of
one year for criminal contempt; that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter of
constitutional right; nor does the (US) Constitution require that contempt subject to prison terms of more
than one year be based on grand jury indictments.
derivatively and implied from an examination of acts and statements. Thus, what
the Court was saying was that respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack and
denigrate the Court, cannot prevail over the plain import of what he did say and
do. Respondent cannot negate the clear import of his acts and statements by
simply pleading a secret intent or state of mind incompatible with those acts or
statements. It is scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one accused of homicide
cannot successfully deny his criminal intent by simply asserting that while he may
have inserted a knife between the victim's ribs, he actually acted from high
motives and kind feelings for the latter.
5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this
Court to punish respondent for contempt of court for out of court
publications."
Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged
modern trends in the United Kingdom and in the United States concerning the
law of contempt. We are, however, unable to regard the texts that he cites as
binding or persuasive in our jurisdiction. The Court went to some length to
document the state of our case law on this matter in its per curiam Resolution.
There is nothing in the circumstances of this case that would suggest to this
Court that that case law, which has been followed for at least half a century or so,
ought to be reversed.
6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition of
indefinite suspension from the practice of law constitutes "cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment". The Court finds it difficult to
consider this a substantial constitutional argument. The
indefiniteness of the respondent's suspension, far from being "cruel"
or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the effect of placing, as it were, the
key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his
own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving respondent the
chance to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and
misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting
appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and
capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly
demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit. The denial is FINAL.
The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion, dated October
25, 1988 and the Supplemental Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988, filed by
respondent
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
SPOUSES
BENJAMIN
SANTUYO, complainants,
HIDALGO, respondent.
SANTUYO
vs. ATTY.
AND
EDITHA
EDWIN
A.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report it submitted to the
Court, the IBP noted that the alleged forged signature of respondent on the
deed of sale was different from his signatures in other documents he
submitted during the investigation of the present case. However, it ruled that
respondent was also negligent because he allowed the office secretaries to
perform his notarial functions, including the safekeeping of his notarial dry
seal and notarial register. It thus recommended:
[5]
[6]
[7]
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did
not categorically state that they appeared before respondent to have the deed
of sale notarized. Their appearance before him could have bolstered this
allegation that respondent signed the document and that it was not a forgery
as he claimed. The records show that complainants themselves were not sure
if respondent, indeed, signed the document; what they were sure of was the
fact that his signature appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as
well as to who actually affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondents contention that he
only met complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged
notarization of the deed of sale. Respondents assertion was corroborated by
one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit executed on November 17, 2001 wherein
she stated that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite respondent to her
house on November 5, 1997 to meet her husband since the two had to be
introduced to each other. The meeting between complainant Benjamin
Santuyo and respondent was arranged after the latter insisted that Mr.
Santuyo personally acknowledge a deed of sale concerning another property
that the spouses bought.
[9]
[4]
[5]
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003, the Court referred the complaint to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP submitted its investigation
report:
[6]
[10]
[12]
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25,
2000. However, respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the
signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the
latters death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent declared that
Benitez appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his
free and voluntary act. Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated
an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
routinary act. It converts a private document into a public instrument, making
it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
[13]
[14]
Neither will respondents defense that the SPA in question was superfluous
and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His
assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most
cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the
truthfulness of every notarial act. As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he
should have been aware of his great responsibility not only as a notary public
but as a public officer as well. A public office is a public trust. Respondent
should not have caused disservice to his constituents by consciously
performing an act that would deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta.
Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project could
not have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have
foisted on the public a spurious contract all to the extreme prejudice of the
We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the
penalty recommended by the IBP which we find too light.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of
gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let
copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and
entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the immediate attention
of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
NESA ISENHARDT,
Complainant,
- versus -
Promulgated:
February 15, 2012
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case stemmed from the verified complaint [1] filed with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) on 9 September 2004 by Nesa G. Isenhardt (complainant),
through her counsel Atty. Edgardo Golpeo, seeking the disbarment of respondent
Atty. Leonardo M. Real (respondent) for allegedly notarizing a document even
without the appearance of one of the parties.
maintained that it was impossible for her to subscribe to the questioned document
in the presence of respondent on 14 September 2000 since she was in Germany at
that time.
To support her contention, complainant presented a certified true copy of her
German passport[3] and a Certification from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID)[4]indicating that she arrived in the Philippines on 22 June 2000
and left the country on 4 August 2000. The passport further indicated that she
arrived again in the Philippines only on 1 July 2001.
Complainant submitted that because of respondents act, the property subject of the
SPA was mortgaged and later foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Antipolo City.
In his answer,[5] respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. He narrated
that sometime in the middle of year 2000, spouses Wilfredo and Lorena Gusi
approached him to seek advice regarding the computer business they were
planning to put up. During one of their meetings, the spouses allegedly introduced
to him a woman by the name of Nesa G. Isenhardt, sister of Wilfredo, as the
financier of their proposed business.
Respondent further narrated that on 14 September 2000, spouses Gusi, together
with the woman purporting to be the complainant, went to his office to have the
subject SPA notarized. He maintained that the parties all signed in his presence,
exhibiting to him their respective Community Tax Certificates (CTCs). He added
that the complainant even presented to him the original copy of the Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT)[6] of the property subject of the SPA evidencing her
ownership of the property.
Respondent noted that spouses Gusi even engaged his services as counsel in a civil
case filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City. The expenses
incurred for the case, which was predicated on the closure of their computer
business for non-payment of rentals, was allegedly financed by complainant. The
professional engagement with the spouses was, however, discontinued in view of
differences of opinion between lawyer and clients, as well as, non-payment of
respondents professional fees.
Respondent concluded that complainants cause of action had already
prescribed. He argued that under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, a complaint for
disbarment prescribes in two years from the date of professional misconduct. Since
the document questioned was notarized in year 2000, the accusation of misconduct
which was filed only in September 2004 had already prescribed. Moreover,
respondent noted that the SPA in question authorizing the grantee Wilfredo Gusi to
mortgage the property of complainant was not used for any transaction with a third
person prejudicial to the latter. The annotation at the back of the TCT[7] would
show that the property subject of the SPA was instead sold by complainant to her
brother Wilfredo for P500,000.00 on 12 January 2001. Thus, he submits that the
SPA did not cause grave injury to the complainant.
The IBP Report and Recommendation
On 8 September 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII2006-405,[8] which adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation [9] of the
Investigating Commissioner. IBP Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa, after due
proceeding, found respondent guilty of gross negligence as a notary public and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year and
disqualified from reappointment as notary public for two (2) years.
Aggrieved,
respondent
on
13
November
2006
filed
Motion
for
Respondent insists that complainant appeared before him and subscribed to the
SPA subject of the instant case. His contention, however, cannot prevail over the
documentary evidence presented by complainant that she was not in the
Philippines on 14 September 2000, the day the SPA was allegedly
notarized. Respondent may have indeed met complainant in person during the
period the latter was allegedly introduced to him by Spouses Gusi but that did not
change the fact established by evidence that complainant was not in the personal
presence of respondent at the time of notarization. It is well settled that entries in
official records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. [13] This principle aptly covers
the Certification from the BID that complainant left the Philippines on 4 August
2000 and arrived back only on 1 July 2001.
moment that the subject SPA was not utilized by the grantee for the purpose it was
intended because the property was allegedly transferred from complainant to her
brother by virtue of a deed of sale consummated between them. What is being
penalized is respondents act of notarizing a document despite the absence of one of
the parties. By notarizing the questioned document, he engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[17] A notarized document is by law entitled
to full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe
the basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the
public in notarized documents will be undermined.[18]
In a catena of cases,[19] we ruled that a lawyer commissioned as notary public
having thus failed to discharge his duties as a notary public, the revocation of his
notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public
for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year, are
in order.
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Leonardo M. Real is
hereby REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as notary public
for a period of two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely. He is
directed to report the date of receipt of this Decision in order to determine the date
of effectivity of his suspension.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondents personal
record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris
Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui,
husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our
Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City and as a result of their marital union,
they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all
surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out
that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in
1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street,
Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of
the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1982.
[1]
believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out
well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her
husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988,
respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant
then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with
respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail.
The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on
that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed
on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more
particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainants
husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer, respondent averred that she met Carlos
Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the
knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in
Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during
one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and
they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985 . Upon their return to Manila,
respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his
children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui
wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second
marriage before they would live together.
[2]
[3]
[4]
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she
would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice
and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988,
respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted
that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her
discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for
Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with
her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to
work with the law firm she was connected with, the woman who represented
[5]
In her Reply dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that
respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and
had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and
that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2)
children with Carlos Ui.
[7]
[8]
[12]
[13]
[14]
Respondent filed her Memorandum on February 22, 1995 and raised the
lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner
for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent
averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
[16]
[17]
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was
the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos
Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent
immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no
reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of
a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in
his courtship.
[18]
[20]
[21]
[23]
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline
submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was
courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single.
The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in
the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he
represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the
bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly,
possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a
ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar,
then the continued possession of good moral character is also a
requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases
to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she
met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in
love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave
birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos
Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of
respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how
the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before.
This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are
burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle
their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to
believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a
compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in
finding out more about Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate
involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused
respondents suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with
Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent
admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy,
China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if
Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage
in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a
circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondents
allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent
was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains
that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent
believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover,
for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly
immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
[27]
[28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards." Respondents act of immediately distancing
herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that
alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting
the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainants
bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers
only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence. This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
[29]
[30]
PATRICIA
FIGUEROA, complainant,
JR., respondent.
vs. SIMEON
BARRANCO,
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that
respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was
born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry
her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F.
Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates
in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were
steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned
as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual
congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son,
Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. It was after the child was born,
complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after
he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent
allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave
onlyP10.00 for the child on the latters birthdays. Her trust in him and their
relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married
another woman. Hence, this petition.
[1]
[3]
[4]
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for
failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of
time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath upon payment
of the required fees.
[5]
Respondents hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the
Court, in response to complainants opposition, resolved to cancel his
scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the
case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971 because
of the charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate,
respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa,
who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes
the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests
a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute
grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or
disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.
[6]
[7]
vs. ATTY.
FRANCISCO
P.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
[2]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
Martinez to pay the plaintiff therein the amount of P60,000 with interest,
P5,000 for moral and exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinezs dilatory tactics
during the trial, citing fourteen (14) specific instances thereof. Martinezs
appeal from the above judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for
his failure to file his brief, despite having been granted three thirty (30)-day
extensions to do so.
[13]
Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but none of the parties
appeared before the Commission, until finally it was considered submitted for
resolution last 27 June 2002. On the same date respondent filed a motion for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the complainant died sometime in June 1997
and that dismissal is warranted because the case filed by him does not survive due to
his demise; as a matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his death.
We disagree with respondents contention.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the Honorable
Supreme Court or the IBP may motu proprio initiate the proceedings when they
perceive acts of lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called by
any one and a probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a lawyer
which requires disciplinary sanctions.
As earlier cited, respondent lawyers propensity to disregard or ignore orders of the
Honorable Supreme Court for which he was fined twice, arrested and imprisoned
reflects an utter lack of good moral character.
Respondents conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa and/or violation
of BP Blg. 22) clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration of justice and
therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions against him (see In re: Abesamis, 102
Phil. 1182; In re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re: Vinzon, 19 SCRA 815; Medina vs.
Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent
Atty. Francisco P. Martinez be disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of
Attorneys immediately.
On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
Resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of its
Investigating Commissioner.
[16]
[19]
The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to furnish a copy of said
Motion to herein complainant. The records also show that respondent was
given several opportunities to present evidence by this Court as well as by
the IBP. Indeed, he only has himself to blame, for he has failed to present his
[20]
[21]
case despite several occasions to do so. It is now too late in the day for
respondent to ask this court to receive his evidence.
This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same patience that it did
when it waited for his comment on the original petition. At any rate, after a
careful consideration of the records of the instant case, we find the evidence
on record sufficient to support the IBPs findings.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so.
In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and convicted by
final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing a worthless check in the
amount of P8,000. The issue with which we are now concerned is whether or
not the said crime is one involving moral turpitude.
[22]
[24]
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import
deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg.
22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly
relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such
offense (emphasis supplied)
[26]
SEC. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty
of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty. (emphasis supplied)
Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the act of a person in
issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not
have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full
upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. Notwithstanding
therein petitioners averment that he was not a lawyer, we nevertheless
applied our ruling in People v. Tuanda, to the effect that
(A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, imports deceit and certainly relates to and
affects the good moral character of a person. [Indeed] the effects of the issuance of a
worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez, through
Justice Pedro L. Yap, transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in
the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it
creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public
since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition,
a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he
owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule
of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals. (emphasis supplied)
[28]
(T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a
closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on
her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her
unworthy of public confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C. No. 4334, 07 July
2004] The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude
of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest
and public order. [Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA 227] It also manifests a lawyers low regard
for her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and
irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.
[Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03 October 2003]
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient
funds to cover the same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral
conduct as to undermine the public confidence in law and lawyers. And while
the general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the
court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in
his non-professional or private capacity, where, however, the misconduct
outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to
show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his
licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or
removing him from the office of attorney.
[30]
[32]
to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On
these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any
professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or to be unworthy to continue
as officers of the Court.
[33]
Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondents plea that if given
another chance to have his day in court and to adduce evidence, the
result/outcome would be entirely different from that arrived at. We note with
displeasure the inordinate length of time respondent took in responding to our
requirement to submit his Comment on the original petition to disbar
him. These acts constitute a willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this
Court, which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a cause
sufficient for suspension or disbarment. Thus, from the time we issued our first
Resolution on 03 July 1996 requiring him to submit his Comment, until 16
March 1999, when he submitted said Comment to secure his release from
arrest, almost three years had elapsed.
It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of time it took
respondent to comply, his Comment consists of all of two pages, a copy of
which, it appears, he neglected to furnish complainant. And while he claims
to have been confined while undergoing medical treatment at the time our
Resolution of 17 February 1997 was issued, he merely reserved the
submission of a certification to that effect. Nor, indeed, was he able to offer
any explanation for his failure to submit his Comment from the time we issued
our first Resolution of 03 July 1996 until 16 March 1999.In fact, said Comment
alleged, merely, that the complainant, Michael Barrios, passed away
sometime in June 1997, and imputed upon the latter unsupported ill-motives
for instituting the said Petition against him, which argument has already been
resolved squarely in the abovementioned IBP report.
[34]
Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to appear before
the Commission as the main reason for the long delay, until the same was
finally submitted for Resolution on 27 June 2002. Respondent, therefore,
squandered away seven years to have his day in court and adduce evidence
in his behalf, which inaction also unduly delayed the courts prompt disposition
of this petition.
In Pajares v. Abad Santos, we reminded attorneys that there must be
more faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court [now Rule
7, Section 3] which provides that the signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that
it is not interposed for delay, and expressly admonishes that for a willful
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action. It is
noteworthy that in the past, the Court has disciplined lawyers and judges for
willful disregard of its orders to file comments or appellants briefs, as a penalty
for disobedience thereof.
[35]
[36]
[37]
For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take respondents old age and
the fact that he served in the judiciary in various capacities in his favor. If at all,
we hold respondent to a higher standard for it, for a judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence, and his conduct
should be above reproach. The fact that respondent has chosen to engage
in private practice does not mean he is now free to conduct himself in less
honorable or indeed in a less than honorable manner.
[38]
[39]
[41]
There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude. The review of
respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become
final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the
respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice
it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice.
[44]
Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there can be no
question that the term moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a
crime involving moral turpitude because the act is unquestionably against justice,
honesty and good morals (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962;
Bouvier's Law Dictionary; In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt cannot
now be questioned, his disbarment is inevitable. (emphasis supplied)
[50]
6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avancea,[51] the conditional pardon extended to the erring
lawyer by the Chief Executive also failed to relieve him of the penalty of disbarment
imposed by this court.
7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,[52] a lawyer was charged and found guilty of the
crime of falsification of public document for having prepared and notarized a deed of
sale of a parcel of land knowing that the supposed affiant was an impostor and that
the vendor had been dead for almost eight years. We ruled that disbarment follows
as a consequence of a lawyer's conviction by final judgment of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and since the crime of falsification of public document involves
moral turpitude, we ordered respondents name stricken off the roll of attorneys.
8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana,[53] we upheld the recommendation
of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted
of estafa through falsification of public documents, because she was totally unfit to
be a member of the legal profession.[54]
9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson,[55] a lawyer was disbarred for
having been convicted of estafa by final judgment for misappropriating the funds of
his client.
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the
very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a
pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
politic.
[56]
WHEREFORE,
respondent
Atty.
Francisco
P.
Martinez
is
hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as
a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
A.C. No. 6057
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found
respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner
San Juan recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for
two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted, with modification, the Report and recommended respondents
suspension from the practice of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court
as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP.
Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by
2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of
law is his only means of support for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for
reconsideration because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the
matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the
Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will
involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who
assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law
commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was
disqualified from owning real property.11Yet, in his motion for
reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership
to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition,
quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainants name. But
respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several
documents,13including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stiers
recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in
complainants name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in
circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of
lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and
the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade
the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of
the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his
office, for which he may be suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the
practice of law for three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted
him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was
suspended from the practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which
declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and
allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of
violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the
practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.