G.R. No.

78214 December 5, 1988

YOLANDA CABALLES, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ and BIENVENIDO
ABAJON,respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by the public respondent
Ministry of Agrarian Reform , now the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its then Minister, the
Hon. Heherson Alvarez, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the herein petitioner and the
private respondent and certifying the criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the
private respondent as not proper for trial.
The facts as gathered by the MAR are as follows:
The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) square meters (20 meters x 3
meters) was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the latter being the petitioner herein, by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes This landholding
is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of about 500 square meters, situated at Lawaan Talisay,
Cebu. The remainder of Lot No. 3109-C was subseconsequently sold to the said spouses by Macario
Alicaba and the other members of the Millenes family, thus consolidating ownership over the entire (500square meter) property in favor of the petitioner.
In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon constructed
his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to the owner, Andrea
Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, agreeing that the produce
thereof would be shared by both on a fitfy-fifty basis. From 1975-1977, Abajon planted corn and bananas on
the landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn but continued to plant bananas and camote. During those
four years, he paid the P2.00 rental for the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to
Andrea Millenes.
Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, told
Abajon that the poultry they intended to build would be close to his house and pursuaded him to transfer his
dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding. Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental
on the land occupied by his house, but his offer was not accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to
vacate the premises, saying that they needed the property. But Abajon refused to leave. The parties had a
confrontation before the Barangay Captain of Lawaan in Talisay, Cebu but failed to reach an agreement. All
the efforts exerted by the landowners to oust Abajon from the landholding were in vain as the latter simply
refused to budge.
On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that immediately after she
reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter,
with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on the property worth about P50.00. A criminal case
for malicious mischief was filed against Abajon and which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4003.
Obviously, all the planting on the property, including that of the banana plants, had been done by Abajon. On

September 30, 1982, upon motion of the defense in open court pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered
the referral of the case to the Regional Office No. VII of the then MAR for a preliminary determination of the
relationship between the parties. As a result, the Regional Director of MAR Regional VII, issued a
certification 1 dated January 24, 1 983, stating that said Criminal Case No. 4003 was not proper for hearing on the
bases of the following findings:
That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the complaining witness,
which is devoted to bananas;
That thin case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his farmholding, which
act is prohibited by law; and
That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian relations.
From the said certification, the petitioner appealed to the then MAR, now the respondent DAR. Acting on
said appeal, the respondent DAR, through its then Minister Conrado Estrella, reversed the previous
certification in its Order 2 of February 3, 1986, declaring Criminal Case No. 4003 as proper for trial as "the land
involved is a residential lot consisting of only 60 square meters whereon the house of the accused is constructed
and within the industrial zone of the town as evinced from the Certification issued by the Zoning Administrator of
Talisay, Cebu."
Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Abajon, the respondent DAR, through its new Minister, herein
respondent Heherson Alvarez, issued an Orders dated November 15, 1986, setting aside the previous
Order 3dated February 3, 1986, and certifying said criminal case as not proper for trial, finding the existence of a
tenancy relationship between the parties, and that the case was designed to harass the accused into vacating his
tillage.
In the summary investigation conducted by the DAR, the former landowner, Andrea Millenes, testified that
Bienvenido Abajon dutifully gave her 50% share of the produce of the land under his cultivation. The
grandson of Andrea Millenes, Roger Millenes, corroborated the testimony of the former, stating that he
received said share from Abajon. Roger Millenes further testified that the present owners received in his
presence a bunch of bananas from the accused representing or 50% of the two bunches of bananas
gathered after Caballes had acquired the property. 4
From these factual findings, the DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of Andrea Millenes, the former
owner, who had testified that she shared the produce of the land with Abajon as truer thereof. 5 Thus,
invoking Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, which provides that "[T]he agricultural leasehold relation under this
Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding"; and that "(I)n case the agricultural lessor sells,
alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor," the MAR ruled that 'the new
owners are legally bound to respect the tenancy, notwithstanding their claim that the portion tilled by Abajon was
small, consisting merely of three (3) meters wide and twenty (20) meters long, or a total of sixty (60) square
meters." 6
Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that:
I. Respondents DAR and Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez committed "grave abuse of power and discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in holding that private respondent Abajon is an agricultural tenant even if he
is cultivating only a 60-square meter (3 x 20 meters) portion of a commercial lot of the petitioner.

II. Public respondents gravely erred in holding that Criminal Case No. 4003 is not proper for trial and hearing
by the court. 7
We hold that the private respondent cannot avail of the benefits afforded by RA 3844, as amended. To invest
him with the status of a tenant is preposterous.
Section 2 of said law provides:
It is the policy of the State:
(1) To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and work on the land as
tillers, owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine
agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial
development;
xxx xxx xxx
RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm land that permits efficient
use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an income sufficient to provide a
modest standard of living to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and education with
possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly
fluctuations in income." 8
The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square meter lot.
Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination
be considered as an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas, and corn on a sixtysquare meter piece of land can not produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to
meet the farm family's basic needs. The private respondent himself admitted that he did not depend on the
products of the land because it was too small, and that he took on carpentry jobs on the side. 9 Thus, the
order sought to be reviewed is patently contrary to the declared policy of the law stated above.
The DAR found that the private respondent shared the produce of the land with the former owner, Andrea
Millenes. This led or misled, the public respondents to conclude that a tenancy relationship existed between
the petitioner and the private respondent because, the public respondents continue, by operation of Sec. 10
of R.A. 3844, as amended, the petitioner new owner is subrogated to the rights and substituted to the
obligations of the supposed agricultural lessor (the former owner).
We disagree.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence
of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de
jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not
entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under
existing tenancy laws. 10
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not
unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops
thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing
gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof
specially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in.
the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of
land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of
this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner
out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its
southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion.
Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that the private
respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA of 3844,
as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not a tenant of the herein petitioner.
Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant,
the criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for trial so that
proceedings in the lower court can resume.
Notwithstanding our ruling that the private respondent is not a tenant of the petitioner, we hold that the
remand of the case to the lower court for the resumption of the criminal proceedings is not in the interest of
justice. Remand to the Municipal Court of Talisay, Cebu, would not serve the ends of justice at all, nor is it
necessary, because this High Tribunal is in a position to resolve with finality the dispute before it. This Court,
in the public interest, and towards the expeditious administration of justice, has decided to act on the merits
and dispose of the case with finality. 11
The criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private respondent for allegedly
cutting down banana trees worth a measly P50.00 will take up much of the time and attention of the
municipal court to the prejudice of other more pressing cases pending therein. Furthermore, the private
respondent will have to incur unnecessary expenses to finance his legal battle against the petitioner if
proceedings in the court below were to resume. Court litigants have decried the long and unnecessary delay
in the resolution of their cases and the consequent costs of such litigations. The poor, particularly, are
victims of this unjust judicial dawdle, Impoverished that they are they must deal with unjust legal
procrastination which they can only interpret as harassment or intimidation brought about by their poverty,
deprivation, and despair. It must be the mission of the Court to remove the misperceptions aggrieved people
have of the nature of the dispensation of justice. If justice can be meted out now, why wait for it to drop
gently from heaven? Thus, considering that this case involves a mere bagatelle the Court finds it proper and
compelling to decide it here and now, instead of further deferring its final termination.
As found by the DAR, the case for malicious mischief stemmed from the petitioner's affidavit stating that
after she reprimanded private respondent Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property
without her knowledge, the latter, with ill intent, cut the banana trees on the property worth about P50.00.

This was corroborated by a certain Anita Duaban, a friend of the petitioner, who likewise executed an
affidavit to the effect that she saw the private respondent indiscriminately cutting the banana trees. 12
The Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that "any person who shall deliberately cause to the
property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter shall be guilty of
malicious mischief." 13
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief are:
1. The offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;
2. The damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving destruction;
3. The damage was caused maliciously by the offender.
After a review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we rule that the aforesaid criminal case against
the private respondent be dismissed.
The private respondent can not be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the banana trees
because, as an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana trees, he owns
said crops including the fruits thereof The private respondent's possession of the land is not illegal or in bad
faith because he was snowed by the previous owners to enter and occupy the premises. In other words, the
private respondent worked the land in dispute with the consent of the previous and present owners.
Consequently, whatever the private respondent planted and cultivated on that piece of property belonged to
him and not to the landowner. Thus, an essential element of the crime of malicious mischief, which is
"damage deliberately caused to the property of another," is absent because the private respondent merely
cut down his own plantings.
WHEREFORE, the Order of public respondents dated November 15, 1986 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case
No. 4003, is hereby DISMISSED. Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay,
Cebu for appropriate action. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 184282

April 11, 2012

FRANCISCO SORIANO AND DALISAY SORIANO, Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the Office of the Solicitor General), Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a Rule 45 petition assailing the October 26, 2007 Decision1 and July 29, 2008 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80551. The appellate court had set aside the Order 3 of the Tagum
City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, acting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC), which denied the motion
to dismiss of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
The facts, as culled from the records, follow:
The Spouses Francisco and Dalisay Soriano were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land
located in Hijo, Maco, Compostela Valley Province. The first parcel had an area of 5.2723 hectares and was
covered by TCT No. (T-8935) T-3120, while the second parcel had an area of 4.0887 hectares and was
covered by TCT No. (T-2906) T-749.4
In October 1999, the two parcels of land were compulsorily acquired by the government pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) made a preliminary determination of the value of the subject lands in the amount of P351,169.34 for
the first parcel andP70,729.28 for the second parcel. Petitioners, however, disagreed with the valuation and
brought the matter before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for a summary
administrative proceeding to fix the just compensation.5
On September 30, 2000, the DARAB rendered its decisions 6 in DARAB Case No. LV-XI-0071-DN-2000 (for
the first parcel) and DARAB Case No. LV-XI-0073-DN-2000 (for the second parcel), affirming the LBPs
preliminary determination. As evidenced by the return cards,7 notices of the two decisions were received by
counsel for petitioners on March 8, 2001 and February 22, 2001, respectively. However, it was only on April
6, 2001 that petitioners filed a petition8 before the RTC of Tagum City, acting as SAC, for the fixing of just
compensation. Thus, the DAR, through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) of Tagum City, filed a
motion9 to dismiss the petition. The DAR argued that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period provided in Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure.10 Section 11 reads:
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The
decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party
shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
On June 27, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss Agrarian Case No. 64-2001 and declared that the
"DARAB Rules of Procedure must give way to the laws on prescription of actions as mandated by the Civil
Code."11 The DAR sought reconsideration of the order, but its motion was denied on September 24,
2001.12Thus, the DAR lodged a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court.

On October 26, 2007, the CA granted the petition and dismissed Agrarian Case No. 64-2001. The CA held:
Public respondent erred in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. An action to fix just compensation for
lands placed under R.A. No. 6657 is outside the purview of the ordinary rules on prescription as contained in
Article 1146 of the Civil Code. The rule implementing R.A. No. 6657 is clear and unequivocal that after a
preliminary determination by the board of the just compensation, a petition should be filed before the SAC
within 15 days from receipt of the boards decision. Considering that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day
period provided by the rules, public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of spouses Sorianos petition. The court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction
over the petition which was filed out of time.13
Later, the CA likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, petitioners filed the present
petition alleging that the CA committed serious errors of law, as follows:
I.
THE 1994 DARAB PROCEDURAL RULES PROVIDING FOR A 15-DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD
TO BRING THE DECISION OF THE ADJUDICATOR DIRECTLY TO THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN
COURT (SAC) ARE NOT HARD AND FAST, AND ADMIT OF CERTAIN LEGALLY-RECOGNIZED
EXCEPTIONS. AMONG OTHERS, STRONG COMPELLING REASONS SUCH AS SERVING THE
ENDS OF JUSTICE AND PREVENTING A GRAVE MISCARRIAGE THEREOF, APART FROM
STRONG CONSIDERATIONS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, WARRANT THE SUSPENSION OF
THE RULES IN THE EXERCISE BY THE COURTS OF EQUITY JURISDICTION.
II.
THE PROVISION IN THE 1994 DARAB RULES [OF PROCEDURE] PROVIDING FOR A MODE OF
APPEAL AND A STRINGENT REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF 15 DAYS TO BRING THE DECISION
OF THE DARAB IN A PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION OF LAND VALUATION DIRECTLY TO THE
SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT (SAC) HAS NO STATUTORY BASIS. THUS, IT IS VOID FOR BEING
ULTRA VIRES.14
Essentially, the issues for our resolution are whether the CA erred in setting aside the June 27, 2001 Order
of the SAC which denied the DARs motion to dismiss, and in finding that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in not dismissing Agrarian Case No. 64-2001 on the ground that it was filed late.
Petitioners admit that their petition was filed late but insist that there exist special and compelling reasons to
relax the otherwise stringent application of the 15-day reglementary period to file the petition for the fixing of
just compensation. They allege that the failure to file the petition in time was due to the fault or negligence of
their former counsel, and that the unconscionably low valuation of the LBP, if not rectified, would unjustly
result in the confiscatory deprivation of their lands through no fault of their own. 15 They likewise contend that
there is no statutory basis for the promulgation of the DARAB procedure providing for a mode of appeal, let
alone for a reglementary period to appeal.
The petition lacks merit.
The appellate court correctly granted the writ of certiorari and nullified the June 27, 2001 Order of the RTC
acting as SAC, as the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss filed by the

DAR. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, which was then applicable, explicitly
provides that
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The
decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party
shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. [Emphasis supplied.]
In Phil. Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,16 we explained that the consequence of the said rule is that the
adjudicators decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period. Considering that
Agrarian Case No. 64-2001, filed with the SAC for the fixing of just compensation, was filed 29 days after
petitioners receipt of the DARABs decision in DARAB Case No. LV-XI-0071-DN-2000 for the lot covered by
TCT No. (T-8935) T-3120 and 43 days after petitioners receipt of the DARABs decision in DARAB Case No.
LV-XI-0073-DN-2000, for the lot covered by TCT No. (T-2906) T-749, the DARABs decisions had already
attained finality.
Petitioners contend that there is no statutory basis for the promulgation of the DARAB procedure providing
for a mode of appeal and a reglementary period to appeal. On the matter of whether the DARAB Rules of
Procedure laid out an appeal process and the validity of the 15-day reglementary period has already been
laid to rest, the Court, in Republic v. Court of Appeals17 and subsequent cases18 has clarified that the
determination of the amount of just compensation by the DARAB is merely a preliminary administrative
determination which is subject to challenge before the SACs which have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation under Section 57, R.A. No. 6657. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals, we ruled
[U]nder the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the
value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Through notice
sent to the landowner pursuant to 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case the landowner
rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the
regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the
land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring
the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for the
determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondents
case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case.
In the terminology of 57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." It would subvert this
"original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation
cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative
decisions.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs
sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and
to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to 57
and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to
decide this question.19(Emphasis supplied.)

The above ruling was reiterated in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals. In that case, petitioner
landowner who was dissatisfied with the valuation made by LBP and DARAB, filed a petition for
determination of just compensation in the RTC (SAC). However, the RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the
DARAB. On appeal, the CA upheld the order of dismissal. When the case was elevated to this Court, we
likewise affirmed the CA and declared that
To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly 50 thereof, Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure provides:
Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation.The decision of the
Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be
appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special
Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only
one motion for reconsideration.
As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, this rule is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the power to
decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts. It is error
to think that, because of Rule XIII, 11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide
petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction.
It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in
the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to
be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is
subject to challenge in the courts.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the
question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the
administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and
unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the
guarantors of the legality of administrative action.
1wphi1

Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule
XIII, 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the case and the Court
of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court notes that although the petition for determination of just compensation in Republic v. Court of
Appealswas filed beyond the 15-day period, Republic v. Court of Appeals does not serve as authority for
disregarding the 15-day period to bring an action for judicial determination of just compensation. Republic v.
Court of Appeals, it should be noted, was decided at a time when Rule XIII, Section 11 was not yet present
in the DARAB Rules. Further, said case did not discuss whether the petition filed therein for the fixing of just
compensation was filed out of time or not. The Court merely decided the issue of whether cases involving
just compensation should first be appealed to the DARAB before the landowner can resort to the SAC under
Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657. In any event, any speculation as to the validity of Rule XIII, Section 11 was
foreclosed by our ruling in Philippine Veterans Bank where we affirmed the order of dismissal of a petition for
determination of just compensation for having been filed beyond the 15-day period under said Section 11. In
said case, we explained that Section 11 is not incompatible with the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
SAC. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Martinez,21we reaffirmed this ruling and stated for the guidance of
the bench and bar that "while a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal

from the agrarian reform adjudicators decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15day period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicators decision will attain finality."
Notwithstanding the foregoing rulings, we noted in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Umandap22 that "[s]ince
the SAC statutorily exercises original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners, it cannot be said that the decision of the adjudicator, if not appealed to the
SAC, would be deemed final and executory, under all circumstances." In certain cases, the Court has
adopted a policy of liberally allowing petitions for determination of just compensation even though the
procedure under DARAB rules have not been strictly followed, whenever circumstances so warrant. 23 Thus,
we allowed a petition refiled by LBP within 5 days from the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order dismissing the original petition, during which time said dismissal could still be appealed to the CA:
x x x The SAC even expressly recognized that the rules are silent as regards the period within which a
complaint dismissed without prejudice may be refiled. The statutorily mandated original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the SAC, as well as the above circumstances showing that LBP did not appear to have
been sleeping on its rights in the allegedly belated refiling of the petition, lead us to assume a liberal
construction of the pertinent rules. To be sure, LBPs intent to question the RARADs valuation of the land
became evident with the filing of the first petition for determination of just compensation within the period
prescribed by the DARAB Rules. Although the first petition was dismissed without prejudice on a technicality,
LBPs refiling of essentially the same petition with a proper non-forum shopping certification while the earlier
dismissal order had not attained finality should have been accepted by the trial court.
In view of the foregoing, we rule that the RTC acted without jurisdiction in hastily dismissing said refiled
Petition. Accordingly, the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the dismissal should be
granted.24(Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, petitioners argue that there exists compelling reason to relax the application of the rules
because the offered compensation package by the LBP for the expropriated lands is unconscionably low.
We find no merit in petitioners submission considering that in the valuation of petitioners lands in the two
cases, the PARAD applied the formula laid down in DAR AO No. 06, series of 1992 as amended by DAR AO
No. 11, series of 1994 and further amended by DAR AO No. 05, series of 1998. It likewise found that
petitioners computed value of their property was unsubstantiated and hence cannot prevail over LBPs
valuation which was determined pursuant to the aforesaid guidelines then in force.
Petitioners have not shown any exceptional circumstance warranting a relaxation of the prescribed period
for the filing of a petition for judicial determination of just compensation. Their petition before the SAC
assailing the separate valuations by the PARAD was filed 29 days (from receipt of the first decision) and 43
days (from receipt of the second decision) late, and without any justifiable reason given for the delay.
Consequently, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in granting DARs petition for certiorari
and dismissing Agrarian Case No. 64-2001.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 26, 2007, and
Resolution dated July 29, 2008, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80551 are AFFIRMED and
UPHELD.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice