RULE 33-38

Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 782 , September 05, 1997
1. Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Chairman of the Committee, suggested that x x x there may be instances where it is very plain that the evidence is
insufficient, but there are also instances where the court is in doubt x x x x it
is the court that will now determine whether a demurrer should be filed or
not after getting the opinion of both sides x x x x If the accused asks for
leave of court and the court supports it, it is good; but x x x if it finds the
motion dilatory, then it denies it. But x x x there should be no waiver if the
demurrer is with leave of court, because there may be a situation where the
court itself may want to dismiss the case x x x x If leave is denied, and the
accused still files the demurrer, then there is waiver (underscoring supplied).
The Committee finally approved the following propositions of the Chief
Justice: (a) The court on its initiative can dismiss the case after giving prior
notice to the prosecution; (b) The accused can file a demurrer only if he is
granted prior leave of court; (c) If the motion for leave or the demurrer is
denied, the accused can present his evidence, and there is no waiver; and,
(d) If the accused files a demurrer without leave, his right to present
evidence is waived.
2. In fine, under the new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the
right to file a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution has rested its case.
If the accused obtained prior leave of court before filing his demurrer, he can
still present evidence if his demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs
without prior leave of court, or after his motion for leave is denied, he waives
his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution. This power to grant leave to the accused
to file a demurrer is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The
purpose is to determine whether the accused in filing his demurrer is merely
stalling the proceedings.
3. In the case at bar, petitioner admits that in the hearing of 20 May 1994 the
trial court denied her motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. In such
case, the only right petitioner has under Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of
Court after having been denied leave to submit a demurrer is to adduce
evidence in her defense. However, even without express leave of the trial
court, nay, after her motion for leave was denied, petitioner insisted on filing
a demurrer instead of presenting evidence in her defense.
4. Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to evidence is
discretionary upon the trial court. But to allow the accused to present
evidence after he was denied prior leave to file demurrer is not discretionary.
Once prior leave is denied and the accused still files his demurrer to
evidence or motion to dismiss, the court no longer has discretion to allow the
accused to present evidence. The only recourse left for the court is to decide
the case on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution. And,
unless there is grave abuse thereof amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, which is not present in the instant case, the trial courts denial of

prior leave to file demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss may not be

disturbed. However, any judgment of conviction by a trial court may still be
elevated by the accused to the appellate court.
Radiowealth Finance Company vs. Del Rosario, 335 SCRA 288 , July
06, 2000
1. Actions; Demurrer to Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Defendants who
present a demurrer to the plaintiffs evidence retain the right to present their
own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them, but if the trial court
agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of
them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to
present their own evidence; Demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations.In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiffs
evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court
disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the
appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal
order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The
appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on
the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.
2. Actions; Remand of Cases; Where the Court of Appeals reversed a demurrer
to evidence rendered by a trial court, it should render judgment on the basis
of the evidence submitted by plaintiff instead of remanding the case for
further proceedings.Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA should have
rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted by the petitioner.
While, the appellate court correctly ruled that the documentary evidence
submitted by the [petitioner] should have been allowed and appreciated x x
x, and that the petitioner presented quite a number of documentary
exhibits x x x enumerated in the appealed order, we agree with petitioner
that the CA had sufficient evidence on record to decide the collection suit. A
remand is not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically
unnecessary on the basis of the facts on record.
Hun Hyung Park vs. Eung Won Choi, 515 SCRA 502 , February 12, 2007
1. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based on either
ones own personal knowledge or on authentic records, or both, as warranted.
The use of the preposition or connotes that either source qualifies as a
sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state, the concurrence of
both sources is more than sufficient. Bearing both a disjunctive and
conjunctive sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a construction that
will exclude the combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of any one
of the alternatives standing alone.
2. The range of permutation is not left to the pleaders liking, but is dependent
on the surrounding nature of the allegations which may warrant that a

verification be based either purely on personal knowledge, or entirely on

authentic records, or on both sources.
3. Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must
never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice. For
what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been made in
good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative.
Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must
never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice. For
what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an
oath[18] to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have
been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative.
4. The Rules, however, require that the petition must be accompanied by
clearly legible duplicate original or true copies of the judgments or final
orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court.
5. When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case
is submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution
as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. At
that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil
aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action
has been waived or reserved.
6. If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly
instituted or the enforcement of civil liability is not waived, the trial court
should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages caused by
the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there is any.
7. For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted.
The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may
adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such
denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there
is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such
aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to
the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil

aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the
crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not
insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.
Mendezona vs. Ozamiz, 376 SCRA 482 , February 06, 2002
1. Actions; New Trial; Newly Discovered Evidence; Requisites.We shall first rule on the issue of whether to consider the testimony of Judge
Durias as newly discovered evidence. A motion for new trial upon the ground
of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is
concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence had been
discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered and
produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c)
the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or
impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably alter the
result. All three (3) requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be
introduced at the new trial.
2. Appeals; If there is a showing that the appellate courts findings of facts
complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion, the Supreme
Court must discard such erroneous findings of facts.Factual findings of the appellate court are generally conclusive on this Court
which is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to
analyze or weigh evidence all over again. However, this rule is not without
exception. If there is a showing that the appellate courts findings of facts
complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion, this Court
must discard such erroneous findings of facts. We find that the exception
applies in the case at bench.
Mesina vs. Meer, 383 SCRA 625 , July 02, 2002
1. Actions; Judgments; Relief from Judgment; Relief from judgment is an
equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional circumstances and
only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present.Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under
exceptional circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence is present. Where the defendant has other available or adequate
remedy such as a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision,
he cannot avail himself of this remedy.
2. Actions; Judgments; Relief from Judgment; The petition for relief must be
filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, and
should be filed with the same court which rendered the decision.Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must
be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment,

final order or other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied

with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioners good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should
be filed with the same court which rendered the decision.
3. Actions; Judgments; Relief from Judgment; As revised, Rule 38 radically
departs from the previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal
Trial Court which decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for
relief.As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows
the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued
the order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old rule, petition for relief
from the judgment or final order of municipal trial courts should be filed with
the regional trial court.
4. Actions; Judgments; Relief from Judgment; The procedural change in Rule 38
is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for municipal and
regional trial courts and designation of municipal/metropolitan trial courts as
courts of record, and that while Rule 38 uses the phrase any court, it refers
only to municipal/metropolitan and regional trial courts; As it stands, neither
the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
allow the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners argue that apart from this change, the present Rule extends the
remedy of relief to include judgments or orders of the Court of Appeals since
the Rule uses the phrase any court. We disagree. The procedural change in
Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for municipal
and regional trial courts and designation of municipal/metropolitan trial
courts as courts of record. While Rule 38 uses the phrase any court, it
refers only to municipal/metropolitan and regional trial courts. The procedure
in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are governed by separate
provisions of the Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be
supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor
the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals allow the remedy of
petition for relief in the Court of Appeals.
5. Actions; Judgments; Relief from Judgment; Equity; The Supreme Court will
not allow a party, in guise of equity, to benefit from its own negligence.As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners allegation
of extrinsic fraud should have been brought at issue in the Metropolitan Trial
Court. If they truly believe that the default of the spouses Mesina prejudiced
their rights, they should have questioned this from the beginning. Yet, they
chose to participate in the proceedings and actively presented their defense.
And their efforts were rewarded as the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in their
favor. When the respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court,
they never raised this issue. Even after the Regional Trial Court reversed the

finding of the MeTC, and the Court of Appeals sustained this reversal,
petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for consideration. This Court will
not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their own negligence.
6. Actions; Judgments; Relief from Judgment; Attorneys; It is a settled rule that
relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects
of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; In exceptional cases, when the
mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, the
Supreme Court affords a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right.Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy
at law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure;
otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of
appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence
or due to mistaken mode of procedure by counsel. Petitioners, however,
place the blame on their counsel and invoke honest mistake of law. They
contend that they lack legal education, hence, were not aware of the
required period for filing an appeal. In exceptional cases, when the mistake
of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, this Court
affords a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this
opportunity is unavailing in the instant case, especially since petitioners
have squandered the various opportunities available to them at the different
stages of this case. Public interest demands an end to every litigation and a
belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no
purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 336 SCRA 475 , July 27, 2000
1. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Summary Judgments; Words and Phrases.A summary judgment is one granted upon motion by a party for an
expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits that there are no important questions
or issues of fact posed (except as to the amount of damages) and therefore,
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
2. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Summary Judgments; Upon a motion for
summary judgment, the sole function of the court is to determine whether or
not there is an issue of fact to be tried, and any doubt as to the existence of
an issue of fact must be resolved against the movantcourts are quite
critical of the papers presented by the moving party but not of the papers in
opposition thereto; If the defense relied upon by the defendant is legally
sufficient and does not appear patently sham, the motion for summary
judgment should be denied.The aforecited rule does not vest in the trial court jurisdiction to summarily
try the issues on depositions and affidavits but gives it limited authority to
render summary judgment only when there is no genuine issue of material
fact at bar. Upon a motion for summary judgment, the sole function of the

court is to determine whether or not there is an issue of fact to be tried, and

any doubt as to the existence of an issue of fact must be resolved against
the movant. Courts are quite critical of the papers presented by the moving
party but not of the papers in opposition thereto. Thus, in ruling on a motion
for summary judgment, the court should take that view of the evidence most
favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving such party the
benefit of all favorable inferences. That one may surmise from plaintiffs
showing that defendant is unlikely to prevail upon a trial is not a sufficient
basis to assume that the allegations of defendant are sham, frivolous or
unsubstantial. If the defense relied upon by the defendant is legally sufficient
and does not appear patently sham, the motion for summary judgment
should be denied.
People vs. Li Ka Kim, 429 SCRA 169 , May 25, 2004
1. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Motions; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Requisites; The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a
new trial are the following.The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are
that(a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if
admitted, would likely change the judgment.
Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 335 SCRA 567 , July
13, 2000
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Relief from Judgment; When a party has
another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial
or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing
such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition;
Petitioner must show that the petition was filed within the reglementary
period which is reckoned from the time the partys counsel receives notice of
the decision.A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed
only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate
remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be
either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial
court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail
himself of this petition. In order for a petition for relief to be entertained by
the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and
strictly complied with the provisions of Rule 38. It is also incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary
period specified in Section 3, Rule 38 (within sixty [60] days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set

aside, and not more than six [6] months after such judgment or final order
was entered, or such proceeding was taken). And the rule is that the
reglementary period is reckoned from the time the partys counsel receives
notice of the decision for notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the
party for purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Relief from Judgment; Failure of a partys
counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to
appeal therefrom is negligence which is not excusable.This Court has consistently held that the failure of a partys counsel to notify
him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is
negligence, which is not excusable. However, notice sent to counsel of
record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to
inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal
is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.
3. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Relief from Judgment; Relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of remedy at law was due to his own negligence.We are not persuaded by the YEES claim that they were denied due process
inasmuch as they were not denied their day in court. In fact, they were able
to prosecute their action and actively participated through counsel in the
proceedings before the lower court. Their failure to file an appeal from the
decision rendering it final and executory is not a denial of due process. They
may have lost their right to appeal but they were not denied their day in
court. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law. In the same manner, the YEES
failure to file their petition for relief within the period provided for under the
Rules is not tantamount to a denial of due process. x x x Relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the
petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been
lost though inexcusable negligence.

Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation vs. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, 461 SCRA 369, June 28, 2005
1. Generally, subsequent compliance with the requirement of affidavit of nonforum shopping does not excuse a party from failure to comply in the first
instance.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which requires the pleader to submit a
certificate of non-forum shopping to be executed by the plaintiff or principal
party is mandatory. A certification of the plaintiffs counsel will not suffice for
the reason that it is petitioner, and not the counsel, who is in the best

position to know whether he actually filed or caused the filing of a petition. A

certification against forum shopping signed by counsel is a defective
certification that is equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement and
constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition. Hence, strictly
speaking, the CA was correct in dismissing the petition.
There are instances, however, when we treated compliance with the rule
with relative liberality, especially when there are circumstances or
compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly
unjustified.
2. The affidavit of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioners counsel. Upon
receipt of the resolution of the CA, however, which dismissed its petition for
non-compliance with the rules on affidavit of non-forum shopping, petitioner
submitted, together with its motion for reconsideration, an affidavit signed
by petitioners president in compliance with the said rule. We deem this to be
sufficient especially in view of the merits of the case, which may be
considered as a special circumstance or a compelling reason that would
justify tempering the hard consequence of the procedural requirement on
non-forum shopping.
3. It is true that petitioner could not move for new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence because in order to have a new trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence, it must be proved that: (a) the evidence was
discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; (c) it is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) it is of such weight
that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. This does not mean
however, that petitioner is altogether barred from having a new trial. As
pointed out by Judge Acosta, the reasons put forth by petitioner could fall
under mistake or excusable negligence.
The mistake that is allowable in Rule 37 is one which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against. Negligence to be excusable must also be
one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against
and by reason of which the rights of an aggrieved party have probably been
impaired. The test of excusable negligence is whether a party has acted with
ordinary prudence while transacting important business.
In this case, it cannot be said that petitioner did not act with ordinary
prudence in claiming its refund with the CTA, in light of its previous cases
with the CTA which did not require invoices and the non-mandatory nature of
CTA Circular No. 1-95.
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals, 458 SCRA 454 , May 16, 2005
1. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Jurisdictions; In gen-eral, in order
for a Court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; Requisites
for Appellate Courts Acquisition of Jurisdiction.-

In general, in order for a Court to have authority to dispose of the case on

the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
parties. Jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the jurisdiction to hear and
decide a case, is conferred by law. Jurisdiction over the person, on the other
hand, is acquired by service of summons or by voluntary appearance. At first
glance and mindful of the rule that the filing of motions seeking affirmative
relief, such as the motion for extension of time to file petition for review filed
by Fernandez in this case, is considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court it may seem at once apparent that the Court of
Appeals had in fact acquired jurisdiction over his person. It has been
repeatedly held that an appearance in whatever form, without expressly
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person. He may appear by presenting a
motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he specifically objects
to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person. As we are dealing here with the jurisdiction of
an appellate court, additional rules are required for jurisdiction to attach
therein, to wit: (1) the petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals within the time for doing so; (2) he must have filed his
petition for review likewise within the time for doing so; (3) he must have
paid the necessary docket fees; and (4) the other parties must have
perfected their appeals in due time.
2. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Jurisdictions; Mere filing of a motion
for extension of time to file a petition for review does not amount to the
appellate court acquiring jurisdiction over the case.The Rule requires that in an appeal by way of Petition For Review, the appeal
is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition
and the payment of docket and other lawful fees. In the discussion of the
Committee on the revision of the Rules of Court, it was emphasized that to
perfect the appeal, the party has to file the petition for review and to pay the
docket fees within the prescribed period. The law and its intent are clear and
unequivocal that the petition is perfected upon its filing and the payment of
the docket fees. Thus, it may be argued, and rightly so, that the Court of
Appeals has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the case because Fernandez
merely filed a motion for extension of time to file petition but not the petition
itself. Withal, sans the petition, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals
has acquired jurisdiction over the case as to say that the trial court is without
authority to act on a motion for new trial. It is axiomatic that if a statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. Indeed, when the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or construction, but only for application. On this point we fully
agree in the position taken by Fernandez that when he filed the motion for
extension of time to file petition for review, jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals had not yet attached, such that his failure to file the petition itself
would normally have the effect of rendering the decision of the lower court
final and executory.

3. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Jurisdictions; New Trial; Where a

motion for new trial has been filed with the trial court during the
reglementary period even after a motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review had been filed with the appellate court, the trial court still
had jurisdiction to rule on the matter.
The consequential question is: what is the legal effect of the filing by
Fernandez of a motion for new trial before the trial court? Assuming that
Fernandez filed his motion for new trial on time, we hold that the trial court
still had jurisdiction to rule on the matter as the jurisdiction it originally
acquired had not yet been lost.
4. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Jurisdictions; Residual Jurisdiction;
Words and Phrases; The residual jurisdiction of the trial court is available at a
stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the
case or the subject matter involved in the appeal; Where no appeal was
perfected and the records of the case have not yet been transmitted to the
Court of Appeals, the case has not as yet attained the residual jurisdiction
stage so as to say that the trial court already lost the jurisdiction it first
acquired and that it is left with only its residual powers.The appellate jurisdiction of the trial court is to be juxtaposed with its
residual jurisdiction as set forth in Rule 42, Section 8(a), 3rd paragraph of the
Rules of Court. Before the Court of Appeals gives due course to a Petition for
Review, the RTC retains jurisdiction for specified instances enumerated
therein, to wit: (1) To issue orders for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal,
such as, the appointment of a receiver, and the issuance of writs of
preliminary attachment or preliminary injunction. (2) To approve
compromises. (3) To permit appeals of indigent litigants. (4) To order
execution pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of Rule 39. (5) To
allow withdrawal of the appeal. The residual jurisdiction of the trial court is
available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This
stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon
the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the
original records or the records on appeal. Considering that no appeal was
perfected in this case and the records of the case have not yet been
transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the case has not as yet attained the
residual jurisdiction stage so as to say that the trial court already lost the
jurisdiction it first acquired and that it is left with only its residual powers.
5. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Jurisdictions; New Trial; A motion
for new trial suspends the running of the period to appeal but does not
extend the time within which an appeal must be perfected.It is without question that Fernandez received a copy of the RTC Decision on
28 June 1994. Fourteen (14) days after the receipt of the decision or
specifically on 12 July 1994, he filed a motion for reconsideration. This
motion was denied by the RTC and the Order of denial was received by

Fernandez on 29 November 1994. Applying Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised

Rules of Court, he had only one (1) day left to file a motion for new trial since
a motion for new trial should be filed within the period to appeal, that is,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment. The motion for new trial
suspends the running of the period to appeal but does not extend the time
within which an appeal must be perfected. Hence if denied, a movant, like
Fernandez in this case has only the balance of the reglementary period
within which to appeal. It bears repeating that Fernandez received a copy of
the RTC decision on 28 June 1994. Applying Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court, he had fifteen (15) days from receipt of the RTC decision to
file a motion for new trial or reconsideration. He filed a motion for
reconsideration fourteen (14) days after receipt of the decision. The motion
was denied and he had only the remaining one (1) day to file a motion for
new trial which day fell on 01 December 1994. Since 30 November 1994 was
a holiday, Fernandez had up to 01 December 1994 to file the motion for new
trial. Extant from the records, instead of a motion for new trial, he filed
before the Court of Appeals on 01 December 1994 the motion for extension
of time to file petition for review. Thereafter, and pending the resolution of
his motion before the Court of Appeals, Fernandez went back to the RTC and
filed on 09 December 1994 a motion for new trial.
6. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Jurisdictions; New Trial; Motions for
Extension of Time; Motions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration may no longer be filed before all courts, lower than the
Supreme Courtmotions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration may be filed only in connection with cases pending before
the Supreme Court, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny
the extension requested.Fernandezs motion for new trial was filed out of time. The fifteen (15)-day
period for filing a motion for new trial cannot be extended. As early as the
case of Habaluyas v. Japzon, cited in Naguiat v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
and reiterated in Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, motions for extension of time to
file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may no longer be filed before all
courts, lower than the Supreme Court. The rule in Habaluyas applies even if
the motion is filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended
because the fifteen (15) days period for filing a motion for new trial or
reconsideration with said court is non-extendible. Thus, motions for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be
filed only in connection with cases pending before the Supreme Court, which
may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. No
such motion may be filed before any lower courts.