REPUBLIC v.

NOLASCO
FACTS: 1. The root of the dispute is a public works project, the Agno River Flood Control Project
(Project), the undertaking of which has been unfortunately delayed due to the present petition.
2. A Bid and Awards Committee (BAC) was constituted by the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) for the purpose of conducting international competitive bidding for the procurement of the
contract for Package IIthe Guide Channel to Bayambang under Phase II of the Project.
3. Six (6) pre-qualified contractors submitted their bids for the project, among them the present
intervenors Daewoo Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. (Daewoo), and China International Water and
Electric Corp. (China International).
4. However, even before the BAC could come out with its recommendations, a legal challenge had
already been posed to preempt the awarding of the contract to Daewoo.
5. On 19 February 2002, Emiliano R. Nolasco, a self-identified taxpayer and newspaper publisher/editorin-chief, filed a Petition, seeking a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, with the RTC
of Manila, naming the DPWH and the members of the BAC as respondents. He alleged having obtained
copies of Confidential Reports from an Unnamed DPWH Consultant, which he attached to his petition.
Nolasco argued that based on the confidential reports it was apparent that Daewoos bid was
unacceptable and the putative award to Daewoo, illegal, immoral, and prejudicial to the government and
the Filipino taxpayers. Invoking his right as a taxpayer, Nolasco prayed that the DPWH and BAC be
restrained from awarding the contract to Daewoo and Daewoo disqualified as a bidder.
6. The RTC issued a TRO for a period of 20 days.
7. Upon learning of the TRO, the DPWH and the BAC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition with Motion for Dissolution of Temporary Restraining Order. While
noting the impropriety of a twenty (20)-day TRO without prior notice or hearing, they pointed out that
Republic Act No. 8975 precisely prohibited the issuance by any court, save the Supreme Court, of a TRO
or preliminary injunction which restrains or prohibits the bidding for or awarding of a contract/project of the
national government. Accordingly, they prayed that the petition be dismissed and the TRO dissolved.
8. This new motion was set for hearing on 21 March 2002, and thereupon the parties were afforded the
opportunity to argue their case. Then, on 27 March 2002, the RTC issued an order dismissing Nolascos
petition. The RTC held that it was a suit against the government without its consent. RTC judge, realizing
his mistake, recalled the said TRO in accordance with RA No. 8975.
9. Nolasco filed a Motion to Issue Partial Judgment and Motion to Dismiss Petition. In said motion,
Nolasco is askig the RTC to order DPWH to award the bid to CHINA, instead of DAEWOO.
ISSUE/S: WON the RTC erred in its September 6, 2002 decision with regard to Nolascos Motion to Issue
Partial Judgment and Motion to Dismiss Petition.
WON the mere opinion (that the DPWH should consider awarding China for the project) of the RTC
judge has binding effect.
WON Sec. 5 Rule 36 (separate judgments) may be applied with regard to the reliefs sought by Nolasco.
HELD: NO. The RTC did not err in its ruling with regard to the said motion.

NO. It does not have a binding effect.

NO. Separate Judgments is not applicable.
RATIO: Nolascos petition had been correctly dismissed by the RTC on two grounds: that Nolascos
general interest as a taxpayer was not sufficient to establish any direct injury to him should the Project be
awarded to Daewoo; and that the petition was a suit against the State, which may not prosper without its
consent.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Order correctly limited itself to the denial of Nolascos motion for
reconsideration without allowing any other relief that Nolasco prayed for in his Motion for Partial
Judgment and to Dismiss Petition. Had the respondent judge instead opted to grant partial judgment and
direct the award of the Project to China International, the Court would not hesitate to strike down such
award. Yet the respondent judge did not act so unequivocally, and merely advised that the DPWH
Secretary should consider such an option.
Sec. 5. Separate judgments. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the
court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all
counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the
claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the
action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining
claims. . . .
On paper, Nolascos petition prays for two reliefs, that the petitioner be restrained from awarding the
Project to Daewoo, and that Daewoo be disqualified as a bidder and its bid be rejected. Yet these reliefs
are obviously intertwined for the allowance of one would necessarily lead to the grant of the other. The
multiple reliefs referred to in the provision refer to those sufficiently segregate from each other that the
allowance of one at a preliminary stage will not preclude litigation on the merits of the others.
More importantly, the rule is explicit that partial judgment with regards one of the reliefs is warranted
only after a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of
the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim. Herein, the partial judgment was
sought even before the respondents had the chance to file their answer to the petition. Moreover, it was
prayed for at a point when, at even such a preliminary stage, the claimant was actually somehow able to
already present evidence in support of his claim, but before the respondents had the chance to rebut this
claim or support countervailing evidence.
At bare minimum, the allowance of a partial judgment at this stage would constitute a denial of
constitutional due process. It would condemn before hearing, and render judgment before trial. Had
indeed partial judgment been granted in the assailed Order, it would have been rendered before the
Petitioner were afforded the opportunity to rebut the evidence of Nolasco, or to present their own
countervailing evidence. While the allowance of partial judgments may expedite the litigation of claims, it
cannot be sanctioned at a stage when the trial judge has not had the opportunity to hear all sides to the
claim. In fact, it was highly imprudent for the respondent judge to have concluded, as he did in his Order,
that it was an admitted fact that the BAC had strayed from fairly applying the Bidding Laws, Guidelines,
Rules, and Regulations, and Bid Tender Documents, considering that the Petitioner had not even filed an
answer or been allowed the opportunity to present any evidence on its behalf.

NAVARRO v. METROPOLITAN BANK

FACTS: 1. Petitioners Antonio Navarro and Clarita Navarro were married on December 7, 1968. During
their union, they acquired three parcels of land in Alabang,Muntinlupa City on which they built their home.
2. The TCTs, however, are registered in the name of Antonio N. Navarro married to Belen B. Navarro.
3. Sometime in 1998, respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (MBTC) had caused the judicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage which Antonio had earlier constituted on the subject properties as
security for a loan he allegedly obtained from MBTC. In December of that year, the properties were sold
at public auction where MBTC, as the lone bidder, was issued a certificate of sale.
4. Clarita brought before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 an action for the
declaration of nullity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale. Clarita alleged that the
properties involved belonged to her and Antonios conjugal partnership property as the same were
acquired during their marriage and that Antonio, with the connivance of a certain Belen G. Belen, had
secured the registration thereof in their names without her knowledge.
5. She pointed out that Antonio and Belen then mortgaged the properties to MBTC in 1993 likewise
without her knowledge. She ascribed fault and negligence to MBTC because it failed to consider that the
properties given to it as security belonged to her and Antonios conjugal partnership property.
6. MBTC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, of laches. With the denial of its
motion, MBTC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. CA ruled in favor or Metrobank.
The decision had attained finality without a motion for reconsideration being filed or an appeal being taken
therefrom.
7. Subsequently, on April 17, 2002, Clarita instituted another action also before the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 256 but this time for the declaration of nullity of the TCTs covering the same properties and
for reconveyance and damages. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-079 and it impleaded
Antonio, Belen, MBTC and the Registers of Deeds of Makati City and Muntinlupa City as defendants.
8. MBTC moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was already barred by the prior judgment
in Civil Case No. 99-177, and that Claritas claim had already been waived, abandoned and extinguished.
9. RTC denied Metrobanks motion to dismiss. It held that res judicata does not apply.
10. Metrobank appealed to the CA. On July 8, 2004, the CA rendered a decision (assailed decision) in
favor of Metrobank. It held that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177 on the ground of laches should
preclude the filing of Civil Case No. 02-079 because the former had the effect of an adjudication on the
merits. Also, it pointed out that inasmuch as the two cases presented identical issues and causes of
action and prayed for the same relief, the second complaint must likewise suffer the effect of laches.

11. Antonio and Clarita are now before this Court assailing the adverse decision of the Court of
Appeals. They believe that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in directing the dismissal of
the complaint in Civil Case No. 02-079.
ISSUE/S: WON the petitioners are now barred by laches.
HELD: YES. They are barred by laches.
RATIO: Because the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780 ordering the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 99-177 had already become final, then the same should bar the filing of Civil Case No. 02079 inasmuch as the two cases raised identical causes of action and issues and prayed for the same
relief.
While the Court agrees that an action to declare the nullity of contracts is not barred by the statute of
limitations, the fact that Clarita was barred by laches from bringing such action at the first instance has
already been settled by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780. At this point in the proceedings,
the Court can no longer rule on the applicability of the principle of laches vis--vis the imprescriptibility of
Claritas cause of action because the said decision is not the one on appeal before us. But more
importantly, the Court takes notice that the decision rendered in that case had already become final
without any motion for reconsideration being filed or an appeal being taken therefrom. Thus, we are left
with no other recourse than to uphold the immutability of the said decision.
No other procedural law principle is indeed more settled than that once a judgment becomes final, it is no
longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal, except only for correction of clerical errors, or
the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment itself is
void. The underlying reason for the rule is two-fold: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and
thus make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and (2) to put judicial controversies to an end, at the
risk of occasional errors, inasmuch as controversies cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely and the
rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.
It needs no elucidation that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed
organs, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should
forever set the controversy at rest. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite time fixed by law. For, after
all, the very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.