V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 9.

51

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Currentness

Penal Code (Refs & Annos)

Title 2. General Principles of Criminal Responsibility

Chapter 9. Justification Excluding Criminal Responsibility

Subchapter E. Law Enforcement

� 9.51. Arrest and Search

(a) A peace officer, or a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his
direction, is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the
actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in
making an arrest or search, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after
arrest, if:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the arrest or search is lawful or, if the arrest
or search is made under a warrant, he reasonably believes the warrant is valid;
and

(2) before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to arrest or search and
identifies himself as a peace officer or as one acting at a peace officer's
direction, unless he reasonably believes his purpose and identity are already
known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested.

(b) A person other than a peace officer (or one acting at his direction) is
justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor
reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making
a lawful arrest, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after lawful arrest
if, before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to and the reason for the
arrest or reasonably believes his purpose and the reason are already known by or
cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested.

(c) A peace officer is justified in using deadly force against another when and to
the degree the peace officer reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately
necessary to make an arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest, if the use of
force would have been justified under Subsection (a) and:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct for which arrest is authorized
included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or

(2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to
be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to the actor or another if
the arrest is delayed.
(d) A person other than a peace officer acting in a peace officer's presence and
at his direction is justified in using deadly force against another when and to
the degree the person reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately
necessary to make a lawful arrest, or to prevent escape after a lawful arrest, if
the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (b) and:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the felony or offense against the public peace
for which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force;
or

(2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to
be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to another if the arrest is
delayed.

(e) There is no duty to retreat before using deadly force justified by Subsection
(c) or (d).

(f) Nothing in this section relating to the actor's manifestation of purpose or

identity shall be construed as conflicting with any other law relating to the
issuance, service, and execution of an arrest or search warrant either under the
laws of this state or the United States.

(g) Deadly force may only be used under the circumstances enumerated in
Subsections (c) and (d).

CREDIT(S)

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, � 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, � 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

2003 Main Volume

Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, � 1.01, throughout the section, following
references to specific subsections, deleted "of this section".

Prior Laws:

Rev.P.C. 1879, arts. 490, 491, 559, 561 to 565.

Rev.P.C. 1895, arts. 593, 594, 664, 666 to 670.

Rev.P.C. 1911, arts. 1014, 1015, 1094, 1096 to 1100.

Vernon's Ann.P.C. (1925) arts. 1142, subd. 5; 1212; 1214 to 1218.

Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. art. 15.27.

CROSS REFERENCES
"Actor" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 1.07.

Arrest,

Generally, see Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. arts. 14.01 et seq., 15.01 et seq.

Evading, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 38.04.

Resisting, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 38.03.

"Deadly force" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 9.01.

Escape,

Generally, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 38.06.

Defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 9.01.

Implements, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 38.09.

Permitting or facilitating, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 38.07.

Unlawful custody effect, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 38.08.

Justification to resist arrest or search, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 9.31.

"Law" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 1.07.

"Peace officer" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 1.07.

"Reasonable belief" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 1.07.

Reckless injury of innocent third person, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 9.05.

Search and seizure,

Generally, see Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. art. 18.01 et seq.

Resisting, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 38.03.

"Serious bodily injury" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 1.07.

Suppression of riot, see Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. art. 8.06.

Theft, force justified to prevent consequences, see V.T.C.A., Civil Practice &
Remedies Code � 124.001; Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. art. 18.16.

Threats, duty of peace officer, see Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. art. 6.05.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

2003 Main Volume

Assault and Battery 64.

Homicide 752 to 756.

Westlaw Topic Nos. 37, 203.

C.J.S. Assault and Battery � 96.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

2006 Electronic Pocket Part Update

ALR Library

169 ALR 1419, Search Incident to One Offense as Justifying Seizure of Instruments
of or Articles Connected With Another Offense.

Encyclopedias

TX Jur. 3d Criminal Law � 455, Self-Defense; Justifying and Mitigating

Circumstances.

TX Jur. 3d Criminal Law � 1905, Arrest and Search; by Police Officer or Officer's
Agent.

TX Jur. 3d Criminal Law � 1906, Arrest and Search; by Police Officer or Officer's
Agent -- by Private Citizen.

Treatises and Practice Aids

Charlton, 6 Tex. Prac. Series � 7.9, Law Enforcement.

McCormick, Blackwell & Blackwell, 8 Tex. Prac. Series � 109.1, Model for Dictating
Objections to the Court's Charge.

McCormick, Blackwell & Blackwell, 8 Tex. Prac. Series � 106.28, Deadly Force by a
Peace Officer in Making an Arrest or Search.

Dix and Dawson, 40 Tex. Prac. Series � 6.98, Entering to Execute Search Warrant --
Entry by Breaking as Limited by Section 9.51 of the Penal Code.

Dix and Dawson, 40 Tex. Prac. Series � 8.55, Use of Force to Make Arrest.

Dix and Dawson, 40 Tex. Prac. Series � 8.57, Entry of Premises to Make Arrest --
Announcement Requirements.

Dix and Dawson, 40 Tex. Prac. Series � 9.91, Use of Force to Make Warrantless
Arrests.

Dix and Dawson, 40 Tex. Prac. Series � 10.57, Use of Force.

Dix and Dawson, 40 Tex. Prac. Series � 6.100, Entering to Execute Search Warrant
-- Exclusion of Evidence Obtained After Unlawful Entry -- Texas Law Requirements.

Dix and Dawson, 43 Tex. Prac. Series � 31.269, Undercover Peace Officer or Person
Investigating Crime Not Accomplice Witness.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Searches and seizures, excessive force, fleeing suspect, threat of serious

physical harm, reasonable misapprehension standard, qualified immunity, see
Brosseau v. Haugen, 2004, 125 S.Ct. 596.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 2

Admissibility of evidence 12

Arrest with warrant 5, 6

Arrest with warrant - In general 5

Arrest with warrant - Validity of process 6

Arrest without warrant 7

Federal law 11

Force to overcome resistance, force used 4

Force used 3, 4

Force used - Generally 3

Force used - Force to overcome resistance 4

Immunity 10

Informants 9

Instructions 15

Jury questions 14

Private citizens 8

Sufficiency of evidence 13

Validity 1

Validity of process, arrest with warrant 6

1. Validity

Enactment of this section, which allows officer or his agent to use whatever force
is necessary to arrest person when officer or agent has reasonable belief that
arrest is lawful and which does not give police discretion to determine legality
or illegality of arrest for all purposes but only speaks to use of force to make
arrest and allows police to arrest without acting at their peril on matter that
may take court months to decide, constituted valid exercise of police power. Ford
v. State (Cr.App. 1976) 538 S.W.2d 633. Arrest 68(2)

2. In general

Vernon's Ann.P.C. repealed arts. 1210 to 1212, justifying an officer in killing a

party who was attempting the rescue of a prisoner only when the officer's life was
endangered thereby or he was threatened with great bodily injury, did not, where
the assault was not made with a deadly weapon, authorize the slaying of such
person. Williams v. State (Cr.App. 1899) 41 Tex.Crim. 365, 54 S.W. 759.

A peace officer has the right to summon assistance to his aid in the discharge of
his duty. Owen v. State (Cr.App. 1910) 58 Tex.Crim. 261, 125 S.W. 405.

The fact that an officer thinks that a writ entitles him to take property under it
will not increase his rights. If the writ is void he is a trespasser. Lassiter v.
State (Cr.App. 1914) 73 Tex.Crim. 35, 163 S.W. 710. Sheriffs And Constables 98(5)

3. Force used--generally

When aggression of officer in making arrest exceeds what is reasonably necessary

to effect arrest, right of self-defense inures to the party assaulted. Stanfield
v. State (1931) 118 Tex.Crim. 47, 38 S.W.2d 94; Daughtery v. State (1944) 146
Tex.Crim. 488, 176 S.W.2d 571.

Degree of force used by police officer when he and other officers detained
arrestee was not excessive, given that arrestee was convicted of aggravated
assault of officer, which required proof that arrestee caused serious bodily
injury under Texas law, and that officer was thus justified, under Texas law, in
using force up to and including deadly force to resist assault and effect arrest.
Sappington v. Bartee, C.A.5 (Tex.)1999, 195 F.3d 234. Arrest 68(2)

Police officer did not commit assault against arrestee under Texas law by pointing
his pistol at arrestee in course of his official duties. Hinojosa v. City of
Terrell, Tex., C.A.5 (Tex.)1988, 834 F.2d 1223. Assault And Battery 2

Officer who was forced to shoot motorist in self-defense, because motorist was
attempting to run officer down with pickup truck, did not use excessive force, and
thus could not be held civilly liable to motorist's estate. Fraire v. City of
Arlington, C.A.5 (Tex.)1992, 957 F.2d 1268, rehearing denied, certiorari denied
113 S.Ct. 462, 506 U.S. 973, 121 L.Ed.2d 371. Civil Rights 1088(2)

Officers who make a rightful arrest, and subsequently use violence and rob the
party arrested, are not exonerated on account of the legality of the alleged
arrest. Tones v. State (Cr.App. 1905) 48 Tex.Crim. 363, 88 S.W. 217, 122
Am.St.Rep. 759. Robbery 14

It was city marshal's duty to arrest prostitute if her conduct on street was
contrary to law, but he had no authority to assault her when she remarked that she
thought "he had it in for her." Hudley v. State (Cr.App. 1917) 81 Tex.Crim. 39,
194 S.W. 160. Arrest 63.2

If an officer, in making an arrest acts in such wanton and menacing manner as to

threaten persons being arrested with serious bodily harm, the latter have the
right to defend themselves by means proportionate to the necessities of the
occasion, as viewed from their standpoint. Snow v. State (Cr.App. 1921) 91
Tex.Crim. 1, 237 S.W. 563. Homicide 805

Aggression of officer using metal knucks in making arrest can go further than is
reasonably necessary to effect arrest. Stanfield v. State (Cr.App. 1931) 118
Tex.Crim. 47, 38 S.W.2d 94. Homicide 805

Where sheriff in arresting accused's son used metal knucks in unlawful manner,
right of self-defense was available to accused. Stanfield v. State (Cr.App. 1931)
118 Tex.Crim. 47, 38 S.W.2d 94. Homicide 805

As respects liability on official bond, officer may use no greater force in

arresting suspected felon than in arresting suspected misdemeanant. Tabor v.
McKenzie (Civ.App. 1932) 49 S.W.2d 874. Sheriffs And Constables 157(4)

4. ---- Force to overcome resistance, force used

An officer having lawful authority to make an arrest, may, on meeting with

resistance, employ such force as may be necessary to overcome such resistance; but
he must use no greater force than is necessary for the arrest and detention of the
accused. Giroux v. State (1874) 40 Tex. 97; Beaverts v. State (1878) 4 Tex.Crim.
175; Carter v. State (1892) 30 Tex.Crim. 551, 17 S.W. 1102.

Legal arrest by an officer being resisted, he may resort to such force as is

necessary, but no more, to overcome the resistance and accomplish the arrest. If
the officer exceeds such force, he is guilty of an offense. Skidmore v. State
(1877) 2 Tex.Crim. 20; Beaverts v. State (1878) 4 Tex.Crim. 175, citing Skidmore
v. State (1875) 43 Tex. 93. And see, also, Giroux v. State (1874) 40 Tex. 97;
Rasberry v. State (1877) 1 Tex.Crim. 665; Carter v. State (1892) 30 Tex.Crim. 551,
17 S.W. 1102; Owen v. State (1910) 58 Tex.Crim. 261, 125 S.W. 405. While an
officer has the right to use necessary force to complete a legal arrest, he may
not kill his prisoner to prevent his attempted escape. Caldwell v. State (1874) 41
Tex. 86. And see Tiner v. State (1875) 44 Tex. 128; Miers v. State (1895) 34
Tex.Crim. 161, 29 S.W. 1074.

An officer or other person, in executing an order of arrest, is authorized to use

such force as is necessary in overcoming resistance to the execution of such
order; but he shall not take the life of the person resisting arrest, unless he
has just grounds to fear that his own life will be taken, or that he will suffer
great bodily injury in the execution of the order. Plasters v. State (1877) 1
Tex.Crim. 673.

If the officer acts outside of his authority or exercises it unlawfully, his

official character does not prevent accused from setting up the unlawful acts to
justify or extenuate acts of resistance. James v. State (1875) 44 Tex. 314.

The officer must not use a deadly weapon in making an arrest unless compelled to
do so by the conduct of the prisoner. English v. State (Cr.App. 1895) 34 Tex.Crim.
190, 30 S.W. 233.

Constable is not warranted in killing person for resisting arrest or fleeing,

unless in danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily injury. Grohoske v.
State (Cr.App. 1933) 124 Tex.Crim. 338, 61 S.W.2d 847. Homicide 754
5. Arrest with warrant--In general

A warrant of arrest issued by a justice of the peace confers no authority to

arrest in another county, unless it is indorsed by a judge of the supreme court,
court of appeals, or a district or county judge (when it may be executed anywhere
in the state), or by a magistrate of the county in which the accused is found,
when it may be executed in the latter county, but must be executed by an officer
of the county where the accused is found. Ledbetter v. State (1887) 23 Tex.Crim.
247, 5 S.W. 226; Peter v. State (1887) 23 Tex.Crim. 684, 5 S.W. 228.

The ordinary jurisdiction of a justice of the peace is circumscribed by the limits

of his precinct, but when proceeding as an examining court his authority is
coextensive with his county. Hart v. State (1883) 15 Tex.Crim. 202, 49 Am.Rep.
188.

Indictment for resisting an officer in his attempt to execute a warrant for the
arrest of a party accused of a felony, should, in addition to showing that the
warrant was sufficient to charge the felony against the party accused, show that
the warrant was legally issued. Pierce v. State (1884) 17 Tex.Crim. 232.

6. ---- Validity of process

If a process, fair and legal on its face, is placed in the hands of an officer for
execution, he will be protected in executing it, although he may know of facts
which render such process in reality void. Tierney v. Frazier (1882) 57 Tex. 437;
Rainey v. State (1886) 20 Tex.Crim. 455.

In accordance with the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable seizures or

searches, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P.1879, arts. 233 to 236 (see, now, arts. 15.02 to
15.05) provided that a warrant for arrest, and also the complaint on which it
issued, had to specify the accused's name, if known, and if his name was unknown,
had to give a reasonably definite description of him. Alford v. State (1880) 8
Tex.Crim. 545.

In Texas, civil liability for both false arrest and false imprisonment will attach
when: there is willful detention of person; against the consent of the party
detained; and detention was without authority of law, and thus no action will lie
against officer for false arrest or false imprisonment where detention is executed
by virtue of legal sufficient process duly issued by court of competent
jurisdiction. McElroy v. U.S., W.D.Tex.1994, 861 F.Supp. 585. False Imprisonment
2; False Imprisonment 7(3)

No person other than an officer can make an arrest, except for a felony committed
in his presence or within his view, unless he is specifically appointed by a
magistrate to execute a particular writ, or is summoned by an officer on a posse
comitatus. Alford v. State (1880) 8 Tex.Crim. 545.

Defendant committed the assault in resisting arrest after he was informed by the
officer assaulted that he had a warrant for him. A defect in the warrant, in that
it only gave his surname, and did not state that his name was unknown, and give a
description of him, being at the time unknown to defendant, was no defense. Graham
v. State (App. 1890) 13 S.W. 1013. Homicide 739

7. Arrest without warrant

The rules under which an arrest could be made by a peace officer, without warrant,
were defined by Vernon's Ann.C.C.P.1925, arts. 212 to 216 (see, now, art. 14.01 et
seq.). These articles prescribed the only circumstances under which an arrest
could be made by a peace officer without a warrant, except when the arrest was
made in the prevention of an offense. Johnson v. State (1878) 5 Tex.Crim. 43; Lacy
v. State (1879) 7 Tex.Crim. 403; Ross v. State (1881) 10 Tex.Crim. 455, 38 Am.Rep.
643; Staples v. State (1883) 14 Tex.Crim. 136; Jacobs v. State (1889) 28 Tex.Crim.
79, 12 S.W. 408; Ex parte Sherwood (1890) 29 Tex.Crim. 334, 15 S.W. 812; Carter v.
State (1892) 30 Tex.Crim. 551, 17 S.W. 1102.

A person unlawfully carrying arms may be arrested without warrant. Hodges v. State
(1879) 6 Tex.Crim. 615; Jacobs v. State (1889) 28 Tex.Crim. 79, 12 S.W. 408.

Under Rev.P.C.1879, art. 322, an officer was authorized, on the information of a

credible person, to arrest without a warrant any person for unlawfully carrying a
pistol. Ex parte Sherwood (App. 1890) 15 S.W. 812. Arrest 63.1

Where a patrolman of railroad yards asked deceased if he would go to the office,

and deceased voluntarily assented, and no command or restraining word was given,
and the door left open while they were in the office, there was no arrest. Rezeau
v. State (Cr.App. 1923) 95 Tex.Crim. 323, 254 S.W. 574. Arrest 68(3)

8. Private citizens

Where a person has acted for several months as a deputy sheriff, under a written
appointment from the sheriff, and has recorded his oath of office, but not his
appointment, he is an officer de facto. Weatherford v. State (Cr.App. 1893) 31
Tex.Crim. 530, 21 S.W. 251, 37 Am.St.Rep. 828. Sheriffs And Constables 20

Where such an officer, who is known in the community as a deputy sheriff, summons
a bystander to assist him in the arrest of an offender, the bystander will be
justified in so doing, and, if the offender shoots him while making the arrest in
an orderly manner, it is murder. Weatherford v. State (Cr.App. 1893) 31 Tex.Crim.
530, 21 S.W. 251, 37 Am.St.Rep. 828. Homicide 552

A private citizen, while engaged in making an unlawful arrest and restraining the
person arrested by threats with a pistol, loses the right of perfect self-defense.
Rutland v. State (Cr.App. 1920) 88 Tex.Crim. 114, 224 S.W. 1088. Homicide 781

9. Informants

Undercover officer's solicitation of informant's armed assistance in making arrest

was not so outrageous as to deny defendant due process; officer accepted
informant's offer to assist only after primary and secondary bust signals failed
to trigger arrest team of other officers, informant was authorized to assist under
statute authorizing citizens to use force to assist officer in making arrest, and
informant's negotiations to secure cocaine were not carried out with defendant.
Ramirez v. State (App. 1 Dist. 1991) 822 S.W.2d 240, petition for discretionary
review refused. Arrest 68(1); Constitutional Law 257.5

Penal Code authorizes informant to arm himself to assist undercover narcotics

officer with arrests in response to request by officer. Jimenez v. State (App. 1
Dist. 1992) 838 S.W.2d 661. Arrest 68(1)

10. Immunity

Officers were not guilty of false arrest and false imprisonment under Texas law,
and thus plaintiffs could not recover on that theory under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), where officers detained plaintiffs to make execution of valid search
warrant and probable cause existed to detain them until officers could verify that
they had no involvement in drug trafficking activity of another person occupying
the same building and posed no threat to the officers' safety. McElroy v. U.S.,
W.D.Tex.1994, 861 F.Supp. 585. United States 78(5.1)

Under Texas law, officers were protected by qualified immunity from claims of
assault, false imprisonment, or false arrest, thus the United States was not
liable for their conduct under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) when officers,
upon breaking into apartment and believing that suspects were involved in
international drug operation, tackled and handcuffed them, inflicting minor
injuries, and pointed guns at them until they could be placed in handcuffs, where,
after determining that suspects, who turned out to be innocent persons in
different dwelling unit from crime suspect, posed no threat to their safety,
officers did nothing further to physically harm them. McElroy v. U.S.,
W.D.Tex.1994, 861 F.Supp. 585. United States 78(9); United States 78(10)

11. Federal law

In determining whether conduct of law enforcement officers constituted assault,

false imprisonment, or false arrest under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
United States could invoke any defenses available to individual law enforcement
officers under state law. McElroy v. U.S., W.D.Tex.1994, 861 F.Supp. 585. United
States 78(5.1); United States 78(9); United States 78(14)

12. Admissibility of evidence

In prosecution of police officer for murder, in which the state claimed that
defendant entered upon deceased's premises armed for purpose of killing deceased,
and the defendant claimed that his purpose was to arrest deceased for shooting
that had taken place on premises, and in which there was testimony as to a quarrel
between defendant and deceased during which deceased had accused defendant of
insulting his wife, but which defendant claimed was a mere protest to the wife as
to shooting on deceased's premises, evidence that there had been shooting on
deceased's premises, and that complaints had been made to defendant thereof, was
admissible. Waggoner v. State (Cr.App. 1923) 96 Tex.Crim. 96, 256 S.W. 266.
Homicide 1047

13. Sufficiency of evidence

Defendant, a deputy sheriff, while taking a drunken prisoner to jail, upon his
resisting, threw him down, and had hold of him when deceased came up and struck
him,--some of the evidence showing with a stick, and some with a brick; and in the
course of the altercation defendant said that if deceased struck him again he
would shoot him. Thereupon deceased did so, and defendant shot him. This was
sufficient to support a finding that defendant was guilty of manslaughter.
Williams v. State (Cr.App. 1899) 41 Tex.Crim. 365, 54 S.W. 759. Homicide 706

City was not entitled to an issue on justification in suit in which damages were
sought for injuries sustained by plaintiff when she was shot in the hand by a city
police officer, in that, in view of the containment order, it could not be said
that officer discharged firearm in an effort to make or assist in the making of an
arrest or search and there was no evidence which furnished a basis for a finding
that officer had reason to believe that any person in plaintiff's apartment was
attempting to escape or attempting to prevent his search of apartment from which
shots were fired. City of San Antonio v. Higle (App. 4 Dist. 1984) 685 S.W.2d 682,
ref. n.r.e.. Trial 350.3(5)

14. Jury questions

Where constable, who was being sued by accused for illegal arrest and had made
threats against accused, obtained warrants for accused's arrest on another charge,
found accused sitting in automobile, informed accused as to warrants, drew pistol,
but replaced it in scabbard, took out black jack and handcuffs, and was attempting
to handcuff accused when accused shot him, right of self-defense was not
established as a matter of law but was for jury. Daugherty v. State (Cr.App. 1943)
146 Tex.Crim. 488, 176 S.W.2d 571. Homicide 1346

15. Instructions

The charge with reference to the right of an officer to use a deadly weapon upon
an arrested party in his custody, only when in the necessary defense of his own
person from serious bodily injury then about to be inflicted upon him by such
prisoner, is not obnoxious to the objection that it based the right of self-
defense upon the actual existence of danger, and not upon its reasonable
appearance. Giebel v. State (App. 1889) 12 S.W. 591. Homicide 1486

In place of a general charge, a charge, stating under what circumstances,

applicable to the facts of the case, defendant, in homicide, as an officer, would
have a right to arrest deceased should be given. Kilpatrick v. State (Cr.App.
1916) 80 Tex.Crim. 391, 189 S.W. 267. Homicide 1470

In murder prosecution arising after defendant shot victim while attempting to

arrest him, in which defendant's defense was that he was justified in using a
certain amount of force to effect the arrest, but that he shot victim in self-
defense, and in which applicable paragraphs of jury charge reflected only those
two theories, inclusion of definition of when "deadly force" could be used by a
person attempting arrest was harmless. Werner v. State (App. 1 Dist. 1984) 680
S.W.2d 858, petition for discretionary review granted, affirmed 711 S.W.2d 639.
Criminal Law 1172.1(3)

V. T. C. A., Penal Code � 9.51, TX PENAL � 9.51

Current through the end of the 2006 3rd Called Session of the 79th Legislature.

� 2006 Thomson/West
END OF DOCUMENT
(C) 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.