Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Band 91
Paul Cobben
ISBN 978-3-11-021987-6
ISSN 0344-8142
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Cobben, Paul.
The nature of the self : recognition in the form of right and morality /
by Paul Cobben.
p. cm. (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, ISSN 0344-8142 ;
Bd. 91)
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 978-3-11-021987-6 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Self (Philosophy). 2. Mind and body. 3. Recognition (Philosophy). 4. Ethics. I. Title.
BD450.C57 2009
126dc22
2009004216
Contents
The Nature of the Self. Recognition in the form of Right and
Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
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12
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15
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81
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31
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48
53
58
63
68
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71
75
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79
VI
Contents
The Fall of the Roman Empire and the experience of the person
The genesis of the moral individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Embodiment of the pure Being in the real Individual: the
self-conscious reality of the Unhappy Consciousness . . . . . . . .
The meaning of the moral individual in the objective world . .
The realization of the moral individual in the objective world:
the process of culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The absolute Freedom: the second self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Retrospection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
81
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126
Contents
VII
Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Recognition between metaphysics and empiricism . . . . . . . . . . 131
Honneths project in relation to the Phenomenology of Spirit
and the Philosophy of Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Chapter 6 The program of the Philosophy of Right as elaboration
of the Phenomenologys project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The conceptual design of the Philosophy of Right . . . . . . . . .
The abstract Right as the formal Notion of the first self . . . . .
Morality as the formal notion of the second self . . . . . . . . . . .
Conscience as the formal unity of right and morality . . . . . . .
Conscience in the Philosophy of Right vis--vis conscience in
the Phenomenology of Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The formal unity of the three forms of the self following from
the Phenomenology of Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The actualization of the Human Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 7 The Family: The Institutional House of the First Self .
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The species life of animals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The family in the Philosophy of Right: animal life in the form
of freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The social organism of the family vis--vis the conceptual
framework of the Philosophy of Right and the
Phenomenology of Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The education of the children in the family of the revised
Philosophy of Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. The socialization of the child in the contingent tradition of
the family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. The process in which the child develops awareness of the
contingence of the family tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Retrospection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Excursus: The Development of the Child to a Real Person in
Confrontation with Jrgen Habermass Reception of the Stages
of Moral Consciousness developed by Lawrence Kohlberg . . .
136
136
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142
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148
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152
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166
VIII
Contents
176
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209
211
211
Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Author index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Subject index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
232
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227
The Nature of the Self. Recognition in the form of Right and Morality
body (preserving, as well, the own nature of the mind as the body). To
conceptualize the immediate unity between mind and body, Hegel
makes use of the metaphor of the lordship/bondsman relation: The lord
represents the mind that also has a body; the bondsman represents the
body that also has a mind. In this way, the mind/body problem is reformulated as the problem of how to contemplate the adequate unity of lord
and bondsman.
The transformation of mind/body into lordship/bondsman is not just
a matter of changing terms. The transformation incorporates the Aristotelian insight that the adequate unity between mind and body can only be
conceived of at the level of society. For Aristotle, the human self, the animal rationale, essentially is a social self, a self that lives in the framework
of a state. This is reflected in the metaphor of the lordship/bondsman relation that makes it clear that the body of the mind essentially is a social
organism. A mind that also has a body is a mind that is objectified in a
social organism. Conversely, the body that also has a mind is a body that
is part of a social organism. In this respect, lordship and bondsman are
Hegels translation of the Aristotelian logos and state.
Hegel, however, transcends the Aristotelian conceptual framework
when the relation between lord and bondsman is understood as a relation
of recognition.3 By this move he combines the social (communitarian)
freedom of Aristotle with the subjective (libertarian) freedom of Kant.4
If the lord is recognized by the bondsman, he not only represents the
unity of the social organism (the lord represents the law of the state
that is actualized by the actions of the bondsman), but also the subjective
freedom of the bondsman (the bondsman is free insofar as he is the lord
of his body: He recognizes this freedom in the lord of the social organism, i. e., he recognizes this lord as the objective reality of his own freedom).
The basic idea of recognition follows from the observation that it is
impossible to conceive of the unity of mind and body at the level of the
3
Paul Ricoeur remarks in the introduction of his book, The Course of Recognition:
My investigation arose from a sense of perplexity having to do with the semantic
status of the very term recognition on the plane of philosophical discourse. It is a
fact that no theory of recognition worthy of the name exists in the way that one
or more theories of knowledge exist. (Preface, p. ix) In fact, Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit is a systematic theory of recognition.
Cf. Williams (1997): My thesis is that the concept of recognition is crucial to
Hegels project of mediating modern individualist subjective freedom (Kant)
and classical ethical substance (Plato, Aristotle). (p. 114/5).
Introduction
The Nature of the Self. Recognition in the form of Right and Morality
tween themselves and the lord because they immediately identify themselves with the lord. The lord is only real as the contingent (traditional)
law of the state. Therefore, the citizens are neither aware of the vertical
recognition (in their consciousness there is no room for other traditional
laws) nor of the horizontal recognition (the citizens are absorbed by their
social roles: These are not mediated by free choice). Only when the discrepancy between the inside and outside perspectives can be overcome
does the lordship/bondsman model cease to be an external attempt to understand the unity of mind and body. The external perspective from
which the model is formulated must become part of the model itself.
We, i. e., the author and the readers of this book, are also human beings
in which mind and body are united. Therefore, if we, from a meta point
of view, design a model to understand the unity between mind and body,
we must recognize in the model all the meta considerations we made
about the unity of mind and body. Only under that condition, can we
accept the model as a necessary one.
The process in which the inside and outside perspectives are brought
together results in the development of the consciousness of the bondsman. The consciousness of the bondsman becomes more and more
aware of the reality in which he is living. This process is discussed in
the subsequent part of Chapter 1.
Since the consciousness of the bondsman is already a moment of the
entirety of the social organism he is living in, the development of this
consciousness can be reconstructed as a necessary process. At the moment, however, that the consciousness wants to know what is the content
of the social law, it is not possible to determine this content by a necessary
deduction: The content of the social organism is contingent (Aristotles
model of the state is compatible with a multitude of traditions). Insofar
as the consciousness of the bondsman is already a moment of the social
organism all the time, this social organism is a contingent organism, i. e.
an organism that has historical existence.
Not all historical organisms can be identified as organisms in which
the consciousness of the bondsman is living. The institutional differentiation of the organism must enable this consciousness to pass through the
development in which it will become aware of the reality it is living in.
Hegel identifies this social organism as the polis of the ancient Greek
world. Chapter 2 elaborates how the polis can be conceived of as the historical social organism in which the immediate unity of right and morality, i. e., the immediate unity of horizontal and vertical recognition, is objectified.
Introduction
Although the Roman Emperor (the lord and master of the world [292/3]) is
the titanic self-consciousness that thinks of itself as being an actual living
god (293) he is a person like the others, a formal self, that has no real power
over the content, i. e., over the substantial world of which he is supposed to
be the ruler.
The Nature of the Self. Recognition in the form of Right and Morality
The idea of the second self is simple: To prevent the risk that the social
law is not in harmony with the moral identity of the person, the second
self wants to make the social law the expression of his moral identity. This
attempt seems to be reasonable when the moral identity is cultivated: It
is no longer the moral identity that is immediately given and that belongs
to the private domain, but it has been socialized and rationalized and has
lost its particular character. The second self wants to make his cultivated
moral identity the content of the social law.
According to Hegel, the absolute freedom of the citizen of the
French Revolution is the historical reality of the second self: He does not
accept any tradition and demands that the social law is in absolutely accordance with his enlightened moral self. It is, however, impossible to
meet the demand of the citizen, not only because all citizens want to
do the same and cannot accept that the other citizens determine the content of the social law, but also because the citizens contradict themselves:
Since the moral identity transcends all positive determinedness, they have
to reject any positive shape of the law. Therefore, the subjectivism of the
French Revolution necessarily ends in the revolutionary terror in which the
citizens try to prevent each others attempt to actualize the social law.
Also, although the second self cannot, evidently, be the adequate actualization of the unity of right and morality, it is certainly a necessary stage
in the development of the nature of the self. A free, moral self cannot tolerate a given social organism; his freedom is only real if this organism expresses his moral identity. The terror of the French Revolution, however,
has shown what are the bloody consequences of a policy that is immediately moralized. This is understood by Jean Jacques Rousseau when he
differentiates between the social law and its transcendent moral legitimation. The social law is legitimate insofar as it can be considered as the expression of the volont gnrale, the general will. This concept remains
transcendent because it must accurately be distinguished from the volont de tous, the will of all, that can be positively deduced from the
real will of the citizens.
Chapter 4 discusses Hegels reception of this Rousseauian reflection
on the French Revolution in the Morality-Chapter of the Phenomenology of
Spirit. The problem is, on the one hand, how to preserve the transcendent
character of the general will, and on the other hand, at the same time understand the existing legal order as a manifestation of the general will.
Hegel rejects Kants solution because of his distinction between a noumenal and a phenomenal world. Since the general will is situated in the noumenal world, and the legal order in the phenomenal world, the problem
Introduction
is only shifted: how to think of the relation between the noumenal and
the phenomenal world. Hegels own solution is elaborated as the third self,
the conscientious individual.
The third self (as reflection on the French Revolution) belongs to the
modern world (Hegels own era) and pretends to express the adequate relation between right and morality. The conscientious individual is related
to the transcendent dimension of the absolute Spirit, i. e., to the absolute
essence of his freedom. This relation reflects the citizens relation to the
general will in Rousseau. At the same time, the conscientious individual
tries to actualize his moral freedom in the objective world, i. e., in the social order in which he is living. Therefore, the adequate relation between
right and morality is conceived of as the relation between objective and absolute Spirit.
In Chapter 5 the three forms of the self are compared to the three
forms of recognition that Axel Honneth distinguishes in The Struggle
for Recognition.6 The comparison is complicated because Honneth relates to the young Hegel whose concept of recognition, according to
Honneth, is influenced by the presuppositions of the metaphysical tradition and has to be reconstructed in the light of empirical social psychology.7 It is examined which meaning Honnths arguments have for
the Phenomenology of Spirit. The conclusion is that the three forms of
the self are not metaphysical in the sense of Honneth.
It took the social experience of the Ancient, the Mediaeval and the
Modern world to be able to formulate the human self adequately. The
insight into the third self presupposes the insight into the first and second
self. The individual who wants to acquire adequate insight into the
human self has to repeat, at an individual level, the social experience of
European history. In other words, this individual must participate in a social organism whose institutions allow the repetition of this social experience. In Chapter 6, it is argued that it is exactly this consideration that
is the basis of the project of Hegels Philosophy of Right. 8 The ethical life
that is developed in this work as the unity of Family, civil Society and
State, is an attempt to integrate the development of the first, second
and third self in the institutional framework of one social organism. Fam6
7
8
Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, Polity Press, Cambridge 1995.
Ibidem, p. 68.
Hegels Philosophy of Right, translated by T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press
1967.
The Nature of the Self. Recognition in the form of Right and Morality
ily, Corporation and State are presented as the adequate institutional embodiment of the first, second and third self.
Chapter 7, 8 and 9 consist of a detailed survey of the way in which
the development of, respectively, the first, second and third self in the Phenomenology of Spirit, returns in the development of, respectively, family,
civil society and state in the Philosophy of Right. My thesis is that the logical
structure of the Philosophy of Right cannot be understood if one does not
acknowledge that it has been Hegels intention to resume the three periods of European history (Antiquity, Middle Ages and Modernity) with
the three corresponding forms of the self as the constituting logical moments of ethical life. From Hegels viewpoint, the Phenomenology of Spirit
and the Philosophy of Right do not represent different positions. The historical order is only transformed into a systematic order.
Curiously enough, however, the Phenomenology of Spirit is not only a
criterion for the positive understanding of the Philosophy of Rights composition, but at the same time, a criterion to criticize this composition. In
the Philosophy of Right, the concept of conscience is reduced in comparison with the Phenomenology of Spirit: Since the Philosophy of Right discusses the objective Spirit, the dimension of the religious conscience is explicitly excluded. The content of conscience is reduced to what can be actualized at the (historical) level of objective Spirit. This reduction has huge
consequences for all three domains of ethical life. The ethical life of the
family is reduced to natural life in the form of freedom; the freedom of
civil society is reduced to economic freedom; the ethical life of the state is
reduced to the mono-cultural nation state.
Chapter 7, 8 and 9 not only reconstruct Hegels composition of the
Philosophy of Right, but also the version that would result from a position
in which conscience is not reduced. In this version, consequently, also the
three domains of ethical life are not reduced: It offers room to multi-culturality, to moral and political freedom and to states that are embedded in
a system of international law. In this version, the relation between absolute
and objective Spirit is conceived of as the relation between human rights
and democracy. My thesis is that this alternative version of the Philosophy
of Right, based on the full consequences of the Phenomenology of Spirit,
elaborates a conceptual framework that is better suitable for the understanding of contemporary multi-cultural and globalized society than
other proposals, especially the popular theories of Jrgen Habermas9
and John Rawls.10
9 Jrgen Habermas, Faktizitt und Geltung, Frankfurt/M., 1992.
Introduction
10
The Nature of the Self. Recognition in the form of Right and Morality
Introduction
11
But, in my opinion, the central point is that Theunissen identifies objective and absolute Spirit. Precisely because Hegel wants to solve the problem of how to devise a community of independent individuals, he has to
introduce the absolute Spirit in distinction from the objective Spirit. The
a-symmetrical relation between the individuals and the absolute Spirit
grounds the intersubjectivity between individuals that have a symmetrical
relation to one another at the level of the objective Spirit. The identification of objective and absolute Spirit totally ignores Hegels project.
The revised Philosophy of Right raises the same questions as Rawlss
Political Liberalism 14 : how to think of a community of persons with different moral opinions. It shows, however, that Rawlss conception of the
moral person remains unreflected. The concept of the moral person already presupposes a structure of basic institutions all the time. An atomized moral person is a contradiction in itself; the attempt to construct an
overlapping consensus between atomized moral persons is totally superfluous. The fundamental failure in Rawlss and Habermass theory converge: neither of them has developed an adequate conception of the
unity between mind and body. They conceptualize a human self without
identity.
The revision of the Philosophy of Right makes it possible to give an
answer to the justified criticism of the Philosophy of Right, itself. In reading Hegels analysis of civil society, for example, Marxs criticism of Hegel
and his alleged alliance with capitalism becomes obvious. The revision,
however, will clarify that Hegel, especially in his analysis of the System
of Needs, betrays his own principles and is too much impressed by the
contingent reality he is confronted with. Also Sieps criticism that
Hegel one-sidedly remains committed to the primacy of the general
and the Christian culture is overcome in the revised version in which
the moral individual transcends the labor system, and in which multi-culturality gets the room it deserves.15
Chapter 1
The Human Self as the Unity of Mind and Body
Introduction
From a philosophical point of view, a scientific fact cannot entirely express what makes a man into a man. Scientific facts depend on scientific
theories: It is only in the framework of scientific theory that facts are defined. Theory gives facts their scientific value. Therefore, if man is scientifically defined as a specific organism with a specific genome, he does
not coincide with his existence as an organism. To his existence also belongs the scientific theory that he develops in order to represent his specific organism. In this chapter, it is discussed what it means to conceive of
man both as an organism and as the scientific reason for whom this organism exists.
The problem to be solved is the age-old problem of the relation between mind and body. This problem cannot be solved by reduction, as it
is done by David Hume and Ren Descartes. While Hume reduces mind
to body when he maintains that all ideas must be reduced to impressions,
Descartes reduces body to mind when he assumes that the res extensa essentially is a clear and distinct idea. In this reduction, either the mode of
being of the mind, or the mode of being of the body disappears, so that
the relation between two modes of being is revealed as a problem that
does not comply with reality. But neither can the problem be solved in
Kants way. Although Kant has understood the one-sidedness of
Humes empiricism and Descartess rationalism, and was in search of a
synthesis of both approaches, his solution does not escape from repeating
the problems of a scientific definition of man. Although Kants project
essentially is an anti-reductionist one because, in his view, mind and
body have their own domain (namely in the noumenal and the phenomenal world), his criteria for the synthesis of mind and body remain external to these domains. Kants definition of man as a unity of mind and
body does not elucidate its own necessity.
For a philosopher, it is not sufficient to propose a scientific model of
the relation between mind and body. A scientific model is subjective in
the sense that it is not unconditional. This is not only because alternative
Introduction
13
models are possible, but also because the criterion of its verification (experimental perception) embodies a specific (conditional) view on the relation between (the world of the) mind and (the world of the) body. This
subjectivity can only be overcome if it has been proven that the model is
not one of the many possible models, but is exclusive. The being that is
modeled as a unity of mind and body must, at the same time, be able to
accept the model that constitutes his unity as a necessary one. The conception of the unity between mind and body has to be unconditional.
Of course, it is not evident that an unconditional model of the unity
of mind and body is possible. All candidate models have to be tested. But
what guarantee have we that the process of testing will ever end? I think
that this dilemma can be overcome by a methodological approach that
allows the systematic construction of the unconditional model. I will
summarize the central steps of this systematic construction:
1. The unity of mind and body must (hypothetically) be determined as
an immediate unity. In that case, the model of the unity between
mind and body necessarily has to be accepted by the mind that is constituted by the model. Because this mind is by definition immediately
unified with the body, it has no room for another interpretation;
2. From an outside perspective, however, the immediate unity of mind
and body is a contradiction (between form and content). Insofar as
it concerns a relation between mind and body, the terms of the relation are (formally) distinguished. Insofar as it concerns an immediate
relation, however, this distinction disappears because, in regard to
their content, mind and body are immediately identical. As a matter
of fact, an immediate relation is no relation;
3. The process of construction consists of the steps that mediate between
the inside perspective in which mind and body are immediately one,
and the outside perspective in which mind and body have domains
that are explicitly distinguished. Each stage of the process is a revision
of the model that conceptualizes the unity of mind and body. The distinction between mind and body that is implicitly presupposed in the
model of their immediate unity is, step by step, made more explicit;
4. If the stages in the process are logically interconnected, i. e., if each
stage is logically deduced from the preceding one, the process can result in an unconditional model of the unity between mind and body:
a model that combines the unity of mind and body with their distinction, and a model that has a necessary status for the mind that is conceptualized by the model itself.
14
16 Wildt (1984) rightly remarks that the Phenemenology of Spirit has to be understood beforehand as a theory of the Self and of Self-Experience. [die Phnomenologie des Geistes von vornherein als Theorie des Selbst und der Selbsterfahrung
zu verstehen [ist].](p. 374).
17 This logical deduction is a dialectical deduction. What this dialectical logic precisely means, will become clear in the next section. Anyhow, the dialectical logic
does not come down to a violation of the law of non-contradiction, as Popper
seems to think. On the contrary, Hegel has developed his dialectics to overcome
contradictory relations and to safeguard the law of non-contradiction.
18 This remark seems to correspond to Terry Pinkards opinion: Accordingly, the
Phenomenology is supposed to take its readers, the participants in the modern European communitys form of life, through the past formations of consciousness
of the European spirit the ways in which that spirit has both taken the essence of things to be, and the ways in which it has taken agents to be cognitively
related to that essence and demonstrate to them that they require the kind of
account which the Phenomenology as a whole provides, that the Phenomenologys
project is therefore not optional for them but intrinsic to their sense of who
they are. (Terry Pinkard, Hegels Phenomenology. The Sociality of Reason, Cambridge 1994, p. 17). The topic of the Phenomenology of Spirit, however, is not
the adequate understanding of European history, but rather the adequate understanding of substance (what, for Hegel, equals the adequate understanding of
the unity of mind and body). Although this understanding is actualized in European history, this history remains an illustration (i. e., a contingent manifestation
form) of the fundamental (logical) structures of substance. Therefore, I cannot
agree to his thesis that the three introductory sections show that a kind of
knowledge that would be independent of social practice is impossible. (p. 21).
Also Philip Kain (Hegel and the Other, New York, 2005) seems the be the victim of the same misunderstanding when he writes: What sense does it make to
call the absolute of one era absolute if it differs from the absolute of another
era? The answer requires us to see that for Hegel reality itself is actually constructed by culture. (p. 19).
15
16
that borrows its unity from the mind that functions as its form. The mind
is the form that is only real because the body is its content. In this way,
mind and body relate to one another in a non-relation: Distinct from one
another, both terms have no meaning. This relation can be illustrated by
Berkeleys esse est percipi. The body only exists insofar as it is perceived by
the mind. Outside its perception, the mind has no existence. This relation is an epistemological relation that is in no way distinguished from
the object that is known. It is about a knowledge that is totally immersed
in its object. Just because of its immediacy, this relation cannot be understood as an interpretation (for example by means of some scientific
model). It is about a knowledge that is completely in unity with its object
and that knows its object absolutely.
If the unity of mind and body is determined in this way, the conclusion is justified that, from a subjective point of view, i. e., from the minds
view, mind and body are a necessary unity. Without one another, mind
and body do not exist at all. But this mind is a very poor one. If it
could express itself, it could not even say I (let alone: I am I). The
relation between mind and body expresses a pure existence that lacks
any determination. The immediacy of the mind/body relation would
be disturbed by any closer determination. In its unity with the body,
the mind is totally undetermined for itself.
The inside and outside perspective are still distinguished. From an
outside perspective, the independence of the mind/body unity is clear.
The unity is distinct from other unities. From an inside perspective, however, the unity has no independence because it cannot make any distinction. On the other hand, only from the inside perspective is the mind/
body unity a necessary one. The subjectivity of this necessity can only
be overcome if the mind/body unity is closely specified and has the opportunity to internalize what, from the outside perspective, has become
clear: The mind/body unity must not only be determined as pure existence, but also as determined existence, i. e., as an independent one.
The mind/body unity that is for itself an independent unity, can be
identified with the result of development that Hegel discusses in the
first part of the subjective Spirit: Anthropology or the Soul. The soul is Hegels terminus technicus to indicate the immediate unity between mind and
body.21 At the level of the soul, however, it is not yet possible to distin21 Hegel defines the soul as the allgemeine Immaterialitt der Natur, deren einfaches ideelles Leben [as natures universal immaterialism, its simple ideal
life.] (Enz. 389), i. e., the soul is the form in which nature has its unity.
17
guish mind and body. The soul is determined by the natural processes in
which its body is involved. At this level, it makes no sense to describe the
mind/body unity as a black-box, because the soul only exists insofar as it
is naturally determined, i. e., the mind has no ability to abstract from the
particular content in which it is involved. This inability has been overcome when the soul is fully developed. At that level, the soul has emancipated itself from its being-submerged-in-nature. The soul is transformed into a mind that can abstract from particular determinations
and has an abstract unity for itself. This abstract unity is expressed in
the distinction that can be made between an inner and outer world.
The soul that has freed itself from nature is for itself insofar as it can distinguish itself from the outside world. The soul has been transformed
into the subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself
the sum total of its merely natural features as an object, a world external
to it but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediately reflected into itself. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. (Enz.
412) 22 Therefore, consciousness is the mind in an immediate unity
with its body. But in this relation, as the mind is undetermined, its
body is, so to speak, a black-box. The mind, however, is determined in
its relation to the outside world; for itself, the mind/body unity is independent. In the second part of the subjective Spirit, the Phenomenology of
Spirit (Enz., 413 ff.), Hegel examines whether the outside and inside
perspective of consciousness are compatible. In the next sections, however, I will not refer to this second part of the subjective Spirit, but to the
elaborated version of the Phenomenology of Spirit, i. e., to the book that
has the same title as this second part.
18
19
20
uli only reflect the internal dividedness of the organism. Any of the endless series of stimuli to which the organism is receptive can be taken into
account. The determination of the stimuli only exists in the endless
change of qualities, without having the possibility to concentrate on specific qualities. Only when the spatio-temporal stimuli have their own
unity (distinct from the unity of the mind) can the mind/body unity adequately relate to them as to an objective world. Only then can the mind
perceive itself as consciousness, i. e., as being related to an objective (outside) world.
John Lockes proposal for the solution of this problem will not do.
He interprets the stimuli as properties, and thinks that these properties,
thanks to the workings of the mind, can be understood as properties
of an identity, i. e., as a complex idea in which the simple ideas of the
properties are unified. In this way, however, the unity of things in the
outside world is not an objective one, but rather a unity that is subjectively constituted. For the same reason, the unity of things in the world cannot be grounded on a priori schemes that belong to the mind or to the
language in which the mind expresses itself: Also in that case, the
unity remains external, i. e., subjectively constituted. The subjectivity of
the unity that is ascribed to the things in the objective world can only
be overcome by considering the radical revolution in the conception of
nature that is introduced by modern science.27
The world of modern science no longer consists of things with properties, but rather of forces of nature. Modern sciences conception of nature has objectivity because it is the physical force that manifests itself in
nature (or rather as nature). Compared to the conception of nature considered up until now, a certain reversion has been performed. Points of
departure are no longer the perceived stimuli or properties, invoking
the problem of their unification. For modern science, natures own
body: After all, it is impossible to have sense experiences without the body. Precisely because the body is, at this level, for the mind only a black-box, it is not
necessary to explicitly thematize the body.
27 The problems in Locke essentially correspond to the problems Hegel discusses at
the second stage of Consciousness: Perception. It is impossible to identify an external thing by perception of properties. To succeed, the properties have to be conceived of as properties that, at the same time, include other properties (the number of properties of a thing can endlessly be enlarged) and exclude other properties (it must be possible to distinguish the properties of the one thing from the
ones of the other). Worded differently, if the outside thing can only be identified
by means of properties, it cannot be identified at all. The unity of the thing is not
itself a property that can be perceived.
21
22
Self-consciousness
The attempt to conceive of the mind/body unity in relation to an independent outside world has failed. From the inside perspective, the sensory
perceivable world has been destroyed. As the self or the I, the mind
has emancipated itself from nature and has become a formal self that only
accepts an independency that it has constituted, itself. This self looks like
Descartess cogito. Like the cogito, it is a formal being-in-itself. Also the
cogito seems to presuppose that the formal structure of being-in-itself is
the only acceptable form of independence. (The formal being-in-itself
Self-consciousness
23
24
Self-consciousness
25
cue its own existence, the pure self has to destroy the existence of the
strange organism.32
The pure negativity towards the strange organism can be articulated
more closely in terms of neediness. Insofar as the body of the mind/body
unity is needy, it is related to an outside world that is determined as a
strange organism. The experience of neediness, however, contradicts the
purely-being-in-itself of the pure self. Therefore, there is no room for a
closer differentiation of neediness. Neediness as such is threatening, not
some particular form of it. Therefore, the pure self turns against neediness as such. Only when it can eliminate neediness as such, can it maintain its pure existence.
Up to a certain level, the elimination of neediness in relation to a
strange organism is possible. The relation of neediness between the
own organism of the mind/body unity and the strange organism implies
that the integrity of the own organism is somehow threatened by the
strange organism. If this would not be the case, then the own organism
is not (practically) related to the strange organism at all. The threat of the
strange organism can have an active form (if the own organism is subjected to the needs of the strange organism) or a passive form (if the strange
organism is an object of the own needs, resulting in the experience of
being dependent on the strange organism for satisfying the own needs).
Both forms of the threat can be overcome when the own organism
kills the strange organism and can make it its prey for satisfying its
needs. Then the own organism has repaired its independence towards
the outside world and is no longer related to any strange organism.
After a while, however, the needs will return, and once again a relation
to strange life arises to which the new needs are directed. In this variation
of needs being satisfied and arising once again, the mind/body unity experiences the life process of its own organism by the strange life. Theredie neue Vollzugsweise der Subjektivitt weiterhin die Bezogenheit auf die gesamte Sphre des sinnlich Erscheinenden bei, jedoch derart, dass smmtliche Inhalte dieser Sphre zugleich auf die Einheit des Bewusstseins bezogen sind, somit
aus der Perspektive der sich konstituierenden Identitt (als Selbstbewusstsein) nur
ein Anderssein oder einen Unterschied darstellen.] p. 75.
32 Hegel calls this negative relation to the outside organism Desire: The simple
I is the genus or the simple universal, for which the differences are not differences only by its being the negative essence of the shaped independent moments;
and self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by superseding this other that
presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness is
Desire. (109).
26
Self-consciousness
27
28
would be a struggle of life and death ending up in the death of one of the
two unities.35
The attempt to develop the adequate relation between mind and
body as the symmetrical relation between two mind/body unities seems
to definitely fail when the struggle results in the death of one of them.
Nevertheless, there is a tradition in philosophy in which the struggle of
life and death between individuals or between groups is presented as a
struggle for recognition. In this tradition, the struggle between individuals can result in a situation in which the struggle is overcome because the
individuals constitute a symmetrical relation of recognition, i. e., a relation in which the individuals relate to one another as self-consciousnesses.
Thomas Hobbes, for example, has the opinion that the so-called legal
status (in which the individuals recognize one another as persons who
participate in a legal order) can be conceived of as a transition from
the natural status (in which the individuals relate to one another in a
struggle of life and death).
Is the transition from the natural into the legal status possible?
According to Thomas Hobbes, the natural status can be described as a
struggle of all against all. The goal of the struggle is the maintenance of
the own life. While defending the own life all is permitted, even the killing of the others. This is the consequence of the ius naturale, the law of
nature that ultimately comes down to kill or be killed.36 The natural status, however, can be sustained when the individuals enter into a social
contract. In that case, they submit to a ruler under the condition that
he succeeds in overcoming the mutual struggle. Therefore, in the transition from the natural status into the legal status, one absolute ruler is ex35 In my opinion, Hegels formulation of the struggle is somewhat confusing: Similarly, just as each stakes his own life, so each must seek the others death, for it
values the other no more than itself; its essential being is present to it in the form
of an other, it is outside of itself and must rid itself of its self-externality. (114)
It is only from an outside perspective that the struggle can be conceived of as a
struggle for recognition. From an inside perspective, the distinction between a
strange organism and a strange self-consciousness cannot yet be made. That
the self-consciousness values the other no more than itself can only be said
from an external reconstruction of this relation. We will see that only the fear
of death results in self-consciousnesss awareness of its body.
36 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, London, 1959, p. 66.
Is the transition from the natural into the legal status possible?
29
changed for another: The power of death is replaced by the power of the
social ruler. The profit that is achieved by this transition is the social
order. This order creates room for the labor that produces the riches dedicated to life. In the social contract, the struggle for survival is continued
by other means: The social order can be a more effective means to guarantee the survival. The means fails if the ruler cannot maintain the social
order. Under these circumstances, the legitimacy of the ruler is undermined and the subjects have the right to chase him away. The distinction
between nature and culture seems to be paper thin. The peace to be
brought about by culture can be threatened at any moment. The return
to the natural status remains always possible, and ultimately depends on
the calculation made by the individuals.
Hobbess construction, however, is based on a false presupposition. If
the individuals in the natural status have the opportunity to calculate and
ask themselves whether or not a contract with a ruler means an improvement, they have, in fact, already left the natural status. If the natural status is characterized by the practical struggle of life and death, there is no
room for calculation or for reflecting the others position as a potential
contract partner. Whoever is able to reflect, and knows the difference between a relation of struggle and a relation of contract, is already part of a
cultural order all the time. Therefore, Hobbess conception of the transition from the natural into the legal status has failed. The reflecting selfconsciousness cannot be at the same time the presupposition and the result of the transition.37
Maybe the natural status can be left otherwise. Maybe a legal status
can be created that is not the result of a contract, but rather follows
from a purely practical development. In that case, the legal order does
not presuppose a self-consciousness that already has the ability to reflect
and make free choices. The animal world seems to offer a lot of examples
of a living-together without a developed self-consciousness. Maybe these
examples can help to construct alternative ways for overcoming the natural status.
Innumerable animal species live together without having a legal order.
Their peaceful cohabitation is not trivial: Animals also have the possibility to struggle even when they belong to the same species. Therefore, their
37 Cf. PhR 75 comment: The intrusion of this contractual relation, and relationships concerning private property generally, into the relation between the individual and the state has been productive of the greatest confusion in both constitutional law and public life.
30
living-together presupposes a principle that banishes the struggle and allows them to coordinate their conduct. The cohabitation of the members
of a flock not only implies that they can live in each others neighborhood,
but also that they have the ability to coordinate action. Only this coordination gives the flock its unity as a flock.
The behavior of animals that coordinate action and form a flock can
be described as the realization of a general law. For, action coordination
only has a meaning under the assumption of a general action goal that is
served by it, for example, the survival of the flock. This general goal can
be interpreted as a general law that is realized by coordinated action.
If it concerns the animals of a flock, the origin of such a general law
can be explained from innate instincts. It can be put forward that these
animals from a natural predestination are predetermined to live in a
flock, although it does not have to be clear in advance which position
they will take within the flock. In some flocks the struggle for leadership
can break out in which the strongest succeeds. Even in that case, the existence of the flock as such is not the result of the physical power of a
triumphing leader. The struggle is not about the constitution of the
flock, but rather about the individual that will exercise the leading role
in the flock.
If the base of the flocks living-together is interpreted in terms of a
general law, this does not make the flock a legal society. It is true that
the legal status enables one to distinguish between actions that do or
do not correspond to the law. But this distinction gets the legal meaning
only if it is known by the actors. An animal of the flock can disobey the
law. But it can only experience its breach of the law if its behavior is practically punished; for example, when it went too far from the flock and is,
because of that, caught by a predator. A law can only become the law of a
legal order if it is known by the actors, and the actors know what action is
legal and what is illegal, what action observes the law and what action
does not. Legal order presupposes reflecting self-consciousness and cannot be situated in a natural order. Once again, the conclusion runs that
the legal status is not preceded by a natural one.38 Although the relation
38 Wildt (1984) seems to suggest that in Hegel the legal status is preceded by a natural struggle: Oppositely, one has to say that Hegel, in this expression, affirms
the appearance again that the struggle is at all possible as a relation of pre-ethical
and, at the same time, self-conscious human subjects, i. e., as Robinsonate.
[Umgekehrt mu man jedoch sagen, da der Kampf als ein Verhltnis vorsittlicher und zugleich selbstbewuter menschlicher Subjekte berhaupt mglich ist
31
of the struggle can be overcome at the level of living nature in the form of
instinctual laws in which the struggle is transformed in cooperation, these
instinctual laws have no legal status. The laws of the legal status have to
be self-conscious.
Until now, we assumed that the mind/body unity can only exist if it is
able to exclude the strange organism. We concluded that this demands
that the struggle of life and death with the strange organism is overcome,
and suggested that this goal could be achieved in a symmetrical relation
to another mind/body unity, i. e., in a legal status. We have argued that
the constitution of the legal status cannot be conceived of as a temporal
transformation of the natural status. The mind/body unity can only exist
if it has been participating in a legal order all the time. As participant of
the legal order, the mind/body unity is no longer confronted with a
strange objectivity, i. e., the strange organism that has to be excluded. Objectivity has lost its strangeness because it has been transformed in the law
that is known by the mind. Therefore, the objectivity is no longer practically excluded, but recognized as an objectivity that has lost its otherness.
Insofar as it can be known by the mind, objectivity and mind must in
some way or another be the same.
The attempt to overcome the contradictions in which the mind/body
unity gets involved, has led to a fundamental change in its determination:
The negative exclusion of strange objectivity has turned into a positive
reception of an objectivity that is knowable. This change, however, has
not been performed from an inside perspective. This perspective will
be elaborated in one of the next sections. Before doing this, however, I
will, in the next section, go into the essential characteristics of the legal
status.
32
loses its purely practical status. If it is also understood that the law is practically valid, the law counts as a legal law. Without this insight, the general law is exercised as a blind law of nature that not only models the actions, but also determines them. Only when the actor is self-conscious
and understands to observe the law does he no longer coincide with
his practical actions. Only then, not only the possibility arises not to observe the general law (incidentally this could have been the case before),
but also the possibility to know that the own actions do not correspond to
the general law. Only then can the actor be made responsible for his actions, and will it make sense to subject him to jurisdiction. The responsible actor who does not observe the general law commits injustice and
has to bear the consequences of his behavior. Whoever commits injustice
lets himself in for the sanctions of the jurisdiction. This overcomes in two
ways the blindness of the general law that is only natural. Not only will
the violation of the general law lose its innocence, but also the sanctions
that punish the violation. The general law that is known, is also known by
the power that maintains the general law. Therefore, the sanctions on violation of the law are no longer practical punishments of mindless behavior (the animal that ventures too far from the flock is seized by hostile
claws) but are self-conscious actions. In both cases, the offender against
the general law brings a hostile power upon himself. But when the general
law has become legal, the hostile power has lost its blindness. The punishment for the breach of the law is no reaction of nature, but a self-conscious action that could not have come off (for example, in case the offender is granted mercy). In both cases, the hostile power that has been
aroused can lead to the same results. The offender who is killed by the
blind power of nature can die under legal conditions, as well (when he
is punished by death). Therefore, the decisive distinction between the
natural and the legal status is not the effect of the power that realizes
the general law, but the character of the general power: Is this power
blind or self-consciousness? From the outside perspective, it cannot be
judged whether the animal of the flock observes the general law because
his instincts do not leave him other possibilities, or because he has knowledge of the sanctions that illegal actions can evoke.
33
34
of a general law, the subjects know where they are standing. They know
how to behave for preventing the exercise of violence against them. Only
in this way does it become possible to enforce action coordination. Only
in this way is the most elementary condition satisfied to enforce social
order. This grounds the dictators interest to observe the general law himself, although he, as dictator, is not obliged to. Because the law is generally known, the subjects immediately know whether the ruler observes the
law that he has enacted (or at least has approved). If it appears that the
ruler does not observe the law, it offers the subjects no advantage to observe the law themselves. For, they do not know whether this is sufficient
to ward off violence. Therefore, by not observing the law, the ruler undermines the social order and risks that the power gets the shape of the exercise of pure violence.
The publicity of the law does not make it a fair one. Publicity, for
example does not need to imply that all are equal for the law. Only
the continuity of the law is guaranteed, because a public law cannot be
changed from day to day. Taken in itself, however, publicity is compatible
with all content, however unfair it may be. Public law can discriminate
between women and men, white and black, nobility and ordinary people.
The public law could even shamelessly formulate that the only important
interest is the interest of the dictator.
It may be clear that the public law cannot have all content. If it is not
more attractive to observe the law than not to observe it, the viability of
the law cannot be explained. Therefore, we can ask ourselves whether
minimal conditions can be formulated to which a viable law has to correspond. What minimal guarantees has the law to offer to make obedience to the law more attractive than its violation?
According to Thomas Hobbes, the law applies with the minimal condition we are looking for when it enables one to avert death. In the meantime, however, we presented the arguments against Hobbes position. The
institution of the legal status necessarily implies that the ruling general
law is known by the self-conscious individuals. Knowledge of the law
characterizes the distinction between the natural society of the flock
and the human society of the legal status. Therefore, a human society exists of self-conscious individuals, not of individuals who are purely natural. For self-conscious individuals, the purely physical survival can never
be a sufficiently legitimate basis of the ruling power. This would result in
a remarkable contradiction. How can a status that lacks room for selfconsciousness (a society in which survival is the highest criterion) offer
a solution to an individual who is confronted with the legitimate prob-
35
36
formed according to a known general law. Self-consciousness has conformed to a dictator all the time, i. e., to a known general law.40
The observation that self-consciousness has always conformed to a
dictator can also be expressed otherwise: For self-consciousness, the law
primarily has the status of natural right, i. e., the law rules immediately
and has an absolute, divine status. Although the law is known, this in
no way means that there is room for the consciousness not to accept
the law. Therefore, it is true that at this stage, right is a form of power
exercise that, up to a certain level, can be called reasonable (the ruling
law is known, random will is prevented) but from an outside perspective,
the power exercise has been externally imposed. The factual laws of nature (determining instinctual action) are replaced by laws that are factual,
as well, namely the laws of a holy tradition.
The elementary legal status can be illustrated by the position of Aristotle, who defines the human being as the animal rationale. To understand the human being we have to conceive of him as an animal that also
has a mind at his disposal. The animal strives after the survival of his species. His actions are programmed according the laws of his instinct. As a
rational animal the human being has a logos. This means that his striving after survival is not programmed according instinctual laws, but rather according to self-conscious laws, the laws of the state in which he is
living. Therefore, the state is conceived of as the objectification of the
human species, as social organism in which man gives shape to his striving for survival as a self-conscious being. Aristotle characterizes the state
as the second nature, as an objective reality that replaces the objective reality of the first nature, i. e., the nature of the body. Both forms of objectivity are expressed in the ruling of laws. In the case of the first nature,
these laws are naturally given; in the case of the second nature, the laws
are established by men. Therefore, the laws of the second nature can
change, i. e., the human being is an animal that can go through a historical development.
In Aristotles view, the contradiction between mind and body that
could not be solved at an individual level, is overcome. The mind has
40 Houlgate (2006) is right when he remarks that not all such life and death
struggles in history issue in relations of dominance and subservience. (69) But
he seems to suggest that sometimes (although not always) relations of dominance
and subservience are the result of life and death struggles. Central in Hegels position is, however, that a natural life and death struggle is incompatible with the
existence of self-consciousness.
37
got an own body in the organism of the state. This organism is not determined by nature because the body of the mind is understood as second
nature, i. e., as a nature whose laws are determined by the mind.
38
mind knows the independence of its own organism: The mind knows it
in its finitude and mortality. But at the same time, the mind is not absorbed in this finitude and mortality. Because of its knowledge, the
mind distinguishes itself from the finitude and mortality of its organism.
Neither is the mind the essence of the organism, for in that case it would
be conceived of as a kind of (essential) property. The fear of death is, rather, the experience in which the mind not only relates to the organism as
an independent being, but also, at the same time becomes aware of its
own independence that is distinguished from the independence of the organism. The mind has a transcendental openness to its organism and,
therefore, can be receptive to the own nature of the organism, i. e., it
is able to understand the organism as an independent self. At the same
time, however, the mind experiences that the self of its organism is not
pure. The self of the organism is sunk in nature, i. e., it is not a self
for itself, but only for the mind. And just because the mind conceives
of its organism as this impure, practical self, it can become aware of itself
as the pure self, i. e., the self whose determinations are self-determinations.
If the fear of death can be understood in this way, it is the key for the
solution of the problem we formulated: The fear of death enables the
pure self to relate to its organism in its own independence. The mind/
body problem is not solved by raising the question of how mind and
body can be brought together in an inner unity, but only by the assumption of an organism that is already an inner unity of mind and body at all
times. Only a mental organism is able to develop an explicit insight into
the relation between mind and body, namely by means of the fear of
death it suffers. The problem is not how the pure self can relate to an independent organism. There is only a question of a pure self insofar as it
has brought about a relation to its organism. In that sense, the purelybeing-for-itself of the minds self is the really-being-for-itself of the organism that has been brought to its pure concept. Only in the fear of
death can the pure self be explicitly distinguished from the independent
self of its organism.
To understand Hegels concept of the fear of death, we have to analyze his understanding of the organism. Like the force of lifeless nature,
the organism has the form of a self: It is a unity manifesting itself.42 The
42 Cf. But for us, or in itself, the object which for self-consciousness is the negative
element has, on its side, returned into itself, just as on the other side conscious-
39
40
ing the mind. The mind was a lord, served by an unnoticed servant.
When, however, the body is subjected to an absolute power, the mind
can no longer ignore the reality of its body, it sees through the finitude
of its organism and becomes aware of its own mortality. This knowledge
of the mortality is a relation of the pure self to its organism. The pure self
has torn away from the practical relations of its organism. In that sense,
the pure self is free: It has freed itself from the natural determinations.
Because of this freedom, the pure self is able to have an open relation
to its organism: It conceives of its organism in its own nature, i. e., as
a finite organism. The mind knows that it only relates to its organism insofar as this relation is put forth by itself. The finite organism only appears insofar as the pure self has distinguished itself from it and relates
itself as pure self to its real self, i. e., to its real being-for-itself.
Insofar as it is now possible for the pure self, having experienced the
fear of death, to relate to an independent organism, i. e., its own organism, the problem of the unity of mind and body is solved from an inside
perspective. From an outside perspective, however, the solution has still
not been found. The fear of death is not only temporal, i. e., linked to
the moment in which the fear of death is experienced, but also dependent
on an absolute power (death) that is practiced on the organism from outside. If the fear of death is dependent on the working of an absolute
power, neither the independence of the pure self, nor the independence
of the organism has been adequately expressed. Faced with the absolute
power of death, both lose their independence.
To understand the adequate unity of mind and body at least two
problems have to be solved. Insofar as the fear of death plays a role, it
must not just have a temporal validity. With the temporality of the
fear of death, in some sense death itself has to be overcome. For the
unity of mind and body may not lose its independence on behalf of
the absolute power of death. At first sight, it seems impossible to satisfy
both demands. However, we have already seen that the key for solving the
problem can be found in Aristotle. He also makes an attempt to conceive
of the unity of mind and body. Because he does not situate the problem
at the level of the individual, but at the level of the human species, he
offers an entrance to overcome death: The individual dies, but the species
survives.
The way in which the relation between mind and body gets shape in
the fear of death can be connected with Aristotles conception of the animal rationale when the absolute power that causes the fear of death has
the form of another self-consciousness. Under this assumption, the rela-
41
45 Cf. Josifovic (2008): To prove itself as the true identity towards its appearance,
the subject has to prove itself as the lord of its body. [Um sich als wahrhaftige
Identitt gegenber seine Erscheinung zu erweisen, muss es sich als Herr ber seinen eigenen Krper erweisen. p. 81].
46 Robert Pippin (2001) has no right when he states that the significance of human
labor is initially merely the avoidance of death. (162) or that self-determination, viewed as originating in the fear of death, is wholly undetermined by
any specific telos or preset value, some absolute of greater value than life.
(162). Precisely the opposite is true: The labor in service of the lord is an attempt
to realize the absolute essence: self-consciousness.
47 Although Josifovic (2008) analyzes the structure of the fear of death differently,
his conclusion is the same: In the fear of death, self-consciousness learns that the
unity of the species is its essence. (Cf. p. 123.).
42
43
being, and on the other hand, is embodied in the dialectical relation between mind and body.50
Thirdly, the turn of phrase in which it is said (apparently also by
Hegel51) that the bondsman recognizes the lord as his lord can be misleading. In no way does the recognition at this level concern an inter-subjective relation between individuals in which the bondsman (one-sidedly)
recognizes another individual as his lord. To speak about recognition at
this level makes sense only from an outside perspective. The mind has
recognized its body as its own self in the form of otherness. This recognition is institutionalized in the lord/bondsman relation. From an inside
perspective, this recognition is no relation at all. The recognition of
the lord is practically expressed when the bondsman serves the lord,
i. e., acts according the legal law. At this level, however, the relation between the legal law and the bondsman is immediate. The legal laws
have the form of traditional values and norms on which the actions of
the bondsman are immediately (i. e., without any critical distance)
based. We will see that the lord, initially, is not a worldly ruler, but rather
a god, i. e., a representation of the bondsmans absolute essence.
Keeping in mind the aforementioned warnings, the lord/bondsman relation can be conceived of as Hegels basic model for the conception of
the unity of mind and body. From an outside perspective, the model is
characterized by two forms of recognition, a vertical one and a horizontal
one. The vertical recognition concerns the relation between the pure self
and the social organism. The social organism is recognized as the histor50 Therefore, I totally disagree with Pippin (What is the Question for which Hegels Theory of Recognition is the Answer?), when he states: Being spiritual
beings is an historical achievement of certain animals; not the manifestation of
an immaterial or divine substance. Said much more simply: The Left-Hegelians
were right. (p. 13) Consequently, I also reject his thesis that There is no supernaturalism or noumenalism in such an account and it is completely non-dualist. (p.14).
51 Hegel characterizes the recognition between lord and bondsman as a recognition
that is one-sided and unequal. (116). Therefore, this relation has nothing to do
with inter-subjectivity. To begin with, servitude has the lord for its essential reality; hence the truth for it is the independent consciousness that is for itself.
(117). That the lord is the essential reality is only practically expressed by the
bondsman, namely by his labor in service of the lord. Even if the bondsman
has developed self-consciousness (thanks to his labor activities), this does not result in a recognition of the lord: He only sees his own being in the lord: It is
in this way, therefore, that consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its own independence. (118).
44
ical embodiment of the pure self. As pure self, the individual is absolute,
an end in itself. Therefore, the vertical recognition has to do with the domain of morality and (as we will see later on) human rights. The horizontal recognition is situated within the social organism. The social organism
is realized by members who observe a legal law. All members are absolute
equals insofar as they are moral individuals. Because of this absolute
equality, they will express themselves as free and equal citizens of the social organism. Therefore, the horizontal recognition has to do with the
domain of right. Thus, the lord/bondsman relation, with its two dimensions of recognition, is an elementary model to integrate the domains
of right and morality (of human rights and democracy).
From an inside perspective, however, the domains of right and morality are still undeveloped. The individuals are totally involved in the
practice of the social organism.52 They cannot differentiate between
their social role and their absolute value as pure selves. Neither they
can differentiate between their social role and their freedom and equality
as citizens. Only when the pure self is integrated in the inside perspective,
when the contradiction between outside and inside perspective is overcome, can the social organism be conceived of as the adequate unity of
right and morality, of democracy and human rights.
45
55 In contrast to Jrgen Habermas (Arbeit und Interaktion, in: J. Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie, Frankfurt/M., 1971), who separates labor
and interaction as categories that are fundamentally different, Hegel shows
how these categories cannot be separated.
56 Cf. Karl Marx, who understands the development of labor division as well as a
natural (naturwchsig) process. Da diese Entwicklung [der Produktivkrfte,
P.C.] naturwchsig fr sich geht, d. h. nicht einem Gesamtplan frei vereinigten
Individuen subordiniert ist (Deutsche Ideologie, Berlin 1969, p. 72). (Since
46
tributes the power over nature ultimately not to the social order, but to
himself. For him, nature has no more secrets. Within the framework of
the social order he is able to subject nature to the desired actions without
being confronted with surprises.57
This shift of power from the lord of the social order to the worker
(the bondsman) is expressed in the differentiation of the workers selfconsciousness. His self-consciousness no longer projects the image of his
identity in the lord of the labor system, but expresses his self in the concepts in which his knowledge of nature is contained. These concepts are
not schemes that are externally (theoretically) applied to nature, but determinations that are mediated by labor activities. For the workers selfconsciousness, these concepts can, therefore, get validity as the essence
of nature.58 By these concepts, the freedom of the pure self, originally
represented by the lord of the labor system, has obtained a specific historical content. The concepts in which nature is interpreted do not express the concept of nature as such, but only the concept of nature as
it is developed in the framework of a specific (historical) labor system,
i. e., in the framework of a specific social organism. Therefore, the freedom of the pure self, being the precondition of the social orders constitution, is hidden behind certain historical ways of expression adopted by
the self.59
The bondsman who has recognized himself in his lord, the worker
who thinks that his concepts of reality are absolute, i. e., are the essence
of reality itself, has fallen into the illusion of having totally realized his
autonomy. He is no longer relating to a god or to any external reality.
He has the illusion that the only reality is the product of his self-conthis evolution takes place naturally, i. e. is not subordinated to a general plan of
freely combined individuals ).
57 In this sense, the bondsman has developed some freedom. This is the freedom of
the production system as such, not the freedom that can be located in an individual as Houlgate (2006) maintains: Accordingly, he will understand himself
to be capable of all kinds of labour and not to be dependent on, or slave to,
any one of them. (p.70).
58 Cf. It is essential, however, in thus characterizing this shape of self-consciousness
to bear firmly in mind that it is thinking consciousness in general, that its object is
an immediate unity of being-in-itself and being-for-itself. (120) Hegel calls this
thinking consciousness stoicism.
59 According to Hegel, stoicism is at the level of the Legal status (corresponding to
Roman Law) historically illustrated: The non-actual thought of it [i.e. personality, P.C.] which came from renouncing the actual world appeared earlier as
the Stoical self-consciousness. (290).
47
scious action. The pure self seems to have totally realized itself, and the
notion that the social organism is only an historical reality seems to
have become totally out of sight. All independent reality that could
have represented the pure self has perished.60
Therefore, the real, historical existence of the social organism makes,
in the long run, the discrepancy between the outside and inside perspective explicit, and highlights why the social organism until now is not determined in a way in which both perspectives can be reconciled. From the
outside perspective, the social organism must be understood as a specific
historical unity of right and morality. The pure self (the moral self ) realizes itself as the legal self that participates in a specific social organism. It
is only important that the moral self expresses itself in the social organism; therefore, the closer determination of this social organism is irrelevant, i. e., is only a matter of contingency. From the inside perspective,
however, the moral self coincides with the historical determination of
the social organism: The real self has concretized itself in the determined
concepts that within the framework of a specific social organism get validity as the concepts of nature as such. The objective reality that, from the
inside perspective, appears as an absolute one, appears, from the outside
perspective, only as an historical one.
To overcome the discrepancy of the outside and inside perspective, it
has to be discussed as to how the unity of mind and body can be developed in a way that, also from an inside perspective, the mind/body unity
can perceive itself as the pure self that realizes itself in a contingent legal
order. This development will be elaborated in two stages. In the first stage
(the stage of the Unhappy Consciousness) the mind/ body unity will get
insight into itself as the pure self (or as the lord). In the second stage
(the stage of Reason) the mind/body unity will understand the objective
reality to which it is related as a social organism in which it has to realize
itself, i. e., it gets insight into itself as the bondsman.61
60 Robert Pippin (2001) misunderstands stoicism. The stoic self-conscious does not
struggle to understand the significance of his labor. (p. 164). The stoic selfconsciousness is determined because it is mediated by labor. But the stoic selfconsciousness itself has no awareness of this mediation. Neither does it make
sense that this position leaves it undetermined what I am to think (except
that I am to think it) and so is empty, tedious. (164). The stoic self-consciousness is rather characterized by the determinations of his thoughts, just because his
thoughts are mediated by labor.
61 The mind/body unity will develop the insight into itself as the unity of lord and
bondsman: Its true return in itself, or its reconciliation with itself will, however,
48
49
50
51
that is only the inner representation of a real individual (i. e., the individual that survived the decline of the social organism), cannot be maintained as an absolute one because it will disappear with the death of
the individual. Therefore, the Unhappy Consciousness has, in some
form, to repeat the dialectics of Self-consciousness. It has to free its absolute
essence from the finite natural world. In contrast to Self-consciousness,
however, the Unhappy Consciousness knows itself to be a finite being
that is distinguished from its absolute essence. As a consequence, the individual tries to find the pure self, i. e., to find an immortal individual in
the real world.66 Such a search, however, is doomed to failure. It is in the
nature of all real individuals to die.67
The failure to find the pure identity in the real world makes sure that
the individual is thrown back to himself and he tries to realize the Unchangeable by means of his labor.68 The finite existence of the living individual is dependent on nature as the inexhaustible source of gifts. Insofar as these gifts are mediated by labor, labor reveals the existence of an
absolute self, i. e., nature as the absolute source of life. This absolute self,
however, is once again affected by the finite self, simply because it only
66 Like the activity of Desire, this search endlessly repeats itself. The Desire that killed the strange life in order to prove to be the essence of this life, will never have
accomplished its proof because it is, again and again, confronted with other life.
Analogously, the Unhappy Consciousness that thinks to have found an absolute
self, has to repeat itself endlessly. Since a self that can be found is a living self,
it will, again and again, experience that the alleged absolute self dies.
67 Hegel hints at the crusaders who search for a living god, but find an empty grave.
Consciousness, therefore, can only find as a present reality the grave of its life.
But because this grave is itself an actual existence and it is contrary to the nature of
what actually exists to afford a lasting possession, the presence of that grave, too,
is merely the struggle of an enterprise doomed to failure. (132).
68 In this relation, the Unhappy Consciousness can be considered as the self-conscious
repetition of the bondsman who serves his lord. This time, however, the bondsman remains distinguished from the lord whom he actualises in his labor. Here,
the lord appears as the absolute source of life, as the nature that enables life to
continue by its gifts. These gifts, however, are mediated by the labor of the
bondsman. The fact that the unchangeable consciousness renounces and surrenders its embodied form while, on the other hand, the particular individual consciousness gives thanks [for the gift], i. e., denies itself the satisfaction of being
conscious of its independence, and assigns the essence of its action not to itself
but to the beyond, through these two moments of reciprocal self-surrender of
both parts, consciousness does, of course, gain a sense of its unity with the Unchangeable. But this unity is, at the same time, affected with division, is again
broken within itself, and from it there emerges once more the antithesis of the
universal and the individual. (134).
52
Reason
53
Reason
At the level of Reason, it is investigated under what conditions the moral
individual can exist, i. e., under what conditions the contingent reality to
which it is related does not contradict its pure self. At the level of observing Reason it is discussed whether the moral individual can be real in a
theoretical relation to the contingent reality. The contingence of reality
comes to the fore in its being sensory-given. Therefore, the question is
whether a reality that is given for the senses can be in harmony with
the pure self of the moral individual. The moral individual has to recognize its pure self in the outside reality; the outside reality must be conceived of as an expression of the pure self.
Insofar as scientists interpret lifeless nature as the expression of natural laws, they consider lifeless nature to be a self, i. e., a self that is formulated as a force of nature. At the level of consciousness, however, we have
seen that the self of the force of nature is not the self of an independent
outside nature, but a self that refers back to the self of the scientist (cf.
Kants Copernican turn). It is only the living nature that has an own
self. The self of the living nature, however, is not pure, but participating
in the life process of the organism or the species. Therefore, the only
chance for the moral individuals observing Reason to recognize its pure
self in the outside nature, must be situated in its relation to a self-conscious being, i. e., to the living self that also has a pure self. However,
the question is whether this pure self can be perceived by observing Reason. Hegels answer is negative. The actions of the real human individuals
are no expression of the pure self. The pure self, rather, manifests itself in
the actions of pure thinking. But observing Reason has no entrance to this
pureness: It is dependent on its observation. In the end, Hegel ridicules
the project of observing Reason in his reference to phrenology. The wish to
observe the pure self is expressed by saying that the being of Spirit is a
71 There would be a reality that is, so to speak, in harmony with the Kantian Categorical Imperative.
54
bone. (208) The contradiction in which observing Reason is involved becomes clear: What is pure cannot, by definition, be observed.
Since it has been clear that the reality of the moral individual cannot
be conceived of in a theoretical relation to reality, Hegel performs the
transition to active Reason. At this level, it is discussed whether the reality
of the moral individual can possibly be conceived of in a practical relation
to reality. The reason for this attempt is obvious: What fails at the level of
theoretical reason, i. e., the realization of the moral individual in relation
to another moral individual, may be possible at the practical level. At
least, individuals who live together in a social organism are no things
for one-another. Therefore, the question that is raised at the level of active
Reason runs: Can the moral individual realize itself in a social organism?
Since it concerns the realization of a moral individual that has to recognize its essence in the contingent reality, the question can also be formulated as follows: Can the moral individual understand the social organism
as a reality that mediates its relation to another moral individual, so that,
in the social organism, the moral individuals make the other moral individuals their subject?
At the level of self-consciousness we witnessed the birth of the social
organism. In the social organism the individuals are the bondsmen who
serve the pure self as their lord. Subsequently, the moral individual was
developed as the result of the decline of the social organism: as the individual who internalized the pure self as its absolute, inner essence. Therefore, the question of whether the moral individual can realize itself in the
social organism comes down to the question of whether the moral individual can return to its origin. Can the individual who acquired his moral
self-consciousness by leaving the social organism, return to the social organism without losing its self-consciousness?
When the contingent reality of the moral individual is determined as
social organism, then it is no longer a strange independence that contradicts the absoluteness of the moral individual. As we saw before, the social organism can be conceived of as the pure self in the form of otherness. Therefore, the relation between the moral individual and the social
organism can be characterized as pleasure: The social organism only affirms the identity of the moral individual. This time, however, the pure
self is not the self of the lord, but the pure self of the moral individual,
itself.
The moral individual is, so to speak, the bondsman who knows his
own pure self as his lord. Moreover, the pure self is not only the pure
self of one moral individual, but also the pure self of other moral individ-
Reason
55
uals. The moral individuals realize their pure self because they practically
participate in a social relation to other moral individuals. They know that
their pure self is not only their inner essence, but also the essence of the
objective world. The pure self is realized in the social organism that is
produced by the actions of the moral individuals. In this relation, however, the uniqueness of the pure self, the moral identity, gets lost. Actually,
the reality of the social organism only exists insofar as a shared legal law is
valid. What is realized remains restricted to what actualizes this shared
law. To realize itself the pure self has to determine itself. This determination is performed in a social organism. This makes it precisely clear that
the pure self has lost its uniqueness or its moral freedom: All moral individuals appear in a social role that is determined by the social organism.
Here, the tension between right and morality is most elementally
shown. The moral individual who wants to realize himself in a legal
order seems to have given up his absolute moral identity and to have exchanged it for the positive social role of the legal subject. The freedom of
the moral individual (implying that all determination is free self-determination) seems to contradict the positive determination of the social organism.72 This discrepancy between morality and right is expressed by
Hegel in terms of Pleasure and Necessity. (217 ff.) The pleasure of the
moral individual who again finds his home in the social organism is disturbed by chilly necessity. The unique individuality of the moral individual gets lost in the general structures of a given social law.
At the level of The law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit
(221 ff.) the moral individual tries to save his unique individuality by
making the law of the social organism his own law, i. e., the law of the
heart. This attempt, however, has to fail. Also the other moral individuals
will try to make the law of the social organism their own law. The result is
a struggle between the moral individuals that cannot be won (unless the
others are eliminated as moral individuals). Therefore, Hegel speaks
about the frenzy of self-conceit: The law of the social organism cannot
be determined from the one-sided subjective point of view.
The potential struggle between the moral individuals can be overcome at the level of Virtue and the way of the world. (228 ff.) The
moral individual can only tolerate the social organism if he accepts
that he has not the power to enforce the law of the heart. (And even
72 Here Derridas double-bind-relation is thematized. Freedom has to realize itself
to be real, but gets lost as freedom in its realization. Cf., J. Derrida, Prjugs,
devant la loi, in: J. Derrida a.o., La facult de juger, Minuit, Paris, 1985, p. 121.
56
if he would have had the power, the enforcement of his law of the heart
would not result in the realization of the moral essence). The moral individual has to accept that the social organism is a contingent reality (way
of the world) that can only maintain its existence when it is actively supported by the actions of the moral individuals. Although the moral individuals know that the social organism is a contingent reality, they have to
recognize it as the realization of their moral essence. The moral individuals are virtuous insofar as they try to educate themselves in order to be
able to observe the laws of the social organism. (This education of the
moral individuals is the self-conscious repetition of the education of
the bondsmen. In their practical labor, the bondsmen developed the differentiated self-consciousness of stoicism. In their self-conscious labor, the
moral individuals developed a differentiated self-consciousness that they
know as the self-consciousness of a contingent social organism.)
If the moral individuals have developed themselves into virtuous individuals they can, from an inside perspective, reconcile with the social
organism. But the price paid for this reconciliation seems to be very
high. Right and morality seem to be reconciled by sacrificing morality.
It is true that is was not enforced by external power and was, rather, an
act of self-sacrifice, but nevertheless, morality seems only to survive as
an inner awareness. The legal subjects know that the social organism
has legitimacy only because they have recognized it in their role as
moral individuals. But this moral recognition seems to have no consequence for the reality of the social organism.
Until now, the social organism has not been specifically qualified. It is
clear that the social organism only survives by the actions of its members:
it survives as long as they observe the laws of the social organism. Until
now, however, these laws remained undetermined. Therefore, although it
has been concluded that the moral individuals have to accept the social
organism as a contingent reality, the question must be raised whether
the moral individuals have to accept all social organisms, irrespective of
any specific determination of their laws. This question is discussed in
the section Individuality which takes itself to be real in and for itself .
(236) At this level, Hegel definitely tries to fill the gap between inner
and outside perspective. If the moral individual not only understands
that, for being real, he has to recognize the social organism, but also
knows in what sense the social organism has to be concretely qualified,
then the reality of his individuality no longer differs from his subjective
insight into this reality. Three options for qualifying the social organism
are examined.
Reason
57
At the level of The spiritual animal kingdom and deceit, or the matter
in hand itself (237), the option is considered that the social organism is
immediately given as a traditional society. Like the instinctual laws of the
animal world, the laws in this case are immediately given (cf. animal kingdom) but, in contrast to the animal world, the laws are also self-conscious.
The individuals immediately know which laws they have to observe (cf.
spiritual animal kingdom). Therefore, the traditional content of the
laws seems the be the matter in hand, itself. The ultimate goal of the
individuals actions is the realization of this traditional content; the actions of the individuals immediately correspond to the norms and values
of tradition. However, insofar as the individuals are also moral individuals, they are only interested in the realization of their moral essence, the
pure self. Therefore, if the individuals act according to the moral values of
the given tradition, they do not really realize themselves. The norms and
values could have been those of another tradition. Contingent norms and
values remain externally related to the moral individuals. What the moral
individuals have in common are not these traditional norms and values,
but rather the moral demand that the social organism expresses their pure
selves.
At the level of Reason and lawgiver (p. 252 ff.), the second option to
determine the social organism is examined. Can the social organism be
the self-conscious product of all moral individuals? Is it possible to identify laws that are necessary, supported by all of them? According to
Hegel, it is indeed possible to find these laws: This type of laws are called
by Kant natural laws, i. e., laws that can be deduced from the conceptual determinations that qualify the relations between the moral individuals. Hegel mentions two examples: Everyone ought to speak the truth
(254) and Love thy neighbor as thyself (255). The first example concerns the moral essence of the individual. Only a moral individual can
speak the truth because of his pure self. As pure self, the moral individual
distinguishes himself from the real world as such. As pure self, he has the
ability to express propositions that qualify things in themselves, i. e., to
express true propositions. Whether the moral individuals can factually
speak the truth, however, is dependent on many contingent conditions.
The second example concerns the realization of the moral individual.
Without the social organism the moral individual cannot be real. In its
turn the existence of the social organism presupposes that the moral individuals recognize one another as free and equal. In this sense, they have
to love their neighbors as themselves. But the commandment cannot determine what real actions the neighbors love imply.
58
The third option to determine the laws of the social organism, discussed as Reason as testing laws (256) is a combination of the first
two options. On the one hand, the point of departure is a traditionally
given social organism, and on the other hand, the laws of this organism
are tested: Are they or are they not an adequate realization of the moral
individuals? But which criterion does reason have at its disposal to perform the test? Because the social organism is a contingent, independent
reality, reason cannot impose its own norms and values. The criteria to
test the social organism can only be derived from the social organism itself. Reason can test whether the norms and values of the social organism
are consistent, whether the social organism is a viable self. This kind of
testing, however, can never result in an unambiguous determination of
the social organisms laws. Consistent law systems can exist in a multitude. Property, simply as such, does not contradict itself; it is an isolated
determinedness, or is posited as merely self-identical. Non-property, the
non-ownership of things, or common ownership of goods, is just as little
self-contradictory. (258).
The examination of the three options has learned that it makes no
sense to look for the most adequate determination of the social laws.
The moral individual is not unambiguously linked with a specified social
organism. The concrete social organism essentially is a contingent reality.
However, this does not justify the conclusion that the moral individual is
indifferent to the determination of the social laws. It is obvious that a social organism can offer more or less openness to moral freedom. At least it
can be investigated under what conditions the social organism gives room
to moral freedom.
59
be determined by its participation in a contingent, historically given, social organism: The laws of the social organism are already determined all
the time.
However, not all social organisms will do. They must correspond to
the minimal conditions that create room for moral freedom. Which these
minimal conditions are is already discussed. The institutions of the social
organism must guarantee the development of the moral individual, i. e.,
they must produce the Unhappy Consciousness. Moreover, the institutions
must enable the moral individual to strive after his realization, i. e., the
moral individual must be involved in a learning process that passes
through the stages of observing and active reason. In other words, the
search of the moral individual for the social organism in which it is adequately realized is projected in the social organism, itself. The contingent, historical organism that is adequate to the moral individual cannot
be determined. What, however, can be determined is a dynamic structure
that institutionalizes the search for the adequate social organism. In the
next chapter, we will see that, according to Hegel, this contingent, historical organism can be identified with the ancient Greek world.
Chapter 2
The Greek World: The Origin of the First Self
Introduction
In this Chapter the law of the social organism, in which the individual (as
the mind/body unity) is real, is nearer determined as the law of a social
organism that is historically found, namely as the Human Law of the
polis, the city-state of Ancient Greece.73 This determination of the social
organism by means of an historically given (contingent) content in some
way joins with the attempt that was made at the level of The spiritual animal kingdom and deceit, or the matter in hand, itself. But the choice of
the Greek city-state is not coincidental. Previously we discussed some examples of the historical reality of the lord/bondsman relation, such as the
example of the Egyptian world in which the lord of the world (the pharaoh) was worshipped as a god. The Human Law of the Greek world,
however, institutionalizes a social organism that (at least initially) has
no gods.74 The Human Law stands for the type of society in which the
bondsmen have recognized themselves in the lord, i. e., a society
that is characterized by the relation of stoicism. The citizens of the
Human Law think to be autonomous; they think that their freedom coincides with its expression in the Human Law.
Referring to the ancient Greek tragedies (especially those of Sophocles) Hegel argues that the Human Law presupposes another law, the Divine Law or the Law of the Family. The existence of this second law, according to Hegel, is no historical coincidence, but is implied by the existence of the Human Law. In the Divine Law, the pure self of the citizens
is institutionalized, i. e., the Divine Law is the embodiment of the Unhappy Consciousness. Therefore, the Divine Law can be considered as
the institutionalized reality of the moral individual.
In the Greek world the domains of right and morality are separately
institutionalized in, respectively, the Human and the Divine Law. More73 The Ancient Greece appears as the origin of western culture, i. e., the culture that
produced the philosophical question on which the Phenomenology of Spirit is
based.
74 The original lawgiver, for example, is Solon, a human being.
61
over, the moral domain (the Divine Law) initially does not concern the
living, but the dead individual. The unreality of the moral individual,
however, contradicts his absoluteness. Therefore, the polis is involved
in a development in which the moral individual tries to realize himself
in the social organism of the Human Law. We will see that, in this attempt, the moral individual passes through the same stages as the
moral individual that tried to realize himself at the level of Reason.
Therefore, the moral individual will experience once again that the
laws of the social organism are contingent. This time, however, the experience is not a hypothetical construction, but an historical reconstruction.
62
If the pure self is not expressed at all in the polis, it would be no more
than a void illusion. Maintaining that the Human Law is an expression of
human freedom would cease to have any meaning. As a result, the law
would only exist, and could have a natural as well as a divine origin.
The human origin of the Human Law can only be understood if this freedom belongs to the reality of the polis. According to Hegel, in the Greek
world it is not the state but the family that does justice to the pure self.
The family is not dealing with citizens but with real individuals which
it keeps alive and educates to become citizens. Also, these activities seem
to have nothing to do with the individuals participation in the pure self.
This changes, however, with the death of the individual. For the state, the
death of the individual is a relative loss, the loss of one of its many citizens. Conversely, for the family, the death of the individual is an absolute
loss. Because the family has to educate its members to their ethical role, it
principally does justice to them as free individuals, i. e., as individuals
who participate in the pure self. The submission to the ethical role is essentially self-submission.
The absolute loss of the family leads to a process of experience which
is structured like the Unhappy Consciousness. The absolute essence of the
deceased individual can only be held in the memory of the family and is
thus separated from the objective world. This separation denies the absoluteness of its essence. Therefore, the family searches for the dead one in
the real world. However, it can only find the body of the lost individual.
In its work, i. e., in the burying of the body, the family tries to reunite
the dead body, by sacrificing its corporeality (the body is given back to
the bosom of the earth) (271) with its absolute essence. This reunion, however, is the result of the familys actions. In its entombing
of the dead family member, the family does justice to the pure self of
the deceased. This justice, however, gets no place in the real world.
The deceased, who is honored by the family, has taken a place in the underworld. Individual and community, the right of the pure self and the
right of the citizens of the state, do not need to be opposed if they are
separated and allocated to different worlds. Hegel formulates the deceaseds right of entombing as the familys duty, i. e., as the Divine Law
that is valid alongside the Human Law. The stability of the Human
Law is saved because the moral dimension is banished to the underworld.
The abstract work of art: the representation of the pure self in the public domain
63
64
76 The first mode in which the artistic spirit keeps its shape and its active consciousness farthest apart in the immediate mode, viz. the shape is there or is immediately present simply as a thing. In this mode, the shape is broken up into the
distinction of individuality, which bears within it the shape of the self, and of
universality, which represents the inorganic essence in reference to the shape,
its environment and habitation (427).
The abstract work of art: the representation of the pure self in the public domain
65
66
of the artist has dissociated itself from its being immediately determined
by the substance. The work of art is the result of the struggle between the
pure activity of the artist and his pathos. Insofar as the sculptor does not
recognize his activity in the work, the work as well as the polis it represents loses its absolute status.
The substance of the polis can regain an absolute representation if the
activity of the artist is also represented in the work. According to Hegel,
this happens in the hymn, the second form of the abstract work of art he
discusses. At this level, the god is represented in the medium of the expressed language. In this medium, the work of art remains, in its objectification, bound to the self. Therefore, the separation between the self
and the substance has been avoided. The hymn is not a thing like a statue
or a temple which, once produced, keeps the activity of the self outside
itself. The hymn only exists in and by the performance of the people.
Here, the religious self-consciousness is pure thought, or the devotion
whose inwardness in the hymn has at the same time an outer existence
(430).
The reverse side of this alliance between the existence of the work of
art and the activity of the self is that the existence of the work of art is
fleeting. The hymn is, in Hegels terminology a vanishing existence
(432). The works objectivity is too much confined in the self and, therefore, falls short of attaining a lasting shape and is, like Time, no longer
immediately present in the very moment of its being present (432).
Now it becomes clear what Hegel implicitly already indicated by
using the term Devotion. In the hymn, the theoretical moment of the Unhappy Consciousness is objectified. In the hymn, the god is represented as
an unchanging but impalpable being. The unhappiness of the Unhappy
Consciousness is due to the contradiction in which it is involved. Because
its god remains impalpable, i. e., it does not appear in the real world, this
been concentrated. The pure self relates itself to the formless essence, as the pure
activity. This pure activity, conscious of its inalienable strength, wrestles with
the shapeless essence. Becoming its master, it has made the pathos into its material and given itself its content, and this unity emerges as a work, universal Spirit individualized and set before us (427). This makes clear in what sense the
work of art is an individualisation of the general spirit. Individuality has been
the pure form of the absolute substance itself. Individuality and substance, however, disintegrate and are transformed into the relationship between the pure self
and its pathos. The specific form of this relationship is objectified in the specific
form of a work of art. Since the work of art gives a renewed and positive reality to
the absolute content, as well, the work of art can be characterized, indeed, as the
individualisation and representation of the general spirit.
The abstract work of art: the representation of the pure self in the public domain
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In the unity of self and divine Being, the devotion is robbed of its
outer existence. The Cult replaces this defect and produces a dwelling
and adornments for the glory of god (435). Once again, it appears
that the labor in which the self sacrifices itself for the god ultimately
shows that the real self is the essence of god: The dwellings and halls
of the god are for the use of man, the treasures preserved therein are
his own in case of need; the honor and glory enjoyed by the god in
his adornment are the honor and the glory of the nation, great in soul
and in artistic achievement (435).
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self is basically a free self that is able to commit any action or, at least,
actions that are not in accordance with the prevailing Human Law.
Therefore, the harmony of the polis is dependent upon restrictive conditions that must be imposed on possible actions. These conditions can be
specified for the different relations that the free individual can take upon
himself towards the polis, i. e., they can be specified for the different moments of the objectified Reason that compose the polis. We will see that
these conditions are represented in the living and the spiritual works of art.
In the living work of art, the first moment of the objectified Reason,
i. e., the observing Reason, is represented as an absolute, everlasting relationship. At this level, the statue is unified with its precondition, the
pure self, and has developed into a living statue expressed by living individuals. The two forms of living art represent, respectively, the Divine
and the Human Law as separated entities. In this separation, the external,
theoretical relationship between the Laws is reflected, which characterizes
the form of the observing Reason.
We have seen that the Divine Law is the house of the pure self. By
means of the Divine Law, the pure self is given an institutional body. The
pure self and its incorporation, mind and body, are represented in the
mystery of bread and wine, of Ceres and Bacchus (438). Ceres stands
for the feminine principle of the body: the simple essence as the movement, partly out of its dark night of concealment up into consciousness,
there to be its silently nourishing substance; but no less, however, the
movement of again losing itself in the nether darkness, and lingering
above only with a silent maternal yearning (437). Bacchus stands for
the masculine principle of the mind. As the moving impulse he is:
nothing but the many-named divine Light of the risen Sun and its undisciplined tumultuous life which, similarly let go from its [merely] abstract Being, at first enters into the objective existence of the fruit, and
then, surrendering itself to self-consciousness, in it attains to genuine realityand now roams about as a crowd of frenzied females, the untamed
revelry of Nature in self-conscious form. (437/8).
The Human Law is the mediated house of the pure self, in which its
mediated existence as citizen has been given a second nature in the objective institutional body of the state. This mediated unity of mind and
body is represented in the athlete of the Olympic Games, the inspired
and living work of art that matches strength with its beauty; and on
him is bestowed, as a reward for his strength, the decoration with
which the statue was honored, and the honor of being, in place of the
god in stone, the highest bodily representation among his people of
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upper world as absolution, not from guilt (for consciousness cannot deny
its guilt, because it committed the act83) but from the crime; and also the
peace of mind following atonement for the crime. (448).
The downfall of the ethical powers is reflected in the completion of
the depopulation of Heaven: The self-consciousness that is represented
in the Tragedy knows and acknowledges, therefore, only one supreme
power, and this Zeus only as the power of the state or of the heart,
and in the antithesis belonging to knowing [of knower and known],
only as the father of the particular that is taking shape in the knowing;
and also as the Zeus of the oath and the Furies, the Zeus of the universal,
of the inner being dwelling in concealment. (449).
Self-consciousness, which has kept Zeus as its only god, has lost its
specific content. Zeus has become the representation of the pure form
of self-consciousness. Therefore, self-consciousness is no longer able to
rescue the ethical substance by sacrificing its self-conscious action. The
pure self is explicitly separated from the contingent reality. The third moment of the active reason, Virtue and the way of the world, ceases being a
constituting moment of the reality of the polis.84 Self-consciousness, the
simple certainty of self, is, in fact, the negative power, the unity of Zeus,
of substantial being and of abstract Necessity; it is the spiritual unity into
which everything returns (449/50). This negative power of self-consciousness is represented in the Comedy: The self-consciousness of the
hero must step forth from his mask and present itself as knowing itself
to be the fate both of the gods of the chorus and of the absolute powers
themselves, and as being no longer separated from the chorus, from the
universal consciousness (450).
In contrast to the self of the gods, the self of self-consciousness is not
imagined. Moreover, the self of self-consciousness is not dependent on a
substantial being: It is only involved in a substantial power insofar as it
acts its part by putting on its mask. But the self quickly breaks out
again from this illusory character and stands forth in its own nakedness
and ordinariness, which it shows to be not distinct from the genuine
self, the actor, or from the spectator (450). This play between the self
of the mask and the genuine self is the exhibition of the ludicrous con83 A better translation would have been deed.
84 We have already seen how Hegel characterized Virtue and the way of the world as
a constituting moment of the polis: It is virtue, which enjoys the fruits of sacrifice, that brings about what it sets out to do, viz., to bring forth the essence into
the light of day, and its enjoyment is this universal life (276).
Conclusion
75
trast between [the self s] own opinion of itself and its immediate existence, between its necessity and contingency, its universality and its commonness (451).
The self that has emancipated itself from the ethical substance is the
free self with the capacity for reasonable thinking.85 Its gods are no longer
coincidental individualities that reflect the divers powers in the ethical
world. Reasonable thinking develops their individualities into the simple
Ideas of the Beautiful and the Good in which return, at the highest level
of abstraction, the Divine and Human Laws. (In the Beautiful the individual gets a universal meaning and in the Good the community encompasses the interests of the individuals). Insofar as the gods have a natural side,
they are clouds,86 an evanescent mist, like those imaginative representations (451/2).
Because of their abstractness, the thoughts of the Beautiful and the
Good are empty so that any individual has the opportunity to give
them his or her own meaning and make them the result of his or her coincidental, contingent individuality: Therefore, the Fate which up to
this point has lacked consciousness and consists in an empty repose
and oblivion, and is separated from self-consciousness, this Fate is now
united with self-consciousness. The individual self is the negative power
through which and in which the gods, as also their moments, viz. existent
Nature and thoughts of their specific character, vanish. At the same time,
the individual self is not the emptiness of this disappearance but, on the
contrary, preserves itself in this very nothingness, abides with itself and is
the sole actuality. (452).
Conclusion
The religion of the work of art is the religion of freedom in its immediate
form. It is the religion of the ancient Greek people that has objectified the
free self in the polis: The polis is the concrete totality of all moments of
the free self. In the immediate form of the polis, however, freedom as
such (i. e., the free self in its pure form) is not objectified. The pure
85 J. Heinrichs, Die Logik der Phnomenologie des Geistes, Bonn, 1974. He thinks
that the transition of the Greek religion into reasonable thinking corresponds
to the transition from Unhappy Consciousness to Reason, see p. 441. However,
we have seen that Reason is already represented by the living and the spiritual
work of art.
86 Here, of course, Hegel is referring to Aristophanes Comedy, The Clouds.
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self is the hidden presupposition of the polis. The reality of the polis is
only a specific historical form of the polis that exists beside a multitude of
other poleis. In the struggle between the poleis, each polis can become
ruined. Their decay appears as an external power, as the empty self of
Fate. In fact, the decay of the polis is caused by an internal power,
i. e., by the penetration of the ethical life of the polis by the pure self.
The development of the polis is the process in which the empty self of
Fate is recognized as the pure self of the real individual. The pure self will
be understood as the Fate of ethical life. In the end, the only reality is the
reality of the contingent self that knows that in its part as persona, it is the
master of this reality.
The development of the polis is an ongoing learning process that is
performed by means of religious representations: All the constituting moments of the ethical life, the moments of the free self, are successively represented by a work of art.87 This representation mediates a raising of the
conscious, which results in the explication of the pure self as the presupposition of the polis.88 At this point, the decay of the polis is over.
The religion of the work art first appears at the moment the pure self
of the individual threatens to penetrate the public domain of the polis.
The decay of the polis is warded off by representing the relation between
individual and community as an absolute and harmonious relation: in
the representation of the statue of the god and the temple. The statue
and the temple, however, cannot repress the pure self because they only
represent the objective appearance of individual and community, not
the free activity that is presupposed by them. Therefore, the pure self
is represented as an absolute being in the abstract work of art. The development of the abstract work of art results in the living work of art in which
the representation of the pure self is immediately united with its reality:
87 W. Jaeschke, Vernunft in der Religion, Stuttgard 1986. He interprets the abstract,
living and spiritual works of arts as historical stages of the religion of the work of
art (see p.208). Although within the development of the spiritual work of art
there seems to be some chronological succession, the religious forms represent
the moment of the polis which are real at the same time. Therefore, it is not necessary that the logical development totally coincides with a chronological one.
88 R. Bubner, Die Kunstreligion als politisches Projekt der Moderne in A. Arndt
a.o. (Ed.) Hegel Jahrbuch 2003, Glauben und Wissen. Erster Teil, p. 310: Die
Generalformel einer Entwicklung der Substanz zum Subjekt erzeugt in der spezifischen Anwendung auf das Religionskapitel, das wir diskutierten, die Eigentmlichkeit, da in der griechischen Lebensform das Substantielle eingebter,
weitergereichter und durch Tradition besttigter Sittlichkeit bereits durch sthetische Transformation vom Ansichsein zum Frsichsein emporgehoben ist.
Retrospection
77
In the athlete of the Olympic Games, the statue of god has become a living god.
In the athlete, however, the pure self remains embedded in natural
relations. It is only at the level of the spiritual work of art that the self
can be expressed as a spiritual one, i. e., as a self that transcends the natural relations. In the Epic, Tragedy and Comedy, the pure self is successively represented as the abstract self of Fate, the self-conscious self of Zeus,
who is the only one supreme power, and the pure self of the real individual that understands itself as the Fate of the world.
Retrospection
We have seen that the polis can be reconstructed as a free state, i. e., as a
social organism borne by free citizens who think that they, by observing
the law, can objectify their pure freedom. This alleged autonomy, however, can only be maintained when the pure self of the citizen can be kept
outside the public consciousness: For this pure self, the real social organism must appear as a contingent order. The pure self is not only embodied in a social organism that is distinguished from the state, namely the
family, but is also placed in another world, i. e., the underworld. The objectification of the pure self is separated from the objectification of the
real self. Both objectifications are distributed over family and state,
over the Divine and Human Law.
The stability of the polis is continuously threatened by the freedom of
the pure self. This threat is warded off when the public consciousness represents the social organism as an absolute reality: In two works of art, in
the temple and the statue of god, citizen and polis are represented as an
absolute relation.
The representation of the polis in the works of art, however, cannot
definitely repress the pure self. The works of art themselves are also a
product of the pure self: They are products of free artists. In its pureness,
the pure self is a being that remains elusive and, therefore, it can only become a subject of self-consciousness in the form of the Unhappy Consciousness. By representing the forms in which the Unhappy Consciousness
tries to realize itself in its turn as an absolute work of art, the potential
undermining working of the pure self can be warded off. In this case,
the forms of the Unhappy Consciousness are represented alongside the absolute representation of the polis. Ultimately, it appears that not the ab-
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solute work of art, but the real individual is the appearance of the pure
self: The real self is a moral individual.
As long as the moral individual is in harmony with the state, it is convinced that it realizes its freedom in the state, i. e., it is related to the state
as the realized observing and active Reason. Because of the contingent
character of the state organism, however, the harmony cannot stand
firm. The individual has the freedom to perform actions that are not
in harmony with the Human Law 89 and undermine its order. To regain
the stability of the polis, the inharmonious relation between individual
and polis is again represented in a work of art and fixated as an absolute
relation. Insofar as the individual relates to the polis in the form of the
observing Reason, this relation is represented in the living work of art; insofar as the individual is related to the polis in the forms of active Reason,
these relations are represented in the spiritual works of art.
At the level of the comedy, however, it is the representation of the
work of art itself that reveals that the work of art represents a contingent
reality as if it were a divine one. Then the individual can become aware of
the contingence of the social organism in which he is living. Consequently, the Human Law loses its legitimacy as the alleged expression of the individuals freedom. This works out in the decline of the Greek world. The
attempt to synthesize the moral and legal dimension has failed; Divine
and Human Law exclude one another.
This conclusion corresponds with the conclusion that was drawn at
the level of the Animal Kingdom. The moral individual cannot adequately
realize itself in a social organism that is contingently given. This time,
however, the conclusion is not drawn on the basis of a hypothetical reconstruction of a social organism, but on the basis of the reconstruction of an
historical social order. Therefore, the decline of the polis does not lead to
the lawgiving Reason, like the reaction was to the failure of the Animal
Kingdom, but to the reconstruction of a new historical social order: a social order in which the deficiency of the Greek society is overcome and in
which a new attempt is made to the adequate realization of the moral individual. Hegel identifies the Roman Empire as this new social order.
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family organism. The general stoicism of the polis is, so to speak, concentrated in the individuality of the person.
From an outside perspective, the persons are a multitude of contingent family organisms. The contents that are realized in the distinguished
families are in no way organically tied with one another. The persons are
only formally related as the legal persons of the property right who recognize one another as free and equal persons. Insofar as the persons coexist as real families, their external relation is represented by the Roman
Emperor. Like the other individuals, the Roman Emperor is a person;
but he is a self beside itself (293), i. e., his content only represents
the externally-being-together of the contingent multitude of families.
This external coherence is also expressed in the religion of the Roman Empire. The Roman gods exist as a pantheon in which they are assimilated in
an external unity.90
The Greek world was structured as the double relation of recognition,
as the being-together of right and morality. Morality was institutionalized
as the Divine Law; alongside morality, right was institutionalized as the
Human Law. In the Roman World right and morality, Human and Divine
Law, are integrated in the reality of the person. On the one hand, the persons recognize one another as the free and equal persons of the Roman
Law; on the other hand, the moral dimension is internalized by the person and practically expressed in the particularity of the family life. This
internalization and practical expression, however, result in the decline
of the pureness of the moral content. In Chapter 4, we will discuss the
return of the pure self in the Realm of Culture. The development of
this world will lead to the genesis of the second self.
90 Cf. In this, the reality of the ethical Spirit is lost, and having lost all content, the
Spirits of national individuals are gathered into a single pantheon, not into a pantheon of picture-thought whose powerless form lets each Spirit go its own way,
but into the pantheon of abstract universality, of pure thought, which disembodies them and imparts to the spiritless Self, to the individual person, a being that is
in and for itself. (454).
Chapter 3
The Realm of Culture: The Genesis of the Second Self
Introduction
As is the case in the polis, also in the Roman Empire the absolute freedom
of the pure self remains an implicit presupposition. The pure self remains
submerged in the practical execution of freedom, i. e., in the way in
which the person expresses his freedom in his property. Therefore, the
discrepancy between inside and outside perspective also at this time continues to exist. From the outside perspective, the property order is a contingent order: an historical form of a social organism. From the inside
perspective, the self only exists insofar as it participates in a property
order. Just like in the polis, also in the Roman Empire the concealed presuppositions come to light: not by the death of the individual, but by the
death of the social organism, i. e., the decline of the Roman Empire. Because of its contingent unity, the decline of the empire is as necessary as
the natural death of the individual. Sooner or later, the Empire has to fall
because of opposed internal power positions.
For the person, the Fall of the Roman Empire means the loss of his
reality as person, i. e., the property order declines. Just as the family of
the polis preserves the pure memory of the deceased family member,
tries to find, again, his reality and arrives at the self-consciousness of
the Divine Law by means of the dialectics of the Unhappy Consciousness,
so the person preserves the meaning of the declined Empire as a pure
Being, tries to find, again, its reality and develops by means of the dialectics of the Unhappy Consciousness the consciousness of the pure Belief . We have to dwell on this development of the pure Belief and
to elaborate how exactly the person survives the Fall of the Roman Empire.
The Fall of the Roman Empire and the experience of the person
The decline of the property order does not necessarily mean the decline
of the persons who were the bearers of the property order. The individual
can survive the implosion of the legal order. But what are the consequen-
82
ces for his freedom? Does the decline of the property order in which the
freedom is realized, also imply the annihilation of freedom? To answer
this question, we first have to discuss the consequences of the decline
of the property order for the self-consciousness of freedom.
The individual who, as person, participates in the property order can
think to be autonomous. After all, he can have his property at his disposal. By the decline of the property order, however, the individual experiences the boundaries of his autonomy. The decline only happens to
him, and surely is no result of his autonomous action. Therefore, the reality of his autonomy appears to be dependent on a power that transcends
his autonomy. This does raise the question of what exactly is the nature of
this power and how it is related to the alleged freedom of the individual.
The external power to which the individual is related and that has become fatal for the property order (the power that, for example manifested
itself in the power of the Ostrogoths who undermined the property order
of the Roman Empire) cannot be understood as the overwhelming power
of nature that immediately threatens the free self-consciousness. As a person, the individual has experienced that nature, in principle, is no obstacle to his freedom. Obviously, nature cannot only manifest itself as a medium in which he can realize his freedom, but also as a medium that resists his freedom. Because nature is factually appearing as a violent power,
the second sight of nature, i. e., nature that is in harmony with freedom,
can only be maintained as a inner representation of the individual. His
second sight seems to be only a recollection of something that has ever
existed.
The recollection, however, is certainly not just an inessential fiction.
Nature as the power that transcends society cannot only be a blind destiny. There has been a time in which it tolerated a free society (in the age
of the polis and the Roman Empire). Therefore, it is not as much an absolute power that, per se, resists freedom, but an absolute power that has
at its disposal the chance of the free individual to realize his freedom. In
this sense, the absolute power of nature is the essence of freedom.91 In this
case, the external violence that ruins the property order shows not so
much the unreality of the individuals freedom, but rather that the reality
of the conditions under which he can practically realize his freedom transcends his autonomy. Therefore, the individual can rescue his freedom by
representing the absolute power as an inner being that has the absolute
power to permit (or forbid) the actualization of his freedom. By this rep91 In fact, here the pure self appears again.
83
resentation, the individual has the awareness that the reality in which he
cannot realize his freedom is not the only possible one. At the same time,
the represented absolute power transcends the alleged autonomy of the
individual. After all, the individual has experienced that he is not able
to guarantee for himself that he can realize his freedom in the real
world. In this sense, the inner representation stands for an absolute
power on which the individual knows himself to be dependent. It is
this power that has the real conditions at its disposal under which he
has the possibility to realize his freedom; this power is the ground of
the property order in which he can realize his freedom.
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85
86
get hold of the outside as an inside he would kill two birds with one
stone: He would not only be able to conceive of the inner being of his
freedom as his own freedom, but would also still have the opportunity
to realize its inner being. The realization should be performed in a
legal order in which freedom not only formally gets shape (as in the property order) but also really: The legal order should guarantee that the natural content also is an expression of freedom by ending the banishing of
this content to the private domain. The law that expresses freedom
should immediately validate the particularity of the individual (that is understood as the content of freedom) as the content of the law.
The aforementioned conditions will be fulfilled by the citizens of the
French Revolution. They not only have put their subjective freedom in the
place of the inner absolute being, but also they want to express their subjective freedom as the content of the law of society. This means that the
formal realization of freedom in the property order has been replaced by
the substantial realization of freedom in a political order in which the citizens immediately want to realize their subjective freedom. The formal realization of freedom by the first self (the person) has been replaced by the
substantial realization of freedom by the second self, i. e., the subject that
wants to realize his subjective freedom.
How the transition from an inner absolute being to which the individual is related (a relation that historically can be situated after the Fall
of the Roman Empire) into an absolute being that is understood as a subjective microcosm that wants to realize itself in the political order (a relation that historically can be situated as the aspiration of the citizens of
the French Revolution) can be really performed, in no way is clear. Hegel
tries to interpret this development as the rise and inner dynamics of Medieval Christianity. He discusses this development as structured according
the stages of the Unhappy Consciousness. 95
95 In his first introduction of the Unhappy Consciousness at the level of Self-consciousness, Hegel illustrates this consciousness already with the examples of Medieval
Christianity. However, it is only at the level of the Realm of Culture that this historical reality is explicitly interpreted.
87
88
89
to a social organism to which he is harmoniously related.99 The social organism has decayed and the objective reality appears as a contingent one.
90
existence. Therefore, the objective world is reconciled with the pure self
of God the Father. As creation of God the Father, the objective world
principally is understood as the creation of a pure self. As a consequence,
the moral individual, in principle, has the possibility to realize his subjective essence in the objective world.
The function of the first stage of the Revealed Religion is comparable
to the first stage of the Religion of Art in the polis. Just like the moments
of the Unhappy Consciousness (namely those moments that resulted in the
embodiment of the recollection of the deceased family member in the living family) were introduced in the public domain by their representation
in the abstract works of art, so the representation of God the Father introduces the moments of the Unhappy Consciousness (namely those moments that resulted in the embodiment of the recollection of the declined
social organism), in the public domain of the Realm of Culture.
The realization of the moral individual in the objective world: the process of culture 91
being.102 From this religious conviction, the moral individual derives the
certitude that he can find again his subjective essence in the objective
world, namely in the objective human world, the social organism.103
After the Fall of the Roman Empire, the institutions of the social organism have to be rebuilt. But the process of rebuilding cannot onesidedly be understood as a more or less coincidental, practical process
in which the real individuals constitute a new social organism by serving
a lord in their role as bondsmen. Because the individuals are also moral
individuals, they do not accept whatever tradition of the social organism.
For the moral individuals, the social organism has legitimacy only insofar
as they can recognize it as the objectification of their subjective essence.
The moral individuals judge the social organism. They consider it to be
good if it corresponds to subjective pure self, and they consider it to be
bad if does not.104 This judgment gives rise to the dialectics of culture between the individuals and the social organism. As well, the individual as
the social organism is cultivated in a process that can only end when the
moral individual can recognize the social organism as an adequate objectification of his pure self.
The first stage of the process of cultivation has the structure of observing Reason. The moral individual tries to recognize his subjective essence
in a (social) world that is objectively given. As we have seen before, the
dialectics of observing Reason repeats (in its own, mediated form) the dialectics of Consciousness and Self-consciousness.
Firstly, the moral individual tries to recognize his essence in the social
organism as an immediately given identity (cf. the Sense-Certainty). In
this immediate relation, however, the social organism remains undetermined (all real social organisms can be immediately given). In the second
attempt, the social organism is determined in relation to the individual.
102 Cf. Spirit is thus posited in the third element, in universal self-consciousness; it is
its community. The movement of the community as self-consciousness that has
distinguished itself from its picture-thought is to make explicit what has been implicitly established. The dead divine Man or human God is in himself the universal consciousness; this he has to become explicitly for this self-consciousness.
(473).
103 The Realm of the Son has the same function in the Realm of Culture, as the living
work of art has in the polis: It represents the integration between the moral individual and the objective world.
104 Cf. Now, self-consciousness holds that object to be good, and to possess intrinsic
being, in which it finds itself; and that to be bad in which it finds the opposite of
itself. (302/3).
92
The realization of the moral individual in the objective world: the process of culture 93
uals who are sacrificing themselves for the social organism. But they are
also corporeal individuals who want to satisfy their needs. Therefore, it
remains unsure whether their service concerns the State Power (so that
the language of flattery is completely honest) or the Wealth, i. e., the reward they receive for their service. At any moment, what is meant as
State Power can turn into its opposite, Wealth, the good can change
into the bad, the being-in-itself into the being-for-self. This ongoing possibility of change is expressed in the language of disruption. 109
The language of disruption seems to make clear that nothing in reality
is what is seems to be. Reality, the social organism seems to lose its substantiality. This becomes absolutely clear when the individual experiences
that it is related to a contingent world. Whether the individual is rewarded for his serving the social organism, he has not under control himself.
Whether he can profit from the Wealth that is produced by the social organism is not dependent on his own decision, but on a strange being, on
the will of the monarch who can or cannot endow him Wealth. Therefore,
the individual experiences the highest possible alienation. The reality that
he should be able to recognize as the reality in which his freedom is realized appears as a reality in which wealth is an external thing and, in
which, consequently, it is totally accidental whether he can realize his essence.
The experience of the highest possible alienation makes the moral individual give up the relation form of observing Reason. 110 He has experienced having no opportunity to find again his essence in the objectively
given social organism and returns as the pure Insight (321 ff.) to himself.
As the pure Insight (that repeats the relation form of stoicism), the
moral individual takes on a rationalistic position. He is related to a contingent world, but considers his pure concept as the essence of this reality.
Therefore, in some sense the pure essence of the moral individual has realized itself, for it is nearer determined. This nearer determination, however, is a conceptual determination that remains alongside the contingent,
sensual reality. [The position of the pure Insight is represented by Ren
Descartes for whom the mathesis universalis is the essence of all reality.]
109 Cf. language of this disrupted consciousness (316), the translation of Sprache
der Zerrissenheit.
110 Cf. But this expendable, selfless being, or the self that has become a Thing, is
rather the return of that being into itself; it is being-for-self that is explicitly for
itself, the concrete existence of Spirit. (316).
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The realization of the moral individual in the objective world: the process of culture 95
its confrontation with the (alleged) Superstition it also becomes clear for
Enlightenment, itself, that it is confronted with its presupposition.
Enlightenment and Superstition relate to one another as the satisfied
and the unsatisfied Enlightenment. 113 The pure Insight that turns against
the contingent reality develops into the satisfied Enlightenment. It tries to
express the essence of the contingent reality in general laws that, in their
turn, express the pure matter, and thus seems to finalize its Enlightenment
project. The alleged superstition, however, remains confined in the reality
of a contingent social organism whose essence, as the beyond (jenseits)
of the divine pure self, remains elusive. Basically, however, both positions
are each others opposite and in this sense they pass into one another. The
beyond of the alleged Superstition (faith) is, as pure thinking, pure identity, pure matter. The other way around, the pure matter of the satisfied
Enlightenment is, as Thing-in-itself, a beyond.
The passing of both positions into one another is performed in the
Realm of Utility, in which all in the world is only a being-in-itself insofar
as it is for an other.114 The satisfied Enlightenment is related to a contingent reality, and experiences in its relation to the unsatisfied Enlightenment
that the contingent reality only exists distinct from the pure self. The unsatisfied Enlightenment is related to the pure self, and experiences in its
relation to the satisfied Enlightenment that its pure self only exists distinct
from the contingent reality.
Actually, the hidden unity of the Realm of Utility is the real individual, i. e., the individual that unites the moral and the legal individual.
The satisfied Enlightenment, by making the unsatisfied Enlightenment its
object, is related to the legal individual, i. e., the member of the social
organism that knows that this organism is legitimated by the pure self
of God. Obviously, the unsatisfied Enlightenment is related to the moral
individual by making the satisfied Enlightenment its object. Therefore,
in the confrontation between satisfied and unsatisfied Enlightenment, the
real individual can develop the awareness to be, as well, the essence as
the appearance of the world. By expressing himself in the social organism,
the real individual is the being-in-itself. This being-in-itself only exists in113 Cf. but there is this difference, the latter is satisfied Enlightenment, but faith
is unsatisfied Enlightenment. (349).
114 Cf. What is useful, is something with an enduring being in itself, or a Thing;
this being-in-itself is at the same time only a pure moment; hence it is absolutely
for an other, but equally is for an other merely what it is in itself; these opposed
moments have returned into the indivisible unity of being-for-self. (354).
96
sofar as it is for another, i. e., the pure self of the god. The pure self of the
god, however, is the inner pure self of the real individual. Therefore, the
real individual appears as the autonomous individual, i. e., the individual
that exists by realizing his inner essence.
Retrospection
97
the that the absolute freedom repeats the second stage of active Reason, The
law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit. The revolutionary citizens
who want to realize their law of the heart are seized by the subjectivism
of self-conceit and are confronted with a strange necessity. The realization of the social organisms law presupposes that all serve the same
lord. This is not possible when the distinction between the moral
and political domain is not respected. The immediate moralization of
politics inevitably leads to terror.116
Retrospection
In the Realm of Culture, the structures of the Greek world are repeated
and brought to self-consciousness. The many poleis with their contingent
ethical content return as the families that have their self-consciousness in
the formal legal person of the Roman Law. Like the Human Law of the
polis, the Roman Law is structured to conform to the relation of stoicism,
which implies that the freedoms pure self remains immersed in the practical performance of freedom. In contrast to the polis, however, in which
the citizen is not aware of the particularity of the ethical content, this
awareness is developed by the person, who knows that the freedom
that he realizes in his family organism has a particular content that is distinguished from the content of other family organisms. At the level of the
Realm of Culture, it is thematized how the person develops insight into
the contingent content of his freedom (like the Greek citizen developed
insight into the contingency of the poliss ethical life) and how he tries to
overcome this contingency in a doubled process of culture (in which, as
well, the person, as his world, is cultivated).
As in the polis, the return of the repressed pure self in the Realm of
Culture also is mediated by death. This time however, not by the death of
the family member, but by the death of the social organism. The remembrance is retained as the inner representation of the absolute pure
Thing. Just as, at the level of the polis, the remembrance of the deceased
family member is embodied in the Divine Law of the family, so the remembrance of the declined social organism is embodied in the faith of
116 In this sense, the Sharia is a form of terror and in some sense, also an insult to
god: after all, as an absolute being, he may not be distinguished from the finite
reality.
98
the individual. In both cases, the embodiment is mediated by the dialectics of the Unhappy Consciousness.
The development of the Realm of Culture is characterized by the
movement in which the faithful individual is integrated with the objective
world. In the first step of this process, mediated by the first stage of the
Revealed Religion, the faithful individual becomes part of the public domain. In the second step, the faithful individual really integrates with
the objective world by means of a process of culture. This process is structured according to the dialectics of observing and active Reason and mediated by, respectively, the second and third stage of the Revealed Religion
(the realm of the Christ and the realm of the Holy Spirit).
The development of the Realm of Culture is the self-conscious repetition of the movement performed in the polis in which the Divine
Law is integrated with the objective world of the Human Law. In the
first step of this process, mediated by the first stage of the Religion of
Art (the abstract work of art) the Divine Law becomes part of the public
domain. In the second step, Divine and Human Law are synthesized in a
process that was also structured according the dialectics observing and active Reason and, this time, respectively mediated by the second and third
stage of the Religion of Art (the living work of art and the spiritual work of
art).
In the Greek world, the moral dimension had its place in the underworld and the legal dimension in the real world of the Human Law. The
first (immediate) attempt to integrate both dimensions in one individual
resulted in the first self of the Roman Law. In the first self, however, the
moral dimension remains implicit: It is only practically expressed in
the freedom of the person to subject his property to his free will. In
the Realm of Culture, the moral dimension has its place in the faithful individual who, initially, is externally related to the institutions of the legal
order. The second (self-conscious) attempt to integrate the moral and
legal dimension resulted in the second self, the absolute Freedom of the
French Revolution. The self-conscious unity of right and morality, however, fails and leads to the revolutionary terror.
The failure of the second self can be explained in terms of the discrepancy between the outside and inside perspectives. From the inside perspective, the second self tries to realize his subjective freedom in the law
of the social organism and he thinks this law to be nothing else than
the expression of his absolute essence. From the outside perspective, however, the second self immediately identifies the absolute moral dimension
with the contingent dimension of the social organism. That this imme-
Retrospection
99
Chapter 4
The Realm of Morality: Making the Third Self
Explicit
Introduction
The culture of the French Revolution is, according to Hegel, the grandest and the last (362) culture. As the absolute freedom, the moral individual is no longer related to an external, traditional world. The moral individual thinks that it can produce the entire world out of his subjective
freedom. This leads to a position in which the dimension of right is totally swallowed up by the dimension of morality. For this reason, the second self of the absolute freedom can be interpreted as the reversal of the
first self of the Roman Empire: The Roman Law represents a world in
which the moral dimension is totally swallowed up by the dimension
of right.
In the Realm of Morality, the realm in which the third self will be identified as conscience, it is developed as to how the dimensions of right and
morality can be conceived of in an adequate unity. Therefore, in the third
self, the first and second self are brought together in an harmonic synthesis.
In contrast to the polis and the Roman Empire, the Realm of Morality
is not a third historical episode in the European history. (Because the
French Revolution took place during Hegels lifetime, such a third historical stage could not be formulated by Hegel without having the pretension to be a fortune-teller.) After the grandest and last culture of the
absolute freedom, all historical experiences are finished with that are necessary to conceptualize the philosophical insight into the adequate relation between the dimensions of right and morality. Therefore, the
Realm of Morality is characterized by philosophical reflection. By
means of the philosophy of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, himself, in the
Realm of Morality, are discussed as to what conclusions can be drawn
from the experiences of the French Revolution.
The point of departure of the Realm of Morality: the Rousseauian Reflection 101
117 Cf. The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death, a death too
which has no inner significance or filling, for what is negated is the empty point
of the absolute free self. It is thus the coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no
more significance than cutting off a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of
water. (360).
102
legal order is only legitimate insofar as it expresses the universal will; only
under that condition does it do justice to the autonomy of all.118
Like the Human Law and the Roman Law, the Napoleonic Law, insofar as it is understood as the expression of the general will, is the third
shape in which the relation of stoicism appears in European history.119
In the Human Law of the polis, stoicism appears in its immediate form
as the autonomous action by which the citizens realize a common traditional content. In the Roman Law, stoicism appears in its self-conscious
form as the autonomous persons who practically realize their subjective
freedom in their property. The stoicism that appears in the Napoleonic
Law synthesizes the two preceding forms. The autonomous citizens realize a common traditional content, but they know this content as the expression of the pure self, i. e., they have insight in the historical contingency of this content.
118 The self has overcome the absolute freedom; it no longer demands that its actions
immediately coincide with the universal will: For consciousness, the immediate
unity of itself with the universal will, its demand to know itself as this specific
point in the universal will, is changed round into the absolute opposite experience. What vanishes for it in that experience is abstract being or the immediacy
of that insubstantial point, and this vanished immediacy is the universal will itself
which it now knows itself to be in so far as it is a pure knowing or pure will.
(362/3).
119 In this sense, the Realm of Morality can be considered as a new historical episode
after the French Revolution, but not as a Realm that passes through a real development.
103
104
terminations of the will. Therefore, the third postulate concerns the harmony between thinking and being.123
In the end, however, the postulates do not succeed in their attempt to
clarify the reality of the Napoleonic Law because they cannot sublate the
contradiction that also characterizes this version of stoicism. On the one
hand, the pure self is determined as an absolute being that absolutely
transcends the domain of nature. At the same time, however, the pure
self is realized in the finite reality of the social organism; i. e., without
nature the pure self does not appear at all and can not be determined.
105
the pure self once again practices an undermining force that leads to a
version of the Unhappy Consciousness.
We have seen that the undermining force of the pure self, at the level
of the Napoleonic Law, results from the reflection of the Dissemblance or
duplicity. As the absolute essence of the world, the pure self is not compatible with its appearance in a finite social organism. This contradiction
can be overcome at the level of Conscience. We will see that this level is
structured according to the stages of the Unhappy Consciousness.
125 Cf. But as moral pure self-consciousness, it flees from this disparity between the
way it thinks [of these moments] and its own essential nature, flees from this untruth which asserts that to be true which it holds to be untrue, flees from this
with abhorrence back into itself. It is a pure conscience which rejects with
scorn such a moral idea of the world; it is in its own self the simple Spirit
that, certain of itself, acts conscientiously regardless of such ideas, and in this immediacy possesses its truth. (383).
106
107
that is immediately given in the framework of the existing social organism. Therefore, the individual thinks that this immediately given action
expresses the reality of his Conscience. 126 The action that is immediately
given, however, is only an example of many actions that are immediately
given. This necessitates a nearer identification of the action that expresses
the content of the Conscience. This is done by the individual by claiming
that especially that action expresses the content of Conscience that does so
according to his subjective conviction.127 The subjectivism into which the
consciences content relapses can be overcome when this conviction is recognized by others.128
b. Conscience as the Unhappy Consciousness that repeats
Self-consciousness
The individual whose conviction is recognized by the others has an intersubjective way of existence that is separated from the given reality of the
social organism. Since this individual considers his self-consciousness (the
conviction of his conscience) essential and the given reality inessential, he
repeats, respectively, the three stages of the development of self-consciousness: Desire, Lordship and Bondage and Stoicism.
The individual repeats Desire because he can only retain the conviction of his conscience as the absolute essence (and consequently, can persist in his autonomy) when he demonstrates that the objective reality to
which he is related is inessential. Therefore, the individual understands
the action in which he expresses his inner nature, his drive or desire as
126 Cf. Action qua actualization is thus the pure form of willthe simple conversion
of a reality that merely is into a reality that results from action, the conversion of
the bare mode of objective knowing [i.e. knowing an object] into one of knowing
reality as something produced by consciousness. (385).
127 Cf. This immediate concrete self-certainty is the essence [of the action]; looking
at this certainty from the point of view of the antithesis of consciousness, the
content of the moral action is the doers own immediate individuality; and the
form of that content is just this self as a pure movement, viz. as [the individuals]
knowing or his own conviction. (387).
128 Cf. This being-for-another is, therefore, the substance which remains in itself or
unexplicated, which is distinct from the self. Conscience has not given up pure
duty or the abstract in-itself; duty is the essential moment of relating itself, qua
universality, to another. Conscience is the common element of the two self-consciousnesses, and this element is the substance in which the deed has an enduring
reality, the moment of being recognized and acknowledged by others. (388).
108
an action that constitutes the social organism. Under that condition his
action contributes to the realization of the absolute content of conscience.
Consequently, the action realizes the individuals duty.129
The needy nature of the individual, however, appears in a multitude
of actions. Therefore, towards the others who dispute that his actions are
dutiful, the individual again and again has to bring up points of view that
show that his actions serve the general good the best. (Analogously, the
elementary Desire had to prove again and again that his pure self is the
essence of the (living) natural objects.) Precisely because of this, because
of the possibility to find again and again a new point of view to illustrate
that his action expresses his duty, the individual can preserve the illusion
of his autonomy.130
Because the individual, on the one hand, thinks himself to be totally
free to determine what is the content of his duty but, on the other hand,
has to manifest himself in a particular action, a discrepancy can arise
about the individuals own opinion with regard to his duty and the opinion of the others. After all, the others judge the individual on the basis of
the actions he performs. If this discrepancy is acknowledged by the individual, he arrives at the repetition of the lordship/bondsman relation, but
this time in a version in which he takes on, as well, the role of the lord as
the role of the bondsman. The individual realises that he, being dependent on his actions, remains tied to the external reality and, therefore, plays
the role of the bondsman. At the same time, the individual, as conscience,
performs the role of the lord. He remains autonomous insofar as his subjective conviction remains dependent on that action that he decides to be
the expression of his conscience.131
The moral content of the individual that has internalized the lordship/
bondsman relation, however, remains elusive for the others. If they consider the action that is really performed by the individual to be the expres129 Cf. But action is called for, something must be determined by the individual, and
the self-certain Spirit in which the in-itself has attained the significance of the
self-conscious I, knows that it has this determination and content in the immediate certainty of itself. This, as a determination and content, is the natural consciousness, i. e. impulses and inclinations. (390).
130 Cf. In the strength of its own self-assurance it possesses the majesty of absolute
autarky, to bind and to loose. This self-determination is therefore without more
ado absolutely in conformity with duty. (393)
131 Cf. What ought to be there, is here an essentiality solely by its being known to be
self-expression of an individuality; and it is this being known that is acknowledged by others, and which as such ought to have an existence. (395).
109
sion of his conscience, the individual always has the possibility to maintain that the moral content is not expressed in this action, but is determined by his expressed conviction that the moral content appears in a
specific action. Moreover, the individuals are not distinguished from
one another, so that it must be assumed that the other individuals also
have internalized the lordship/bondsman relation. They could get involved
in a mutual struggle if one of them identifies the moral content with a
particular action: Regularly the other would identify the moral content
with another action. This mutual struggle, however, would be senseless
because it is not the objectivity of the action that makes it a moral
one, but rather the judgment that the individuals pass on the action.
This makes it possible that the individuals can reconcile. They can recognize themselves in the others with respect to the opinion that it is the individuals moral judgment that makes or does not make the action of the
expression of conscience. This reconciliation implies the individuals
emancipation from their roles as bondsmen. The objectivity to which
they are related no longer has the quality of an external action, but exists
of the intersubjectively shared judgment on the moral content of the action.
The overcoming of their role as bondsmen induces the individuals to
repeat stoicism. 132 Once again they can cherish the illusion to be completely autonomous. From the inside perspective, the natural reality has
been totally sidetracked. The content of the duty is no longer realized
in the medium of nature, but in the medium of speech. The individuals
have the opinion that the realization of their duty is nothing else than expressing their conviction concerning the content of their duty towards
others. The objectivity of the duty is derived from the individuals mutual
recognition that they are convinced that the expressed conviction on the
content of the duty is true. Hegel indicates them as the self-satisfied individuals who are absolutely convinced of their own excellence and who
can persevere in this conviction because they confirm one another in their
being excellent.133
132 Cf. The declaration of this assurance in itself rids the form of its particularity. It
thereby acknowledges the necessary universality of the self. (397).
133 The spirit and substance of their association are thus the mutual assurance of
their conscientiousness, good intentions, the rejoicing over this mutual purity,
and the refreshing of themselves in the glory of knowing and uttering, of cherishing and fostering, such an excellent state of affairs. (398).
110
111
This realization, however, can only be performed by means of the linguistic action that belongs to the individual insofar as he is corporeal. Because
every real action necessarily is a finite one, the realization of the absolute
essence necessarily implies the decline of its absoluteness. This dilemma
can also be expressed in terms of the lordship/bondsman relation. As we
saw before, the awareness of the individual is no longer that he plays the
role of the lord (because he transcends all action) as well as the role of the
bondsman (because he is tied to the real action). Now the individual understands, on the one hand, that he has to be as the lord as well as the
bondsman because the lord cannot be real without the bondsman; but,
on the other hand, he has experienced that both positions exclude one
another.
The necessary conclusion seems to be that, even though Hegel develops the individual as the unity of mind and body, the individual can not
be conceived of without contradiction, This conclusion, however, is rash.
The development is accomplished by the research of the conditions under
which the individual can be understood, after all, as unity of mind and
body.
The question of whether the lord moment can be compatible with
the bondsman moment can be discussed as an inner dialogue in which it
is investigated how both moments relate. The problem is, however, that
in this exercise it remains unclear what is the objective value of such an
inner dialogue. Because all individuals comprise both moments, the dialogue can also be constructed as a dialogue between two individuals who
each take on one of the moments. For conveniences sake, I will indicate
these individuals respectively as the lord and the bondsman.135
The lord thinks that whoever performs the good cannot dirty his
hands by real action. All real action serves a particular interest and has
lost the pureness of the good. The bondsman takes on the opposite position. He thinks that action is necessary because otherwise the good remains unreal. Therefore, the lord judges that the bondsman performs the
bad and that he is hypocritical because he claims to perform the good.
The bondsman reacts by maintaining that his position is not distinguished from that of the lord at all. Also the lord performs a real action when
135 As lord, consciousness transcends all specific content; as bondsman, however,
it is linked with a specific content: Conscience, which in the first instance is
only negatively directed against duty as this given specific duty, knows itself to
be free from it; but since it fills the empty duty with a specific content from itself,
it is positively aware that it, as this particular self, makes the content. (400).
112
113
essarily implies the other), but this observation is neutral with regard to
the question of the individuals real existence. It is only obvious that, if
the conscientious individual exists, this conscientious individual can realize the good only by finite action. Precisely because he is tied to real action, the actual realization of the good transcends his autonomy. The autonomous individual is not the lord who produces the bondsman out of
himself, thus being the creator of his own corporeality. His corporeality
(and, consequently, his being situated), is already predisposed to his autonomy all the time and, therefore, confines his autonomy. The realization of the absolute good can only be performed by the absolute good
itself that can use the conscientious individual as a means for this end.
The conscientious individual can do no more than try to realize the
good, insofar as his powers permit him to do so. Whether or not he succeeds, transcends his autonomy and can only be understood as the mercy
granted by the absolute good, itself: In that sense, the absolute good has
to be understood as an actor, i. e., as the absolute Spirit. 139
114
ognized as the essence of the social organism. If the conscientious individual understands the social organism where he is living as an objective
reality in which the absolute Spirit has realized itself (in a finite form), he
only has become aware of the relation that principally is already expressed
in the lordship/bondsman relation all the time. The free individual serves as
bondsman, the pure self that is represented as a lord. If the conscientious
individual conceives of the absolute Spirit as the ground of this world, he
has understood what religion represented: the pure self. The absolute Spirit is the pure self that appears in history.
At this level, the metaphor of lord and bondsman can cause misunderstandings. The free individual is no bondsman of the absolute Spirit in
the sense that he is one-sidedly used as a means that realizes the end of the
absolute Spirit. Precisely because the individual has understood that the
absolute Spirit is the essence of religion, he has understood that the god
is his own pure self. In his relation to the absolute Spirit, the individual
has understood his finiteness. On the one hand, he has conceived of
the pure self as his absolute essence, and on the other hand, he knows
that he can only realize this absolute essence in the form of an historical
social organism, i. e., in a finite manner.
We have witnessed that the individuals insight in his finitude is
mediated by an historical process. This insight itself, however, transcends
the historical process. Only when this insight has been developed, can it
become clear that the religious representation of the pure self also reflects
the social organism whose pure self it represents. (We have observed that
the social organism and the religious representation are interconnected.)
In other words, only then can it become clear that religion represents the
(absolute) pure self in a finite form. This comes to the fore in the systematical place of religion in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Although it is obvious that Europes historical development cannot be understood without
religion, and although it is obvious, as well, that the religion of the work of
art is an integral part of the Greek world, like the revealed religion is an
integral part of the Realm of Culture, Hegel discusses the religion forms
only after the Realm of Morality, i. e., after having developed the individuals relation to the absolute Spirit. Hegels considerations seem to be plausible.140 Only when religion can be understood as expression of the absolute Spirit, and only when it is understood that this expression is finite,
does the contingence of the religious representation become acceptable:
140 Later on, I will raise the question of the religions systematical place again. See
Chapter 7, Retrospection.
Retrospection
115
Religion can be conceived of as the representation of the lord that necessarily has a contingent form. This contingent form will be sublated at the
level of the philosophical notion, the absolute Knowledge, that Hegel discusses in the last chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, following on the
chapter on Religion. It is true that Hegel also has the opinion that, at the
level of the conscientious individual, the relation to the absolute Spirit is
already reached (so, before the systematical discussion of Religion). But at
this stage, the absolute Spirit can only be formally determined. Only when
it has been shown, at the level of Religion, that the absolute Spirit really
manifests itself in history (i. e., in historical religion forms), can the content of the absolute Spirit be developed: the absolute Notion that all appearing reality presupposes.
Retrospection
At the level of the second self, the absolute freedom, the moral individual
had in mind the immediate realization of his freedom in the social organism. From an outside perspective, however, this attempt resulted in an inadequate realization of freedom. The absolute freedom is performed by
the contingent individual who tries to makes his subjective freedom the
measure for all. In this relation the moral and legal order are not compatible: the legal order is sacrificed to the moral one.
At the level of the third self, conscience, the realization of the conscientious individuals freedom is mediated by the absolute Spirit. Therefore,
right and morality appear as the relation between social organism and absolute Spirit. At this level, the relation between right and morality, seen
from the inside perspective, is no longer contradicted by the outside perspective. This time, neither right is absorbed by morality, nor is morality
absorbed by right. It is true that the moral dimension (the absolute Spirit)
is objectified in the social organism, but this means in no way that the
separation between right and morality disappears. The difference between
absolute Spirit and social organism is maintained (as a kind of ontological difference): The absolute Spirit transcends the social organism. This
transcendence is objectively expressed in the process of world history.
World history makes explicit that all social organisms are only contingent,
i. e., they decline and are followed by other social organisms. 141
141 The Phenomenology of Spirit discusses world history at the level of religion.
116
142 Cf. Smith (1989): As we shall see later, there is an inner teleology to moral
growth whereby the life-cycle of the individual moral agent, in some sense, recapitulates the experience or history of the entire species. Nothing is ever lost or
forgotten, but is incorporated into a richer conception of the self. For Hegel,
as for Freud later on, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. p. 129.
Retrospection
117
the Phenomenology of Spirit, but I will show that this work provides in the
adequate elements for a reconstruction of Hegels answer to Honneth.
Chapter 5
Honneths Criticism of Hegels Metaphysics
Introduction
In his book, The Struggle for Recognition, Axel Honneth reverts to the
concept of recognition that has been developed by the young Hegel. At
the same time, however, he claims that we cannot appeal to this concept
just like that, because it remains connected to the presuppositions of the
metaphysical tradition. Hegels speculative thesis that the formation of
the practical self presupposes mutual recognition between subjects has to
be reconstructed in the light of empirical social psychology. (68) The
thesis that there exist various forms of reciprocal recognition, needs
an empirically supported phenomenology, one that allows Hegels theoretical proposal to be tested and, if necessary, corrected. (69) At the
end, it has to be examined whether the third thesis, according to
which the sequence of forms of recognition follows the logic of a formative process that is mediated by the stages of moral struggle (69) can
withstand empirical doubts (70).
Although Honneth does not expressly relate himself to the Phenomenology of Spirit (in which the topic of a struggle for recognition was
restricted to the issue of the conditions for the emergence of self-consciousness [145]), I will investigate in this chapter whether I have to
take to heart the objections that Honneth expresses against the young
Hegel if I relate myself to the concept of recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and want to make it productive for our era. Is this concept a
metaphysical one, and does this mean that we can only sensibly relate to
this concept if it can stand an empirical test?
The Phenomenology of Spirit and the question of The Nature of the Self 119
rary thinkers like Jrgen Habermas and John Rawls seem to determine
the human individual, in the footsteps of Kant, in an ambiguous manner.
On the one hand, the human being is a reasonable or moral individual
and borrows his uniqueness from this qualification (he is a discourse partner who is not exchangeable or has a unique plan of life); on the other
hand, he is a corporeal individual who is distinguished from the others
by his corporeal identity. However, it remains unclear how his moral
or reasonable identity has to be conceived of in a unity with his corporeal
identity. As a corporeal individual, the human being seems to be the bearer of mental powers. But how the human being can be understood as the
unity of mind and body is not thematized. It is only clear that the corporeal identity does not determine the mental one, and that the mental
identity does not determine the corporeal one.
In the preceding chapters it is examined whether the unity between
mind and body can be understood by conceptualizing their mutual relation as a relative contradiction, i. e. as a form/content distinction: The
mind is understood as the form in which the body gets its unity. It was
investigated under which conditions the inner unity between mind and
body that was formulated from an outside perspective, could also be understood from an inside perspective. If this investigation is successful,
then the mind/body unity can be understood as a unity in itself, i. e.,
as a unity that independently exists. Therefore, this investigation can
also be formulated as the question of whether the unity of mind and
body can be conceived of as a substance.
Such a project is as well distinguished from the project of Descartes,
who separated mind and body by assigning them to different substances,
as from the one of Spinoza who transformed mind and body by means of
the attributes of thinking and extension into moments of the unique divine substance. As the Cartesian project, this project does justice to the
unique individual, but this time it does not result in the dualism between
mind and body. The project is closely related to Hegels project in the
Phenomenology of Spirit, but initially has another objective. After all
Hegel does not raise the question of whether the unity of mind and
body can be conceived of as substance, but rather the question of whether
it has a meaning at all to speak about the existence of a substance. Ultimately, his answer is positive. It makes sense, if we understand substance
as subject, as the absolute Spirit. This seems to bring Hegels project into
the neighborhood of Spinoza: Substance is eminently the divine substance.
120
121
122
the social organism. It has to be clear that the social organism is a contingent reality in which the free self has expressed itself in a specific
way. In other words, the free self must not be absorbed in the specific
way in which it has objectified itself.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the first step to develop freedom from
the inside perspective is performed at the level of the Unhappy Consciousness, the position in which, so to speak, the bondsman has internalized the
pure essence of the social organism (the pure self of the lord). The second
step is performed at the level of Reason, where the Unhappy Consciousness
wants to find again the (social) reality as expression of his internalized
pure self. From the outside perspective, it is clear at once that this second
step has to fail. As a contingent reality, the social organism cannot at the
same time be understood as the expression of many free selves. Therefore,
the result of the development of Reason is that the single self gets the insight that the social organism remains an external contingent reality. The
law of the social organism cannot be determined from the perspective of
the single self.
123
the question of whether the unity of mind and body can be conceived of
as a substance has become, in a certain way, empirically testable. The response to this question appears to be dependent upon the answer to another question: Can the Human Law of the polis sensibly be understood
as a social organism in which the lordship/bondsman relation has got real
shape? And, subsequently, can the Human Law be understood as substance?
The relation between the lordship/bondsman relation and the Human
Law that is established here, can raise the question of why Hegel, after his
discussion of the lordship/bondsman relation, does not immediately switch
over to the Spirit-Chapter, leaving out the passages regarding the Unhappy Consciousness and Reason. This, however, can effectively be explained.
The Human Law can only be understood as substance if it can be clarified that the pure freedom of the Greek citizens does not submerge in the
Human Laws practical actualization of freedom. The Greek citizen has to
acquire insight into the contingency of the Human Law. In other words,
he has to endure the experiences of the Unhappy Consciousness and Reason.
This means that not only the lordship/ bondsman relation, but also the Unhappy Consciousness and Reason must be found again in the historical reality of the polis. We have seen that this, according to Hegel, is indeed the
case: In the polis, the Unhappy Consciousness can be found again in the
relations of the Divine Law, the law of the family, and Reason can be
found again in the relation between Human and Divine Law.
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125
in the conclusion that the pure self and the social organism can only be
understood as a substantial unity if they are already comprehended as an
inner unity all the time. This position demarcates the inner certainty of
Conscience, the third form of the Unhappy Consciousness that is discussed
in the Spirit-Chapter.
We have examined how conscience, in the development in which it actualizes its subjective certainty, repeats in a self-conscious manner the dialectical movement of Consciousness and Self-consciousness, and acquires
the explicit insight into itself as Unhappy Consciousness. Then, Conscience
becomes aware that it has to understand its pure essence (its lord), as
the absolute Spirit that realizes itself in and by the social organism.
What this self-realization of the lord (the absolute Spirit), exactly means
can easily evoke misunderstandings.
The introduction of the absolute Spirit does not mean that the real
human being (as unity of mind and body), is reduced to a marionette,
to be tools in the hands of an absolute power. After all the point of departure of the Spirit-Chapter was human freedom: the human who is not
one-sidedly understood as a natural being, but also as a spiritual being
who is autonomous and has, therefore, objectified himself in the
Human Law. This Human Law has been understood as an historical, dialogical relation, i. e., as a relation that for the particular individual appears
as a contingent reality. Therefore, the question has to be answered of how
this contingent reality (the Human Laws collective actualization of freedom), can be reconciled with the particular freedom of the individual.
The response to this question resulted in the three forms of the self
that can be considered as closer determinations of the institutional structure of the Human Law: Only under the condition of these closer determinations can the Human Law be reconciled with the particular freedom.
The institutional structure of the first self (the person) has to guarantee
that each individual has room for the particular determination of his freedom (for a particular tradition). The institutional structure of the second
self (the absolute freedom), has to guarantee that the Human Law is no
contingent reality, but is explicitly posed as the reality that has been
brought about in and by the actions of socialized individuals, and that,
consequently, becomes valid as a dialogical reality. The institutional structure of the third self has to guarantee that the dialogical reality is effectively brought about. It must guarantee that all comprehend the dialogical
reality as expression of their pure freedom. This means that they have
to understand this reality as self-expression of the absolute Spirit.
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The insight into the three forms of the self can hardly be called a metaphysical insight. They determine the conditions under which the social
organism can be reconciled with the particular freedom. Because Hegel
makes certain historical conditions the presupposition to acquire these insights, they have, in some sense, an empirical basis. Neither can it be
maintained that the development of these historical conditions imply a
metaphysical conception of history: as if history is ruled by a necessary
teleology. It is only implied that if the unity of mind and body is adequately understood as substance (i. e. as well from the inside as from
the outside perspective), the involved historical stages must have been
gone through. Like Habermas, Hegel could distinguish between development logic and development dynamic: The logical reconstruction of the
historical process may well be distinguished from its actual dynamic.
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between mind and body is objectified as a social organism that is understood as the expression of an institutional self, i. e., the lord. The lord represents the pure self that is actualized in the social organism in a particular, historical manner. The actualization of the social organism is performed by the labor of the bondsman who works in the service of the
lord. Considered from the outside perspective, the lord has two functions.
On the one hand, he represents the unity of the social system: He is, so to
speak, the king who symbolizes the norms and values that determine the
tradition of the ruling social system. On the other hand, he represents the
legitimacy of the ruling power: He is, so to speak, the god, the transcendent being that is the basis of the ruling power. This transcendent being is
a pure self. Because this transcendent being is actually the essence of the
bondsman, the power of the king is legitimate. From the inside perspective, initially both roles totally coincide. The pure freedom of the bondsman totally remains absorbed in the practical action by which he actualizes the social organism.
Nevertheless, the bondsman does not totally coincide with his social
action. If this would be the case, he would not distinguish himself from
an animal that lives in a social connection. The bondsman is also a selfconscious being. This is expressed by Hegel when he says that the bondsman recognizes the lord as his essence. This recognition means, firstly,
that the lord may not be one-sidedly interpreted as an external power
of nature that physically forces the bondsman to do what he wants. Secondly, this recognition means, positively, that for the bondsman, the lord
represents his own absolute essence: In this sense, the lord is the representation of a goddess. Therefore, the recognition of the lord by the bondsman has nothing to do with the recognition of the one human individual
by the other. It is not necessary at all that the lord represents a human
individual. He, rather, represents an absolute power with which the
human individual is confronted (which power, just by recognizing it as
a lord, is no external power). Therefore, it is no option at all, that the
relation between lord and bondsman (to do justice to democratic freedom), actually should be a symmetrical one. In his recognition of the
lord, the bondsman recognizes that the values that regulate his practical
action are absolute ones.
The lordship/bondsman relation teaches that, for the bondsmen who
actualize in their actions the Human Law, this law never is a contingent
reality. This is expressed by them when they represent the lord for whom
they work as an absolute power. For that reason, the exercise that was
executed in the Spirit-Chapter with regard to historical forms of the
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Religion
129
being actualizes the Human Law in and by his action, and that this action
actualizes at the same time his particular freedom, but that he is able at all
to express his actions in a Human Law in which all express their freedom,
transcends his particular freedom. He positively expresses this notion of
his own finitude when he understands the Human Law as the self-expression of an absolute subject whose essence is the human freedom. The Phenomenology of Spirit discusses this absolute subject in the chapters about
Religion and absolute Knowledge.
Religion
We have seen that, at the level of religion, the social organism is represented as an absolute being. Therefore, the essence of the goddess can
only be understood as the general human freedom if, in the social organism, justice has been done to the free self. We have seen that this is only
the case after the French Revolution. Since in the Spirit-Chapter several
forms of the social organism are gone through, this could be the basis
for a reconstruction of the religious representations that correspond to
these forms. Only together with these religious representations can the
historic reality of these forms of the Human Law be understood, so
that the abstraction of the Spirit-Chapter is overcome. Unlike Hegel, I
have discussed the society forms of the Spirit-Chapter in connection
with the corresponding religion forms. I will explain the reason for this
later on in this chapter.
In his reconstruction of the religion forms, however, Hegel goes a step
further. At the level of the Religion of Nature, he reconstructs the religion
forms that precede the Greek society, i. e., that precede the society in
which human freedom has at least objectified itself in a Human Law.
These religion forms correspond with relations that were discussed before, at the level of Consciousness and Self-consciousness. At this level,
human freedom still is absorbed in relations of nature. This can also
be formulated in terms of the lordship/bondsman relation (which, for a
matter of fact, is not done by Hegel, himself ): The action of the bondsman is still linked with the natural organism (it has not yet obtained a
institutional form in a social organism), and the lord is, at this level,
the power of nature that is represented as a divine power. This results
in the forms of the so-called religion of nature.
In the first form of the religion of nature (god as light), the natural
reality of Sense-Certainty (the many sensory given objects), is represented
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as a divine being. In the second form (god as flower or god as animal), the
object of Perception (the thing with many properties), and Understanding
(the force), are respectively represented by a flower and an animal as a
divine being. Finally, in the third form (the religion of the artificer),
the world of the lordship/bondsman relation is represented as a divine relation, namely the relation between pharaoh and pyramid. (From these
religions of nature, by the way, an extra argument can be borrowed for
my alternative presentation of the Consciousness Chapter: The attempts
to comprehend the outside world as a unity are repeated here by the representation of the outside world as a goddess. Since the goddess is the absolute essence of the representing self, here it becomes explicit that it is
about comprehending the representing self as substance.)
At first it may seem strange that, in the Religion-Chapter, Hegel reverts to religion forms that precede the Greek world. Why discuss these
forms, when the Spirit-Chapter historically only begins at the Greek
world? At second glance, there are, at least from Hegels perspective,
good reasons for this move. Due to the introduction of the religion of
nature, not only do the forms of the Unhappy Consciousness and Reason
have their religious representation (we have seen how this happened at
the level of the religion of art and the revealed religion), but also the
forms of Consciousness and Self-consciousness. Consequently, all forms of
consciousness that are gone through in the development that was oriented
to the comprehension of the mind/body unity, have their religious representation. Moreover, these representations are thus reconstructed, that
they are placed in a dialectical coherence. Together, they form a development in which it is more and more adequately explicated under which
conditions the unity of mind and body can be comprehended as a substantial unity. This development is completed in the formal concept of
the absolute Spirit in which it is comprehended that the human being
can express the substantial unity of mind and body when he actualizes
himself in a Human Law that he can, at the same time, understand as
self-expression of a pure self. This formal concept of the absolute Spirit
is transformed into a substantial one when the dialectical coherence of religion forms (and the societies that correspond to these forms), can be understood as moments of the self-expression of the pure self. Then, substance is understood as subject. However, this subject is not the
human subject, the substantial unity of mind and body, but rather is
the divine subject that in his self-realization produces the entire reality.
With this last step, an absolute subject is introduced that is linked with
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132
Although these three forms are developed in a reflection on the contingent European history (Antiquity, Middle Ages, Modernity), and, consequently, represent insights that could only be developed on the basis of
an historical process of experience, they express necessary relations. They
express the necessary forms to which the institutional structure of the
Human Law has to correspond to be valid as the actualization of the
pure self. It is true that this means that the appearance of these three
forms of the self in a real society can only be mapped if they are linked
to empirical data that are borrowed from that society (this is elaborated in
the next chapters), but the relevance of these three forms as such is not
based on empirical testing.
Although Axel Honneth, in his The Struggle for Recognition, relates to works that Hegel has written earlier than the Phenomenology of
Spirit, the three forms of recognition he distinguishes (Love, Respect
and Solidarity), strongly recall the three forms of the self that Hegel
has developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This is especially true because, for Honneth, the three forms of recognition have their institutional
reality in family, civil society and state. In the next chapters, it will be made
clear that this is also the case for the three forms of the self. If Honneths
three forms of recognition can indeed be related to the three forms of the
self in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and if Honneth implicitly presupposes
the unity of mind and body, this would mean that his project, as formulated at the beginning of this chapter, has to be reformulated. The testing,
in the light of empirical social psychology for which Honneth is looking, must concern the concrete historical appearance of the three forms of
the self, not the metaphysical framework in which these forms are developed. I think that this reformulation is only supported if it is more
closely viewed what the empirical testing to which he is appealing actually
implies. Then, it appears that this testing already presupposes the normative framework of the three forms of recognition all the time. The way in
which Honneth formulates his program is already an indication for this:
But before I can outline at least a few of the essential features of the social
theory I have in mind, two presuppositions must first be systematically clarified, presuppositions that are inherent but not developed in Hegels and
Meads theories of recognition. First, the three-part division that both authors appear to make among forms of recognition needs a justification
that goes beyond what has been said thus far. The extent to which such a
distinction actually fits anything in the structure of social relations is something that must be demonstratedindependently of the texts discussed until
nowby showing that this way of distinguishing phenomena can be brought
into approximate agreement with the results of empirical research. In what
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follows, this demonstration is to take the form of a phenomenologically-oriented typology that aims to describe the three patterns of recognition in such
a way that they can be checked empirically against the data from individual
sciences. Central here will be evidence for the claim that the various forms of
reciprocal recognition can, in fact, be mapped onto different levels of the
practical relations-to-self in the way suggested, in vague outline, in Meads
social psychology. On the basis of this typology, one can approach the second
task that Hegel and Mead bequeathed to us in failing to clarify a crucial implication of their theoretical ideas. Both thinkers were in fact equally unable
to identify accurately the social experiences that would generate the pressure
under which struggles for recognition would emerge within the historical
process (p.93)
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concept of the good should not be conceived of as the expression of substantive values that constitute the ethos of a concrete tradition-based community. Rather, it has to do with the structural elements of ethical life
which, from the general point of view of the communicative enabling
of self-realization, can be normatively extracted from the plurality of all
particular forms of life. (172) It remains unclear how such an extraction
can result in necessary preconditions.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel showed how these necessary
conditions can be deduced from the question of how the unity of
mind and body can be comprehended as a substantial unity. Honneth
seems to presuppose this unity. He does not understand that the necessary
preconditions of individual self-realization precisely follow from Hegels
deduction. In his theory of the three forms of recognition, therein fails
the fundamental form of recognition that is able to base the inner
unity of these three forms: the recognition of the body by the mind.
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143 Erzsbet Rzsa (2005) shows that, in this respect, there is a discrepancy between
the preface and the main text of the Philosophy of Right.
Chapter 6
The program of the Philosophy of Right as elaboration
of the Phenomenologys project
Introduction
In this chapter, I will show that the program that Hegel elaborates in his
Philosophy of Right can be completely understood as the elaboration of a
project that is inspired by the Phenomenology of Spirit. The relation between both works not only implies that the Phenomenology of Spirit
can elucidate what is at stake in the Philosophy of Right, but also can
serve as a critical touchstone. Does Hegel remain true to his own project?
I will put forward the thesis that it has been Hegels intention to remain
totally true to the position he has developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. But I also want to make clear that the relation between both works is
complex: Starting from the Phenomenology of Spirit, it is possible to write
a Philosophy of Right that responds much better to the demands of our
era. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel is sometimes so much led by the
reality of his time, that it is at the cost of the critical potency that has already been developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
Partly, the fact that Hegel has been led by his own time is unavoidable. In the introduction of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel, himself, already indicates that a philosopher cannot surpass his era.144 This is not
only about a form of modesty, but also about a boundary that Hegel
has methodologically justified. The institutions of the rule of law cannot,
once and for all, be developed by a philosopher who takes in the standpoint of eternity, but essentially have an historical form. They are the result from the Reason as testing laws, i. e., from the reason that, on the base
of universal criteria, tests in what sense existing institutions can be interpreted as expressions of freedom.
My criticism on Hegel does not concern the historical determinedness
of the institutions in the Philosophy of Right, but rather, the universal cri144 It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary
world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jump over
Rhodes. PhR, p.11.
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teria that underlie his testing. Although Hegel derives his central arguments from the Phenomenology of Spirit, I will show that there is some
tension between both works. Ultimately, in his reception of these criteria
in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel has been influenced too much by the
reality of his time. Consequently, the realization of human freedom has
been conceived of too much from the primacy of labor, i. e., from the
economic domain. At the same time, it cannot be put just like that,
that this making labor absolute (what comes down to conceiving the spiritual existence of man too much from his corporeal existence) is innocent of the Phenomenology of Spirit. In principle, this making labor absolute is innocent of the project of the Phenomenology of Spirit: After all it is
again and again argued that the pure self cannot be absorbed by the social
organism. But the methodological organization of the work, in which the
religion forms corresponding to the historical forms of the social organism are discussed afterwards, promotes making labor absolute in the Philosophy of Right. In the Philosophy of Right, the methodological distinction
between objective and absolute Spirit is made a real one. The relation to
the absolute Spirit is only discussed at the level of world history, not at
the level at which the real social institutions are developed. After all,
these institutions are not real because they are developed from the objective Spirits point of view. Their reality is only in sight when the relation
to the absolute Spirit is developed.
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mal unity of the three forms of the self, as the formal unity of Right and
Morality.
In Chapters 7, 8 and 9, I will discuss how Hegels concept of right
applies to the institutions that he finds in the modern world of his
time: To what extent can they be conceived of as expression of freedom?146 Insofar as the contingent institutions from his era can indeed
be conceived of as expression of freedom, he includes them in his Philosophy of Right as institutions of Ethical Life. I will show how Hegel, in the
three sections of Ethical Life (Family, Civil Society and State)147 reverts to
the Philosophy of Right. [Das zweite Selbst, d. h. das Individuum als wesentliches
Moment der Substanz, wie auch die Aufhebung des ersten Selbst sind Gedankenbestimmungen der hegelschen Philosophie, die auch in der Rechtsphilosophie zu
erkennen sind.] (p. 78).
146 In contrast to Alan Patton (1999), I do not think that Hegel makes a priori
claims about the social and institutional conditions under which human personality and subjectivity can be developed and sustained. (p. 204).
147 Honneth (2003) remarks: how much the idea of a social differentiation of
three spheres of recognition owes to a kind of social-theoretical transformation of
Hegels Philosophy of Right. Just as Hegel spoke with regard to the ethical (sittlich) order of modern society of three institutional complexes (the family, civil
society, and the state), whose internal constitution as spheres of recognition allows the subject to attain the highest degree of individual freedom through active
participation, the same basis idea is to be found in my own reflections in the
form of a differentiation of three differently constituted spheres of reciprocal recognition. p. 143/4. However, Honneth distinguishes two differences with Hegels approaches. In the first place, the struggles for recognition at the three levels
essentially function only to motivate the transition to the next level of ethically
constituted institutions. (p. 144).
Secondly, Honneth reproaches Hegel a concretism that makes that the borders between the institutional complexes on the one side, and the spheres of recognition on the other, break down altogether. (p. 146). I do not think that this
conclusion can be maintained. The three forms of the self represent three forms
of recognition that are relatively independent. Moreover, it is rather Honneths
concretist reading of Hegel than Hegel himself, who identifies the three
forms of the self with the contingent institutions.
Honneth (2000) interprets Right and Morality in the Philosophy of Right as
two definitions of individual freedom, which independently of each other
had already exerted, in his view, considerable influence upon the practical selfconception of society. (p. 34) I have tried to clarify that Right and Morality
are internally linked in Hegels concept of recognition. In this sense, recognition
reconciles the complementary perspectives of Nancy Fraser and can become clear
what according to Honneth remains unclear: it remains completely unclear why
the capitalist social order is now to be investigated specifically from the two perspectives of economy and culture, when it would seem equally possible to analyze the object filed from other perspectives, such as morality or law. [law
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the Phenomenology of Spirit. On the one hand, they are designed as actualization of the three forms of the self (as Family, Corporation and State)
and revert to Antiquity, Middle Ages and Modernity (respectively Ethical
World, World of Culture and Morality); on the other hand, these actual
forms of the self, as in the Phenomenology of Spirit, can be understood
as ways in which the spiritual animal kingdom, the Reason as lawgiver
and the Reason as testing laws get shaped.
140
141
152 This moment refers to the first moment of active Reason in the Phenomenology of
Spirit: Pleasure and Necessity. This time, however, pleasure (as purpose) is, so to
speak, developed as a positive moment of the moral individual in his entirety, the
conscientious individual.
153 This moment refers to the second moment of active Reason in the Phenomenology
of Spirit: the law of the heart and the frenzy of self- deceit. This time, however, the
law of the heart (as intention) is, so to speak, developed as a positive moment of
the moral individual in his entirety, the conscientious individual.
154 This moment refers to the third moment of active Reason in the Phenomenology of
Spirit: Virtue and the way of the world. This time, however, virtue (as conscience)
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143
The formal unity of the three forms of the self following from
the Phenomenology of Spirit
If we depart from the Phenomenology of Spirit, the formal unity of the
three forms of the self look different. Once again conscience, as the
third form of the self, can be understood as the unity of the first and second self. We have seen that the individual who is conceived of as the unity
of mind and body, at the level of conscience, could be understood for the
first time in a way in which inside and outside perspective coincide. As
conscience, the individual is related to the absolute Spirit that he understands as the pure self manifesting itself in the social organism. He has the
certitude that he indirectly actualizes his freedom by observing the laws of
157 The element in which the universal mind exists in art is intuition and imagery,
in religion feeling and representative thinking, in philosophy pure freedom of
thought. In world history this element is the actuality of mind in its whole compass of internality and externality alike. PhR 341.
158 The religious conscience, however, does not belong to this sphere at all. ( 137
A).
159 Fred. Neuhouser maintains: Indeed, one of the persistent aims of this book has
been to show that the normative standards that inform Hegels social theory can
be made plausible and compelling in detachment from his secular theodicy simply by articulating how they have their source in the idea of practical freedom
(p. 270). I will invert Neuhousers critcism. The problem of the Philosophy of
Right is that it is too much detached from Hegels secular theodicy. Hegels comprehensive metaphysical vision (p. 270) precisely consists of the adequate articulation of the ideal of practical freedom.
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the social organism in which he is living. Also from the outside perspective, the perspective of world history, the actualization of freedom is understood in this way. Since outside and inside perspective coincide, this
concept of conscience can be immediately valid as the formal, absolute
concept of conscience. There is no need to abstract from historical conditions.
The first and the second self belong to the previous history of conscience. They determine the fundamental structures of the society
forms that the individual must have passed through to have the ability
to develop insight into conscience. At the level of conscience, the individual knows that he can actualize his freedom only in a finite way, namely
by participating in the social organism of which he is part. The first and
the second self impose a nearer determination of the social organism in
which conscience can actualize his freedom. The social organism has to
be thus structured so that it enables the conscientious individual to
pass through the relation forms of the first and second self; or better,
that it has already passed through them all the time, so that his insight
in the social organism as one in which he can actualize his freedom is conditioned by this social organism itself.
The conscientious individual can only pass through the relation form
of the first self when the social organism corresponds to the demand that
it is already given all the time as an objective reality. Since this demand
means that conscience has to find his freedom immediately in the reality
that is objectively given, it comes down to understanding the social organism as objectification of observing Reason. Since the social organism
that is immediately given is real as property, the relation in which the
first self appears can, like in the Philosophy of Right, be understood as
the relation between person and property, i. e., as the free self who
takes the given thing as the expression of his freedom. In contrast to
the Philosophy of Right, the relation between person and property is
this time already understood all the time as a moment of the surpassing
conscience. As conscience, the individual knows that his free essence, in
the form of immediacy, is realized in the relation between person and
property.
The freedom of the person is only practically expressed in the property. His pure self, the self that transcends any actualization, is absorbed
in the practical process. It is true that the person in the use of the property can show that he is the lord of the thing, but this lordship is only
expressed because the person is, so to speak, his own bondsman. In
the labor of the use of the property, the person practically expresses
145
his subjective freedom, i. e., the thing appears as use value that is consumed by the person. This consumption, however, does not satisfy immediately given natural needs, but rather the needs that are defined by the
norms and values of the immediately given social organism. The pure self
of the person is not expressed in the labor of the use of the property.
This would only be the case if, at the same time, the factual use of the
property expresses that the person has the freedom to use the property
otherwise.
The persons independence from the particular use of the property
(his freedom vis--vis the thing) can appear when the property only functions as a token of the persons freedom. The property, in its function as
token, abstracts from the physical qualities of the thing without which the
thing could not have any use value. It is only important insofar as it refers
to the undetermined freedom of the person: it only represents the that of
his freedom. The problem is, however, how the thing can appear as token
in the objectifying relation that characterizes the first self, i. e., the self of
the abstract Right. 160 Can the token be found in the given objectivity of
the world? As in Hegels version of the abstract Right, the transition of
the relation of Contract can also be made in this revised version. If the
possession of property is principally mediated by exchange on the base
of an exchange contract, this cannot only make explicit that the persons
recognize one another as proprietors, but also that the quality of the
property is inessential. Principally, everything can be exchanged to everything else. The property is only a token for recognition, i. e., the representation of the persons freedom.
While the second moment of the abstract Right in the revised Philosophy of Right is once again the Contract, the third moment of abstract
Right differs from the original version and can not be identified as the
Wrong. For, the problem that has to be solved at the level of the second
moment is not that the exchange between persons remains accidental. It is
true that the content of the commodities that are exchanged between the
persons is not determined. Consequently, it remains accidental whether
or not the exchanged commodities are qualified to satisfy the needs
that are defined by the norms and values of the social organism in
which the person practically expresses his freedom. But this state of affairs
does not result in the Wrong, i. e., the possible contradiction between the
formal (general) will of the free and equal persons and their particular
160 In the abstract Right, the relations of observing Reason appear in their true form:
Objective reality is developed as expression of the free self, i. e., the person.
146
will. The problem of the revised abstract Right is rather that it does not
allow bringing together the general freedom of the formal persons and
the content of their particular will. At the level of abstract Right both dimensions exclude one another. Either the will of the person is determined
as a particular will that is expressed in the thing as a particular use value,
or the will of the person is determined as a free will that is expressed in
the thing as a general exchange value. But the thing that appears as use
value does not appear as exchange value, and vice versa. This problem
can only be overcome by the second self that is discussed at the level of
Morality.
The conscientious individual can only pass through the relation form
of the second self when the social organism corresponds to the demand
that it is produced by the individual himself: He must be the lawgiver
of the social organism. As in Hegels Philosophy of Right, the first moment
of Morality can be characterized as Purpose and Responsibility ( 115
118). If the social organism is the product of the free individual, it is
overcome that the content of the social law is accidental; at the same
time, the content can be freely determined.
As in Hegels Philosophy of Right, also the second moment of Morality
can be determined as Intention and Welfare ( 119 128). At this level is
formulated as to what criteria the free content of the social law is subjected: In the social law, the welfare of the individual has to be actualized.
The approval of this demand, however, is not unproblematic. When it
is assumed that each subject can have knowledge of his subjective freedom and, based on this knowledge, can try to actualize his welfare in a
social organism (for example a family organism), then the question remains as to whether the realization of the welfare of the one subject is
compatible with the one of the other. Therefore, in his Philosophy of
Right, Hegel adds the demand that also the welfare of the others has to
be actualized, and elaborates this demand as the third moment of Morality, as Conscience that has the duty to actualize the general good
( 129 140). This move, however, is highly problematic. In a certain
sense, the subjective identity that tries to express his subjective freedom
is given. The subject cannot assume at random any identity, but has to
discover by life experience what his very identity is. This contingence
of subjective identity makes the possible harmony between the actualization of subjective welfare by many subjects a rather accidental affair. The
accidentalness of this harmony can only be overcome when the many
subjective identities can be conceived of as moments of a shared social
organism. But this is only possible when their contingence, in one way
147
or another, is abolished. The problem of abstract Right returns in a specific form at the level of Morality. The particular and the general actualization of freedom can, on the one hand, not be brought together, but on
the other hand, do presuppose one another. The particular realization of
freedom is not possible when it is not in harmony with the actualization
of freedom of all. But if it is in harmony with the general actualization of
freedom, it seems to decline as particular freedom realization. Therefore,
at the level of the second moment of Morality, only the demand can be
formulated that the particular as well as the general freedom, that the particular welfare as well as the general welfare, has to be actualized. Both
demands, however, cannot be unified in the conscience that is determined as the duty to actualize the general good, as is done in the Philosophy of Right.
We have seen that conscience in the revised Philosophy of Right has
been differently determined. The conscientious individual knows that
the social organism in which he is living is a contingent self-expression
of the absolute Spirit, and he knows that he can only indirectly contribute
to the actualization of the absolute good by serving the institutions of the
social organism in which he is living. By now we have seen to which nearer determinations this social organism has to respond: to the structures of
abstract Right and Morality. We have also seen what are the consequences
of these determinations: The demand has to be made upon the social organism that it actualizes right and morality in an adequate unity; room
must be made for both subjective and general actualization of freedom.
Moreover, it is clear that the subjective actualization of freedom may
not be reduced to a moment of the general good; neither may the absolute good161 be reduced to the general good.
Only when the conscientious individual actualizes himself in a social
organism that is structured according the revised abstract Right and the
revised Morality, can he also realize in this organism the self-insight of
being a conscientious individual. Precisely because the social organism institutionally distinguishes between the particular and the general actualization of freedom can it meet the demands raised by the conscientious
individual: The social organism has to be a contingent realization form
of the absolute Spirit (it actualizes the absolute good in the form of the
161 Hegel maintains: The good is thus freedom realized, the absolute end and aim
of the world. ( 129) This absolute good may not be confused with the general
good that is realized in the particular state.
148
149
Chapter 7
The Family: The Institutional House of the First Self
Introduction
In this chapter, I will elaborate the institutional actualization of the first
self for our era, i. e., I will confront the conceptual determinations of the
first self with institutions of our globalized world and examine which institutions can be considered as an adequate realization of the first self. To
prepare for this attempt, however, I will first go into Hegels attempt in
the Philosophy of Right to elaborate the institutionalization of the first self
for the nineteenth century. I will criticize the result of Hegels attempt,
i. e., the family. This criticism does not concern the features of the family
that typically seems to belong to the Nineteenth Century, but is more elementary. I will show that Hegel, by giving the family a natural content,
confuses natural and ethical immediacy. As a consequence, his concept of
family does not meet the criteria for the first self that Hegel himself has
developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This criticism will appear helpful for the positive construction of the first self s institutional embodiment.
The family in the Philosophy of Right: animal life in the form of freedom
151
objectified in a particular female individual. The male individual represents the moment of generality; the female individual, on the other
hand, represents the moment of particularity. Finally, the offspring expresses the species life as it is in and for itself. From the outside perspective, the offspring has been produced by his parents; from the inside perspective, the offspring recognizes its parents and acts in accordance with
them.
152
The man is the free person who represents the family in the social domain
(the civil society as the multitude of families). ( 178) The woman is the
bondsman of her husband insofar as she actualizes in her labor the freedom of the lord: In the labor of the family, the free and equal persons
are reproduced.164
153
to the man and the woman, i. e., a pattern that is based on a biological
qualification, makes that their action is inspired by their pathos
(their character as man or woman), rather than that it is a free action.
It is true that, compared to the polis, the relation between man and
woman has changed. Although also in the polis the man is linked with
the moment of generality (the Human Law), and the woman to the moment of particularity (the Divine Law), their actions are fundamentally
different from those of the marriage partners in the Philosophy of Right.
The actions of man and woman in the polis are one-sided because they
only observe one of the two laws. In the marriage of the Philosophy of
Right, this one-sidedness seems to have been overcome. The Human
and Divine Law are, so to speak, unified in the love of the marriage partners. In their love the partners share their identity. Therefore, the actions
of man and woman can no longer be one-sided. If the woman acts, she
acts at the same time in the name of her husband, and vice versa. Man
and woman both represent in their actions the entirety of their shared
identity.
However, if we compare the way in which the division between
Human and Divine Law is overcome in the family of the Philosophy of
Right, to the way in which it is overcome in the Phenomenology of Spirit,
it is immediately clear that the actions of the marriage partners cannot be
considered to be free ones. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the overcoming
of the division between the two laws is performed in the transition from
the polis into the Roman world. This transition results in the formal person of the Roman Law that Hegel characterized as the first self. The first
self as it appears in the Roman Law seems to coincide with the first self as
it is embodied in the marriage of the Philosophy of Right. On the one
hand, in both cases the first self is real as the family organism that appears
in the property of the family; on the other hand, the family organisms
relate to one another as the free and equal persons. Nevertheless, this similarity is deceitful.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the transition from the polis to the
Roman Law implies what Hegel calls a ruin of ethical substance.
(289) The person of the Roman Law has emancipated himself from the
tradition of the polis (or better, since the different poleis have different
traditions from the traditions of the polis). As person the individual
has internalized the pure self that was remembered by the Divine Law.
This internalization, however, is only immediately performed: It is not
known by the individual, but only practically expressed in the family
life. As a consequence, the content of family life is purely contingent;
154
166 It is only in the transition into the civil society that Hegel speaks about the disappearance of ethical life. ( 181).
167 Therefore, I agree with Steinberger (1988): But, more strongly, I would suggest
that the twothe theory of gender and the theory of marriageare, in fact, flatly
contradictory. (p. 188). For a criticism of Hegels conception of the gender values see also Hardimon (1994), p. 185).
155
156
157
to determine the quality of the external world, it lacks, in this sense, freedom.
The experience of the lack of freedom is based on the naturally given
neediness; in this relation freedom is impossible. In his neediness the
child is confronted with a power that it cannot overcome. As a natural
organism he can never break the power of the outside world. In his neediness, he remains dependent on the outside world and, in the long run, he
will even decline by its power. Ultimately the child dies (although we may
hope that this will only happen at an older age). Not the free will has the
ultimate control over the body, but death. Therefore, freedom seems to
be incompatible with corporeality.
The child, however, is not a mere natural organism that is related to a
natural environment. He is cared for by his parents and lives in the context of his family. The life environment of the child is, so to speak, an
artificial organism: a life community that is created by the actions of
the parents. The goal of the life community is, amongst others, to guarantee that the needs of the communitys family members are satisfied.
Good parents will do their utmost best to make sure that their children
lack nothing. If they succeed, the child is not related to an outside world
manifesting itself as a strange power that leaves it accidental whether his
needs are or are not satisfied, but rather to an outside world in which he
recognizes his own essence. His parents have taken care that his world is
an extension of himself in which all his needs are satisfied. Therefore,
nothing seems to hinder the childs awareness of the I. The only reason
for the existence of the world seems to be to serve the child.
The world to which the child is related is the social organism of the
family in which his parents have expressed their subjective freedom.
(Later on, I will discuss how this has to be understood.) Consequently,
the childs needs that are satisfied cannot be considered as immediate natural needs (the needs of a biological organism), but rather as the cultural
needs in which the free subjective identity of the parents expresses itself.
In this sense, the natural organism of the child is already socialized all the
time: The needs that he can satisfy and that are developed in the course
of his growing up are already the cultural needs of the social organism of
the family all the time. Therefore, the child cannot distinguish between
the actualization of his I and the actualization of the free subjectivity
of his parents, i. e., he can immediately recognize his parents as his
lord, as representation of his own essence.169
169 Here, it has no meaning at all to maintain that the childs recognition of the pa-
158
Partly, the freedom of the child is only appearance. The child thinks
to be free because he identifies himself with his guardians. Actually, however, the relation between the child and his parents is totally a-symmetrical. The child conforms to the family life that is constituted by his parents. But at the same time, it cannot be maintained that this relation
lacks any freedom. The child is not subjected to the parental authority
because he has been driven by instinctual actions. Neither is he subjected
because he has been forced by his parents. The child obeys because he
identifies himself with his guardians. His submission, like the submission
of the bondsman to the lord, is self-submission. This is exactly the germ
of his freedom.
The child who grows up in the context of the family becomes more
and more familiar with its norms and values. He learns to speak the language in which he can make all the distinctions that are necessary for the
family life. He approaches, more and more, the role that is expected of
him. The child internalizes the demands of his parent, so that the life
in the family becomes something totally obvious. Because of that, the authority of the parents vis--vis the child loses its externality. The child no
longer identifies with the guardians, but experiences family life as the actualization of his own freedom. He thinks that he is doing nothing other
than practicing the norms and values that follow from his own conviction. He is convinced that his life is totally in harmony with himself.
Therefore, the disciplining in the family to which the child is subjected
appears as self-discipline and self-expression.
b. The process in which the child develops awareness of the contingence
of the family tradition
The freedom of the child that has socialized himself in the social organism of the family is freedom only in appearance. The social content he
has appropriated is constituted by his parents. Although the process of
socialization presupposes that the child is free (he is able to observe cultural norms and values), his pure self is absorbed by the norms and values
that he practically performs in the family. Like the citizen of the polis, the
rents has to be preceded by a struggle of life and death. The reality of the child is
not first a natural organism that is afterwards socialized. He already realizes himself in the form of freedom all the time. Yet, it makes sense to put forth that the
fear of death is institutionalised in the social organism of the family: Without the
family the child would die.
159
child can only become aware of his pure freedom when he develops insight into the contingency of the family norms and values. I will show
that the stages of this process of development can be reconstructed according to the format of the religion of the work of art. As in the polis,
the pure self will appear as the undermining force of the family tradition.170
We have experienced that, at the level of the polis, the pure self got its
embodiment in the family, i. e., in its Divine Law. Later on, I will elaborate that, also in the revised Philosophy of Right, the pure self (in its immediate form) gets its embodiment in the family. This time, however, the
pure self that is embodied is not the pure self of the deceased family
member, but the pure self of the parents. The persons that constitute
the family organism can express their subjective freedom in the norms
and values of the family they create. Therefore, the norms and values
of the family have a totally different status for the parents than for the
child.
That the norms and values of the family express the subjective freedom of the parents, is indirectly experienced by the child who is growing
up. Since the parents express their subjective freedom in the family organism, all families have different, contingent norms and values. The difference between the norms and values is experienced by the child when he is
confronted with other families. The experience of the contingence of the
family norms and values threatens to undermine the childs confidence in
his own family. For the first time, he has the suspicion that there is some
difference between his identity and the one of his parents.
The child, however, had identified himself with his parents and had
been convinced that his destiny lies in the unconditional care of his parents. Therefore, the experience of contingence does not immediately result in the childs loss of basic trust, or in an identity crisis. The child,
rather, tries to ward off the undermining forces, and repairs the conviction that his own family expresses his own absolute identity. His confrontation with other families does not make his own family an exchangeable
one. The childs consciousness of the absolute meaning of his own family
is represented by the image of his family. The child makes his parents and
his parental house the representation of his absolute identity (like the citizens of the polis represented their absolute identity in the statue of the
god and the temple).
170 Once again, this reconstruction of the childs development is purely hypothetical.
160
By representing the family, the child can develop a self-conscious insight into the family relation. To maintain his image of the family as the
expression of his subjective identity, the child is obliged to assimilate
more and more determinations in his image until the moment when
he must admit that the family organism is a contingent entity that fails
to give shape to his subjective identity. We will see that the stages of
the representations can indeed be structured like the stages of the religion
of the work of art.
The child was urged on the representation of the family because he
was confronted with other families having other values and norms.
This diversity practically expresses the pure self of the persons: They
all have the subjective freedom to constitute a family organism in
which their subjective norms and values are embodied. If, however, the
child represents the family organism in which he is living by means of
the image of his parents and his house, he represents the subjective particularity of the family organism. But this particularity is not represented
as the product of the pure self of his parents. Therefore, to retain the
image of the family as the representation of his absolute identity, the
child must integrate the pure self of his parents in his image of the family.
Since his parents express their pure self in the language in which they
utter their subjectivity, the child must make this language the image of
the family, as well. Insofar as this language functions as an image of
the family, the pure self has become part of the childs consciousness of
it.171 We will see that this penetration of the pure self, in the end, contributes to the revelation of the contingency of the family organism.
The pure self that is embodied in the speaking voice of the parents
has a vanishing existence that falls short of attaining a lasting shape
and is, like Time, no longer immediately present in the very moment
of its being present.172 Therefore, the child passes through the Unhappy
Consciousness: The representation of his absolute essence slips away. The
representation can only be brought back when the free self of the parents
is synthesized with the social organism of the family. The representation
of this synthesis finds the child in the ritual actions of the parents, i. e.,
171 Cf. the hymn at the level of the religion of the work of art: The hymn represents
the pure self of the artist who produced the work of art (the statue of the god).
With the hymn, the pure self penetrates in the public consciousness of the polis
(likewise here, in the family, in the form of the human voice).
172 Here, I repeat the qualifications that Hegel gives to the hymn at the level of the
religion of the work of art.
161
162
relates to the broader objectivity of the social world. The child expects to
get back his free essence in the social reality: He identifies himself with
sport heroes, pop stars and movie stars.175
Sooner or later, the child will experience the limitations of the identification with his youth heroes. They become stiffened icons in which he
cannot recognize the freedom of his identity. Therefore, the child tries to
understand the broader objective world as the world in which he can recognize his free essence, because this world is mediated by his action. Since
the actions of the broader social world are outside the scope of the child
(who only acts in the domain of the family), this understanding of the
broader social world can only be achieved be means of representations.
Like the Ancient Greek citizens who represented their social world in
the spiritual works of art (Epic, Tragedy and Comedy), so the modern
child portrays his world in distinct spiritual works of art. In both cases,
the representations must ward off the outside world that threatens the
norms and values of the original family.
In the multicultural society, collectively shared stories such as the
Iliad, and the tragedies and comedies of the Ancient Greek world, fail.
Nevertheless, in the public domain of the multicultural society, stories
circulate (in the form of books, movies, theatre pieces, television programs, songs, musicals), that can have the same educative function as
the spirituals works of art, namely making the children aware of the contingency of the norms and values of their original families. These stories
can teach (as in the Epic), that if all individuals persist in their original
norms and values while acting in the public domain, they make the
blind destiny master of the world. Or they can make it clear (as in the
tragedies), that, although the subjectivity that is expressed in the family
organism excludes the inter-subjectivity that is expressed in the public domain, at the same time they presuppose one another. Or, ultimately, they
show (as in the comedies), that the stories are only constructions in which
the protagonists play their roles. Under the masks of their roles, however,
they remain the ordinary individuals who all have their own family norms
and values. Probably this explains the popularity of (real-life) soaps and
programs like Idols, i. e., programs in which the actors are unskilled, ordinary people.
The stories teach the children that all attempts to attribute to the
norms and values of their own family a status that surpasses contingency,
175 Cf. the living work of art in the Greek world, in which the observing Reason was
represented.
163
are in vain. The norms and values express the subjectivity of their parents
to which the children are related as to a contingent fact. The awareness of
this contingency ends in the ethical dissolution of the family: At the
moment that the child himself realizes that the norms and values of his
original family are contingent, his relation to these norms and values becomes external. As a consequence, he is no longer a member of the social
organism of the family. Although the child may factually still live with his
original family, it loses for him the meaning of an ethical institution in
which he shares the norms and values with his family members.
In Hegels Philosophy of Right, the ethical dissolution of the family has
another meaning: The ethical dissolution of the family consists in this,
that once the children have been educated to freedom of personality, and
have come of age, they become recognized as persons in the eyes of the
law and as capable of holding free property of their own and founding
families of their own, the sons as heads of new families, the daughters
as wives. They now have their substantive destiny in the new family;
the old family, on the other hand, falls into the background as merely
their ultimate basis and origin, while, a fortiori, the clan is an abstraction,
devoid of rights. ( 177)
Also according to Hegel, the ethical dissolution of the family has to
do with the growing up of the children and the external relation they develop towards the original family. In Hegels view, this externality is practically expressed in the new families that are constituted by the children.
The externality does not concern the awareness that the norms and values
of the original family are contingent. On the contrary, it appears that the
new families essentially have exactly the same norms and values as the
original family. Hegel not only indicates that the man and woman in
the new families have the same gender roles as in the original family
(the sons as heads of new families, the daughters as wives), but he
also seems to assume that the grownup sons and daughters are immediately prepared to constitute a new family. The notion fails that the children can only constitute their own family when they have developed their
own subjective norms and values. Once again it appears that Hegel confuses ethical immediacy with natural immediacy. Ethical immediacy expresses non-exchangeable subjectivity and appears in a multitude of
forms. In the Philosophy of Right, the ethical immediacy is not only confused with natural immediacy because it has apparently only one form of
appearance, but also because this single form is, as we have seen before,
deduced from natural (biological) relations.
164
Retrospection
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel understands the family as the social organism in which the animal reproduction gets shape in the form of freedom. As a consequence, the ethical content of the family is not developed
as the ethical life in the form of immediacy, i. e., as the domain in which
the contingent subjectivity of the free individuals is expressed. The ethical
immediacy is confused with the natural immediacy: Natural relations are
transformed into ethical relations that are still determined by nature.177
This determination of the family not only contradicts subjective freedom
because it confines the tradition of family life to the one that is determined by nature, but also because this confined tradition offers no
176 Also in the Philosophy of Right, the persons develop their subjectivity only at the
level of civil society. This subjectivity, however, is not brought down to the family
relations. In this respect, Hegel seems to be influenced by the Phenomenology of
Spirit, in which the three forms of the self belong to distinct historical periods
and are not developed as moments in the framework of a concrete entirety.
177 In fact, Hegel returns to his position of the Jena Lectures of Philosophy. Cf. Honneth (1995): Hegel now makes use of recognition: In love relationships, he
writes in a marginal remark, it is the uncultivated natural self that is recognized. (p. 37).
Retrospection
165
room for the actualization of subjective freedom at all. According to Hegels Philosophy of Right, there is only a place for subjectivity outside the
family: at the level of civil society.
Departing from the Phenomenology of Spirit, the embodiment of the
first self in the social organism of the family must be understood otherwise. The family members themselves must be able to understand the ethical life of the family as a contingent tradition in which the life partners
express their subjective freedom. In this revised conception of the family,
the education of the children becomes more complicated. Education is
not only the process in which the children are socialized in the tradition
of the family, but also the process in which they develop insight into the
contingent status of this tradition. Moreover, the education process has to
be continued at the level of civil society, where the children must develop
insight into their own subjective identity. Only when this condition is fulfilled, are they in the position to constitute their own marriage.
Although the revision of the concept of family is inspired by the Phenomenology of Spirit, this work is at the same time responsible for the confusion in the Philosophy of Right. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel
discusses the religion forms that belong to the historical worlds only afterwards, when the transition to the absolute Spirit has been performed. The
separation between religion and the objective world returns in the Philosophy of Right, because this work is meant as the systematic development
of the objective Spirit. However, it is precisely this separation that prevents
the adequate development of the first self s embodiment.
In Chapter 8, I will examine the embodiment of the second self in civil
society. At this level, I can discuss the continuing education process in
which subjective identity is developed. Before the elaboration of this program, however, I will first make an attempt to make my reconstruction of
the childs moral development more plausible. In an Excursus, I will compare this reconstruction with Habermass reconstruction of Kohlbergs
stages of moral consciousness.
166
167
168
have for Habermas the status of what he calls hypothetical reconstruction. (116) Habermas tries to reconstruct which concept of moral law
and which concept of autonomy are active in our cultural tradition. Rational reconstructions remain to have a hypothetical status, and can only
retain their attractiveness if they are indirectly supported by scientific,
i. e., empirically testable theories. (116/7) Our attempts to get to grips
with the essential determinations of the moral subject by conceptual analysis will be a thorn in Habermass side. After all, this kind of project tries
to maintain philosophys autonomy.
Yet, Habermas appeal to scientific (and, consequently, testable) theories, offers an exquisite chance to deepen the confrontation with our approach. In his article Moralbewutsein und kommunikatives Handeln
(Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action181), Habermas confronts himself with the development stages of the moral consciousness as
they are conceived of by Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg has the opinion
that the development of the moral consciousness (at least insofar as it
is characteristic for our culture), necessarily goes through six stages. It
is about a developmental psychological theory that pretends that it can
be empirically tested. In the article just mentioned, Habermas tries to interpret development stages in terms of the discourse ethics. If this is possible, discourse ethics can profit from the empirical testing by which
Kohlbergs theory is supported.
Also in our approach, the moral consciousness can only be generated
if it goes through some number of development stages. In this case, however, the development stages do not have the status of a scientific hypothesis, but are developed in the framework of an attempt to understand how
a free person can be conceived of as a corporal individual at all. Therefore, philosophical insights are pretended. But also, philosophical insights
are not apart from the empirical reality. Therefore, it is worth the effort to
examine whether the development stages that are distinguished by Kohlberg can also be explained in terms of philosophical development stages.
In the following exposition, the discourse ethical interpretation is
compared to the philosophical one. This makes it possible to articulate
more precisely the import and scope of both approaches.
181 Jrgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, in: Jrgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Polity Press 1992.
169
170
In the second stage of the pre-conventional phase, the moral consciousness has experienced that it cannot overcome its relation to nature.
It experiences what it means to be a living organism. It is constantly confronted with its own neediness and its action is oriented to the satisfaction
of its needs. Now, nature appears as an independent power that has the
structure of an organism; nature appears as the process in which the child
sometimes can satisfy his needs and sometimes not.
The second phase that Habermas (with Kohlberg) distinguishes is the
conventional phase. In this phase, the social reality no longer remains kept
out of range. The moral subject knows that his action takes place in the
social context and is, therefore, linked with conventions. His motive to
act is no longer inspired by the power of the guardian or by the advantage
a certain action brings, but by the duty to respect the prevailing tradition.
In the first stage of the conventional phase (i. e., in the third stage of the
moral consciousness), the moral consciousness identifies itself with the
specific role it has in society. It thinks to have the duty to fulfill the
role society has in mind. In the second stage of the conventional stage
(i. e., in the fourth stage of the moral consciousness), it no longer acts
one-sidedly from the specific role that has been assigned to it, but relates
itself to the social system in its entirety. It understands that that society
can only survive if it has certain underlying norms. It considers it to be
its duty to observe these norms because they are legitimized by the universal will.
Also, the conventional phase can be distinguished in our approach.
The moral subject that cannot realize its freedom as a natural organism
tries to reach its goal in the framework of the family community. In
this relation, the objective reality is no longer a given natural being-at-itself, but the traditional reality of the family. In the first stage of this conventional phase, the child identifies himself with the head of the family.
He obeys the head of the family as an undisputed authority, and by this,
takes on his role as a member of the family. He experiences the fulfillment of this role as his immediate duty because, without this role, he
would be deprived of his identity.
Precisely because the child conforms himself to the tradition of the
family, he passes step by step through a development by which he reaches
the second stage of the conventional stage. Step by step, he gets involved
in the life of the family. He develops a language with which he can make
all distinctions that are relevant in this world. For him, the world loses all
its strangeness. Therefore, a change can take place in his conception of
the familys essence. The reality of family life is no longer conceived of
171
as dependent on the family heads authority, but gets its ground in the
insight that the child has developed in family life. The child completely
knows his reality: he has appropriated this reality and feels as at home in
it as a fish does in the water. Reality has removed all its strangeness and is,
for the child, nothing other than the real appearance of his own insight.
The child no longer acts on the basis of the authority of the family head,
but on the basis of his own insight, i. e., his insight into the nature of reality. The child knows that he lives in a specific family community. He
acts in correspondence to his insight into how a member of the family
should behave.
In the post-conventional phase, the moral subject is able to discuss
society as such. He is explicitly able to distinguish between the subjective,
inter-subjective and objective world. Therefore, he not only knows that
social conventions are changeable, but also he can distinguish between
the norms that are factually valid in the social world and those that
should be valid according to his subjective insight. In the first stage of
the post-conventional insight (i. e., the fifth stage of the moral consciousness), the moral subject wants to discover the highest principles of justice
and wants to test (in a scientific discourse), to what extent the norms that
are actually valid correspond to these highest principles of justice. The
Theory of Justice, as it has been developed by John Rawls, can be considered a model of this stage.
In the second stage of the post-conventional phase (i. e. the sixth and
highest stage of moral consciousness), the moral consciousness no longer
thinks that the highest principles of justice can be identified by a theoretical construction. It is only certain that the highest principles of justice are
the result of a procedure as described by Habermas in his concept of the
practical discourse. Therefore, the moral subject strives for the creation of
the conditions under which the practical discourse can be performed.
Also in our approach, a post-conventional phase can be distinguished.
In this phase, the child is confronted with other families and discovers the
contingence of the tradition of his own family life. For the first time, the
child is forced to conceive of his subjective identity independently from
his family life. He opposes family life as a changeable traditional reality.
Because of this, he seems to have lost all moral certainty. Yet this does not
imply that the child relapses into moral skepticism. He has felt completely at home in the family. He has experienced the family affection resulting
in his opinion to be really free. Family has made him what he is, including the one who is now opposing the family. Now the child knows that he
can never again be absorbed by family life and that he has an independent
172
identity. At the same time, he knows that he never would have become
who he is without the family. Therefore, he once again turns to the family
and examines which principles underlie the tradition of the family, and
hopes after all to find in these principles the actualization of his freedom.
The stage in which the moral consciousness identifies these principles
with the family rituals that raise up the life of the family members above
actual life and link it with the continuity of changing generations, corresponds to the first stage of Kohlsbergs post-conventional consciousness.
Now moral consciousness understands family life as appearance of universal principles. The transition into the sixth and highest stage of
moral consciousness, however, has not been made. If the moral consciousness of the child concludes that the family rituals are after all
only valid in the contingent family community, then he does not conclude that the principles that underlie family have to be understood as
the result of a practical discourse, but he turns away from the family
and no longer tries to actualize his freedom in it. The child leaves the parental house and tries to keep the universality of his freedom by actualizing his freedom outside the family, namely in his role as the person
who actualizes himself in the symmetrical exchange of properties. We
will still see how the grownup child later founds his own family and
no longer has to consider the real family life as an external, contingent
reality, because he can make it the expression of his subjective freedom.
In the next chapter, I will elaborate under what conditions this subjective
freedom can be developed. At least the grownup children will have to participate in the public discussion of civil society.
Concluding considerations
Habermas claims that his Theory of communicative Action, and the related
discourse ethics, acquires indirect scientific support with the help of the
stages of moral consciousness that Kohlberg distinguishes. On the one
hand, these stages of the moral consciousness can be interpreted in
terms of the Theory of communicative Action, and, on the other hand,
they can be experimentally tested. However, if it is right that the stages
of moral consciousness developed by Kohlberg can be equally well interpreted in our approach, there seems to be a problem. Which approach is
affirmed by Kohlbergs scientific experiments? Are the stages formulated
thus abstractly that they are compatible with at least two and possibly
more approaches? Then it has little meaning to claim that a theory is in-
173
174
these distinctions from the outside to bear on material derived from previous
research.184
175
Chapter 8
The Civil Society: Developing the Institutional House
of the Second Self
Introduction
In this chapter, I will elaborate the institutional actualization of the second
self for our era, i. e., I will confront the conceptual determinations of the
second self with institutions of our globalized world and examine which
institutions can be considered as an adequate realization of the second
self. To prepare this attempt, however, I will first go into Hegels attempt
in the Philosophy of Right, to elaborate the institutionalization of the second self for the Nineteenth Century. I will critique the result of Hegels
attempt, the Corporation (or, what Hegel calls, the second family). This
criticism does not concern the features of the Corporation that typically
seem to belong to the Nineteenth Century, but is more elementary. I
will show what are the consequences of Hegels confusion at the level
of the family (where he confused natural and ethical immediacy). At
the level of civil society, there is no room for subjective freedom in its
pregnant meaning: It is reduced to a subjectivity that is totally socialized.
As a consequence, Hegels concept of Corporation does not meet the criteria for the second self that Hegel himself has developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This criticism will appear helpful for the positive construction of the second self s institutional embodiment.
177
tract. The families are the concrete persons who recognize one another
as free and equal. Their mutual recognition becomes real in the Contract,
i. e., at the moment that the families exchange their properties.
The civil society, as the multitude of families, seems to correspond to
the Roman Law in which the legal persons recognize one another as free
and equal. Also the persons of the Roman Law are family heads, and in
this sense, concrete persons: They reproduce themselves by the free consumption of the familys property and they express their mutual recognition by the exchange of properties.
The comparison between the civil society and the Roman Law allows a
further elaboration insofar as Hegel characterizes the relations between
the persons in both cases as a disappearance of ethical life. The
Roman Law has been constituted after the decline of the ethical life
that was actualized in the Greek world. The Roman families no longer
share their norms and values, and are only related insofar as they exchange properties. At the level of civil society, the free and equal persons
have left family life: The family is only represented as the commodities
that are produced by the family and that can be exchanged with the commodities of other families.
The disappearance of ethical life leads to the decline of the Roman
Empire because it is not guaranteed that the persons can harmoniously
live together. In Chapter 4, it is discussed which developments this decline induced: The pure self that was absorbed by the practical freedom
of family life returned in the form of an inner representation, and was
embodied in the Belief. The judgment that the Belief passed on the (objective) institutional world, induced, in its turn, a process of culture in
which the persons were completely socialized. This resulted in the absolute freedom of the French Revolution, i. e., in the revolutionary citizens
who want to immediately actualize their alleged autonomy.
At the level of civil society, however, the disappearance of ethical life
cannot lead to the decline of civil society. Civil society is already a moment
of the entirety of the ethical life in which the conscientious individual has
actualized his freedom all the time. The person is the conscientious individual who is aware that he actualizes his freedom in the civil society: He
knows that his actualization of freedom, at the level of civil society, has a
mediated form, i. e., the mediated unity of right and morality. Therefore,
the person of the civil society is also an autonomous moral subject who
wants to actualize his subjective freedom. The person of the Contract
is, at the same time, the subject of Intention and Welfare.
178
The problem is, however, that it is not evident that the persons of the
civil society can be the subjects of Intention and Welfare, as well. Whereas
the formal (free and equal) persons do not exclude one another, this may
be different for the subjects of Intention and Welfare. The actualization of
the welfare of the one can exclude the welfare of the other. Therefore, the
persons of the civil society, like the persons of the Realm of Culture, must
pass through a process of culture that guarantees that they can strive after
their subjective welfare without excluding one another. We will see that
this process results in the Corporations. The Corporations make possible
what failed, at the level of absolute freedom, in the Realm of Culture:
the harmony between the moral individuals that actualize their subjective
freedom. In the next section, I will discuss the process of education in the
civil society, and show that it is structured like the process of culture in the
Realm of Culture.
179
the subjective point of view of the person for whom the commodity, as
use-value, exists of a multitude of qualities; on the other hand, the objective point of view of the market. In this objective view, the commodity
has exchange-value, i. e., a general value that is equal for all persons of
the market. Like the Perception (the second moment of Consciousness)
was not able to bring together his two points of view (the One and the
Also), or, like the moral individual (of the Realm of Culture) was not
able to reconcile State Power and Wealth, so the person fails to bring together the points of view that divide the commodity in use-value and exchange-value. This is only possible from a point of view in which Understanding is repeated.
The person can restore the unity of the commodity when he realizes
that the use-value, as well as the exchange-value, must be reduced to himself. The exchange-value of the commodity is no objectivistic quality beside the use-value, but is intrinsically twined with the use-value: Exchange-value has to be understood as use-value as such. ( 63) Exchange-value and use-value are related as being essence and appearance.
The commodity has a general value on the market (exchange-value);
but it can only have this exchange-value when this exchange-value is expressed in some (specific) use-value. Without use-value, the commodity
has no exchange-value. Therefore, at this level the person is related to
the commodity like Understanding (the third moment of Consciousness)
is related to nature: Objectivity is conceived of as a supra-sensual force
(cf. exchange-value) that is expressed in the sensual manifestations of
the force (cf. use-value). Since, however, the value of the commodity
(both exchange-value and use-value), depends on the evaluating person,
the commodity has its unity in the evaluating person (as in the Realm
of Culture, State Power and Wealth appeared to have their unity in the
judging individual).
After having repeated the stages of Consciousness (in the form of observing Reason), the person repeats the stages of Self-consciousness (in the
form of observing Reason). If the unity of the commodity is dependent
on the persons evaluation, its objectivity is only guaranteed as long as
the process of evaluation is continued. This means that the exchange of
commodities must be overcome as an accidental action. In that case,
the families are not households that are, in principle, self-supporting,
only exchanging the commodities that they do not need for their own
consumption, but households whose consumption is structurally mediated by the exchange on the market. They maintain the objective world
that corresponds to their evaluating activity by repeating again and
180
again the exchange of commodities. (Cf. the Desire that maintains its certitude to be the essence of all reality by repeating again and again the negation of nature, or the (Realm of Cultures) moral individual who maintains the objectivity of the unlimited Monarch by repeating again and
again his language of flattery.)
Even if the persons consumption is structurally mediated by the market, it remains possible that the person has needs that are not satisfied by
the exchange process. This means that his welfare is not adequately actualized. The adequate integration of Contract, and Intention and Welfare, demands further steps. Only when the person is totally socialized and the
families have become moments of a production system that is essentially
mediated by market exchange, can the actualization of the persons welfare be guaranteed. This total socialization, that Hegel considers the proper Culture of civil society, is performed in a relation in which the lordship/
bondsman relation is repeated (in the form of observing Reason).
The total socialization of the person presupposes that the family is no
longer the institution in which the labor activities are localized. Labor
must have the shape of a social production system, i. e., a labor system
in which labor essentially is mediated by exchange. In Marxist terminology, one would say: Labor must have become a commodity at the market.
The person who sells his labor as a commodity on the market gets involved in a relation that can be described in terms of a lordship/bondsman
relation. By selling his labor force, he places himself (as bondsman), in
the service of an employer (as lord), who organizes the labor process.
The goal of the labor process is not the immediate satisfaction of the
needs of a family, but rather the production of commodities that can
be sold at the market (and indirectly satisfy the needs of the families).186
The mechanism of the market is determined by the two relation
forms that constitute it: Contract, and Intention and Welfare. As the persons of the Contract, the individuals are exchangeable, i. e., their actions
are formal and general; as subjects of Intention and Welfare, the individuals are particular, i. e., they strive after their particular welfare. Therefore, Hegel can maintain that the moment of generality and the moment
of particularity are the constituting coordinates of the market. ( 186)
These moments, however, are externally related, so that the process of
186 Later on we will see that this relation can, in some respect, be compared to the
Marxist relation between wage labor and capital. In principle, however, this comparison cannot be made because Hegel does not sustain the doctrine of labor
value.
181
their integration has the form of a continuous turn. The moment of generality turns into the moment of particularity, and the moment of particularity turns into the moment of generality. This continuous movement
appears in the supply and demand of the market. On the one hand, the
persons of the market offer a particular supply, i. e., a use-value. On the
market, this particular supply turns into a general exchange-value. On the
other hand, the persons of the market sell the commodities that correspond to their demand. In this case, the general exchange-value of the
commodities turns into the particular use-value. This turn from usevalue into exchange-value, and vice versa, matches with the language of
disruption in the Realm of Culture.
The competition at the market evokes innovations: not only concerning the development of new products, but also in the field of technological improvements. This innovation is at the center of the process of culture that Hegel discerns in civil society. When Hegel introduces, in 190
of the Philosophy of Right, the concept of human need, he distinguishes it
from animal need. The animal need is naturally given and, therefore,
fixed: An animals needs and its ways and means of satisfying them
are both alike restricted in scope. As a spiritual being, man transcends
the animals natural fixation: Though man is subject to this restriction
too, yet at the same time he evinces his transcendence of it and his universality, first by the multiplication of needs and means of satisfying
them, and secondly by the differentiation and division of concrete need
into single parts and aspects which in turn become different needs, particularized and so more abstract.
What is remarkable here is that Hegel interprets human needs as a
prolongation of animal needs.187 Human needs can be understood as a
multiplication and differentiation of natural needs. ( 195) Such an
opinion one would sooner expect in Marx (who understands the needy
man in his relation to nature), than in Hegel. For, Hegel emphasizes
that the reality of man as a spiritual being is only conceivable within a
culture community (of which the lord/bondsman relation is the basic
model). According to that view, human need has not to be conceptualized, as in the case of animals, in relation to the first nature, but in relation to the second nature ( 151): the norms and values of the family
187 This conclusion is in line with Houlgate (2006): Instead of simply having a natural need for food, therefore, they may want a particular kind of food prepared in
a particular way, for example. In this way, Hegel explains, the needs and wants of
human beings become more and more specialized and refined.
182
community that determine which needs are valid in it. Once again, however, it becomes clear that Hegel identifies the contingence of the family
community (for the children, the norms and values of the family appear
as traditional facts), i. e., its finitude, with its naturalness in the form of
freedom: Traditional facts are equated with natural immediacy that is
taken up in the form of freedom. We already saw what the consequences
are : The contingence of the family community is not discussed, so that
the norms and values of the family community seem to be given once and
for all and, moreover, the same for all families, i. e., there is no room for
multi-culturality.
183
184
185
has some dominance, but cannot sustain the argument that civil society is
not rich enough in principle.
Distinct from Marx and Smith, Hegel is not one-sidedly connected to
the doctrine of labor value. He emphatically maintains that the value of a
service in which someones personality or spiritual powers are called upon
cannot just be compared to the value of things.194 Hegels argumentation
that some are superfluous because they cannot get a job in the System of
Needs, appears not to be principal. Factually, the supply of unskilled labor
may surpass the demand, but precisely because they are spiritual beings,
people are able to educate themselves, and thus offer an alternative supply
that matches the demand of the market.
The reification that is performed in the labor process is a self-reification. The workers are self-conscious to participate in a dynamic process in
which the self-reification can be performed again and again differently
and more differentiated. The reification in the labor process is mediated
by a contract between persons and, therefore, is based on a relation of
law. The culture of the labor process contributes to the reality of formal
law.195 It results in a socialization of the persons nature, leading to the fact
that the person not only formally, but also really can participate in a social
order structured according to general rules of law.
Insofar as the persons are totally socialized, they have replaced their
natural needs and drives196 by actions that completely correspond to
the System of Needs: The formal persons of the Contract have completely
socialized the actions in which they actualize their welfare. This means
that they are also in their real actions free and equal: Their real actions
are exchangeable because they have been transformed in inter-subjective
actions that function as a moment in the rationalized System of Needs.
194 Counsels acceptance of a brief is akin to this, and so are other contracts whose
fulfilment depends on character, good faith, or superior gifts, and where an incommensurability arises between the services rendered and value in terms of cash.
(In such cases the cash payment is called not wages but honorarium.) ( 80).
195 As the private particularity of knowing and willing, the principle of this system
of needs contains absolute universality, the universality of freedom, only abstractly and therefore as the right of property. At this point, however, this right is no
longer merely implicit but has attained is recognized actuality as the protection of
property through the administration of justice. ( 208).
196 See: Introduction Philosophy of Right, 19.
186
Under this condition, the social presuppositions are fulfilled for the functioning of what Hegel calls the Administration of Justice. 197
The Administration of Justice institutionalizes what we call today private Law. It not only formulates the generalized action patterns as positive
rules of laws, but also takes care for the maintenance of these rules of law.
On the one hand, this Administration of Justice has been made possible
because the persons have cultivated their nature; on the other hand, it
is the Administration of Justice that contributes to the process of culture
and makes it possible. The integration of Contract, and Intention and welfare has its institutional shape in the Administration of Justice. And, like
the System of Needs that it contains, the Administration of Justice is also
a dynamic system that develops itself in time, for example, under the influence of technological improvements.
The Administration of Justice ( 209 ff.) can be characterized as the
domain in which the person practically actualizes the general good. It institutionalizes the System of Needs that produces all commodities for the
good life, i. e., the ethical community in which all families are united.
Therefore, the existence of the Administration of Justice is dependent on
the particular will that wills the general as such, i. e., on the lord of
the ethical community. In the next chapter, we will see that this lord is
institutionalized as the third self who manifests itself in the state power.
The System of Needs that is institutionalized in the framework of the
Administration of Justice can be considered as the immediate, positive actualization of the freedom of the persons. By participating in the System of
Needs, they practically satisfy their needs in the form of freedom. This
immediate form of the actualization of freedom is once again structured
as the relation of stoicism (in the form of observing Reason), i. e., the freedom of the pure self is absorbed in its practical manifestation: The pure
self as such is not expressed. However, insofar as the persons are also
moral subjects, they are also conscientious individuals, i. e., they know
themselves as the pure selves who cannot content themselves with the actualization of the immediate good in the System of Needs, but who have to
actualize the absolute good in which they can recognize themselves as
pure selves. To reach this goal, the person passes through the stages of active Reason.
197 This moment matches with the pure Insight of the Realm of Culture: it repeats the
relation of stocism (in the form of observing Reason).
187
188
189
decision. The individual must decide that he is willing to become a member of a Corporation, and the Corporations must decide that they accept
the individual as a member. On the other hand, both decisions must
be rooted in rational arguments. The individual must make his choice
for a profession because he understands that he has the subjective capacities for it. And the Corporation must accept an individual as its member
on objective grounds. The Corporation must need new members for the
economically considered production of its commodities, and the individual must be objectively qualified (by the demanded certificates), for the
branch of the Corporation.
At the level of the Corporation, the second stage of active Reason, The
law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit, is repeated.200 The law of the
market is replaced by a self-made and self-conscious law, the law that
dominates the social organism of the Corporation. For the individual,
the law of the Corporation can be identified as the law of the heart.
The individual has cultivated his immediate nature on the market and
by means of education. By transforming his immediate nature, he has appropriated it as his free, subjective nature. It is this subjective nature that
he can actualize in the framework of the Corporation as his law of the
heart. At the state level, the actualization of subjective freedom of the
one (his law of the heart) would exclude the actualization of the subjective
freedom of the others (the other laws of the heart). All individuals would
make the law of the state their subjective law, and would experience that
their intentions are not compatible. They would become aware of the
frenzy of self-conceit, the hubris of the one-sided subjective autonomy
that, at the level of the Realm of Culture, led to the absolute freedom, to
the terror of the French Revolution. At the level of the Corporation, however, the confrontation between incompatible subjectivities can be avoided. Because there are many Corporations, the individuals can choose the
one that corresponds to their subjective freedom. Moreover, the Corporations do not exclude one another, but are rather moments of the production system in its entirety.
Although not all individuals can become a member of a Corporation,
at least the ones who participate in them seem to have the possibility to
actualize their subjective freedom. However, since we have seen that the
Administration of Justice, as the Police and the Corporation, presuppose, as
200 The Corporation repeats, as well, the Tragedy that thematizes two laws of the
heart that are still determined by natural qualifications: the Human and the Divine Law.
190
well, the existence of a state in which the particular will, that wills the
general as such, is institutionalized, the adequate actualization of freedom
demands the development of the institutions of the state. This will be the
subject of the next chapter. Before we can turn to this chapter, however,
we must examine what criticism Hegels conception of civil society evokes,
and discuss the possible alternatives.
191
limits to the supply of unskilled labor that the market can absorb. But
that argumentation also cannot be proved. Firstly, the modern production system is characterized by a dynamics in which the demand of products and services can be infinitely differentiated, so that the demand for
labor is not principally clamped down.203 And secondly, it is always possible to adjust the labor supply by education.
Hegels thesis that the civil society is not rich enough for all appears to
arise from making the distinction between theoretical and practical education absolute. Influenced by the reality of his era, Hegel has been seduced to separate both forms of education, and so creates room for a
Marxist analysis avant la lettre. In that analysis, the distinction between
theoretical and practical education is transformed into the separation between spiritual and manual labor (a separation that Marx characterizes as
the highest form of labor division).204 Then, the ultimate consequence of
practical education is the ability to make oneself part of the mechanical
labor process. This makes man an appendage of the machine, and reduces
labor to purely physical effort.205 Only under that condition does the doctrine of labor value have a certain validity. To Hegel, however, it has to be
objected to that this form of manual labor is incompatible with his theory
of the realization of freedom. In human labor, theoretical and practical
education have to remain connected.
It is true that Hegel seems to resume the moral subjectivity at the level
of Police, and Corporation, but this resumption remains insufficient.
These institutions do not only not change the fact that some are excluded
(because the market mechanism principally excludes them), but also restrict the subjective freedom to economic freedom: In the Corporation,
the individuals are recognized as professionals, not as unique subjects.
203 According to Houlgate (2006), Hegel also assumes this infinite differentiation:
it is evident that there is no limit to what people might want or need in
the future. (p. 199) However, for Hegel, the production system operates in
the framework of the good life.
204 Karl Marx, Deutsche Ideologie, Die Teilung der Arbeit wird erst wirklich Teilung
von dem Augenblicke an, wo eine Teilung der materiellen und geistigen Arbeit
eintritt. (p. 31). (Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment
when a division of material and mental labour appears.).
205 Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Alle Arbeit ist einerseits Verausgabung menschlicher Arbeit im physiologischen Sinn, und in dieser Eigenschaft gleicher menschlicher
oder abstrakt menschlicher Arbeit bildet sie den Warenwert. (p. 61). (On the
one hand all labour is, speaking physiologically, an expenditure of human labour
power, and in its character of identical abstract human labour, it creates and
forms the value of commodities.).
192
They have the freedom to choose and develop their professions, but not
the freedom to actualize their subjective freedom as such; they are appreciated colleagues, not ends in themselves.
Although Hegel rightly maintains that good workmanship is to be
framed in an ethical community (i. e., a community with shared views
on the good life), at least two fundamental objections can be made
against his attempt to understand this community as a Corporation.
First, in his opinion, the corporations have a mediating function in the
development of the highest form of the ethical community, the good
life as it is shaped at state level. The corporations can have this function
because Hegel thinks that they together form an organic unity: the production system in its entirety that is in the service of the good life at state
level. This assumption is based on a presupposition that was criticized before, namely the assumption that the commodities and services produced
by the production system can be understood as the ongoing differentiation of the natural individuals needs, which have their unity in his natural organism. The differentiation of the production system flows from
the immoderate differentiation of the scientific and technological knowledge in reaction to the immoderate differentiation of the demand on the
market. This demand has no organic limits on itself, neither of the individual (whose needs are not natural, but cultural), nor of the state (production is oriented to the world market, not to the state organism).
The internal immoderation of the production systems rationality,
i. e., the rationality of Understanding 206, leads to a second fundamental
objection against the Corporation: Any attempt to understand the labor
community immediately as a moral community, in accordance with contemporary business ethics207, neither does justice to morality, nor to the
rationality of the production system. A company selects people because
of their professional qualities, and enters into a contract with them
that is principally redeemable. In that sense, the employee is not a
moral individual. In the other way around, the moral individual does
not derive the norms and values in which he expresses his subjectivity
from the particularity of a production branch.
At the end, Hegels reduction (making the economic domain absolute
at the cost of ethical immediacy), is caused by a methodological demar206 The rationality of Understanding exists of the endless repetition of analysis and
synthesis without inner unity.
207 P. Ulrich, Ch. Sasarin, Facing Public Interests. The Ethical Challenge to Business
Policy and Corporate Communications.
193
194
cialized. The initial determination of the welfare has to do with the immediate ethical life of the family.
Later on, it shall become clear that the ethical life of the family can be
understood as the objectification of the shared subjective norms and values of the marriage partners who have constituted the family. The process
of culture, however, does not start from the position of these marriage
partners, but from the position of their grown up children. As we have
witnessed in Chapter 7, these children have experienced that these
norms and values are contingent, i. e., different from the norms and values of other families. For the time being, however, this does not mean
that the grown up children dissociate themselves from these norms and
values. Although they know that they are contingent, they have, for the
moment, no reason to adopt other norms and values than those of
their original family. Therefore, they consider these norms and values
as their own ones, and if they have the intention to actualize their subjective welfare, they want to recognize these norms and values in the objective world.
As in the Philosophy of Right, the revised process of culture begins
with the repetition of the stages of observing Reason and, more particularly, with the relation forms of Consciousness and Self-consciousness in the
form of observing Reason. Therefore, the initial situation of the process
of culture can be characterized as the grown up children who want to actualize their subjective welfare immediately: They want to recognize the
norms and values of their original family in the commodities they find at
the market, i. e., they expect that these commodities immediately correspond to their family life. The commodities must be able to satisfy the
needs that belong to the immediate ethical life of their families (cf.
Sense-Certainty).
The commodities on the market, however, have general exchange
value, i. e., they can satisfy the needs of some families, but not necessarily
the needs of all of them. Therefore, for the grownup children, the objectivity of the commodities on the market falls apart in use-values and exchange-values, i. e., in commodities that canand those that cannotsatisfy their subjective welfare (cf. Perception). It depends, from the familys
point of view, on whether or not the objective world actualizes its subjective welfare.
The grownup children can restore the unity of the commodity when
they succeed in bringing together the two points of view. The exchange
value of the commodity is no objectivistic quality beside the use-value,
but is intrinsically intertwined with the use-value: exchange-value has
195
196
ily can overcome this strange objectivity when it is able to buy (or acquire
by exchange), the commodities that can satisfy its needs (because they
have, inside the framework of the family use-value). But in this case,
the strange objectivity will sooner or later return when the family
needs other commodities from the market. It seems that this return
can be prevented when the satisfaction of needs is structurally mediated
by the market, i. e., under the conditions of a fully developed free market:
capitalism.
In a fully developed free market, the production process is no longer
centered in the family, but in organizational units (factories) whose workers are gathered by mediation of the market. Therefore, the family can no
longer exchange its surplus products, i. e., the products it does not need
for its own consumption. The only products of the family are the family
members themselves. The only commodity it can exchange is the labor
force of the family members. So, the family sells the labor force of the
family members and buys the commodities that can satisfy the needs
of the family. The labor force is bought by the factories that produce
commodities for the market, i. e., commodities that have to be sold to
the families. Under these conditions, the commodities on the market
have become a moment in the consumption process of the families.
They have lost their strange objectivity because they are produced to
be sold at the market, i. e., in the end they are produced for the consumption of the families.210
Even under the conditions of a fully developed market, however, the
autonomy of the family members cannot be completely restored. One the
one hand, the immediate ethical life of the family can generate needs that
do not correspond to commodities that are supplied by the market; on
the other hand, it can be the case that the family cannot afford to buy
the commodities of the market. The question is how the demand in
the private domain of the family can be geared to the supply in the public
domain of the market.
Insofar as the family members sell their labor force to the factories,
they enter a labor process in which they repeat the lordship/bondsman relation in the form of observing Reason. They serve their lord, i. e., the
organizer of the labor process, by performing the tasks that are demanded
by the labor process. Once again, this labor process is involved in the dynamics of the free market. These dynamics result in a development of the
210 The endless repetition of the exchange process in order to restore autonomy
matches with the relation form of Desire (in the form of observing Reason).
197
labor process (new products, ongoing division of labor, new technologies), and a cultivation of the workers. The process of cultivation, however, differs fundamentally from the process of culture as it is elaborated
in the Philosophy of Right.
The central difference is that the process of culture can never lead to
the complete socialization of the worker. Although his mind and body
can be better and better trained to accomplish the job, although the
job may become more and more specialized, under all circumstances
the worker remains a moral individual. The cultivation results in better
practical skills and better insight into the objective nature of the labor
process, but the worker will never coincide with his labor activities.
The cultivation, rather, creates the possibility to make a distinction between the subjective norms and values of the family and the objective
world of labor. While the subjective norms and values of the family
are originally completely immersed in the labor process within the family,
the differentiation between the family and the labor process,211 also enables the worker to differentiate between his subjective norms and values
and the normative demands of labor itself. The more the labor process is
objectified in machines and labor division, the more insight the worker
can develop into the pure identity of his subjective norms and values.
Once again the process of culture prepares the individuals to live
under the conditions of the Administration of Justice. They learn what
it means to act according to rules that have an inter-subjective validity.
After all, the culture in the labor process finishes the education of the
grown up children. Thanks to the process of culture, they have the ability
to act as real persons, i. e., to actualize their freedom and equality because
they observe the rule of law that is equal for everybody. In contrast to the
Philosophy of Right, however, the process of culture does not solve the
problem of how to harmonize the demand of the families and the supply
of the market. The socialization of the worker in the labor process does
not imply at all that that the needs of the families are also socialized. By
becoming aware of the subjectivity of the family norms and values, the
individuals understand that the needs of the family are subjective. Although these subjective needs can only be satisfied by mediation of the
market, this does not mean that the market can satisfy all subjective
needs. The problem is not so much that the market would not be able
to respond to the diversity of the family needs because the supply on
the market is qualitatively and quantitatively limited. New demand gen211 Vs. Habermas, no separation between labor and interaction, cf. footnote 55.
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erates new supply. The problem is, rather, whether the families have
enough money to effectuate their demand on the market. In other
words, can the families satisfy their needs with the money that they receive in exchange for their labor force? Has the production system the
ability to actualize the good life, i. e., can it satisfy the needs of all individuals?
212 Cf. Der Geist ist ein Knochen, the being of Spirit is a bone. (208).
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200
volved with one another as moral subjects. More particularly, there can
be, for example, public discussions about subjective norms and values,
or the individuals can inform themselves about the norms and values
of the others by mass-media, movies, books, etc. This confrontation
can have effects of several kinds. The individuals can conclude that the
multitude of norms and values puts them all in perspective, so that, in
fact, it is irrelevant in which norms and values the individuals express
their subjectivity. This kind of relativism, however, would not only contradict freedom itself (we have seen that the moral dimension is a necessary moment of freedom), but also cannot explain the social reality of the
individuals: If they live in a world that is characterized by a multitude of
subjective norms and values, it must be clear how this multitude can be
reproduced. Therefore, in the end, only two other possible reactions are
meaningful. On the one hand, the individual can experience that the
norms and values of his original family are indeed also his own. On
the other hand, he can discover that the norms and values that express
his subjectivity are different, and identify them as the norms and values
he is confronted with in civil society. In both cases, the norms and values
lose, from the perspective of the individual, their contingent status. If the
individual is convinced that the norms and values express his own subjectivity, he understand them as the appearance of his absolute essence, i. e.,
he understands them as the manifestation of his conscience.
To get its social meaning, the new conviction of the individual has to
be institutionally objectified. The individual must express his subjective
norms and values in the family organism, i. e., the grownup child must
marry and create his own family. The marriage, however, cannot be the
marriage as it is conceived of in the Philosophy of Right. We have seen
that the gender roles in this conception do not leave room for subjective
norms and values. In these gender roles, a specific tradition is made absolute. If, however, the complementary gender roles are given up and
both partners are themselves already complete moral subjects, the problem has to be solved as to how it is still possible to think of a lifelong relationship between partners.
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plete in themselves, share a subjective identity? Would there be any reason for the individual to constitute a household together with another individual? Could the general conditions be met for the maintenance of an
institution which has, amongst other things, the task to raise and educate
children?
At first glance, a relationship between partners who are not complementary seems to be contradictory. If a relationship between partners implies a shared subjective identity, it must be possible to conceptualise this
identity as an harmonious unity. How is this harmony thinkable if the
participating partners are not complementary? There is only one alternative. The love of the partner must not concern the other in his specific
gender role, but the other individual as such. In that case, the partners experience a full openness for one another. Their relationship is not dialectical in the sense that the identity of the partner has a meaning that is
only relative to his own identity. The identity of the other partner becomes meaningful in itself. The shared identity with the partner is constituted, so to say, by suspending his own identity. The one partner makes
the identity of the other partner his own. The asymmetry of this kind of
relationship can be avoided if both partners perform the same movement,
i. e., if both partners make the other partners identity their own.
This alternative of totally sacrificing ones own identity may seem
rather unrealistic. But I think that the alternative gives an adequate description of two individuals who have fallen in love. If I am in love,
the loved one, in the first place, is not a woman or man, but an irreplaceable, unique individual. I will be obsessed by the loved one and not be
able to keep her out of my mind. Moreover, I will be prepared to please
her in all possible ways. For me, the loved one would be the centre of the
world.
The question is however, whether love has any objectivity.213 Is it not
the saying that love makes one blind? What can be the meaning of appro213 This problem cannot be solved by institutionalizing the partner relationship in
marriage, as R.Winfield seems to think: By itself, however, lovers concern
and sharing remains purely contingent upon personal feeling, whose own durability is itself accidental. Marriage, on the other hand, upholds the rights and duties of spouses even when their passion has lapsed. (R. Winfield, The just Family,
New York, 1998, p. 84) The question is that, even if the passion has lapsed, the
partners must still want to join immediately together in their unique individuality. (p. 82) If passion has lapsed, the way Winfield characterizes the positive
freedom of marriage no longer holds: Accordingly, marriage can be said to contribute a positive freedom in which the immediacy of romantic love becomes
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203
dividual who has an absolute identity can fall in love. Only an individual
who already owns an absolute identity can absolutely make his partners
identity his own. In accordance with Hegel, I will refer to this absolute
identity as conscience. (Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 382) Let us consider
the new situation in which the magic power of love has collapsed, and the
partners are pushed back into the intimacy of their conscience. The attempt to comprehend the shared identity in terms of the receptiveness
for the beauty of the partner has failed. Once again, the partners appear
in complete isolation, delivered to the mystery of their private conscience.
Yet the introversion of the private conscience cannot be accepted. If conscience stands for the absoluteness of ones identity, it must overcome its
one-sided subjective status. An identity which has no real existence, cannot be maintained as an absolute one.215
From the inside perspective, the real existence of the absolute identity
seems not to be problematic. The individual who claims to know his absolute identity evidently will act in accordance with his insight. Therefore, he will claim that the actions in which his existence is real, expresses
his conscience. From the outside perspective, however, things are different, because the immediate unity between conscience and the expression
of conscience in actions has no validity. The external observer is confronted with a multitude of actions, and must ask himself which actions are
expressing the others conscience. Is, for instance, the other expressing
his identity by walking? Therefore, the subjective conviction to express
his own identity by subjective action only makes objective sense if the
conviction is acknowledged by others. In this way, the first step can be
made to restore the identity, which is shared by both partners. In the mutual acknowledgement by both partners that the conviction is right that
the subjective actions express the absolute subjective identity, they enable
one another to give their claim for an absolute identity some objectivity,
namely as the claim which is inter-subjectively shared. (Cf. the transition
from Consciousness in to Self-consciousness)
Even in case of a shared claim, however, it remains unclear where the
content of this claim comes from, and on what grounds the reached consensus is based. If, for instance, identity is physically determined because
the individual decides to express the most intimate subjective feelings, du215 In the following paragraphs, I interpret the dialectics of Morality (Phenomenology of Spirit) in the light of the partner relationship of man and woman. As is
discussed in Chapter 6, this dialectics repeats Consciousness, Self-Consciousness
and Unhappy Consciousness.
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rable consensus is impossible. The one partner has to indicate which feelings express his identity. But each time the other partner thinks he knows
the relevant feelings, it can be too late, because the feelings have already
changed. It is impossible to deduce an absolute identity from a multitude
of feelings. All synthesis of feelings into a unity can only be provisional.
Therefore, the partners can only maintain their absolute identity if they
assume that it has a spiritual origin. (Cf. Desire)
As a consequence, subjective identity should be understood as free
self-determination, which surpasses its subjective status because it is acknowledged as free self-expression. But even then the absolute subjective
identity is not safeguarded. Once again, subjective identity appears as dependent on (mutual) recognition, i. e., consensus. The progress which has
been made consists of the demand that not only the that of consciences
conviction, but also the what of its spiritual content must be recognized
by the partner. But as long as recognition only has an inter-subjective status, it still remains unclear what is the objective ground of the consensus
between the partners and, in connection to this omission, whether the
consensus is more than a temporary one. The subjective identity has existence as long as, and as far as, the mutual recognition actually is expressed. In that sense, the subjective identity is dependent on time-spatial
activities, i. e., on speech-acts. (Cf. Stoicism) This dependency excludes its
absoluteness.
The conclusion seems to be justified that the idea of an absolute subjective identity must be dropped. The acts which mediate its existence, at
the same time deprive it of its absoluteness. Only one escape is possible.
The partners must realise that their subjective identity, i. e., the identity
which makes them soul mates for one another, has already been given
all the time. (Cf. the transition to the Unhappy Consciousness)
Real action is not oriented to the constitution of an absolute identity,
but on the striving for knowing the absolute identity. This learning process is embedded in a practical relationship in which the partners, as mutual lovers, are already involved all the time. The choice of the partners to
form one shared subjective identity does not create the soulmateship, but
can, at best, formalize the soulmateship which already existed all the time.
The choice for one shared subjective identity is divided in itself. By their
choice, the partners do not become one individual, but they are expressing that the process of developing insight into their subjective identity
cannot be performed without the partner. The appropriation of ones
subjective identity is the ongoing striving for clarifying ones life history.
On the one hand, this clarification presupposes that the own life has been
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already been lived all the time (including the participation in civil society), and, on the other hand, it presupposes that the recognition by the
partner is looked for. Of course, the acknowledgement of an interpretation by the partner is not the criterion of its truth. Yet, it can be maintained that without this acknowledgement the interpretation cannot be
true. The objectivity of the own subjective identity can only be known,
insofar as it is continuously expressing itself in the relationship with
the partner. Mortal men are not able to have absolute knowledge of
their absolute subjective identity. But the continuity of the relationship
with the life partner, and the associated acknowledgement of the attempt
of interpreting the own life history, can be a hint for the truth of this interpretation.
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unity of the production system (the Verstandesstaat216). The production system of modern society, however, produces for the world market.
This means that the production system, out of itself, has no unity that
precedes the good life as it is defined at state level. Nor are the branches
in the production system organically linked to one another. If somewhere
in the world new demand is created, then, in principal, new branches can
be developed without limitations prescribed by the market system.
The normative standards for the production system must in some
way or another be deduced from the norms and values of the families.
This, however, is only possible when a number of mediations can be performed. On the one hand, it must become clear how the multitude of
norms and values of the distinct families can brought together in an encompassing system of norms and values. On the other hand, it must be
understood how the norms and values are related to the production system.
It is evident that the norms and values of the distinct families are restricted by the modern production system: Only those norms and values
are permissible that respect the separation between the private domain of
the family and the public domain of the System of Needs. 217 But the attempt to bring the various norms and values of the families together,
can initially be performed apart from the System of Needs. Although, in
principle, each family can have its own norms and values, in reality
many families will share its norms and values with other families. Therefore, it is possible to divide civil society into groups of families that share
norms and values.218 Insofar as these groups are institutionalized in ideological associations like denominations, cultural organizations, journals,
ideological clubs (humanists, socialists, liberals) etc., the first step has
been made to transform the various norms and values in an encompassing
system: The many families are structured in a limited number of ideological associations.219
216 Cf. 183 the state as the Understanding envisages it.
217 In an allusion to Rawls one could say: not all values and norms belong to reasonable comprehensive doctrines.
218 Which groups exactly exist and how they emerge in a struggle for recognition
has to be observed by empirical sociology.
219 These ideological associations can, for example, be interpreted as cultural minorities. In this sense, the freedom and equality of the French Revolution has
prepared the contemporary multi-cultural society. Of course, these cultural minorities differ from the national minorities Kymlicka (1995) has in mind
when he writes: On the contrary, national minorities often claim an inherent
207
208
Retrospection
209
Retrospection
We have discussed how Hegel develops the Corporation as the institutional embodiment of the second self. This embodiment presupposes that the
contradiction between the freedom and equality of the persons and the
uniqueness of the moral subjects is overcome by a process of culture in
the modern production system. The culture of the production system socializes the moral individuals and makes them suitable to participate in
the legal order of a social organism. This social organism is subdivided
in Corporations in which the individuals can actualize their moral particularity.
We observe that Hegels conception of the embodiment of the second
self does not adequately do justice to the moral subject. Ultimately, he is
sacrificed to the labor system. As an alternative to Hegels concept, I developed the ideological association. These associations are not mediated
by the culture of the production process, but rather by a learning process
in the public domain of civil society. By mediation of public discussion,
the individuals develop insight into their subjective norms and values.
Mediated by political parties, the ideological associations formulate the
normative framework of the production system, i. e., the shared norms
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and values of the good life. In the next chapter, it will be discussed how
the good life is institutionalized in the state, and how the state can be considered as the embodiment of the third self.
Chapter 9
The State: The Embodiment of the Third Self
Introduction
In this chapter, I will elaborate the institutional actualization of the third
self for our era, i. e., I will confront the conceptual determinations of the
third self (as elaborated at the level of Morality in the Phenomenology of
Spirit), with institutions of our globalized world, and examine which institutions can be considered as adequate realizations of the third self. To
prepare this attempt, however, I will first go into Hegels attempt in the
Philosophy of Right to elaborate the institutionalization of the third self for
the Nineteenth Century. I will criticize the results of Hegels attempt, the
Nation State (or, what one could call in a variation on Hegel, the third
family). This criticism does not concern the features of the State that typically seem to belong to the Nineteenth Century, but is again more elementary. I will show what are the consequences of Hegels confusion at
the level of the family (where he confused natural and ethical immediacy), and at the level of civil society (in which subjective freedom is reduced to a subjectivity that is totally socialized). As a consequence, Hegels concept of State does not meet the criteria for the third self that
Hegel himself has developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. For the citizens, the third self seems to coincide with the objective reality of the Monarch. Therefore, their conscience is restricted to its objective appearance
and is not conceived of in its relation to the absolute Spirit. This criticism
will appear helpful for the positive construction of the third self s institutional embodiment.
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moment of the State, however, seems a bit strange. But this becomes understandable if we call to mind what Hegel meant by Injustice. At the
level of abstract Right, it remained undetermined whether the particular
and the general will were in harmony. Therefore, Injustice could not be
excluded: particular and general will could contradict one another.
That was precisely the reason that the transition to Morality had to be
made: The particular will could not remain undetermined. At the level
of the State, however, the adequate unity of Right and Morality has
been developed. Therefore, the harmony between the particular and general will can be guaranteed. As the moment of the State, Injustice is sublated, i. e., the particular and the general will are in harmony. The State is
the particular will who wills the general will as such. The State is an institutionalized self: the Monarch. The Monarch is the individual who, in
his institutional role as Monarch, wills the general will as such. ( 279).
For the citizens of the State, the Monarch represents the objectification of their freedom. The State is the reality of the good life, the actualization of the (general) Good. The conviction that the State is the actualization of the Good is subjectively expressed in the patriotism of the citizens. This patriotism functions as the Conscience of the citizens who are
convinced that this Conscience is actualized in the ethical life of the
State. ( 268) In the relation between the Monarch and the citizen, the
lordship/bondsman relation has got its definitive shape. The citizen acts
in service of the Monarch. But he knows that he, by this service, actualizes his own freedom. After all, the Monarch represents the good life: in
his recognition of the Monarch, the citizen recognizes his own freedom.
As representation of the citizens freedom, the Monarch is an individual who plays, as does the lord, an institutional role. In this institutional role, the Monarch is, so to speak, an immortal individual: not only because the institutional role survives when the Monarch dies, but also because the monarchy is hereditary, i. e., the reproduction of the monarchal
family guarantees that the monarch is succeeded. ( 280) But, in contrast
to the lord of the initial lordship/bondsman relation, the Monarch is not
only the (institutionalized) symbol of the citizens freedom, but also the
developed reality of this freedom. He is the adequate reality of the
third self and, therefore, the adequate unity of the first and second self.
We have seen that the embodiment of the first self, the family, could
be interpreted as the immediate actualization of freedom. In the family,
the moments of the free person, i. e., generality, particularity and singularity, are actualized in the immediate unity of the family organism: the
gender role of man (moment of generality), and woman (moment of par-
213
214
over, the Executive is, in some sense, responsible for the Administration of
Justice because it not only contains what we call nowadays the Government, but also Jurisdiction, i. e., juridical actions that try to correct normal actions.
Finally, Legislature and Executive are united in the Crown ( 275 ff.),
the true existence of the moment of singularity. This not only means
that both these powers are intertwined (the Executive is based on the
laws of the Legislature, as is the existence of the Legislature as institution
based on actions of the Executive), but also that they are the moment of
an encompassing power: The Monarch, i. e., the representative of the
Crown, is, as well, President, Leader of the Government and Chief Justice.
Although the good life, as it is objectified in the state, is mediated by
the subjective freedom of the free market, it remains an historical manifestation of freedom. In the language of the Philosophy of Right, the
good life objectifies the Spirit of a People. Therefore, the State does
not seem to be considered as the adequate realization of the third self.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the third self is developed as the conscientious individual who is related to the absolute Spirit. The conscientious
individual knows that the actualization of his freedom has a contingent,
historical form. In that sense, the ethical life cannot be the absolute end
and aim of the world ( 129) as it is stated in the Philosophy of Right.
In the Philosophy of Right, this problem is solved by the differentiation between the conscience of the citizens and the conscience of the
Monarch. As conscientious individuals, the citizens are the patriots who
are convinced that it is their duty the observe the laws of the state.
The obedience of this duty coincides with the actualization of their freedom. At state level, the moral ought, i. e., the duty to realize the good,
has been completely fulfilled. The Monarch, however, is the conscientious
individual who is aware of the finitude of ethical life. The Monarch can,
so to speak, distinguish between the general good that is actualized in the
state, and the absolute good that principally transcends any historical realization. The Monarch is the conscientious individual who is related to
the absolute Spirit and, therefore, knows that the objective world of
the state is only a finite manifestation of the absolute Spirit.
In the Philosophy of Right, the conscience of the Monarch is mentioned in 285: The third moment in the power of the crown concerns
the absolute universality which subsists subjectively in the conscience of
the monarch and objectively in the whole of the constitution and the
laws. Although this formulation makes it dubious whether the Monarch
really transcends the objective world of the state, this transcendence seems
215
to be presupposed in the right to pardon criminals: The right to pardon criminals arises from the sovereignty of the Monarch, since it is this
alone which is empowered to actualize minds221power of making undone
what has been done and wiping out a crime by forgiving and forgetting
it. ( 282) Moreover, also the majesty of the Monarch seems to indicate his transcendence: The personal majesty of the monarch, on the
other hand, as the final subjectivity of decision, is above all answerability
for acts of government. ( 284)
The transcendence of the state and the relation to the absolute Spirit is
explicitly discussed at the level of International Law (330 ff.) and World
History ( 341 ff.): In the relations between the states, the transition from
objective into absolute Spirit has been made. Therefore, it is at this level
that the conscience of the Monarch can be compared with the conscience
as it is developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The relations between
states are essentially conceived of as relations between the Monarchs of
the states: The states tendency to look abroad lies in the fact that it is
an individual subject. Its relation to other states, therefore, falls to the
power of the crown. ( 329) This means that the relations between states
depend on different wills each of which is sovereign. ( 330) Precisely
because of the sovereignty of these wills, they are free to recognize one
another or to refuse this. If they do recognize one another, their relation
is structured like the beautiful soul, one of the moments of conscience
in the Phenomenology of Spirit. As long as the Monarchs recognize one
another, they can persevere in the illusion of their absolute autonomy.
This autonomy, however, is only real insofar as the Monarchs continue
to express their mutual recognition. When, however, this process is broken off, the contradiction in which they are involved becomes clear. The
Monarch is autonomous insofar as he has realized himself in the good life
of the state. Also, the other Monarch is autonomous insofar as he has realized himself in the state: But this time it is about another state. Therefore, the conclusion must be that, insofar as the Monarch has realized
himself in the good life of the state, his autonomy cannot be recognized
by the other Monarch. As expression of the Monarchs conscience, the
states exclude one another: They cannot both be an absolute reality.
The mutual exclusion of states is discussed at the level of world history. Since there exists no international legal order, the states are related
as in a state of nature ( 333) i. e., when the states do not succeed in
arranging agreements, the ultimate consequence is war. The struggle of
221 In German: Macht des Geistes.
216
world history, however, has not only a destructive result. Although all
states strive after their own survival, world history can be conceived of
as a process in which freedom is actualized more and more adequately.
This is the cunning of Reason that is active in history, behind the
back of the world leaders. In the cunning of Reason, it is expressed
that it is ultimately the absolute Spirit that manifests itself in world history,
not blind destiny.
In the Philosophy of Right, world history is classified in four Realms:
the Oriental Realm, the Greek Realm, the Roman Realm and the Germanic
Realm. These four realms correspond to the four stages of world history
as they are discussed in the Religion Chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit 222. Once again, world history is interpreted as a process in which the
absolute Spirit comes to itself in a progressive development of religion
forms. And, once again, these religion forms are attributed to distinct
states in distinct historical periods, i. e., states which are essentially
mono-cultural. In contrast to the Phenomenology of Spirit, however, the
transition to the absolute Spirit is not performed by the conscience of
the individual. Even the Monarchs do not understand that their actions
can be interpreted as manifestations of the absolute Spirit.
217
218
losophy of Right, this is possible when the citizen recognizes the monarch
as a person who represents the social organism in which his freedom is
actualized. Once again, the citizen is understood as the third self, the conscientious individual. This time, however, the conscience of the citizen
cannot be identified with his patriotism. As in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the citizen is, as a conscientious individual, related to the absolute Spirit.
For the revised citizen, the social organism of the state that is represented by the monarch does not coincide with the adequate actualization of his conscience. The revised citizen knows that he can actualize
his freedom only in the form of objective Spirit, i. e., as the good life
that is only an historical realization form of the absolute good. The
good life remains distinguished from the absolute Spirit. Therefore, the
monarch is not absolute insofar as he represents the unity of the
good life in which the citizen actualizes his freedom, but rather insofar
as he represents the absolute ground of the states unity, the absolute Spirit.
The monarch who represents the absolute Spirit can be interpreted
as the president of the constitutional state. Insofar as the state organism is
an historical entity, its law is subjected to changes that are especially related to developments in the domain of civil society. However, insofar
as this law is also legitimized as the embodiment of the third self, it is
also founded in the absolute Spirit, i. e., it has a supra-historical essence.
In our era, we know this supra-historical essence as the so called human
rights, as the absolute moral rights that are attributed to human beings as
such. These are the rights whose conceptions are developed at the level of
the revised abstract Right and the revised Morality. (cf. Chapter 6).
The human rights can get a specific formulation in the Constitution of
the state. This is the first step to actualize the human rights in the objective world. In the Constitution, the human rights are related to an historical state organism. The Constitution gives the human rights not only a
positive formulation as the fundamental rights of the Constitution, but
also reconciles them to the normative framework of the positive law
that is valid in an historical state organism.
The president who represents the Constitution plays an institutional
role that is distinguished from his natural existence. Since this institutional role expresses that the existence of the state is legitimized by the absolute Spirit, it has the majesty that the Philosophy of Right attributes to the
monarch. The majesty, however, cannot be an argument to make the
function of the president an hereditary one. It is only important that
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the Constitution guarantees that the function of the president is, under all
circumstances, fulfilled. This could be done by determining the presidency as a constitutional monarchy. An argument for this solution would be
that it at least becomes clear that it is irrelevant what are the personal
qualities of the president. But it is an illusion to think that an hereditary
president can claim a status that is more absolute than, for example, an
elected president. In both cases, it is the Constitution that determines how
an individual is selected for the presidency. Nature can not only not guarantee that a president has offspring (so that constitutional rules are needed to determine who in this case will be the successor), but even when
offspring are available, it is, for example, not a law of nature that the eldest son will be the successor224 : The constitution determines which family
relations are relevant.
As the representative of the absolute Spirit, i. e., as the representative
of the Constitution, the president cannot be the leader of the government.
As a finite reality, the good life and its government are distinguished from
the absolute Spirit: they have an independent, contingent existence. Nevertheless, however, the good life is not totally separated from the absolute
Spirit: in its absoluteness the absolute Spirit has to manifest itself in the
good life. As manifestation of the absolute Spirit, the laws that constitute
good life can be considered as contingent appearances of human rights.
Therefore, the Constitution determines that the president has to take
care for the powers that constitute good life. The president is not himself
the leader of these powers, but he has to install them as relative independent powers. As the absolute ground of the powers of good life, the president represents, in the eyes of the citizens, not only the human rights,
but also democracy: By installing the powers of good life that is in accordance to the human rights, the president guarantees the existence of
a democratic legal order.
In contrast to the Philosophy of Right, the powers of the good life cannot be identified as, respectively, Legislature, Executive and Crown, but
rather as the trias politica of Montesquieu. Although the state nowadays
also has a legislative power, this power cannot be a moment of the Crown
or the Presidency. As the power that constitutes the framework of the social organism of the state, it has a relative independency: On the one
hand, the legislative power formulates his laws in correspondence with
224 This was precisely the conflict between Eteokles and Polyneikes: for the Divine
Law they were both son of the king (even twins), who could claim to be his successor. For the Human Law, however, only the eldest son has this right.
220
the Constitution; on the other hand, the laws integrate the developments
at the level of civil society. The second power of the present day state, the
Government, has the same task as the Executive, insofar as the Government is responsible for the existence of the institutional framework in
which the laws of the legislative power are actualized. Jurisdiction, however, does not belong to the task of the Government, but is, rather, the
third power of the social organism of the state. The power of Jurisdiction
guarantees the unity of the state organism as such: It judges whether the
laws of the legislative power are in harmony with the Constitution, and
whether the actions of the Government and the citizens are in harmony
with the laws. Once again, the three powers of the state can be considered
as the institutional objectification of the three moments of the person
(generality, particularity and singularity). But this time, these powers cannot (like the Monarch) be considered as the absolute end and aim of the
world that is only practically legitimized at the level of world history. The
three powers are embedded in, and legitimized by, the Constitution that is
represented by the President.
In the next section, I will discuss how the conscience of the citizen
can be developed in accordance with the conscience as it is developed
in the Phenomenology of Spirit. After all, the third self of the Phenomenology of Spirit is the presupposition of the revised concept of the state.
The development of the third self as the presupposition of the revised state
221
222
Once the citizens have developed insight into the conscience at state
level, they understand the entirety of their conscience. At the level of the
family, the conscientious individuals actualize their conscience in the
form of immediacy. As in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the conscientious
marriage partners actualize their conscience by repeating the stages of
Consciousness and Self-consciousness (cf. pp. 106 109). At the level
of the System of Needs, the conscientious individuals actualize their conscience in the form of mediation. As in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the
conscientious persons on the market actualize their conscience by repeating the stages of observing Reason (cf. 194 196). It is true that we have
presented this stage of the actualization of conscience as a learning process
in which the grownup children acquired insight in the norms and values
of their original family in distinction from the reality of the production
system. But this learning process remains important for the persons who
have founded their own family. In their participation in the System of
Needs, they actualize the norms and values of their family by their specific
supply and demand on the market, and by their specific contribution to
the discussions in civil society. Moreover, they can develop these norms
and values under influence of the confrontation with newly developed
products and services or new ideological positions and opinions. At the
level of the revised Police and Corporation (the ideological Association),
the transition is made to the ultimate form of conscience (as it gets
shape at the level of the state). As in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the
moral subjects actualize their conscience by repeating active Reason. At
the end, they learn at the level of Jurisdiction, that their conscience is related to the absolute Spirit.
The three domains of ethical life, family, civil society and state, institutionalize together the complete learning process of conscience in accordance with the learning process as it is developed in the Phenomenology
of Spirit. As a consequence, in the revised Philosophy of Right, the moral
ought is conserved at the level of ethical life. In the original Philosophy
of Right, the moral ought is overcome because the three moments of the
moral subject (Purpose and Responsibility, Intention and Welfare, Good and
Conscience), are realized at the level of ethical life: In the social organism
of the family, the purpose of the partners is realized so that they are responsible for their actions; in the social organism of the Corporation,
the intention is realized so that the actions of the Corporations members
serve their welfare; in the social organism of the state, conscience (patrio-
The Government
223
tism) is realized so that the state coincides with good life.225 In the revised
Philosophy of Right, however, Purpose is not absorbed by the social organism of the family, but remains distinguished from this organism because
it is expressed by the partners insofar as they actualize conscience in the
form of immediacy. Likewise, Intention is not absorbed by the social organism of the Corporation. Intention appears as the actualization of conscience in the form of mediation, i. e., as the subjective norms and values
that are explicated in distinction from the production system. Conscience,
finally, is not absorbed by the social organism of the state because it is not
narrowed to patriotism. By the discussions in the parliament and the corresponding discussions in the public domain, the citizens learn that the
realized good life is an historical manifestation of the absolute good,
i. e., the tension between conscience and good life is conserved.
The Government
Like the Executive in the Philosophy of Right, the Government is the moment of state power in which the moment of particularity is objectively
institutionalized, i. e., the Government guarantees that the real actions
of the citizens are performed within the framework of the general laws
as they are determined by the legislative power. The Government, however, is not only an instrument of the legislative power, i. e., a bureaucracy of
civil servants who only execute what is told by the legislative power, but
also is a relative independent power. Although the Government is dependent on the legislative power, this last power is, in the other way around,
also dependent on the Government. The political parties in the parliament can try to formulate their conception of good life, based on their
subjective norms and values, and translate this conception in a systematic
system of laws. This system of laws, however, cannot coincide with the
system of law that underlies the States reality of good life. Not only because the system of law is a compromise between many political parties
(the dominance of one party would contradict subjective freedom), but
225 Nevertheless, I do not think that Peter Steinbergers (1988) conclusion can be
maintained: In this regard, I believe that Hegels intention to view political society as an ethical community is emblematic of the degree to which his political
thought is so very different from the superficially similar views of more orthodox
liberals, including Kant himself. (p. 244) The realization of good life in world
history is distinguished from the absolute good. My criticism of Hegel is that
only the philosopher seems to know this distinction, not the citizen himself.
224
Jurisdiction
In the revised Philosophy of Right, the moment of singularity is not objectified in the power of the President. We have seen that the President represents the absolute ground of the state, not state power itself. Nevertheless, also the revised Philosophy of Right needs a power in which the moment of singularity is objectively objectified. Since the legislative power in
the Government are relatively independent, their mutual harmony is not
guaranteed, and cannot be guaranteed by one of these two powers: In
that case, they would lose their relative independence. Therefore, the harmony can only be safeguarded by a third power, namely Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction judges whether the actions in the State are in accordance with
International Law
225
the law. It judges not only the actions of the Government, but also the actions of the legislative power itself (are the laws in accordance with the
Constitution?), the citizens, the family members and the persons of the
market. The Administration of Law that was already discussed at the
level of civil society, is part of the power of Jurisdiction (in contrast to
the Police that is part of the Government).
International Law
Since the citizens are conscientious individuals who are related to the absolute Spirit, i. e., who know that the state they are living in is only an
historical form of good life, the modern state is not only practically related to other states. The citizens know that it is their absolute duty to actualize human rights in the good life of a democratic state. Because this
moral demand concerns all human beings, the citizens are not only related to their fellow citizens, but to all. At the same time, however, the citizens know that the moral demand can only be actualized in an historical
state that is distinguished from other states. The awareness of the historical finiteness of the own state implies an internal relation to other states:
Domestic and international law are intertwined.
Insofar as all states are legitimized by human rights, international law
exists and can made explicit by international treaties in which the human
rights are recognized. By this recognition, the states, at the same time,
recognize one another as equal, i. e., as historical forms of good life.
This mutual recognition of states excludes illegitimate states, i. e., states
in which the human rights are internally violated, or states that do not
recognize all legitimate states as equal.
The possible existence of illegitimate states seems to imply that only
under the condition of a world Government can the actualization of freedom be guaranteed. A world Government, however, cannot be defended
on principle grounds. It is true that if a world Government exists, the conclusion must be that the world citizens obviously recognize this world
Government as a legitimate state, but this does not mean that the world
Government is the most adequate form to actualize freedom. The existence of a world Government only factually expresses that there are no illegitimate states that can threaten the realization of freedom. But it cannot principally prevent this threatening. Since the actualized good life is
an historical existence (be it in the form of a world state or in the form of
many states), good life principally exists as a multitude of good lives. In
226
227
228
Just because the participants in the legal system are also conscientious individuals, they do not coincide with their role as legal persons. As conscientious individuals, they are also outsiders, critically relating themselves
to the operating conception of the good life. It is because of this outside
position that the free legal community is an open and dynamic society
which must again and again integrate newly developed views: not only
new technological inventions, but also new cultural costumes, originating
from one of its cultural subgroups.
Modern society has to integrate colliding opinions about, for example, sexuality, abortion, euthanasia, the relation between state and religion, the meaning of the public domain, the relation between men and
women. Because of its openness to cultural diversity, the modern nation
state has made the international dimension part of its internal functioning. The self-reflexivity of the modern state not only concerns the awareness of being a specific historical state among other states, but also (and
especially), the insight of being involved in an ongoing process of change,
provoking the ongoing necessity for critical discussions about how to
handle these changes. For that reason, national law is not locked in itself,
but is rather open for international dimensions.228
This openness is given shape in international law.229 On the one
hand, nation states may enter into treaties, which give international
courts the competence to review national legislation and jurisprudence
(for example the European Court); on the other hand, they can, with
the help of the UN, intervene in foreign legal communities. The problem
is, however, that the legitimacy of international law remains dependent
on national law.230 Nations can withdraw from international treaties, if
they do not want to accept decisions of international courts concerning
their legislation and jurisprudence.231 And the legitimacy of interventions
228 On the one hand, this international dimension is recognized by Francis Fukuyama (Francis Fukuyama, State Building. Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century, Profile Books, 2005, p.154). But he confronts this position with
the idea that the will of the people is the highest authority (ibidem, p.155).
229 This opinion, however, is disqualified by Francis Fukuyama as a European illusion: The problem with the European position is that while such a higher realm
of liberal democratic values might theoretically exist, it is very imperfectly embodied in any given international institution. (Fukuyama, 2005, p.156).
230 The international community is a fiction insofar as any enforcement capability depends entirely on the action of individual nation-states. (Fukuyama, 2005,
p.157).
231 Fukuyama gives a couple of examples concerning the United States: Much of
this centered on European charges of American unilateralism on issues like the
229
in a state which has terminated its UN membership seems to be very dubious. Once again, international law seems to have no legitimacy without
the existence of a world state. Nevertheless, I think this conclusion is premature. We have not only seen that the world state is not a necessary precondition for international law, but also that it is not even its most adequate institutional form.
Essentially the existence of international law is not dependent on the
existence of a world state. As soon as reason is the legitimisation of the
legal order, domestic law can potentially be developed into international
law: the universality of reason can be translated into the universality of
law, i. e., into law without boundaries. If national law is understood as
the expression of universal values (human rights and democracy)232, it
is a small step to recognize other legal systems, which understand themselves as the expression of these universal values, as well.233 International
law is created from the moment that the shared universal norms are formulated in a treaty text (like the UN declaration for human rights), and
subscribed to by a number of countries. In that case, international law is
not dependent on the existence of a central world power, but rather on
the explicit self-submission of nation states to the shared universal values.
Under these circumstances international law is not an external power, imposed upon the nation states, but rather an objectification of what was
treatment of al-Qaida prisoners in Guantnamo Bay, the American abrogation of
the antiballistic missile treaty, Washingtons failure to join the International
Criminal Court, and, earlier, the Bush administrations announcement that it
was withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol on global warming. The most serious
rift, however, emerged over Washingtons intention to attack Iraq in order to effect regime change and eliminate its WMD. (Fukuyama, 2005, p.142).
232 Habermass discourse theory of law is an example of this position. Erst nach dieser Weichenstellung kann ich das System der Rechte mit Hilfe des Diskursprinzips so begrnden, da klar wird, warum sich private und ffentliche Autonomie,
Menschenrechte und Volkssouvernitt wechselseitig voraussetzen . (Habermas,
1992, p. 111/2). (Only after this preliminary spadework can I ground the system of rights with the help of the discourse principle, so that it becomes clear
why private and public autonomy, human rights and popular sovereignty, mutually presuppose one another., Habermas (1996), p. 84).
233 Of course, this view opposes John Rawlss Fact of Reasonable Pluralism (John
Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press 2000, p.124). However, if
Rawls remarks that They cannot argue that being in a relation of equality
with other peoples is a western ideal. (p.122), it appears to be possible to
speak about equality independent of the cultural context. In my Das Gesetz
der multikulturellen Gesellschaft (Paul Cobben, 2002, Wrzburg), I develop freedom and equality as absolute values, which precede all cultural differences.
230
already implied in domestic law all the time. The question can be raised
whether this way of institutionalizing international law is the best alternative. Can it be argued that the world state is a better solution?
International law, that is not enforced by the power of a world state,
seems to be powerless. If it is not powerless, it seems to be dependent on a
coincidental coalition of states. In that case, particular states would, under
the guise of international law, only strive after their own interests. I think,
however, that the powerlessness of international law does not necessarily
need to be a disadvantage. The powerlessness of international law has a
reverse side. Because international treaties seems to be without enforceable obligations, they are less affected by the constraints of domestic law,
i. e., they offer more room to the universal, moral point of view.234
Norms for protection of the environment or minorities can correspond
to higher, i. e., more universal standards than would be possible in the
domain of domestic law. In international treaties, nation states can
show their moral superiority without having to be afraid of its practical
consequences. In the end, there is no power to enforce international treaties, even if there are international courts. But, and this is the point I want
to make here, in a mediated way international treaties do have a practical
meaning. They can be an important factor in domestic public discussions,
and ultimately result in an adjustment of domestic law. In this mediated
way, international law can be enforced by particular nation states. The
high moral standard of international law can influence the development
of domestic law. The other way around, the development of domestic law
can influence the development of international law. Because nation states
are becoming more and more globalized and multicultural, international
relations are becoming, as it were, more and more internalized in domestic law. Domestic law has to deal with many cultural groups that have
their own values and norms, and with economic processes which are essentially part of a globalized market. Therefore, the gap between domestic
and international law becomes narrower, so that, as in the EU, domestic
law can become part of a continental law system.
234 For Francis Fukuyama, the lack of enforceable obligations is only a disadvantage:
A great deal of both international and national law coming out of Europe consists of what amounts to social policy wish lists that are completely unenforceable. Europeans justify these kinds of laws by saying they are expressions of social
objectives; Americans reply, correctly in my view, that such unenforceable aspirations undermine the rule of law itself. (Fukuyama, 2005, p.157).
231
Domestic and international law are not only interdependent, but can
also strengthen one another. Domestic law can be influenced by the less
restricted moral orientation of international law; international law can
profit from the internalized international law structures of domestic
law. Because of these dialectics between domestic and international law,
the existence of a multitude of nation states in no way contradicts the existence of international law. Therefore, the world state can be redefined as
the process in which international law is developed in its dialectic relation
to a multitude of domestic law systems.235
235 Instead of this dialectics between domestic and international law, Thomas Pogge
proposes an intermediary position: What I am proposing instead is not the idea
of a centralized world state, which is really a variant of the pre-eminent-state idea.
Rather, the proposal is that governmental authority or sovereignty be widely
dispersed in the vertical dimension. [] Thus, persons should be citizens of, and
govern themselves through, a number of political units of various sizes, without
any one political unit being dominant and thus occupying the traditional role of
the state. (Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Cambridge, 2004,
p.178) However, these political units must derive their legitimacy from a central
body. I think that this central body can only be identified as the state.
Concluding remarks
We have examined the nature of the self. In Chapter 1, we stated that the
human self cannot be determined by science. Because the human self is
the actor of science, he transcends all scientific objectification. The
human self has a nature that has insight into his nature, i. e., the
human self is self-reflective. Therefore, it is not sufficient to determine
the human self as a natural self (a body) that has also the capacity
for science (i. e., has also a mind), but our definition of the mind/
body-unity must coincide with the self-insight of the human self into
his existence as unity of mind and body.
The first step to develop the adequate conception of the unity of
mind and body has been made by Aristotle. Only when the body is understood as a social organism can it be prevented that the mind is reduced
to an epiphenomenon of the body; only in the relation between mind
and social organism can both terms of the relation maintain their relative
independency.
The second step to develop the adequate conception of the unity between mind and body has been made by Hegel. Only when the relation
between mind and social organism is understood as a relation of recognition is the general freedom of the mind (expressing itself in the law of the
social organism), compatible with the particular freedom of the mind (expressing itself in the subjective freedom of the individual).
In the relation of recognition, two forms of recognition are combined: on the one hand, the horizontal recognition that makes that the
individuals recognize one another as the free and equal persons of a
shared law; on the other hand, the vertical recognition that makes that
the individuals recognize that their subjective existence has its ground
in an absolute being. Recognition unites the dimensions of right and
morality.
The third step to develop the adequate conception between mind and
body implies the elaboration of the relation of recognition. The horizontal and vertical recognition of right and morality have to be developed
into an institutional entirety in which the free and equal legal persons
are reconciled with the absolute value of the moral subjects. Therefore,
Concluding remarks
233
this institutional entirety guarantees the adequate actualization of democracy and human rights.
In the first part of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel develops under
what conditions the social organism has to correspond in order to generate citizens who can understand this social organism as the unity of right
and morality. This development, however, cannot result in the determination of a concrete social law. A real social organism remains a contingent reality.
In the second part of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel presents a
contingent social organism, i. e., the Ancient Greek world, as the social
organism that fulfills the structural conditions of the relation of recognition. As the unity of the Divine Law and the Human Law, the Greek
world embodies the (immediate) unity of morality and right.
Since the absolute value of the moral subject contradicts the exchangeability of the legal person, the immediate unity of right and morality in
the Greek world can only exist as long as the Human and Divine Law remain separated, i. e., are assigned to different worlds. The separation between these worlds, however, cannot be maintained, and the Roman Law
appears as the truth of the Greek world.
The Roman Law represents the world of the first self in which the relation of recognition is one-sidedly actualized. The first self is the legal
person whose actualization as a moral subject remains accidental. Since
the moral subject has an absolute value, this accidentality of is realization
has to be overcome. Historically, the moral subject is done justice during
the French Revolution, when the second self realizes himself in the form of
the absolute freedom. The second self is the moral subject that makes his
moral content the content of the social law. The second self, however, excludes the others. Therefore, the second self is as much one-sided as the
first self. His attempt to realize himself as a moral subject is incompatible
with the existence of a multitude of legal persons.
The insight into the adequate actualization of recognition results
from the philosophical reflection on the French Revolution by Rousseau,
Kant and Hegel. The adequate actualization of recognition presupposes
the existence of the third self, the conscientious individual. The third
self knows that he cannot immediately realize his moral subjectivity in
the legal order, because this moral subjectivity transcends all historical objectification. Nevertheless, he can understand the (legitimate) legal order
as a finite (historical) attempt to actualize his moral subjectivity. The
third self can understand the history of states as the ongoing process
that is oriented to a better realization of the moral subject.
234
Concluding remarks
Hegels Philosophy of Right elaborates how the three forms of the self
can be brought together in the institutional framework of the legitimate
social order. This framework enables the individual to repeat the historical learning process in which the three selves are developed. Therefore,
the institutions that are developed in the Philosophy of Right, in principle,
express the adequate realization of recognition, i. e., the adequate unity of
Right and Morality. In the ethical institutions of family, civil society and
state, the three forms of the human self are, in principle, actualized. Hegels actual elaboration of the systematic unity of the three selves, however, has to be criticized. His systematic development remains too much influenced by European history. The first and second self are not adequately developed as moments of the third self. As a consequence, the institutions of the Philosophy of Right fail to do sufficient justice to the conscientious individual. Hegel, however, offers the conceptual tools for an adequate elaboration of the unity of the three selves. This results in a revised
version of the Philosophy of Right, in which, for example, mono-culturality, the primacy of economics and the lack of a democratic public domain
are overcome.
The adequate actualization of recognition coincides with the adequate realization of the unity between Right and Morality. This unity appears in an institutional order in which the three forms of the self get
shape. My thesis is that only an ethical order that does justice to the adequate institutionalization of the three forms of the self can be considered
as a legitimate order, i. e., as a legitimate actualization of human rights
and democracy.
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Author index
Antigone 73, 78
Aristophanes 75
Aristotelian 2f.
Aristotle 2, 4, 36, 40f., 232
Bacchus 67, 70
Berkeley, Georg 16
Bubner, Rdiger 76
Ceres 67, 70
Cobben, Paul 167, 229
Copernican 21, 53
Creon 72
Locke, John 20
Luhmann, Niklas 236
Lusordo, Dominico 236
Derrida, Jacques 55
Descartes, Ren 12, 22f., 93, 119
Napoleon 101
Neuhouser, Frederick
217
Jaeschke, Walter 76
Josifovic, Sasa 24, 26, 41
Kain, Philip
14
239
Author index
Taylor, Charles 1
Theunissen, Michael
Ulrich, P.
10f.
192
73f., 77
Subject index
Abortion 228
Absoluteness 52, 54, 61f., 67f., 85,
87, 89f., 102, 111, 202204, 219
Action 2f., 5, 3036, 41, 43, 4548,
5153, 5557, 61f., 65, 67,
6974, 78f., 82, 84, 89, 94,
102f., 106113, 121f., 125, 127,
129, 141, 150, 152f., 157f.,
160162, 166, 169f., 179f., 182,
185f., 203f., 213f., 216, 220,
222226, 228
Communicative Action 10,
166169, 172174
Actualization 6, 50, 82, 107,
122125, 127, 131f., 135, 137,
139142, 144, 146148, 150,
152, 157f., 161, 165, 169, 172,
176178, 180, 186, 188190,
198f., 205, 211214, 217f.,
221223, 225f., 233f.
Administration of Justice 189-191,
193, 201, 217, 218
Adulthood 151
Affection 120, 171
Affirmation 173, 175
Animal 2, 29f., 32, 36, 39f., 43f.,
57, 67, 127, 130, 150f., 164, 181
Animal Kingdom 57, 60, 78, 139
Antiquity 8, 128, 132, 139
Antithesis 51, 61, 65, 74, 79, 107
Appearance 21, 30, 41, 48f., 68, 73,
76, 78, 85, 95, 105, 132, 135,
149, 158, 163, 171f., 179, 190,
193, 195, 200, 211, 219
Argumentation 94, 167, 173, 185,
191
Artist 6466, 68, 77, 160
Association 109, 207, 209
Ideological Association 206209,
220, 222, 224, 226
Subject index
241
242
Subject index
Subject index
Frenzy of Self-conceit
101, 189
Funeral 161
243
244
Humanitarian Intervention
Intimacy 203
Subject index
226
Subject index
245
Naturalness 186
Nature 13, 5f., 10, 14, 1624,
28f., 3133, 3640, 42, 4548,
5153, 64, 70f., 75, 82, 85, 88,
92, 103105, 107109, 113, 118,
120, 127, 129, 164, 169171,
179182, 185f., 189, 195, 197,
215, 219, 232
Necessity 12, 16, 55, 69, 7175, 94,
97, 134, 141, 161, 187f., 198,
228
Need 10, 18, 25f., 34, 37, 39, 42,
52, 6163, 68, 72, 89, 9294,
103, 116, 118, 132, 144f., 154,
156f., 170, 179182, 185f.,
189198, 205, 209, 224, 230
Neediness 25, 156f., 169f.
246
Subject index
Punishment 32, 67
Purpose and Responsibility
146, 222
141,
Subject index
Reification 185
Relation 2f., 7f., 1019, 2131,
3643, 5155, 57f., 60f., 6873,
7680, 83f., 86, 88f., 9195, 97,
100103, 105, 108111,
113116, 119130, 132134,
136f., 139141, 143146, 148,
150153, 155158, 160f., 163f.,
167, 169f., 173178, 180182,
185187, 193196, 198, 207,
211f., 215217, 219, 221,
225233
Dialogical Relation 123, 125
Market Relation 183, 188
Religion 44, 48, 63, 65, 75f., 80,
87, 89, 94, 113115, 126,
129131, 135, 137, 143, 154,
159f., 165, 216f., 228
Religion of Art 90, 98, 130, 135,
216
Religion of Nature 129f.
Religion of the Artificer 45, 130
Revealed Religion 89f., 94, 98,
113f., 130, 135, 216
Remembrance 50, 71, 97
Repetition 7, 51, 56, 88, 94, 98,
108, 178, 192, 194, 196
Representation 3, 42f., 4952, 63,
65f., 7078, 8285, 87, 89f., 97,
101, 113115, 127130, 145,
157, 159f., 162, 177, 202, 212,
220
Research 106, 111, 132, 155,
173175
Revolution 20, 101
French Revolution 57, 49, 86,
96, 98102, 104, 124, 129, 177,
189, 206, 233
Reward 67, 70, 93
Right 1, 311, 29, 36, 41, 43f., 47,
52, 55f., 60, 62, 79f., 83f., 94,
98, 100, 115f., 124, 133155,
159, 163165, 172, 176178,
181, 185, 187f., 190, 193f.,
197f., 200f., 203, 205, 207209,
211219, 221224, 226f., 229,
232234
247
248
Subject index
Subject index
249
250
Subject index