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Loadstar Shipping vs.

CA (GR 131621, 28 September 1999)


Facts:
On 19 November 1984, Loadstar Shipping Co. Inc. received on board its M/V Cherokee (a) 705
bales of lawanit hardwood; (b) 27 boxes and crates of tilewood assemblies and others; and (c) 49
bundles of mouldings R & W (3) Apitong Bolidenized for shipment. The goods, amounting to
P6,067,178, were insured for the same amount with the Manila Insurance Co. (MIC) against various
risks including total loss by total loss of the vessel. The vessel, in turn, was insured by Prudential
Guarantee & Assurance, Inc. (PGAI) for P4 million.
On 20 November 1984, on its way to Manila from the port of Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, the vessel,
along with its cargo, sank off Limasawa Island. As a result of the total loss of its shipment, the
consignee made a claim with Loadstar which, however, ignored the same. As the insurer, MIC paid
P6,075,000 to the insured in full settlement of its claim, and the latter executed a subrogation receipt
therefor.
On 4 February 1985, MIC filed a complaint against Loadstar and PGAI, alleging that the sinking of
the vessel was due to the fault and negligence of Loadstar and its employees. It also prayed that
PGAI be ordered to pay the insurance proceeds from the loss of the vessel directly to MIC, said
amount to be deducted from MICs claim from Loadstar. In its answer, Loadstar denied any liability
for the loss of the shippers goods and claimed that the sinking of its vessel was due to force
majeure. PGAI, on the other hand, averred that MIC had no cause of action against it, Loadstar
being the party insured. In any event, PGAI was later dropped as a party defendant after it paid the
insurance proceeds to Loadstar. On 4 October 1991, the trial court (RTC of Manila, Branch 16, Civil
Case 85-29110) rendered judgment in favor of MIC, ordering Loadstar to pay MIC the amount of
P6,067,178, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, P8,000 as attorneys
fees, and the costs of the suit. Loadstar elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which, however
on 30 January 1997, agreed with the trial court and affirmed its decision in toto. Loadstars motion for
reconsideration was denied on 19 November 1997. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
Issues:
(1)

Is

the

M/V

Cherokee

common

carrier?

Yes.

(2) Did LOADSTAR observe due and/or ordinary diligence? No.


Held: The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals;

with

costs

against

Loadstar.

(1) LOADSTAR argues that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued a certificate of
public convenience, it did not have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route, and there was only
one

shipper,

one

consignee

for

special

cargo.

LOADSTAR relied on the 1968 case of Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc.,

where this Court held that a common carrier transporting special cargo or chartering the vessel to a
special person becomes a private carrier that is not subject to the provisions of the Civil Code. Any
stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its
agent is void only if the strict policy governing common carriers is upheld. Such policy has no force
where the public at large is not involved, as in the case of a ship totally chartered
SC: It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience, and this public
character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic,
occasional,

episodic

or

unscheduled.

The cases invoked by LOADSTAR are not applicable in the case at bar for simple reason that the
factual settings are different. The records do not disclose that the M/V Cherokee, on the date in
question, undertook to carry a special cargo or was chartered to a special person only. There was no
charter party. The bills of lading failed to show any special arrangement, but only a general provision
to the effect that the M/V Cherokee was a general cargo carrier. Further, the bare fact that the vessel
was carrying a particular type of cargo for one shipper, which appears to be purely coincidental, is
not reason enough to convert the vessel from a common to a private carrier, especially where, as in
this

case,

it

was

shown

that

the

vessel

was

also

carrying

passengers.

Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, LOADSTAR fits the definition of a common
carrier under Article 1732 of the Civil Code. (See De Guzman v. Court of Appeals.)
(2) LOADSTAR also maintains that the vessel was seaworthy. Before the fateful voyage on 19
November 1984, the vessel was allegedly dry docked at Keppel Philippines Shipyard and was duly
inspected by the maritime safety engineers of the Philippine Coast Guard, who certified that the ship
was fit to undertake a voyage. Its crew at the time was experienced, licensed and unquestionably
competent. With all these precautions, there could be no other conclusion except that LOADSTAR
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the vessels seaworthiness.
LOADSTAR further claims that it was not responsible for the loss of the cargo, such loss being due to
force majeure. It points out that when the vessel left Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, on 19 November
1984, the weather was fine until the next day when the vessel sank due to strong waves.
SC: We find that the M/V Cherokee was not seaworthy when it embarked on its voyage on 19
November 1984. The vessel was not even sufficiently manned at the time. For a vessel to be
seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for the voyage and manned with a sufficient number of
competent officers and crew. The failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its
vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty prescribed in Article 1755 of the
Civil

Code.

Neither do we agree with LOADSTARs argument that the limited liability theory should be applied in
this case. The doctrine of limited liability does not apply where there was negligence on the part of
the vessel owner or agent.. LOADSTAR was at fault or negligent in not maintaining a seaworthy
vessel and in having allowed its vessel to sail despite knowledge of an approaching typhoon. In any
event, it did not sink because of any storm that may be deemed as force majeure, inasmuch as the
wind condition in the area where it sank was determined to be moderate. Since it was remiss in the

performance of its duties, LOADSTAR cannot hide behind the limited liability doctrine to escape
responsibility for the loss of the vessel and its cargo.

PEDRO DE GUZMAN VS CA AND ERNESTO CENDANA


Facts:
Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer. He buys scrap materials and brings those that he
gathered to Manila for resale using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the return trip to Pangasinan,
respondent would load his vehicle with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered, charging
fee lower than the commercial rates. Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman
contracted with respondent for the delivery of 750 cartons of Liberty Milk. On December 1, 1970,
respondent loaded the cargo. Only 150 boxes were delivered to petitioner because the truck carrying
the boxes was hijacked along the way. Petitioner commenced an action claiming the value of the lost
merchandise. Petitioner argues that respondent, being a common carrier, is bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence, which it failed to do. Private respondent denied that he was a common
carrier, and so he could not be held liable for force majeure. The trial court ruled against the
respondent, but such was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not private respondent is a common carrier
(2) Whether private respondent is liable for the loss of the goods
Held:
(1) Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. Article 1732
also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to
the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or
solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. It appears to the Court that
private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely "backhauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although such backhauling was done
on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and even though private
respondent's principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others. There is no dispute that
private respondent charged his customers a fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below

commercial freight rates is not relevant here. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for
the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.
(2) Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:
a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
d. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and
e. Order or act of competent public authority."
The hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of exempting
causes listed in Article 1734. Private respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of
extraordinary diligence on the part of private respondent. We believe and so hold that the limits of
the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the
goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or
force." we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the
control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall
that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport
of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable,
provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.

Del Prado vs. Meralco (GR 29462, 7 March 1929)


52 PHIL 900
Facts:
The Manila Electric Company, is engaged in operating street cars in the City of Manila for the
conveyance of passengers; and on the morning of 18 November 1925, one Teodorico Florenciano,
as
Meralcos motorman, was in charge of car 74 running from east to west on R. Hidalgo Street, the
scene of the

accident being at a point near the intersection of said street and Mendoza Street. After the car had
stopped at
its appointed place for taking on and letting off passengers, just east of the intersection, it resumed
its course
at a moderate speed under the guidance of the motorman. The car had proceeded only a short
distance,
however, when Ignacio del Prado ran across the street to catch the car, his approach being made
from the left.
The car was of the kind having entrance and exit at either end, and the movement of del Prado was
so timed
that he arrived at the front entrance of the car at the moment when the car was passing. Del Prado,
upon
approaching the car, raised his hand as an indication to the motorman of his desire to board the car,
in
response to which the motorman eased up a little, without stopping. Upon this, del Prado seized,
with his left
hand, the front perpendicular handpost, at the same time placing his left foot upon the platform.
However,
before del Prados position had become secure, and even before his raised right foot had reached
the platform,
the motorman applied the power, with the result that the car gave a slight lurch forward. This sudden
impulse
to the car caused del Prados foot to slip, and his hand was jerked loose from the handpost. He
therefore fell to
the ground, and his right foot was caught and crushed by the moving car. The next day the member
had to be
amputated in the hospital.
An action was instituted in the CFI of Manila by Ignacio del Prado to recover damages in the amount
of
P50,000 for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of Meralco in the
operation of
one of its street cars in the City of Manila. Upon hearing the cause the trial court awarded to del
Prado the
sum of P10,000, as damages, with costs of suit. Meralco appealed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment with the modification that the sum to be
recovered
reduced to P2,500; with costs against Meralco.

1. No obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop cars at points other than
appointed for stoppage
There is no obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop its cars to let on intending
passengers at other points than those appointed for stoppage. It would be impossible to operate a
system of
street cars if a company engaged in this business were required to stop any and everywhere to take
on people
who are too indolent, or who imagine themselves to be in too great a hurry, to go to the proper
places for
boarding the cars.
2. Duty of the motorman of the car
Although the motorman of the car was not bound to stop to let the passenger on, it was his duty to do
no act that would have the effect of increasing the passengers peril while he was attempting to
board the car.
The premature acceleration of the car was a breach of this duty.
3. Nature of relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons; Duty of the carrier
The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and a
failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty
(culpa
contractual) under articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the duty that the
carrier of
passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting
therefrom.
4. Cangco vs. Manila Railroad; Culpa Contractual
The case of Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768), supplies an instance of the violation of
the duty with respect to a passenger who was getting off of a train. In that case, the plaintiff stepped
off of a
moving train, while it was slowing down in a station, and at a time when it was too dark for him to see
clearly
where he was putting his feet. The employees of the company had carelessly left watermelons on
the platform
at the place where the plaintiff alighted, with the result that his feet slipped and he fell under the car,
where
his right arm was badly injured. This court held that the railroad company was liable for breach of

positive
duty (culpa contractual), and the plaintiff was awarded damages in the amount of P2,500 for the loss
of his
arm. In the opinion in that case the distinction is clearly drawn between a liability for negligence
arising from
breach of contractual duty and that arising under articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code (culpa
aquiliana).
5. Relevance of distinction between Culpa Contractual and Culpa Aquiliana as to defenses
available
The distinction between the two sorts of negligence is important in this jurisdiction, for the reason
that where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a breach of positive
obligation, an
employer, or master, may exculpate himself, under the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil
Code, by
proving that he had exercised due diligence to prevent the damage; whereas this defense is not
available if the
liability of the master arises from a breach of contractual duty (culpa contractual).
6. Training of motorman irrelevant in breach of obligation under Article 1101 of the Civil Code
Herein, the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the diligence of a good father
of
a family to prevent the damage suffered by del Prado; and to establish this contention the company
introduced
testimony showing that due care had been used in training and instructing the motorman in charge of
this car
in his art. This proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that the liability involved was derived from a
breach of
obligation under article 1101 of the Civil Code and related provisions.
7. Relevance of distinction between negligence arising under Article 1902 and 1101 as to mitigation
of liability
Another practical difference between liability for negligence arising under article 1902 of the Civil
Code and liability arising from negligence in the performance of a positive duty, under article 1101
and
related provisions of the Civil Code, is that, in dealing with the latter form of negligence, the court is
given a
discretion to mitigate liability according to the circumstances of the case (art 1103). No such general

discretion is given by the Code in dealing with liability arising under article 1902; though possibly the
same
end is reached by courts in dealing with the latter form of liability because of the latitude of the
considerations
pertinent to cases arising under this article.
8. Contributory negligence a mitigating circumstance under Article 1103 Civil Code
As to the contributory negligence of del Prado, as in Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil.,
359), it is treated as a mitigating circumstance under article 1103 of the Civil Code. Herein, the
negligence of
del Prado was contributory to the accident and must be considered as a mitigating circumstance.
9. Proximate cause of the accident
Del Prados negligence in attempting to board the moving car was not the proximate cause of the
injury. The direct and proximate cause of the injury was the act of Meralcos motorman in putting on
the
power prematurely. A person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of injury from
boarding
the car under the conditions open to his view, but he cannot fairly be held to assume the risk that the
motorman, having the situation in view, will increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the car
before he is
planted safely on the platform. Again, the situation is one where the negligent act of the companys
servant
succeeded the negligent act of the passenger, and the negligence of the company must be
considered the
proximate cause of the injury.
10. Rule analogous to the doctrine of the last clear chance
The rule applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which is sometimes referred
to
as the doctrine of the last clear chance. In accordance with this doctrine, the contributory
negligence of the
party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of
reasonable
care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party.
11. Award of damage
With respect to the effect of this injury upon del Prados earning power, although he lost his foot, he
is able to use an artificial member without great inconvenience and his earning capacity has

probably not been


reduced by more than 30%. In view of the precedents found in the Courts decisions with respect to
the
damages that ought to be awarded for the loss of a limb, and more particularly Rakes vs. Atlantic,
Gulf and
Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359); Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768); and Borromeo vs. Manila
Electric
Railroad and Light Co. (44 Phil., 165), and in view of all the circumstances connected with the case,
the Court
is of the opinion that del Prado will be adequately compensated by an award of P2,500.

Saludo Villanueva vs Mariano Medina


Gr no. L-10126, 22 Oct 1957
Facts:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952, bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by
its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of
Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. At about
2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one
of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right
side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way
they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the
driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of
them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with
petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce
fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It
would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank
on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under
and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help
set it on fire. Hence, the petitioners sought for the recovery of compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees against the respondent.
Issye: Whether or not the respondent is liable.
Held:
YES.

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
The proximate cause in the case at bar was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when
the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the
tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and
the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers
had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available. The burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence
of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor because none of them have cautioned or taken
steps, with the circumstances present, to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the
bus.

AMANDO MIRASOL vs. THE ROBERT DOLLAR CO.


G.R. No. L-29721 March 27, 1929
FACTS:
Plaintiff alleges that he is the owner and consignee of two cases of books, shipped in good order and
condition at New York, USA, on board the defendants steamship President Garfield, for transport
and delivery to the plaintiff in the City of Manila, all freight charges paid.
The two cases arrived in Manila on September 1, 1927, in bad order and damaged condition,
resulting in the total loss of one case and a partial loss of the other. The loss in one case is P1,630
and the other P700, for which he filed his claims. The plaintiff alleged that he never entered into any
contract with the defendant limiting defendants liability as a common carrier.
The defendant refused and neglected to pay, giving its reason that the steamship President Garfield
at all the times alleged was in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped and supplied,

10

and fit for the voyage. It also alleged that the damage to the plaintiffs merchandise, if any, was not
caused through the negligence of the vessel, its master, agent, officers, crew, tackle or
appurtenances, nor by reason of the vessel being unseaworthy or improperly manned, but that such
damage, if any, resulted from faults or errors in navigation or in the management of said vessel. It
also alleged that in the in the bill of lading issued by the defendant to plaintiff, it was agreed in writing
that defendant should not be "held liable for any loss of, or damage to, any of said merchandise
resulting from any of the following causes, to wit: Acts of God, perils of the sea or other waters," and
that plaintiff's damage, if any, was caused by "Acts of God" or "perils of the sea." Defendant also
alleged that the damage, if any, was caused by "sea water," and that the bill of lading exempts
defendant from liability for that cause. That damage by "sea water" is a shipper's risk, and that
defendant is not liable.
The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff for P2,080 with legal interest, from which both
parties appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the defendant is liable.
RULING:
The defendant having received the two boxes in good condition, its legal duty was to deliver them to
the plaintiff in the same condition in which it received them. From the time of their delivery to the
defendant in New York until they are delivered to the plaintiff in Manila, the boxes were under the
control and supervision of the defendant and beyond the control of the plaintiff.
The defendant having admitted that the boxes were damaged while in transit and in its possession,
the burden of proof then shifted and it devolved upon the defendant to both allege and prove that the
damage was caused by reason of some fact which exempted it from liability.
As to how the boxes were damaged, when or where, was a matter peculiarly and exclusively within
the knowledge of the defendant and in the very nature of things could not be in the knowledge of the
plaintiff. To require the plaintiff to prove as to when and how the damage was caused would force
him to call and rely upon the employees of the defendant's ship, which in legal effect would be to say
that he could not recover any damage for any reason.
Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights,
and when goods are delivered on board ship in good order and condition, and the ship owner
delivers them to the shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves upon the ship owner to both
allege and prove that the goods were damaged by the reason of some fact which legally exempts
him from liability; otherwise, the shipper would be left without any redress, no matter what may have
caused the damage.

11

The evidence for the defendant shows that the damage was largely caused by "sea water," from
which it contends that it is exempt under the provisions of its bill of lading and the provisions of the
article 361 of the Code of Commerce.
The fact that the cases were damaged by "sea water," standing alone and within itself, is not
evidence that they were damaged by force majeure or for a cause beyond the defendant's control.
The words "perils of the sea," as stated in defendant's brief apply to "all kinds of marine casualties,
such as shipwreck, foundering, stranding," and among other things, it is said: "Tempest, rocks,
shoals, icebergs and other obstacles are within the expression," and "where the peril is the proximate
cause of the loss, the ship owner is excused." "Something fortuitous and out of the ordinary course is
involved in both words peril and 'accident'."

Ganzon vs. CA (GR L-48757, 30 Mary 1988)


Second Division, Sarmiento (J)
Facts:
On 28 November 1956, Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro B. Ganzon to haul 305
tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT Batman.
Pursuant
to this agreement, Mauro B. Ganzon sent his lighter Batman to Mariveles where it docked in 3 feet
of water.
On 1 December 1956, Gelacio Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to Filomeno Niza, captain of the
lighter,
for loading which was actually begun on the same date by the crew of the lighter under the captains
supervision. When about half of the scrap iron was already loaded, Mayor Jose Advincula of
Mariveles,
Bataan, arrived and demanded P5,000.00 from Gelacio Tumambing. The latter resisted the
shakedown and
after a heated argument between them, Mayor Jose Advincula drew his gun and fired at Gelacio
Tumambing.
The gunshot was not fatal but Tumambing had to be taken to a hospital in Balanga, Bataan, for
treatment.
After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But on 4 December 1956, Acting Mayor
Basilio
Rub, accompanied by 3 policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza and his crew to dump the scrap
iron where
the lighter was docked. The rest was brought to the compound of NASSCO. Later on Acting Mayor

12

Rub
issued a receipt stating that the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron.
Tumambing instituted in the CFI of Manila an action against Ganzon for damages based on culpa
contractual.
The trial court rendered a decision absolving Ganzon from liability. On appeal, however, the
appellate court
reversed and set aside the decision appealed from, and entered a new one ordering Ganzon to pay
Tumambing
the sum of P5,895.00 as actual damages, the sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the
amount of
P2,000.00 as attorneys fees; with costs against Ganzon. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals;
with costs
against Ganzon; the decision being immediately executory.
1. By delivery, the scraps are placed in the possession of the common carrier; Contract of carriage
perfected; Duties of the carrier
By the act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the
common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the contract of carriage was
deemed
perfected. Consequently, the carriers extraordinary responsibility for the loss, destruction, or
determination of
the goods commenced. Pursuant to Article 1736, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only
upon the
delivery, actual or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to
receive
them. The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter did not impair the
said
contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier, albeit still
unloaded.
2. Loss not due to any cause enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code
Herein, Ganzon has failed to show that the loss of the scraps was due to any of the following causes
enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code, namely: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or
other
natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act
or

13

omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the
packing or in
the containers; and (5) Order or act of competent public authority.
3. Negligence presumed; Burden of proof to prove otherwise
Herein, Ganzon is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. By reason of this
presumption, the court is not even required to make an express finding of fault or negligence before it
could
hold Ganzon answerable for the breach of the contract of carriage. Still, Ganzon could have been
exempted
from any liability had he been able to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the
goods in his custody, according to all the circumstances of the case, or that the loss was due to an
unforeseen
event or to force majeure. As it was, there was hardly any attempt on the part of Ganzon to prove
that he
exercised such extraordinary diligence.
4. Order by competent authority must be valid, to allow carriers absolution from liability as per
caso fortuito
Before Ganzon could be absolved from responsibility on the ground that he was ordered by
competent public authority to unload the scrap iron, it must be shown that Acting Mayor Basilio Rub
had the
power to issue the disputed order, or that it was lawful, or that it was issued under legal process of
authority.
The appellee failed to establish this. Indeed, no authority or power of the acting mayor to issue such
an order
was given in evidence. Neither has it been shown that the cargo of scrap iron belonged to the
Municipality of
Mariveles. What we have in the record is the stipulation of the parties that the cargo of scrap iron
was
accumulated by the appellant through separate purchases here and there from private individuals.
The fact
remains that the order given by the acting mayor to dump the scrap iron into the sea was part of the
pressure
applied by Mayor Jose Advincula to shakedown Tumambing for P5,000.00. The order of the acting
mayor did
not constitute valid authority for Ganzon and his representatives to carry out.

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5. The intervention of the municipal officials was not of a character that would render impossible
the fulfillment by the carrier of its obligation
The intervention of the municipal officials was not of a character that would render impossible the
fulfillment by the carrier of its obligation. Herein, Ganzon was not duty bound to obey the illegal order
to
dump into the sea the scrap iron. Moreover, there is absence of sufficient proof that the issuance of
the same
order was attended with such force or intimidation as to completely overpower the will of the
petitioners
employees. The mere difficulty in the fulfillment of the obligation is not considered force majeure. The
scraps
could have been properly unloaded at the shore or at the NASSCO compound, so that after the
dispute with
the local officials concerned was settled, the scraps could then be delivered in accordance with the
contract of
carriage.
6. No incompatibility between Civil Code provisions on common carriers and Articles 361 and 362
of the Code of Commerce; Article 1733 NCC modified Article 352 as to degree of diligence required
of
carrier
There is no incompatibility between the Civil Code provisions on common carriers and Articles 361
and 362 of the Code of Commerce which were the basis for the Courts ruling in Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Ynchausti & Co. and which Ganzon invokes in the petition. For Article 1735 of
the
Civil Code, conversely stated, means that the shipper will suffer the losses and deterioration arising
from the
causes enumerated in Article 1734; and in these instances, the burden of proving that damages
were caused by
the fault or negligence of the carrier rests upon him. However, the carrier must first establish that the
loss or
deterioration was occasioned by one of the excepted causes or was due to an unforeseen event or to
force
majeure. Be that as it may, insofar as Article 362 appears to require of the carrier only ordinary
diligence, the
same is deemed to have been modified by Article 1733 of the Civil Code.
7. Findings on actual and exemplary damages not disturbed

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Finding the award of actual and exemplary damages to be proper, the same will not be disturbed by
the Supreme Court. Besides, these were not sufficiently controverted by Ganzon.

MARIANO VS. THE ADMIRAL LINE GR 22134 OCT 17, 1924


Doctrine: Where property in the hands of a common carrier is not delivered within a reasonable time
after it has reached its destination, the carrier, in the absence of any legal exemption and after
demand has been made and delivery refused, is liable for a conversion of the property.
A tender of the property, to be effectual, must have been made within the time in which the
defendant was entitled to deliver it and the plaintiff bound to receive it.
Facts:
1. Plaintiff Mariano Uy Chaco Sons & Co. alleges that upon arrival of the S. S. Satsuma at the port of
Manila, there were short-delivered one case of varnish and paint remover and fifty bales of oakum,
for the conversion of which, defendant is liable.
2. Defendant Admiral Line argues that the merchandise had been delayed, had been found, and
delivery thereof had been tendered and rejected.
3. It appears that the interval which elapsed between the date when the merchandise should have
been delivered and the presentation of the complaint was approximately 11 months. The delay which
ensued between the date when the merchandise should have been delivered and the date when it
was finally tendered was close to 2 years and 4 months. The time which passed between the date
when the merchandise should have been delivered and the date when the defense of tender was set
up, was over 3 years.
Issue:Whether or not defendant is guilty of conversion?
Held:
Yes. As a general rule, mere delay in the delivery of goods by a common carrier, no matter how long
continued, is not a conversion thereof, but is only a breach of the contract of carriage. Therefore,
where a carrier fails to deliver goods within a reasonable time, although he thereby makes himself
liable for the damages incurred by reason of the delay, the consignee cannot refuse to accept the
goods from him and recover their value but is compelled to receive them.
However, a demand and a refusal to deliver is sometimes essential to show a conversion. Even after
demand, if the goods are tendered before a suit is brought, the consignee cannot refuse to receive

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the goods and sue for conversion, his sole remedy being an action for damages resulting from the
delay.
Though the carrier may delay ever so long, the owner cannot charge him with a conversion, or for
the value of the goods, if they are safely kept, unless they have been demanded of the carrier and
their delivery refused.
Where property in the hands of a common carrier is not delivered within a reasonable time after it
has reached its destination, the carrier, in the absence of any legal exemption and after demand has
been made and delivery refused, is liable for a conversion of the property. The consignee, under
such circumstances, may elect to waive all the title to the property and sue for conversion, and after
he has done so, a subsequent tender by the carrier will not be available for it as a defense.
A tender of the property, to be effectual, must have been made within the time in which the
defendant was entitled to deliver it and the plaintiff bound to receive it. In this case, the tender made
was not until long after the lapse of this period, and, not being accepted, is no bar to plaintiffs right to
recover.
A delay of more than 2 years in making delivery was conclusively unreasonable. A delay in pressing
a defense predicated on tender, of more than 2 years counted from the date when the complaint was
filed, was likewise unreasonable. Defendant was unable to turn the goods over to plaintiff at any time
before the complaint was presented, and in fact, could not do so until a long time thereafter. From the
foregoing, defendant was in effect guilty of conversion and must accordingly respond for the value of
the property at the time of conversion.

PAL vs. CA (GR 92501, 6 March 1992)


Facts:
At about 5:30 a.m. on 17 April 1985, Isidro Co, accompanied by his wife and son, arrived at the
Manila International Airport aboard the airlines PAL Flight 107 from San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Soon after embarking, Co proceeded to the baggage retrieval area to claim his 9 pieces of checkedin luggage with the corresponding claim checks in his possession. Co found eight of his luggage, but
despite diligent search, he failed to locate the 9th luggage, with claim check number 729113. Cos
lost luggage was a Samsonite suitcase measuring about 62 inches in length, worth about US
$200.00 and containing various personal effects purchased by Co and his wife during their stay in
the United States and similar other items sent by their friends abroad to be given as presents to
relatives in the Philippines. Cos invoices evidencing their purchases show their missing personal
effects to be worth US $1,243.01, in addition to the presents entrusted to them by their friends which
Co testified to be worth about US $500.00 to US $600.00. Co then immediately notified PAL through

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its employee, Willy Guevarra, who was then in charge of the PAL claim counter at the airport. Willy
Guevarra filled up a printed form known as a Property Irregularity Report, acknowledging one of the
Transportation Law, 2004 ( 185 ) Haystacks (Berne Guerrero) Cos luggages to be missing, and
signed it after asking Co himself to sign the same document. In accordance with his procedure in
cases of this nature, Willy Guevarra asked Co to surrender to him the nine claim checks
corresponding to the nine luggages, i.e., including the one that was missing. Co, on several
occasions, unrelentingly called at PALs office in order to pursue his complaint about his missing
luggage but to no avail.
Thus, on 15 April 1985, Co through his lawyer wrote a demand letter to PA: through Rebecca V.
Santos, its manager for Central Baggage Services. On 17 April 1985, Rebecca Santos replied to the
demand letter acknowledging that to date we have been unable to locate your clients baggage
despite our careful search and requesting Cos counsel to please extend to him our sincere
apologies for the inconvenience he was caused by this unfortunate incident. Despite the letter,
however, PAL never found Cos missing luggage or paid its corresponding value. On 3 May 1985, Co
filed a complaint against PAL for damages.
Issue:
WON PAL is liable
WON PAL can avail the limited liability rule
Ruling:
The Regional Trial Court of Pasay City found PAL liable, and rendered judgment on 3 June 1986,
sentencing PAL to pay Co the amounts of (1) P42,766.02 by way of actual damages; (2) P20,000.00
by way of exemplary damages; (3) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; all in addition to the costs or the
suit. The court also dismissed PALs counterclaim for lack of merit. On appeal, and on 19 July 1989,
the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial courts award.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for review for lack of merit; with costs against PAL.
1. Probative value of PALs retrieval report The probative value of PALs retrieval report was passed
upon by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, whose finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Although the passenger should produce his claim tag if he had not surrendered it because there was
no baggage received; it would appear that the passenger surrendered all the 9 claim checks
corresponding to the 9 luggages, including the one that was missing, to the PAL officer after
accomplishing the Property Irregularity Report, and thus, it could not be possible for the passenger
to produce the same in court.
It is now for the carrier to produce the veracity of their Baggage Retrieval Report by corroborating
evidence other than testimonies of their employees. Such document is within the control of PAL and
necessarily requires other corroborative evidence.
2. Purely factual issues not reviewable by the court Assignments of error, which raise purely factual
issues, are not reviewable by the Supreme Court (Sec. 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court). The Court
reviews only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth in the petition. (Hodges vs. People,

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68 Phil. 178.) Whether or not the lost luggage was ever retrieved by the passenger, and whether or
not the actual and exemplary damages awarded by the court to him are reasonable, are factual
issues which we may not pass upon in the absence of special circumstances requiring a review of
the evidence.
3. Warsaw Convention; Alitalia vs. IAC not applicable In Alitalia vs. IAC (192 SCRA 9, 18, citing Pan
American World Airways, Inc. vs. IAC, 164 SCRA 268), the Warsaw Convention limiting the carriers
liability was applied because of a simple loss of baggage without any improper conduct on the part
of the officials or employees of the airline, or other special injury sustained by the passengers. The
petitioner therein did not declare a higher value for his luggage, much less did he pay an additional
transportation charge.
4. Law of destination; Samar Mining vs. Nordeutscher Lloyd In Samar Mining Company, Inc. vs.
Nordeutscher Lloyd (132 SCRA 529), the Court ruled that the liability of the common carrier for the
loss, destruction or deterioration of goods transported from a foreign country to the Philippines is
governed primarily by the New Civil Code. In all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and
obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by Transportation
Law, 2004 ( 186 ) Haystacks (Berne Guerrero) Special Laws. Herein, since the passengers
destination was the Philippines, Philippine law governs the liability of the carrier for the loss of the
passengers luggage.
5. Article 1733 NCC Article 1733 provides that Common carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
6. Article 1735 NCC Article 1735 provides that In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5 of the preceding article if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as required in article 1733.
7. Article 1753 NCC Article 1753 provides that The law of the country to which the goods are to be
transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration.
8. No error in disregarding limits of liability under Warsaw Convention Herein, PAL failed to
overcome, not only the presumption, but more importantly, Cos evidence, proving that the carriers
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss of his baggage. Furthermore, PAL acted in bad faith
in faking a retrieval receipt to bail itself out of having to pay Cos claim. The appellate cout therefore
did not err in disregarding the limits of liability under the Warsaw Convention.

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