Provrem

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2
Preliminiary Injunction (Rule 58)

Thunder Security and Investigation Agency v. NFA
Nature of the case: petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse CAs
decision
Facts:
Sometime in September 2002, petitioner Thunder Security and Investigation Agency,
owned and operated by petitioner Lourdes M. Lasala as sole proprietor, entered into a
Contract for Security Services with respondent National Food Authority (NFA), Region
I. The contract provided that Thunder Security will provide 132 security guards to
safeguard the NFAs personnel, offices, facilities and properties in Region I for a period
of one year from September 15, 2002 to September 15, 2003.
Subsequently, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184 was enacted on January 10, 2003, and
took effect on January 26, 2003. Said law expressly repealed, among others,
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 40 which governed the bidding procedure of service
contracts in the Government.
Since petitioners contract with the NFA was about to expire on September 15, 2003,
the NFA caused the publication of an Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid on
May 11 and 18, 2003, intended for all private security agencies. Petitioner paid the
bidding fee of P1,000.00 on May 21, 2003 to signify its intention to participate in the
bidding process.
However, on June 9, 2003, the NFA, through Assistant Regional Director Victoriano
Molina, chairman of respondent NFA-Regional Bids and Awards Committee (NFARBAC), notified petitioner to submit the required documents not later than June 19,
2003 in order to qualify for the bidding.
On June 26, 2003, the NFA-RBAC informed petitioner that its application to bid had
been rejected due to its failure to submit the required documents.
Aggrieved, petitioner sent a letter of protest to the NFA on July 10, 2003, contending
that until the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9184 can be
promulgated, no bidding should take place. Notwithstanding, respondents rejected
petitioners application.
Respondents defended their position, citing an instruction coming from then NFA
Administrator Arthur C. Yap which directed that in the absence of the said IRR and
due to the exigency of the service, respondents projects would be temporarily guided
by the provisions of E.O. No. 40, among others, provided the same are consistent
with R.A. No. 9184.
Unfazed, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Prohibition and Preliminary
Injunction, with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
seeking, among others, to enjoin respondents from awarding the contract to another
security agency.
On August 8, 2003, the RTC issued a TRO against respondents. RTC granted the writ
of preliminary injunction in favor of petitioner and directed respondents to desist from
terminating petitioners services until further orders from the RTC. The RTC held that
the composition and the orders of the NFA-RBAC were void because the IRR of R.A.
No. 9184 has not yet been promulgated. The RTC also found that no observers from
the private sector were present in the bidding process as required by law.
RTC denied respondents motion for reconsideration
Thus, respondents sought recourse from the CA by way of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, charging the RTC of grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of the said orders.
CA granted the petition. It held that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it
issued the writ of preliminary injunction against respondents despite the utter lack of
basis and justification for its issuance. The CA highlighted that while IRR-A of R.A. No.
9184 took effect on October 8, 2003, and thus could not have been applied by the

RTC in its August 27, 2003 Order, its failure to consider the said IRR-A in resolving
respondents motion for reconsideration amounted to grave abuse of discretion. The
CA added that contrary to the trial courts ruling, there were three observers present
during the bidding process, as shown by the Minutes of the Meeting for public bidding
held on July 16, 2003. The CA further opined that petitioner did not appear to possess
a clear legal right to enjoin the awarding of the contract considering that petitioners
right to participate in the bidding was itself dubious as petitioner failed to submit the
necessary documents required by respondents.
Thunder filed an MR but the CA denied the same
Issue:
WON the CA erred in setting aside the RTC orders which granted injunctive relief to
petitioner
Held:
No.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a partys
substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for
an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation
which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as
the party applying for the writ is concerned.
At times referred to as the Strong Arm of Equity, we have consistently ruled that there is no
power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than
the issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury where
courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; in cases of
extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative
inconvenience bear strongly in complainants favor; where there is a willful and unlawful
invasion of plaintiffs right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a
continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and
maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily
interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation.
For the writ to issue, two requisites must be present, namely, the existence of the
right to be protected, and that the facts against which the injunction is to be
directed are violative of said right. It is necessary that one must show an
unquestionable right over the premises.
Thus, the following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction,
be it mandatory or prohibitory, will issue:
1)
The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected,
that is a right in esse;
(2)
There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3)
There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant; and
(4)
No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury.

In this case, it is apparent that when the RTC issued its December 1, 2005 Order,
petitioner has no more legal rights under the service contract which already expired
on September 15, 2003. Therefore, it has not met the first vital requisite that it must have
material and substantial rights that have to be protected by the courts. It bears stressing
that an injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights;
it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act
which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. Verily,
petitioner cannot lay claim to an actual, clear and positive right based on an expired service
contract.
Moreover, well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that no court can compel a
party to agree to a contract through the instrumentality of a writ of preliminary
injunction. A contract can be renewed, revived or extended only by mutual consent of the
parties. By issuing the assailed orders most particularly its December 1, 2005 Order, the RTC
in effect extended the life of the parties expired contract in clear contravention of our earlier
pronouncements.
2. BP PHILIPPINES, INC versus CLARK TRADING CORPORATION,
Facts:
BP Philippines, Inc. (petitioner), a corporation engaged in the development, manufacture,
importation, distribution, marketing, and wholesale of: (i) the products of the BURMAH
CASTROL GROUP, including, x x x the CASTROL range of lubricants and associated products
x x x," filed a Complaint for "injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order (TRO) and damages" in the RTC against respondent Clark
Trading Corporation, owner of Parkson Duty Free, which, in turn, is a duty free retailer
operating inside the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). Parkson Duty Free sells,
among others, imported duty-free Castrol products not sourced from petitioner.
Petitioner alleged that sometime in 1994 it had entered into a Marketing and Technical
Assistance Licensing Agreement and a Marketing and Distribution Agreement (agreements)
with Castrol Limited, U.K., the owner and manufacturer of Castrol products. Essentially,
under the terms of the agreements, Castrol Limited, U.K. granted petitioner the title
"exclusive wholesaler importer and exclusive distributor" of Castrol products in the territory
of the Philippines. Under the July 22, 1998 Variation "territory" was further clarified to
include duty-free areas.
Petitioner claimed that respondent, by selling and distributing Castrol Products not sourced
from petitioner in the Philippines, violated petitioners exclusive rights under the
agreements. Petitioner, citing Yu v. Court of Appeals as basis for its claim, contended that
the unauthorized distribution and sale of Castrol products by respondent "will cause grave
and irreparable damage to its goodwill and reputation."
On March 4, 1999, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a TRO for a period of
twenty (20) days enjoining respondent "from selling and distributing Castrol products until
further orders x x x."
On April 15, 1999, the RTC denied petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, there being no sufficient justification for the relief.
Respondent, in its answer, stated that petitioner had no cause of action. Respondent alleged
that it was a stranger to the agreements, it being neither a party nor a signatory thereto.
While respondent admitted that it distributed and sold Castrol products, it also posited that it
only conducted its business within the confines of the CSEZ in accordance with Executive
Order Nos. 140,20 25021 and 250-A.22 Since petitioner was not authorized to operate,

distribute and sell within the CSEZ, respondent did not violate the agreements because its
efficacy only covers an area where petitioner is allowed by law to distribute.
After trial on the merits, the RTC dismissed the complaint. With regard to the propriety of the
issuance of a preliminary injunction, the RTC ruled that the petitioner cannot be entitled to
an injunction in the instant case. It has not shown that it has a right which must be protected
by this court, and it failed to show also that defendant is guilty of acts which [violate] its
rights.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Petitioner has not shown that it has a right which must be protected and that [respondent] is
not guilty of acts which violate [petitioners] right.
Respondent was not a dealer of petitioner nor was there any business dealing or
transaction at all between [petitioner] and [respondent]
Respondent was already selling imported Castrol GTX products even prior to the
execution of the Variation to Marketing and Distribution Agreement dated 23 July
1998 between [petitioner] and Castrol Limited, a corporation established under the
laws of England
Petitioner failed to show that [respondents] duty free importation of said Castrol GTX
products which were sold at its Parkson Duty Free Shop was a sinister scheme
employed by [respondent] in order to by-pass [petitioner]
Petitioner did not allege in its Complaint nor prove who the supplier of [respondent]
was with respect to said Castrol GTX products sold in Parkson Duty Free Shop. There
is no showing that [respondent] sought Castrol Limited of England in order to procure
Castrol GTX products for retailing inside the duty free shop of [respondent] within the
Clark Special Economic Zone, with the intention of violating the purported exclusive
marketing and distributorship agreement between [petitioner] and Castrol Limited of
England.
There is no evidence that any party was duped and that [respondent], who is not a
privy to the marketing and distribution agreement between [petitioner] and Castrol
Limited of England, employed any sinister scheme or ploy at all.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: whether or not petitioner is entitled to injunction against third-persons on the basis of
its marketing and distribution agreements.
NO.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain
from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and
as an incident in the main action.
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an
independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue.
Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction
which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits

can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding
prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of
the action without the court issuing a final injunction.
In the present case, neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals found any nefarious scheme by
respondent to induce either party to circumvent, renege on or violate its undertaking under
the marketing and distribution agreements. We note that no allegation was made on the
authenticity of the Castrol GTX products sold by respondent.
As we have already stated, the writ of injunction would issue:
Upon the satisfaction of two requisites, namely: (1) the existence of a right to be protected;
and (2) acts which are violative of said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the
issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not
designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainants right is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of
actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.
3. PNB versus Ritratto
WHETHER THE ISSUANCEOF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WAS PROPER----NO
Anent the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the same must be lifted as it is a mere
provisional remedy but adjunct to the main suit.
A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary or preventive remedy that may only be
resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the principal action.
The dismissal of the principal action thus results in the denial of the prayer for the issuance
of the writ.
Further, there is no showing that respondents are entitled to the issuance of the writ. Section
3, Rule 58, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may
be granted when it is established:
(a)
That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of,
or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually,
(b)
That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the acts or acts complained
of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c)
That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do,
or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of
the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
Thus, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
compensation.21 Respondents do not deny their indebtedness. Their properties are by their
own choice encumbered by real estate mortgages. Upon the non-payment of the loans,
which were secured by the mortgages sought to be foreclosed, the mortgaged properties are
properly subject to a foreclosure sale. Moreover, respondents questioned the alleged void
stipulations in the contract only when petitioner initiated the foreclosure proceedings.
Clearly, respondents have failed to prove that they have a right protected and that the acts
against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.22The Court is not
unmindful of the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that there may be

serious grounds to nullify the provisions of the loan agreement. However, as earlier
discussed, respondents committed the mistake of filing the case against the wrong party,
thus, they must suffer the consequences of their error.
All told, respondents do not have a cause of action against the petitioner as the latter is not
privy to the contract the provisions of which respondents seek to declare void. Accordingly,
the case before the Regional Trial Court must be dismissed and the preliminary injunction
issued in connection therewith, must be lifted.
Ortigas v CA
Facts:
Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership (Ortigas) through its Manager, Manuel
Lozano (old manager), leased to Wellington Syquiatco (Wellington) a unit in
Gondolla alley at Greenhills Shopping Center at a monthly rental of Php1,500.
Later on, Wellington sold his leasehold rights & obligations of the Gondolla unit to
respondent spouses (Kings spouses), and such sale was approved by Ortigas.
When Ortigas dismissed Lozano (old Manager), it found out that the letter-lease
agreements signed by the latter, allegedly without authority, includes a clause
providing 6. Electric and water bins shall be for our (i.e. Ortigas) account."
(sa letter sa lease agreements ky nkaingon sa par.6 nga ang Ortigas kuno bhala sa
pagbayad sa electric ug water bills)
Lim (new manager) met with the Kings, wanted to correct the inequities in the lease
agreements. The Kings did not sign the new lease agreement.
So when the electricity bills came, Ortigas tried to collect from Kings for the payment
of such bills. But, Kings protested through a letter by citing par 6 of their
agreement (katong ingn c Ortigas nga xa kuno bhala sa elec ug water).
Subsequent bills came but Kings, still, refused to pay the said bills. Ortigas then
disconnected the electricity supply to them. (Napuno na c Ortigas Haha)
As a consequence, Kings then filed a civil case against Ortigas for specific
performance & damages, with prayer for issuance of prelim manda injunction.
Ortigas filed an opposition to Kings application for injunction. It argued that if the
injunction would be granted, the plaintiffs would be unjustly enriched at his
expense. (Reason: 2k kapin iya mabayran sa AVERAGE kuryente consumption ni
Kings unya 1,500 ra ang iyang kita. Haha. Subsidize xa ug 800 dw per monthLugi
ang bata Haha)
RTC denied the application. Kings appealed to CA.
CA reversed the denial, and issued the writ upon filing of bond by Kings.
Issue: WON the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying plaintiffs' application
for a preliminary mandatory injunction.
Ruling: NO!
The writ of preliminary injunction, in general, cannot be sought as a matter of right, but
its grant or refusal rests in the sound discretion of the court under the
circumstances and the facts of the particular case. The writ is the "strong arm of
equity" and therefore should not be used to sanction inequity.

The defendant in the case, the petitioner herein, was able to show that the electricity
consumed per month by the King spouses was way above the amount of the monthly rentals
which they were paying to the petitioner, thereby in effect making the latter subsidize the
business of the former in the leased premises. Such an obviously inequitable situation by
which private respondents enriched themselves at the expense of petitioner cannot be
ignored, as private respondents wanted the trial court to do, by insisting on a strict
adherence to the letter of the contract, which petitioner questioned, alleging inter
alia obvious mistake and collusion, and non-approval of the contract by the principal of the
signatory for the lessor defenses which must eventually be considered by the court a quo in
deciding the merits of the case.
It is thus not a simple case of a contracting party having made a bad bargain and who must
be made to abide by it. The trial court, considering the equities of the case, refused
to issue the preliminary mandatory injunction. We hold that in refusing to do so
the trial court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion.
In general, courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which in
effect disposes of the main case without trial. This is precisely the effect of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the respondent appellate court. Having granted
through a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction the main prayer of the complaint, there
is practically nothing left for the trial court to try except the plaintiffs' claim for
damages.
Joy Mart Consolidated Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
-
The government established the Light Rail Transit System (LRT) which route is from
Baclaran to Balintawak Monument and vice versa.
Thus, negotiations were made between the government and the owners of the
properties affected by the project.
Some of the properties are owned by Joy Mart Consolidated, including the lot where
the Presidente Hotel leased by Joy Mart was located.
Joy Mart consented to sell the properties and give up its leasehold rights over the
adjacent properties, PROVIDED that it would be given the FIRST OPTION to redevelop
the entire area denominated as the CONSOLIDATED BLOCK of the LRT Carriedo
Station encompassing Joy Marts properties.
While negotiations were ongoing, the LRTA (Special Committee on Land and Property
Acquisition of the Light Rail Transit Authority) contracted with Philippine General
Hospital Foundation (PGHF).
PGHF was granted the right, authority, and license to develop the areas adjacent to
the LRT stations and to manage and operate the concessions to be established in
Caloocan, Manila, and Pasay, with the right to sublease, assign, and transfer any of
its rights and interests therein.
After that, Joy Mart conveyed its properties to LTRA through a Deed of Absolute Sale.
The said deed contained the right of first option.
As partial compliance with the aforestated first option, the PGH Foundation subleased
to Joy Mart the LRT Carriedo station covering the consolidated block for the purpose
of constructing a multi-storey building of first class materials.
LTRA however only allowed Joy Mart to occupy an area of 1,141.20 square meters as
the rest of the areas within the consolidated block would be used by the LRT station
and as set-back area or open space for the benefit of the commuting public.
It reminded LTRA of its right to exercise the first option.
Joy Mart then constructed an 8 storey building

-
Then, LTRA entered into Commercial Stalls Concession Contract with the Phoenix
Omega Development and Management Corporation ("Phoenix" for brevity) awarding
to it all the areas and commercial spaces within the three LRT terminals and the
fifteen (15) on-line stations.
Joy Mart learned of this, and demanded its right but to no avail.
Joy Mart filed a complaint for specific performance of contract and damages for
breach of contract with injunction against the LRTA and Phoenix on August 21, 1987.
The injunction was to
command
LTRA
and
Phoenix
individually
and
collectively, their officers and employees, to cease and desist from the construction
being had in the property adjacent to the leased premises.
RTC issued the injunction.
Phoenix sought relief in CA by filing a Petition for certiorari and prohibition. (naglibog
ko kay isa sa gipangayo ni Phoenix kay ibalik daw ang case sa original na RTC na first
naka take og jurisdiction, pero wala naman gisulti sa facts kung asa jud diay nag
una).
While it was pending in CA, Phoneix and LRTA petitioned to dissolve the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, offering to post a counterbond.
They alleged that the writ of preliminary injunction was causing tremendous losses to
LRTA and Phoenix because they have been unable to use the commercial stalls in the
consolidated block while Joy Mart could be compensated for any loss it may suffer if
the injunction were lifted.
Joy Mart opposed the petition.
RTC dissolved the writ (based on Sec.6, Rule 58) TAKE NOTE: na elevate na
ang matter sa CA.
CA knowing the RTC decision dismissed the certiorari petition for being moot and
academic.
This time, c Joy Mart na pod ang niadto sa CA for a TRO/ PRELIM INJUNCTION
CA temporarily restrained Phoenix and LTRA from continuing its activities until further
orders from CA.
Despite such order, Phoenix still continued with its activities.
Joy Mart filed a motion to declare Phoenix in contempt.
CA dismissed both petitions by Joy Mart.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue: whether the trial court continued to have control of the writ of preliminary injunction
even after the same had been raised to the Court of Appeals for review.
Held: NO.
After the LRTA and Phoenix had elevated the writ of preliminary injunction to the Court of
Appeals for determination of the propriety of its issuance (CA-G.R. SP No. 12998), the trial
court (notwithstanding the absence of a temporary restraining order from the appellate
court) could not interfere with or preempt the action or decision of the Court of Appeals on
the writ of preliminary injunction whose annulment was sought therein by Phoenix and the
LRTA.
In petitioning the trial court to lift the writ of preliminary injunction which they themselves
had brought up to the Court of Appeals for review, Phoenix and the LRTA engaged in forumshopping. After the question of whether the writ of preliminary injunction should be annulled
or continued had been elevated to the Court of Appeals for determination, the trial court lost
jurisdiction or authority to act on the same matter. By seeking from the trial court an order
lifting the writ of preliminary injunction, Phoenix and LRTA sought to divest the Court of

Appeals of its jurisdiction to review the writ. They improperly tried to moot their own petition
in the Court of Appeals a clear case of trifling with the proceedings in the appellate court
or of disrespect for said court.
The actuation of Judge Luna in Civil Case No. 87-41731 can be categorized as disrespectful.
It is not excused by the fact that Phoenix and LRTA were presenting evidence of losses and
damages in support of their motion to lift the writ of preliminary injunction, for that could as
easily have been done by them in the Court of Appeals which possesses "the power to try
cases and conduct hearing, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings" (Sec. 9, par. [3],
2nd par.. B.P. Blg. 129).
The trial judge played into the hands of Phoenix and the LRTA, and acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in granting their motion to dissolve the writ
of injunction. Judicial courtesy behooved the trial court to keep its hands off the writ of
preliminary injunction and defer to the better judgment of the Court of Appeals the
determination of whether the writ should be continued or discontinued.
The non-issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Court of Appeals upon receipt of
the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 12998 simply meant that the trial court could proceed to hear
and decide the main complaint of Joy Mart for specific performance of contract and damages
against the LRTA and Phoenix. It did not give the lower court a license to interfere with the
appellate court's disposition of the writ of preliminary injunction.
By simply "noting" that the trial court's order lifting the writ of preliminary injunction
had mooted the case before it, the Court of Appeals displayed regrettable indifference
toward the lower court's interference with the exercise of the appellate court's jurisdiction to
decide and dispose of the petition for certiorari pending before it. Instead of being jealous of
its jurisdiction, the Appellate Court was simply glad to be rid of the case.
The Court of Appeals' reasoning that the trial court did not overlap or encroach upon its (the
Court of Appeals') jurisdiction because the trial court "was actually delving into a new matter
the propriety of the continuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in view of
developments and circumstances occurring after the issuance of the injunction" (pp. 5152, Rollo), is unconvincing, for the issue of the impropriety of issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction was inseparable from the issue of whether the writ should be maintained or not.
By lifting the writ of injunction before the Court of Appeals could rule on whether or not it
was properly issued, the trial court in effect preempted the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction and
flouted its authority.
The private respondents' application to the trial court for the dissolution of the writ of
preliminary injunction that was pending review in the Court of Appeals was a form of forum
shopping which this Court views with extreme disapproval. The lower court's proceeding
being void for lack of jurisdiction, the writ of preliminary injunction should be reinstated, and
the petition to annul the writ (CA-G.R. SP No. 12998) should be dismissed on the ground of
forum shopping as provided in Rule No. 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, Rules of
Court.

PCIB V NAMAWU
On December 22, 1975 the National Mines & Allied Workers' Union obtained in NLRC a
judgment ordering the Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. to pay the union P4,298,307.77 as
severance pay, etc. The judgment became final and executory on January 6, 1976.
On April 18, 1979 the NLRC, through a Labor Arbiter, granted the union's ex parte motion of
April 16, 1979 for the garnishment of the amount of P4,298,307.77 due from Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation to the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank and the Manila Banking Corporation, as part of the price for which the mining
machinery and equipment of the Philippine Iron Mines (acquired under foreclosure sale by
the two banks) was sold by the two banks to Atlas. (The total price was thirty million pesos.)
On that same date, April 18, Atlas complied with the writ of garnishment and delivered to
the sheriff a check for P4,298,307.77.
The order of garnishment and Atlas' compliance with it are assailed in this certiorari
proceeding on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the two banks were not parties in the
labor case and the funds garnished were not due to the judgment debtor, Philippine Iron
Mines.
After deliberating on these facts, the Court Resolved (1) to REQUIRE the respondents within
ten (10) days from notice to ANSWER the petition (not to file a motion to dismiss) and (2) to
ISSUE a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION after the petitioners had filed a satisfactory bond
in the sum of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000). It should be specified in the writ that
Atlas is directed to stop payment on the said check, that respondent Union is enjoined from
cashing the check and, if the check has not yet been delivered to the union, then respondent
sheriff is directed to return the check to Atlas. If the check has been delivered to the Union,
the latter is enjoined from distributing the proceeds thereof to its members and to return the
check to Atlas. (Vol. 1, Record.) with the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction after
the required bond was filed on May 9, 1979, after petitioners filed their supplemental
petition of April 24, 1979 and Urgent Motion of April 30, 1979.
It appears, however, as stated in the answer of respondent Union dated October 10, 1979,
that "the check turned over by the Sheriff of the NLRC to herein respondent on April 20,
1979 was encashed on April 23, 1979 and the proceeds thereof were duly distributed to its
members/claimants on the same day (April 23, 1979) and everyday thereafter, until the
distribution was finished on May 5, 1979. In fact, on May 10, 1979, respondent union filed
with the Labor Arbiter a "Report of Compliance and Motion for Admission and Approval of
Schedule of Distribution" dated May 10, 1979, a copy of which is herewith attached and
made part hereof as Annex "18". A corresponding order approving the aforesaid distribution
was issued by Labor Arbiter Manuel B. Lorenzo on May 12, 1979, a copy of which is herewith
attached and made part hereof as Annex "19". Under the present circumstances, respondent
union can only invoke the following legal principle: 1wph1
The established principle is that when the events sought to be prevented by injunction or
prohibition have already happened, nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited because

nothing more could be done in reference thereto. (Aragones vs. Subido, L-24303, Sept. 23,
1968, 25 SCRA 95)
WHEREFORE, petitioners respectfully pray that:
1. This Petition is given due course;
2. Pending determination of the merits of this Petition, a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction upon such bond as this Honorable Court may fix, be
issued ordering the Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation
to stop payment of the check delivered to the NLRC Sheriff, the National Labor
Relations Commission (Regional Branch No. IV), particularly the Sheriff
thereof, from delivering said check to the Union, and the National Mines &
Allied Workers' Union (NAMAWU-MIF) from distributing the proceeds of the said
check to its members; and to return the proceeds of the chock for
P4,341,290.84 to the petitioners;
3. After appropriate proceedings, judgment be rendered making the Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction permanent and setting aside the NLRC Order
dated 18 April 1979.
Petitioners likewise pray for such other relief as may be deemed just and
equitable under the premises.
ISSUE: WON THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS PROPER.
RULING:
YES.
It would seem that this case is now moot and academic, the prohibitory injunction prayed for
being already impossible of enforcement, the acts sought to be enjoined having been
already consummated.
But it is obvious from the allegations of the petition that the main and real remedy aimed at
by petitioners is for them to be considered as in no way liable for the money paid to the
laborers of respondent Philippine Iron Mines by virtue of the writ of execution and
garnishment in question and that the obedience or compliance thereto by respondent Atlas
was uncalled for, hence Atlas should be held still liable to them for the amount
aforementioned it had delivered to the Sheriff in order to complete the P30 M purchase price
of the PIM properties sold by them to Atlas.
To the extent of being repetitious but if only to bring home the point, under
the above-quoted Deed of Sale unconditionally and unqualifiedly protective of
Atlas, the petitioners, as the sellers, legally and validly warranted unto Atlas,
as the buyer, (1) full and (2) unencumbered title to the subject properties, (3)
that they have full rights and capacity to convey title to and effect peaceful
delivery of these properties to Atlas, and, very importantly, (4) that they shall
hold Atlas "free and harmless from all claims and incidental actions of National
Mines & Allied Workers Unions (NAMAWU)" inclusive of NAMAWU's action for
annulment (Civil Case No. 2727, Branch 11, CFI-Camarines Norte).

The above warranties of the petitioners in favor of Atlas need no further
interpretation. With due respect, this Honorable Court must instead apply and
enforce these warranties against the petitioners, pristinely and unequivocally
clear as these warranties are.
Clearly, the facts of the instant petition viewed vis-a-vis the above- quoted
legal and contractual warranties, guarantees and duties of the petitioners in
favor of Atlas show that the former have no cause of action against the latter.
(Page 790, Vol. II, Record.)
b. We cannot but agree with the Solicitor General that:
Fourthly, since the decision of December 22, 1975 in the aforementioned NLRC case was
brought about by the cessation or shutdown of business by PIM, its workers enjoy first
preference as regards wages due for services rendered prior to the bankruptcy or
liquidation, as against other creditors, like herein petitioners, notwithstanding any provision
of law to the contrary.
Indeed, from whatever point of view We try to look at the situation of petitioners, it always
comes out that they cannot cheat the Union claimants/members of what is due them by law
for work actually done by them and other benefits. They bought the properties in question
with open eyes.t@lF They sold the same knowing they were saddled with the rights of the
laborers of PIM under the clearance of the Ministry of Labor. The deed of sale included, as it
should, a warranty that the properties are free from all liens and encumbrances. ATLAS had
the right to receive the properties free from any lien and encumbrance, and when the
garnishment was served on it, it was perfectly in the right in slashing the P4,298,307.77
from the P30M it had to pay petitioners in order to satisfy the long existing and vested right
of the laborers of financially moribund PIM, without any liability to petitioners for
reimbursement thereof.
With this declaration of the respective rights of the parties, it follows that all proceedings or
suits pending in the lower courts are subordinated to such declaration, if they may not be
deemed already moot and academic.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the petition and settling
the respective rights of the parties hereto as above declared, with costs against petitioners.
Paras v ROURA
Facts:
Judge Roura Judge who handled the principal case Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. vs. Hon. Reynaldo V. Roura, etc. et al
Ricardo L. Paras who filed this Complaint in his capacity as General Manager of
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
Oscar G. Tiglao - driver of the Philippine Rabbit
Rosanna Del Rosario Complainant of the main case.

On 8 August 1986, Judge Roura rendered a Decision finding Oscar G. Tiglao,

former driver of the Philippine Rabbit, guilty of the crime of damage to
property with multiple serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
The Decision became final and executory and a Writ of Execution was issued
against Oscar G. Tiglao.
Since the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied, Judge issued an Order
directing issuance of a Subsidiary Writ of Execution against the employer of
Oscar G. Tiglao, that is, the Philippine Rabbit. Upon receipt of this Order,
Philippine Rabbit filed a Notice of Appeal which was denied by the respondent
Judge.
On 6 December 1986, a Subsidiary Writ of Execution was issued to

respondent Deputy Sheriff Carreon. Two months later, on 6 February 1987,
respondent Sheriff Carreon levied upon an Isuzu bus of Philippine Rabbit and
issued a Notice of Sale of the bus which was scheduled for public auction on 6
March 1987. Phil Rabbit filed an MR but was again denied.
On 2 March 1987, Philippine Rabbit went on a Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition, with prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction, before the
Court of Appeals, seeking to enjoin the implementation of the Subsidiary Writ
of Execution.
On 3 March 1987, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution issuing a TRO so

that the issues raised in this petition may not be considered moot and
academic. It enjoins the respondents (Judge Roura, Deputy Sheriff Carreon,
and complainant Rosanna del Rosario, represented by Atty. Frumencio N.
Pulgar) from implementing the Subsidiary Writ and the Sheriff sale.
By Letter dated 30 March 1987, Pulgar, reminded Deputy Sheriff that the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by CA had expired on 24 March 1987 and
requested to proceed with the sale of the bus. Acting on this request, Carreon
issued a Sheriff's Notice of Sale on 7 April 1987 setting the date of the public
auction sale of Bus on 14 April 1987.
On 13 April 1987, Phil Rabbit then filed with the CA an Urgent Motion seeking
the extension of the lifetime of the Temporary Restraining Order on the same
date and by filing with the respondent Judge an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Hold in Abeyance the scheduled sale of PRBL Inc. property."
On 14 April 1987, Judge Roura denied PRs Ex-Parte Motion for having become
moot and academic, the auction sale having taken place as scheduled and
Rosanna del Rosario, being the highest bidder, having already bought Bus No.
239 for the amount of P250,000.00.
CA then gave a Resolution on 8 May 1987 granting the PRs application for a
preliminary injunction, the affectivity of which was conditioned upon
Philippine Rabbit's filing a bond covering the award of damages by the trial

court. Upon subsequent motion of Philippine Rabbit, the Court of Appeals by
still another Resolution dated 30 June 1987, resolved to annul the 14 April
1987 auction sale conducted by respondent Deputy Sheriff Carreon, as
violative of its Resolutions dated 3 March 1987 and 8 May 1987. The Court of
Appeals ordered respondent Judge to release Bus No. 239 to Philippine
Rabbit, the latter having posted the required bond.
Hence this admin case was filed by Paras, under the theory that the phrase
"until further order from [the Court of Appeals)" had the effect of restraining
respondents from implementing the Subsidiary Writ indefinitely until the
restraining order is lifted by the issuing court.
Issue:
W/N Judge Roura, Deputy Sheriff Carreon and Atty. Pulgar are administratively liable
for implementing the Subsidiary Writ of Execution notwithstanding the presence of
the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the CA.
Held:
No. This administrative complaint has no legal basis.
Section 8 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, set out a general rule
concerning the duration of effectivity of restraining orders issued by "all inferior
courts which is the 20 day period.
In Celso Defalobos v. Hon. Gregorio U. Aquilizan, etc., et al., 1 SC reiterated
that, it is well-settled that the life span of a temporary restraining order
automatically expires on the 20th day by the sheer force of law and no judicial
declaration to that effect is necessary. The extension by the respondent judge of the
restraining order was already void therefore, as correctly contended by the SolicitorGeneral, there was no effective restraining order which the petitioner could have
disobeyed hence contempt had no basis.
In Delbros Hotel Corporation v. The Intermediate Appellate Court, etc., et
al.,G.R. No. 72566, the Supreme Court held that the above quoted Section 8 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines is applicable to temporary restraining orders issued by
the Court of Appeal. This is emphasized in the preamble of the Interim Rules which
states that the same shall apply to all inferior courts according to the Constitution."
The term "inferior courts" as used therein refers to all courts except the Supreme
Court, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals.
It follows, therefore, that respondent Judge Roura did not violate any legally
effective act or order of the Court of Appeals when he dismissed Philippine Rabbit's
ex parte Motion to Hold in Abeyance the scheduled sale of PRBL Inc. property.
Similarly, the Temporary Restraining Order of 3 March 1987 of the Court of Appeals
had already lapsed when Deputy Sheriff Carreon implemented anew on 14 April
1987 the Subsidiary Writ of Execution and Atty. Pulgar's act of requesting in writing
the Deputy Sheriff to proceed with the Notice of Sale upon expiration of the twentyday period, was strictly in accordance with law. There was no legal impediment to

the acts of Atty. Pulgar and Deputy Sheriff Carreon. Finally, there is nothing in the
record to suggest that the respondents acted otherwise than in entire good faith.
Rivera v. Florendo
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction

seeking the annulment of the Orders of the then Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XXXVI
Petitioner corporation was organized and registered by the herein petitioner
Rivera and four (4) other incorporators.
Subsequently, Isamu Akasako, a Japanese national and co-petitioner who is
allegedly the real owner of the shares of stock in the name of petitioner
Aquilino Rivera, sold 2550 shares of the same to private respondent Milagros
Tsuchiya for a consideration of P440,000.00 with the assurance that Milagros
Tsuchiya will be made the President and Lourdes Jureidini a director after the
purchase.
Aquilino Rivera who was in Japan also assured private respondents by
overseas call that he will sign the stock certificates because Isamu Akasako is
the real owner. However, after the sale was consummated and the
consideration was paid with a receipt of payment therefor shown, Aquilino
Rivera refused to make the indorsement unless he is also paid.
It also appears that the other incorporators sold their shares to both
respondent Jureidini and Tsuchiya such that both respondents became the
owners of a total of 3300 shares or the majority out of 5,649 outstanding
subscribed shares of the corporation and that there was no dispute as to the
legality of the transfer of the stock certificate to Jureidini, all of which bear
the signatures of the president and the secretary as required by the
Corporation Law with the proper indorsements of the respective owners
appearing thereon. Exhibits "B-1" to "B-4" are specifically indorsed to her
while Exhibits "B-2" and "B-3" are indorsed in blank. Aquilino Rivera admitted
the genuineness of an the signatures of the officers of the corporation and of
an the indorsee therein.
Nonetheless, private respondents attempted several times to register their
stock certificates with the corporation but the latter refused to register the
same.
Thus, private respondents filed a special civil action for mandamus and
damages with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or receivership naming
herein petitioners as respondents of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XXXVI presided by respondent Judge.
Thereafter, a hearing was held on the application for preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or receivership, after which respondent
Judge issued an order for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
authorizing respondent Jureidini and Tsuchiya to manage the
corporation's hotel and restaurant, upon the filing of a bond in the
amount of P30,000.00. (Basis sa iya order: The Court is aware that

preliminary mandatory injunction is the exception rather than the rule, but
according to the Code Commission, in its report on page 98, "the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction is called for by the fact that there are at
present prolonged litigation between owner and usurper and the former is
deprived of his possession even when he has an immediate right thereto." In
the instant case, the right of the petitioners is clear and unmistakable on the
law and the facts and there exists an urgent and paramount necessity for the
issuing of the writ in order to prevent extreme or rather serious damage
which ensues from withholding it.)
Riveras counsels filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that
respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the case, while through Atty.
Bueno, they filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order granting the
issuance of a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. Judge Florendo denied
both but increased the amount of the bond from P30,000.00 to P120,000.00
to sufficiently protect the interests of herein petitioners.
Hence, this petition.
On August 14, 1981 petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Restraining Order
and Other Provisional Injunctive Reliefs
In the same resolution of August 17, 1981, after deliberating on the petition
and supplemental to the petition, the Court Resolved: (a) to require the
respondents to comment thereon (not to file a motion to dismiss within ten
(10) days from notice and (b) upon petitioners' filing of an injunction
bond in the amount of P30,000.00 to issue a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction enjoining respondents from enforcing the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction dated June 23, 1981 issued in Civil
Case No. 132673. (Rollo, p. 160). Said bond was filed on August 20, 1981
(Rollo, p. 161) and accordingly, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by this Court on August 21, 1981 (SC issued a PI to enjoin the
enforcement of the PMI issued by lower court)
Subsequently, petitioners filed a manifestation and urgent motion on August
28, 1981 praying that private respondent Lourdes Jureidini and her counsel
Atty. Arthur Canlas be declared in contempt of court for the former's alleged
defiant refusal: (a) to acknowledge receipt of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction of August 21, 1981 and (b) to comply with the said writ issued by
this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in issuing the writ of
mandatory preliminary injunction in this case
RULING: YES

Petitioners insist that what was issued was a provisional receivership, while private
respondents maintain that the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction. Be that as it may, it appears obvious that from the abovementioned
rulings of this Court, petitioners' contention that respondent Judge in the issuance
thereof committed acts of grave abuse of discretion, is well taken.
A mandatory injunction is granted only on a showing (a) that the invasion

of the right is material and substantial; (b) the right of complainant is
clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. (Pelejo v. Court of Appeals,
117 SCRA 668, Oct. 18, 1982).
A mandatory injunction which commands the performance of some specific
act is regarded as of a more serious nature than a mere prohibitive
injunction, the latter being intended generally to maintain the status quo
only. While our courts, being both of law and equity, have jurisdiction to
issue a mandatory writ, it has always been held that its issuance would be
justified only in clear cases; that it is generally improper to issue it before final
hearing because it tends to do more than maintain the status quo; that it should be
issued only where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right and that
the latter's case is one free from doubt and dispute. (National Marketing v. Cloribel,
22 SCRA 1038, March 13, 1968).
Respondent court in the instant case violated the fundamental rule of
injunctions that a mandatory injunction will not issue in favor of a party
whose rights are not clear and free of doubt or as yet undetermined.
(Namarco v. Cloribel, 22 SCRA 1038-1039, March 13, 1968). It will be recalled that
the disputed shares of stock were purchased not from the registered owner but from
a Japanese national who allegedly was the real owner thereof. It was also alleged
that the registered owner was only a dummy of Akasako. it is also true that the trial
court has already made findings to that effect at the hearing for the issuance of the
Order of June 5, 1981 (kato hearing for the PI). Nonetheless, these are contentious
issues that should properly be ventilated at the trial on the merits. As correctly
stated in petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the Order of the trial court is in
effect a judgment on the merits, declaring expressly or impliedly that petitioners are
stockholders of the Corporation at the hearing of only the incident for the issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On the other hand if the Order amounts to a
judgment on the merits, the lower court should first rule on what private
respondents seek, the registration of their shareholdings in the books of the
corporation and the issuance of new stock certificates. It is only thereafter that the
subsequent act of management may be ordered and the period of finality of such a

judgment should be in accordance with the Rules of Court, giving the respondents
the right to an appeal or review and not be immediately executory as the Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction would infer.
Another fundamental rule which appears to have been violated in the case
at bar is that no advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the
other, a court should not by means of a preliminary injunction transfer the
property in litigation from the possession of one party to another where
the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts
ownership thereto. (Rodulfo v. Alonso, 76 Phil. 225), February 28, 1946).
Similarly, the primary purpose of an injunction is to preserve the status
quo, that is the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded
the controversy. In the instant case, petitioner Rivera is the registered majority
and controlling stockholder of the corporation before the ensuing events transpired.
By the issuance of the Writ in question he appears to have been deprived of his
rights as stockholder thereof apart from his status as Chairman of the Board and
President of the corporation, with Akasako as the Manager of the two restaurants in
this case; the same being the last uncontested status which preceded the
controversy.
Pede na dili basahon:
Whether or not the TC had jurisdiction over the subject matter: YES
(before ni xas amendment transferring jurisdiction to the rtc haaaa)
It has already been settled that an intracorporate controversy would call for the
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission. (Hello! Sauna pa man ni na
law) On the other hand, an intra-corporate controversy has been defined as "one
which arises between a stockholder and the corporate. There is no distinction,
qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever."
As confirmed by this Court, "shares of stock may be transferred by delivery to the
transferee of the certificate properly indorsed. 'Title may be vested in the transferee
by delivery of the certificate with a written assignment or indorsement thereof '
There should be compliance with the mode of transfer prescribed by law.
There is merit in the findings of the lower court that the present
controversy is not an intracorporate controversy; private respondents are
not yet stockholders; they are only seeking to be registered as
stockholders because of an alleged sale of shares of stock to them.

Therefore, as the petition is filed by outsiders not yet members of the
corporation, jurisdiction properly belongs to the regular courts.
Whether or not mandamus will lie against petitioners: NO

It is evident that mandamus will not lie in the instant case where the shares of stock
in question are not even indorsed by the registered owner Rivera who is specifically
resisting the registration thereof in the books of the corporation. Under the above
ruling, even the shares of stock which were purchased by private respondents from
the other incorporators cannot also be the subject of mandamus on the strength of
mere indorsement of the supposed owners of said shares in the absence of express
instructions from them. The rights of the parties will have to be threshed out in an
ordinary action.
Whether the respondents should be held in contempt for not complying
with the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the SC: NO
On the contempt incident involving private respondent Lourdes Jureidini, a
Manifestation and Urgent Motion was filed by petitioners to declare her in contempt
of Court for allegedly refusing to acknowledge receipt of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued by this Court and for allegedly refusing to comply therewith.
Attributed to her were the following statements: "I will not obey that ... Yes, I am
higher than the Supreme Court ... I will obey only what my lawyer tells me."
In her explanation however, she said that she was fazed by the presence of the
server accompanied by the lawyers and that she asked to have time to confer the
matter to her lawyer.
There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment or command of a court, or injunction granted by
a court or judge, more particularly in this case, the Supreme Court,
constitutes Indirect Contempt punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. (Rule 71, Section 3(b) and Section 6).
However, it is also well settled that "the power to punish for contempt of court
should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only
occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that
respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail." Only in cases
of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised. A bona
fide misunderstanding of the terms of the order or of the procedural rules should
not immediately cause the institution of contempt proceedings." "Such power 'being
drastic and extra-ordinary in its nature ... should not be resorted to ... unless
necessary in the interest of justice.' " (Gamboa v. Teodoro, et al., supra).

In the case at bar, although private respondent Jureidini did not
immediately comply with the Writ of Injunction issued by this Court, it
appears reasonable on her part to request that she be allowed to confer
with her lawyer first before she makes any move of her own. It is likewise
reasonable for counsel for private respondent to request that he be given time to
file a motion for clarification with the Supreme Court.
Jureidini cannot also be faulted for finding it difficult to understand the writ issued
against her by the Supreme Court as she believed that not only have she and her
correspondent the legal right to manage the restaurant but the equitable right as
well, having been placed in possession of the corporate property only after posting
a bond of P120,000.00.
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS vs. BORROMEO
FACTS:
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU-TUCP) filed a notice of strike with the then Ministry of
Labor and Employment, Region X, at Cagayan de Oro City as a consequence of a
controversy arising from charges of unfair labor practices against the respondent, BELYCA
Corporation, a firm engaged in livestock farming. It filed a complaint for various offenses
against the private respondent ranging from unfair labor practice to non-payment of the
minimum wages.
On the same date, the private respondent commenced suit for injunction with the
respondent Regional Trial Court. It alleged that the petitioner had obstructed free ingress to
the firm's premises, "preventing workers of Belyca farms from entering the business
establishments ... preventing said workers from giving feeds and/or food to the hogs and
fowls which would kill all of said hogs and fowls if not attended to this very day ..." On the
same day, the respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
"commanding herein defendants [the striking workers], their agents and/or representatives
to allow plaintiff [the private-respondent) or workers or authorized representatives free
passage to and from Belyca Farms, located at Kalasungay Malaybalay, Bukidnon to feed
plaintiffs seven thousand five hundred (7,500) hogs and eight thousand (8,000) fowls."
Then the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (to lift TRO as well as for the dismissal
of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. However, the respondent judge denied the
motion.
The Belyca Corporation filed an urgent motion "for extension of the life of the restraining
order previously issued to another twenty days." Then thee respondent judge granted it.
WHEREFORE, for the sake of justice and fairness, the temporary mandatory
order dated July 24, 1986 which expired on August 13, 1986 is hereby
extended to another period of twenty (20) days to be counted from August
13, 1986. It will expire on October 2, 1986 which is the date of the hearing
of the main petition.

Done this 19th day of August, 1986 at Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
[Please note the erroneous reckoning of the expiration date of the TRO which should be
September 2, 1 986, after the twenty-day extension (from August 13), and not October 2,
1986. It is self-evident that twenty (20) days from August 13, 1986 would be September 2,
1986 and not October 2, 1 986.]
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the case in question involves a labor dispute.
2. Whether or not the Court a quo acted without jurisdiction in the case before it.
3. Whether or not injunction itself stands as an exceptional remedy in labor cases.
HELD:
1. Yes, the case in question involves a labor dispute which is patent from the
records. In rendering his ruling, the respondent judge himself was aware that the dispute
was the result of an impasse between employer and employees, an impasse cognizable
alone by the National Labor Relations:
... This Court agrees in toto with the defendants that it has no jurisdiction to
decide on the question of legality or illegality of strikes and lockouts,
inasmuch as the power to decide on said legal question properly belongs to
the National Labor Relations Commission, Ministry of Labor. There is no
shadow of a doubt that defendants are workers or employees of plaintiff
Belyca Corporation and likewise it is undisputed that their demands for
increase of wages, reinstatement and other demands fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission or Labor
Arbiters of the Ministry of Labor. ...
The respondent judge cannot enjoin acts carried out as a consequence of the
strike without unavoidably ruling on the legality of the strike itself.
2. No, thereby, the Court a quo has no jurisdiction to issue the Writ of Injunction
for it should be prayed for in connection with that labor dispute originate from
the Court having jurisdiction over the main case inasmuch as it is that Court that
has cognizance of all relevant facts.
The courts of law have no jurisdiction to act on labor cases or various incidents arising
therefrom. That is basic and elementary. Jurisdiction to try and adjudicate such cases
pertains exclusively to the proper labor officials of the Department of Labor, thus:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor
Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for

decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms
and conditions of employment;
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non- payment or
underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other
benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except
claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity
benefits.
4. Cases involving household services; and
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters. 4
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 128 ...
(b) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representatives shall have the
power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with
the labor standards provisions of this Code based on the findings of labor
regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of
inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the
enforcement of their order, except in cases where the employer contests the
findings of the labor regulations officer and raise issues which cannot be
resolved without co considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in
the normal course of inspection.
The reason for such exclusive jurisdiction is that since picketing and strikes may be mere
incidents or consequences of an unfair labor practice, it is but proper that a Writ of
Injunction prayed for in connection with that labor dispute originate from the Court having
jurisdiction over the main case inasmuch as it is that Court that has cognizance of all
relevant facts.
It is clear then that the Court a quo acted without jurisdiction in the case before
it.
3. Yes, in labor cases, injunction itself stands as an exceptional remedy. It does
not lie save in those cases as the Labor Code provides. Thus:

ART. 255. Injunction prohibited.No temporary or permanent injunction or
restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall
be issued by any court or other entity, except as otherwise provided in Article
218 and 264 of this Code.
The provisions referred to are as follows:
(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all
Prohibited or unlawful acts in any labor dispute which, if not restrained
forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render
ineffectual any decision in favor of such party. Provided, That no temporary
injunction against the commission of acts Prohibited under Article 265 of this
Code shall be issued by the Commission, except after due notice and
hearing and in accordance with its rules: Provided, further, That any ex
parte restraining order issued by the Commission, or its Chairman or
Vice Chairman when the Commission is not in session and as may be
prescribed by its rules, shall be valid for a period not exceeding
twenty (20) days Provided, finally, That the receipt of evidence for the
application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any
of its Labor Arbiters who shall, in cases where the parties are not residents of
Metro Manila, conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine to
be accessible to the parties and its witnesses and shall submit thereafter his
recommendation to the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
(g) When in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause
strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur
in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or
distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries,
including those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and
Employment shall assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify
the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect artifical of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or
certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to
work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the- strike or
lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to
ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may
issue to enforce the same.
The fact that the poultry and piggery maintained by the private respondent required close
care and attention does not warrant the respondent judge's assumption of jurisdiction. It did
not confer on him the competence he did not have. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by
the demands of emergency.

This is not, of course, to say that the strike in question was, ergo, legal. As we said,
concerted acts of labor are the do of the labor officials, not the judiciary.
The gross haste, furthermore, with which the challenged TRO was issued (it was issued on
the same day the complaint was filed)and based on the bare word alone of Belyca (that
the strikers had behaved unlawfully in the course of the strike)has not eluded this Court.
This is a grave abuse of discretion. Plainly, it denied the workers due process of law.
Additional Notes:
It is likewise a serious abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge to
extend such a TRO. Under the Rules of Court as amended a TRO has a nonextendible lifetime of twenty days (that is, assuming that the TRO itself was valid)
upon the expiration of which, it dies a natural death. (In this case, the respondent
judge extended the life of the TRO to fifty (50)days from August 13, 1986 to October 2,
1986as stated in the order itself.) If a writ of preliminary injunction is granted, the writ
then takes its place. But it cannot substitute for the writ (if one is not granted within the
twenty-day period) by the simple expedient of "extending" its life. The issuance of
"perpetual" TROs was precisely the motivating factor behind the amendment of the Rules.
4. Carbungco v. CA
Facts:
A restraining order was issued against Carbungco by the CA on March 11, 1987
On April 9, 1987, respondent Court issued another restraining order "in view of the
special circumstances under which this case is being heard. . .
Issue:
WON CA may issue another temporary restraining order of indefinite duration after
the first had automatically expired on the twentieth (20th) day of its issuance without
private respondents having taken steps to obtain a preliminary injunction.
Held:
No.
Sec. 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court as amended by BP Blg. 224, which reads:
Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; issuance of restraining order. No
preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the defendant. If it shall appear
from the facts shown by a affidavits or by the verified complaint that great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the judge to
whom the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a restraining order to
be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from date of its issuance. Within the said
20-day period, the judge must cause an order to be served on the defendant requiring him
to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, and
determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted,
and shall accordingly issue the corresponding order. In the event that the application for
preliminary injunction is denied, the restraining order is deemed automatically vacated.
is also applicable to the Court of Appeals.

Under the said provision, a judge (or justice) may issue a temporary restraining order
with a limited life of 20 days from date of issue.
If before the expiration of the 20-day period the application for preliminary injunction
is denied, the temporary restraining order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated.
If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said
20 days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the
sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary. A temporary
restraining order CAN NO LONGER EXIST INDEFINITELY for it has become truly temporary.
Conclusion:
The second restraining order issued is therefore a patent nullity. Case was remanded to the
CA for resolution on the merits
Carbungco v. CA
G.R. No. 78265
January 22, 1990
Facts:
A restraining order was issued against Carbungco by the CA on March 11,

1987
On April 9, 1987, respondent Court issued another restraining order "in view
of the special circumstances under which this case is being heard. . .
Issue:
WON CA may issue another temporary restraining order of indefinite duration
after the first had automatically expired on the twentieth (20th) day of its
issuance without private respondents having taken steps to obtain a
preliminary injunction.
Held:
No.
Sec. 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court as amended by BP Blg. 224, which
reads:
Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; issuance of restraining
order. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the defendant.
If it shall appear from the facts shown by a affidavits or by the verified complaint
that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can
be heard on notice, the judge to whom the application for preliminary injunction was
made, may issue a restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20)
days from date of its issuance. Within the said 20-day period, the judge must cause
an order to be served on the defendant requiring him to show cause, at a specified

time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, and determine within the
same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and shall
accordingly issue the corresponding order. In the event that the application for
preliminary injunction is denied, the restraining order is deemed automatically
vacated.
is also applicable to the Court of Appeals.
Under the said provision, a judge (or justice) may issue a temporary
restraining order with a limited life of 20 days from date of issue.
If before the expiration of the 20-day period the application for preliminary
injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would thereby be deemed
automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for
preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining order
would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial
declaration to that effect being necessary. A temporary restraining order CAN NO
LONGER EXIST INDEFINITELY for it has become truly temporary.
Conclusion:
The second restraining order issued is therefore a patent nullity. Case was
remanded to the CA for resolution on the merits
ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLS, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS.
FACTS:
On 1 August 1984, RMC Garments, Inc. (RMC) leased from Peter Pan Corporation (Peter
Pan) its properties (Leased Premises) located on Ortigas, Metro Manila where RMC, a
garments manufacturing company, installed machinery on the Leased Premises and brought
in furniture, office equipment and supplies.
Two years thereafter, Rosario Textile Mills Corp. (Rosario Textile) advised RMC in a letter
that it had acquired the Leased Premises, including the chattels found inside, from GBC
Corporation (GBC) through a Deed of Assignment of Rights and Interests and demanded
RMC to vacate the Leased Premises within 10 days. Rosario Textile proceeded to exercise its
right of self-help. Representatives of Rosario Textile entered the Leased Premises; cut off
RMCs power supply and communication lines; barricaded the road leading to the Leased
Premises, padlocked the entrances and posted guards to prevent entry and Rosario Textile
removed the machinery, equipment, garments and other chattels found inside the Leased
Premises.

Consequently, RMC and Peter Pan filed an injunction suit in the trial court which trial court
granted upon posting P50,000 bond by petitioner. RMC filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return of the missing chattels which RTC
granted.
Rosario Textile assailed the Order in a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. CA upheld RTC. The SC likewise affirmed the Decision, which attained finality with
the entry of judgment on 17 August 1988.
On 2 February 1989, the trial court issued an Order[6] requiring Rosario Textile to comply with
the Orders and reiterated its orders directing defendants to allow entry to the Leased
Premises and to return the various machineries they took.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Compliance on 7 January 1997 stating that they could
no longer return the sewing machines since these were gutted by the fire.
On 23 May 1997, the trial court issued the Order ruling that the alleged destruction of the
sewing machines did not extinguish petitioners obligation to return these machines. The trial
court held that petitioners were already in default at the time the fire allegedly destroyed
the machines. And the responsible officers of defendant are hereby ordered to make
complete restitution to the plaintiff of the value of the sewing machine they failed to return,
within 10 days from receipt of the order.
Petitioners assailed the Orders dated 23 May and 4 December 1997 in a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Petitioners contended that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion when it ordered petitioners to make a complete restitution of the value
of the sewing machines pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and held that a violation of
a writ of injunction subjects a party to a citation for civil or criminal contempt, punishable by
a fine or imprisonment. Courts may punish for contempt officers and agents of corporations
for breach of an injunction regardless of whether the injunction is directed against them or
the corporation only. The Court of Appeals also held that the trial courts order of complete
restitution of the value of the sewing machines was not a prejudgment of the case on the
issue of ownership. The Court of Appeals explained that the trial court did not order
restitution of the value of the sewing machines as a declaration of ownership in RMCs
favor. Rather, the trial court used the value only as a measure of the amount of penalty for
the violation of the injunction when restitution of the machines became impossible.
MR denied.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the restitution of the value of the sewing machines by petitioners in their personal
capacities a proper penalty for refusal to comply or violation of injunction?
HELD:

Yes, An Injunction duly issued must be obeyed, however erroneous the action of the court
may be, until a higher court overrules such decision. As affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
this Court, the trial court properly issued the injunction order directing petitioners to return
the sewing machines
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on 16 November 1995
amended Sections 1 and 6 (now Section 7), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which provide the
penalties for direct and indirect contempt committed against superior and inferior courts.
Under the amendment, in case of violation of writs of injunction or restraining orders, the
rule now provides that the court may order complete restitution through the return of the
property or the payment of the amount alleged and proved. Restitution is defined as the "act
of making good or giving equivalent for any loss, damage or injury; and indemnification."
Petitioners are not excused from complying with the writ of injunction on the ground a fire
destroyed the machines, considering that the fire occurred years after the court had ordered
petitioners to return the machines. Where there is nothing more to return in this case
because of the destruction of the sewing machines, the officers must be held personally
liable for the restitution of the money equivalent of the lost sewing machines. The restitution
of the value of the sewing machines is not as a declaration of ownership in but pursuant to
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95.
The Court affirmed the complete restitution of the value of the sewing machines to RMC by
petitioners consistent with the remedial and preservative principles of citations for
contempt, and as demanded by the respect due the orders, writs and processes of the
courts of justice.

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Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Preliminiary Injunction (Rule 58)

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

On 8 August 1986, Judge Roura rendered a Decision finding Oscar G. Tiglao,

On 6 December 1986, a Subsidiary Writ of Execution was issued to

On 2 March 1987, Philippine Rabbit went on a Petition for Certiorari and

On 3 March 1987, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution issuing a TRO so

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Hence, this petition.

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

A mandatory injunction is granted only on a showing (a) that the invasion

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Pede na dili basahon:

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Whether or not mandamus will lie against petitioners: NO

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

A restraining order was issued against Carbungco by the CA on March 11,

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLS, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS.

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

Provisional Remedies Cases Batch 2

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