ONG vs GENIO

FACTS:
> Ong (petitioner) filed a criminal complaint against
respondent Jose Casim Genio (respondent) for Robbery
which was dismissed by the City Prosecutor.
> However, DOJ in its resolution charged the respondent
with Robbery.
> RTC dismissed the case because the other elements of
the crime of Robbery, specifically the elements of intent to
gain, and either violence against or intimidation of any
person or force upon things, were not specifically alleged in
the Information filed against respondent.
> Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, claiming
that the RTC erred in relying on Section 6(a), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, since the said
provision relates to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and
it does not cover the determination of probable cause for
the filing of the Information against respondent but, was
denied.
> Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
before the CA but respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
petition since petitioner has no legal personality because
the authority to do so lies exclusively with the State as
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
> CA resolved in dismissing the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC erred in dismissing the
information on the ground for lack of probable cause when
it has previously concluded that the same information is
defective?

evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable

cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant
of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already
been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge
who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of
this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the complaint or information.
Pursuant to the aforementioned provision, the RTC judge,
upon the filing of an Information, has the following
options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or she
finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in
case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five
days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court
within thirty days from the filing of the information.
It bears stressing that the judge is required to
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause. This, the RTC judge
clearly complied with in this case.

PLACER vs VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
> Petitioners filed bulk of informations with the City Fiscal,
which was certified by the latter.
> Following receipt of said informations, respondent judge
issued an order of the hearing of said criminal cases for the
purpose of determining the propriety of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest. It required petitioners to
submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses
and other documentary evidence in support of the informations
to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the
findings of probable cause by petitioners.
> Petitioners filed two separate motions for reconsideration of
said orders, contending that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they
are authorized to determine the existence of a probable cause
in a preliminary examination/investigation, and that their
findings as to the existence thereof constitute sufficient basis
for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the court.
> Motions were denied.
> Petitioners filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus to
set aside the aforesaid orders and to compel respondent to
issue the warrants of arrest.
> They contend that the fiscal's certification in the information
of the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient
justification for the judge to issue a warrant of arrest; and that
such certification binds the judge, it being supported by the
presumption that the investigating fiscal had performed his
duties regularly and completely.
> Upon the other hand, respondent justifies his order as an
exercise of his judicial power to review the fiscal's findings of
probable cause. He further maintains that the failure of
petitioners to file the required affidavits destroys the
presumption of regularity in the performance of petitioners'
official duties.
ISSUE:

RULING:
NO. Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure clearly provides:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the
Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing
of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the

Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the

purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to
submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other
documentary evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation?

RULING:

PEOPLE vs INTING

YES. The primary requirement for the issuance of a

warrant of arrest is the existence of probable cause.

FACTS:

There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the
fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, But does such
certification bind the judge to come out with the warrant? We
answer this query in the negative. The issuance of a warrant
is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise
of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate.
The judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause before issuing , a warrant or order of arrest. If on the
face of the information the judge finds no probable cause,
he may disregard the fiscals certification and require the
submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable
cause.
The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of
affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses is to
enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the case
outright or to require further proceedings.
We hold that respondent did not abuse his discretion in doing
so. From the informations and affidavits presented to him, he
found the charges patently without basis or merit. For
respondent to issue the warrants of arrest and try the
accused would only expose the latter to unnecessary
harrassment, anxiety and expense. And as already pointed
out, under the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases,
the respondent judge has the power to order the outright
dismissal of the charge if, from the information and the
affidavits attached thereto, he finds the same to be patently
without basis or merit.

> Mrs. Barba filed a complaint against OIC-Mayor Regalado with

the COMELEC, for allegedly transferring her, a permanent
Nursing Attendant in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very
remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or
clearance from COMELEC as required by law.
> Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty. Lituanas,
Provincial Election Supervisor (1) to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the case; (2) to prepare and file the necessary
information in court;
> After a preliminary investigation, Atty. Lituanas found a prima
facie case. He filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case
for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code
against the OIC-Mayor.
> The respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the
accused OIC Mayor.
> Before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside
its order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to
determine probable cause.
> The court gave Atty. Lituanas 15 days from receipt to file
another information charging the same offense with the written
approval of the Provincial Fiscal. But he failed to comply with the
order, the trial court then quashed the information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted
by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses
have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal before the RTC
may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether
or not probable cause exists?
RULING:
NO. First, the determination of probable cause is a
function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or
Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the
Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does
not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the
determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to
follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the
Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the
report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any),
and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's
certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his
determination.

And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the

preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for
trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the
course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no
confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable
cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The
preliminary investigation proper-whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the
function of the Prosecutor.
This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC
Judges also lost the power to make a preliminary examination for
the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to
justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant).
Such a power indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a power
has been and remains vested in every judge by the provision in
the Bill of Rights securing the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence
of mere Court rule or statute to revoke. The distinction must,
therefore, be made clear while an RTC Judge may no longer
conduct preliminary investigations to ascertain whether
there is sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint
or information, he retains the authority, when such a pleading
is filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable
cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished
as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a
sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an
investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary
investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's
job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is
more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in
nature and is lodged with the judge. It is in this context that
we address the issue raised in the instant petition so as to
give meaning to the constitutional power vested in the
COMELEC regarding election offenses.
In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only
to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election
laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to
conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving
election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge
determine probable cause and for filing an information in
court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. Bearing these
principles in mind, it is apparant that the respondent trial court
misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the
information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

COJUANGCO vs SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
> A violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices was filed by the
Office of SolGen before the PCGG against the former
Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) and the
former members of the PCA Governing Board thereby giving
COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross
inexcusable negligence to the grave (sic) and prejudice of the
Filipino people and to the Republic of the Philippines.
> Court ruled that all proceedings in the preliminary investigation
conducted by the PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was
directed to transmit the complaints and records of the case to the
Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
> It was referred then to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for
review and if warranted, for the preparation of the criminal
information and affirmed the recommendation.
> Case was filed then to the Sandiganbayan and order of arrest
was issued.
> Petitioner filed an opposition for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest, petitioner alleged that since the only documents attached
to the Information and submitted to respondent Sandiganbayan
were the Resolution of the panel of investigators and the
Memorandum Office of the Special Prosecutor, same were not
adequate for the determination of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest by respondent Sandiganbayan; but was
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by
respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void?
RULING:
YES. The determination of probable cause by the
prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made
by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held
for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the
other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for
placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice.
Since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely
solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable
cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously
and understandably, the contents of the prosecutors report will
support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the
accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge

must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting

evidence, other than the prosecutors bare report, upon which to
legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence)
of a probable cause to issue an arrest order.

LIM vs FELIX

This responsibility of determining personally and independently

the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him
by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the
prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up
the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the
information and his bare resolution finding probable cause,
but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as
to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate
judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.

> Designated investigator filed an amended complaint with the

Municipal Trial Court accusing, among others, Vicente Lim,
Sr., Mayor Susana Lim, et. al. of the crime of multiple murder
and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.
> After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court
issued that a probable cause has been established for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the
amended complaint.
> The court ordered the arrest of the petitioners.
> Petitioners filed a motion requiring the transmittal of the
initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation
conducted by the Municipal Judge for the best enlightenment
of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the
existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well
as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the
mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall
issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been
personally convinced of such probable cause.
> Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit
the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest
against the accused including the petitioners herein.

Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the

case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and
examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial
courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every
case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of
an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must
have sufficient supporting documents (such as the
complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of
witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon
which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least,
upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause. He cannot rely solely and entirely
on the prosecutors recommendation, as Respondent Court did in
this case. Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to
personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants
of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his
bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report
of the investigating officer.
As alleged by petitioner, in the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan
had two pieces of documents to consider when it resolved to
issue the warrant of arrest against the accused: (1) the Resolution
of the Panel of Investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman
recommending the filing of the Information and (2) the
Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor denying the
existence of a prejudicial question which will warrant the
suspension of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan had nothing
more to support its resolution.
Similarly, we are now constrained to rule that herein respondent
court failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of personally
determining the existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of arrest. For the two cited documents were the product of
somebody elses determination, insufficient to support a finding of
probable cause by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, the warrant of
arrest issued by respondent court against herein petitioner is
palpably invalid.

FACTS:

ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest
without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification
and recommendation that a probable cause exists?
RULING:
NO. This is not a novel question. In the case of Placer
v. Villanueva, we ruled that a judge may rely upon the fiscal's
certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the
certification does not bind the judge to come out with the
warrant of arrest.
The judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face
of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission
of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause.

There is no problem with search warrants which are relatively

fewer and far between and where there is no duplication of
work between the Judge and the Prosecutor. The problem lies
with warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or highly
urban areas. If a Judge has to personally question each
complainant and witness or go over the records of the
Prosecutor's investigation page by page and word for word
before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for arrest
warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his
or her more important judicial functions.1
At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of
the 1987 Constitution which requires ". . . probable cause to
be personally determined by the judge . . .", not by any other
officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as
in this case where all the records of the investigation are in
Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable
cause. The determination is made by the Provincial
Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been
satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the
report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of
each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory
or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The
Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the
personal determination is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the
circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the
Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and
investigation report whenever necessary. He should call
for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer
the court's probing questions when the circumstances of
the case so require.
We reiterate that in making the required personal
determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on
the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The
extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of
each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion.
However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having
no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest.
Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave
error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's
certification and issued the questioned Order without
having before him any other basis for his personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause.

PANGANDAMAN vs CASAR
FACTS:
> Shooting incident occurred which left at least five persons dead
and two others wounded.
> Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent the widow of
one of the victims, filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial
Fiscal asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of the
incident.
> Criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed by P.C. Sgt.
Respondent Judge "examined personally all (three) witnesses
(brought by the sergeant) under oath thru. Thereafter the Judge
"approved the complaint and issued the corresponding warrant of
arrest" against the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by
the witnesses) and fifty (50) "John Does."
> An "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed seeking recall
of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of a "thorough
investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation
had been "hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching
questions" having been propounded. The respondent Judge
denied the motion for "lack of basis;"
> It would hardly have been possible for respondent Judge to
determine the existence of probable cause against sixty- four (64)
persons whose participations were of varying nature and degree
in a matter of hours and issue the warrant of arrest in the same
day;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge had the power to
issue the warrant of arrest without completing the entire
prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation. Stated
otherwise, is completion of the procedure laid down in Section 3
of Rule 112 a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest?
RULING:
YES. And although not specifically so declared, the
procedure mandated by the Rule actually consists of two phases
or stages.
The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency
of the complaint and the affidavits and other documents offered in
support thereof. And it ends with the determination by the Judge
either: (1) that there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, in
which case he dismisses the complaint and transmits the order of
dismissal, together with the records of the case, to the provincial
fiscal; or (2) that the complaint and the supporting documents
show sufficient cause to continue with the inquiry and this ushers
in the second phase.

This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of

the complaint, access to the complainant's evidence and an
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting
documents.
The procedure above described must be followed before the
complaint or information is filed in the Regional Trial Court. Failure
to do so will result in a denial of due process.
There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary
investigation must be completed before a warrant of arrest may
be issued. What the Rule provides is that no complaint or
information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court
may be filed without completing that procedure. But nowhere is it
provided that the procedure must be completed before a warrant
of arrest may issue. Indeed, it is the contrary that is true. The
present Section 6 of the same Rule 112 clearly authorizes the
municipal trial court to order the respondent's arrest even before
opening the second phase of the investigation if said court is
satisfied that a probable cause exists and there is a necessity to
place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice.
The argument, therefore, must be rejected that the respondent
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant
of arrest against petitioners without first completing the
preliminary investigation in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. The rule is and has always been that such issuance
need only await a finding of probable cause, not the completion of
the entire procedure of preliminary investigation.
Also without appreciable merit is petitioners' other argument that
there was scarcely time to determine probable cause against
sixty-four persons (the fourteen petitioners and fifty "Does") within
a matter of hours on a Saturday when municipal trial courts are
open only from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. That argument founders
upon the respondent Judge's positive affirmations that he had
personally and closely examined under oath the three witnesses
to the complaint and that he had issued the warrant of arrest
"believing that the offense thus filed had been committed."
Nothing in the record before this Court belies or discredits those
affirmations which have, besides, the benefit of the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. The
contention that the witnesses to the complaint had merely sworn
before the respondent Judge to statements prepared

beforehand and submitted by a military investigator must, in

view of the foregoing considerations and for lack of any
support in the record, be dismissed as mere speculation.

PEOPLE vs CA
FACTS:
> Rosalinda Dy, according to the petition, was shot at
pointblank range by private respondent Jonathan Cerbo in the
presence and at the office of his father, private respondent
Billy Cerbo.
> Eyewitness Elsa B. Gumban executed an affidavit positively
identifying private respondent Jonathan Cerbo as the
assailant.
> Municipal Circuit Trial Court, after a preliminary
investigation, found sufficient ground to engender a wellfounded belief that the crime of murder has been committed
by private respondent Jonathan Cerbo.
> Also charging private respondent Billy Cerbo of conspiracy
in the killing which he subsequently denied.
> Prosecution filed an amended information including Billy
Cerbo in the murder case. A warrant for his arrest was later
issued.
> Private respondent Billy Cerbo then filed a motion to quash
warrant of arrest arguing that the same was issued without
probable cause.
> Respondent Judge issued the first assailed order dismissing
the case against Billy Cerbo and recalling the warrant for his
arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is propriety of the trial courts
dismissal, for want of evidence, of the Information for murder
against Private Respondent Billy Cerbo?

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the

existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest,
must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted,
there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this
stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to
review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such
evidence in determining probable cause.
Verily, a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of
arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for
doing so. Corollary to this principle, the judge should not
override the public prosecutors determination of probable
cause to hold an accused for trial, on the ground that the
evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest
warrant insufficient, as in the present case.

HO vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
> The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman a complaint against Doris Teresa Ho, et al. The
complaint was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act
3019 prohibiting a public officer from entering into any contract or
transaction on behalf of the government if it is manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
> However, after a review, Special Prosecution Officer
recommended that both Rolando Narciso and Doris Teresa Ho be
charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.
> Sandiganbayan issued the now questioned warrant of arrest
against Petitioners. Petitioner Ho initially questioned the issuance
thereof in an Urgent Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest/Motion for
Reconsideration. They alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in
determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant for
their arrest, merely relied on the information and the resolution
attached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without other
supporting evidence, but Sandiganbayan denied said motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge may determine probable
cause and issue warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the
resolution of the prosecutor (in the instant case, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) who conducted
the preliminary investigation, without having before him any of
the evidence (such as complainants affidavit, respondents
counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been
submitted at the preliminary investigation?
RULING:

RULING:
NO. The trial court erred in dismissing the Information
filed against the private respondent.
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor. It is an executive function, the correctness of the
exercise of which is a matter that the trial court itself does not
and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial
must be distinguished from the determination of probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is judicial function.

NO. The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:

no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of

arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause,

he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
The determination of probable cause is a function of the
Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the
Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge
alone makes this determination.
The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind
the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of
probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the
Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutors certification
of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits the
transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting
documents behind the Prosecutors certification which are material
in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
In the instant case, the public respondent relied fully and
completely upon the resolution of the graft investigation officer
and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor, attached to the
information filed before it, and its conjecture that the Ombudsman
would not have approved their recommendation without
supporting evidence. It had no other documents from either the
complainant (the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines) or the
People from which to sustain its own conclusion that probable
cause exists. Clearly and ineluctably, Respondent Courts findings
of the conduct of a due and proper preliminary investigation and
the approval by proper officials clothed with statutory authority are
not equivalent to the independent and personal responsibility
required by the Constitution and settled jurisprudence. At least
some of the documentary evidence mentioned (Contract of
Affreightment between National Steel Corporation and National
Marine Corporation, the COA-NSC audit report, and counteraffidavits of Rolando Narciso and NMC officials), upon which the
investigating officials of the Ombudsman reportedly ascertained
the existence of probable cause, should have been physically
present before the public respondent for its examination, to
enable it to determine on its own whether there is substantial
evidence to support the finding of probable cause. But it
stubbornly stood pat on its position that it had essentially
complied with its responsibility. Indisputably, however, the
procedure it undertook contravenes the Constitution and settled
jurisprudence. Respondent Court palpably committed grave
abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of
arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and
recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of
probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings
and recommendation.

OKABE vs GUTIERREZ
FACTS:
> Maruyama executed a fifteen-page affidavit-complaint and
filed the same with the Office of the City Prosecutor, charging
Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, with
estafa. Petitioner, who was engaged in the business of "doorto-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged
that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon.
> Information against the petitioner was filed in the RTC.
> Trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner
with a recommended bond; the petitioner posted a personal
bail bond.
> Trial court issued an Order setting the petitioners
arraignment and pre-trial; the private prosecutor filed an
urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure
order petitioner will soon exit Japan and enter the
Philippines to precisely attend a wedding.
> Petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold
Departure Order and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan
for her children.
> The court found probable cause for the petitioners arrest.
Since the petitioners motion for a determination of probable
cause was made after the court had already found probable
cause and issued a warrant for the petitioners arrest, and
after the latter filed a personal bail bond for her provisional
liberty, such motion was a mere surplusage;
> The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a plea
for a writ of preliminary injunction. CA partially granted insofar
as the denial of petitioners Motion to Lift/Recall Hold
Departure Order.
> Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari for the
reversal of the decision and resolution of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge committed a
grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the warrant of arrest?

RULING:
YES. If the judge is able to determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause on the basis of the records

submitted by the investigating prosecutor, there would no

longer be a need to order the elevation of the rest of the
records of the case. However, if the judge finds the records
and/or evidence submitted by the investigating prosecutor to
be insufficient, he may order the dismissal of the case, or
direct the investigating prosecutor either to submit more
evidence or to submit the entire records of the preliminary
investigation, to enable him to discharge his duty. The judge
may even call the complainant and his witness to themselves
answer the courts probing questions to determine the
existence of probable cause.
In this case, the investigating prosecutor submitted to the
respondent judge only his resolution after his preliminary
investigation of the case and the affidavit-complaint of the
private complainant, and failed to include the affidavits of the
witnesses of the private complainant, and the latters reply
affidavit, the counter-affidavit of the petitioner, as well as the
evidence adduced by the private complainant as required by
case law, and now by Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. The aforecited affidavits, more
specifically the fax message of Lorna Tanghal and the
document signed by her covering the amount of US$1,000,
are of vital importance, as they would enable the respondent
judge to properly determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause.
In sum, then, we find and so declare that the respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause for the
petitioners arrest in the absence of copies of the affidavits of
the witnesses of the private complainant and her reply
affidavit, the counter-affidavit of the petitioner, and the
evidence adduced during the preliminary investigation before
the investigating prosecutor.

AAA vs CARBONELL
FACTS:
> A complaint of rape was raised by the petitioner against Arzadon
and the investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding that a
prima facie case of rape exists and recommending the filing of the
information.
> An information was filed before the RTC.
> Arzadon appealed the Resolution then Acting Secretary of
Justice Merceditas Gutierrez found no probable cause and
directed the withdrawal of the Information in Criminal Case.
> Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner, however,
Secretary of Justice issued another Resolution finding that
probable cause exists. Thus, a new Information for rape was filed
against Arzadon.
> Arzadon filed an Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest.
Respondent Judge Carbonell granted the motion and directed
petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand.
> Instead of taking the witness stand, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration claiming that the documentary evidence
sufficiently established the existence of probable cause.
> Respondent Judge Carbonell issued the assailed Order
dismissing Criminal Case for lack of probable cause. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge Carbonell acted
with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case of rape
for lack of probable cause?
RULING:
YES. In the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar, the
Court explained that this constitutional provision does not
mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally
evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses.
We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon,
where we held that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges
merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an
accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a
probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.

True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for
the judges personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal
examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an
utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable
cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the
investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the
documentary evidence in support thereof.
Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the
part of the judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of
the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez, we stressed
that the judge should consider not only the report of the
investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the
documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the
accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if
any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon
the filing of the Information. If the report, taken together with the
supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable
cause, it is not compulsory that a personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses be conducted.

After a careful examination of the records, we find that there is

sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. The gravamen
of rape is the carnal knowledge by the accused of the private
complainant under any of the circumstances provided in Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Petitioner has
categorically stated that Arzadon raped her, recounting her
ordeal in detail during the preliminary investigations. Taken
with the other evidence presented before the investigating
prosecutors, such is sufficient for purposes of establishing
probable cause. It is well-settled that a finding of probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
beyond reasonable doubt. Probable cause is that which
engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial. It does not require that the
evidence would justify conviction.
It is clear therefore that respondent Judge Carbonell gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing Criminal Case for lack of
probable cause on the ground that petitioner and her
witnesses failed to take the witness stand. Considering there
is ample evidence and sufficient basis on record to support a
finding of probable cause, it was unnecessary for him to take
the further step of examining the petitioner and her witnesses.
Moreover, he erred in holding that petitioners absences in the
scheduled hearings were indicative of a lack of interest in
prosecuting the case. In fact, the records show that she has

relentlessly pursued the same.

TABUJARA III vs PEOPLE

FACTS:
> Respondent Daisy Dadivas-Afable simultaneously filed two
criminal complaints against petitioners for Grave Coercion and
Trespass to Dwelling.
> Petitioners filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit.
> Petitioners denied the allegations against them. They argued
that they went to the house of respondent to thresh out
matters regarding some missing pieces of jewelry.
Respondent was a former employee of Miladay Jewels, Inc., a
company owned by the Dayrits and who was then being
administratively investigated in connection with missing
jewelries. Despite several summons to appear, respondent
went on AWOL.
> MTC dismissed the complaints for lack of probable cause.
> Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. MTC
reversed his earlier findings of lack of probable cause. This
time, he found probable cause to hold petitioners for trial and
to issue warrants of arrest.
> Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that
the alleged affidavit of Mauro V. de Lara on which the court a
quo based its findings of probable cause was hearsay
because it was not sworn before the Judge; did not personally
appear before the investigating judge during preliminary
investigation.
> Petitioners moved for clarificatory hearings. However, before
the court a quo could render a resolution based on said
clarificatory hearings, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
before the Regional Trial Court with prayer for issuance of
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners argued that the court a quo gravely abused its
discretion in issuing said Orders finding probable cause and
ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest based solely on the
unsworn statement
> RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition for
annulment Orders of the Municipal Trial Court.
> Petitioners filed a Petition for Review before the Court of
Appeals asserting that the court a quo acted with grave abuse
of discretion in basing its findings of probable cause and
ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest solely on the
unsworn statement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in the
issuance of warrant of arrest based solely on the unsworn

statements of the witnesses?

RULING:
YES. Clearly, Judge Adriatico gravely abused his
discretion in issuing Orders finding probable cause to hold
petitioners liable for trial and to issue warrants of arrest
because it was based solely on the statement of witness
Mauro De Lara whom Judge Adriatico did not personally
examine in writing and under oath; neither did he propound
searching questions. He merely stated in the assailed Order
that he overlooked the said statement of De Lara;
nevertheless, without conducting a personal examination on
said witness or propounding searching questions, Judge
Adriatico still found De Laras allegations sufficient to establish
probable cause. Plainly, this falls short of the requirements
imposed by no less than the Constitution.
When the investigating judge relied solely on the affidavit of
witness De Lara which was not sworn to before him and whom
he failed to examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, he deprived petitioners of the opportunity to test the
veracity of the allegations contained therein. Worse,
petitioners arguments that De Laras affidavit was hearsay was
disregarded by the investigating judge despite the fact that the
allegations therein were completely rebutted by petitioners and
their witnesses affidavits, all of whom appeared before and
were personally examined by the investigating judge.
The procedure described in Section 6 of Rule 112 is
mandatory because failure to follow the same would
amount to a denial of due process. With respect to the
issuance by inferior courts of warrants of arrest, it is necessary
that the judge be satisfied that probable cause exists: 1)
through an examination under oath and in writing of the
complainant and his witnesses; which examination should be
2) in the form of searching questions and answers. This rule is
not merely a procedural but a substantive rule because it gives
flesh to two of the most sacrosanct guarantees found in the
fundamental law: the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the due process requirement.
The issuance of warrants of arrest is not mandatory. The
investigating judge must find that there is a necessity of
placing the petitioners herein under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Perusal of the records
shows no necessity for the immediate issuance of warrants of
arrest. Petitioners are not flight risk and have no prior criminal
records.

GUTIERREZ vs HERNANDEZ
FACTS:
> Joint complaint-affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) by complainants P/Supt. Alejandro
Gutierrez, et. al. against then (now retired) Judge Godofredo
G. Hernandez, charging the latter with: Gross ignorance of the
law; Impropriety; Grave misconduct; Conduct unbecoming of a
judge; and, Lack of integrity to continue as a member of the
judiciary.
> A complaint involving Cruz's minor daughter who was
allegedly recruited to work in a KTV bar.
> CIDD officers and agents, conducted a rescue operation
accompanied by Ernesto Cruz, Gus Abelgas and other ABSCBN TV crew members who took footage of the operation.
> As a result of the rescue operation, a complaint for violation
of Republic Act (RA) 9208 in relation to RA 7610 was
subsequently filed before the City Prosecutor's Office against
PO2 Ringor.
> Complainants were surprised to discover that cases for
grave coercion and qualified trespass to dwelling had been
filed against them, Gus Abelgas and Ernesto Cruz in the MTC,
before the sala of the respondent judge.
> It was in connection with said charges, that the instant
administrative complaint arose. In their joint complaintaffidavit, complainants sought to hold the respondent judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law in issuing warrants of
arrest in inordinate haste, forgoing the mandatory conduct of
preliminary examination and personal determination of
probable cause.
> Respondent judge denies the accusations against him and
dismisses the same as pure harassment calculated to cast
doubt on his character and integrity as a retiring judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge follow proper
procedure in the issuance of the arrest warrants?
RULING:
NO. It is apparent from the facts on record that the
complainants were never issued any subpoena to accord them
the opportunity to file their counter-affidavits to adduce
evidence controverting those alleged in the criminal
complaints against them before the respondent judge issued

the warrants of arrest. Moreover, the warrants of arrest were

issued without complying with the requisite conditions therefor.
Indubitably, there was no preliminary investigation conducted
as required by the rules since no subpoena was issued to
herein complainants for them to file counter-affidavits.
Furthermore, the inordinate haste attending the issuance
of the warrants of arrest against complainants, Ernesto
Cruz, and Gus Abelgas belies the conduct of preliminary
examination and personal determination of probable cause, in
contravention of the provisions of the Rules of Court, and
constituting a denial of due process.
From the foregoing provision, there are three (3) conditions
that must concur for the issuance of the warrant of arrest
by the municipal judge during a preliminary investigation.
The investigating judge must:
1. Have examined in writing and under oath the
complainant and his witnesses by searching questions
and answers;
2. Be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and
3. That there is a need to place the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.
The issuance of the warrants of arrest in this case was clearly
irregular since, not only did it lack a preliminary investigation,
but the order granting such issuance did not show any finding
of a need to place complainants under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Even if the judge finds probable cause, it is not
mandatory for him to issue a warrant of arrest. He must
further determine the necessity of placing the respondent
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice. It is improper for a municipal judge to issue a
warrant of arrest without any finding that it was necessary to
place the accused in immediate custody to prevent frustration
of the ends of justice.
The procedure described in Section 6(b) of Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court is mandatory and failure to follow the same
would amount to a denial of due process.

PEOPLE vs LUMAYOK
FACTS:
> Accused-appelant herein Lucio Lumayok, was charged with
the crime of Rape with Murder.
> After said accused entered a plea of not guilty, the case
proceeded to trial. Trial court rendered its decision finding the
accused guilty as charged with supreme penalty of death.
> The present case is an appeal by way of automatic review.
> Discounting the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the
trial court, the appealed judgment would now rest only on the
purported confession of the accused taken from him while he
was under custodial investigation by the police authorities.

Considering the non-observance of the requisites above

prescribed and the impairment of the basic rights of the

herein accused-appellanr, his

constitute inadmissible evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the
investigation was proper?

counsel and that any statement he might make could be

used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient means-by telephone if
possible- or by letter of messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed
by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived
but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. any statement obtained in violation of
the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

arrest and the custodial

RULING:
NO. It is true that the accused denied having committed
the crime when he was interviewed by Patrolman Arabo and Rojo
when he was brought to the Police station. While the accused
confessed to Patrolman Andres Bajao about his having raped and
killed Gloria Bemos, such a confession is inadmissible because
the accused was not only tricked into making the confession but
also the accused was not informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent, not to testify aginst himself and to be assisted by
counsel.
Patrolman Andres Bajao, testifying for the prosecution declared
that during the investigation of Lucio Lumayok conducted by
Patrolman Rojo and Arabo, no member of the family of the said
accused nor any lawyer was present and the accused was not
apprised that his statements may be used against him or of his
right to remain silent and to have a lawyer.
Court reiterated the correct procedures for peace officers to
follow when making arrest and in conducting a custodial
investigation.
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, ... . He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to

alleged

confession

But what most strongly militates against acceptance of the

alleged confession, is the fact that the same was obtained
from the accused by means of torture and threats.
That Lucio Lumayok was maltreated and intimidated while
under detention and confinement in the municipal jail in order
that he would confess to the crimes imputed to him is easily
believable. Even the trial court in its decision made mention
that the private parts of the appellant had been indeed burned.
When the threat or promise was made by, or in the
presence of, a person in authority, who has, or is
supposed by the accused to have power or authority to
fulfill the threat or promise, the confession of the accused
will be presumed inadmissible. A confession made under
the influence of threat or promise of reward or leniency is
inadmissible.
To close, in the absence therefore of any evidence, direct or
circumstantial, satisfactorily establishing the guilt of the herein
accused and considering that his involuntary confessions or
admissions can be attributed to the violence, torture and
lingering threats inflicted on him and as the recitals in the
supposed admissions, tainted with dubiousness are attached
to a weak and improbable motivation, We conclude that the
guilt of the herein accused has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE vs ALBIOR
FACTS:
> Accused-appellant Francisco Albior was among those
charged for robbery and the gruesome rape and slaying of a
young nurse in her own bedroom.
> Upon arraignment, accused-appellant Albior, together with
accused Manalangsang and Vasquez pleaded "not guilty" to
the charge. Accused John Doe alias "Jun" and Peter Doe alias
"Bernardo" remained at large. Subsequently, accused
Manalangsang withdrew his plea of "not guilty" and changed it
to "guilty" and he was correspondingly sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
> After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment finding
accused-appellant Albior guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with homicide with rape and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
> Thus, only accused-appellant Albior interposed an appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in admitting
prosections evidence which were obtained in violation of the
accuseds constitutional rights?
RULING:
YES. The lack of assistance of counsel in Albior's
waiver of his right to counsel is evident from the testimony of
the investigating officer. Though the accused is willing to give
a voluntary statement without assistance of a counsel
constitutional guarantee that the right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel.
For his defense, accused-appellant Albior testified that at the
time of the commission of the crime, he was at the house of
his cousin in Baesa, Quezon City and that he had nothing to
do with the crime. He said that he did not understand Tagalog,
the dialect in which the extra-judicial confession was written,
being a Cebuano, and that he only signed it because he was
told that if he did he would be released.
It must also be noted that although Albior hardly speaks
Tagalog, Cebuano being his native dialect, the sworn

statement is in Tagalog. It does not suffice that an interpreter,

an agent of the CIS, was present during the interrogation (as
stated in the sworn statement) because by virtue of its being
written in Tagalog, Albior was deprived of the opportunity to
comprehend through his own reading what he was signing.
Finally, the testimony of Albior that he agreed to sign the
sworn statement because he was promised that he would
be released adds to the conclusion that he did not
understand what he was signing. No reasonable person
would believe the promise that he would be released if he
knows that he had just signed a statement admitting his
participation in the commission of a very serious offense.
In view of the foregoing defects, the Court is constrained to
hold Albior's sworn statement inadmissible in evidence.
That accused-appellant Albior conspired with Bernard Reyes,
Carlos Manalangsang and "Jun" to commit the robbery has
not been established either. The extrajudicial confessions of
Manalangsang and Vasquez, the only evidence remaining
against Albior with the rejection of his sworn statement, are
contradictory as to whether or not Albior was actually part of
the conspiracy. While Manalangsang claims that the plan
included Albior and "Jun" as look-outs, he categorically stated
that Reyes and himself had no other companions when they
perpetrated the robbery. On the other hand, Vasquez, whose
information was undoubtedly hearsay, said that Albior and
"Jun" were with Reyes and Manalangsang, but stated that
Reyes and Manalangsang narrated during a drinking spree
that only they were involved. Without a doubt, no conviction
can be had on the basis of these contradictory statements.

PEOPLE vs HUANG ZHEN HUA

FACTS:
> Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against
Crime (PARAC) received word from their confidential informant
that Peter Chan and Henry Lao, and appellants Jogy Lee and
Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking.
> PARAC secured Search Warrant No. 96-801 for violation of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms
and explosives) and Search Warrant No. 96-802, for violation of
Sections 12, 14 and 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425.
> Policemen found two kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
popularly known as shabu, paraphernalia for its production, and
machines and tools apparently used for the production of fake
credit cards.
> The policemen brought the appellants to the PARAC
headquarters. The following articles were found and confiscated
by the policemen in the condominium unit.
> Appellant Jogy Lee denied the charge. The policemen placed
two plastic bags on the bed before they searched the masters
bedroom.
> Pangan (chief security of the subdivision) testified that he and
the policemen knocked on the door to the condominium unit but
that no one responded. He shouted, Sir Henry, referring to Lao,
but there was no response from inside the condominium. After
about three (3) to five (5) minutes, a policeman kicked the door
open and they entered the house.
> After trial, the court rendered judgment convicting both
appellants of the crime charged.
ISSUE:

Clearly, the requirement of proof of guilt beyond reasonable

doubt has not been met. Thus, although the Court condemns
in the strongest possible terms the brutal and shocking rape
and slaying of Dana May Garces, given the attendant
circumstances, it finds itself with no other recourse but to
apply the law and to acquit Francisco Albior of the crime
charged.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused-appellant
Francisco Albior is hereby ACQUITTED.

Whether or not the search made by breaking into the

premise was valid?
RULING:
YES. We agree with the contention of the appellant that
the constitutional proscription against unreasonable search and
seizure applies to Filipino citizens, as well as to aliens temporarily
residing in the country. The rule against unreasonable search and
seizure forbids every search that is unreasonable; it protects all
those suspected or known to be offenders, as well as the
innocent. The guarantee is as important and imperative as the
guarantee of the other fundamental rights of the citizens.
Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The

officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after
giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any
outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or
anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any
person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
The police officers were obliged to give the appellant notice, show
to her their authority, and demand that they be allowed entry.
They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a
house to execute the search warrant if, after such notice and
demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of directed
search. This is known as the knock and announce principle which
is embodied in Anglo-American Law. The method of entry of an
officer into a dwelling and the presence or absence of such notice
are as important considerations in assessing whether subsequent
entry to search and/or arrest is constitutionally reasonable. In
Gouled v. The United States, it was held that a lawful entry is the
indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search would
violate the Constitution if the entry were illegal, whether
accomplished by force, by illegal threat or mere show of force.
Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible
when (a) a party whose premises or is entitled to the possession
thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; (b) when such person
in the premises already knew of the identity of the officers and of
their authority and persons; (c) when the officers are justified in
the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and
(d) when those in the premises, aware of the presence of
someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock
at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the
officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is
being attempted. Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy
evidence or dispose of evidence. However, the exceptions above
are not exclusive or conclusive. At times, without the benefit of
hindsight and ordinarily on the spur of the moment, the officer
must decide whether or not to make an unannounced intrusion
into the premises. Although a search and seizure of a dwelling
might be constitutionally defective, if the police officers entry was
without prior announcement, law enforcement interest may also
establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry. Indeed,
there is no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each
case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. In
determining the lawfulness of an unallowed entry and the
existence of probable cause, the courts are concerned only with
what the officers had reason to believe and the time of the entry
In this case, we rule that the policemen complied with Section 7,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure before
entering the condominium unit. Appellant Lee admitted, when she
testified, that the police officers were accompanied by Chuang, a
Cantonese interpreter, who informed her that his companions
were police officers and had a search warrant for the premises,

and also explained to her that the officers were going to search
the condominium unit. The appellant was sufficiently aware of the
authority of the policemen, who wore PARAC uniforms, to conduct
the search and their purpose. Moreover, Anciro, Jr. told the
appellant, in English, to bring some clothes with her as she was to
be brought to the police headquarters. Without such request
being interpreted to the appellant, the latter did as she was
directed and took some clothes from the cabinet atop the
headboard.
The evidence on record shows that the police officers knocked on
the outer door before entering the condominium unit, and after a
while, the appellant opened the door and allowed the policemen
and Pangan to enter.
The appellant failed to prove that the policemen broke open the
door to gain entry into the condominium unit. She could have
asked the court for an ocular inspection to show the door which
was allegedly broken into by the policemen, or at least adduce in
evidence pictures showing the said breakage. The appellant failed
to do so. The testimony of the appellant is even belied by Pangan,
who was a witness for the appellant, who certified, along with
three other security guards, that nothing was destroyed and that
the search was conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner.

PEOPLE vs BURGOS
FACTS:
Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused
Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with
the use of firearm against his life, if he refused. Pursuant to
this information, PC-INP members went to the house of the
Burgos and saw him plowing his field when they arrived. One
of the arresting offices called Burgos and asked him about the
firearm. At first, Burgos denied having any firearm, but later,
Burgos's wife pointed to a place below their house where a
gun was buried in the ground.
After recovery of said firearm, Burgos pointed to a stock pile
of cogon where the officers recovered alleged subversive
documents. Burgos further admitted that the firearm was
issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, team leader of sparrow unit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest valid? Is the
warrantless search valid?
RULING:
NO. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer
arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is
about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of
that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence
or within his view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case.
Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers,
it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar
Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the wife of
Burgos.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however,
it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.
That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may

have been committed. The fact of the commission of the

offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the Burgos was arrested on the sole basis of
Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to
suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were
still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The
subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of
information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the
arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the
moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is
discovered afterward can make it lawful. The fruit of a
poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.

UMIL vs RAMOS (1990)

FACTS:
> Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command
(RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a
member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated
for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital, the wounded
person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon,
is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad,
responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers. In view of
this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.
> City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with
the RTC an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie
Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon
Agents of Persons in Authority."
> Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before the
Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or nor there was a valid arrest?
RULING:
YES. As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he
was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just
after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a
day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest
without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of
the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the
arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it
can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the
nature of continuing crimes.
From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners
that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without
basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes,

and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance,

on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in
the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from
the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a
massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the
arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of
the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing
overt acts of violence against government forces, or any
other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the
rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled
by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very
survival of society and its government and duly constituted
authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the
rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities
which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection,
most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their
persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies
continues cannot be less justified.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in
flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or
when an offense has just been committed and the person making
the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it. The rationale behind lawful
arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the case of
People vs. Kagui Malasugui thus:
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a
warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy

of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of

criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.

UMIL vs RAMOS (1991)

FACTS:
> Separate motions before the Court, seeking reconsideration.
> In the Umil case, the arresting officers had good reasons to
believe that an NPA member (Rolando Dumal, although using a
fictitious name) was indeed being treated at St, Agnes Hospital for
gunshot wounds. The information was from the attending doctor
and hospital management, and therefore came from reliable
sources.
> In the case of Wilfredo Buenaibra, the same admitted that he
was an NPA courier.
> In the case of Amelia Roque, subversive documents and live
ammunitions were found at the time of her arrest, and she
admitted to owning such documents.
> As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, agents
frisked them and found subversive documents and loaded guns
without permits.
> With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she arrived at a house subject to a
search warrant. Ammunition and subversive documents were
found in her car.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rolando Dural was lawfully arrested?
RULING:
YES. Dural and the other petitioners were lawfully
arrested for being members of the NPA (mere membership is
penalized), and for subversion (a continuing offense).

Subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base

which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness
& violence until the objective of overthrowing organized
government is attained.
Likewise, the arresting officers had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who
committed the offense (based on actual facts), coupled with
good faith in making the arrest.
The Court reiterates that mere suspicion of being a
Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a
ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court
predicated the validity of the arrests on the compliance with

the requirements of a long existing law; probable cause and

good faith of the arresting peace officers; and that the arrest
be on the basis of actual facts and circumstances.

instances are not deemed unreasonable even in the

absence of a warrant:

law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the

Constitution itself.

PEOPLE vs TUDTUD

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest . (Sec. 12,

Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are: (a) a
prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; (d) plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable
cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

PEOPLE vs MOLINA

FACTS:
> Toril Police Station received a report from a civilian asset named
Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud allegedly responsible
for the proliferation of marijuana in their area.
> Police conducted surveillance in Soliers neighborhood, they
gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in
illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in
selling marijuana.
> With an info that Tudtud will be back from Cotabato with new
stocks of marijuana, police approached two men disembarked
from bus and indentified themselves as policemen and ordered to
open the box. The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which
were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and
another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap
the packages. They contained what seemed to the police officers
as marijuana leaves.
> The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed
them of their rights and brought them to the police station. The
two did not resist.
> Subsequently charged before the RTC with illegal possession of
prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not
guilty.
> RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged
and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
> On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among
other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves,
which they claim were seized in violation of their right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest and search was valid?
RULING:
NO. The rule is that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such
search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning
of the above-quoted constitutional provision, and any evidence
secured thereby, will be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.
The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only
unreasonable searches and seizures. The following

Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps

felt it necessary to conduct their own surveillance. This
surveillance, it turns out, did not actually consist of staking out
appellant Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal
trade, but of a mere gathering of information from the assets
there. The police officers who conducted such
surveillance did not identify who these assets were or the
basis of the latters information. Clearly, such information
is also hearsay, not of personal knowledge.
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency
that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant,
PO1 Desiertos assertions of lack of time notwithstanding.
Records show that the police had ample opportunity to apply
for a warrant.
As the search of appellants box does not come under the
recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the
marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in
evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay
testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the
conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order.
Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As
Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil that some
criminals escape than that the government should play an
ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a

FACTS:
> PNP received an information regarding the presence of an
alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. SPO1 Paguidopon was
then with his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer
pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the
pusher.
> SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged
pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma- a, Davao City any time that
morning, which immediately dispatched the team to proceed to
the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for
the alleged pusher to pass by.
> A "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. The
police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point,
accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the
same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1
Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked
accused-appellant Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, "Boss,
if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted on
opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside.
Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed
by the police officers.
> Accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from
them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in
violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, but was denied
> Both accused of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt,
pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused
NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to
suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the majiuana is admissible as evidence
for having been seized in violation of the constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures?
RULING:
NO. In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its
judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of
accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the
peace officers, are valid because accused-appellants were caught
in flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited drugs.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that
"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative

of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view

of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto
arrest.
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward
indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board
a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing,
attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not
that accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we
will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag.
Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the
arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a
crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not
constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest.
Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not
participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to
the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the
subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer
conducted a surveillance of accused-appellant Mula, SPO1
Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned Mula's name
and address after the arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1
Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is
worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in
person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they
were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have
afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant
Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle
when, SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect
to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he
had never seen him before the arrest.
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does
not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the
search conducted on their person was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could
not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the
Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accusedappellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the
government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of
our law-enforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts for the
achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the
fundamental rights and liberties of individuals as guaranteed in

the Bill of Rights, which protection extends even to the basest of

criminals.

PEOPLE vs CHUA
FACTS:
> PNP Officers received a report from their confidential informant
that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the
Thunder Inn Hotel The informer further reported that accusedappellant distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke bars. On the
basis of this lead, the PNP Chief immediately formed a team and
the civilian informer positioned themselves across McArthur
Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting Thunder Inn Hotel.
The other group acted as their back up.
> Their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant
which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the Thunder
Inn Hotel. Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and
introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant
pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a
crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket.
Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which
yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from
his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents
of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline
substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small
transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20)
pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accusedappellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other police
operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items
to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters.
> Opened the sealed Zest-O juice box, he found 2 big plastic
bags containing crystalline substances revealed that the siezed
items contained shabu.
> Accused Binad Sy Chua is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charge.

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop
and frisk principles is applicable to justify the warrantless
arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police
operatives on accused-appellant.
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended
at the very moment he is committing or attempting to
commit or has just committed an offense in the presence
of the arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on the fact
that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful
arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings.
Accordingly, for this exception to apply two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case
at bar. The record reveals that when accused-appellant arrived
at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his car
along the McArthur Highway, alighted from it and casually
proceeded towards the entrance of the Hotel clutching a
sealed Zest-O juice box. Accused-appellant did not act in a
suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no
overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.

NO. In the case at bar, there appears on record some

facts of weight and substance that have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which casts
doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant.

In the same vein, there could be no valid stop-and-frisk in this

case. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and
pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer
should properly introduce himself and make initial
inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests
unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the
latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.
The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason,
in accordance with the police officers experience and the
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to
be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It
should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure
should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.

In the present case, the police received information that the

accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the
Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to
act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search
warrant. The search is valid being akin to a stop and frisk.

The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar.

There was no valid stop-and-frisk in the case of accusedappellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested
before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items
found in his possession. The apprehending police operative

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest was lawful?
RULING:

failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellants

business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box
he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only
introduced themselves when they already had custody of
accused-appellant. Besides, at the time of his arrest, accusedappellant did not exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious
conduct reasonable enough to dispense with the procedure
outlined by jurisprudence and the law. There was, therefore,
no genuine reasonable ground for the immediacy of accusedappellants arrest.
Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended
on the information given to them by their confidential
informant. Accordingly, before and during that time of the
arrest, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that
accused-appellant had just committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime.
At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal drugs
actually occurred, accused-appellants warrantless arrest and
consequent search would still not be deemed a valid stop-and
frisk. For a valid stop-and-frisk the search and seizure must
precede the arrest, which is not so in this case. Besides, as
we have earlier emphasized, the information about the illegal
activities of accused-appellant was not unknown to the
apprehending officers. Hence, the search and seizure of the
prohibited drugs cannot be deemed as a valid stop-and-frisk.
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the
basis of the seized items found in accused-appellants
possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second,
the evidence, i.e., the plastic bags found in the Zest-O juice
box which contained crystalline substances later on identified
as methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and the 20
rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, were not inadvertently
discovered. The police officers first arrested accusedappellant and intentionally searched his person and peeked
into the sealed Zest-O juice box before they were able to see
and later on ascertain that the crystalline substance was
shabu. There was no clear showing that the sealed Zest-O
juice box accused-appellant carried contained prohibited
drugs. Neither were the small plastic bags which allegedly
contained crystalline substance and the 20 rounds of .22
caliber ammunition visible. These prohibited substances were
not in plain view of the arresting officers; hence, inadmissible
for being the fruits of the poisonous tree. In like manner, the
search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle,
a consented warrantless search, or a customs search. It
cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances,
for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.

PEOPLE vs MENDEZ
FACTS:
> Accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Rene Baby
Cabagtong were charged of rape with homicide.
> Having heard that a certain Ronnie Cabagtong was involved
in the killing of his daughter, Rico filed a complaint against
Ronnie, who was then investigated by the police.
> Aurea Cabagtong pointed to accused-appellants Baby
Cabagtong and Renante Mendez as the perpetrators of the
crime.
> Accused-appellant Renante Mendez, He was not shown any
warrant when they were arrested.
> Accused-appellant Renante Mendez and Ronnie Cabagtong
were brought to the municipal hall, where their pictures were
taken. After they were investigated, Renante was locked up in
jail and brought downstairs, while Ronnie Cabagtong was
taken upstairs.
> Accused-appellants, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged.
> The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution,
particularly the testimonies of Ronnie Cabagtong and his
mother, credible and rendered judgment for the prosecution.
> Court hereby finds both accused Renante Mendez and Baby
Cabagtong guilty of the offense of Rape with Homicide beyond
all reasonable doubt and hereby sentences them to the
supreme penalty of DEATH.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in giving full credence
to the inconsistent testimonies of the prosecution witness?
RULING:
YES. First. As already noted, the prosecution is
anchored mainly on the testimonies of Ronnie Cabagtong and
his mother, Aurea Cabagtong. Upon closer examination,
however, certain circumstances make these testimonies
suspect. It is doubtful whether Ronnie really saw accusedappellant Renante Mendez raping Candy, with the latters
hands being held by the other accused-appellant, Baby
Cabagtong. Ronnie admitted that it was raining that evening
and that it was dark as there was no moonlight. He claimed,
however, that he was nevertheless able to recognize accusedappellant Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong because of a
light from a lantern (parol) hanging about five meters away
from the trail where the crime had been committed. His

testimony is contrary to the testimony of another prosecution

witness, Zosimo Mejica, who categorically stated that there
were no houses near the area where Candys body was found
and that it was surrounded by trees. Mejica testified.
If there were no houses near the crime scene, it is cause for
wonder how the parol, where the light allegedly came from,
could have been hanged within a distance of five meters from
the place where Ronnie claimed he witnessed the incident.
Even if the crime was committed near the trail, and not on the
exact spot where Candys body was found, the nearest house
would have to be at least 50 meters away. Ronnie even
embellished his story by claiming that the parol was made of
wood with a wick, inside a bottle.
Second. Ronnies behavior after allegedly witnessing the
incident belied his pretension. He was supposed to have
witnessed a crime. Yet he went home, took his supper and
went to sleep as if nothing had happened. When accusedappellants went to his house, Ronnie did not show any
apprehension but matter of factly asked his mother to let them
in. This is not the normal reaction of a person who supposedly
has just seen a crime committed. Ronnies claim that the victim
was his cousin all the more makes his story incredible.
It has been held time and again that, to be credible,
testimonial evidence should come not only from the mouth of a
credible witness but it should itself be also credible,
reasonable and in accord with human experience. The
testimonies of Ronnie Cabagtong and his mother Aurea simply
do not meet these standards.
Accused-appellants defense is alibi. But it is settled that where
the evidence of the prosecution is itself feeble, particularly as
to the identity of the accused as the author of the crime, alibi
assumes importance and acquires commensurate strength.
The rule that alibi must be satisfactorily proven was never
intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases;
otherwise, the accused would be put in the difficult position of
having to prove his innocence even where the prosecutions
evidence is vague and weak. The prosecution cannot profit
from the weakness of accused-appellants alibi. It must rely on
the strength of its own evidence and establish the guilt of
accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
Indeed, unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, an
accused is entitled to an acquittal. Only when the conscience
is satisfied that the crime has been committed by the person
on trial should the sentence be for conviction. We find that the
prosecution in this case failed to establish the guilt of accused-

appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence presented

against them failed to prove that they were responsible for the
crime. While we deplore this gruesome incident and
commiserate with the victims family, we cannot sustain
accused-appellants conviction on the wretched testimony of
an alleged eyewitness presented by the prosecution.
Nor can we close our eyes to the palpable violations of the
rights of accused-appellants during the period of their
detention. The record shows that accused-appellants were
arrested without any warrants from the courts. Contrary to his
claim, SPO2 Cernio did not have personal knowledge of the
commission of the crime so as to justify the warrantless arrest
of Renante Mendez. Personal knowledge of facts in arrests
without warrant under 5(b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure must be based upon probable cause, which means
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when it is based on
actual facts, i.e., when it is supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause
of guilt of the person to be arrested.
Finally, the records do not show that accused-appellants
were assisted by counsel in the course of the
investigation.
During
their
questioning
at
the
headquarters, only the police investigators were present.
Nowhere in the records was it shown that they were
apprised of their rights under the Constitution. While no
confession was obtained from them, their interrogation at
that time could nonetheless have given the police
valuable leads into the unsolved crime. Accusedappellants also insist that they did not receive a copy of
the order requiring them to submit counter-affidavits. The
Clerk of Court of the MCTC of Gamay merely testified as
to the issuance of said order, but testimony does not
confirm that such it was received by accused-appellants.
The fact that these irregularities were never raised before
arraignment, and were therefore considered waived when
accused-appellants entered their pleas, does not justify the
short cuts. These procedural lapses clearly indicate that the
police had shut its mind off to the possibility that other parties
might have committed the crime.

PEOPLE vs DORIA

operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to

arrest him even without a warrant.

FACTS:

The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of

her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of
marijuana and marked bills are different matters.

> A buy-bust operation conducted by PNP. In that operation

Florencio Doria was caught selling marijuana, but the marked
money was not recovered from him, he confessed that the
marked money was left a the house of his associate Violeta
Gaddao y Catama. He lead them to the house of his
associates and there found Catama with the marked money.
The policemen arrested them together with the box, its
contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the
investigator at headquarters.
> After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted the accusedappellants. The trial court found the existence of an
"organized/syndicated crime group".
ISSUE:
Whether or nor the warrantless arrest of accusedappellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and
the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom
is valid?
RULING:
NO.
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant
Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three
instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested
without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught
in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is
apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust

Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a

judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such
warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be
made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom
may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives
his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested
without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the
box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made
without a search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the
warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in
"hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful
arrest.
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed
during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her
arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not
committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court,
there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from
the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact, she
was going about her daily chores when the policemen
pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified
under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal
knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under
Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable
cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested
is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person
to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the
part of the peace officers making the arrest.

Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the

basis of the alleged identification made by her coaccused.
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao
was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and
home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and
marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her
arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court
correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view,
making its warrantless seizure valid.
On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he (PO3
Manlangit) merely presumed the contents to be marijuana
because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust
marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the
plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly
manifest its contents to a viewer. The marijuana was not in
plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant
was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of
the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never
considered by the trial court.

CADUA vs CA
FACTS:

area. The accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the

reported statements of complainants, he was identified as a
logical suspect in the offense just committed.

> While deployed, PNP received a radio dispatch requesting them

to proceed to North Fairview. Said dispatch was based on a report
concerning an alleged holdup of complainants Lourdes Bulos and
her daughter Bernadette, who were in need of police assistance.
> Police officers found both complainants who stated that the
alleged holduppers had just fled. They were held up by two (2)
men at the corner of Archer and Regalado Streets, near their
house. The police officers also asked in what direction the alleged
holduppers fled and what they were wearing. Then, the police
officers requested the complainants to board the patrol unit in
order to facilitate the search for the two (2) men. The
complainants identified the men as the alleged holduppers, one of
which is the petitioner in this case. The police officers slowed
down to a stop, and called out to the suspects. As Burdeos was
approaching the suspects, he noticed that petitioner Cadua was
about to pull something which was tucked at the right side of his
waist. Burdeos promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua and warned
him not to move. He then frisked Cadua and found in his
possession a .38 caliber paltik revolver.
> Assistant City Prosecutor found only the case for Illegal
Possession of Firearms warranting the filing of an Information.
During the investigation for robbery, complainants manifested
their doubts as to the identity of the respondents, hence he set
this matter for further investigation.
> On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
> Petitioner seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the trial court. The CA ruled that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner was based on probable cause and
that the police officers had personal knowledge of the fact which
led to his arrest.
> Petitioner now comes before us on certiorari under Rule 45.

That the victims of the reported robbery failed to pursue a

formal complaint is not decisive in this case. What is material
is that the officers acted in response to the events which had
just transpired and called for the appropriate police response.
As to the element of personal knowledge, the officers could
not be faulted. It is not correct to say they acted without
observing standards of reasonableness and probable cause.
They responded promptly to a legitimate complaint of the
victims and they had a reasonable suspicion that the persons
pointed out at the scene were the perpetrators of the offense.
This in itself is sufficient justification for the officers to call the
attention of the accused at that point in time when he was
identified as a suspect by the complainants.

ISSUE:

When petitioner was searched contemporaneously with the

arrest, the paltik was found in his possession, and seized.
Such seizure cannot be considered unlawful nor
unreasonable. Moreover, at that moment of search and
seizure, there was in the mind of the arresting officer more
than a mere suspicion that petitioner was armed. Petitioners
movements clearly suggested the presence of a weapon
tucked at the side of his waist. The fact that Burdeos made an
immediate draw for his service revolver was an instinctive
response to petitioners actions which, under the
circumstances, indicated a high probability of an offensive
attack with a lethal weapon.

Whether or not his right to be protected from any

unlawful warrantless arrest has been violated?
RULING:
NO. Petitioner could not dispute that there was an
initial report to the police concerning the robbery. A radio
dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who
proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio
message. When they reached said place, they met up with the
complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon
the officers invitation, both mother and daughter boarded the
mobile unit to join them in conducting a search of the nearby

Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to

affirm the finding below that the warrantless arrest of petitioner
is lawful. We also agree that the incidental search and
subsequent seizure of the unlicensed firearm in question is
likewise lawful and valid.
Noteworthy, among the exceptions to the necessity for a
search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an
incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either
while a crime is actually being committed, or soon after its
commission. The right to search includes in these instances
that of searching the person of one who is arrested, in order to
find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or
as the means for its commission.

Petitioners arrest having been found valid and the seizure of

the firearms lawful.

PEOPLE vs MONTILLA
FACTS:
> Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias "Joy,"
was charged on for violating Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, before the Regional Trial Court.
> The consequent arraignment conducted and a plea of not
guilty from appellant.
> It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that
appellant was apprehended at around 4:00 A.M. was caught
transporting marijuana.
> These two officers later asserted in court that they were
aided by an informer in the arrest of appellant.
> Accused was never informed of his constitutional rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid search and arrest?
RULING:
YES. On the defense argument that the warrantless
search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence
obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the
consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof
was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under that
provision, a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated,
necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to
validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous
weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense. On the other hand, the
apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable
cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in
cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in
Section 5(a). These instances have been applied to arrests
carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. The
conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a
relative term the determination of which must be resolved
according to the facts of each case, is understood as having
reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and

conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the

objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying
a traveling bag and a carton box should not elicit the slightest
suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal.
But, precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs
being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers
and concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably
assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the
informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the
drugs were in appellant's luggage. It would obviously have
been irresponsible, if not downright absurd under the
circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "wait and
see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and
seizure that, at the point prior to the search, were already
constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could
properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded
and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating
the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable
cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually
committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs.
With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of
his belongings without the requisite warrant were both
justified.

PEOPLE vs JAYSON
FACTS:
> Accused-appellant, then a bouncer at the Ihaw-Ihaw
nightclub. He was arrested after he had been pointed by
eyewitnesses as the gunman. Recovered from him was a .38
caliber revolver, four live bullets, and one empty shell.
> That the same .38 caliber revolver was used by the accused
in killing Nelson Jordan.
> Accused-appellant was initially charged with murder but,
after plea-bargaining, he was allowed to plead guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide.
> He was charged with illegal possession of firearm in an
amended information.
> Found guilty by the RTC. On appeal, CA increased the
penalty.
> Accused-appellant maintains that he acted in the good faith
belief that he was authorized to carry the firearm by virtue of
the mission order and memorandum receipt issued to him by
Major.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants arrest and the
seizure from him of the firearm in question considering that
both were made without any warrant from a court is valid?

RULING:
YES. With respect to the arrest, SPO1 Loreto Tenebro
testified that at around 10:00 in the evening of March 16,
1991, while he and Patrolmen Camotes and Reinerio Racolas
were patrolling in their car, they received a radio message
from their camp directing them to proceed to the Ihaw-Ihaw on
Bonifacio Street where there had been a shooting.
Accordingly, they proceeded to the place and there saw the
victim, Nelson Jordan. Bystanders pointed to accusedappellant as the one who had shot Jordan. They then arrested
accused-appellant. Seized from him was a .38 caliber revolver
with serial number 91955. The firearm was covered by a
mission order and memorandum receipt. Considering these
facts, we hold that the warrantless arrest and search were
valid.
Rule 113, 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides:

TERRY vs OHIO

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer

or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: . . . .

FACTS:

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he

has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it.
In the case at bar there was a shooting. The policemen
summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim.
Accused-appellant was pointed to them as the assailant only
moments after the shooting. In fact accused-appellant had not
gone very far (only ten meters away from the Ihaw-Ihaw),
although he was then fleeing. The arresting officers thus acted
on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim
and of facts indicating that accused-appellant was the
assailant.
The subsequent search of accused-appellants person and the
seizure from him of the firearm was likewise lawful. Rule 126,
12 states:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.

The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual

on a street corner while repeatedly walking up and down the
same street. The men would periodically peer into a store
window and then talk some more. The men also spoke to a
third man whom they eventually followed up the street. The
officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were
casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to
approach the men for questioning, and given the nature of the
behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of the
men before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner
produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged
with carrying a concealed weapon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a search for weapons without
probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(Constitution)?
RULING:
YES. We merely hold today that where a police
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself
as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search
under the Fourth amendment.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is
not required to conduct a stop-and-frisk, it nevertheless holds
that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stopand-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons

concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a twofold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that
a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in
an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer.

PADILLA vs CA

RULING:

FACTS:

YES. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued

for the arrest of petitioner. (Sect. 5 on Arrest without warrant)

> Manarang and Cruz were on the restaurant while waiting for the
rain to subside riding on their motorcycle when they heard a
screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a
vehicle running very fast followed by a sickening sound of the
vehicle hitting something. Manarang and Cruz went out to
investigate and immediately saw the vehicle occupying the edge
or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side.
Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic group
and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to
report the incident to the Philippine National Police. Manarang
went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle
had hit somebody. He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he
went back to the restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and chased
the vehicle. During the chase he was able to make out the plate
number of the vehicle and through the radio once again reporting
that a vehicle heading north was involved in a hit and run
accident. Manarang went back to where he came from when
Manarang was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the vehicle
that had figured in the hit and run incident emerging from the
corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant with same plate number and
that the driver was Robin Padilla. SPO2 Miranda told appellant to
alight to which appellant complied. When he alighted with both his
hands raised, a gun tucked on the left side of his waist was
revealed. Other ammunition and gun was also confiscated on the
appellants car.
>Petitioner was correspondingly charged Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions under P.D. 1866.
> The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, but granted
his application for bail. During the arraignment , a plea of not
guilty was entered for petitioner after he refused, upon advice of
counsel, to make any plea.
> After trial, Angeles City RTC convicting petitioner of the crime
charged.
> Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was
illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in
the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential agent authorized,
under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the
subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal
possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest was legal?

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he

has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer or private person. Both elements concurred
here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle
figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the
"presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to
arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that
"presence" does not only require that the arresting person
sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance
created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene." As
testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires
followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor),
reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase
to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to
apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the
PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan
bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and
SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who
effected the actual arrest of petitioner.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest
by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were
not at the scene of the hit and run. We beg to disagree. That
Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who
admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in
effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the
propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent
action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring
petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are
unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting
an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who , in all
probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an
untrained civilian may not be able to contain without
endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing
lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function
in collaboration with private citizens. It is precisely through this
cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did
not become an additional entry to the long list of unreported
and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like
petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has been set
in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police
was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action.

The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a

moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime - all
created a situation in which speed is essential and delay
improvident. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the
forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and
articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been
engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante
delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith &
Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's
warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually
committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could
likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just
committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual
apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the
Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen
saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its
dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and
the dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the
arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved
in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers
acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable
hearsay information.
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from
petitioner without a search warrant, the admissibility in evidence
of which, we uphold.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed
appears that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms
and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search
which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden
places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the Smith &
Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they
came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently
discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist
and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after
alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the
confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately
apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the
Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat.
Thus it has been held that:

Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were

products of an active search done by the authorities on the
person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search
warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search
incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance).

him.

PEOPLE vs RACHO
FACTS:
> Confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular
phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent
later reported the transaction to the police authorities who
immediately formed a team composed of member of PDEA,
the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local
police force to apprehend the appellant. The agent gave the
police appellants name, together with his physical description.
> Appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was
on board a Genesis bus. The team members then posted
themselves along the national highway. When appellant
alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as
the person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the
bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle
that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was
about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited
him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu.
Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled
out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped
therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug.
> The team then brought appellant to the police station for
investigation. Then confiscated specimen.
> Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165.
> During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty".
> RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of
Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165.
> In his brief, appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses
for the prosecution. He questions the admissibility of the
confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
ISSUE:
Whether of not the evidence is admissible and the
arrest is legal?
RULING:
NO. After a thorough review of the records of the
case, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity
of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during
the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against

The records show that appellant never objected to the

irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is
the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse,
coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case, we
must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant,
having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of
his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his
arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of
the court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest
therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is
necessary for us to ascertain whether or not the search which
yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant,
even without a warrant, was the tip given by the informant that
appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This
circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that
information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a
valid warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable
information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform
some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. We
find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established
doctrine.
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless
search precisely because there was no adequate probable
cause. We required the showing of some overt act indicative
of the criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a
crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the
arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing,
or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest,
appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was
waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any
suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground
for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was
committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the
information given by the informant, appellant would not have

been apprehended and no search would have been made,

and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been
confiscated.
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree," hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in
evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987
Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot
be sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an
acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his
right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea
and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier
mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction
of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an
illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest.

GO vs CA

LARRANAGA vs CA

ISSUE:

ISSUE:

PEOPLE vs MAHINAY
FACTS:

Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been

effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go?

Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest?

RULING:

RULING:
NO. In the instant case, the offense for which
petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was
obviously commenced and completed at one definite location
in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal
shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting
of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not
present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time
petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the
"arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably
regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been
committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover,
none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge"
of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had
shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted
had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was
the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered
in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however,
constitute "personal knowledge."

NO. It does not appear in the case at bar that

petitioner has just committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit an offense when the police officers tried
to arrest him on September 15, 1997. In fact, petitioner was
attending classes at the Center for Culinary Arts at that time.
We reject the prosecutors' argument that petitioner was
actually committing a crime at the time of the arrest since
kidnapping with serious illegal detention is a continuing crime.
In the case of Parulan v. Director of Prisons cited by the
prosecutors, kidnapping with illegal detention is considered a
continuing crime where the deprivation of liberty is persistent
and continuing from one place to another. The facts show that
the alleged kidnapping was committed on July 16, 1997. One
of the victims, Marijoy Chiong, was found dead in Sitio
Tanawan, Barangay Guadalupe, Carcar, Cebu on July 18,
1997, while the other victim, Jacqueline Chiong, remains
missing to date. There is no showing that at the time of the
arrest on September 15, 1997, Jacqueline Chiong was being
detained by petitioner who was then residing in Quezon City.
Hence, petitioner may not be considered as continually
committing the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention at the time of the arrest.

> Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with

Maria Isip.
> The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's
neighbor.
> Before the incident happened, appellant and his friends
were on a drinking spree, when drunk asked permission from
Isip to go out with his friends. Meanwhile, the child victim was
missing. Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for
supper last night and never went home which is very unlikely.
On the following day, appellant boarded on a passenger
jeepney. On the same day, the dead body of the victim was
found. Some of the personal belongings of the victim and of
the appellant were found at Isips house (that time was under
construction). A series of follow-up operation and the accused
was arrested. He made a extra-judicial confession in a
presence of his counsel, and admitted on how he killed and
raped the victim but he was not alone. He pointed another two
persons as his co-conspirators.
> He was charged with rape with homicide but pleaded not
guilty.
> RTC convicted the accused with supreme penalty of death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made by
the accused is proper?
RULING:

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful

warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5
of Rule 113.

YES.
Appellant was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan,
Batangas. The police officers allegedly brought him to a big
house somewhere in Manila. There, appellant heard the police
officers plan to salvage him if he would not admit that he was
the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared, he executed
an extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was assisted
by Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to sign the
extra-judicial confession.
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several
circumstantial evidence, which upon thorough review of the
Court is more than enough to prove appellants guilt beyond
the shadow of reasonable doubt.

Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and

after having been informed of his constitutional rights with the
assistance of a counsel from the Public Attorneys Office
voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commission of the
crime. Said confession of accused Larry Mahinay given with
the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have
been freely and voluntarily given. That accused did not
complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his
person. He did not even informed the Inquest Prosecutor
when he sworn to the truth of his statement that he was
forced, coersed or was promised of reward or leniency. That
his confession abound with details know only to him. The
Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office and
as testified by said attorney he informed and explained to the
accused his constitutional rights and was present all
throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed the
statement given by the accused. Lawyer from the Public
Attorneys Office is expected to be watchful and vigilant to
notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and
the physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem
findings shows that the cause of death Asphyxia by manual
strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory substantiate.
Consistent with the testimony of the accused that he pushed
the victim and the latters head hit the table and the victim lost
consciousness.
There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in
giving the statement. There were no medical certificate
submitted by the accused to sustain his claim that he was
mauled by the police officers.
There being no evidence presented to show that said
confession were obtained as a result of violence, torture,
maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or
leniency nor that the investigating officer could have been
motivated to concoct the facts narrated in said affidavit; the
confession of the accused is held to be true, correct and freely
or voluntarily given.
WHEREFORE,
AFFIRMED.

the

conviction

of

appellant

is

hereby

PEOPLE vs VELOSO
FACTS:
> A building was used by an organization known as the
Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member
of the House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He
was also the manager of the club.
> The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called
Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house.
The chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and
verified this fact.
> A search warrant was obtained. Nearly 50 persons were
apprehended including Veloso, he refused stating that the police
have no authorities to search the area since the name stated on
the warrant was John Doe and he is not John Doe. Despite of
refusal to be search, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and
long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and
chips were taken from his pockets.
> All persons arrested in the raid were accused of gambling. All of
them were eventually acquitted in the CFI for lack of proof, with
the sole exception of Veloso, who was found guilty of maintaining
a gambling house.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrant stating the name of John
Doe was valid?
RULING:
YES. John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from
what has already been said regarding the essential requirements
of warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and about
blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a person
whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or
"Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void,
without other and further descriptions of the person to be
apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting
under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best
descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or
persons to be apprehended, and this description must be
sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon
whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal
appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of
residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he
can be identified.
Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John
Doe" warrant, on the other hand, the apprehension will not be
illegal, or the officer liable, because under such circumstances it is
not necessary that a warrant should have been issued.

In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the
search warrant itself described the building to be searched as "the
building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine
Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the
premises to be searched. It is the prevailing rule that a description
of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended. The police officers were accordingly authorized to break
down the door and enter the premises of the building occupied by
the so-called Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the
right to arrest the persons presumably engaged in a prohibited
game, and to confiscate the evidence of the commission of the
crime. It has been held that an officer making an arrest may take
from the person arrested any money or property found upon his
person, which was used in the commission of the crime or was
the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person arrested
with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which
may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause, but not
otherwise.
Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that
the application for the search warrant, the affidavit, and the search
warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to be
seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant did state that
"John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied
by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the building
numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling
Law." Now, in this connection, it must not be forgotten that the
Organic Act requires a particular description of the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized, and that the
warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the
gambling apparatus, and, in addition, contained a description of
the person to be seized. Under the authorities cited by the
appellant, it is invariably recognized that the warrant for the
apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in those cases
where it contains a description personae such as will enable the
officer to identify the accused." The description must be sufficient
to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to
be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had
gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by
him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John
Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police
could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
Again, it must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo was
supposed to be used for club purposes. It was not the home of
Veloso; not the place of abode of the family, which the law
carefully protects in all of its sanctity. It was a club partially public
in nature. It was, moreover, a camouflaged club with a high
sounding name calculated to mislead the police, but intended for
nefarious practices. In a club of such a character, unlike in the
home, there would commonly be varying occupancy, a number of

John Does and Richard Roes whose names would be unknown to

the police.
John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the
rule. The police should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and

whenever it is feasible. The police should not be hindered in the

performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of
performance under the best of conditions, by superficial
adherence to technicality or far fetched judicial interference.

We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in

their conclusions to the effect that the search warrant was valid,
and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, of the crime of resistance of the agents of the
authority.