Causes of the Franco-Prussian War

Main article: Franco-Prussian War

Telegram to the public, Bismarck made it sound as if
The causes of the Franco-Prussian War are deeply the king had treated the French envoy in a demeaning
fashion. Six days later, France declared war on Prussia and Southern German States immediately sided with
Prussia.[2]
French Emperor Napoleon III and Prime Minister mile
Ollivier's eagerness to relieve France from internal political convulsions also contributed to Frances declaration
of war on Prussia.[3]

1 European wars and the balance

of power: 18651866
In October 1865, Napoleon III, ruler of France, met with
Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck in Biarritz,
France. It was there that the two men struck a deal
France would not get involved in any future actions between Prussia and Austria or ally herself with Austria if
Prussia did not allow Austria to claim Venetia. When
Austria and Prussia met in May 1866, Bismarck honored
the agreement made in Biarritz the previous year and refused to allow Austria to have Venetia. Austria then attempted to guarantee Italy Venetia if they remained neutral, but the two nations were unable to agree on a suitable arrangement as an alliance formed earlier in the year
bound Italy to Prussia. Napoleon III then committed a
serious blunder by agreeing with Austria in a treaty to accept Venetia by allowing Austria to go to war with Prussia, a move which violated the agreement Napoleon had
made with Bismarck.[4]

Map of the North German Confederation (red), the Southern

German States (orange) and Alsace-Lorraine (pink).

rooted in the events surrounding the German unication. In the aftermath of the Austro-Prussian War (1866),
Prussia had annexed numerous territories and formed the
North German Confederation. This new power destabilized the European balance of power established by the
Congress of Vienna (1815) after the Napoleonic Wars.
Prussia then turned its attention towards the south of Germany, where it sought to expand its inuence.
France was strongly opposed to the annexation of the
Southern German States (Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden
and Hesse), which would have created a too powerful
a country next to its border. In Prussia, a war against
France was deemed necessary to arouse German nationalism in those States that would allow the unication of
a great German empire. This aim was epitomized by
Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's quote: I knew
that a Franco-Prussian War must take place before a
united Germany was formed.[1] Bismarck also knew that
France should be regarded as the aggressor in the conict
to bring the Southern German States to side with Prussia,
hence giving Germans numerical superiority.[2]

After Prussia emerged victorious over the Austrian army

at the Battle of Kniggrtz (also known as Sadowa or
Sadov) in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, negotiations were being held between Austria and Prussia in
July and August of that year.[5] It was during that period that Napoleon III rst discovered that a bladder stone
was causing him great pains, created from gonorrheal
infection.[6] His condition was so bad during those negotiations that he was forced to retire to Vichy to recuperate, removing himself from Paris. Although the emperor
favored neutrality as to not upset events, certain members of his circle thought it was an unwise move, considering the opportunity to prevent Prussia from becoming
too strong. One of these men, foreign minister douard
Drouyn de Lhuys, convinced the emperor to plant 80,000
men on the eastern border to convince Wilhelm I to maintain the balance of power in Europe. Despite this im-

However, the immediate cause of the war resides in the

candidacy of a Prussian prince to the throne of Spain,
France feared encirclement by an alliance between Prussia and Spain. The Hohenzollern princes candidacy was
withdrawn under French diplomatic pressure, but Otto
von Bismarck goaded the French into declaring war by
altering a telegram sent by William I. Releasing the Ems
1

1 EUROPEAN WARS AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: 18651866

Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of Prussia

portant victory, de Lhuys was subverted by several other

ministers, and Napoleon III changed his mind, reverting
to a position of neutrality. This change of heart would
end up causing de Lhuys to ultimately lose his position.[7]
Napoleon IIIs wife Empress Eugnie, who took an active
part throughout his rule, referred to this time much later
as the critical date, the Empires fatal date; it was during
these months of July and August that our fate was sealed!
Of all that period, there is not a single fact, not a single
detail that has not remained in my mind.[8]

Napoleon III, Emperor of the French

surprised since he had already gained a powerful position in Europe by the armistice, and called Napoleon IIIs
request among others later like 'an innkeepers bill' or a
waiter asking for 'a tip'. He asked Benedetti to provide
the proposal in writing, and the ambassador obliged his
Franz Joseph of Austria accepted Bismarcks terms unrequest. This document was to be important to Bismarck
der the Peace of Prague. Using this to his advantage,
later on, to great eect.[10]
Bismarck declared the German Confederation of 1815
null and void, and created a new network of states un- The true views of Napoleon III on the subject of the balder Prussian control. Frankfurt-am-Main, Hannover, ance of power in Europe can be found in a state circular
Hesse-Kassel (or Hesse-Cassel), Holstein, Nassau, and handed to every diplomatic representative for France. In
Schleswig were annexed outright while Hesse-Darmstadt, this paper dated September 1, 1866, the emperor saw the
Mecklenburg, Saxony, the Thuringian duchies, as well as future of Europe after the Peace of Prague in this manthe cities of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lbeck were com- ner:
bined into a new North German Confederation that governed nominally and was actually controlled by Prussia
Policy should rise superior to the narrow and
herself.[9]
mean prejudices of a former age. The Emperor
Bismarck was approached soon after the end of the
war by Napoleon IIIs ambassador to Prussia, Vincent
Benedetti. Benedetti brought with him a secret proposal
by Napoleon III that France would approve of Bismarcks
acquisition of the northern German states and their control over the southern German states if Prussia remained
neutral while France annexed Belgium and Luxembourg.
France had earlier guaranteed the independence of Belgium in the Treaty of London in 1839 as an independent
and perpetually neutral state, making the proposal a tacit
agreement to break their promise. Bismarck was very

does not believe that the greatness of a country

depends upon the weakness of the nations which
surround it, and he sees a true equilibrium only
in the satised aspirations of the nations of Europe. In this, he is faithful to old convictions and
to the traditions of his race. Napoleon I foresaw the changes which are now taking place on
the continent of Europe. He had sown the seeds
of new nationalities: in the Peninsula, when he
created the Kingdom of Italy; and in Germany,
when he abolished two hundred and fty three

2.2

Bismarck and German nationalism

separate states. [11]

2
2.1

Domestic agenda in France and

Prussia
French prestige and politics

3
the French nation behind the Bonapartist dynasty. With
the resulting prestige from a successful war, Napoleon III
could then safely suppress any lingering republican or revolutionary sentiment behind reactionary nationalism and
return France to the center of European politics.[14]

2.2 Bismarck and German nationalism

Prussia in turn was also beset with problems. While revolutionary fervour was far more muted than in France,
Prussia had in 1866 acquired millions of new citizens
as a result of the Austro-Prussian War,[15] which was
also a civil war among German states. The remaining
German kingdoms and principalities maintained a steadfastly parochial attitude towards Prussia and German unication. The German princes insisted upon their independence and balked at any attempt to create a federal
state that would be dominated by Berlin. Their suspicions were heightened by Prussias quick victory and subsequent annexations.[16] Before the war, only some Germans, inspired by the recent unication of Italy, accepted
and supported what the princes began to realise, that Germany must unite in order to preserve the fruit of an eventual victory.[17]

Jules Favre of the Second Republic in 1865

Main article: Second French Empire

Frances position in Europe was now in danger of being
overshadowed by the emergence of a powerful Prussia,
and France looked increasingly at-footed following Bismarcks successes. In addition, French ruler Napoleon
III was on increasingly shaky ground in domestic politics. Having successfully overthrown the Second Republic and established the Bonapartist Second Empire,
Napoleon III was confronted with ever more virulent demands for democratic reform from leading republicans
such as Jules Favre,[12] along with constant rumours of
impending revolution. In addition, French aspirations in
Mexico had suered a nal defeat with the execution of
the Austrian-born, French puppet Emperor Maximilian I
of Mexico in 1867.[13]
The French imperial government now looked to a diplomatic success to stie demands for a return to either a
republic or a Bourbon monarchy. A war with Prussia
and resulting territorial gains in the Rhineland and later
Luxembourg and Belgium seemed the best hope to unite

Bismarck had an entirely dierent view after the war in

1866: he was interested only in strengthening Prussia
through the eyes of a staunch realist. Uniting Germany
appeared immaterial to him unless it improved Prussias
position.[18] Bismarck had mentioned before the war the
possibility of ceding territory along the Rhine to France,
and Napoleon III, urged by his representatives in France,
used these casual references by Bismarck to press for
more of the territory that Prussia had received from Austria. These discussions, leaked by Bismarck to the German states in the south, turned former enemies into allies
almost overnight, receiving not only written guarantees
but armies that would be under the control of Prussia.[19]

3 Alliances and diplomacy

3.1 German states
Diplomatically and militarily, Napoleon III looked for
support from Austria, Denmark, Bavaria, Baden, and
Wrttemberg, as all had recently lost wars against Prussia. However, Napoleon III failed to secure revanchist
alliances from these states. Denmark had twice fought
Prussia during the First and Second Wars of Schleswig (a
stalemate in the 184850, and a defeat in 1864 against a
confederation of North German states and Austria under
the leadership of Prussia), and was unwilling to confront
Prussia again. As part of the settlement of the AustroPrussian War in 1866, secret treaties of mutual defense
were signed between Prussia and Bavaria, Baden, and
Wrttemberg. What made them especially signicant

3 ALLIANCES AND DIPLOMACY

was that not only were they secret, giving Napoleon III a
false sense of security, but Bismarck had used Napoleon
IIIs earlier demand of territory along the Rhine to drive
the southern German states into his arms. By these
treaties, Prussia would defend all of the southern German states with its military power as long as their states
joined the Northern Confederation in defense of Prussia.
It was a bargain that would gravely threaten the French
empereur and his designs on restoring French pride.[20]

3.2

Austria and Italy

The Austrian Chancellor Count Friedrich Ferdinand von

Beust was impatient to take his revenge on Bismarck for
Sadowa. As a preliminary step, the Ausgleich with Hungary was rapidly concluded. Beust persuaded Francis
Joseph to accept Magyar demands which he had till then
rejected..[21] However, Austria would not support France
unless Italy was part of the alliance. Victor Emmanuel
II and the Italian government wanted to support France,
but Italian public opinion was bitterly opposed so long
as Napoleon III kept a French garrison in Rome protecting Pope Pius IX, thereby denying Italy the possession
of its capital (Rome had been declared capital of Italy in
March 1861, when the rst Italian Parliament had met
in Turin). Napoleon III made various proposals for resolving the Roman Question, but Pius IX rejected them
all. Despite his previous support for Italian unication,
Napoleon did not wish to press the issue for fear of angering Catholics in France. Raaele De Cesare, an Italian
journalist, political scientist, and author, noted that:
The alliance, proposed two
years before 1870, between France,
Italy, and Austria, was never concluded because Napoleon III [...]
would never consent to the occupation of Rome by Italy. [...] He
wished Austria to avenge Sadowa,
either by taking part in a military
action, or by preventing South Germany from making common cause
with Prussia. [...] If he could insure, through Austrian aid, the neutrality of the South German States
in a war against Prussia, he considered himself sure of defeating the
Prussian army, and thus would remain arbiter of the European situation. But when the war suddenly broke out, before anything
was concluded, the rst unexpected
French defeats overthrew all previsions, and raised diculties for
Austria and Italy which prevented
them from making common cause
with France. Wrth and Sedan followed each other too closely. The

Roman question was the stone tied

to Napoleons feet that dragged
him into the abyss. He never forgot,
even in August 1870, a month before Sedan, that he was a sovereign
of a Catholic country, that he had
been made Emperor, and was supported by the votes of the conservatives and the inuence of the clergy;
and that it was his supreme duty
not to abandon the Ponti. [...]
For twenty years Napoleon III had
been the true sovereign of Rome,
where he had many friends and relations [...] Without him the temporal power would never have been
reconstituted, nor, being reconstituted, would have endured.[22]
Another reason why Beustss desired revanche against
Prussia did not materialize was the fact that, in 1870, the
Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Andrssy was vigorously opposed.[23]

3.3 Russia

Tsar Alexander II of Russia

In addition to the problems facing Napoleon III in ob-

5
taining potential allies, Bismarck worked feverishly to
isolate France from the other European powers. Since
1863, Bismarck had made eorts to cultivate Russia, cooperating, amongst other things, in dealing with Polish
insurgents. This important move gained for Bismarck the
neutrality of Russia if Prussia went to war, and it also prevented Austria from taking sides with France as Austria
fully supported the Poles.[24] When Alexander II came to
France on an ocial visit in 1867, he was at the receiving
end of an unsuccessful assassination attempt by Polishborn Anton Berezovski while riding with Napoleon III
and the Empress Eugenie. Tsar Alexander was very offended that not only the French courts had given Berezovski imprisonment instead of death but also the French
press had sided with the Pole rather than Alexander. This
experience forever shattered his views of France and saw
in the reaction his visit had received why his father had
despised the French.[25]
In 1868, he held discussions with the Prussians, intending to counter a possible Austrian alliance with Napoleon
III by Franz Joseph. If German forces were, for any reason, bogged down in the west, then Prussias eastern and
southern anks would have been highly vulnerable. With
his usual skill, Bismarck moved carefully to sidestep the
nightmare. The Russian government even went so far as
to promise to send an army of 100,000 men against the
Austrians if Austria joined France in a war against Prussia. Whilst at Ems in the crucial summer of 1870 Wilhelm I and Bismarck had meetings with Tsar Alexander,
also present in the spa town Alexander, though not naturally pro-German, became very comfortable with Prussian suggestions.[26]

Though it had enjoyed some time as the leading power of

continental Europe, the French Empire found itself dangerously isolated.

4 Monarchial crises
4.1 Luxembourg crisis
Main article: Luxembourg Crisis
The king of the Netherlands, William III, was under
a personal union with Luxembourg that guaranteed its
sovereignty. Napoleon III had taken note that the king
had amassed certain personal debts that would make a
sale of Luxembourg to France possible. However, Luxembourg lies astride one of the principal invasion routes
an army would use to invade either France or Germany
from the other. The city of Luxembourgs fortications
were considered the Gibraltar of the North and neither
side could tolerate the other controlling such a strategic
location.

The pressure on Bismarck to object not only came from

his monarch William I, but from Chief of Sta of the
Prussian army Helmuth von Moltke. Moltke had additional reason to object: he desired war with France, stating atly, Nothing could be more welcome to us than
to have now the war that we must have.[29] Bismarck
balked at such talk about war. He refused to actually engage France on the basis that he rmly believed that Prussia would gain a far more decisive advantage by merely
Bismarck also had talks at Ems with Alexander opposing the sale and that Napoleon III could be thwarted
Mikhailovich Gorchakov, the Russian Foreign Minister, due to his fear of war with Prussia.[30]
and was assured in mid-July, days before the French
Assuming that Bismarck would not object, the French
declaration of war, that the agreement of 1868 still
government was shocked to learn that instead Bismarck,
held: in the event of Austrian mobilisation, the RusPrussia and the North German Confederation were
sians conrmed that they would send 300,000 troops into
threatening war should the sale be completed. Napoleon
[27]
Galicia. Bismarck now had all he wanted: a counter to
III had let precious months peel away in trying to comAustria and the assurance of a one-front war.
plete the transaction, allowing Bismarck time to rally support to Prussias objection.[31] To mediate the dispute, the
United Kingdom hosted the London Conference (1867)
3.4 United Kingdom
attended by all European great powers. It conrmed LuxBismarck then made Benedettis earlier draft public to embourgs independence from the Netherlands and guarThe Times in London that demanded Belgium and Lux- anteed its independence from all other powers. War apembourg as the price for remaining neutral during the peared to have been averted, at the cost of thwarting
[32]
Austro-Prussian War. Sensitive to the threat of a major French desires.
power controlling the strategically signicant Low Countries and the English Channel coastline, the United Kingdom government in particular took a decidedly cool at- 4.2 Spanish throne
titude to these French demands, and the British people
were disturbed by this subversive attempt at going back The Spanish throne had been vacant since the revolution
on Napoleon IIIs word. Therefore, Britain as a nation of September 1868, and the Spanish oered the
did nothing to aid France. The Prime Minister, William throne to the German prince Leopold of HohenzollernGladstone, expressed his thoughts on the matter to Queen Sigmaringen, a Catholic as well as a distant cousin of
Victoria by writing to her that Your majesty will, in com- King Wilhelm of Prussia. Leopold and Wilhelm I were
mon with the world, have been shocked and startled. [28] both uninterested, but the wily Bismarck was acutely

4 MONARCHIAL CRISES

interested, as it was an opportunity to once again best

Napoleon III. Bismarck persuaded Leopolds father to accept the oer for his nation, and it was accepted instead
by Leopold himself in June 1870.[33]

4.3

The Hohenzollern crisis and the Ems

Dispatch

Wilhelm I of Germany at his desk

On 2 July 1870, "Marshall Prim [who held power in

Spain] announced in Madrid that the Spanish government
had oered the crown of Spain to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern." [34] Fearing that a Hohenzollern king in Prussia and another one in Spain would put France into a twofront situation, France this time was determined to stand
up to the expansion of Prussian inuence. Napoleon III
at this time was suering the most unbearable pain from
his stones,[35] and the Empress Eugnie essentially was
charged with countering the designs of Prussia. She had
a vital interest in the crisis as she was of Spanish blood
and a member of the royal line. The secretary of foreign
aairs, Duc Antoine de Gramont, was directed by the
Empress to be the principal instrument by which France
would press for war should Leopold ascend the throne.
Gramont delivered a speech in front of the Chambre lgislative, proclaiming that We shall know how to fulll our
duty without hesitation and without weakness. The fatal
mistake would soon come as a result of Gramonts inexperience, for he counted on alliances that only existed in
his mind.[36]
The French press immediately protested the
prospect of a Hohenzollern on the Spanish
throne, and on 6 July the new Foreign Minister, the Duc de Gramont [...] told the Chamber
that France would not permit Prince Leopold
to become King of Spain. [The French Premier Emile] Ollivier added that he had no doubt

that Prussia would yield in the face of French

rmness, but that 'if war be necessary, the government will not enter upon it without the consent of the Legislative Body.' Gramonts statement and Olliviers mention of war were greeted
with great enthusiasm by the deputies, and in
the public galleries the ladies rose to their feet
and waved their handkerchiefs as they joined
in the wild applause. Next day the Paris press
called for war with Prussia, and on 8 July their
language was even more violent. The government instructed [Comte Vincente] Benedetti, the
French ambassador to Prussia, to demand that
King William should publicly refuse his consent
to Prince Leopolds acceptance of the throne of
Spain.[34]
On 11 July, Benedetti spoke to King William
at the watering spa at Ems, and asked him to
refuse his consent to Prince Leopolds candidature; Bismarck was on holiday at his estates
in East Prussia. King William agreed to order Prince Leopold to withdraw. Ollivier announced the Prussian surrender in the Chamber
on 12 July and hailed it as a French triumph and
a Prussian humiliation. Bismarck thought the
same and considered resigning as Prime Minister. Gramont and Ollivier did not conceal
their regret that the Prussians had given in; and
the deputies and most of the press were disappointed that that there was to be no war. [...]
Louis Napoleon sensed the public regret that
there would be no war. 'The country will be disappointed,' he cabled to Ollivier on 12 July; 'but
what can we do?' He was in complete agreement with the decision which was taken by the
Cabinet on the same day to ask for further guarantees from Prussia and to require King William
to give an undertaking that he would never in
the future allow Prince Leopold to accept the
crown of Spain. When Benedetti confronted
King William on the promenade at Ems on the
afternoon of 13 July and asked him to give this
undertaking, the King was annoyed, refused to
do so, and walked away a little abruptly.[37]
Following this direct confrontation, which had bypassed
diplomatic protocols, King Wilhelm then sent a message
to Berlin reporting this event with the French ambassador,
and Bismarck shrewdly edited it to make it like a red tag
to the bull for the French government.[38] The dispatch
was edited as follows (with the words sent in bold):
Count Benedetti spoke to me on the promenade, in order
to demand from me, nally in a very importunate manner, that I should authorize him to telegraph at once
that I bound myself for all future time never again to
give my consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their
candidature. I refused at last somewhat sternly, as it is

4.4

European public reaction

7
This dispatch made the encounter more heated than it really was. Known as the Ems Dispatch, it was released to
the press. It was designed to give the French the impression that King Wilhelm I had insulted the French Count
Benedetti, and to give the Prussian people the impression that the Count had insulted the King. It succeeded
in both of its aims- Gramont called it a blow in the face
of France, and the members of the French legislative
body spoke of taking immediate steps to safeguard the
interests, the security, and the honor of France. [40] On
19 July 1870 Le Sourd, the French Charg d'Aaires, delivered Napoleons declaration of war at the Foreign Ofce in Berlin.[41] According to the secret treaties signed
with Prussia and in response to popular opinion, Bavaria,
Baden, and Wrttemberg mobilised their armies and
joined the war against France.[42]

4.4 European public reaction

At the outbreak of the war, European public opinion
heavily favored the Germans. For example, many Italians
attempted to sign up as volunteers at the Prussian embassy
in Florence, and a Prussian diplomat visited Giuseppe
Garibaldi in Caprera. After the fall of Napoleon III following the Battle of Sedan, Bismarcks demand for the
return of Alsace caused a dramatic shift in that sentiment,
which was best exemplied by the reaction of Garibaldi
soon after the revolution in Paris, who told the Movimento
of Genoa on 7 September 1870, Yesterday I said to you:
war to the death to Bonaparte. Today I say to you: rescue
the French Republic by every means.[43]

5 See also
Memorial stone to the Ems Dispatch in Bad Ems

FrenchGerman enmity

6 References
neither right nor possible to undertake engagements of this
kind tout jamais. Naturally I told him that I had as yet
received no news, and as he was earlier informed about
Paris and Madrid than myself, he could clearly see that
my government once more had no hand in the matter. His
Majesty has since received a letter from the Prince. His
Majesty having told Count Benedetti that he was awaiting
news from the Prince, has decided with reference to the
above demand, upon the representation of Count Eulenburg and myself, not to receive Count Benedetti again,
but only to let him be informed through an aide-decamp that his Majesty had now received from the Prince
conrmation of the news which Benedetti had already received from Paris, and had nothing further to say to
the ambassador. His Majesty leaves it to your Excellency
whether Benedettis fresh demand and its rejection should
not be at once communicated both to our ambassadors and
to the press.[39]

Baumont, Maurice. Gloires et tragdies de la IIIe

Rpublique. Hachette, 1956.
Bresler, Fenton. Napoleon III: A Life. New York:
Carroll & Graf, 1999. ISBN 0-7867-0660-0
The Last Days of Papal Rome by Raaele De Cesare
(1909) London, Archibald Constable & Co.
Howard, Michael. The Franco-Prussian War: The
German Invasion of France 18701871. New York:
Routledge, 2001. ISBN 0-415-26671-8
Jelavich, Barbara. Russia and the Formation of the
Romanian National State, 1821-1878. Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
Jerrold, Blanchard. The Life of Napoleon III. Longmans, Green & Co.,1882.

7 NOTES
Kleinschmidt, Arthur. Drei Jahrhunderte russischer
Geschichte. J. Rde, 1898.

[10] Bresler(1999). pp. 338339

[11] Jerrold(1882) p. 332

Martin, Henri; Abby Langdon Alger. A Popular

[12] Martin, Henri; Abby Langdon Alger (1882). A Popular
History of France from the First Revolution to the
History of France from the First Revolution to the Present
Present Time. D. Estes and C.E. Lauriat, 1882.
Time. D. Estes and C.E. Lauriat. pp. 491492.
Nolte, Frdrick. L'Europe militaire et diplomatique
au dix-neuvime sicle, 1815-1884 E. Plon, Nourrit
et ce, 1884.

[13] Bresler(1999), p. 345

[14] Wawro(2003), p. 30

Radzinsky, Edvard. Alexander II: The Last Great [15] Wawro(2003), p. 17

Tsar. Simon and Schuster, 2005.
[16] Taylor(1988), pp. 84-85.
Ridley, Jasper. Garibaldi. Viking Press, New York, [17] Taylor(1988), pp. 70-71.
1976.
Ridley, Jasper. Napoleon III and Eugnie. Viking
Press, New York, 1980.

[19] Taylor(1988), pp. 88-89.

Robertson, Charles Grant. Bismarck. H. Holt and

Co, 1919.

[20] Robertson, Charles Grant (1919). Bismarck. H. Holt and

Co. pp. 220221.

Taithe, Bertrand. Citizenship and Wars: France in

Turmoil 1870-1871. Routledge, 2001.

[21] Albertini, Luigi (1952). The Origins of the War of 1914,

Volume I. Oxford University Press. p. 4.

Taylor, A.J.P. Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988. ISBN 0241-11565-5

[22] De Cesare, Raaele (1909). The Last Days of Papal

Rome. Archibald Constable & Co. pp. 439443.

Wawro, Georey. The Franco-Prussian War: The

German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. ISBN
0-521-58436-1

[18] Taylor(1988), pp. 86-87.

Notes

[1] Otto von Bismarck (A.J. Butler, trans.), Bismarck: The

Man and the Statesman, vol. 2, page 58. Originally published in 1898; reprinted in 2007 by Cosimo Classics of
New York, New York.
[2] http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/216971/
Franco-German-War
[3] Wawro, Georey (2003). The Franco Prussian War.
Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-58436-4.

[23] Albertini, Luigi (1952). The Origins of the War of 1914,

Volume I. Oxford University Press. p. 6.
[24] Holt, Lucius Hudson; Alexander Wheeler (1917). The
History of Europe from 1862 to 1914: From the Accession
of Bismarck to the Outbreak of the Great War. Macmillan.
pp. 6970, 127.
[25] Radzinsky, Edvard (2005). Alexander II: The Last Great
Tsar. Simon and Schuster. p. 200.
[26] Kleinschmidt, Arthur (1898). Drei Jahrhunderte russischer Geschichte. J. Rde. p. 425.
[27] Jelavich, Barbara (2004). Russia and the Formation of the
Romanian National State, 1821-1878. Cambridge University Press. p. 202.
[28] Bresler(1999), pp. 338-339.
[29] Taylor(1988) pp. 104-105
[30] Taylor(1988) pp. 107-108

[4] Taylor, A.J.P. (1988). Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman. Hamish Hamilton. pp. 8083. ISBN 0-241-115655.

[31] Wawro(2003) pp. 22-23.

[5] Jerrold, Blanchard (1882). The Life of Napoleon III.

Longmans, Green & Co. p. 327.

[33] Wawro(2003), p. 34.

[6] Bresler, Fenton (1999). Napoleon III: A Life. Carroll &

Graf. pp. 324325.

[32] Taylor(1988) p. 106

[34] Ridley (1980) p. 558

[35] Bresler(1999), pp. 357-358.

[7] Jerrold(1883). pp. 327330

[36] Wawro(2003), pp. 35-36.

[8] Bresler(1999). p. 340

[37] Ridley (1980) p. 561

[9] Wawro, Georey (2003). The Franco-Prussian War: The

German Conquest of France in 1870-1871. Cambridge
University Press. p. 16. ISBN 0-521-58436-1.

[38] Bresler(1999), p. 363

[39] Bresler(1999), pp. 363-364.

[40] Bresler(1999), pp. 364-365.

[41] Moritz Busch, Bismarck: Some secret pages from his history, Macmillan, New York (1898) Vol. I, p. 37
[42] Howard(1991), p. 60.
[43] Ridley, Jasper (1976). Garibaldi. Viking Press. p. 602.

External links
http://petitsamisdelacommune.chez-alice.fr/
Postcards from the Franco-German War 1870/71
Texts and documents about German-French relations and an essay on the Franco-German war

10

9 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

9.1

Text

Causes of the Franco-Prussian War Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_the_Franco-Prussian_War?oldid=672087355

Contributors: Dogface, The Land, Lacrimosus, Rich Farmbrough, Julius.kusuma, Sherurcij, Axeman89, Rjwilmsi, Dcheng, Str1977, RussBot, Victor falk, Melchoir, Je5102, Colonies Chris, Egsan Bacon, Iridescent, Murgh, Italus, Faizhaider, CommonsDelinker, DrKiernan,
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Piron, Frietjes, Blaue Max, Zhmr, DavidLeighEllis, Monkbot and Anonymous: 21

9.2

Images

File:Commons-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: ? Contributors: ? Original

artist: ?
File:Flag_of_Germany.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/b/ba/Flag_of_Germany.svg License: PD Contributors: ?
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File:Gedenkstein_Emser_Depesche.jpg Source:
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File:Jules_Favre_1865_Nadar.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d1/Jules_Favre_1865_Nadar.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Map-NDB.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f7/Map-NDB.svg License: CC BY-SA 2.5 Contributors:
Based on map data of the IEG-Maps project (Andreas Kunz, B. Johnen and Joachim Robert Moeschl: University of Mainz) - http://www.
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File:Napoleon3.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e6/Napoleon3.jpg License: Public domain Contributors:
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File:Otto_von_Bismarck.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e5/Otto_von_Bismarck.JPG License: Public
domain Contributors: Evert A. Duykinck, A Portrait Gallery of Eminent Men and Women of Europe and America, with Biographies. New
York: Johnson, Wilson and Company. http://www.jamessmithnoelcollection.org/images/otto%20von%20bismarck.jpg Original artist:
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9.3

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