Set 2 Case Digest Consti

SET 2 CASE DIGEST
Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada
Constitutional law 1
Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: The Concept of the State - Sovereignty
Title: THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN (GRP) , G.R. No. 183591
The respondent moved to dismiss the case. The

respondent argued that there is no justiciable controversy
that is ripe for judicial review stating MOA-AD remains to
be a proposal that does not automatically create legally
demandable rights and obligations until the operative
acts required have been duly complied with.
Issues:
Facts:
This case is in relation to writ of injunction and temporary
restraining order filed by the Province of North Cotabato
against the Government of the Philippines Peace Panel
(GRP) regarding MOA-AD (Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain) between the GRP and MILF.
1. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the

MOA is ripe for adjudication?
2. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of
the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA?
The petitioners are invoking their right to information on

public concerns, seek to compel the GRP to provide them
the complete copies on the MOA-AD. Petitioner also
prayed that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
3. Is MOA-AD unconstitutional?
Due to the writ of injunction issued, the signing of the

agreement did not materialize.
Answer to issue #1. Yes,. Concrete acts under the MOAAD are not necessary to render the present controversy
ripe.
By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a

Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing
public respondents and their agents to cease and desist
from formally signing the MOA-AD. The Court also
required the respondent to submit to the Court and
petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the MOAAD, to which the respondent complied.
Court Ruling:
The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of

respondents to consult the local government units or
communities affected constitutes a departure by
respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3.
Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the
mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by

any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial
review.
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the nonsigning of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of
the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the
Court finds that the present petitions provide an
exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of
(a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the
exceptional character of the situation and paramount
public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
(d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
Answer to issue #2. Yes,. There was a grave abuse of
discretion.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to
carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated
by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act
No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was
designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of
the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
Answer to issue #3. Yes,. MOA-AD is contrary to law and
is unconstitutional.
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The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing

an associative relationship between the BJE and the
Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated
March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace
panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the
Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.
Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is
authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an
act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves
through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment
process is through an undue influence or interference
with that process.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international
agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the
Philippines under international law, respondents' act of
guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a
constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally
defective.
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Issue:
Topic: The Concept of the State - Territory
1. Had the RA 9522 resulted in a reduction to Philippine

territory by excluding Kalayaan Island Group and
Scarborough Shoal?
Title: PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, ET AL. VS.

HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, G.R No. 187167
2. Is Republic Act 9522 unconstitutional?

Facts:
Court Ruling:
Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et al., filed a writ of
certiorari and prohibition for the passage of Republic Act
No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic
baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby
territories in compliance with UNCLOS III.
In compliance of these requirements, RA 9522 shortened
one baseline, optimized the location of some base points
around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and
the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose
islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the RA
9522 as it reduces the Philippine maritime territory and
asserted RA 9522 undermines the sovereignty and
national security by opening the countrys maritime
passage by all vessels and aircrafts.
Answer to Issue # 1. No. The RA 9522 did not reduce

the Philippine territory.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or
loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating,
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e.,
the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the
baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles
from the baselines]), and continental shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits.
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines
would have committed a breach of two provisions of
UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires
that [t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to
any appreciable extent from the general configuration of
the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III
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requires that the length of the baselines shall not exceed

100 nautical miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the
total number of baselines which can reach up to 125
nautical miles.
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed
sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for
several decades, these outlying areas are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline
loped around them from the nearest basepoint will
inevitably depart to an appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago.
Answer to Issue # 2. No. The RA 9522 is consistent with

the Constitution and our national interest.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law
for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as
embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is
therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines
in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the
Constitution and our national interest.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the
Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all
living and nonliving resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community
since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS
III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III,
the international community will of course reject it and will
refuse to be bound by it.

Topic: De Facto Government
Title: CO KIM CHAM vs EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH,
G.R. No. L-5
Facts:
This case was initiated during the transition of
government from the Japanese occupation to US military
occupation in the Philippines. The petitioner Co Kim
Cham filed for a mandamus that the respondent judge of
the lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in
a civil case against Eusebio Tan Keh which happened
during the Japanese occupation.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance on the
civil case filed by Co Kim Cham against Tan Keh based
on the proclamation issued by General Douglas
MacArthur which had the effect of invalidating and
nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgement of the
court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
established during the Japanese military occupation.
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Issue:
Should the Philippine government, the so called
Philippine Republic established during the Japanese
occupation a de facto government and will the judicial
proceedings remain valid?
and proceedings of the courts of justice of those
governments, which are not of a political complexion,
were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known
principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law,
remained good and valid after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas
MacArthur.
Court Ruling:
Yes, it is a De Facto government as it was established
and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy
a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is
denominated a government of paramount force.
The government established in the Philippines, under
the so-called Philippine Republic, during Japanese
occupation, was and should be considered as a de facto
government; and that the judicial proceedings conducted
before the courts which had been established in this
country, during said Japanese occupation, are to be
considered legal and valid and enforceable, even after
the liberation of this country by the American forces, as
long as the said judicial proceedings had been
conducted, under the laws of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines
The governments by the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation being de facto
governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts

Topic: The Concept of the State - Parens Patriae
Title: THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS vs EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE
AHORRAS DE MANILA, G.R. No. L-9959
Facts:
On June 3, 1863, Philippines was hit by an earthquake,
due to this event a central relief board was appointed by
the authority of the King of Spain to distribute the money
on the Philippine treasury that were subscribed and paid
amounting to $400,000 as a relief of those damaged by
the earthquake. On 1883, upon the petition of governing
body of El Monte de Piedad, the Philippine Government
allocated $80,000 to El Monte de Piedad from this relief
fund.
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On 1912, after a change of government, on the account

of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands
bring suit to recover from Monte De Piedad the said
amount plus the interest. After due trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of the petitioner.
The respondent made an appeal claiming that the
government is not a proper party to the action. The only
person who cold claim to be damaged are the donors.
Issue:
Can the Philippine government file suit against El Monte
de Piedad to recover the loaned amount?
Consequently, the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring
the action." The earthquake fund was the result or the
accumulation of a great number of small contributions.
The names of the contributors do not appear in the
record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted
with the title to their respective contributions. The
beneficiaries, consisting of the original sufferers and their
heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite
numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the
original sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It
would be impracticable for them to institute an action or
actions either individually or collectively to recover the
$80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily
pursued is for the Government to again assume control
of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was
originally destined.
Court Ruling:
Yes, the Philippine government can file a suit on behalf of
the donors and beneficiaries of the relief funds as Parens
Patriae.
The Governments of Spain and of the Philippine Islands
in complying with their duties conferred upon them by
law, acted in their governmental capacities in attempting
to carry out the intention of the contributors. It will this be
seen that those governments were something more, as
we have said, than mere trustees of the fund.
It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only
persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment
to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the
cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither.

Topic: The Concept of the State - Doctrine of Parens
Patriae
Title: ELISEO F. SORIANO vs MA. CONSOLIZA P.
LAGUARDIA, G.R. No. 164785
Facts:
Eliseo F. Soriano filed a motion for reconsideration for the

three-month suspension rendered by MTRCB on the
television show Ang Dating Daan to which Elisio
Soriano (petitioner) is the host of that program.
The show was suspended by the MTRCB after the host
of the show who is also the petitioner on this case made
an absurd utterances when he was provoked by the INC
ministers.
The petitioner claimed that his religious program is per se
beyond the review by the MTRCB. He claims a
suppression of his freedom to exercise his religious belief
and profession. He submits that the choice of words he
used has been harsh but strongly maintains that the
same was consistent with his constitutional right of
freedom of speech and religion.
He claimed there was no representation before MTRCB
and there was no due process of law.
Issue:
Can the state interfere on matters pertaining to
expressing freedom of speech and freedom to exercise
religious belief?
Court Ruling:
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Yes, with State as applying the doctrine of Parens
Patriae.
Petitioner next harps on the primacy of his freedoms,
referring particularly to the exercise of his religious beliefs
and profession, as presiding minister of his flock, over the
right and duty of the state as parens patriae. Petitioners
position may be accorded some cogency, but for the fact
that it fails to consider that the medium he used to make
his statements was a television broadcast, which is
accessible to children of virtually all ages. As already laid
down in the Decision subject of this recourse, the interest
of the government in protecting children who may be
subjected to petitioners invectives must take precedence
over his desire to air publicly his dirty laundry.
The public soapbox that is television must be guarded by
the state, which purpose the MTRCB serves, and has
served, in suspending Ang Dating Daan for petitioners
statements. As emphasized in Gonzalez v. Kalaw
Katigbak,4 the freedom of broadcast media is, in terms of
degree of protection it deserves, lesser in scope,
especially as regards television, which reaches every
home where there is a set, and where children will likely
be among the avid viewers of the programs shown.
The same case also laid the basis for the classification
system of the MTRCB when it stated, "It cannot be
denied though that the State as parens patriae is called
upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of
the young.
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As stressed at every possible turn in the challenged

Courts Decision, the defining standards to be employed
in judging the harmful effects of the statements petitioner
used would be those for the average child, not those for
the average adult. We note that the ratings and
regulation of television broadcasts take into account the
protection of the child, and it is from the childs narrow
viewpoint that the utterances must be considered, if not
measured. The ratings "G," "PG" (parental guidance),
"PG-13," and "R" (restricted or for adults only) suggest as
much. The concern was then, as now, that the program
petitioner hosted and produced would reach an
unintended audience, the average child, and so it is how
this audience would view his words that matters. The
average child would not be concerned with colorful
speech, but, instead, focus on the literal, everyday
meaning of words used. It was this literal approach that
rendered petitioners utterances obscene.
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus based
on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the
enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the
Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime
of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the sovereignty
of the legitimate government in the Philippines and,
consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino
citizens thereto was then suspended; and that there was
a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
Issue:
Can the charge of treason be suspended when there is
change of sovereignty?
Court Ruling:
No, because it is an offense against the same
government and the same sovereign people.

Topic: The Concept of the State - De Facto
Government
Title: ANASTACIO LAUREL vs ERIBERTO MISA, G.R.
No. L-409
Facts:
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the

exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate
government in the territory occupied by the enemy
military forces, because the authority of the legitimate
power to govern has passed into the hands of the
occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political
laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and
obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or
in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason
that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted

legitimate government, they are inoperative or not
applicable to the government established by the
occupant; that the crimes against national security, such
as treason and espionage; inciting to war,
correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's
country, as well as those against public order, such as
rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of
firearms, which are of political complexion because they
bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal
Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are
also suspended or become inapplicable as against the
occupant, because they can not be committed against
the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and
that, while the offenses against public order to be
preserved by the legitimate government were
inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the
reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also
inoperative as against the ousted government for the
latter was not responsible for the preservation of the
public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the
said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason
committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied
territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter
during the enemy occupation
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution which provides that pending
the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of
the United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe
allegiance to the United States", was one of the few
limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people
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retained by the United States, but these limitations do not
away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the
same way that the people of each State of the Union
preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of
the United States conferred upon the latter by the States;
that just as to reason may be committed against the
Federal as well as against the State Government, in the
same way treason may have been committed during the
Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the
United States as well as against the sovereignty of the
Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our
form of government from Commonwealth to Republic
does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the
crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth,
because it is an offense against the same government
and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our
Constitution provides that "The government established
by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth
of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and
the proclamation of Philippine independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be
known as the Republic of the Philippines";

Topic: The Doctrine of State Immunity
Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON.
GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, G.R. No. L-30671
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and
prohibition proceedings challenged the validity of the writ
of execution to garnish the funds of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines issued by the respondent Judge
Guillermo Villasor.
The petitioner alleged ground of being excess of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion and prayed that
the writ of execution must be nullified.
Judge Guillermo Villasor on a Special Proceedings
favored P.J Kiener Co., Gavino Unchuan and
International Construction Corporation against the
petitioner, confirming the arbitration award in the amount
of Php 1, 712, 396.40. Judge Villasor, issued an order
declaring the decision final and executory, directing the
Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City, as well as Manila
to execute the said decision.
The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on
deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine
Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their
branches are public funds duly appropriated and
allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and
allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, as per Certification by the AFP Controller.
Issue:
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Can the funds of AFP be part of garnishment

proceedings?
Court Ruling:
No, the AFP funds could not be part of garnishment
proceedings.
A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from
a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object
of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent
to be sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when
the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and
public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed
to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law."
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Magasaysay and was reserved for settlement
purposes.Under the administration of NARRA, a tract of
land situated in the Municipality of Tinambac and Siruma,
Camarines Sur, the Land Authority started sub-diving and
distributing the land to the settlers.

Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PABLO
FELICIANO , G.R. No. 70853
Facts:
On the ground of non-suability of the State, the Republic
of the Philppines, as the petitioner seeks the review of
the Intermediate Appellate Court and reversing the order
of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur which
dismissed the complaint of the
respondent Pablo
Feliciano for the recovery of ownership and possession
of parcel of land.
History of the case:
Pablo Feliciano bought a land consisting of 4 lots (Lot 1,
Lot 2, Lot 3 and Lot 4) inTinambac, Camarines Sur which
is covered by Proclamation No. 90 of Ramon
Because of this, Pablo Feliciano filed for recovery of

ownership and possession of a parcel of land and
prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of
the property in question and that the defendant be
ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.
The trial court rendered a decision that Lot No. 1 to be
the private property of Pablo Feliciano and lots 2, 3 and 4
reverted to the public domain.
A group of settlers on the questioned property intervened
and alleging among other things that they had been in
possession of the land in question for more than 20 years
under claim of ownership. The intervenor filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground the State cannot be sued
without its consent.
Issue:
In the case at bar, can the state invoke its immunity from
suit for the recovery of property?
Court Ruling:
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We find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of nonsuability of the State has proper application in this case.
The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing
the State to court just like any private person who is
claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the
recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action
in personam. It is an action directed against a specific
party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only
such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the
private respondent herein, is directed against the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic
Act No. 3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the
complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under
settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a
showing that the State has consented to be sued, either
expressly or by implication through the use of statutory
language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such
showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself
fails to allege the existence of such consent. This is a
fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should
have been dismissed.
The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of
immunity from suit when the case was tried before the
court a quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal.
It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked by
the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings."
There is no showing in the case at bar that the

informacion posesoria held by the respondent had been
converted into a record of ownership. Such possessory
information, therefore, remained at best mere prima facie
evidence of possession. Using this possessory
information, the respondent could have applied for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public
Land Act, which is an action in rem. However, having
failed to do so, it is rather late for him to pursue this
avenue at this time. Respondent must also contend, as
the records disclose, with the fact admitted by him and
stated in the decision of the Court a quo that settlers
have been occupying and cultivating the land in question
since even before the outbreak of the war, which puts in
grave doubt his own claim of possession.

Title: DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE vs THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R.
No. 104269
Facts:
This case is relation to labor issue filed to National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) by Sultan Security
Agency who entered into contract with the Department of
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Agriculture for security services provided by Sultan

Security Agency.
appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the

decision became final and executory.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner charges the

NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to
quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the
NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim
against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More
importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has
disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the
State.
The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution commanding

the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment
against the property Department of Agriculture. The City
Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the
petitioner, i.e. one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit
Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one (1) unit Toyota Crown. 6
These units were put under the custody of the property
custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public
auction or the final settlement of the case, whichever
would come first.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that

the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit
by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security
Agency.
Antecedent facts:
Several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a
complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of
13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as
for damages.
The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding
herein petitioner and jointly and severally liable with
Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims,
aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security
guards. The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with

prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the
petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ
issued was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly
acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that,
therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and
void and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed
equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also
pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property
would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental
functions to the prejudice of the public good.
Issues:
1. Having established the fact the Department of
Agriculture entered into a contract with Sultan
Security Agency, would it make Department of

Agriculture suable?
2. Can their property be the object of execution
should their be liability?
Court Ruling:
Answer to issue # 1. No. Department of Agriculture can
invoke its immunity from suit.
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not
pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its
being a governmental entity when it entered into the
questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact,
performed any act proprietary in character.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a state
may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can this be deemed to have actually given
its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts.
It does not apply where the contracts relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the
projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of
the highest order; they are not utilized for not dedicated
to commercial or business purposes.
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Answer to issue # 2.
Claimants have to prosecute their money claims against
the Government under Commonwealth Act 327, stating
that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law
waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to the
general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that "no
execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by
any Court against the Government of the (Philippines),
and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act
327 for filing money claims against the Government must
be strictly observed.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent
to be sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when
the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs or execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the correspondent
appropriation as required by law. The functions and
public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed
to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Title: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs HON. JUDGE
JAVIER PABALAN, G.R. No. L-33112
Facts:
This is a certiorari and prohibition proceeding initiated by
Philippine National Bank against Judge Javier Pabalan
who issued a writ of execution and notice of garnishment
of the funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
deposited on one of the branches of Philippine National
Bank.
PNB invoked the Doctrine of Non-Suability and asserted
that the fund
of Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration deposited in PNB is public in character.
Issue:
Can the funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration deposited in Philippine National Bank be
garnished?
Court Ruling:
Funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued
were not exempt from garnishment.
If the funds appertained to one of the regular
departments or offices in the government, then, certainly,
such a provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is
not the case here. Garnishment would lie. Only last
January, as noted in the opening paragraph of this
decision, this Court, in a case brought by the same
petitioner precisely invoking such a doctrine, left no doubt
that the funds of public corporations could properly be
made the object of a notice of garnishment. Accordingly,
this petition must fail.

Title: MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC vs
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of
CUSTOMS, G.R. No. L-23139
Facts:
This is a suit initiated by Mobile Philippines Exploration
Inc. against Customs Arrastre Service and Bureau of
Customs.
Mobile Philippines expected 4 cases of rotary drill parts

which were shipped from abroad but they received only 3
cases. This is a suit to recover the value of undelivered
case of rotary drill parts in the amount of P18,493.37 plus
other damages.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that not being persons under the law,
defendants cannot be sued.
Mobile Philippines contends that not all government
entities are immune from suit, that Bureau of Customs as
operator of the arrastre service is discharging proprietary
functions and as such, can be sued by private
individuals.
Issue:
In the case at bar, can the Bureau of Customs be sued?
Court Ruling:
No, since doing the arrastre service is a necessary
incident of the primary and governmental function of the
Bureau of Customs.
The situation here is not materially different. The Bureau
of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of
Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with no personality
of its own apart from that of the national government. Its
primary function is governmental, that of assessing and
collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and
penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937).
To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident.
For practical reasons said revenues and customs duties
can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving
the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration
of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty
provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities and
officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the
merchandise actually landed.
And this checking up requires that the landed
merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable
place in the customs premises to enable said customs
officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operations.
Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be
deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the
primary and governmental function of the Bureau of
Customs, so that engaging in the same does not
necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For
otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function
without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign
immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as
to the necessary means to that end.

SET 2 CASE DIGEST
Title: NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION vs JOSE

TEODORO, SR, G.R. No. L-5122
Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not
possessing juridical personality under the law, is
incapable of suing and being sued.
Facts:
Issue:
This case was in effect to the abolishment of National
Airports Corporation by Executive Order No. 365. To take
its place Civil Aviation Authority was created.
Before the National Airport Corporations was abolished,
Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airport
Corporation P65,245 as fees for landing and parking on
Bacolod Airport no. 2 for the period up to and including
July 31, 1948. National Airports Corporations since
already abolished, was not able to make any payment to
Capitol Subdivision Inc. who is the owner of the land
used as airport. Therefore, the owner of the land, Capitol
Subdivision Inc, filed a case against Philippine Airlines.
Philippe Airlines countered a 3rd party complaint against
National Airport Corporation, by that time already
dissolved, and served summon to Civil Aeronautics
Administration. Philippine Airlines believes that National
Airport Corporations and its predecessors in interest
should pay the Capitol Subdivision Inc. the reasonable
rentals for the use of their land.
The counsel of the National Airports Corporation filed a
motion to dismiss the ground that the court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain a 3rd-party complaint first,
because the National Airports Corporation "has lost its
juridical personality," and, second, because agency of the
Can Civil Aviation Authority be sued?

Court Ruling:
Yes, Civil Aviation Authority. The power to sue and be
sued is implied from the power to transact private
business.
Section 7 of Executive Order No. 365 reads:
All records, properties, equipment, assets, rights, choses
in action, obligations, liabilities and contracts of the
National Airport Corporation abolished under this Order,
are hereby transferred to, vested in, and assumed by, the
Civil Aeronautics Administration. All works, construction,
and improvements made by the National Airports
Corporation or any agency of the National Government in
or upon government airfields, including all appropriations
or the unreleased and unexpended balances thereof,
shall likewise be transferred to the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.
Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration are, under Section 3, to execute contracts
of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant
concession rights, and under Section 4, to charge landing

fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline,
accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use of any
property under its management.
These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, in our opinion, the power to sue and be
sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the
power to transact private business. And if it has the
power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration with greater reason should
have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and
against the National Airports Corporation, having
acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action
and assumed all the liabilities of the latter.
To deny the National Airports Corporation's creditors
access to the courts of justice against the Civil
Aeronautics Administration is to say that the government
could impair the obligation of its corporations by the
simple expedient of converting them into unincorporated
agencies.
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the
category of a private entity. Although not a body
corporate it was created, like the National Airports
Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of
government, but to run what is essentially a business,
even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the
promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling
public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from
being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private
concerns.
The Philippine Airlines' third party-complaint is premised
on the assumption that the National Airports Corporation
is still in existence, at least for the limited object of
winding up its affairs under Section 77 of the Corporation
Law. Our opinion is that by its abolition that corporation
stands abolished for all purposes. No trustees, assignees
or receivers have been designated to make a liquidation
and, what is more, there is nothing to liquidate.
Everything the National Airports Corporation had, has
been taken over by the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
To all legal intents and practical purposes, the National
Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics
Administration is its heir or legal representative, acting by
the law of its creation upon its own rights and in its own
name. The better practice then should have been to
make the Civil Aeronautics Administration the third party
defendant instead of the National Airports Corporation.
The error, however, is purely procedural, not put in issue,
and may be corrected by amendment of the pleadings if
deemed necessary.

Title: MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION
vs HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, G.R. No. L-52179
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
Judge Romeo N. Firmes decision:
Facts:
IN VIEW OF ALL OF (sic) THE FOREGOING,

judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs, and
defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly
and severally, plaintiffs Juana Rimando-Bania,
Mrs. Priscilla B. Surell, Laureano Bania Jr., Sor
Marietta Bania, Mrs. Fe B. Soriano, Montano
Bania, Orja Bania and Lydia B. Bania the
sums of P1,500.00 as funeral expenses and
P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of the
late Laureano Bania Sr., P30,000.00 as moral
damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's fees.
Costs against said defendants.
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union filed a petition for

certiorari with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
mandatory injection seeking the nullification or
modification of the proceedings and the orders issued by
the responded Judge Romeo N. Firme.
Antecedent Facts:
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney and a
sand and gravel truck and a dump truck of Municipality of
San Fernando and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the
impact, several passengers of the jeepney including
Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they
sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of
physical injuries.
The private respondents filed a complaint for damages
against the owner and the driver of the passenger
jeepney, however the defendants filed a 3rd-party
complaint against the Municipality of San Fernando and
the driver of the dump truck.
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union filed its answer
and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of
action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of
action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the
passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the
collision.
The Complaint is dismissed as to defendants

Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo
Balagot.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)
Issue:
1. Whether or not the respondent court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it
deferred and failed to resolve the defense of
non-suability of the State amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
2. Is the State liable for torts committed by its
employee?
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Court Ruling:
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is

liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of
liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the
driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing
governmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized in
the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla (G. R. No. L-29993,
October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606), the distinction of
powers becomes important for purposes of determining
the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents
which result in an injury to third persons
In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the

resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State
amounting to lack of jurisdiction until trial. However, said
respondent judge failed to resolve such defense,
proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a
decision against the municipality and its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when in the exercise of its judgment it
arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability
of the State in the guise of the municipality. However,
said judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his
decision dated October 10, 1979 he held the municipality
liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular
employee.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly
provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution,
to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and
cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged
in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the
sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are
subject to suit even in the performance of such functions
because their charter provided that they can sue and be
sued. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, p. 39)
It has already been remarked that municipal

corporations are suable because their charters grant
them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless,
they are generally not liable for torts committed by them
in the discharge of governmental functions and can be
held answerable only if it can be shown that they were
acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities
to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right
to show that the defendant was not acting in its
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or
that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by
law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. (Cruz,
supra, p. 44.)
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the
municipality insists that "he was on his way to the
Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the
repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." (Rollo, p.
29.)
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the

regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed
pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the
dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to
his office.
the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true

that the collision was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the
defendant for the sum of P14,741.
There was a waiver from the government of immunity
from suit.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by
the Philippine Legislature, that:
SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to

bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila against the Government of the
Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility
for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital, and to
determine the amount of the damages, if any, to
which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said
collision, and the Attorney-General of the
Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the
Government of said Islands, to defendant said
Government at the same.
Topic: The Doctrine of State Immunity - Non-Suability

is Waived
Title: E. MERRITT vs GOVERNMENT
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, G.R. No. L-11154
OF
THE
Facts:
This case is an appeal of both parties from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor
of Merrit again the Government of the Philippine Islands .
Counsel for the plaintiff complaint for limiting general
damagaes. Whilst, the Attorney-General on behalf of
Government of the Philippine Islands urges that the the
trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between
the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the
Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by
SEC. 2.
passage.
This Act shall take effect on its
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
Issue:
Since Government of the Philippine Islands expressly

waived its immunity from suit, will the State be liable for
the damage due to the tort of its agent ?
Court Ruling:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a
special agent, but not when the damage should have
been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained
to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of
the preceding article shall be applicable
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article
1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent
(and a special agent, in the sense in which these words
are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties
of his office if he is a special official) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an
agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an
employee of the acting administration and who on his
own responsibility performs the functions which are
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which
are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme
Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil
Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among
others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the
responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to
the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or
omissions imputable to a public official charged with
some administrative or technical office who can be held
to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by
the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court
in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the
payment of damages, caused by an official of the second
class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation
infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the
Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122
Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government
of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the
above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain,
for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when
they act as special agents within the meaning of
paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur
of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such
an agent.

Title: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs
ELIODORO B. GUINTO, G.R. No. 76607
HON.
Facts:
This is a suite against US Air Force officials n relation to a
bidding conducted for a barber services in their station at
Clark Air Base. The United States of America was not
impleaded in the complaints but has moved to dismiss on
the ground that it is in effect suit against USA to which it
has not consented. It is now contesting the denial of its
motions by the respondent judges.
The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over other
bidders who claimed that Dizon made a bid for four
facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was
not included in the invitation to bid.
The other bidders complained to the Philippine Area
Exchange (PHAX). PHAX, explained that the Civil
Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon
as a result of the February 24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon
was already operating this concession and the expiration
of the contract had been extended from June 30, 1986 to
August 31, 1986. They further explained that the
solicitation of the CE barbershop would be available only
by the end of June and the private respondents would be
notified.
The other bidders filed a complaint to compel PHAX and
the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to
conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and
to allow them by a writ of preliminary injunction to
continue operating the concessions pending litigation.
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to

the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that
the action was in effect a suit against the United States of
America, which had not waived its non-suability. The
individual defendants, as official employees of the U.S.
Air Force, were also immune from suit.
On the same date, July 22, 1986, the trial court denied
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 10, 1988, the trial court denied the
petitioners' motion to dismiss, holding in part as follows:
From the pleadings thus far presented to this
Court by the parties, the Court's attention is called
by the relationship between the plaintiffs as well as
the defendants, including the US Government, in
that prior to the bidding or solicitation in question,
there was a binding contract between the plaintiffs
as well as the defendants, including the US
Government. By virtue of said contract of
concession it is the Court's understanding that
neither the US Government nor the herein
principal
defendants
would
become
the
employer/s of the plaintiffs but that the latter are
the employers themselves of the barbers, etc. with
the employer, the plaintiffs herein, remitting the
stipulated percentage of commissions to the
Philippine
Area
Exchange.
The
same
circumstance would become in effect when the
Philippine Area Exchange opened for bidding or
solicitation
the
questioned
barber
shop
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
concessions. To this extent, therefore, indeed a

commercial transaction has been entered, and for
purposes of the said solicitation, would necessarily
be entered between the plaintiffs as well as the
defendants.
so, all the barbershop concessionaires are under the

terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United
States government fixed commissions in consideration of
the exclusive concessions granted to them in their
respective areas.
The Court, further, is of the view that Article XVIII

of the RP-US Bases Agreement does not cover
such kind of services falling under the
concessionaireship, such as a barber shop
concession.
This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any

immunity from the complaint filed by the private
respondents in the court below. The contracts in question
being decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in
the United States of America v. Ruiz case cannot be
applied here.
Issue:
Can the US invoke their state immunity?
Court Ruling:
Concerning G.R. No. 76607, we also find that the
barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the
United States government are commercial enterprises
operated by private person's. They are not agencies of
the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities
demandable as a matter of right by the American
servicemen. These establishments provide for the
grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the
basic haircut and shave (as required in most military
organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo,
massage, manicure and other similar indulgences. And
all for a fee. Interestingly, one of the concessionaires,
private respondent Valencia, was even sent abroad to
improve his tonsorial business, presumably for the
benefit of his customers. No less significantly, if not more

Title: THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs JAMES
VINZON, G.R. No. 154705
Facts:
Republic of Indonesia filed a petition for review on
certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
in relation to a suit against the petitioner regarding a
breach of maintenance agreement with James Vinzon of
Vinzon Trade and Services.
The agreement stipulated that Vinzon Trade and Services
shall maintain specified equipment at the Indonesia
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
Embassy main building.

It also specified hat the
agreement shall be effective for a period of four years
and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by
either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from
the date of expiry.
Prior to expiry date of the agreement, Vinzon Trade and
Services was informed by the Indonesia Embassy that
the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of
the incoming Chief of Administration. When the Chief of
Administration assumed the position he allegedly found
respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in
compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance
Agreement. Hence, they terminated the agreement which
is already months delayed after the contract expiry date.
Respondents
Opposition
likewise
alleged
that
Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim
can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for
tortious acts done with malice and bad faith.
On May 17, 2001, the trial court denied herein petitioners
Motion to Dismiss. It likewise denied the Motion for
Reconsideration subsequently filed.
Issue:
Having established that the Embassy of Indonessia have
engaged into contract, has it waives it immunity from
suit?
Vinzon Trade and Services find this unlawful and filed a

suit against the Embassy of Indonesia.
Court Ruling:
The Embassy filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the

Republic of Indonesia, as a foeign sovereign State, has
sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a
party-defendant in the Philippines.
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must

be clear and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by
necessary implication. We find no such waiver in this
case.
Vinzon opposed to the said motion alleging that the

Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity
from suit. He based this claim upon the following
provision in the Maintenance Agreement:
Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance
Agreement shall be settled according to the laws
of the Philippines and by the proper court of
Makati City, Philippines.
Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a

contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be
construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an
act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start
of the inquiry. Is the foreign State engaged in the regular
conduct of a business? If the foreign State is not
engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity,
and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged,
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its

nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii.
Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract
stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement
shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines
and by a specified court of the Philippines is not
necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. The
aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily
inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the other hand,
such provision may also be meant to apply where the
sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or
otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act.
The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to
include Philippine laws in its totality, including the
principle recognizing sovereign immunity. Hence, the
proper court may have no proper action, by way of
settling the case, except to dismiss it.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, submits the view
that, the Maintenance Agreement was entered into by the
Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its
governmental functions. In such a case, it cannot be
deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. As to the
paragraph in the agreement relied upon by respondent,
the Solicitor General states that it was not a waiver of
their immunity from suit but a mere stipulation that in the
event they do waive their immunity, Philippine laws shall
govern the resolution of any legal action arising out of the
agreement and the proper court in Makati City shall be
the agreed venue thereof.

Title: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs HON. V. M.
RUIZ, G.R. No. L-35645
Facts:
This is a petition filed by the United State of America to
review and restrain the respondent judge, Hon. V.M.
Ruiz, from trying Civil Case no. 779-M on the Court of
First Instance in Rizal.
The Civil Case no. 779-M was filed by Eligio de Guzman
and Co. who claimed to have a contract with the US
Navy having a naval base on Subic, Philippines as part of
the Military Base Agreement between the Philippines and
the United States. The contract Eligio de Guzman and
Co. claiming for is for the repair of the wharves.
This contract however was not materialize as Eligio de
Guzman and Co. received a letter from the US Navy
stipulating Eligio de Guzman and Co. do not qualify to be
granted with the contract for the repair of the wharves of
the US Naval base.
Eligio de Guzman and Co. filed a suit against the USA
and Messrs. James Galloway and William Collins (all
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
members of the Engineering Command of the US Navy).

The complaint was to allow them to perform the work and
if their performance is no longer possible, they must be
paid with the damages. Eligio de Guzman and Co. also
asked for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
defendants from entering into contracts with the third
parties for work on the projects.
projects are an integral part of the naval base which is

devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of
the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated
to commercial or business purposes.
The lower court favored Eligio de Guzman and Co. hence

the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the
proceeding of Civil Case no. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction
on the part of Trial Court.

Title: FERNANDO A. FROILAN vs PAN ORIENTAL
SHIPPING CO, G.R. No. L-6060
Issue:
Can the USA Navy invoke state of immunity from suit?
Court Ruling:
Yes. The officers of the US Navy was performing a
governmental functions.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State
may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given
its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to
the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the
Facts:
Fernando A. Froilan purchased a vessel for FS-197 for
P200,000 from the Shipping Commission, paid only
P50,000 as down payment and the balance will be paid
in installment.
To secure the payment of the balance, he executed a
chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping
Commission.
Froilan was not able to pay the mortgage, Shipping
Commission took possession of said vessel and
considered the contract of sale cancelled. Shipping
Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines.
Froilan appealed the action of the Shipping Commission

to the President of the Philippines and on its meeting, the
Cabinet restored him of all his rights under his original
contact with the Shipping Commission.
Froilan had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but
the latter refused to do so. He, therefore, prayed that,
upon the approval of the bond accompanying his
complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of
said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances,
and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful
possession thereof.
The Court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by
Froilan.
Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed its answer denying the
right of Froilan to the possession of the said vessel; it
alleged that the action of the Cabinet on August 25, 1950,
restoring Froilan to his rights under his original contract
with the Shipping Commission was null and void; that, in
any event, Froilan had not complied with the conditions
precedent imposed by the Cabinet for the restoration of
his rights to the vessel under the original contract; that it
suffered damages in the amount of P22,764.59 for
wrongful replevin in the month of February, 1951, and the
sum of P17,651.84 a month as damages suffered for
wrongful replevin from March 1, 1951; it alleged that it
had incurred necessary and useful expenses on the
vessel amounting to P127,057.31 and claimed the right
to retain said vessel until its useful and necessary
expenses had been reimbursed
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Government of the Republic of the Philippines, filed a

complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan failed to pay
to the Shipping Commission the balance due on the
purchase price of the vessel in question, that Shipping
Commission was entitled to the possession of the said
vessel either under the terms of the original contract as
supplemented by Froilan's letter dated January 28, 1949,
or in order that it may cause the extrajudicial sale thereof
under the Chattel Mortgage Law.
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines ,
therefore, prayed that Froilan be ordered to deliver the
vessel in question to its authorized representative, the
Board of Liquidators; that Froilan be declared to be
without any rights on said vessel and the amounts he
paid thereon forfeited or alternately, that the said vessel
be delivered to the Board of Liquidators in order that the
intervenor may have its chattel mortgage extrajudicially
foreclosed in accordance with the provisions of the
Chattel Mortgage Law; and that pending the hearing on
the merits, the said vessel be delivered to it .
On May 10, 1952, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim of
the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against it on the ground
that the purpose of said counterclaim was to compel the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines to deliver
the vessel to it (Pan Oriental Shipping Co.) in the event
that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
recovers the vessel in question from Froilan. In view,
however, of the order of the lower court dated February
3, holding that the payment made by Froilan to the Board
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of Liquidators constituted full payment of Froilan's

obligation to the Shipping Administration, which order had
already become final, the claim of the Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. against the Republic of the Philippines was
no longer feasible, said counterclaim was barred by prior
judgment and stated no cause of action. It was also
alleged that movant was not subject to the jurisdiction of
the court in connection with the counterclaim.
"No direct suit can be maintained against the

United States. But when an action is brought by
the United States to recover money in the hands
of a party who has a legal claim against them, it
would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the
right of setting up such claim in a court of justice,
and turn him around to an application to
Congress." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth
Ed., pp. 36-37, citing U. S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet.
150, 8 L. ed. 899.)
Issue:
Can Shipping Commission invoke its immunity from suit?
Court Ruling:
The other ground for dismissing the defendant's
counterclaim is that the State is immune from suit. This is
untenable, because by filing its complaint in intervention
the Government in effect waived its right of non-suability.
The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it
of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The
state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of
actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the
initiative in an action against a private party, the state
surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the
level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires,
within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims
and other defenses he might have against the state. The
United States Supreme Court thus explains:
It is however, contended for the intervenor that, if there

was at all any waiver, it was in favor of the plaintiff
against whom the complaint in intervention was directed.
This contention is untenable. As already stated, the
complaint in intervention was in a sense in derogation of
the defendant's claim over the possession of the vessel
in question.

Title: VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs NICOLAS CUENCA,
G.R. No. L-26400
Facts:
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This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of

Instance of Cebu dismissing the complaint of Victoria
Amigable.
Antecedent Facts:
Victoria Amigable owned a registered lot. Amigable have
Transfer Certificate of Title which supersedes the
Transfer Certiticate of Title issue to her by the Register of
Deeds of Cebu, with no annotation in favor of the
government of any right or interest in the property
appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a
portion of the said lot for the construction of the Mango
and Gorordo Avenues.
Amigables consel wrote to the President of the
Philippines requesting a payment for the portion of the
appropriated lot the by the government. It was endorsed
to the Auditor General who rejected the plea.
Due to the rejection of Amigables plea, she filed a
complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and
Nicolas Cuenca who was then the Coomissioner of
Republic Highways for the recovery of ownership and
possession of the land traversed by the Mango and
Gorordo Avenue. She also sought for payment of
compensatory damages.
The defendant answered , among others, that the action
was premature since the claim not having first filed with
the office of the Auditor General, and the action is a suit
against the government the claim for moral damages
have no valid basis.
The court dismissed the case filed by Amigable on the
ground that , t it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
cause of action for the recovery of possession and
ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the
ground that the government cannot be sued without its
consent; that it had neither original nor appellate
jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim for
compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the
same being a money claim against the government; and
that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed,
nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the
government had not given its consent to be sued.
Issues:
1.Can DPWH invoke its immunity from suit?
2.If they can be sued, will they be liable?
Court Ruling:
Answer to issue # 1. No. DPWH cannot invoke its
immunity from suit in the case at bar..
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of
Cebu, involving a claim for payment of the value of a
portion of land used for the widening of the Gorordo
Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, held that where the government
takes away property from a private landowner for public
use without going through the legal process of

expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government without
thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit without its consent. We there said: .
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the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then
that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still
be appropriately invoked.
Answer to issue # 2:
... . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be

compensated for property taken for public use
were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of
this character should not be summarily dismissed.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen. Had the government
followed the procedure indicated by the governing
law at the time, a complaint would have been filed
by it, and only upon payment of the compensation
fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party
entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may
it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so
condemned, to appropriate the same to the public
use defined in the judgment." If there were an
observance of procedural regularity, petitioners
would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is
unthinkable then that precisely because there was
a failure to abide by what the law requires, the
government would stand to benefit. It is just as
important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to
legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of
law were to be maintained. It is not too much to
say that when the government takes any property
for public use, which is conditioned upon the
payment of just compensation, to be judicially
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to
Considering that no annotation in favor of the

government appears at the back of her certificate of title
and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance
of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant
remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner,
she could bring an action to recover possession of the
portion of land in question at anytime because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since restoration of possession of said portion
by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at
this time because it is now and has been used for road
purposes, the only relief available is for the government
to make due compensation which it could and should
have done years ago. To determine the due
compensation for the land, the basis should be the price
or value thereof at the time of the taking.
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled
thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the
land from the time it was taken up to the time that
payment is made by the government. 3 In addition, the
government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of
which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.

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Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

The respondent moved to dismiss the case. The

1. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the

The petitioners are invoking their right to information on

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Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

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The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing

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Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: The Concept of the State - Territory

1. Had the RA 9522 resulted in a reduction to Philippine

Title: PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, ET AL. VS.

2. Is Republic Act 9522 unconstitutional?

Answer to Issue # 1. No. The RA 9522 did not reduce

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requires that the length of the baselines shall not exceed

Answer to Issue # 2. No. The RA 9522 is consistent with

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

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Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

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Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

On 1912, after a change of government, on the account

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

Eliseo F. Soriano filed a motion for reconsideration for the

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SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

As stressed at every possible turn in the challenged

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted

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Subject: Constitutional Law 1

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Can the funds of AFP be part of garnishment

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Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Because of this, Pablo Feliciano filed for recovery of

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There is no showing in the case at bar that the

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

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Agriculture for security services provided by Sultan

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