SABIC RBI Methodology Training Final Rev5

Table of Contents
Risk Based Inspection Methodology Training

Chapter 1 - Introduction to RBI
1.1 RBI Overview
1.2 API 580 Risk Based Inspection
1.3 API 581 RBI Base Resource Document
1.4 Risk Measurement
1.5 Risk Management
1.6 Meridium RBI Methodology
Chapter 2 - Degradation Mechanism Evaluations
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Internal Corrosion Degradation Mechanism Evaluation
2.3 External Corrosion Degradation Mechanism Evaluation
2.4 Environmental Cracking Degradation Mechanism Evaluation
2.5 Other Degradation Mechanisms
Chapter 3 - Consequence Evaluations
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Flammable & Toxic Consequence Evaluation
3.3 Flammable Consequence Evaluation
3.4 Toxic Consequence Evaluation
3.5 Economic Impact Consequence Evaluation
3.6 Environmental Consequences
3.7 Exchanger Bundle Consequences
3.8 Tank Bottom Consequences
3.9 Safety/Health Consequences
Chapter 4 - Risk Ranking
4.1 Risk Ranking
Chapter 5 - Inspection Strategy Management
5.1 Strategy Management
Chapter 6 - Overview of Integrated Evergreen RBI Workflow
6.1 Integrated Evergreen RBI Workflow
6.2 Block A RBI System Identification & Collecting and Loading Design and
Process Data
6.3 Block B Risk Assessment
6.4 Block C Developing Inspection Strategies
6.5 Block D Executing Inspection Strategies
6.6 Overall RBI Workflow Diagram
Glossary
Copyright Meridium, Inc. 2002-2011. All rights reserved.

Confidential and proprietary information of Meridium. Published Sep. 2011.
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Table of Contents
Appendices
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Appendix A Risk Matrix Graphic
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Appendix B Simplified RBI Steps
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Appendix C Representative Hole Sizes per RBI Component
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Appendix D Structural Tmin per RBI Component
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Table of Contents
Revision History
Version
Date
Author
Description
30-Ago-2007
V. Nihalani
Initial draft
15-Sep-2007
M. Gurley
General Edits based on client review
16-Feb-2008
M. Gurley
Changes to section 2.3, and added

appendix A,B.
16-Mar-2008
M. Gurley
Added Appendix C,D
10-Ago-2008
D. Rodas, M.
Gurley
General Review Edits per Client

Comments , Added Safety
Consequence section, Updated TOC
13-Sep-2011
D. Rodas, F.
Perillo
General Review Edits after version

upgrade from 321 to 342

Ch.1 - Introduction to RBI
Chapter 1
Introduction to RBI

Page 1
1.1 RBI Overview

Risk Based Inspection (RBI) involves prioritizing and managing an
Inspection program, where the equipment items to be inspected are
ranked according to risk.
80% of the risk is associated with

less than 20% of the equipment.
It is often said that, 80% of the risk is associated with less than 20%
of the Equipment. Thus, in order to optimize the utilization of finite
Inspection resources, companies deploy their Inspection resources on
their most critical equipment.
1.1.1 Goals of an RBI Program

The goal of RBI is to effectively manage risk through optimal utilization
of resources. RBI typically involves the deployment of maintenance
and inspection resources to work on high-risk items, so that the
overall cumulative risk is reduced. In some cases, RBI may involve
performing inspections more often than would be required per
conventional inspection practices. In other cases, certain low risk
items may not be inspected as frequently.
1.1.2 RBI vs. Traditional Inspection Methodologies

The most important distinction between RBI and other FMEA
methodologies is that RBI systematically accounts for both the
Probability of Failure and Consequence of Failure when determining
Risk. HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Analysis) accounts for
Consequence of Failure, but not Probability of Failure. API 510/570
accounts for Probability of Failure, but does not adequately account
for Consequence of Failure.

Page 2

1.1.3 Levels of RBI Analysis
There are three levels of RBI Analysis, each of which corresponds to an
approach. Many approaches fall somewhere on a continuum, between
the three defined levels.
Level One Qualitative
Level Two Semi-Quantitative
Level Three Quantitative
The Qualitative approach is based upon a questionnaire, while the
quantitative approach is based upon detailed calculations. Each
approach has its advantages and disadvantages. The Qualitative
approach is more subjective and has minimal data requirements, but
input from a knowledgeable Subject Matter Expert is essential. The
Quantitative Approach is more objective, but data requirements are
extensive.
1.1.4 RBI Benefits

Adopting the RBI methodology to direct the course of an inspection
program can yield many benefits such as:
Improve safety and reliability
Reduce overall inspection costs by spending budgets more
efficiently
Assess plant risks using qualitative, semi-quantitative or
quantitative analysis
Identify critical contributors to risk
Optimize inspection intervals and methods
1.1.5 Outcomes of the RBI Process

Expected outcomes of the RBI process include:
A detailed Inspection Strategy, including inspection methods,
scope, and frequency
An equipment ranking by risk
Other risk mitigation activities
An expected risk level after the Inspection Plan and risk mitigation
activities have been implemented
An understanding/ acceptance of current risk
A more efficient risk control and management system for the
assessed Equipment

Page 3

1.1.6 RBI Limitations
The effectiveness of RBI may be limited by the following:
- Human error
- Natural disasters
- External events
- Secondary events
- Deliberate acts (i.e. sabotage)
- Inherent risk in handling hazardous materials
- Inspection method detectability
- Design errors
- Previously unknown mechanism of deterioration
- RBI was developed to address the function of Pressure Boundary
Containment (i.e. RBI is not typically used in evaluating damage
mechanisms that dont affect the pressure boundary)
- Inaccurate or missing information
- Inadequate design or faulty equipment installation
- Operating outside the acceptable design envelope
- Ineffective execution of the plan
- Lack of qualified personnel and teamwork
- Lack of sound engineering and operational judgment
- Should not be used as a substitute for RCM, RCA, or PHAs
Adopters of RBI should be mindful of these pitfalls and associated
impact on risk and effective RBI implementation.
1.1.7 Evergreening
It is important that the RBI Process be an evergreen process. Most
often, companies invest a lot of time and resources performing an RBI
study for an upcoming Turnaround, but then fail to update the study
on a regular basis. Since RBI is essentially a condition-based
inspection program and equipment conditions change over the life of
the equipment, RBI studies should be updated as the equipment or
process conditions change. As equipment conditions change, an RBI
assessment should be re-evaluated. Companies often define Trigger
Points that necessitate an RBI re-analysis. These trigger points may be
either new Inspection data or changes in the process or process
excursions. The RBI process should be integrated with other processes
such as the MOC, PHA and CPP (Critical Process Parameter)
processes. This methodology can be particularly useful when
optimizing the scope of work for a turnaround/Shutdown.

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1.1.8 Industrial Applications of RBI

Industrial applications of Risk Based Inspection include:
Petrochemicals
Specialty chemicals
Offshore platforms
Pipelines
Pharmaceuticals
Pulp and paper
Cement
Other process industries
1.1.9 RBI Acceptance by Other Industries

The following industries have also recognized RBI as an acceptable
practice:
Fossil fuel power
Nuclear power
1.1.10 U.S. Regulatory Acceptance

Latest editions of the following codes recognize RBI as an acceptable
practice:
API 510 Pressure Vessel Code
API 570 Piping Code
API 653 Aboveground Storage Tank

Page 5

1.1.11 RBI Resource Documents
The American Petroleum Institute has published two documents in
regards to risk based inspection. These documents are discussed later
in this document.
API 580 Risk Based Inspection
This document describes the fundamental elements of
an RBI Program
API 581 RBI Base Resource Document
This document describes the tools and methods used
to accomplish the requirements entailed in the RBI
Program (i.e. inspection methods)
1.1.12 The Future of RBI

Risk Based Inspection will no doubt evolve as a methodology. Likely
changes to RBI include:
Integration with API 750 Management of Process Hazards
Integration with PSM (OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119)
Integration with EPAs Risk Management Program (RMP)
regulations
1.1.13 Conclusion
The RBI method of comparative risk ranking provides a useful tool to
deploy resources more efficiently and make better manpower staffing
decisions.

Page 6
1.2 API 580 Risk Based Inspection

1.2.1 API 580
The API 580 recommended practice is intended to provide guidance on
developing a risk-based inspection (RBI) program on fixed equipment
and piping in the hydrocarbon and chemical process industries. It
includes:
What is RBI?
What are the key elements of RBI?
How to implement a RBI program
API 580 brings to light the various issues that should be considered in
an RBI program. It does not specify an exact methodology, but
recognizes that different methodologies can be used to accomplish the
intended objectives of an RBI program.
1.2.2 API RP Development Group

The API RP Development Group consists of representatives from over
twenty international refining, chemical, and exploration companies.
Among the representatives are experts in Mechanical Design,
Corrosion Engineering, NDE, and Inspection Compliance. Whenever
necessary, the group consults others with specialized expertise.
1.2.3 Regulatory Acceptance

Countries that recognize API 580 to some extent include:
USA
Germany
Brazil
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Malaysia
Japan
Mexico
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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1.2.4 API 580 RBI Intersection with PHA, RCMetc
RBI alone cannot adequately cover all aspects of risk management. It
should complement existing processes like PHA and RCM, but not
serve as a substitute for them. For instance, an RBI assessment could
define how inspection activities could mitigate the risk associated with
loss of containment for a piece of equipment. However, when the same
equipment neared the end of its life, an RCM strategy could define an
end of life strategy involving equipment replacement or repair.
RCM Analysis is applied at a system level. Whenever a Loss of
Containment function is subjected to an RCM Analysis and inspection
activities are planned to mitigate the risk associated with the loss of
containment, RBI Analysis results could be used to complement the
Equipment Plan.
1.2.5 API 580 - Topics Covered

API 580 covers all the following topics:
Planning the RBI assessment
Collecting data and information
Identifying deterioration mechanisms and Failure analysis
Assessing Probability of Failure
Assessing Consequence of Failure
Risk determination, assessment, and management
Risk management with Inspection activities
Other risk mitigation activities
Reassessing and updating
Roles, responsibilities, training and qualifications
Documentation and record keeping
Note A good RBI program facilitates all the above items. The amount
of data collection required for a full-blown quantitative RBI analysis can
be extensive. However, if a systematic corrosion study is carried out
and different Damage Mechanisms are accurately identified, then data
gathering and collection efforts will be almost parallel activities.

Page 8

1.2.6 API 580 Equipment Covered
API 580 applies to all the following equipment:
Pressure Vessels
Process Piping
Storage Tanks
Rotating Equipment (Pressure-containing components)
Boilers and Heaters
Heat Exchangers (Shells and Bundles)
Pressure Relief Devices
1.2.7 API 580 Equipment Not Covered

API 580 does not apply to the following equipment:
Instrument and Control Systems
Electrical Systems
Structural Systems
Machinery components
However, companies have started investigating the adoption of RBI
methodologies for these types of equipment if their failure could lead to
loss of containment from connected static equipment.

Page 9
1.3 API 581 RBI Base Resource Document

The API 581 Base Resource Document (BRD) describes the basic
technology and methods adopted within the API RBI methodology.
Whereas API 580 describes the basics of an RBI program, this
document describes in greater detail the different tools and methods
that allow a user to meet the requirements of API 580. Some of these
would include things like:
Explanation of performing Risk Analysis
Explanation of performing Consequence Analysis
Explanations of Probability of Failure Evaluations
Development of Inspection Strategies
Damage Mechanism Evaluations
Etc
1.3.1 Summary
API 580 lays the groundwork for a well rounded successful RBI
program. Using this document as a base resource will help to
understand the fundamental parts that make up the overall RBI
program. Once these principles are applied, API 581 can be used as a
tool to help determine which specific methods to use. At the end of the
RBI assessment, the company has a better understanding of the
process, the associated damage mechanisms, and the risk associated
with it. Good documentation not only helps companies during audits
but also helps keep the analysis alive.

Page 10
1.4 Risk Measurement

Figure 1-2 shows the risk matrix used throughout Meridium RBI. By
using this matrix, you can see that the product of likelihood and
consequence determines the risk associated with a piece of equipment.
Inspection Priority Categories
Probability Categories
11
High
Medium-High
16
13
Risk Ranking
Medium
Low
20
17
14
23
21
18
15
10
25
24
22
19
12
E
D
C
B
A
Consequence Categories
Figure 1-2: RBI Risk Matrix
Probability is the combined probability of occurrence for all of

the types of damage that could take place to a given piece of
equipment, such as internal corrosion, cracking, fatigue, etc.
Consequence is often the worst-case scenario if there are
multiple consequence effects, such as loss of containment and
production loss.
Inspection Priority is the combination of consequence and
probability which will be used to generate RBI
recommendations.
It is important to understand that RBI will not totally eliminate risk

but will expose the high risk equipment, and then allow users the
Page 11

opportunity to mitigate it. However, studies have shown that given the
same level of Inspection activity, RBI Inspection programs provide
more risk reduction than conventional Inspection Programs. This can
be seen in figure 1-3 which can also be found in the API 581
document.
Figure 1-3: RBI vs. Conventional Inspection program Risk
1.4.1 Relative vs. Absolute Risk

When using an absolute risk value, it pertains to the piece of
equipment being assessed and doesnt consider any other equipment
in the area. By using a relative risk value, the user is comparing all
equipment in a group against each other to determine relative risk.
Although companies have developed their own formulas to quantify
risk, RBI essentially focuses on calculating relative risk, as opposed to
absolute risk.
Companies in different parts of the world may place different levels of
emphasis on various things when they try to quantify risk. In any
case, it is very important that a consistent method be used, in order
for this relative ranking to be effective. Consistency in performing the
risk assessment is more important than accuracy.
Page 12
1.5 Risk Management

1.5.1 Basis of Risk Management Programs
Risk Management Programs generally involve the following four-phase
process:
Phase One: Identify Specific Failure Modes or Deterioration

Mechanisms - Different Failure Modes that apply to individual
equipment or components are identified. Failure modes are
defined as the different mechanisms that may cause the
equipment or component to deteriorate over time and eventually
lead to failure. Failure Modes are sometimes referred to as
Damage Types.
Phase Two: Assess Risk - The deterioration rate and equipment

tolerance to each deterioration mechanism is ascertained. This
assessment results in a Damage Factor for each deterioration
mechanism. The Cumulative Damage Factor is obtained by
adding the individual Damage Factors and is used to assess
risk.
Phase Three: Identify Risk Mitigation Alternatives - Highrisk equipment is examined and different risk mitigation
alternatives are investigated. These alternatives might include a
more sensitive Inspection Plan, Equipment Re-design,
Equipment replacement, Equipment repair, or in some extreme
cases a Change in Process.
Phase Four: Develop an Action Plan - An action plan is

established to carry out the recommended actions that have
been identified in Phase Three.
1.5.2 Using RBI to Manage Operating Risks

To manage operating risks, you should define the susceptibility of each
Equipment item and consider the following factors:
Process fluid or contaminants and aggressive components
Unit throughput
Desired unit run length between scheduled shutdowns
Operating conditions, including upset conditions

Page 13

1.5.3 Risk Management using Probability of Failure
The probability of failure is a function of four factors:
Deterioration mechanism
Rate of deterioration
Probability of detecting deterioration and predicting future
deterioration states using inspection techniques (i.e.
inspection confidence rating)
Tolerance of equipment to the type of deterioration (i.e.
material of construction)
Since RBI is fundamentally based upon the assessment of equipment
risk with respect to different damage types, it is critical that all these
factors be considered. Note that this analysis should be performed for
both normal and upset conditions.
1.5.4 Establishing Inspection Plans & Priorities

Following are the key deliverables needed to establish an Inspection
Plan and priorities:
Inspection Plan with unmitigated risk for current operation
Ranking of equipment by unmitigated risk
Mitigation plan for unacceptable risks
1.5.5 Inspection may not adequately manage risk

In some cases, it may not be possible to adequately manage risk
through inspection. Consider the following cases:
Equipment nearing retirement
Failure mechanisms dictated by operating conditions, i.e. low
temperature brittle fracture which cant be predicted by
inspection
Consequence-dominated risks
Therefore, RBI should be used in conjunction with other processes like
HAZOP and RCM.

Page 14
1.6 Meridium RBI Methodology

To meet the intent of the RBI Methodology within the Meridium
software the following components are used:
Degradation Mechanism Evaluations
Consequence Evaluations
Risk Ranking
Inspection Strategy Management
These separate components of the Meridium RBI Methodology are
discussed in greater detail throughout the sections that follow.
Figure 1-1 depicts a high level overview of the Meridium RBI Workflow.
In this graphic, you can see the different aspects of the integrated
workflow and how they relate to one another. For more detailed
information, refer to the official STRP4 RBI Workflow document.
Figure 1-1: RBI Workflow

Page 15

1.6.1 Degradation Mechanism Evaluations used in Meridium
Internal Corrosion (quantitative)

External Corrosion (quantitative)
Environmental Cracking (quantitative)
Other Damage Mechanisms (qualitative)
1.6.2 Consequence Evaluations used in Meridium
Flammable Consequence (quantitative)

Toxic Consequence (quantitative)
Economic Impact Consequence (quantitative)
Product Leak Consequence Tube Bundles (quantitative)
Environmental Consequence (qualitative)
1.6.3 Risk Ranking

Meridium determines the overall risk ranking by taking into account
all of the individual rankings from all of the Potential Degradation
Mechanisms in the following manner:
Rolling up Probability of Failure (POF) - from individual
Degradation Mechanism Evaluations the worst case scenario
for POF is used for the overall POF.
Rolling up Consequence of Failure (COF) - from individual
Consequence Evaluations the worst case scenario for COF is
used for the overall COF.
Performing Risk Ranking based on a 5 X 5 Risk Matrix The
overall risk ranking is determined by plotting the rolled up
POF and COF on the standard 5 X 5 matrix as seen in figure
1-2.
1.6.4 Inspection Strategy Management

Using the Risk Ranking and subsequent inspection priority, Meridium
uses Strategy Rule Sets to create a System Generated RBI
Recommendation (SGRR) from a reference table that has been
populated by subject matter experts. These recommendations are then
reviewed by an Analyst and reconciled into executable inspection
plans.

Page 16
Ch.2 - Degradation Mechanism Evaluations
Chapter 2
Degradation Mechanism
Evaluations

Page 17
2.1 Introduction
During the Risk Assessment of an RBI Component, one of the main
tasks is to perform Degradation Mechanism Evaluations. These
evaluations take into account a host of different information depending
on the specific mechanism being evaluated and run that data through
stored calculations within the Meridium software. The objective of
these evaluations is a Probability Category for each Potential
Degradation Mechanism (PDM). These Probability Categories are then
used in conjunction with the Consequence Categories to determine the
overall Inspection Priority. Consequence Evaluations are covered in
Chapter 3. This section will discuss the methods that are used to
evaluate each damage mechanism. The calculations and decision
sequences that are shown in this chapter are automatically computed
by the Meridium software. They are displayed here to explain how the
data input is being used in these evaluations.
2.2 Internal Corrosion Degradation Mechanism

Evaluation
The required sequence of calculations for internal corrosion is depicted in figure 2-1 and
explained in greater detail throughout this section.
Figure 2-1: Calculation Sequence for Internal Corrosion

Page 18

2.2.1 Calculating or Estimating Intermediate Variables
In order to perform Internal Corrosion Degradation Mechanism Evaluation, it is necessary to
calculate or estimate the following intermediate variables:
o
Corrosion Rate (Long Term & Short Term) =
CRLT
CRST
o
o
o
o
Vbase - Vlast
=
Where
Dbase - Dlast
Vnear Vlast
Dnear - Dlast
Where
CRLT Long Term Corrosion Rate

Vbase Base Measurement
Vlast Last Measurement Value
Dbase Base Measurement Date
Dlast Last Measurement Date
CRST Short Term Corrosion Rate
Vnear Near Measurement Value
Vlast Last Measurement Value
Dnear Near Measurement Date
Dlast Last Measurement Date
Estimated Wall Loss = Nominal Wall Thickness Estimated Wall Thickness

Estimated Wall Remaining = Nominal Wall Thickness Estimated Wall Loss
Fractional Wall Loss = Estimated Wall Loss / Nominal Wall Thickness
Over Design Factor (Wall Ratio) = Estimated Wall Remaining / Tmin
The Corrosion Rate can be based on any of the following:

o Expected (Design) Corrosion Rate A user-entered value that represents the best
estimate or intended Design Corrosion Rate
o Short-term Corrosion Rate Calculated based on the Near and Last Thickness
Measurements for the associated RBI component
o Long-term Corrosion Rate - Calculated based on the Base and Last Thickness
Measurements for the associated RBI component
The Corrosion Rate and the time between inspections allow one to establish the Estimated
Wall Loss and in turn, calculate the Fractional Wall Loss.
The calculation of Pressure Minimum Thickness involves the following steps, as depicted
in figure 2-2:
o Select Design Code
o Select Material Specification
o Select Material Grade
o Look Up Allowable Stress
o Select Joint Efficiency
o Calculate Pressure Minimum Thickness

Page 19
Figure 2-2: Pressure Minimum Thickness Calculation Sequence
Fundamentally, the Design Code choice determines what Allowable Stress tables are
applicable. The Material Specification is a pick list of the materials listed in the Allowable
Stress table for the chosen Design Code. The Material Grade is a pick list that is based on the
choice of Material Specification.
First, the user selects what Design Code applies:
o ASME VIII Div 1
o ASME B31.3
o API 650
o Null
If Null is chosen for Design Code, then the user can enter the Allowable Stress, Material
Specification, and Material Grade manually. If the Design Code is not Null, then the
Material Specification and Material Grade must be selected from the pick-lists.
The Allowable Stress is a look-up based on the choices of Design Code, Material
Specification, Material Grade and Design Temperature. The determination of Allowable
Stress for Storage Tank Bottoms, however, is based on Material Specification and Material
Grade selections, but not Design Temperature. In addition, there is an Override option that
will permit manual entry of Allowable Stress.
Joint Efficiency is also selected from a pick-list. The default value is 1.00.

Page 20

Based on these values, Pressure Minimum Thickness can be calculated:
Pmin = f (E, PDesign, OD, AS)
where:
Pmin = Minimum Pressure Thickness

E = Joint Efficiency
PDesign = Design Pressure
OD = Outside Diameter
AS = Allowable Stress
The Structural Minimum Thickness is looked up from standard tables using industry best
practices and based on the RBI Component type.
- The higher of the Structural Minimum Thickness and Pressure Minimum Thickness is
used to calculate the Estimated Minimum Thickness. It is also possible to override
this value by entering the value manually.
- The Number of Years in Service and Corrosion Rate are used to calculate Wall Loss.
- Wall Loss divided by the Initial Wall Thickness results in Fractional Wall Loss.
- Wall Remaining is obtained by Subtracting Wall Loss from Initial Wall Thickness.
- Wall Remaining divided by Estimated Minimum Thickness results in a Wall Ratio.
The Corrosion Factor (CF) is determined based upon:
- Number of inspections
- Inspection Confidence (Very High, High, Medium, Low) Based on inspection history
- Fractional Wall Loss
The Internal Corrosion Probability Category (ICPC) is determined based on the value of the
corrosion factor (CF) that was determined in the previous table:
Corrosion Factor (CF)
Internal Corrosion Probability Category (ICPC)
1 <= CF < 10
10 <= CF < 100
100 <= CF < 1000
CF >=1000
In order to account for over design, the final Internal Corrosion Probability Category
(ICPC) is lowered by one category (the numeric ICPC goes down one Rank) if:
- The Corrosion Rate is less than 0.127mm/year
and
- The wall ratio is greater than 1.5

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2.3 External Corrosion Degradation Mechanism Evaluation

2.3.1 Introduction
External Corrosion Degradation Mechanism Evaluations involve the following
calculations/assessments:
An assessment of the Corrosion Rate can be based on any of the following:
o Expected Corrosion Rate A user-entered value that represents the best estimate
of the Local Corrosion Rate.
o Calculated Corrosion Rate This Corrosion Rate is calculated for Corrosion
Under Insulation (CUI) and is a function of Operating Temperature.
o Average Corrosion Rate This represents the Average Corrosion rate as
measured by determining pit depths.
2.3.2 Adjustments to External Age and Corrosion Rates

Adjustments to External Age and Corrosion Rates are made based on the factors outlined
below:
External coatings/paint is visually inspected and graded with a Coating Quality rating. These
ratings can influence an Age Adjustment based on the following values:
Coating Quality
Coating Factor
Age Adjustment
Best
-10
Average
-5
None
.2
-1
Insulation is visually inspected and graded with an Insulation Condition. The resulting
Insulation Condition is used to apply a Corrosion Rate Adjustment, as follows:
Insulation Condition
Corrosion Rate Adjustment
Good (G)
x 0.5
Fair (F)
No adjustment
Poor (P)
x 1.5

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The Insulation Type is used to apply a Corrosion Rate Adjustment, as follows:
Insulation Type
Corrosion Rate Adjustment
Asbestos
x 1.5
Calcium Silicate (not Chlorine free)
No adjustment
Calcium Silicate (Chlorine free)
x 0.75
Mineral Wool / Fiberglass
x 0.75
Foam / Cellular glass
x 0.50
A Corrosion Rate Adjustment is applied to account for Local Humidity. Local Humidity
may be either atmospheric or resulting from the proximity of equipment to a cooling tower.
If atmospheric humidity is High, then the corrosion rate is adjusted higher by a
factor of 50%.
If the equipment is located within 50 yards of a cooling tower, then the user-selected
humidity factor should be raised by one category.
2.3.3 After Adjustments Have Been Made

After adjustments have been made to External Age and Corrosion Rates:
-
The External Age and Corrosion Rate are used to calculate Wall Loss.
Wall Loss divided by the Initial Wall Thickness results in Fractional Wall Loss.
Wall Remaining is obtained by Estimated Wall Loss from Initial Wall Thickness.
Wall Remaining divided by Estimated Minimum Thickness results in a Wall Ratio.
The Corrosion Factor (CF) is determined based upon:

-
Number of inspections
Inspection Confidence (Very High, High, Medium, Low) Based on inspection history
Fractional Wall Loss

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External Corrosion Probability Category (ECPC) is then determined based on Corrosion
Factor using the Table below:
Corrosion Factor (CF)
External Corrosion Probability Category (ECPC)
1 <= CF < 10
10 <= CF < 100
100 <= CF < 1000
CF >= 1000
In order to account for over design, the final External Corrosion Probability Category
(ECPC) is lowered by one category (the numeric ECPC goes up one Rank) if:
- The Corrosion Rate is less than 0.127mm/year
and
- The wall ratio is greater than 1.5

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2.4 Environmental Cracking Degradation Mechanism

Evaluation
2.4.1 Introduction
Environmental Cracking Degradation Mechanisms can be performed for the following
degradation mechanisms:
o Wet H2S
o Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking
o Caustic Cracking
o Amine Cracking
o Polythionic Acid SCC
o Sulfide Stress Cracking
o Carbonate Cracking
o Hydrogen Stress Cracking Hydrofluoric Acid
2.4.2 Environmental Probability Category

An Environmental Probability Category is determined for each environmental cracking
mechanism by calculating an Environmental Cracking Corrosion Factor. This factor is
based on the Initial Potential for environmental cracking, any damage found during previous
inspections, the number of previous inspections, and inspection confidence. Initial Potential
is determined based on the material properties and contaminant levels. Table 2-1 shows
these Initial Potential criteria.

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Table 2-1 Initial Potential Criteria for Environmental Cracking

Degradation
Initial
Mechanism Potential
Wet H2S
H
(Blistering,
M
SOHIC, HIC,
SSC)
L
Chloride
H
Stress
Corrosion
Cracking (C1
M
SCC)
Caustic
Cracking
Amine
Cracking
(ASCC)
Polythionic
Acid SCC
(PTA)
Material / Environmental Criteria

H2S > 50 ppm, free H2O, not PWHT, HCN > 20 ppm OR pH < 5.5
H2S > 50 ppm, free H2O, PWHT, HCN > 20 ppm OR pH < 5.5 OR
Cracking Agent > 50 ppm, free H2O, Not PWHT, HCN < 20 ppm, no erosion
(i.e., stable scale)
H2S >= 20 ppm and < 50 ppm, free H2O, PWHT, HCN > 20 ppm OR
Complies with MR-0175, HCN , 20 ppm
Chloride (Cl-) concentration >= 50 ppm, temperature > 140F plus residual
stress and dissolved O2 >= 10 ppm OR all austenitic stainless steels (304,
316, 321, 347)
Chloride (Cl-) concentration 25 - 50 ppm, dissolved O2 < 10 ppm,
temperature > 140F plus residual stress
Chloride (Cl-) concentration 5 - 25 ppm, dissolved O2 < 0.1 ppm, pH >= 9.0,
temperature > 120F
Carbon steel or 300 SS at temperatures > 200F and all concentrations of

caustic. Steaming out caustic systems, and operation upsets, Not PWHT
Carbon steel at temperatures > 200F and < 30% caustic concentration,
PWHT of CS welds and bends.
Operating temperatures < 100F and up to 50% caustic concentration, or

temperatures < 150F and caustic concentration < 20%
Carbon steel not PWHT and MEA all concentrations and temperatures or
DEA/MDEA > 140F
Carbon steel not PWHT and MEA and operating temperatures of 125 - 150F
for all types of amines
Carbon steel PWHT regardless of operating temperature and concentration
Sensitized austentic SS are likely when: surface has iron sulfide scale,
operating temperature > 800F process upsets with air and water ingress,
poor caustic wash procedures
Sensitized austentic SS and non-thermally stabilized 321 and 347 are

possible when: likely when: surface has iron sulfide scale, higher upset
temperatures, some process upsets with air and water ingress, good caustic
wash procedures
A chance for sensitized austentic SS and thermally stabilized 321 and 347
when: surface has iron sulfide scale, stable operation (no process upsets),
good caustic wash procedures

Page 26

The Current Potential for Environmental Cracking and Adjusted Years Since Last
Inspection are calculated based on the following things and can be found in Table 2-2:
Initial Potential for environmental cracking
Number of Prior Environmental Cracking Inspections
Inspection Confidence
Whether there was Damage Found during the last inspection
Table 2-2 Current Potential and Adjusted Years in Service Reference Table
# Prior
Damage
Current Potential for
Environmental Inspection Found
Environmental
Cracking
Confidence (Last
Cracking
Inspections
Inspection)
0
>0
N/A
Low
N/A
No
Initial Potential
Initial Potential
>0
Low
Yes
Very High
Yes
>1
Very High
Yes
High
Yes
One Category Higher

than Initial Potential,
up to High
One Category Higher
up to High
Two Categories
Higher than Initial
Potential, up to High
One Category Higher
up to High
>1
High
Yes
Two Categories
Higher than Initial
Medium
Yes
One Category Higher

up to High
>1
Medium
Yes
Two Categories
Higher than Initial
Very High
No
One Category Lower

than Initial Potential
(If Initial Potential =
Low, Current
Potential = Low)

Adjusted Years Since Last Inspection
Years in Environmental Cracking Service

Years in Environmental Cracking Service
Years since Last Environmental Cracking

Inspection + (Years in Environmental
Cracking Service Years Since Last
Environmental Inspection) / 4
Years Since Last Environmental
Cracking Service
Page 27
# Prior
Environmental
Cracking
Inspections
Damage
Current Potential for
Inspection Found
Environmental
Confidence (Last
Cracking
Inspection)
>1
Very High
No
High
No
>1
High
No
Medium
No
>1
Medium
No
Adjusted Years Since Last Inspection
Low
Years Since Last Environmental Cracking

Service
Initial Potential
Inspection + 5 (with a maximum = (Years in
Environmental Cracking Service))
One Category Lower Years since Last Environmental Cracking
than Initial Potential ( Inspection + 5 (with a maximum = (Years in
If Initial Potential =
Environmental Cracking Service))
Low, Current
Potential = Low)
Initial Potential
Inspection + 10 (with a maximum = (Years
in Environmental Cracking Service))
One Category Lower Years since Last Environmental Cracking
than Initial Potential ( Inspection + 10 (with a maximum = (Years
If Initial Potential =
in Environmental Cracking Service))
Low, Current
Potential = Low)
The corrosion factor for environmental cracking is then calculated by using the current
potential for environmental cracking and the adjusted years since the last inspection. Based
on these values, Pressure Minimum Thickness can be calculated:
ECCF = f (POTcurrent, , Yadjusted))
where:
ECCF = Environmental Corrosion Cracking Factor

POTcurrent = Current Potential for Environmental Cracking
Yadjusted = Adjusted Years
The Environmental Cracking Probability Category is based on the Environmental
Cracking Corrosion Factor, as follows:
Environmental Cracking Corrosion Factor
Environmental Cracking Probability Category
1-9
10 - 99
100 - 999
1000+

Page 28
2.5 Other (Qualitative) Damage Mechanism Evaluation

2.5.1 Introduction
In addition to the quantitative degradation mechanism evaluation methodologies described
earlier, Meridium System also includes a list of qualitative degradation mechanism
evaluation. When these qualitative degradation mechanisms are evaluated, a user can
manually specify a POF Category of 1-5. No calculations are performed by the system.
Meridium provides the following qualitative Degradation Mechanisms as a starting point:
Mechanical Fatigue
Temper Embrittlement
Liquid Metal Embrittlement
Graphitization
Brittle Fracture
Carburization
Creep
Erosion
Hot Hydrogen Attack
Hydrogen Embrittlement
Phase Change Embrittlement
Stress Corrosion Cracking
Thermal Fatigue
Clients have the ability to add additional degradation mechanisms that can be evaluated in a
similar qualitative manner.

Page 29

2.5.2 Achieving Consistency
Since these degradation mechanisms are qualitative, it is desirable that some guidelines be set
as a corporation so that these degradation mechanisms are evaluated consistently across sites
and by different people.
In order to facilitate this, Meridium allows the client to maintain a Reference Table at a
Corporate Level that can be used to document these guidelines. Shown in figure 2-4 is an
example for Brittle Fracture (which is an ODM). The entered guidelines can be seen beside
each POF ranking, describing what those ratings should be equivalent to.
Figure 2-4: Other Degradation Mechanism Reference Table

Page 30

If the above mentioned reference tables are populated, then when a user selects a POF
Ranking for an ODM, the system automatically looks up the description from the Reference
Table and Populates it on the ODM Evaluation Datasheet as shown in Figure 2-5.
Figure 2-5: Other Degradation Mechanism (Brittle Fracture) Data Sheet
Having such guidelines available provides the RBI Analyst with the necessary information
that facilitates ranking POF categories in a consistent manner.

Page 31
Ch.3 - Consequence Evaluations
Chapter 3
Consequence Evaluation

Page 32
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, the two main parts of an RBI Risk
Assessment are Degradation Mechanism Evaluations (covered in Chapter
2) and Consequence Evaluations. When evaluating Consequences of
failure for an RBI component we are not concerned with the mechanism
(i.e. internal corrosion, CUI, crackingetc) but the overall consequence of
the failure. Because of this, once all of the consequences have been
evaluated the worst case consequence scenario (in conjunction with the
Probability Category) is used as a basis for determining the Inspection
Priority/Risk Ranking. The following sections explain in more detail the
different Consequence Evaluations performed within Meridium.
3.2 Flammable & Toxic Consequence Evaluation

3.2.1 Flammable and Toxic Consequence Overview
When you perform a Loss of Containment Consequence Analysis, you estimate what might
happen if the selected equipment item were to experience a loss of containment. Loss of
Containment consequences might include fire, toxicity, environmental contamination,
production leak, and/or production loss, based on the particular equipment type.
Loss of Containment Consequence Analysis Steps

Following are the basic steps used in Flammable and Toxic Consequence Evaluations:
1)
Characterize the Fluid

Determine if the fluid is hazardous (flammable, toxic, or reactive)
o If toxic, then what is the amount?
Determine the Initial Fluid State (liquid or gas)
Select a Representative Fluid (the chemical species that most closely
resembles the fluid in terms of properties)
Note - For mixtures, use the closest match, based first on boiling point, and
then on molecular weight
2)
Estimate the amount of fluid that could be released

For liquids, also specify whether the area has a dike that could contain a leak
Estimate the leak size
Based on the RBI Component Type
3)

Page 33

4)
5)
Criticality Calculator calculates the duration of the leak

Based on leak size, pressure differential, fluid thermodynamic properties, and
time necessary to detect and isolate the leak
Calculate separate flammable and toxic consequences
Based on fluid properties, amount of fluid releases, and other miscellaneous
factors.
These basic concepts will be covered in subsequent sections. Some additional factors will
also be considered for heat exchanger bundles and storage tank bottoms.
3.2.2 Characterizing the Fluid

The analysis process begins by characterizing the fluid that resides in the pipe or vessel.
First, you must determine whether the fluid is hazardous, and in particular:
Flammable
Toxic
Reactive (Capable of causing a chemical or thermal burn)
You must correctly identify the fluids initial state (gas or liquid). Finally, you must select a
Representative Fluid, i.e. the chemical species that most closely resembles the fluid in terms
of properties.
If the stream is relatively pure, then it is easy to select a Representative Fluid. However, a
stream may contain a mixture of flammable and toxic fluids, such as a natural gas with a
high H2S content.
Frequently, refinery and chemical distillation streams are mixtures of flammable materials.
In the case of hydrocarbons, the representative material should match the molecular weight
and volatility of the stream as closely as possible. Flammable consequence results are not
highly dependent on the exact material selected, provided the molecular weights are similar,
because air dispersion properties and heats of combustion are similar for all hydrocarbons
with similar molecular weights.
Sometimes flammable fluids, such as amines or alcohols, are mixed with water. If a mixture
will burn, then it should be treated as a flammable component, and its Heat of Combustion
and Pool Fire Factor should be calculated for the mixture.
Properties of fluids can be found in standard reference books, but it may be necessary to
consult with someone familiar with the process operation in order to properly select the
representative fluid, initial state, and fluid properties.
To summarize, the following information is required for a Loss of Containment

Page 34

Consequence Analysis:
Is the fluid flammable, toxic, or reactive?
Is the Initial Fluid State gas or liquid?
What is the Representative Fluid?
If the Representative Fluid is Toxic:
What amount of toxic material is present?
Is there a toxic end point, i.e. a dike to contain the toxic material?
If the Representative Fluid is Flammable:
What is its Heat of Combustion?
What is its Pool Fire Factor?
If the Representative Fluid is Reactive, then use the following values to model:
Final State = Liquid
Pool Fire Factor = 1
3.2.3 Estimating the Amount of Fluid that could be released

Once a representative fluids properties have been selected, the next step is to estimate the
maximum amount of material that could be released if a Loss of Containment event were to
occur. Theoretically, this would be the amount of material contained in a particular section
of the plant. However, the amount of material released is often reduced because operators
can close manual valves, de-inventory sections, or otherwise stop a leak once they become
aware that a release is in progress. In addition, piping restrictions and differences in
elevation can serve to effectively slow or stop a leak.
3.2.4 Estimating the Leak Size

In order to estimate the amount of material that would be released, it is necessary to assume
that a pre-defined set of leak sizes exist based on the particular equipment type. These predefined leak sizes represent small, medium, large, and rupture cases for the particular
equipment type.
3.2.5 Estimating the Release Rate

This analysis approach models all releases as continuous, or occurring over a measurable
period of time, and allowing a liquid to form a pool on the ground or a gas to disperse into
the atmosphere. Release rates depend upon the physical properties of the material, the initial
phase, and the process conditions. Release rate equations are based on whether the fluid is a
liquid or gas in the equipment, and if it is a gas, whether it will experience sonic or subsonic
flow. Two-phase flow is usually modeled as a liquid.

Page 35
3.2.6 Calculating Liquid Release Rate

The Liquid Release Rate is a function of the following variables and is based on Bernoulli
equations:
Ql = f ( , A, P )
where:
Ql = Liquid mass flow
= Liquid density
A = Cross-sectional area of hole

P = Pressure differential
Calculating Gas Release Rate with Sonic Flows
The Gas Release Rate with Sonic Flows is a function of the following variables:
Qv = f (T, A, Cp/Cv)
where:
Qv = Gas Mass Flow
T = Upstream Temperature
A = Cross-sectional Area of hole
Cp/Cv = Ratio of Heat Capacities
Calculating Gas Release Rate with Subsonic Flows

Qv = f (P, T, A, Cp/Cv)
where:
Qv = Gas Mass Flow
P = Upstream Pressure
T = Upstream Temperature
A = Cross-sectional Area of hole
Cp/Cv = Ratio of Heat Capacities

Page 36

3.2.7 Estimating the Duration of the Release
Once the release rate is calculated, the next step is to estimate the Release Duration. Release
duration is the lesser of the time required to detect and isolate the leak or the time required to
de-inventory the entire system. The time required to detect and isolate the leak is based on
the physical location of the plant, the location and type of isolation valves, and the leak size
and location.
Detection and isolation are considered separate events. The sum of these two events
represents the time that material escaped from the piping or vessel. If these times are not
known, then default values of 5 minutes can be used for both detection and isolation time.
On the other hand, the length of time to de-inventory the entire system is calculated by
simply dividing the system inventory by the release rate.
3.2.8 Calculating Leak Quantity

The amount of fluid released as a result of a leak is calculated by multiplying the release
rate, which is assumed to be constant, by the release duration. A constant release rate is a
conservative assumption, since the release rate generally decreases over time as the system
pressure declines.
3.2.9 Determining the Final Fluid Phase

The dispersion characteristics of a fluid after release are highly dependent on the final phase
of the fluid (gas or liquid). If the fluid changes state upon release, the final material phase
may be difficult to assess. Therefore, the following table has been provided to offer simple
guidelines for determining the final fluid phase.
Fluid Phase at Steadystate Operating
Conditions
Fluid Phase at Steady-state

Ambient Conditions
Determination of Final Phase

for Consequence Calculation
Liquid
Liquid
Model as liquid
Gas
Gas
Model as gas
Gas
Liquid
Model as liquid
Gas
Model as gas unless fluid boiling

point at ambient conditions is
greater than 80 F, in which case
you should model as liquid
Liquid

Page 37
3.3 Flammable Consequence Details

Flammable consequence calculations are based on methods developed by the US EPA
(Environmental Protection Agency) and are calculated based on the area affected by a
possible ignition release. Releases involving fluids with a final gas phase are modeled as
vapor cloud explosions, and those involving fluids with a final liquid phase are modeled
as pool fires. Figure 3-1 depicts the decision tree used for evaluating the flammable
consequence for a risk assessment.
Figure 3-1: Flammable Consequence Evaluation Decision Tree

Page 38

3.3.1 Calculating Flammable Consequence for Fluids in
Final Gas Phase
The following assumptions are made regarding the release of fluids with a final Gas Phase,
in order to model the release as a vapor cloud explosion:
A release of flammable gases or a volatile flammable liquid will form a vapor cloud with
a quantity equal to the total quantity of material released.
The entire contents of the vapor cloud are within the flammability limits, and will
explode.
10% of the flammable vapor in the cloud will participate in the explosion.
The following equation is used:
D = f (Wf, HCf, HCTNT)

D = Distance to flammable effect
Wf = Flammable material mass
HCf = Flammable material heat of combustion
HCTNT = TNT heat of combustion
where:
3.3.2 Calculating Flammable Consequence for Fluids in

Final Liquid Phase
The following assumptions are made regarding the release of fluids with a final Liquid
Phase:
When a flammable vapor or condensing flammable vapor is released, the total quantity
of the flammable substance forms a liquid pool.
The liquid leak area is not diked, and the liquid instantaneously forms a pool 0.39 inch
(1.0 cm.) deep.
The liquid pool will ignite.
Consequence distances are calculated based on a heat radiation level that could cause
second-degree burns from a 40-second exposure.
Those exposed would be able to escape the heat in 40 seconds.
The heat radiation level is 5,000 Watts per square meter.
Ambient temperature is 25 C (77 F).

Page 39

A Pool Fire Factor (PFF) has been calculated for flammable substances with boiling points
below the assumed ambient temperature (25 C or 77 F). This factor is used to estimate the
distance from the center of a pool fire from which second degree burns would result after a
40-second exposure.
The PPF for liquids with boiling points above the assumed ambient temperature (25 C or
77 F) is a function of the following variables:
PFF = Pool Fire Factor

Hc = Heat of Combustion
Hv = Heat of Vaporization
Cp = Heat Capacity
Tb = Boiling Temperature
PFF = f (Hc, Hv, Cp, Tb)
where:
3.3.3 Flammable Release Probability

The flammable release consequence is a strong function of the probability that the release
will ignite. The probability of ignition is a function of the representative fluid and associated
operating temperature. In general, as the temperature of the released fluid increases, the
probability of ignition increases. The probability of ignition is a function of the following
variables:
Pig = f (Top, Tfp, Tauto, Pigfp)

where:
Pig = Probability of Ignition

Top = Operating Temperature
Tfp = Flash Point Temperature
Tauto = Auto Ignition Temperature
*Pigfp = Probability of Ignition at Flash Point Temperature
* If near ignition source Pigfp = 100%

Page 40

3.3.4 Determining Consequence Category for a Flammable
Release
For flammable materials, the consequence of a release is based on the area affected by the
ignition event.
For a vapor release, the effect is modeled as a vapor cloud with an endpoint (distance from
the release) determined by a 1 psig over-pressure from the blast. This threshold is
considered the pressure that might cause broken windows and result in injuries to those in
the affected area.
For a liquid release, the effect area is determined as the distance from the ignited liquid pool
where the thermal radiation would potentially cause second degree burns to a human with a
40 second exposure.
The effects of the two thresholds (1 psig over-pressure and 5 KW per m2) are considered
sufficiently equivalent from a safety perspective to compare directly.
Consequence Category is based on the flammable affect area, as follows:
Flammable Effect Area (m)
Consequence Category
> 464,515.2
46,451.5 464,515.2
4,645.2 46,451.5
464.5 4,645.2
< 464.5

Page 41
3.4 Toxic Consequence Details

Toxic consequences are determined based on the area affected by the release.
Toxic materials with a final gas phase are modeled using dispersion modeling software
based on a standard set of atmospheric and topographical conditions. Toxic materials
with a final liquid phase are modeled as a liquid pool with a release rate from the pool to
atmosphere estimated as the rate of evaporation from the pool.
Figure 3-3 summarizes the steps associated with calculating a toxic consequence.
Figure 3-3: Toxic Consequence Evaluation Decision Tree

Page 42

3.4.1 Calculating Toxic Gas Release Rate into the
Atmosphere
The following assumptions are made regarding the release rate of toxic gas:
Toxic gases include all regulated toxic substances that are gases at ambient temperature
(25C or 77F).
Meteorological conditions for the worst-case scenarios are defined as atmospheric
stability class F (stable atmosphere), wind speed of 1.5 meters per second (3.4 miles per
hour), and ambient temperature of 25C or 77F.
Topography is classified as urban since a plant generally contains many obstructions.
3.4.2 Calculating Toxic Liquid Release Rate into the

Atmosphere
The following assumptions are made regarding the release rate of toxic liquids into air:
The release rate to air for toxic liquids is the rate of evaporation from the pool formed by
the released liquid.
The total release quantity spills onto a flat, non-absorbing surface.
The total quantity spilled spreads instantaneously to a depth of 0.39 inch (one
centimeter) in an undiked area or to cover a diked area instantaneously.
At ambient temperature, the pool liquid then evaporates at a rate determined by the
following equation:
Qr = f ( , LFA, Qt )
where:
Qr = Liquid Mass Evaporation Rate
= Liquid Density
LFA = Liquid Factor Ambient

Qt = Total Liquid Mass Released
At temperatures sufficiently above ambient temperature, the following equation is used

to determine the evaporation rate:
Qr = f ( , LFB, Qt )
where:
Qr = Liquid Mass Evaporation Rate
= Liquid Density
LFB = Liquid Factor Boiling

Qt = Total Liquid Mass Released

Page 43

3.4.3 Estimating the Distance to Toxic Endpoint
Toxic endpoint is assumed to be the distance from the release where a serious injury from
exposure to a toxic substance in the air would occur. Determination of the appropriate toxic
endpoint depends on whether the gas or vapor is neutrally buoyant or dense. Reference
tables for both 10 minute and 60 minute releases provide consequence distances for both
neutrally buoyant and dense gases and vapors under urban (congested) conditions. Tables
for 10 minute releases are used if the duration of the release is 10 minutes or less; tables for
60 minute releases are used if the duration of the release is more than 10 minutes.
3.4.4 Determining the Consequence Category of a Toxic

Release
The toxic consequence category is determined by the area affected by the toxic event. Toxic
releases for both vapor and liquid releases are modeled as a dispersed elliptical cloud with a
toxic endpoint determined by a published toxic concentration threshold which will cause
serious injury upon exposure in the air.
The toxic affect area (TAA) can be converted into a consequence category by using the
following table:
Toxic Effect Area (m)
> 464,515.2
46,451.5 464,515.2
4,645.2 46,451.5
464.5 4,645.2
< 464.5

Page 44
3.5 Economic Impact Consequence Evaluation

3.5.1 Determining the Economic Impact
The economic impact of an RBI Component failure is the sum of:
-
Maintenance Cost Estimated cost of repairing the component to state of

safe operation
Lost Production Cost This is a calculated value based on:

o Product Unit Price This value is auto-populated from a reference table
based on the product code selected by the RBI Analyst.
o Amount of Downtime The estimated amount of time that the production
impact will last
o Product Throughput Rate Impacted - This indicates the throughput rate
that would be impacted because of equipment downtime (because of
shutdown or slowdown). This field is calculated as (Rated Capacity X %
Reduction of Rated Capacity/100)
For example, if a product has a product unit price of 5000SAR and the downtime caused by
a failure is 24 hours and the Product Throughput Rate Impacted is 5 metric tons per day and
the overall estimated then the calculated result would be (5000 X 24 X 5 = 600,000SAR)
The following ranking guidelines are recommended while Performing Economic Impact
Consequence Evaluation:
Description
Economic Impact
Catastrophic
> 10,000,000 SAR
Very Serious
1,000,000 10,000,000 SAR
Serious
100,000 1,000,000 SAR
Significant
10,000 100,000 SAR
Minor
< 10,000 SAR

Page 45
3.6 Environmental Consequence Evaluation

3.6.1 Determining the Environmental Impact
The environmental impact of failure is set by picking the definition of each consequence from
the picklists located in Meridium. These picklists are populated with the definitions and
consequence rankings from SABIC SHEM standards. They are as follows:
Environment
Release/Spillage
Environment
Release/Spillage
Environment
Release/Spillage
Environment
Release/Spillage
Environment
Release/Spillage
Environment
Off Spec
Discharge
Environment
Off Spec
Discharge
Environment
Off Spec
Discharge
Event with a potential release/spillage < then

10 MT of hazardous chemicals/substance
inside/outside the SABIC premises and/or
resulting in fatality to personnel inside/outside
the SABIC premises.
Event with a potential release/spillage
between 4 to 10 MT of hazardous
chemicals/substance inside/outside the SABIC
premises and/or resulting in injury to
personnel inside/outside the SABIC premises.
between 1 to 4 MT of hazardous
premises and not resulting in injury to
personnel outside the SABIC premises.
between < 1 MT of hazardous
premises and/or not resulting in injury to
personnel inside/outside the SABIC premises.
Event with no potential release/spillage of
hazardous chemicals/substance inside/outside
the SABIC premises.
Event that potentially results in off spec
discharge to sea water, canal, river, storm
water causing mortality to aquatic life or off
spec discharge causing failure of
public/central waste water treatment plant.
discharge of greater then 500% of local
regulations for sea water, canal, river, storm
water at the point of discharge from the
facility.
discharge of greater than local regulations for
sea water, canal, river, storm water at the
point of discharge from the facility.

Page 46

Environment
Off Spec
Discharge
Environment
Water
Contamination
Environment
Water
Contamination
Environment
Water
Contamination
Environment
Water
Contamination
Environment
Other
Environment
Other
Environment
Other
Environment
Other
Environment
Other
Environment
Other
Event that has no off spec discharge
Event that potentially results in contamination

of deep / potable water aquifer or
contamination requires remediation of greater
then 70 metric tons of contaminated soil .
of deep / potable water aquifer or
contamination requires remediation of 30 to
70 metric tons of contaminated soil.
of deep/potable water aquifer or
contamination requires remediation of less
than 30 metric tons of contaminated soil.
Event does not result in contamination of deep
/ potable water aquifer.
Event with a potential release of Nonhazardous chemicals/ substance inside/outside

the SABIC premises and release/spillage > 50
MT
Event with a potential release of NonHazardous Chemicals/ Substance (including
polymers, fertilizer etc) within or outside the
SABIC Divisions, Affiliates and Subsidiaries
premises and Release/spillage of 20-50 MT
Event with an potential emission from
vent/stack including dust (except steam) of
contaminants greater than the local
regulations or failure of Pollutant control
device.
Event that potentially results in 5 minutes of
cumulative smoky flaring within any two
hours during normal operations
All other events with a potential
release/spillage of non-hazardous
chemicals/substance <20 MT.
Event will not potentially result in a
release/spillage of non-hazardous chemicals /
substance.

Page 47
3.7 Exchanger Bundle Consequence Evaluation

3.7.1 Determining the Exchanger Bundle Consequence
The consequences for exchanger bundles are calculated differently due to the fact that there
are two processes at work (shell side and tube side). Depending on the effect of the two
processes mixing, the flammable, toxic, and product loss consequence will be evaluate.
3.7.2 Determining the Leak Rate

The initial leak size is modeled as being the same diameter as the nominal thickness of the
tube wall and increasing in a linear fashion over time depending on the corrosion rate entered
by the user. By using the corrosion rate for this calculation, the material of construction is
taken into account. For the leak rate calculation, an average leak rate value is used. The delta
pressure is calculated based on the operating pressure that has been entered for both the shell
side and tube side processes. With these values (and the fluid characteristics), the system can
calculate a leak rate over time. These leak rates can be then be classified as Major or Minor
depending the amount of product being leaked
Category
Flammable
Toxic
Major
Leak Rate > 45Kg/min
Leak Rate > 2.2Kg/min)
Minor
Leak Rate < 45Kg/min
Leak Rate < 2.2Kg/min)
3.7.3 Flammable Consequence Determination

If the leaking fluid is flammable then the user first selects what effect a tube leak will have on
the mixing of the products. There are three choices for the user to select:
Catastrophic (The leak could cause a catastrophic loss of containment or violent
chemical reaction)
Flammable HC (hydrocarbon) leak into a utility system
Utility leak into a HC system

Page 48
Flammable Consequence Category Table

If Flammable leak type
is:
and Leak Rate

Category is:
And final fluid

phase is:
Then Flammable
Consequence
Category is:
Leak could cause a

catastrophic loss of
containment or violent
chemical reaction
Major or Minor
Liquid or Gas
Major
Gas
Minor
Gas
Major
Liquid
Minor
Liquid
Major
Liquid or Gas
Minor
Liquid or Gas
Flammable HC leak into

a utility system
a utility system
a utility system
a utility system
Utility leak into a HC
system
Utility leak into a HC
system
3.7.4 Toxic Consequence Determination

If the leaking mixture is toxic then the leak type will have to be determined in a similar
fashion as the flammable consequence. The following choices are available:
Catastrophic (The leak could cause a catastrophic loss of containment or violent
chemical reaction)
Toxic leak into a utility system
Toxic leak into a process system
Leak into a toxic system

Page 49

Toxic Consequence Category Table
If Toxic leak type is:
and Leak Rate

Category is:
And final fluid

phase is:
Then Toxic
Consequence
Category is:
Leak could cause a

catastrophic loss of
containment or violent
chemical reaction
Major or Minor
Liquid or Gas
Major
Liquid or Gas
Minor
Liquid or Gas
Major
Liquid or Gas
Minor
Liquid or Gas
Major or Minor
Liquid or Gas
Toxic leak into a utility

system
Toxic leak into a utility
system
Toxic leak into a process
system
Toxic leak into a process
system
Leak into a toxic system
3.7.5 Product** Loss Consequence Determination

One of the unique issues concerning tube bundle leaks is the possibility of a small leak
occurring over a long period of time. For this reason an additional consequence is evaluated
due to the economic impact of this lost product. As stated above an average leak rate is
calculated by the system. It is also estimated that a leak starts at one half of the typical
inspection interval* and lasts until the next inspection when its then discovered. This
information coupled with a unit value price for the product can be used to determine an overall
product loss amount using the following formula:
Product Value Lost = Pv*Lr*Ld
Where:
Pv = Product value (SAR/Kg)
Lr = Average Leak Rate (Kg/min)
Ld = Leak Duration (Inspection interval / 2)
When the overall value of the lost product is determined then the category is assigned based
on the following table:
Description
Value of Lost Product
Catastrophic
> 10,000,000 SAR
Very Serious
1,000,000 10,000,000 SAR
Serious
100,000 1,000,000 SAR
Significant
10,000 100,000 SAR
Minor
< 10,000 SAR

Page 50
*Note Inspection Interval refers to an estimated time that the equipment would be normally
opened such as a re-occurring turnaround or cleaning cycle. This is an estimate, so there is
no need to change this value based on precise inspection intervals that are calculated.
**Product refers to whatever process fluid is currently contained within the piece of
equipment.

Page 51
3.8 Tank Bottom Consequence Evaluation

3.8.1 Determining the Tank Bottom Consequence
Tank bottom consequences will be evaluated depending on the type of foundation it is built on
and the effect of the product leaking out of the bottom. If a leak is allowed to go on for a long
period of time and it enters the ground then a significant expense can be incurred in cleaning
up the spill.
3.8.2 Foundation Type

The foundation type of the tank bottom has to be entered to determine the effect of a bottom
leak. If the foundation is an impervious type (such as a concrete, or double bottom), then the
leak will be modeled in much the same way as other components with regards to flammable
and toxic consequences. If the foundation is non-impervious then the leak will be absorbed by
the ground. The selection of foundation types are:
Double Floor
Concrete
Clay
Silt
Sand
Gravel
3.8.3 Determining the Leak Rate

The initial leak size is modeled as being the same diameter as the nominal thickness of the
bottom plate and increasing in a linear fashion over time depending on the corrosion rates
(both internal and underside) entered by the user. By using the corrosion rate for this
calculation, the material of construction is taken into account. For the leak rate calculation, an
average leak rate value is used.
3.8.4 Leak Effect

Depending on the environmental effects of the bottom leak (for a non-impervious foundation
type, a significant economic impact can be assumed. The duration of the leak is estimated as
one half of the typical inspection interval*. The following table shows the different Leak
Effects and their relative clean-up costs. These rates are based on USA estimated costs and
have been converted to KSA Riyals. Changing the values of these clean-up costs will not have
an overall effect on the consequences as they will still remain relative to each other.
Leak Effect
Ground
Public Surface Water
Underground Water Table
Clean-up Cost (SAR/m3)

65
130
650

Page 52

*Note Inspection Interval refers to an estimated time that the equipment would be normally
opened such as a re-occurring turnaround or cleaning cycle. This is an estimate, so there is
no need to change this value based on precise inspection intervals that are calculated.
3.8.5 Tank Bottom Consequence

After the total economic impact of the unit clean-up efforts are calculated, the tank bottom
consequence factor can be assigned based on the following table.
Environmental Clean up Cost
> 10,000,000 SAR
1,000,000 10,000,000 SAR
100,000 1,000,000 SAR
10,000 100,000 SAR
< 10,000 SAR

Page 53
3.9 Safety Consequence Evaluation

3.9.1 Determining Safety/Health Consequence
The Safety Consequence evaluation is intended for those safety consequences not covered in
the Flammable and Toxic consequence evaluations. Example of these type of consequences
would be things such as steam burns, physical injuries, hot water burnsetc.
The user manually selects the consequence definition based on the pick list found in the
SABIC SHEM standards. The following table shows the definitions and their corresponding
consequence categories.
Event potentially resulting in loss of life
Event potentially resulting in injury/illness that causes a lost workday
Event potentially resulting in injury/illness that requires medical treatment
Event potentially resulting in injury/illness that requires only first aid.
No safety/health impact

Page 54
Ch.4 - Risk Ranking
Chapter 4
Risk Ranking

Page 55
Ch.4 - Risk Ranking
4.1 Risk Ranking

4.1.1 Introduction
In the Meridium RBI Workflow being implemented at SABIC, Risk Ranking is
done on a 5 X 5 Matrix as shown in figure 4-1.
Inspection Priority is the number indicated in each cell of the Risk matrix and is
obtained by mapping the POF on the Y Axis and COF on the X Axis.
POF is categorized on a scale of 1-5 with 1 representing the Highest Likelihood of
failure and 5 the least
COF is categorized on a scale of A-E with A representing the most severe
Consequence of failure and E the least.
Based on the Inspection Priority obtained, Risk is ranked as either High, Medium
High, Medium or Low. The color legends corresponding to each Risk Rank have
been illustrated in the Table above.
4.1.2 Inspection Priority

As seen in the above Risk Matrix, Inspection Priority can have a value of 1-25.
Inspection Priority indicates the priority that should be given to the RBI
Component based on the Risk Assessment performed. Inspection Priority of 1
indicates the Highest Priority while 25 indicates the lowest.
Inspection Priority is obtained for each Degradation Mechanism evaluated. This
Inspection Priority for each Degradation Mechanism is obtained by mapping the
POF Category for that Degradation Mechanism and the Combined Consequence
on the Risk Matrix.
A Combined Inspection Priority is also obtained which represents the Inspection
priority after all Degradation Mechanisms have been considered and rolled up.
This is obtained by mapping the Combined POF Rolled Up Category and the
Combined Consequence on the Risk Matrix.

Page 56
Ch.4 - Risk Ranking
Risk = POF x COF
POF = Probability of Failure

COF = Consequence of Failure

1
11
16
13
20
17
14
23
21
18
15
10
25
24
22
19
12
E
D
C
B
A
Figure 4-1: RBI Risk Matrix
Risk Ranking
Inspection Priority
High
1-5
Medium High
6 - 12
Medium
13 - 19
Low
20 - 25

Page 57
Ch.4 - Risk Ranking

In the Risk Assessment illustrated in figure 4-2:
POF Category for Internal Corrosion is 2 and a Combined Consequence of
B which results in an Inspection Priority of 6 for Internal Corrosion.
POF Category for External Corrosion is 2 and a Combined Consequence
of B which results in an Inspection Priority of 6 for External Corrosion.
POF Category for Environmental Cracking is 4 and a Combined
Consequence of B which results in an Inspection Priority of 15 for
Environmental Cracking.
POF Category for Other Damage Mechanism is 2 and a Combined
Consequence of B which results in an Inspection Priority of 6 for Other
Damage Mechanism.
After all Degradation Mechanisms have been considered, the Probability
of Failure of 1 and a Combined Consequence of B results in an Inspection
Priority-Rolled Up of 2.
Figure 4-2: Sample Risk Assessment

Page 58
Ch.4 - Risk Ranking

4.1.3 Rolling up Consequence of Failure (COF)
A consequence Category is obtained for each type of Consequence (Flammable,
Toxic, Production Loss etc.) and then the worst case scenario is used as the
Consequence of Failure- Rolled Up.
4.1.4 Rolling up Probability of Failure (POF)

A POF Category is obtained for each Degradation Mechanism. The worst case is
taken is used as the Probability of Failure Rolled Up except when:
There are two or more Degradation Mechanisms that have the same POF
Category and that is the highest amongst all the Degradation Mechanisms
evaluated. In this case the Probability of Failure Rolled Up goes up by one (1)
rank. This upward adjustment cannot be made if the POF for the individual
Degradation Mechanisms is already the highest i.e. 1.
In the example above, there are three Degradation Mechanisms (Internal
Corrosion, External Corrosion and Other Damage Mechanism) that all have a
POF of 2. This results in a Probability of Failure Rolled up to 1.

Page 59
Ch.5 - Inspection Strategy Management
Chapter 5
Inspection Strategy
Management

Page 60
5.1 Strategy Management

Strategy Management involves using the Risk Assessment values and Strategy Rule Sets
to determine an Inspection Scope. Strategies Rule Sets have been developed for each
Degradation Mechanism that will be evaluated in an RBI Risk Assessment. These
strategies follow a logic tree that will determine what type of inspection scope is needed
for a specific Degradation Mechanism. For example, figure 5-1 depicts a portion of the
logic tree for Internal Corrosion of pressure vessels.
Environmental Cracking
Environmental Cracking
Inspection Priority
1-5
LC19
1st
Inspection?
6-12
LC191
LC20
1st
Inspection?
13-19
LC201
LC21
1st
Inspection?
20-22
LC211
LC22
1st
Inspection?
23-25
LC221
LC23
1st
Inspection?
LC231
Figure 5-1: Partial View of an Inspection Strategy Logic Tree
These logic trees have been entered as strategies within the Meridium software. After
performing a risk assessment for an RBI Component the strategies are executed and the
appropriate inspection scope is recommended based on the logic case that the decision
making process ended on (i.e. for the tree above if the inspection priority is a 3 and the
half life is less than 2 years then logic case (LC) 10 would be used to generate a
recommended inspection scope). For a detailed explanation of these strategies refer to the
SABIC_STRP4 RBI Strategy Management document.
Page 61
Chapter 6
RBI Workflow

Page 62
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
6.1 Integrated Evergreen RBI Workflow

As companies operate in todays competitive environment, owner operators are
continuously striving to improve process safety and environmental stewardship while
accomplishing their business objectives of operating in a cost effective manner.
While pursuing the above objectives one of the methodologies that has gained
widespread acceptance is Risk Based Inspection (RBI). API 580 is one of the first
RBI standards published that outlines the essential elements of an RBI program
specifically as it pertains to secondary failures or failures associated with loss of
containment and use of Inspection Activities to manage the risk associated with these
type of failures.
Some of the early adopters of RBI have successfully used the principles of RBI for
reducing risk while optimizing their inspection activities.
6.1.1 RBI High Level Workflow

The Meridium RBI Workflow that is illustrated in figure 6-1 has been developed to
address the following essential elements:
Evergreen RBI Process: As the equipment condition is changing and new
history is being obtained, RBI Assessment should be re-evaluated and
Inspection Plan Updated.
Integrated RBI Process: For an effective RBI program, the RBI Analysis
workflow is tightly integrated with the Inspection Management System as
well as the data coming from the Maintenance and Process Historian Systems.
Consistent RBI Process: In order to drive consistency in the RBI program the
RBI System Identification results provide valuable input and serve as the
starting point for the RBI Analysis Process performed at the RBI Component
Level.

Page 63
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow

The different blocks of the RBI Workflow have been detailed in the figures and
tables that follow. Each block is shown independently with a table that details the
specific sections of that block.
Figure 6-1: RBI High Level Workflow

Page 64
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
Block
ID
Block
Description
Purpose
RBI System
Identification &
Collecting and
Loading Design
and Process
Data
This is the upfront engineering work that is required before

beginning the RBI Analysis. Although only represented as
one block, this is the most important step of the RBI
Workflow. If done correctly, it will lay the foundation of an
evergreen RBI process. This involves performing a Corrosion
Study, where RBI System are identified, Potential
Degradation Mechanisms are assigned to the RBI System, and
RBI Components are identified for each RBI System. It also
involves collecting and capturing related Design and Process
Data at the RBI Component Level. This has been broken
down into different steps as indicated in the Section 3.
Risk
Assessment
Based on the Degradation Mechanisms identified in the Block

ID A above and the data gathered, a systematic evaluation is
performed on all of the degradation mechanisms and
consequences. These evaluations result in a Risk Ranking
associated with each Degradation Mechanism, as well as an
Overall Risk Ranking. This has been broken down into
different steps as indicated in the Section 4. As a part of this
process, other Historical Data (Maintenance Event History
and Process Excursions) is also reviewed and evaluated.
Developing
Inspection
Strategies
After the Risk Assessment Stage, the results of the Risk

Assessment are used by Strategy Rule Sets to get preliminary
RBI Recommendations that are then reviewed and reconciled
by an RBI Analyst to generate final Inspection Strategies.
Executing
Inspection
Strategies
The Inspection Strategies are then tracked in Inspection

Manager and when Inspections are due, they are performed in
the field and the results are documented in Inspection
Manager and/or Thickness Monitoring within Meridium.

Page 65
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
6.2 Block A RBI System Identification &

Collecting and Loading Design and Process Data
Figure 6-2 RBI High Level Workflow Block A

Page 66
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
Figure 6-3 RBI Workflow - Block A Detail

Page 67
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
Block
ID
Block
Description
Purpose
Involves taking a Process Unit and breaking it into RBI Systems
based on grouping of Equipment or Equipment Components that
are exposed to similar Corrosion Mechanism Environments.
A1
Define RBI
System
RBI System is defined by a team comprised of a Process

Engineer, Inspector, Inspection Engineers, Corrosion Engineer
and Operations Specialist. The team collectively examines the
process and divides a process unit into several RBI Systems.
As part of this step, a brief description is developed with regard
to System Description, Process Description and Corrosion
Mechanisms applicable for the RBI System.
A2
Assign CPPs
(Critical
Process
Parameters) for
the RBI System
defined in A1
A3
Assign Potential
Degradation
Mechanisms for
the RBI
Systems
Identifying CPPs for the RBI System forms the basis of defining
the Operating Window from a Reliability Standpoint. This also
involves identifying the Process Parameters that need to be
monitored and the associated thresholds.
Involves assigning the Potential Degradation Mechanisms

applicable for the RBI System under consideration. Meridium
provides a library of Potential Degradation Mechanisms; some
of which are evaluated based on quantitative algorithms built
into Meridium. Others are qualitative; the evaluation of which is
done outside Meridium or based on company agreed guidelines.

Page 68
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow

Block
ID
A4
Block
Description
Identify and
Assign RBI
Components for
Respective RBI
System
Purpose
Define RBI Components - Since different components of the
same Equipment may be subjected to different Degradation
Mechanism Environments, an RBI Analysis is performed at the
RBI Component level rather at an Equipment Level. This step
involves identifying the RBI Components for the various
Equipments. These RBI Components form the basis for
performing the RBI Analysis in Step B4. For example, typical
RBI Components for a Shell and Tube Exchanger could be
Exchanger Channel, Exchanger Shell and Tube Bundle.
Assign RBI Components to respective RBI System By assigning RBI Components to the RBI System, the Potential
Degradation Mechanisms and CPPs assigned to the RBI System
get passed down to the RBI Components that are a part of the
RBI System. The individual Potential Degradation Mechanisms
and CPPs can still be validated and modified at the RBI
Component level.
A4a
Capture Design
and Process
Data on RBI
Components
Additional Process and Design Data is captured for the RBI

Components created in Step A4 with the objective for creating a
repository of data that is used for RBI Analysis.
A4b
Review and
Validate
Potential
Degradation
Mechanisms
obtained from
RBI System
As there may be some specific considerations for part of the RBI

system, the PDMs obtained from the RBI System need to be
validated and modified (as necessary) at the RBI Component
level. These PDMs are systematically evaluated during the RBI
Analysis step.

Page 69
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow

Block
ID
A5
A6
Block
Description
Purpose
Create
Inspection
Profile Items
Involves setting up Inspection profile items that are conceptually

similar to setting up TMLs for UT Inspections (this step can
either be carried out when new Equipment is installed or during
the process of Documenting an Inspection Report). Just as TMLs
form the basis where Thickness Readings are captured during a
UT/RT Inspection, Inspection profile Items form the basis where
Inspection findings are captured during a Qualitative Inspection.
An Inspector/SME creates the items and sets up an Inspection
profile so that Inspections and related Findings can be
documented in a consistent manner.
Create TMLs
Create TML Groups and Define Technical Characteristics Since technical design data for each TML Group will be
different, TML Groups need to be defined for each equipment
and technical data needs to be captured for these TML Groups.
Some typical TML Groups for a Shell and Tube Exchanger
would be Channel Inlet Nozzle (N1), Channel Outlet Nozzle
(N2), Shell Inlet Nozzle (N3) and Shell Outlet Nozzle (N4),
Channel Head, Shell Head, Tubes, Tubesheet etc. Please note
that these TML Groups are different from the RBI Components
defined in A4.
Create TMLs for TML Groups - After the TML Groups have
been defined and TML Group data captured; TMLs are defined
for these TML Groups. Users also have an option of mapping
TML Groups to the RBI Components created in Step A4.

Page 70
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
6.3 Block B Risk Assessment
Figure 6-4 RBI High Level Workflow Block B

Page 71
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
Figure 6-5 RBI Workflow - Block B Detail

Page 72
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
Block
ID
Block Description
Purpose
Review/Analyze
Inspection Data
While performing RBI Analyses, an evaluation is

done on each Degradation Mechanism. During
these evaluations, Inspection History available for
that Equipment is reviewed and analyzed to
determine the Number of Inspections as well as the
Inspection Confidence Rating applicable for each
Degradation Mechanism being evaluated.
B2
Evaluate Captured
Excursion data
In addition to Inspection Data, it is also important

that Process Excursion Data is evaluated in order to
get a more realistic understanding of the extent of
degradation with regard to each Degradation
Mechanism.
B3
Review Corrosion
Analysis Data
A review of Corrosion Data is necessary for

evaluation of Internal Corrosion Degradation
Mechanism.
B1
B4
Risk Assessment
POF Evaluations are performed for each DM.

These evaluations result in a POF Ranking on a
scale of 1 -5 on the Risk Matrix for each DM.
COF Evaluations are performed for the associated
Consequences. The Consequence Evaluations result
in a COF Ranking on a scale of A-E on the Risk
Matrix for each Consequence Category.
An Overall Risk Ranking (POF X COF) on the RBI
Component is then obtained resulting in a Ranking
of High, Medium High, Medium or Low on the
Risk Matrix.

Page 73
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
6.4 Block C Developing Inspection Strategies
Figure 6-6 RBI High Level Workflow Block C

Page 74
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
Figure 6-7 RBI Workflow - Block C Detail

Page 75
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
Block
ID
Block Description
Purpose
Generate RBI Inspection Recommendations
RBI Recommendations are generated based on:
RBI Risk Assessment Results (B4) and Strategy Logic
configured in System RBI Strategy Rule Sets.
The output from this step is RBI Recommendations which
include Inspection Task, Plan and Scope. These RBI
Recommendations need to be evaluated and consolidated by
the RBI Analyst as outlined in the next step.
C1
Generating and
Consolidating RBI
Recommendations
C2
Task Management
Task Management has been broken down into steps C2a C2c.
Creation/Update of
Task
Inspection Tasks can originate from one of three sources:

o RBI Strategies.
o Traditional or Legacy Inspection Strategies: These would
apply to Equipment that has not yet been transitioned from
the traditional approach to the RBI Based Approach.
o Non RBI Inspection Tasks for Equipment that are not
covered under the RBI Scope (Cathodic Protection Systems,
ERPs, etc) but still need to be managed from an Inspection
Management Standpoint (based on Company Guidelines and
Policies).
C2a
Finalize RBI Strategies

The RBI Recommendations generated above are then
consolidated where the following options are available for each
RBI Recommendation:
o Can be used as such for an Inspection Strategy.
o Multiple Recommendations can be grouped and managed
through a single Inspection Strategy.
o Some RBI Recommendations can be cancelled after clearly
documenting the justification for this action.
An example illustrating these cases has been given in the RBI
Functional Specification Document.

Page 76
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow

Block
ID
Block Description
Purpose
The Inspector reviews the list of upcoming tasks with
Recommended Inspection Dates as calculated by the
System. The Inspector then aligns the Inspection Dates with
Turnarounds or other Events to determine the Scheduled
Inspection Dates based on Company guidelines and Policies.
C2b
Inspector reviews
and schedules Task
Implementation Related Details

Although there will be instances when the Scheduled
Inspection Dates are set past the Recommended Inspection
Dates, it is necessary that appropriate mechanisms are put in
place to minimize these occurrences. Thus, if the Scheduled
Inspection Date goes past the Recommended Next Inspection
Date, alerts will be provided and triggered to notify the
responsible person.
If SAP privileges are made available, the person in-charge has
an option of creating a SAP Notification automatically, for
performing the Inspection Task. If not, then an SAP
notification can be created manually, and then the SAP
Notification Number is entered manually in Meridium.
C2c
Inspector tracks
Scheduled
Inspection Task
The Inspector tracks Scheduled Inspection Tasks, reviews

existing Inspection Profile Items and TMLs and makes
modifications (as deemed appropriate) when ready to perform
the Inspection.

Page 77
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
6.5 Block D Executing Inspection Strategies
Figure 6-8 RBI High Level Workflow Block D

Page 78
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
Figure 6-9 RBI Workflow - Block D Detail
Block ID
Block Description
Purpose
D1
Perform Inspections
Based on Existing Inspection Schedules from C2 the

Inspector performs Inspections.
D2
Document
Qualitative
Inspections
This has been broken down in more detail as shown in

Block D2 - Documenting Qualitative Inspections (See
figure 5-10).
D3
Capture New
Thickness Readings
UT/RT Thickness Readings are documented in TM. As

New Thickness Readings are captured, new Corrosion
Rates are calculated and are made available for RBI
Analysis.
D4
Update Inspection
Schedules
The Inspection Task Last Date is reset based on Inspection

Completion Date and a new Next Inspection Date (NID) is
calculated by the System.
D5
Manage
Recommendations
This has been broken down in more detail in Block D5Manage Inspection Recommendations (See figure 5-11).

Page 79
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
Figure 6-10 RBI Workflow - Block D2 Detail

Page 80
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
Figure 6-11 RBI Workflow - Block D5 Detail

Page 81
Ch.6 - RBI Workflow
6.6 Overall RBI Workflow Diagram

Figure 6-12 depicts all of the separate RBI Workflow blocks as one integrated workflow.
Figure 6-12 Overall RBI Workflow

Page 82
Glossary
Glossary

Page 83
Glossary
Term/Acronym
Meaning
Absolute Risk
A risk value assigned to a piece of equipment without considering its

relationship to other equipment in the area
APM
Asset Performance Management.
Asset
The physical aspect of a plant item that is relevant to the mechanical

design, construction and maintenance of a process plant. Assets may
sometimes be referred to in general terms as equipment items.
COF
Consequence of Failure.
RBI System
RBI System is grouping of Equipment or Equipment Components that

are exposed to similar Corrosion Mechanism Environments.
Corrosion
Mechanisms
These are the mechanisms identified by the Corrosion Engineer during

the RBI System Identification Process. Examples are Amine
Corrosion, HCL Corrosion, Galvanic Corrosion etc.
CPP
Critical Process Parameters.
ERPs
Electrical Resistance Probes. Used for real time corrosion monitoring.
Inspection
Confidence
Rating
Confidence Rating applied to Inspection History based on

effectiveness of NDE Methods used for detecting a particular Damage
Type (i.e. internal degradation, external degradationetc).
Inspection Profile
Items
Inspection Profile Items are created to characterize the Equipment and

form the basis how the Equipment will be inspected and documented.
Inspection
Strategies
Inspection Strategies outline the Plan, Task and Scope.
NDE
Non Destructive Examination.
NID
Next Inspection Date.
Operating
Window
Aggregation of CPPs considered together comprises the Operating

Window for the specific Process. Any excursions outside the
Operating Window should be reviewed and evaluated for any
potential impacts on existing RBI Analysis and subsequently
Inspection Strategies.
Persistent Fluid
A fluid that will remain in a liquid form once it has been released
from a storage tank. This is used in Tank Bottom consequence
evaluations.
POF
Probability of Failure.
Potential
Degradation
These are the Potential Damage Types, they are indicative on how
Corrosion Mechanisms are evaluated as part of the RBI Analysis.

Page 84
Glossary
Term/Acronym
Meaning
Mechanisms
(PDM)
Examples are General Corrosion (Thinning), Localized Corrosion,

Pitting etc. These represent the Effects of Corrosion Mechanisms.
Recommended
Inspection Dates
Inspection Dates recommended by the System based on Strategy Rule

Sets and results of the RBI Assessment.
Relative Risk
A risk value that is assigned by comparing all of the equipment in a

similar manner to determine a risk value that is relative to the values
of other equipment in the area.
Risk Assessment
Overall Assessment of Risk based on POF and COF. Sometimes

referred to as an RBI Analysis
Risk Matrix
Risk Matrix used to depict Risk on a 5X5 Risk Matrix with POF
Rankings on one scale and COF on another scale.
RT TML
RT TMLs are those TMLs where Thickness Measurements are

obtained using the Radiography NDE method.
Scheduled
Inspection Dates
Inspection Dates Scheduled by the inspector based on other activities

like T/A Schedule.
Shell Side
A term referring to the process outside of the tubes of a shell and tube
heat exchanger.
System RBI
Strategy Rule
Sets
Rule Sets that are used to recommend Plan, Scope and Task based on
the Degradation Mechanism evaluated and associated Risk.
TMLs
Thickness Monitoring Locations.
Tube Side
A term referring to the process inside the tubes and channel of a shell
and tube heat exchanger. Also sometimes referred to as Channel Side.
UT TML
UT TMLs are those TMLs where Thickness Measurements are

obtained using the Ultrasonic NDE method.

Page 85
Appendices
Appendix A - Risk Matrix

1
11
16
13
20
17
14
23
21
18
15
10
25
24
22
19
12
E
D
C
B
A

Page 86
Appendices
Appendix B Simplified RBI Steps

Upfront
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Create RBI Systems

Engineering
and Data
Assign CPPs to RBI System
Gathering
Assign PDMs to RBI System
Identify and Create RBI Components
Assign RBI Components to RBI System
Validate PDMs and CPPs for RBI Components
Capture additional operating and design data for RBI
Components
8. Create inspection profiles (if needed)
9. Create TMLs (if needed)
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
Create RBI Analysis for RBI component

Perform Damage Mechanism Evaluations
Perform Consequence Evaluations
Generate RBI Recommendations
Review and reconcile RBI recommendations
Create inspection tasks
Execute inspection tasks
Document inspections
Go to step 10

Sustainable
RBI Process
Page 87
Appendices
Appendix C Representative Hole

Sizes per RBI Component Types
RBI Component
Equipment Type
Leak Size(Cm2)
Hole Diameter
(mm)
1" Pipe
1.5" Pipe
10" Pipe
12" Pipe
14" Pipe
16" Pipe
18" Pipe
2" Pipe
2.5" Pipe
20" Pipe
24" Pipe
3" Pipe
3/4" Pipe
30" Pipe
36" Pipe
4" Pipe
48" Pipe
6" Pipe
60" Pipe
8" Pipe
Column Bottom
Column Top
Filter
Fin/Fan Cooler
Heat Exchanger
Chan
Heat Exchanger
Shell
Pressure Vessel
Reactor
Storage Tank
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel
0.710
0.968
9.548
11.419
12.387
13.355
13.355
1.245
1.652
14.452
15.548
2.052
0.316
20.258
25.613
2.852
31.677
6.413
45.613
7.935
53.548
53.548
20.258
0.645
3.007
3.511
11.029
12.061
12.562
13.043
13.043
3.983
4.587
13.568
14.074
5.112
2.007
16.064
18.063
6.027
20.088
9.038
24.105
10.054
26.118
26.118
16.064
2.867
Pressure Vessel
38.323
22.095
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel
38.323
53.548
126.709
2027.093
22.095
26.118
40.176
160.695

Page 88
Appendices
Appendix D Structural Tmin Values

per RBI Component
RBI Component
Equipment Type
1" Pipe
1.5" Pipe
10" Pipe
12" Pipe
14" Pipe
16" Pipe
18" Pipe
2" Pipe
2.5" Pipe
20" Pipe
24" Pipe
3" Pipe
3/4" Pipe
30" Pipe
36" Pipe
4" Pipe
48" Pipe
6" Pipe
60" Pipe
8" Pipe
Column Bottom
Column Top
Filter
Fin/Fan Header
Heat Exchanger Tubes
Heat Exchanger Chan
Heat Exchanger Shell
Pressure Vessel
Reactor
Storage Tank
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Piping
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel
Pressure Vessel

Structural Tmin
(mm)
1.575
1.575
3.175
3.175
3.175
3.175
3.175
2.388
2.388
3.175
3.175
2.388
1.575
3.175
3.175
2.388
3.175
2.388
3.175
2.388
3.175
3.175
3.175
3.175
0.889
3.175
3.175
3.175
3.175
3.175
Page 89

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Table of Contents

Risk Based Inspection Methodology Training

Copyright Meridium, Inc. 2002-2011. All rights reserved.

Appendix A Risk Matrix Graphic

Appendix B Simplified RBI Steps

Appendix C Representative Hole Sizes per RBI Component

Appendix D Structural Tmin per RBI Component

Copyright Meridium, Inc. 2002-2011. All rights reserved.

General Edits based on client review

Changes to section 2.3, and added

Added Appendix C,D

General Review Edits per Client

General Review Edits after version

Copyright Meridium, Inc. 2002-2011. All rights reserved.

Ch.1 - Introduction to RBI

Copyright Meridium, Inc. 2002-2011. All rights reserved.

Ch.1 - Introduction to RBI

1.1 RBI Overview

80% of the risk is associated with

1.1.1 Goals of an RBI Program

1.1.2 RBI vs. Traditional Inspection Methodologies

Copyright Meridium, Inc. 2002-2011. All rights reserved.

Ch.1 - Introduction to RBI

1.1.4 RBI Benefits

1.1.5 Outcomes of the RBI Process

Copyright Meridium, Inc. 2002-2011. All rights reserved.

Ch.1 - Introduction to RBI

Copyright Meridium, Inc. 2002-2011. All rights reserved.

Ch.1 - Introduction to RBI

1.1.8 Industrial Applications of RBI

1.1.9 RBI Acceptance by Other Industries

1.1.10 U.S. Regulatory Acceptance

Copyright Meridium, Inc. 2002-2011. All rights reserved.

Ch.1 - Introduction to RBI

1.1.12 The Future of RBI

Copyright Meridium, Inc. 2002-2011. All rights reserved.

Ch.1 - Introduction to RBI

1.2 API 580 Risk Based Inspection

1.2.2 API RP Development Group

1.2.3 Regulatory Acceptance

Copyright Meridium, Inc. 2002-2011. All rights reserved.

Ch.1 - Introduction to RBI

1.2.5 API 580 - Topics Covered

Copyright Meridium, Inc. 2002-2011. All rights reserved.

Ch.1 - Introduction to RBI

1.2.7 API 580 Equipment Not Covered

Copyright Meridium, Inc. 2002-2011. All rights reserved.

Ch.1 - Introduction to RBI

1.3 API 581 RBI Base Resource Document

Copyright Meridium, Inc. 2002-2011. All rights reserved.

Ch.1 - Introduction to RBI

1.4 Risk Measurement

Inspection Priority Categories

Figure 1-2: RBI Risk Matrix

Probability is the combined probability of occurrence for all of

It is important to understand that RBI will not totally eliminate risk

Ch.1 - Introduction to RBI

Figure 1-3: RBI vs. Conventional Inspection program Risk

1.4.1 Relative vs. Absolute Risk

Ch.1 - Introduction to RBI

1.5 Risk Management

Phase One: Identify Specific Failure Modes or Deterioration

Phase Two: Assess Risk - The deterioration rate and equipment

Phase Four: Develop an Action Plan - An action plan is