In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Pedro Santillon, Claro SANTILLON, petitionerappellant, v Perfecta MIRANDA, Benito MIRANDA and

Rosario CORRALES, oppositorsappellees

G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965
FACTS:
Pedro Santillon died without testament leaving his wife, Perfecta Miranda and one son, Claro.
Four years after Pedros death, Claro filed a petition for letters of administration which was
opposed by his mother and spouses Benito Miranda and Rosario Corrales. The court
appointed commissioners to draft a project of partition and distribution of all properties of
Pedro. Claro then filed a motion to declare share of heirs and to resolve conflicting claims of
the parties invoking Art.892 of the New Civil Code insisting that after deducting from the
conjugal properties (conjugal share of Perfecta), the remaining must be divided as follows:
for her and for him. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed besides her conjugal half, she
was entitled under Art. 996 of the NCC to another of the remaining half. After due notice
and hearing, the court held that Perfecta is entitled to shares and the remaining share for
Claro after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE:
The manner of division of share of the estate of an intestate decedent when the only survivors
are the spouse and one legitimate child.
RULING:
Intestate proceedings in the New Civil Codes chapter on legal or intestate succession, the
only article applicable is Art. 996. Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference
from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code form which Art. 996
was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow
or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow
or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second
situation, thereby indicating the legislators desire to promulgate just one general rule
applicable to both situations.

Surviving spouse concurring with a legitimate child entitled to one-half of the intestate
estate.

When intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with only one legitimate child of the
deceased is entitled to one-half of the estate of the deceased spouse under Art. 996 of
the Civil Code.
BAGUNU vs PIEDAD
G.R. No. 140975. December 8, 2000
FACTS:
Augusto H. Piedad died intestate without any direct descendants or ascendants. The trial
court awarded the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad. Pastora Piedad is the maternal
aunt of Augusto. Petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special
Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of
Augusto H. Piedad. She contends that she has a right to succession given that she is the
daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad. She contends that the proceedings were
tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the notice of hearing,

lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of
allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The RTC denied the motion,
prompting petitioner to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the
dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involved pure
questions of law. Finding merit in that argument, the CA dismissed the appeal, citing Section
2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would require all appeals
involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90
of the Court. Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate court in the
instant petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court set aside the alleged procedural
decrepitude there was none - and took on the basic substantive issue.
ISSUE:
Can petitioner Ofelia Bagunu, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside
respondent Pastora Piedad, a collateral relative of the third civil degree?
HELD:
NO. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the
decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones,
saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. x x x

Right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending line. In the
collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.
The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil
degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of
preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate
parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the
surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent.
Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962,
aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the
collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
"Article 966. x x x "In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is
made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees
removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first
cousin and so forth."

Respondent Pastora Piedad, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto
H. Piedad excludes petitioner Ofelia Baguna, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab
intestato to the estate of the decedent.
The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner do not
at all support her cause.
"Article 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the
other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. "The latter shall succeed without distinction of
lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."

"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship
in the collateral line."

The law means only that among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of
succession), no preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship by the
whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin
of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt,
being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree
of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative.
The Supreme Court denied the instant petition.
SANDEJAS v. LINA
Doctrine: In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters incidental
and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling, mortgaging or
otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate.

Facts:

On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying
that letters of administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his
wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS. Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court
appointing Eliodoro as administrator.

On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the
records burned were the records of the Court where Sandejas filed his petition.

On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-inintervention was filed by Alex A. Lina alleging that Sandejas, in his capacity as seller,
obligated to sell to Lina 4 parcels of land.

Eliodoro died in November 1984 in Canada. His counsel is still waiting for official word on
the fact of the death of the administrator. He also alleged that the matter of the claim of
Alex becomes a money claim to be filed in Eliodoro's estate. the lower court issued an
order directing the other heirs of Sandejas to move for the appointment of a new
administrator within 15 days from receipt of the order.

On January 1986, Alex filed a Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas on the following reasons: that Alex has not
received any motion for the appointment of an administrator in place of Eliodoro; that his
appointment would be beneficial to the heirs; that he is willing to give away his being an
administrator as long as the heirs has found one. The heirs chose Sixto Sandejas as new
administrator. They were reasoning out that it was only at a later date that Sixto accepted
the appointment. The lower court substituted Alex Lina with Sixto Sandejas as
administrator.

On November 1993, Alex filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of conditional
sale executed between Alex A. Lina and Elidioro and to compel the heirs to execute a
deed of absolute sale in favor of Alex. The lower court granted Alex's motion.

Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr.
and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled
that the ownership of the four lots was to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios until
the approval of the sale was obtained from the settlement court.

What is the settlement court's jurisdiction?

Held:
Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules
of Court. One can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under
administration. A stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the
effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be
taken out of custodia legis, but only with the court's permission.
Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences have no bearing on
the intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional sale. Probate
jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the
probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the
removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental
and collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling,
mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this
point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow
from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.
In the present case, the Motion was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to Alex; hence,
that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent
to file a separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share
of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the
deceased spouses.
Re: Intervenor's Standing
Petitioners contend that under Rule 89, only the executor or administrator is authorized to
apply for the approval of a sale of realty under administration. Hence, the settlement court
allegedly erred in entertaining and granting respondent's Motion for Approval.
There is no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey. Notice.
Effect of deed. -- Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real
property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that
purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property according to such contract, or
with such modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if the contract
is to convey real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute the deed. "

This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically
requiring only the executor or administrator to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage
or otherwise encumber real estate for the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies
(Section 2);or for authority to sell real or personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees or
legatees and other interested persons, although such authority is not necessary to pay debts,
legacies or expenses of administration (Section 4).
Section 8 mentions only an application to authorize the conveyance of realty under a contract
that the deceased entered into while still alive. While this Rule does not specify who should

Issue:

file the application, it stands to reason that the proper party must be one who is to be
benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be entitled to the avails of the suit.
ARMAS v. CALISTERIO
GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000
FACTS:
Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April
1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second
husband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The
latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of
Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court
declaration of Bounds presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole
surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly
bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as
administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to
her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
ISSUE:
Whether Marrieta and Teodoricos marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of
presumptive death.
HELD:
The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958 where
the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect
in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance only to
cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive
death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of
absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrietas marriage with Teodorico is valid
and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.
BARANDA v. GUSTILO
Tuesday, August 12, 2014
Facts:

A petition for reconstitution of title was filed with the CFI (now RTC) of Iloilo involving a
parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by OCT No.
6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. The OCT was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was
issued in the names of petitioners Baranda and Hitalia.

The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana
Silao refused to honor on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same
Lot No. 4517. The Court found out that TCT No. 257772 was fraudulently acquired by
Perez, Gotera and Susana. Thereafter, the court issued a writ of demolition which was
questioned by Perez and others so a motion for reconsideration was filed.

Another case was filed by Baranda and Hitalia (GR. NO. 62042) for the execution of
judgement in the resolutions issued by the courts.
In the meantime, the CA dismissed a civil case (GR. NO. 00827) involving the same
properties. (NOTE: three cases na ang involve excluding the case at bar.)
The petitioners prayed that an order be released to cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to
cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia.
In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso
annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued
new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners.
However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis
pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title.
This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in
the new certificates.
Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration
invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.

Issue:
What is the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Held:
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of
Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... If the instrument is
not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such
denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to
appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper
step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other
instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with
the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question
shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the
party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."
The function of ROD is ministerial in nature
The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances,
instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did
not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's
Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of
the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.
In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other
instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land

Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration
Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
No room for construction for the laws on functions of ROD
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The statute concerning
the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is
clear and leaves no room for construction.

Parish Priest of Victoria vs. Rigor

This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at

Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty-four hectares. That devise was
made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria, Tarlac, in favor of his
nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood.
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on
August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in
the will were the testator's nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia RigorEscobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a
devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19, 1954,
the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for
the appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the deceased administratrix,
Florencia Rigor), who should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying
that the possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The probate
court granted the petition. A new administrator was appointed. On January 31, 1957 the
parish priest filed another petition for the delivery of the ricelands to the church as trustee.
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957
praying that the bequest be declared inoperative and that they be adjudged as the
persons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria,
"no nearest male relative of" the testator "has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp.
25 and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition was opposed by the parish priest of Victoria.
Judge De Aquino granted the second motion for reconsideration in his order of December
10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew named Edgardo G.
Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian in the San Jose
Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The administrator was directed to deliver
the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee.
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that Father
Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male relative who would take the
holy orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years because to enforce it
beyond that period would violate "the rule against perpetuities". It ruled that since no
legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty years after the testator's death, the same
should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and
article 870 of the new Civil Code.
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments.
When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in

accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly
appear that his intention was different from that literally expressed (In re Estate of
Calderon, 26 Phil. 333
"The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is "the
life and soul of a will". It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the polestar, in
giving effect to a will"
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator
intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a
priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he
discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say annually twenty masses with
prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the
ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male
relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's
nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado", or how long after the testator's death would it be determined that he had
a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that
has brought about the controversy between the parish priest of Victoria and the testator's
legal heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male relative who
would study for the priesthood should be determined. Did the testator contemplate only
his nearest male relative at the time of his death? Or did he have in mind any of his
nearest male relatives at anytime after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the
time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to
inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens,
except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To
construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his
death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the
disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest legal heirs were his three sisters or seconddegree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the
testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a
son of his sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But
since he could not prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with certitude what
category of nearest male relative would be living at the time of his death, he could not
specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (the sons of
his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative".
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a
seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the
probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no
more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie
la carrera eclesiastica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives

born after his death, he could have so specified in his will. He must have known that such
a broad provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his
bequest.
Following that interpretation of the will, the inquiry would be whether at the time Father
Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had
manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically
answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January
31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "no nearest male relative of the late
(Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on
Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as
envisaged in the will, was likewise inoperative.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old
Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be
inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in
which the right of accretion exists" ("el legado . . . por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto,
se refundir en la masa de la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de
acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960(2), which
provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that
belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands,
the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the
testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or
that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's
will is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be
intestate succession as to the property covered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham
vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEOHERRERA, petitioner,vs. FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.
G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987GUTIERREZ, JR., J

Facts:

Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March 13, 1952,
in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive
properties in the province of Cebu.

On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition
for the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament left by the said
deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed
Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof.

After due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the
deceased was a forgery.

The testate proceeding was converted into intestate proceedings.

After determining the intestate heirs of the decedent, the court ordered that the assets of
the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and
distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9 declared intestate heirs.
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir
under the forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as
one of the heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of
the deceased and that in the declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted,
in disregard of the law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all other
forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was entitled to a
legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child.
Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order of the
court dated April12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the legal heirs of the
deceased Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973.
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he submitted
to support his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a
portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated
July 31, 1967, supposedly signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose
Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera,
Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales,
Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished
to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the ground
that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
claim; that respondent Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver
agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of
heirs; that the same is void having been executed before the distribution of the estate and
before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack
of subject matter.
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five declared
heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato
Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of
Vito Borromeo.
It is argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of Hereditary Rights"
executed on July31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked on June 29,
1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force
and effect because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has
been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article
1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid, the person
must be certain of the death of the one from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the
inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the
inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were, therefore, uncertain. This
view, according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057 of the same Code
which directs heirs, devisees, and legatees to signify their acceptance or repudiation
within thirty days after the court has issued an order for the distribution of the estate.
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under Article 1043 of
the Civil Code there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir before he can
accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of the
death of the person from whom he into inherit and that he must be certain of his right to
the inheritance. He points out that at the time of the signing of the waiver document on

July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo
was already dead as well as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver
document itself.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an acceptance or renunciation of inheritance, in order to be valid, must be
preceded by a court declaration that the person making the acceptance or renunciation is
indeed an heir.
RULING:
No. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties included
in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to
the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties
have the character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the
moment of the death of the deceased, by principle established in article 657 and applied by
article 661 of the Civil Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere
fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased
until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any
event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code.
The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding
hereditary portion." The heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the
order to partition the estate was issued only in 1969.
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be
effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2)
the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. The
intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the
only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent
with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that
no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible.
The circumstances of this case relinquish their rights, Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967.
Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they
submitted a proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they
proposed to concede to all the eight (8)intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties,
personal and real, including all cash and sums of money in the hands of the Special
Administrator, as of October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them in any action then
pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and concede to
them all the 14 contested lots. In this document, the respondent recognizes and concedes
that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver document, is an heir of the
deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of
Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent now purports it to be. Had the
intent been otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia
Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to
them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and30, 1969, the majority of the
declared heirs executed an Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be distributed.
This Agreement of Partition was approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June
29, 1968, the petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment
purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo
all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as an intestate heir in the
estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment was

P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and Amelia
Borromeo (assignees in the aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of
Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors named in the same deed of assignment. The
stated consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of
Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968,
while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March 24,196
IMPERIAL v. CA
G.R. NO. 102037 | JULY 17, 1996
Petitioner: Melanio Imperial
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Guillermo Solleza, et al.
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
Lot No. 1052 and Lot No. 1091, both situated in Lucban, Quezon, were originally owned by
Maria Imperial. She was survived by her two children: Adela and Melanio. Adela died on May
4, 1986 and survived by her husband Guillermo Solleza and Rosa, Victoria, Virgilio and
Guillermo, Jr. children.
On May 1, 1979, Adela and Melanio agreed to register the lots in the name of Melanioto
expedite the titling of the parcels of land. Adela executed a 'Kasulatan ng Pagtalikod sa
Karapatan,' waiving her rights over the lots. On the same date, Melanio executed a
'Pagwawalang Bisa sa Pagtalikod sa Karapatan,' declaring that the document was simulated.
By virtue of the waiver, Melanio was able to obtain titles over the lots in his name. Melanio
also executed a document, 'Sa Sino Mang Makatalastas Nito,' acknowledging the one-half
share of his sister in Lot No. 1091 and 1052.On May 4, 1985, Melanio sold lot No. 1052
covered by OCT No. 27941 for the sum of 20,000php. The sale was discovered by Rosa
Solleza. Adela's heirs filed the case praying that inasmuch as lot No. 1052 had been sold by
defendant Melanio without giving any share of proceeds to Adela, lot No. 1091 should be
reconveyed or returned to the estate of Adela.
RTC Lucena Branch 60 Court ordered Melanio to pay plaintiffs 10,000php plus 16% interest;
7,500php for litigation expenses; 5,000php as exemplary damages; DECLARED MELANIO
AS THETRUE AND RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO. 1091 BECAUSE ADELA SOLD HER
SHARETO MELANIO ON LOT NO. 1091
Ruling of the CA
Lot Nos. 1052 and 1091 were owned in common by Melanio and Adela; Adela never sold 1/2
share of lot 1091 to Melanio. When Melanio appropriated for himself the entire proceeds from
the sale of lot 1052, he was deemed to have waived his share in lot 1091. LOT 1091
SHOULD NOW BE SOLELY OWNED BY ADELA. Melanio claims that he had already paid
Adela the amounts of 4,575php on June 16, 1979; 200php on November 8, 1979 and another
200php on May 7, 1980, representing 1/2 of the price of Lot No. 1091
ISSUE:
Whether Adela (and her heirs) lay exclusive claim over Lot No. 1091 as their own where
Melanio who owns one-half of the undivided share of the area of two lots sells one of the lots
without giving to his co-heir the latter's share of the proceeds

RULING:
Inasmuch as the terms of the agreement between Adela and Melanio provide for one-half
undivided share for Melanio over Lots 1091 and 1052, and Melanio in effect waived his rights
over one-half of the remaining Lot 1091 when he sold and appropriated solely as his own
proceeds from the sale of Lot 1052, law and equity dictate Lot 1091 should now belong to the
estate of the late Adela Imperial Solleza, represented by her heirs.
The trial court erred in saying that Adela sold her share to Melanio on Lotto. 1091.
The last receipt is dated May 7, 1980. Adela Imperial died on May4, 1986. No deed was
executed by Adela in favor of Melanio.
The receipts do not show it is payment of Adela's one-half share of the lot.
The amounts remitted by Melanio were the shares of Adela forth sale of subdivision lots in lot
No. 1091. This is based on the document, 'Sa Sino Mang Makatalastas Nito,' affirming the
1/2share of Adela.
The receipts show:

P4575 (bilang kabahagi ng lote no. 1091 sa Lucban, Quezon)

P200 (partial for lot 1091)

P200 (bilang kabahagi sa lote 1091)

Melanio did not ask for the execution of a Deed of Sale within the period of 6 years from the
date of the last receipt until Adela's death on May 4, 1986
Buhay De Roma v. CA
July 23, 1987
Facts:
Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She died intestate. When
administration proceedings were ongoing, Buhay was appointed administratrix and filed an
inventory of the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties donated
by their mother to Buhay and fruits thereof had not been included. The Parcels of Land totaled
P10,297.50 and the value is not disputed. The TC issued an order in favor of Buhay because
when Candelaria donated the properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of Donation sa
pamamagitanng pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli which the TC interpreted as a
prohibition to collate and besides the legitimes of the two daughters were not impaired. On
appeal, it was reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable not an express
prohibition to collate.
Issue:
Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.
Held:
The pertinent Civil Code provisions are:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title,

in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in
the account of the partition. (1035a)
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have
so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the
donation should be reduced as inofficious. (1036)
The SC affirmed the appellate courts decision and that it merely described the donation as
irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the donated
properties from collation as required under the provisions of the NCC. Given the precise
language of the deed of donation the decedent donor would have included an express
prohibition to collate if that had been the donors intention. Absent such indication of that
intention, the rule not the exemption should be applied.
Vda. De Tupas vs. RTC of Negros Occidental
G.R. No. L-65800, October 3, 1986
FACTS:
Epifanio R. Tupas owned lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre, his private
capital. On August 2, 1977, he donated the foregoing properties to the Tupas Foundation, Inc.,
which had thereafter obtained title to said lots. Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978,
childless, leaving his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He also
left a will dated May18, 1976. Among the assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and
839.Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any inheritance, Tupas'
widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. to have the donation declared inofficious
insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible by one-half. The Trial Court dismissed
the complaint because: (1) the properties which were disposed of by way of donation one year
before the death of Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of
his death on August 20, 1978; (2) the donated properties were Epifanio's capital or separate
estate; and (3) Tupas Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the
donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art.1061, C.C.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation inter vivos made in favor of Tupas Foundation, Inc. was subject
to collation.
RULING:
Yes. A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is
that he cannot give by donation more than he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). If he
does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious
and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess, though without prejudice to its
taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing donated
(Art. 771, Civil Code). Such a donation is, moreover, collation able, that is, its value is in
imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the time of his death for the purpose of
determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of
the estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs,
although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to limit collation to the
latter class of donations.Collationable gifts should include gifts made not only in favor of the
forced heirs, but even those made in favor of strangers, so that in computing the legitimes, the
value of the property donated should be considered part of the donor's estate. The fact,

therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor
at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. Collation
contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos. The further fact that the lots donated
were admittedly capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of
inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more
than what was within his power to give. In order to find out whether a donation is inofficious or
not, the rules are: (1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of
the testator's death;(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be
paid out or deducted from the value of the property thus left;(3) the determination of the
difference between the assets and the liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary estate;(4) the
addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they were made, of donations
subject to collation; and (5)the determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting from the
total thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of each respective
compulsory heir. Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the
freely disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be measured. If the
value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then it must be
allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be
reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be
returned or reverted to the sole compulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.
ADAN v. CASILI
76 Phil 279 | March 18, 1946
FACTS:
The plaintiff Felix Adan commenced this action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
against his sister Victoria Adan and the latter's husband, Agapito Casili, to secure the judicial
partition of the estate left by their deceased mother, Simplicia Nepomuceno, alleged to consist
of six parcels of land which are specifically described in the complaint. Parcels 1 and 3,
however, were subsequently discarded, the first having been sold by the parties to the
municipality of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, and the second being admittedly the property of
Maria Adan, a half sister of the parties litigant. The remaining four parcels, referred to in the
record as lots Nos. 2, 4, 5, and 6, are valued by both parties at P2,783.55.
The defendants interposed the following defense: That the four lots in question were ceded by
the deceased Simplicia Nepomuceno to her daughter Victoria Adan as her share of the
inheritance; and that the plaintiff has received more than his share consisting of money,
livestock, palay, and real property, namely:
Expenses of the plaintiff as a student from 1918 to 1925

P8,000.00

Twelve carabaos received by the plaintiff from his mother, at P30

each

9;360.00

Three hundred cavans of palay, at P4.20 a cavan

1,260.00

Cash taken by the plaintiff from his mother in 1927

1,110.00

Two parcels of land bought by the plaintiff with money he

received from his mother

1,220.00

ISSUE:
Whether or not record to disprove or impeach the testimony of the defendants to the effect
that the plaintiff took and received from his mother during the latter's lifetime?
HELD:
We find no competent evidence in the record to disprove or impeach the testimony of the
defendants to the effect that the plaintiff took and received from his mother during the latter's
lifetime P1,110 in cash and 300 cavans of palay in the manner and under the circumstances
narrated by the defendant spouses as witnesses in their own behalf. The 300 cavans of palay
was taken by the plaintiff from the granary of his mother in 1927. The cash consisting of
twenty-peso and five-peso bills and amounting in all to P1,110 was taken by the plaintiff from
his mother's trunk on an occasion when she suffered a collapse and when the plaintiff took
some money from the same trunk with which to pay for injections. As we have said, the
plaintiff did not testify to deny the testimony of the defendants. It is admitted in the brief for the
plaintiff and appellant that the latter took 300 cavans of palay from his mother's granary, but it
is claimed that said palay belonged to him. In the absence of plaintiff's testimony to support
such claim, there is no basis upon which to sustain it. It was also proved during the trial that
the plaintiff took possession of twelve carabaos belonging to his mother and that the value of
said animals was P30 a head.
It was also established during the trial that the plaintiff studied surveying in Manila and that
during his studies his mother and sister sent him money for his support and expenses,
amounting to approximately P500 a year. Although the defendants claim that his studies
lasted from 1918 to 1925, we sustain the contention of the plaintiff and appellant in his brief
that it took him only two years to finish the course of surveying, because it is a matter of
common knowledge that surveying is a two-year course, and it is probable that the rest of the
time was spent by him in acquiring a high-school education.

Under the article 1041 of the Civil Code, allowances for support, education, attendance in
illnesses, even though unusually expensive, apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or
customary presents are not subject to collation. But article 1042 of the same Code provides
that expenses which may have been incurred by the parents in giving their children a
professional or artistic career shall not be brought to collation unless the parent so orders or
they encroach upon the legitimate. It also provides that in cases in which it is proper to collate
them, the money which the child would have spent if it had lived in the house and company of
its parents shall be deducted there from. Since the career of surveyor is a professional one,
and since the expenses incurred by plaintiff's mother in giving him that career encroached
upon the legitimate, it is proper to collate one-half of the amount spent by her for him during

the two years he studied surveying, the other half being considered as the amount which the
plaintiff would have spent if he had lived in the house and company of his mother.
ISSUE:

LEGASTO vs. VERZOSA

Whether or not the partition made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces, the
defendants and appellants herein, was valid enforceable.

G.R. No. L-32344 | March 31, 1930

HELD:
DOCTRINE: No contracts may be entered into with respect to future inheritances except those the object
of which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in accordance with article 1056.Considering that the
language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to mean that a person may, by acts inter vivos, partition his
property referred to in the section wherein said article is found, without the authority of a testament
containing an expression of his last will, or the authority of law, for, otherwise, a partition thus made would
be tantamount to making a will in a manner not provided for, authorized, nor included in the chapter
referring to testaments, and especially, to the forms thereof, which is entirely different from the legal
consequences of a free disposition made by parents during their lifetime, whereby they give to their
children the whole or a part of their property.

FACTS:
Sabina Almadin executed a will devising certain parcels of land belonging to her, to her four
nieces and daughters of her sister Catalina Almadin, designating the parcels to be given to
each. Sabina Almadin partitioned her property among her aforesaid sister and nieces,
executing a deed to her niece, Maria Verzosa, assigning and making over to her three parcels
of her land therein described. On the same day, Sabina Almadin executed a deed in favor of
her niece Oliva Verzosa, assigning to her two parcels of land described in said instrument.
Sabina Almadin executed a deed in favor of her niece Toribia Verzosa, assigning to her the
four parcels of land therein described. Again on the said day, August 8, 1925, Sabina Almadin
executed a deed to her niece Ruperta Palma assigning to her three parcels of land described
therein. The assignees, Maria Verzosa, Toribia Verzosa, Oliva Verzosa, and Ruperta Palma,
took possession of their respective parcels thus ceded by Sabina Almadin, and have to this
day been cultivating them as exclusive owners thereof. Sabina Almadin passed away and her
sister, Catalina Almadin, presented by Attorney Federico Marino, propounded her will,
mentioned above, for probate. The said will was not admitted to probate. Vivencio Legasto,
then, the special administrator appointed by said Court of First Instance of Laguna to take
charge of Sabina Almadin's estate, filed the complaint which originated this case, claiming the
delivery of the parcels of land.

NO. Article 1056 of the Civil Code Provides: ART. 1056. If the testator should make a partition
of his property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.

Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271 makes reference to the
aforesaid article, in providing that no contracts may be entered into with respect to future
inheritances except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in
accordance with article 1056, it is evident that said difference likewise leads to the conclusion
that a partition thus made should be on the basis of a testamentary or legal succession and
should be made a conformity with the fundamental rules thereof and the order of the heirs
entitled to the estate, because neither of the two provisions could be given a wider meaning or
scope than that they simply provide for the division of the estate during the lifetime of the
owner, which, otherwise, would have to be done upon the death of the testator in order to
carry into effect the partition of the estate among the persons interested.

It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and authoritative
commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his
property, but he must first make a will with all the formalities provided for by law. And it could
not be otherwise, for without a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of
the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers to that property
which he has devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos in
not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to
distinguish between the one who freely donates his property in life and one who disposes of it
by will to take effect his death.

Sabina Almadin must have been aware of the necessity of a prior will, since before making the
partition of her property among her nieces, the defendants herein, she executed a will giving
to each of them the same parcels of land which she later transferred to them gratuitously.

5.
6.
7.

And since Sabina Almadin's will is null and void for lack of the legal requisites, consequently,
the partition which she made of her estate among her nieces the defendants-appellants
herein, during her lifetime is likewise null and void.
A testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a will with all
the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without a will there can
be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter vivos made by a testator
of his property, it necessarily refers to that property which he has devised to his heirs. A
person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is not called a testator, but a donor. In
employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between one who freely
donates his property in life and one who disposes of it by will to take effect after his death.
ANGELA I. TUASON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANTONIO TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO
ARANETA, INC., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-3404 April 2, 1951 MONTEMAYOR, J.
Doctrine: Supreme Court found no valid ground for the partition insisted upon the appellant.
Supreme Court find from the evidence as was done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6 sq.
m. which is the total area of the parcel held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of
the entire area remained unsold at the time of the trial in the year 1947, while the great bulk of
97.5 per cent had already been sold. As well observed by the court below, the partnership is
in the process of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and even assuming that Art.
400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by agreement may agree to
keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear that the
remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four years left of the ten-years
period fixed by Art. 400.
FACTS:
1. The sisters Angela Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio
Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land in Sampaloc, Manila, each owning an undivided 1/3
portion.
2. Nieves wanted and asked for the partition of the common property, but failing in this, she
offered to sell her 1/3 portion.
3. The share of Nieves was offered for sale to her sister and her brother but both declined to
buy it. It was offered to their mother but the mother declined to buy, saying that if the
property increased in value, she might be suspected of having taking advantage of her
daughter.
4. Finally, the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., domestic corporation and
a new certificate was issued covering the same property.

8.

9.

The three owners agreed to have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then
sold, the proceeds of the sale to be later divided among them. (Agreement is embodied in
the Memorandum of Agreement).
Atty.
Antonio
Araneta
was
acting
as the
attorney-in-fact
and
lawyer
of Angela Tuason and Antonio Tuason and at the same time was themember
of
the
Board of Director of the third co-owner, Araneta Inc.
Contract stated that the three co-owners agreed to improve the property by filling it and
constructing roads and curbs on the same and then subdivided it into small lots for sale.
ARANETA INCS DUTIES

It was to finance the whole development and subdivision

It was to prepare a schedule of prices and conditions of sale, subject to the approval
of the two other co-owners

It was invested with authority to sell the lots into which the property was to be
subdivided

Execute the corresponding contracts and deeds of sale

It was also to pay the real estate taxes

To furnish each of the two co-owners copies of the subdivision plans and the monthly
sales and rents and collections made thereon
Angela Tuason revoked the powers conferred on her lawyer J. Antonio Araneta

Angela notified Araneta, Inc. that because of alleged breach of the terms of the
Memorandum and abuse of powers granted to it in the document.

Thus, she had decided to rescind said contract and asked that the property held in
common be partitioned.
10. Angela filed a complaint asking the court to order the partition of the property in question
and she be given 1/3 of the same including rents.

She had been tricked into signing it

She was given to understand by Antonio Araneta acting as her attorney-in-fact and
legal adviser that said contract would be similar to another contract of subdivision of
a parcel into lots and the sale entered into Gregorio Araneta and the heirs of D.
Tuason

But it turned out that the contracts were widely different from each other from the first
contract.

FIRST CONTRACT: The terms of contract is more favorableto the owners therein
and less favorable to the Araneta Inc.

Atty. Araneta was more or less disqualified to act as her legal adviser as he did
because he was one of the officials of Araneta Inc.,

That the defendant company did not previously show the plans of subdivision, the
schedule of prices and conditions of sale

Gregorio Araneta, Inc. infringed the terms of the contract for:

It failed to make the necessary improvements on the property

It failed to submit to the plaintiff from time to time schedule of prices and conditions
under which the subdivided lots are to be sold

To furnish the plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plants

11. The Brother Antonio Tuason did not agree to the suit and its purpose for he evidently did
not agree to the suit and its purpose for he joined AranetaInc. as a co defendant

10

12. TRIAL COURT ruled that the complaint be dismissed

ISSUE
1. Whether or not the 2 contracts are different which may lead to rescission?
2. Whether there is a ground for partition of property?
Garcia v. Calaliman
G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989
HELD:
1.

2.

Both contracts are similar and practically the same. The Supreme Court ruled that the
copies of both contracts were shown to the plaintiff Angela and her husband, a broker
and both had every opportunity to go over and compare them and decide on the
advisability of or disadvantage in entering into the contract; that although Atty. Antonio
Araneta was an official of the Araneta Inc., being a member of the Board of Directors of
the Company at the time that contract was executed, he was not the party with which
Angela contracted and that he committed no breach of trust. The act of Atty. Antonio
Araneta in giving the plaintiff a copy of the contract before the same was executed,
constitutes a full disclosure of the facts. With respect to the charged that the defendant
corporation failed to submit to plaintiff a copy of the subdivisions plans x x x the Court
ruled that it has no basis. The evidence shows that the defendant corporation submitted
to the plaintiff periodically all the data relative to prices and conditions of the sale of the
subdivided lots, together with the amount corresponding to her but without justifiable
reason, refused to accept them because of that attitude the company thought it was
useless for the corporation to continue sending her statement of accounts, checks and
other things. So, if the defendant corporation proceeded with the sale of the subdivided
lots without the approval of the plaintiff, it was because it was under the correct
impression that under the contract exhibit 6 the decision of the majority co-owners is
binding upon all the three. The Court feels that recission of the contract exhibit 6 is not
minor violations of the terms of the agreement, the general rule is that
"recission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but only
for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of
the parties in making the agreement" (Song Of & Co. vs. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47
Phil. 821).
Supreme Court found no valid ground for the partition insisted upon the appellant.
Supreme Court find from the evidence as was done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6
sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per
cent of the entire area remained unsold at the time of the trial in the year 1947, while the
great bulk of 97.5 per cent had already been sold. As well observed by the court below,
the partnership is in the process of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and
even assuming that Art. 400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by
agreement may agree to keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years,
there should be no fear that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within
the four years left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. 400.
ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. Each
may, at anytime, demand the partition of the thing held in common. Nevertheless, an
agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length of time, not exceeding
ten years, shall be valid. This period may be a new agreement.

FACTS:

On February 11, 1946, one Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of
unregistered land. On his death the property was inherited by his nephews, nieces,
grandnephews who are the descendants of his late brothers, Pedro, Simeon,
Buenaventura and Marcos.
The heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, Porfirio Garcia, Dioscoro Garcia, Flora
Garcia, Consolacion Garcia, Remedios Garcia, Trinidad Garcia, and Baltazar Garcia
signed a document entitled, Extra-judicial Partition and Deed of Sale.
Heirs Francisco Garcia, Paz Garcia, and Maria Garcia, petitioners herein, filed
against the spouses Jose Calaliman and Paciencia Trabadillo, private respondents an
action for legal redemption of the 3/4 portion of the parcel of land inherited by the heirs
from the late Gelacio Garcia, which portion was sold by their co-heirs to the defendants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners took all the necessary steps to effectuate their
exercise of the right of legal redemption within the period fixed by Art. 1088 of the Civil Code.

HELD:
Yes. Written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in
some other manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written
notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its
validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided
for any alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does not
prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for
written notification of redemption

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MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON,

BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON,
oppositors-appellants
33 SCRA 554 (1970)
The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather
than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of partition submitted
by the contending parties, that project which will give the greatest effect to the testamentary disposition
should be adopted. Thus, where the testatrix enumerated the specific properties to be given to each
compulsory heir and the testatrix repeatedly used the words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a
partition of the estate by an act mortis causa, rather than as an attempt on her part to give such
properties as devises to the designated beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to
each compulsory heir were deemed to be in full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in
the nature of devises.
The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision of Article 886 which reads:
"Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved
it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative
prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the will under consideration, the testatrix disposed of practically her
entire estate by designating a beneficiary for each property. Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions
included that portion of the estate called "legitime." It is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article
1080 (which is the basis of the following decision) with Article 886.

FACTS:
In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: 6
legitimate children and 1 legitimate granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the others
were the appellants
1. Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango. The beneficiaries
were the 7 compulsory heirs and six grandchildren
2. In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8 million)
which included real and personal properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar
Central Devt Co
3. During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of the
deceaseds estate
4. In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance with her
testamentary disposition where she devised and bequeathed specific real properties
comprising almost her entire estate among her heirs. Based on the partition, Marina and
Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs
5. Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as follows:

the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was
comprised of cash and/or properties specifically given to them based on the will

Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less
the cash/properties to complete their respective legitime
6. The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the estate
where Marina and Tomas were to receive considerably less
7. The lower court approved the executors project of partition citing that Art 906 and 907
NCC specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall
be completed. The court cited that if the proposition of the oppositors was upheld, it will
substantially result in a distribution of intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC

ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this case
HELD:
Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative
shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to
every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." In Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held that "the intentions and wishes of the testator,
when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions
raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance
therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly
appears that his intention was otherwise."
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when
expressed clearly and precisely in his last will, amount to the only law whose mandate must
imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and
legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion
for the testator's will. Thus, the oppositors proposition for partition cannot be given effect.
ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the nature of a partition.
In her will, the decedent noted that after commanding that upon her death all her obligations
as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for the probate of her
last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she
expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in
accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each
real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory
heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid
partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC,
providing that "Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will,
such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs."
CAB: This was properly complied with in the executors project of partition as the oppositors
were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the decedent
in her will and the differential to complete their legitimes were taken from the cash and/or
properties of Marina and Tomas, who were obviously favored by the decedent in her will.
Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions support the executrixappellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of
partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary
disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would
consider as mere devises and legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free
portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven
compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by
intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.

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EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to him", from the death of her ancestors, subject to
rights and obligations of the latter, and, she cannot be deprived of her rights thereto except by
the methods provided for by law
DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will of specific properties to
specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appears from the whole context of
the will and the dispositions by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small
properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention
was to partition her whole estate through her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her
testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not
as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective
legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will,
immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise:
"FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this
testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time
of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased."
COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here, distribution and partition of
the entire estate was made by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations
during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor
having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of Art 1061 to
1063 of the Civil Code on collation.
CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their right was
merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has
been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a
further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the
testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Gertrudes De Los SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.Maximo De La CRUZ, defendantappellant.
G.R. No. L-29192, February 22, 1971

FACTS:
Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue. She had a niece named Marciana who is
the mother of herein defendant, Maximo. Gertrudes, who is Pelagias grandniece, and several
co-heirs including Maximo, entered into an Extrajudicial Partition
Agreement purposely for the distribution of Pelagias estate. They agreed to adjudicate three
(3) lots to Maximo, in addition to his share, on condition that the latter would undertake the
development and subdivision of the estate which was the subject matter of the agreement.
Due to Maximos failure to comply with his obligation, Gertrudes filed a complaint for specific
performance.
In Maximos answer, he stated that Gertrudes had no cause of action against him because the
said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that she was not an heir
of Pelagia and was included in the agreement by mistake. The lower court held that Maximo,
being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the
right of the plaintiff to inherit from Pelagia, hence, he must abide by the terms of the
agreement. Maximo filed a Motion for New Trial but was denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Gertrudes de los Santos, a grandniece of the decedent, is an heir of the latter.
RULING:
Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, could not inherit from the
latter by right of representation.
Article 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but neve
r in theascending.In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters, whether they are of the full or half blood.
Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.
Article 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant
ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews
and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece
is excluded by law from the inheritance.

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