TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC. vs.

COURT OF APPEALS,
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court Appeals dated August
14, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 36349, and its Resolution dated March 15, 1996, which denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
On December 13, 1993, private respondents filed an action for Partition before the Regional Trial Court
of Morong, Rizal. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Juan De Castro, died intestate in 1993 and
they are his only surviving and legitimate heirs. They also alleged that their father owned a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 3010 located at Barrio San Juan, Morong, Rizal, with an area of two thousand two
hundred sixty nine (2,269) square meters more or less. They further claim that in 1979, without their
knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale was made possible
when Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the property. It is the contention of private respondents
that the sale made by Mariano affected only his undivided share to the lot in question but not the shares of
the other co-owners equivalent to four fifths (4/5) of the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending, as its special defense, lack of jurisdiction and
prescription and/or laches. The trial court, after hearing the motion, dismissed the complaint in an Order
dated August 18, 1984. On motion for reconsideration, the trial court, in an Order dated October 4, 1994,
reconsidered the dismissal of the complaint and set aside its previous order. Petitioner filed its own motion
for reconsideration but it was denied in an Order dated January 5, 1995.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari anchored on the
following grounds: a) the RTC has no jurisdiction to try and take cognizance of the case as the causes of
actions have been decided with finality by the Supreme Court, and b) the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion and authority in taking cognizance of the case.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the Court of Appeals, finding no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the lower court, dismissed the petition in a Decision dated August 14,
1995.Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated March 15,
1996. Hence this petition.
Petitioner submits the following grounds to support the granting of the writ of certiorari in the present
case:
FIRST GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) HAD NO
JURISDICTION TO TRY SUBJECT CASE (SP. PROC. NO. 118-M). THE CAUSES OF ACTION HEREIN
HAVE BEEN FINALLY DECIDED BY THE HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (BR. 31)
MAKATI, METRO MANILA, AND SUSTAINED IN A FINAL DECISION BY THE HON. SUPREME COURT.
SECOND GROUND

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY WHEN IT
SUSTAINED THE ORDERS OF THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) DATED OCTOBER 4,
1994, AND THE ORDER DATED JANUARY 5, 1995, WHEN SAID RTC (BR. 79) INSISTED IN TRYING
THIS CASE AGAINST TCMC WHEN IT HAS RULED ALREADY IN A FINAL ORDER THAT PETITIONER
IS NOT A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST BY THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 170, ENTITLED ELPIDIA A. DE CASTRO, ET. AL. vs. TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, ET.
AL., WHICH CASE INVOLVED THE SAME RELIEF, SAME SUBJECT MATTER AND THE SAME
PARTIES.
THIRD GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY WHEN IT
CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY DISREGARDED THE EXISTENCE OF RES JUDICATA IN THIS
CASE.
The pivotal issues to be resolved in this case are: whether or not the Regional Trial Court and/or the
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the case, and if so, whether or not the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
In assailing the Orders of the appellate court, petitioner invokes Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as its
mode in obtaining a reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution. Before we dwell on the merits of this
petition, it is worth noting, that for a petition for certiorari to be granted, it must be shown that the respondent
court committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction and not mere errors of
judgment, for certiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgment, which are correctible by appeal. [1] By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not enough -- it must be grave. [2]
In the case at hand, there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the public
respondent. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, when it took cognizance of the action for partition filed
by the private respondents, it acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. [3] Jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. [4] Acquiring
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case does not necessarily mean that the lower court meant to
reverse the decision of the Supreme Court in the land registration case mentioned by the petitioner.
Moreover, settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, hence the courts jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up
in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. [5] This has to be so, for were the principle otherwise, the ends of
justice would be frustrated by making the sufficiency of this kind of action dependent upon the defendant in
all cases.
Worth stressing, as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction any alleged errors committed in the
exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are revisable by timely appeal
and not by a special civil action of certiorari.[6] Based on the foregoing, even assuming for the sake of
argument that the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court, which earlier denied
petitioners motion to dismiss, such actuation on the part of the appellate court cannot be considered as
grave abuse of discretion, hence not correctible by certiorari, because certiorari is not available to correct
errors of procedure or mistakes in the judges findings and conclusions.
In addition, it is now too late for petitioner to question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. It was
petitioner who elevated the instant controversy to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. In effect,
petitioner submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals by seeking affirmative relief therefrom. If

a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge that courts jurisdiction in the same
case.[7] To do otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy
of the Court.
On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
[8]
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only the sellers share pro indiviso,
and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantors share in the partition of the property owned in
common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one coowner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the coowner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. The proper action in a
case like this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of possession of the property owned in
common from the third person, but for division or partition of the entire property if it continued to remain in
the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it. [9] Such partition should result in
segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
In the light of the foregoing, petitioners defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain
proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as
his share is concerned. In Budlong vs. Bondoc,[10] this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean
that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil
Code explicitly declares: No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. CA

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or
directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication
did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and
thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision [1] promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent
Resolution[2] promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals [3] in CA-G.R. CV No.
23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:[4]
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a
new one entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of
Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa
Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered
under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want
of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for
the issuance of a decree be issued."

The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of
his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. [5]The application was
docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.[6] However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his
heirs -- Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado -- represented by their
aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of
jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:[7]
"x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD
1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit `E' was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits `F' and
`G'). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over
the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice
of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation."
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion
provides:[8]
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose;
the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official
Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same
paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general
circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the
Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume
jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial
hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of
procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally
infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained,
set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro
Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dated
November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court
notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be
based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat
his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65. [9]
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion [10] in holding

x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a
newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be
published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation. According to petitioner,
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and xxx in xxx a
newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process. [11]
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural defect. They add that publication in
the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.[12]
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: [13]
x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation
is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to explain matters
fully and present their side. Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise:[14]
x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any
way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and
posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any
party who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.
The Courts Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of
initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. -Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all
whom it may concern.' Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain
date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

xxx xxx xxx

Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official
Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to
whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly
confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction
and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word
denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. [15] While concededly such
literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its
context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal
mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,[16] the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held
that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and
(3) posting, all of which must be complied with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would
not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who,
per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if
mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation
is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.[17] Being in rem, such proceeding
requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or
interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the
process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be
adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has
been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by
satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in
the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty.[18] He must prove his title against the
whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concerned -nay, the whole world -- who have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively
invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary norms
of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the
name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory
when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting,
all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality
that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its
circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at
all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any
other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences
of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a
manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and
posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private
respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute
itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory
requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that

where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation; there is room only for application. [19]There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land
registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future,
after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of
isDISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

the assailed Decision

private respondent for

and
land

Resolution
registration

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO MATUTE Y AMASA vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

This action was commenced on the 28th day of December, 1906, in the Court of Land Registration. The
petitioner asked that five parcels of land particularly described in the first paragraph of his complaint, all
located within the jurisdiction of the pueblo of Davao, on the Island of Mindanao, be registered under the
Torrens system. The petitioner alleged that if the court should finds that he was not entitled to have said
parcels of land registered by reason of ownership, that the same should be registered in his name in
accordance with the provisions of chapter 6 of Act No. 962. The petitioner alleged that said parcels of land
contain 1,785 hectares.
On the 16th day of October. 1908, Juan Sumulong, associate judge of the Court of Land Registration,
granted said petition in the following words: "On motion by the petitioner, the petition in this case is
dismissed, without prejudice to his reproducing the same whenever he may deem it advisable so to do."
About eighteen later, on the 22nd day of March, 1910, the petitioner appeared in court and asked that his
original cause of action be revied. Said motion contained the following:
1. That, on the date of October 16, 1908, the court, on motion by the petitioner, issued a order
dismissing the petition in this case, reserving to him the right to reproduce it whenever he might
deem it advisable so to do.
2. That, by reason of the aforementioned order and it being to the interests of the petition that this
case be tried anew for the purpose of its final decision, he hereby set forth that he reproduces in all
its part the petition presented in the said case.
3. That the petitioner further sets forth that the land described in the petition, Exhibit E, is included in
the Civil Reservation No. 111 for the organization of a pueblo in the municipality of Davao.
The petitioner therefore prays the court to cancel the order of dismissal issued in this case October
16, 1908, and to direct that the case be proceeded with in the ordinary manner until final judgment
be rendered.

Manila, March 22, 1910 Ambrosio Santos, attorney for petitioner. No. 4 Salcedo, Santa Cruz,
Manila.
On the 1st day of April, 1910, the Honorable Higinio Henitez, associate judge of the Court of Land
Registration, granted said motion and ordered that cause be included "in the calendar for the next session in
the Province of Davao."
On the 26th day of September, 1910, the Attorney-General, Ignacio Villamor, appeared and duly presented
an exception to said order of the 1st of April, 1910, and on the same day (26th of September, 1910)
presented a motion based upon the following grounds:
1. That, on the date of October 16, 1908, this Honorable court issued the following order:
'On motion by the petitioner, the petition in this case is dismissed, without prejudice to his
reproducing the same whenever he may deem it advisable so to do.
'Manila, P.I., October 18, 1908. (Sgd.) Juan Sumulong, acting associate judge.'
2. That, about the 1st of April, 1910, on motion by the petitioner, Judge Benitez issued an order
granting the reopening of this case and assigning a date for the hearing.
3. That the order granting a reopening of this case is contrary law: (a) Because it was issued after
the lapse of more than one year from the date of the order of dismissal; and ( b) because in the order
of dismissal, dated October 16, 1908, the petitioner was only granted the right to reproduce his
application.
4. That the question here involved and now sought to have decided is of great importance for the
procedure that must in future be followed importance for the procedure that must in future be
followed by this court in similar cases, and a ruling on the point in discussion is required of this court,
to avoid appeals that might cause unnecessary expense to the litigating parties.
Therefore the undersigned Attorney-General prays that this point be considered by the court in banc, and
that after due hearing the order of this court dated April 1, 1910, be set aside, with the declaration that the
reopening of this case was improper.
Said motion was referred to the consideration of three judges of the Court of Land Registration, sitting in
banc. Upon due consideration, said judge decided that they, by virtue of the provisions of section 8 of Act
No. 1648, had no jurisdiction to intervene in said cause, for the purpose of modifying said cause, of April 1,
1910.
Section 8 of Said Act No. 1648, provides: "Upon a decision being rendered by any judge serving on the
Court of Land Registration, either party in interest may, within thirty days after the decision is rendered by
such judge, petition the court in banc, consisting of all the judges serving on the court, or at least three of
said judges, for a rehearing of the case, and, if it shall appear to such court in banc that the decision on
which a rehearing is asked is in conflict with any previous decision of the court, or of any judge thereof, or
with any decision of the Supreme Court of these Islands, or of any other competent appellate tribunal, then
the court in banc, may, in its discretion, by vote of a majority of its members, grant the rehearing petitioned
for, annul the decision of the single judge, and rehear the case siting in banc; and the decision of the court in
banc shall be the decision of the Court of Land Registration in the case, and may be regularly appealed from
as in other cases."

On the 17th day of November, 1910, the Attorney-General presented his formal opposition to the registration
of said parcels of land in question.
On the 15th of March, 1911, the petitioner again asked permission to amend his complaint and to change
the description of the land contained in parcel E.
The cause was duly set down for trial and after hearing the evidence, the Honorable James A. Ostrand,
associate judge, on the 23d day of January, 1912, rendered his decision, in which he denied the right of the
plaintiff to have registered in his name parcels A and B, described in the first paragraph of the complaint, for
the reason that the evidence did not show that he was the owner of said land. The judge found that the
evidence did show that the petitioner was entitled to hace parcels C, D, and E, described in the first
paragraph of the complaint, registered. He granted the registration of said parcels C and D, under the
provisions of subsection 5 of section 54 of Act No. 926. The court granted the registration of parcel E,
because, as he found, the petitioner had been, by himself and through his predecessors, in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notarious possession and occupation of said parcel, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for thirty years.
On the 1st day of February, 1912, the Attorney-General duly excepted to the order of the judge granting the
registration of said parcels C, D, and E, and on the same day presented a motion for a new trial. Said motion
for a new trial was denied on the 2d day of February, 1912, to which order denying the motion for a new trial,
the Attorney-General duly excepted and presented his bill of exceptions and appeal to this court.
In this court the Attorney-General presents two assignments of error, as follows:
I. The court incurred an error of law in declaring the case reopened by its order of April 1, 1910; and
II. It likewise erred in decreeing the registration of the land, the subject matter of the application, in
favor of the petitioner, because it lacked jurisdiction over the matter in litigation and over the person
of the petitioner.
With reference to the first assignment of error, it will be remembered that the petitioner, on the 31st day of
January, 1908, asked that he be permitted to retire his petition presented in said cause, "reserving, however,
the right to reproduce it afterwards in other proceedings;" that said motion was granted on the 16th day of
October, 1908, with the condition: "without prejudice to the said petitioner's reproducing it whenever he
might deem it advisable so to do;" that more than seventeen months later (the 22nd day of March, 1910),
the petitioner asked that said cause be reinstated; that said cause was reinstated, by order of the court, and
again placed upon the calendar on the 1st of April, 1910.
The Attorney-General, in support of his first assignment of error, contends that the order of the court of the
1st of April, 1910, reinstating said cause without the presentation of a new petition and the citation of the
parties again, was illegal and done without authority of law and was beyond the jurisdiction of the court. In
support of his contention, the Attorney-General cites numerous decisions. He argues that the order of the
court dismissing said cause, even conditionally (the 16th of October, 1908), became a final order, after the
lapse of the time within which an appeal might have been perfected; that the action was thus terminated;
that it could not revived by reinstatement; that the only way that the action could be considered again by the
court was by the presentation of a new petition and a new citation of the parties. The Attorney-General
argues that the decisions of the Court of Land Registration become final after expiration of the time within
which the defeated party might appeal. Section 14 of Act No. 496, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 1484,
provides that parties desiring to appeal from an order of the Court of Land Registration must present their
bills of exception within thirty days, and that time may be extended by the court for another thirty days. The
Attorney-General argues that if the appeal is not perfected within such time, the judgment is final. It is
argued by the Attorney-General that the general rule is that the judge may alter or amend his decision in

matters of substance, any time during the term within such judgment is rendered, but that after the
termination of said term, the judge is without jurisdiction to make any order in a cause terminated by a final
decision, and that, inasmuch as there are no terms, as such, for the Court of Land Registration, the
judgment should be final and cannot be altered or amended after the time has elapsed for the perfection of
the appeal. (Arnedo vs. Llorent and Liongson, 18 Phil. Rep., 257; Whipley vs. Dewey, 17 Cal; Miller vs.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 30 Mont., 289, 76 Pac. Rep., 691; Cameron vs. McRoberts, 3 Wheat. (U.S.), 591;
Brooks vs. Burlington & S. Ry. Co., 102 U.S., 107; Bronson vs. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410; Tubman vs. B. & O.
R. Co., 190 U.S., 38.)
In the case of Whipley vs. Dewey (17 Cal., 314) the supreme court of California, in a case where a plaintiff
moved that his cause be dismissed, with the right to have the dismissal set aside, said:
The order permitting a plaintiff to move to set aside the nonsuit preserved all his rights in the
proceedings, but in legal effect it amounted to nothing more than a right to move for a new trial, and
it was necessary that the provisions of the statute in relation to new trials should be complied with.
This was not done, and upon the expiration of the term, the court lost all jurisdiction of the matter.
(Lurvey vs. Wells, 4 Cal., 106; Natoma Water & Mining Co. vs. Clarkin, 14 Cal., 544; Brown vs. Aspden, 14
How. (U.S.), 25; U.S. Knight's Admr., 1 Black (U.S.), 488; Public Schools vs. Walker, 9 Wall. (U.S.). 603;
Hudson & smithvs. Guestier, 7 Cranch (U.S.), 1.)
In the case of Bronson vs. Schulten (104 U.S., 410), Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the Supreme Court of
the United States, said: "during the term when it is rendered or entered of record, a judgment or order,
however conclusive in its character, is under the control of the court pronouncing it, and may then be set
aside, vacated, or modified, after the term, unless steps be taken during its continuance, by motion or
otherwise, errors in final judgments can only be corrected by an appellate court."
The record shows that the land, or at least some parcels, was occupied by others than the petitioner at the
time of the commencement of the action. Nearly eighteen months had expired from the time the petitioner
made a motion that his petition be dismissed, before he asked that the same be reinstated. So far as the
record shows no new notices or citations were issued to any of the parties interested. Many other persons,
during the eighteen months, might have acquired an interest in the land in question.
In reply to the argument of the Attorney-General, relating to the finality of the judgment dismissing the
petition at the request of the petitioner, the attorney for the plaintiff cites section 37 of Act No. 496.
Said section provides: "If in any case the court finds that the applicant has not proper title for registration, a
decree shall be entered dismissing the application, and such decree may be ordered to be without prejudice.
The applicant may withdraw his application at any time before final decree, upon terms to be fixed by the
court."
The phrase in said section: "and such decree (dismissing the application) may be ordered to be without
prejudice," simply means that the petitioner may again institute the same action for the same purpose, and
nothing more. The provision of said section that "the applicant may withdraw his application at any time
before final decree, upon terms to be fixed by the court," does not contemplate that the Court of Land
Registration is authorized to dismiss an action with the right to reinstate it after the expiration of seventeen
or eighteen months, without new notices and new citations to the parties interested. If a petitioner in the
Court of Land Registration may be permitted to have his cause of action dismissed and have it reinstated
again after the lapse of seventeen or eighteen months, without new citations and new notices to the parties,
then he may have it reinstated after the lapse of any time. We do not believe that such a procedure was
contemplated by the legislature in adopting said section.

The foregoing interpretation may work a hardship upon the petitioner in the present case. We believe,
however, that it is a safer rule of follow, even at the cost of an occasional hardship, to adhere to the principle
which we have announced, and to refuse to recognize the right of a petitioner in a case like the present, to
have his action reinstated, without new citations and new notices, after the lapse of the time within which an
appeal might be perfected from the decision of the Court of Land Registration. We do not believe that the
Court of Land Registration, in dismissing a petition upon the application of the petitioner, with permission to
reinstate the same, has a right to do so upon any terms which do mot require that the parties shall be
required, when the application for reinstatement is made, to re-cite all the parties who may be interested in
the land in question.
The attorney for the petitioner argues that the Attorney-General did not perfect his appeal within the time
required by law and that therefore his appeal should be dismissed. It will be remembered that the order of
the lower court reinstating said cause was dictated on the 1st day of April, 1910. The motion of the AttorneyGeneral for a rehearing and his exception to said order was not presented until the 26th day of September,
1910. There is nothing in the record, however, which shows on what date the Attorney-General received
notice of said order. The time within which he must present his exception or motion for a new trial does not
begin to run until after he has received notice of the order of the court. Inasmuch as the record does not
contain any proof as to the time when the Attorney-General received notice of said order, we must conclude
that his motion and exception were presented in time.
In view of the foregoing conclusions, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the second assignment of error.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, without prejudice to the plaintiff,
and, without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-13919

September 18, 1959

AGUSTIN PARAISO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
JESUS CAMON, defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant to recover one-half portion of a lot situated in Bacolod City.
Defendant set up the defense that he required said lot without knowledge of any defect in the title of the
vendor which is a torrens title and that he acquired title thereto unaffected by any lien or encumbrance not
noted thereon.
After the parties had submitted a partial stipulation of facts and additional evidence in support of their
contentions, the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint without costs. Plaintiffs appealed from
this decision and the case was certified to this Court because it involves purely question of law.
Plaintiffs claim that the land in question was formerly a portion of Lot No. 391 of the cadastral survey of the
City of Bacolod originally belonging to San Sebastian Subdivision owned by Juliana de la Rama. The lot was
bought by Agustin M. Paraiso, Sr., father of plaintiffs, on installment basis, and when he died on May 16,
1946, his widow, Anita Vda. de Paraiso, continued paying the installments, having said the price in full on
February 3, 1951. As a consequence, a deed of definite sale was executed in her favor and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 8848 was issued in her name. On September 17, 1954, the widow sold the lot to
Jesus Camon for the sum of P4,800.00 on condition that she can repurchase the same within a period of
one year, and having failed to redeem it within that period, Camon consolidated his ownership over the
property. On this property there was then a two-story building which after the sale was occupied by Camon
and his family jointly with one Tomas Exito and his family who occupied the lower floor. Camon later
obtained a new title in his name after the widow had executed in his favor an absolute deed of sale.
The principal errors assigned by appellants against the trial court are: (1) in not permitting them to prove with
whose money heir mother paid the whole price of the lot in question; (2) in not permitting them to prove that
their mother did not bring any property to the marriage and had acquired none during and after her marriage
was dissolved by the death of her husband; (3) in not permitting them to prove the date when the house
standing on the lot in question was constructed; and (4) in not admitting Exhibit D as evidence to show that
the lot in question was originally bought by heir late father Agustin Paraiso, Sr.

It is the theory of appellants that the lot in question is conjugal in nature because it is their father who
initiated its purchase from San Sebastian Subdivision and had paid several installments on account up to
the time of his death on May 16, 1946 even if their mother continued paying the installment and paid the
price in full on February 3, 1951 when the said subdivision executed a definite deed of sale in her favor. In
view of such theory, appellants tried to present evidence to show that a portion of the consideration of the
sale was paid by their father and that the rest was paid by their mother out of the Philippine Army, but their
attempt was blocked by appellee and his objection was sustained by the trial court. Plaintiffs particularly lay
stress on Exhibit D which is a ledger of the San Sebastian Subdivosion wherein are entered the lot in
question, the name of the buyer, the payments made on account of the price, the dates of payment and
other data pertinent to the transaction which show that the initial payments were made by their late father
Agustin Paraiso.
This claim of appellants is not entirely devoid of merit considering the facts which they tried to prove by their
evidence which were alleged in their complaint and hence they are entitled to present such evidence under
our rules, but we cannot also consider the action taken by the trial court to be erroneous bearing in mind that
the lot in question is covered by a torrens title and the same appears issued exclusively in the name of their
mother Anita Vda. de Paraiso. It must be noted that the defense of appellee is that he bought the land from
said widow in the belief that she was the exclusive owner of the same considering that its title appears
issued in her name and there is nothing therein to indicate that it suffers from any lien or encumbrance of
any kind. In fact, the objection of appellee to the evidence of appellants on the matter is predicated on such
defense and the trial court upheld the objection having in mind the law and jurisprudence governing
transfers of registered lands.
Thus, in the case of William H. Anderson vs. Garcia, 64 Phil., 506, this Court held:
We hold that under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act that gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land (secs. 50 and 51, Land Registration Act). A person dealing
with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the
property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face
of the register of the certificate of title. To require to him to do more is to defeat one of the primary
objects of the Torrens system. A bona fide purchaser for value of such property at an auction sale
acquires good title as against a prior transferee of the same property if such transfer was unrecorded
at the time of the auction sale. (See also Castillo vs. Sian, 105 Phil., 622).
Here there is no clear evidence showing that appellee acted with knowledge of the origin of the property or
tat it is conjugal in nature other than a mere conjecture. Bad faith cannot be presumed but must be
established by clear evidence more so when the property subject of the sale which is sought to be annulled
is covered by a torrens title. In circumstances, we are persuaded to affirm the decision of the trial
court.1wphl.nt
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with out pronouncement as to costs.