Labor Cases Finals

FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171448

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
*
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
CHARLIE COMILA and Promulgated:
AIDA COMILA,
Accused-Appellants. February 28, 2007
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On April 5, 1999, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, an Information [1] for
Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate, as defined and penalized under
Article 13(6) in relation to Articles 38(b), 34 and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise
known as the New Labor Code, as amended, was filed against Charlie Comila, Aida Comila and
one Indira Ram Singh Lastra, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of September, 1998, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offer, recruit, and promise
employment as contract workers in Italy, to the herein complainants, namely:
MARLYN ARO y PADCAYAN, ANNIE FELIX y BAKISAN, ELEONOR DONGGA-AS y
ANGHEL, ESPERANZA BACKIAN y LAD-EY, ZALDY DUMPILES y MALIKDAN, JOEL
EDIONG y CALDERON, RICKY WALDO y NICKEY, JEROME MONTAEZ y OSBEN,
DOVAL DUMPILES y SAP-AY, JONATHAN NGAOSI y DUMPILES, EDMUND DIEGO y
SUBIANGAN and MARLON PETTOCO y SUGOT, without said accused having first
secured the necessary license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Information was docketed in the RTC as Crim. Case No. 16427-R and raffled to
Branch 60 thereof.
On the same date April 5, 1999 and in the same court, twelve (12) separate
Informations[2] for Estafa were filed against the same accused at the instance of the same
complainants. Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 16428-R to 16439-R and likewise raffled to the
same branch of the court, the twelve (12) Informations for Estafa, varying only as regards the
names of the offended parties and the respective amounts involved, uniformly recite:
That on or about the 10th day of November, 1998, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one ZALDY DUMPILES Y
MALIKDAN by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to wit: the accused
knowing fully well that he/she/they is/are not AUTHORIZED job RECRUITERS for
persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Zaldy Dumpiles y
Malikdan and pretended that he/she/they could secure a job for him/her
abroad, for and in consideration of the sum ofP25,000.00 and representing the
placement and medical fees when in truth and in fact could not; the said Zaldy
Dumpiles y Malikdan deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed
by the accused parted away the total sum of P25,000,00 in favor of the accused,
to the damage and prejudice of the said Zaldy Dumpiles y Malikdan in the
aforementioned amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00),
Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Of the three accused named in all the aforementioned two sets of Informations, only
accused Aida Comila and Charlie Comila were brought under the jurisdiction of the trial court,
the third, Indira Ram Singh Lastra, being then and still is at large.
Arraigned with assistance of counsel, accused Aida Comila and Charlie Comila entered a
plea of NOT GUILTY not only to the Information for Illegal Recruitment (Crim. Case No. 16427R) but also to the twelve (12) Informations for Estafa (Crim. Case Nos. 16428-R to 16439-R).
Thereafter, a joint trial of the cases ensued.
Of the twelve (12) complainants in both the illegal recruitment and estafa charges, the
prosecution was able to present only seven (7) of them, namely: Annie Felix y Bakisan; Ricky
Waldo y Nickey; Jonathan Ngaosi y Dumpiles; Marilyn Aro y Padcayan; Edmund Diego y
Subiangan; Jerome Montaez y Osben; and Eleonor Dongga-as y Anghel. A certain Jose Matias of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was supposed to testify for the
prosecution but his testimony was dispensed after the defense agreed that he will merely
testify to the effect that as per POEA records, accused Aida Comila and Charlie Comila were not
duly licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.
In a consolidated decision[3] dated October 3, 2000, the trial court found both accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale by a
syndicate, as charged in Crim. Case No. 16427-R, and of estafa, as charged in Crim. Case Nos.
16430-R; 16431-R, 16432-R, 16434-R, 16436-R, 16438-R, and 16439-R. The other informations
for estafa in Crim. Case Nos. 16428-R, 16429-R, 16433-R, 16435-R and 16437-R were, however,
dismissed for lack of evidence. We quote the fallo of the trial courts decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby finds the accused, Aida
Comila and Charlie Comila:
1.
In Criminal Case No. 16427-R, GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale Committed by a Syndicate. They are hereby
sentenced to each suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of P100,000.00;
2.

reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa. There being no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are

hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum. They shall also jointly and severally
pay the complainant, Marilyn Aro, the sum of P25,500.00
plus interest from the date this Information was filed until
it is fully paid;
3.

provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
pay the complainant, Annie Felix, the sum of P50,000.00
it is fully paid;
4.

mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and applying
the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they
are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
pay the complainant, Eleanor Dongga-as, the sum of
P50,000.00 plus interest from the date this Information
was filed until it is fully paid;
5.

provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are
pay the complainant, Edmund Diego, the sum of
6.

penalty of four (4) years and two (2)months of prision
pay the complainant, Jonathan Ngaosi, the sum of
7.

mayor as maximum. They shall also jointly and severally
pay the complainant, Ricky Waldo, the sum of P25,000.00
it is fully paid;
8.

correccional, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision
pay the complainant, Jerome Montaez, the sum of
was filed; and
9.
Criminal Cases Nos. 16428-R; 16429-R; 16433-R;

16435-R and 16437-R are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
evidence.
In the service of the various prison terms herein imposed upon the accused Aida
Comila and Charlie Comila, the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code
shall be observed.
As to the accused, Indira Sighn Lastra, let all these cases be archived in
the meantime until the said accused is arrested.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to a Notice of Appeal[4] filed by the two accused, the trial court forwarded the
records of the cases to this Court in view of the penalty of life imprisonment meted in Crim.
Case No. 16427-R (Illegal Recruitment in large scale). In its Resolution[5] of October 3, 2001, the
Court resolved to accept the appeal and the subsequent respective briefs for the
appellants[6] and the appellee[7] as well as the appellants reply brief.[8]
Thereafter, and consistent with its pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[9] the
Court, via its Resolution[10] of September 22, 2004, transferred the cases to the Court of
Appeals (CA) for appropriate action and disposition. In the CA, the cases were assigned one
docket number and thereat docketed as CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 01615.
In a decision[11] promulgated on December 29, 2005, the appellate court affirmed that of
the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated October 3, 2000 of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 60, in Criminal Cases Nos. 16427-R
to 16439-R finding accused-appellants guilty of (1) illegal recruitment committed
in large scale; and (2) seven (7) counts of estafa is hereby AFFIRMED and
UPHELD.
With costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
The cases are again with this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal [12] interposed by the
herein accused-appellants from the aforementioned affirmatory CA decision.
Acting thereon, the Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desire.
In their respective manifestations,[13] the parties opted not to file any supplemental
brief and instead merely reiterated what they have said in their earlier appellants and
appellee's briefs.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in the brief[14] it filed for appellee People,
summarizes the facts of the case in the following manner:
Annie Felix was introduced by her sister-in-law, Ella Bakisan, to appellant
Aida Comila in August 1998 (pp. 3, 24, tsn, September 14, 1999). Ella Bakisan told
her that appellant Aida Comila could help her find work abroad as she was
recruiting workers for a factory in Palermo, Italy (ibid.). Annie Felix then went to
meet appellant Aida Comila at the Jollibee outlet along Magsaysay Avenue,
Baguio City in August, 1998 to inquire about the supposed work in Italy (pp. 3-4,
tsn, ibid.). There were other applicants, aside from Annie at the Jollibee outlet at
the time, similarly inquiring about the prospective jobs abroad (ibid.).
Annie met appellant again at the St. Theresas College on or about
September 6 or 7, 1998 (p.11, ibid.). there were around fifty (50) to sixty (60)
applicants at that time (ibid.). Appellant introduced them to a certain Erlinda
Ramos, one of the agents of Mrs. Indira Lastra, a representative of the Far East
Trading Corporation (p.4,11, ibid.). Accordingly, Erlinda Ramos would be
responsible for the processing of the applicants visas (ibid.). Erlinda Ramos even
showed them the copy of the job order from Italy (ibid.). Like Ramos, appellant
likewise introduced herself to Annie and the other applicants as an agent of
Lastra (pp. 3-4, ibid.).
Annie submitted all her requirements to appellant, along with the
amount of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) as processing fee (p.6, tsn, ibid.). She
also paid a total of twenty three thousand (P23,000.00) as partial payment of her
placement fee of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) on or about September 6 or
7, 1998. Appellant issued a common receipt detailing the amounts she received
not only from Annie Felix (23,000.00) but also for her fellow applicants, Zaldy
Dumpiles (P23,000.00), Joel Ediong (P25,000.00), and Ricky Baldo (P25, 000.00)
(p. 8, tsn, ibid.).
Annie went to Manila several times to complete her medical examination
as required (pp. 14-16, tsn, ibid.). Considering appellant Aida Comilas pregnancy
at that time, her husband Charlie Comila, also an agent of Lastra, accompanied
Annie and the other applicants during their medical check-up (pp. 22-24, ibid.).
On the last week of October, 1998, Annie again paid appellant the total
amount of twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) to complete her placement
fee of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00). Annie was told that her flight
to Italy was scheduled on September 14, 1998 (p. 20, ibid.). Later on, Erlinda
Ramos told Annie that her flight to Italy was re-scheduled to October, 1998 due
to a typhoon (p.20, ibid.).
There were others like Annie Felix who were similarly enticed to apply for
the promised job in Italy (pp. 4-5, tsn, September 22, 1999). Among them were
Ricky Waldo, Edmund Diego, Eleanor Donga-as, Jonathan Ngaosi, Marilyn Aro
and Jerome Montaez (pp. 4-5; 19-28, tsn, September 22, 1999, afternoon
session).
In the briefing at St. Theresas College, Navy Road, Pacdal, Baguio City, (p.
7, tsn, September 22, 1999; pp. 29-30, tsn, September 14, 1999) appellant
briefed Ricky Waldo and the rest of the applicants on their application
requirements (pp. 7-8, tsn, Sept. 22, 1999). The briefing was conducted by
appellants Aida Comila, Charlie Comila, and Erlinda Ramos who alternately
talked about the documents to be submitted for the processing of their
applications and the processing fee of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) they
have to pay (p.8, tsn, September 22, 1999). In the same briefing, they were also
told that Erlinda Ramos was scheduled to go to Italy on September 14, 1998 and
that whoever would pay P25,000.00 first, or half of the P50,000.00 processing
fee would be able to go with her to Italy (p. 8. tsn, September 22, 1999). Per the
job order shown to Jonathan Ngaosi, for instance, male workers were to receive
a salary of two thousand three hundred dollars ($2,300.00) plus an additional
eight dollars ($8.00) for overtime work (p.8, tsn, September 21, 1999, afternoon
session).
After undergoing the required medical examination in Manila, applicants
Ricky Waldo and company paid the following amounts for their respective
processing fees, which were duly receipted by appellant Aida Comila in three
separate documents, thus:
8-23-98, received the amount of P14,000.00 from Ella Bakisan. Signed,
Aida Comila. The second document again is a piece of paper of which the
following is written: 9-7-98. Received the amount of the following: Philip Waldo,
P20,000.00; Doval Dumpiles, P23,000.00 Edmund Diego, P25,000.00; Jerome
Montaez, P25,000.00 Total- P93,000.00. Received by A. Comila. The
3rd document is page of a yellow pad and it reads 9-7-98, received the following
amounts from Zaldy Dumpiles - P23,000.00; Joel Ediong - P25,000.00; Ricky
Waldo- P25,000.00; Annie Felix - P23,000.00; Marlon Tedoco P23,000.00. Total
P119,000.00. Received by Aida Comila; witnesses Ella Bakisan. (p.14, tsn, of
witness Edmund Diego, September 22, 1999, morning session).
Considering the payments they made, Ricky Waldos flight to Italy was
scheduled on September 14, 1999 while those of Marilyn Aro, Edmund Diego,
Jerome Montanez, Jonathan Ngaosi, and Eleanor Donga-as were scheduled on
October 27, 1999 (pp. 8-9, tsn, September 22, 1999; pp. 32-33, tsn, September
14, 1999; pp. 2-4, tsn, September 15, 1999; p. 24, September 21, 1999; p.10, tsn,
September 22, 1999, morning session; p. 27, tsn, September 22, 1999, afternoon
session).
Like Annie Felix, Ricky Waldos flight did not push through as scheduled
on September 14, 1999 (pp. 32-34, tsn, September 14, 1999; pp. 2-4,
tsn, September 15, 1999). Appellant Aida Comila explained that the rescheduling was due to typhoon (ibid.). Rickys flight was then re-scheduled to
October 7, 1999 but was again moved to October 27, 1999 as, according to
appellant Aida Comila, there were some problems in his papers and that of the
other applicants (pp. 2-3, ibid.).
On October 25, 1998, appellant Aida Comila called the applicants for a
briefing at the St. Therese Building at the Navy Base, Baguio City (p.24,
tsn, September 21, 1999). In the same briefing, Erlinda Ramos, as representative
of the supposed principal, Indira Lastra, explained to the applicants that their
flight on October 27, 1999 was cancelled but will be re-scheduled (ibid.).
Appellant Aida Comila told them that they have to wait for the notice from the
Italian Embassy (ibid.).
On the first week of November, 1998, appellant Charlie Comila told
Marilyn Aro and several other applicants that their visas would be released (p.
25, September, 21, 1999). Appellant Charlie Comila accompanied them and the
others to the Elco Building at Shaw Boulevard, Pasig City purportedly to see
Erlinda Ramos (p.25, tsn, September 21, 1999). When Erlinda Ramos arrived, she
told Marilyn and the other applicants to wait for the release of their visas, the
following day (p.25, ibid.). Marilyn and the rest came back each day for one
whole week but the promised visas were not released to them (ibid.).
Marilyn and the other applicants complained to appellant Charlie Comila
about the delay and told him of their doubts about their application and the
promised job in Italy (ibid.). At this point, appellant Charlie Comila assured them
that they should not worry and that everything will be alright (ibid). Appellant
Charlie Comila then brought them to Indira Lastra (p.26, ibid.).
Marilyn Aro, Annie Felix, and the rest were all shocked to find out that
Indira Lastra was actually an inmate of Manila (Quiapo) city jail. (p.26, ibid.; p.
13, tsn, September 14, 1999). They felt at once that they were, indeed, victims of
illegal recruitment (ibid.).When they demanded the return of their money from
Indira Lastra, the latter told them to withdraw their money from appellant Aida
Comila (p.26. ibid.).
Upon their return to Baguio, Marilyns group proceeded to appellant Aida
Comilas residence at Km. 6, La Trinidad, Benguet to demand the return of their
money (p. 27, tsn, ibid.). Appellant Aida Comila, however, told them to wait as
Indira Lastra will soon be out of jail and will personally process their papers at
the Italian Embassy (ibid.). Marilyn and the other applicants followed-up several
times with appellant Aida Comila the return of the amounts of money they paid
for their supposed placement fee, but were simply told to wait (ibid.). the last
time complainants visited them, appellants Aida Comila and Charlie Comila were
already in a Bulacan jail (p. 27, ibid.).
In April, 1999, Marilyn Aro, Edmund Diego, Annie Felix, Eleanor Donga-as,
Jerome Montanez, Ricky Waldo and Jonathan Ngaosi filed their complaint
against appellants Aida Comila and Charlie Comila before the Criminal
Investigation Group (CIG).
In the same month of April 1999, separate Informations for estafa and
illegal recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate or violation of Article
13 (b) in relation to Article 38 (b) 34, and 39 of P.D. No. 442, otherwise known as
the Labor Code of the Philippines were filed against appellants Charlie Comila,
Aida Comila and Indira Lastra.
In their appellants brief, accused-appellants would fault the two courts below in (1)
finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa;
and (2) totally disregarding the defense of denial honestly advanced by them.
It is not disputed that accused-appellants Charlie Comila and Aida Comila are husbandand-wife. Neither is it disputed that husband and wife knew and are well-acquainted with their
co-accused, Indira Ram Singh Lastra, and one Erlinda Ramos. It is their posture, however, that
from the very beginning, appellant Aida Comila never professed that she had the authority to
recruit and made it clear to the applicants for overseas employment that it was Erlinda Ramos
who had such authority and who issued the job orders fromItaly. Upon this premise, this
appellant contends that the subsequent transactions she had with the applicants negate the
presence of deceit, an essential element of estafa under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. On the charge of illegal recruitment, this appellant argues that she was
merely trying to help the applicants to process their papers, believing that Indira Ram Sighn
Lastra and Erlinda Ramos would really send the applicants to Italy. With respect to co-appellant
Charlie Comila, the defense submits that the prosecution miserably failed to prove his
participation in the illegal recruitment and estafa.
The appeal must fail.
After a careful and circumspect review of the records, we are fully convinced that both
the trial and appellate courts committed no error in finding both appellants guilty beyond moral
certainty of doubt of the crimes charged against them. Through the respective testimonies of
its witnesses, the prosecution has satisfactorily established that both appellants were then
engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The combined testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses point to appellant Aida Comila as the one who promised them foreign
employment and assured them of placement overseas through the help of their co-accused
Indira Ram Singh Lastra. For sure, it was Aida herself who informed them of the existence of job
orders from Palermo, Italy, and of the documents needed for the processing of their
applications. Aida, in fact, accompanied the applicants to undergo medical examinations
in Manila. And relying completely on Aidas representations, the applicants-complainants
entrusted their money to her only to discover later that their hopes for an overseas
employment were but vain. In the words of the trial court:
Aida Comila cannot escape culpability by the mere assertion that the
recruitment activities were done by Ella Bakisan, Erlinda Ramos and Indira Lastra
as if she was just a mere observer of the activities going on right under her nose,
especially so that the seven complainants who testified all pointed to her as their
recruiter. She could not adequately explain why: (1) she had to show and explain
the job order and the work and travel requirements to the complainants; (2) she
had to meet the complainants at Jollibee, Magsaysay Ave., Baguio City and in her
residence; (3) she had to be present at the briefings for the applicants; (4) she
received the placement fees even if she claims that she received them from Ella
Bakisan; (5) she had to go down to Manila and accompanied the complainants
for their medical examination; and (6) she had to go out of her way to do all
these things even when she was pregnant and was about to give birth. Certainly,
she was not a social worker or a humanitarian who had all the time in this world
to go out of her way to render free services to other people whom she did not
know or just met. To be sure, Aida Comila had children to attend to and a
husband who was unemployed to be able to conduct such time-consuming
charitable activities.[15]
Running in parallel vein is what the CA wrote in its appealed decision:[16]

As regards appellant Aida Comilas contention that she did not represent
herself as a licensed recruiter, and that she merely helped complainants avail of
the job opportunity on the belief that Indira Lastra and Erlinda Ramos would
really send them to Italy, the same hardly deserves merit. The crime of illegal
recruitment is committed when, among other things, a person who, without
being duly authorized according to law represents or gives the distinct
impression that he or she has the power or the ability to provide work abroad
convincing those to whom the representation is made or to whom the
impression is given to thereupon part with their money in order to be assured of
that employment.
In fact, even if there is no consideration involved, appellant will still be
deemed as having engaged in recruitment activities, since it was sufficiently
demonstrated that she promised overseas employment to private complainants.
To be engaged in the practice and placement, it is plain that there must at
least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a
recruiter whether locally or abroad.
As regards appellant Charlie Comila, it is inconceivable for him to feign ignorance of the
illegal recruitment activities of his wife Aida, and of his lack of participation therein. Again, we
quote with approval what the trial court has said in its decision: [17]
Charlie Comila could not, likewise, feign ignorance of the illegal
transactions. It is contrary to human experience, hence, highly incredible for a
husband not to have known the activities of his wife who was living with him
under the same roof. In fact, he admitted that when Aida gave birth, he had to
accompany the complainants to Manila for their medical examination and again,
on another trip, to bring them to the office of Erlinda Ramos to follow-up their
visas. The fact that he knew the ins and outs of Manila was a desperate excuse
or reason why he accompanied the complainants to Manila considering that, as
he and his wife claimed, they have nothing to do with the recruitment activities.
Furthermore, if he and his wife had nothing to do with the recruitment of the
complainants, why did he have to sign the letter and accommodate the request
of Myra Daluca whom they have not really known. But damning was his
statement that he signed the letter because Aida was not there to sign it. Such a
statement would only show that they were indeed parties to these illegal
transactions. Charlie Comila would even claim that he was just an elementary
graduate and so he did not understand what he was asked to sign. But his
booking sheet showed that he was a high school graduate. He was a conductor
of a bus company who should know and understand how to read and write.
Furthermore, he was already a grown up man in his thirties who knew what was
right and wrong and what he should or should not do.
It is well
established in jurisprudence that
person
may
be
charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard
to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such an intent is
imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by
any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions,
or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of fraud.[18] Here, it has been sufficiently proven that both appellants represented themselves
to the complaining witnesses to have the capacity to send them to Italyfor employment, even
as they do not have the authority or license for the purpose. Doubtless, it is this
misrepresentation that induced the complainants to part with their hard-earned money for
placement and medical fees. Such act on the part of the appellants clearly constitutes estafa
under Article 315, paragraph (2), of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellants next bewail the alleged total disregard by the two courts below their defense
of denial which, had it been duly considered and appreciated, could have merited their
acquittal.
The Court disagrees. The two courts below did consider their defense of
denial. However, given the positive and categorical testimonies of the complainants who were
one in pointing to appellants, in cahoots with their co-accused Indira Ram Singh Lastra, as
having recruited and promised them with overseas employment, appellants defense of denial
must inevitably collapse.
All told, we rule and so hold that the two courts below committed no error in adjudging
both appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment committed
by a syndicate in large scale and of estafa in seven (7) counts. We also rule that the penalties
imposed by the court of origin, as affirmed by the CA, accord with law and jurisprudence.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision of the
CA, affirmatory of that the trial court, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER G.R. Nos. 182978-79

AND PROMOTION, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J.(Chairperson),
- versus - Carpio Morales,*
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ.
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA
CUARESMA (for and in behalf of
their daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma),
WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC.
and JAIME ORTIZ (President,
White Falcon Services, Inc.),
Respondents.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA G.R. Nos. 184298-99

CUARESMA (for and in behalf of
their daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma),
Petitioners,
- versus WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. Promulgated:
and BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER

AND PROMOTION, INC.,
Respondents. April 7, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These consolidated petitions assail the Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
dated May 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 finding White Falcon
Services, Inc. and Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. solidarily liable to indemnify
spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma the amount of US$4,686.73 in actual damages with
interest.
On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service

Exporter and Promotion, Inc.[2] (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), for a contract duration of three years, with a corresponding
salary of US$247.00 per month.
Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.
Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of Jasmin, narrated that on June 21, 1998, Jasmin was found
dead by a female cleaner lying on the floor inside her dormitory room with her mouth foaming
and smelling of poison.[3]
Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of the AlBirk Hospital, who conducted an autopsy of Jasmins body, the likely cause of her death was
poisoning. Thus:
According to letter No. 199, dated 27.2.1419H, issued by Al-Birk Police

Station, for examining the corpse of Jasmin Cuaresma, 12.20 P.M. 27.2.1419H,
Sunday, at Al-Birk Hospital.
1. The Police Report on the Death

2. The Medical Diagnosis
Sex: Female Age: 25 years Relg: Christian
The said person was brought to the Emergency Room of the hospital;
time 12.20 P.M. and she was unconscious, blue, no pulse, no respiration
and the first aid esd undertaken but without success.
3. Diagnosis and Opinion: Halt in blood circulation respiratory system and

brain damage due to an apparent poisoning which is under
investigation.[4]
Name: Jasmin Cuaresma

Sex: Female
Marital Status: Single Nationality: Philipino (sic)
Religion: Christian Profession: Nurse
Address: Al-Birk Genrl. Hospital Birth Place: The Philippines
On 27.2.1419H, Dr. Tariq Abdulminnem and Dr. Ashoki Komar, both have
examined the dead body of Jasmin Cuaresma, at 12.20 P.M., Sunday,
22.2.14189H, and the result was:
1. Report of the Police on the death

2. Medical Examination: Blue skin and paleness on the Extrimes (sic),
total halt to blood circulation and respiratory system and brain damage.
There were no external injuries. Likelypoisoning by taking poisonous
substance, yet not determined. There was a bad smell in the mouth and
unknown to us.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
Jasmins body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the
City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical report
indicated that Jasmin died under violent circumstances, and not poisoning as originally found
by the KSA examining physician. The City Health Officer found that Jasmin had abrasions at her
inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated
wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and
legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; rib fracture; puncture wounds; and
abrasions on the labia minora of the vaginal area.[6]
On March 11, 1999, Jasmins remains were exhumed and examined by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested negative for
non-volatile, metallic poison and insecticides.[7]
Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmins parents and her surviving heirs,
received from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the following amounts:
P50,000.00 for death benefits; P50,000.00 for loss of life; P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; and
P10,000.00 for medical reimbursement.
On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its
principal in the KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance benefits, as
well as moral and exemplary damages for Jasmins death. [8]
In their complaint, the Cuaresmas claim that Jasmins death was work-related, having
occurred at the employers premises;[9] that under Jasmins contract with Becmen, she is entitled
to iqama insurance coverage; that Jasmin is entitled to compensatory damages in the amount
of US$103,740.00, which is the sum total of her monthly salary of US$247.00 per month under
her employment contract, multiplied by 35 years (or the remaining years of her productive life
had death not supervened at age 25, assuming that she lived and would have retired at age 60).
The Cuaresmas assert that as a result of Jasmins death under mysterious circumstances,
they suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish. The situation, they claim, was aggravated by
findings in the autopsy and exhumation reports which evidently show that a grave injustice has
been committed against them and their daughter, for which those responsible should likewise
be made to pay moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide, citing a
prior unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the medical
report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. They likewise deny liability because
the Cuaresmas already recovered death and other benefits totaling P130,000.00 from the
OWWA. They insist that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to iqama insurance because this refers
to the issuance not insurance of iqama, or residency/work permit required in the KSA. On the
issue of moral and exemplary damages, they claim that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to the
same because they have not acted with fraud, nor have they been in bad faith in handling
Jasmins case.
While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and motion for substitution
alleging that Rajab terminated their agency relationship and had appointed White Falcon
Services, Inc. (White Falcon) as its new recruitment agent in the Philippines. Thus, White Falcon
was impleaded as respondent as well, and it adopted and reiterated Becmens arguments in the
position paper it subsequently filed.
On February 28, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[10] dismissing the complaint
for lack of merit. Giving weight to the medical report of the Al-Birk Hospital finding that Jasmin
died of poisoning, the Labor Arbiter concluded that Jasmin committed suicide. In any case,
Jasmins death was not service-connected, nor was it shown that it occurred while she was on
duty; besides, her parents have received all corresponding benefits they were entitled to under
the law. In regard to damages, the Labor Arbiter found no legal basis to warrant a grant
thereof.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (Commission) reversed the

decision of the Labor Arbiter. Relying on the findings of the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan
City and the NBI as contained in their autopsy and toxicology report, respectively, the
Commission, via its November 22, 2002 Resolution[11] declared that, based on substantial
evidence adduced, Jasmin was the victim of compensable work-connected criminal aggression.
It disregarded the Al-Birk Hospital attending physicians report as well as the KSA police report,
finding the same to be inconclusive. It declared that Jasmins death was the result of an accident
occurring within the employers premises that is attributable to her employment, or to the
conditions under which she lived, and thus arose out of and in the course of her employment as
nurse. Thus, the Cuaresmas are entitled to actual damages in the form of Jasmins lost earnings,
including future earnings, in the total amount of US$113,000.00. The Commission, however,
dismissed all other claims in the complaint.
Becmen, Rajab and White Falcon moved for reconsideration, whereupon the
Commission issued its October 9, 2003 Resolution[12] reducing the award of US$113,000.00 as
actual damages to US$80,000.00.[13] The NLRC likewise declared Becmen and White Falcon as
solidarily liable for payment of the award.
Becmen and White Falcon brought separate petitions for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals.[14] On June 28, 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision,[15] the dispositive
portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the subject petitions are DENIED but in the execution of the
decision, it should first be enforced against White Falcon Services and then
against Becmen Services when it is already impossible, impractical and futile to
go against it (White Falcon).
SO ORDERED.[16]
The appellate court affirmed the NLRCs findings that Jasmins death was compensable,
the same having occurred at the dormitory, which was contractually provided by the
employer. Thus her death should be considered to have occurred within the employers
premises, arising out of and in the course of her employment.
Becmen and White Falcon moved for reconsideration. On May 14, 2008, the appellate
court rendered the assailed Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. Accordingly,

the award of US$80,000.00 in actual damages is hereby reduced to US$4,686.73
plus interest at the legal rate computed from the time it became due until fully
paid. Petitioners are hereby adjudged jointly and solidarily liable with the
employer for the monetary awards with Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotions, Inc. having a right of reimbursement from White Falcon Services,
Inc.
SO ORDERED.[17]
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals found that although Jasmins death was
compensable, however, there is no evidentiary basis to support an award of actual damages in
the amount of US$80,000.00. Nor may lost earnings be collected, because the same may be
charged only against the perpetrator of the crime or quasi-delict. Instead, the appellate court
held that Jasmins beneficiaries should be entitled only to the sum equivalent of the remainder
of her 36-month employment contract, or her monthly salary of US$247.00 multiplied by
nineteen (19) months, with legal interest.
Becmen filed the instant petition for review on certiorari (G.R. Nos. 182978-79). The
Cuaresmas, on the other hand, moved for a reconsideration of the amended decision, but it
was denied. They are now before us via G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
On October 6, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 184298-99 with G.R.
Nos. 182978-79.
In G.R. Nos. 182978-79, Becmen raises the following issues for our resolution:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GAVE MORE

CREDENCE AND WEIGHT TO THE AUTOPSY REPORT CONDUCTED BY THE
CABANATUAN CITY HEALTH OFFICE THAN THE MEDICAL AND POLICE REPORTS
ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND ALBIRK HOSPITAL.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ON THE BASIS OF THE

POSITION PAPERS AND ANNEXES THERETO INCLUDING THE AUTOPSY REPORT, IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS CAUSED BY
CRIMINAL AGGRESSION.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE

DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS COMPENSABLE PURSUANT TO THE RULING
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN TALLER VS. YNCHAUSTI, G.R. NO. 35741, DECEMBER
20, 1932, WHICH IT FOUND TO BE STILL GOOD LAW.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN

LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA NOTWITHSTANDING ITS
ADMISSIONS THAT IQAMA INSURANCE WAS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR SINCE

IQAMA IS NOT AN INSURANCE.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT

THE DEATH OF JASMIN WAS WORK RELATED.

LIABLE TO JASMINS BENEFICIARIES FOR THE REMAINDER OF HER 36-MONTH
CONTRACT COMPUTED IN THIS MANNER: MONTHLY SALARY OF US$246.67
MULTIPLIED BY 19 MONTHS, THE REMAINDER OF THE TERM OF JASMINS
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, IS EQUAL TO US$4,686.73.

LIABLE TO PAY INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE FROM THE TIME IT WAS DUE UNTIL
FULLY PAID.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN AND

WHITE FALCON JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE EMPLOYER
NOTWITHSTANDING THE ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY EXECUTED BY WHITE
FALCON IN FAVOR OF BECMEN.
On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 184298-99, the Cuaresmas raise the following issues:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PROVISIONS

OF THE CIVIL CODE CONSIDERED GENERAL LAW DESPITE THE CASE BEING
COVERED BY E.O. 247, R.A. 8042 AND LABOR CODE CONSIDERED AS SPECIAL
LAWS.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE

DECEASEDS FUTURE EARNINGS WHICH IS (AN) INHERENT FACTOR IN THE
COMPUTATION OF DEATH BENEFITS OF OVERSEAS FILIPINO CONTRACT
WORKERS.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN REDUCING THE DEATH

BENEFITS AWARDED BY NLRC CONSIDERED FINDINGS OF FACT THAT CANNOT BE
DISTURBED THROUGH CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
The issue for resolution is whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by
way of benefits and damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin.
The terms and conditions of Jasmins 1996 Employment Agreement which she and her
employer Rajab freely entered into constitute the law between them. As a rule, stipulations in
an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the
force of law between the contracting parties. [18] An examination of said employment
agreement shows that it provides for no other monetary or other benefits/privileges than the
following:
1.
2.
3.
1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;
Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract and to the
Philippines at the end thereof, as well as for her vacation at the end of
each twenty four-month service;
Transportation to and from work;
4.
Free living accommodations;
5.
Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental operations,

plastic surgery charges and lenses, and medical treatment obtained
outside of KSA;
6.
Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and her employer,
but the exit/re-entry visa fees, fees for Iqama issuance, renewal,
replacement, passport renewal, sponsorship transfer and other liabilities
shall be borne by her;
7.
Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets to Manila after
twenty four-months of continuous service;
8.
9.
Eight days public holidays per year;
The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her service will be
calculated as per labor laws of KSA.
Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or for accident, death or
other benefits that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals and appellate
court granted variably in the guise of compensatory damages.
However, the absence of provisions for social security and other benefits does not make
Jasmins employment contract infirm. Under KSA law, her foreign employer is not obliged to
provide her these benefits; and neither is Jasmin entitled to minimum wage unless of course
the KSA labor laws have been amended to the opposite effect, or that a bilateral wage
agreement has been entered into.
Our next inquiry is, should Jasmins death be considered as work-connected and thus
compensable? The evidence indicates that it is not. At the time of her death, she was not on
duty, or else evidence to the contrary would have been adduced. Neither was she within
hospital premises at the time. Instead, she was at her dormitory room on personal time when
she died. Neither has it been shown, nor does the evidence suggest, that at the time she died,
Jasmin was performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental to her employment as nurse,
because she was at her dormitory room. It is reasonable to suppose that all her work is
performed at the Al-birk Hospital, and not at her dormitory room.
We cannot expect that the foreign employer should ensure her safety even while she is
not on duty. It is not fair to require employers to answer even for their employees personal
time away from work, which the latter are free to spend of their own choosing. Whether they
choose to spend their free time in the pursuit of safe or perilous undertakings, in the company
of friends or strangers, lovers or enemies, this is not one area which their employers should be
made accountable for. While we have emphasized the need to observe official work time
strictly,[19] what an employee does on free time is beyond the employers sphere of inquiry.
While the employers premises may be defined very broadly not only to include premises
owned by it, but also premises it leases, hires, supplies or uses, [20] we are not prepared to rule
that the dormitory wherein Jasmin stayed should constitute employers premises as would allow
a finding that death or injury therein is considered to have been incurred or sustained in the
course of or arose out of her employment. There are certainly exceptions,[21] but they do not
appear to apply here. Moreover, a complete determination would have to depend on the
unique circumstances obtaining and the overall factual environment of the case, which are here
lacking.
But, did Jasmin commit suicide? Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon vehemently insist that
she did; thus, her heirs may not claim benefits or damages based on criminal aggression. On the
other hand, the Cuaresmas do not believe so.
The Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway
into her employment contract. It is beyond human comprehension that a 25-year old Filipina, in
the prime of her life and working abroad with a chance at making a decent living with a highpaying job which she could not find in her own country, would simply commit suicide for no
compelling reason.
The Saudi police and autopsy reports which state that Jasmin is a likely/or
apparent victim of poisoning are patently inconclusive. They are thus unreliable as evidence.
On the contrary, the autopsy report of the Cabanatuan City Health Officer and the
exhumation report of the NBI categorically and unqualifiedly show that Jasmin sustained
external and internal injuries, specifically abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated
wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma
(contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular
hemorrhage at the anterior chest; a fractured rib; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the
labia minora of the vaginal area. The NBI toxicology report came up negative on the presence
of poison.
All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly raped prior to her death.
Even if we were to agree with the Saudi police and autopsy reports that indicate Jasmin
was poisoned to death, we do not believe that it was self-induced. If ever Jasmin was poisoned,
the assailants who beat her up and possibly raped her are certainly responsible therefor.
We are not exactly ignorant of what goes on with our OFWs. Nor is the rest of the world
blind to the realities of life being suffered by migrant workers in the hands of some foreign
employers. It is inconceivable that our Filipina women would seek employment abroad and face
uncertainty in a foreign land, only to commit suicide for unexplained reasons. Deciding to leave
their family, loved ones, and the comfort and safety of home, to work in a strange land requires
unrivaled strength and courage. Indeed, many of our women OFWs who are unfortunate to end
up with undesirable employers have been there more times than they care to, beaten up and
broken in body yet they have remained strong in mind, refusing to give up the will to
live. Raped, burned with cigarettes, kicked in the chest with sharp high-heeled shoes, starved
for days or even weeks, stabbed, slaved with incessant work, locked in their rooms, forced to
serve their masters naked, grossly debased, dehumanized and insulted, their spirits fought on
and they lived for the day that they would once again be reunited with their families and loved
ones. Their bodies surrendered, but their will to survive remained strong.
It is surprising, therefore, that Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon should insist on suicide,
without even lifting a finger to help solve the mystery of Jasmins death. Being in the business of
sending OFWs to work abroad, Becmen and White Falcon should know what happens to some
of our OFWs. It is impossible for them to be completely unaware that cruelties and
inhumanities are inflicted on OFWs who are unfortunate to be employed by vicious employers,
or upon those who work in communities or environments where they are liable to become
victims of crime. By now they should know that our women OFWs do not readily succumb to
the temptation of killing themselves even when assaulted, abused, starved, debased and,
worst, raped.
Indeed, what we have seen is Rajab and Becmens revolting scheme of conveniently
avoiding responsibility by clinging to the absurd theory that Jasmin took her own
life.Abandoning their legal, moral and social obligation (as employer and recruiter) to assist
Jasmins family in obtaining justice for her death, they immediately gave up on Jasmins case,
which has remained under investigation as the autopsy and police reports themselves
indicate. Instead of taking the cudgels for Jasmin, who had no relative or representative in the
KSA who would naturally demand and seek an investigation of her case, Rajab and Becmen
chose to take the most convenient route to avoiding and denying liability, by casting Jasmins
fate to oblivion. It appears from the record that to this date, no follow up of Jasmins case was
ever made at all by them, and they seem to have expediently treated Jasmins death as a closed
case. Despite being given the lead via the autopsy and toxicology reports of the Philippine
authorities, they failed and refused to act and pursue justice for Jasmins sake and to restore
honor to her name.
Indeed, their nonchalant and uncaring attitude may be seen from how Jasmins remains
were repatriated. No official representative from Rajab or Becmen was kind enough to make
personal representations with Jasmins parents, if only to extend their condolences or
sympathies; instead, a mere colleague, nurse Jessie Fajardo, was designated to accompany
Jasmins body home.
Of all lifes tragedies, the death of ones own child must be the most painful for a
parent. Not knowing why or how Jasmins life was snuffed out makes the pain doubly
unbearable for Jasmins parents, and further aggravated by Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcons
baseless insistence and accusation that it was a self-inflicted death, a mortal sin by any religious
standard.
Thus we categorically hold, based on the evidence; the actual experiences of our OFWs;
and the resilient and courageous spirit of the Filipina that transcends the vilest desecration of
her physical self, that Jasmin did not commit suicide but a victim of murderous aggression.
Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcons indifference to Jasmins case has caused
unfathomable pain and suffering upon her parents. They have turned away from their moral
obligation, as employer and recruiter and as entities laden with social and civic obligations in
society, to pursue justice for and in behalf of Jasmin, her parents and those she left
behind. Possessed with the resources to determine the truth and to pursue justice, they chose
to stand idly for the sake of convenience and in order that they may avoid pecuniary liability,
turning a blind eye to the Philippine authorities autopsy and toxicology reports instead of taking
action upon them as leads in pursuing justice for Jasmins death. They have placed their own
financial and corporate interests above their moral and social obligations, and chose to secure
and insulate themselves from the perceived responsibility of having to answer for and
indemnify Jasmins heirs for her death.
Under Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995,[22] the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in country
or overseas, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular.[23] The State shall provide
adequate and timely social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers. [24] The
rights and interest of distressed[25] overseas Filipinos, in general, and Filipino migrant workers,
in particular, documented or undocumented, are adequately protected and safeguarded. [26]
Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local recruitment agencies, miserably failed to
abide by the provisions of R.A. 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend assistance to
their deployed OFWs, especially those in distress. Instead, they abandoned Jasmins case and
allowed it to remain unsolved to further their interests and avoid anticipated liability which
parents or relatives of Jasmin would certainly exact from them. They willfully refused to protect
and tend to the welfare of the deceased Jasmin, treating her case as just one of those unsolved
crimes that is not worth wasting their time and resources on. The evidence does not even show
that Becmen and Rajab lifted a finger to provide legal representation and seek an investigation
of Jasmins case. Worst of all, they unnecessarily trampled upon the person and dignity of
Jasmin by standing pat on the argument that Jasmin committed suicide, which is a grave
accusation given its un-Christian nature.
We cannot reasonably expect that Jasmins parents should be the ones to actively
pursue a just resolution of her case in the KSA, unless they are provided with the finances to
undertake this herculean task. Sadly, Becmen and Rajab did not lend any assistance at all in this
respect. The most Jasmins parents can do is to coordinate with Philippine authorities as
mandated under R.A. 8042, obtain free legal assistance and secure the aid of the Department of
Foreign Affairs, the Department of Labor and Employment, the POEA and the OWWA in trying
to solve the case or obtain relief, in accordance with Section 23[27] of R.A. 8042. To our mind,
the Cuaresmas did all that was within their power, short of actually flying to the KSA. Indeed,
the Cuaresmas went even further. To the best of their abilities and capacities, they ventured to
investigate Jasmins case on their own: they caused another autopsy on Jasmins remains as soon
as it arrived to inquire into the true cause of her death. Beyond that, they subjected themselves
to the painful and distressful experience of exhuming Jasmins remains in order to obtain
another autopsy for the sole purpose of determining whether or not their daughter was
poisoned. Their quest for the truth and justice is equally to be expected of all loving parents. All
this time, Rajab and Becmen instead of extending their full cooperation to the Cuaresma family
merely sat on their laurels in seeming unconcern.
In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC,[28] a seaman who was being repatriated
after his employment contract expired, failed to make his Bangkok to Manila connecting flight
as he began to wander the streets of Bangkok aimlessly. He was shot to death by Thai police
four days after, on account of running amuck with a knife in hand and threatening to harm
anybody within sight. The employer, sued for death and other benefits as well as damages,
interposed as defense the provision in the seafarer agreement which provides that no
compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting
from a willful act on his own life by the seaman. The Court rejected the defense on the view,
among others, that the recruitment agency should have observed some precautionary
measures and should not have allowed the seaman, who was later on found to be mentally ill,
to travel home alone, and its failure to do so rendered it liable for the seamans death. We ruled
therein that
The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to
provide a companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was
expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. The
uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners who, knowing fully well that its
employee had been suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still
allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling to say the least. Such attitude
harks back to another time when the landed gentry practically owned the
serfs, and disposed of them when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise
lost their usefulness.[29] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, more than just recruiting and deploying OFWs to their foreign principals,
recruitment agencies have equally significant responsibilities. In a foreign land where OFWs
are likely to encounter uneven if not discriminatory treatment from the foreign government,
and certainly a delayed access to language interpretation, legal aid, and the Philippine
consulate, the recruitment agencies should be the first to come to the rescue of our distressed
OFWs since they know the employers and the addresses where they are deployed or
stationed. Upon them lies the primary obligation to protect the rights and ensure the welfare of
our OFWs, whether distressed or not. Who else is in a better position, if not these recruitment
agencies, to render immediate aid to their deployed OFWs abroad?
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. Article 21 of the Code states that any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. And, lastly, Article 24 requires that in all contractual,
property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his
moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the
courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcons acts and omissions are against public policy
because they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs abroad,
who are entitled to full protection under the law. They set an awful example of how foreign
employers and recruitment agencies should treat and act with respect to their distressed
employees and workers abroad. Their shabby and callous treatment of Jasmins case; their
uncaring attitude; their unjustified failure and refusal to assist in the determination of the true
circumstances surrounding her mysterious death, and instead finding satisfaction in the
unreasonable insistence that she committed suicide just so they can conveniently avoid
pecuniary liability; placing their own corporate interests above of the welfare of their
employees all these are contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, and constitute
taking advantage of the poor employee and her familys ignorance, helplessness, indigence and
lack of power and resources to seek the truth and obtain justice for the death of a loved one.
Giving in handily to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide, and adamantly insisting on
it just to protect Rajab and Becmens material interest despite evidence to the contrary is
against the moral law and runs contrary to the good custom of not denouncing ones fellowmen
for alleged grave wrongdoings that undermine their good name and honor. [30]
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle
of Philippine
labor and social
legislation,
contract
stipulations
to the
contrary
notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the State to
afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employers. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which
states that laws which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. [31]
The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public interest, [32] and
neither shall act oppressively against the other, or impair the interest or convenience of the
public.[33] In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor
of the safety and decent living for the laborer.[34]
The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the part of the
employer is sanctioned by Article 2219 (10)[35] of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of such
damages in actions referred to in Article 21.[36]
Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Cuaresmas are entitled to moral
damages, which Becmen and White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to pay, together with
exemplary damages for wanton and oppressive behavior, and by way of example for the public
good.
Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based
employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. This joint
and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is
meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due
him.[37] If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and
directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with
the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. [38]
White Falcons assumption of Becmens liability does not automatically result in Becmens
freedom or release from liability. This has been ruled in ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation
v. NLRC.[39] Instead, both Becmen and White Falcon should be held liable solidarily, without
prejudice to each having the right to be reimbursed under the provision of the Civil Code that
whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid.[40]
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2008 in CAG.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 is SET ASIDE. Rajab & Silsilah Company, White
Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc., and their corporate
directors and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable and ORDERED to indemnify the
heirs of Jasmin Cuaresma, spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma, the following amounts:
1) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as moral damages;
2) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as exemplary

damages;
3) Attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award; and,
4) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136821
October 17, 2002
ROVELS ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
EMMANUEL B. OCAMPO, JOSE M. SILVA, SR., THE HEIRS OF EXPEDITO LEVISTE, SR., *
CONRADO CALALANG, and FRANCISCO CARREON, SR., respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
June 5, 19982 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43260, affirming the Decision of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in SEC Case No. 09-95-5135 dismissing the petition to be declared the
majority stockholder of Tagaytay Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC). The petition
was filed by Rovels Enterprises, Inc. (Rovels), herein petitioner. Rovels is a domestic corporation
engaged in construction work. Its President is Eduardo Santos. TTTDC was among Rovels
clients.
In payment for the services rendered by Rovels, the Board of Directors of TTTDC passed a
Resolution on December 29, 1975 providing as follows:
"RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved that payment for professional fees and services rendered
by x x x Rovels Enterprises x x x be made in cash if funds are available, or its equivalent number
of shares of stock of the corporation at par value, and should said creditors elect the latter
mode of payment, it is further resolved that the President and/or his Secretary be authorized as
they are hereby authorized, to issue the corresponding unissued shares of stock of the
corporation."3 (emphasis added)
The Resolution was signed by three of TTTDCs directors, namely, Victoriano Leviste, Bienvenido
Cruz, Jr., and Roberto Roxas. Roberto Roxas is the President of TTTDC and stockholder of Rovels
at the same time. Noticeably, the signatures of the other two (2) TTTDC directors Jose Silva,
Jr. and Emmanuel Ocampo do not appear in the subject Resolution despite their presence in
the December 29, 1975 Board meeting.4
On February 23, 1976, Eduardo Santos, President of Rovels, on behalf of TTTDC, filed with the
SEC an application for exemption from registration of TTTDCs unissued shares of stock
transferred to it (Rovels) as payment for its services worth One Hundred Eight Thousand Pesos
(P108,000.00). This was done because under Section 4 (a) of the Revised Securities Act, no
shares of stocks shall be transferred unless first registered with the SEC or permitted to be
sold.5
On May 7, 1976, the SEC, in its Resolution No. 260,6 granted Eduardo Santos application.
On March 1, 1976, the TTTDC Board of Directors passed another Resolution7 repealing its
Resolution of December 29, 1975, thus:
"RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the Resolution of December 29, 1975 authorizing the
payment of creditors with unissued shares of the corporation be as it is hereby repealed:
Resolved further that the matter as well as the amount of the creditors claims be given
adequate study and consideration by the Board." (emphasis added)
In view of the December 29, 1975 TTTDC Board Resolution transferring to Rovels the said
shares of stock as construction fee, TTTDC Directors Jose Silva, Jr. and Emmanuel Ocampo filed
a complaint with the SEC against Roberto Roxas, TTTDC President, and Eduardo Santos, Rovels
President, docketed as SEC Case No. 1322. In their complaint, Silva and Ocampo alleged that
there was no meeting of the TTTDCs Board of Directors on December 29, 1975; that they did
not authorize the transfer of TTTDCs shares of stock to Rovels; that they never signed the
alleged minutes of the meeting; and that the signatures of the other two (2) Directors,
Victoriano Leviste and Bienvenido Cruz, Jr., as well as that of TTTDCs Secretary Francisco
Carreon, Jr., were obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. They also alleged that the
TTTDC Board Resolution dated December 29, 1975 was repealed by the March 1, 1976
Resolution. They thus prayed that the transfer of TTTDCs shares of stock to Rovels pursuant to
Resolution dated December 29, 1975 be annulled.
On March 17, 1979, SEC Hearing Officer Eugenio E. Reyes issued a Decision8 in favor of Silva and
Ocampo, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Considering that the (December 29, 1975) board resolution which authorizes the corporation
to pay its creditors with its unissued shares of stock x x x had been expressly revoked or
repealed on March 1, 1976 as earlier pointed out, Commission Resolution No. 260 (granting
Santos application for exemption from registration of the unissued shares), when issued on
May 7, 1976 x x x had lost its legal basis. Consequently, the corresponding issuance of shares
was without authority of the board of directors."
xxx
xxx
xxx
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission finds and so holds that the purported
board resolution of December 29, 1975, not having been properly passed upon at a duly
constituted board meeting, cannot be recognized as valid and hence, without legal force and
effect. Consequently, the issuance of shares of stock to corporate creditors of the Tagaytay Taal
Tourist Development Corporation is null and void. In view thereof, the shares in question are
still considered unissued and remain part of the authorized capital stocks of the Tagaytay Taal
Tourist Development Corporation. This is without prejudice to the rights of said corporate
creditors as against Tagaytay Taal Tourist Development Corporation for the latters contractual
obligations." (emphasis added)
On appeal by Roberto Roxas and Eduardo Santos, the SEC en banc, in its Decision dated
September 2, 1982 in SEC-AC No. 049,9 affirmed the Decision of the SEC Hearing Officer. This
Court, in its Decision of June 20, 1983 in G.R. No. 61863,10 likewise affirmed the Decision of the
SEC en banc. The Decision of this Court became final and executory on September 2, 1983. 11
Subsequently, TTTDC, Jose Silva, Emmanuel Ocampo, Victoriano Leviste, Francisco Carreon, Jr.,
and Expedito Leviste, Sr., another stockholder of TTTDC, (the SILVA GROUP, now respondents),
filed with the SEC a petition against Eduardo Santos, Sylvia S. Veloso, Josefina Carballo, Augusto
del Rosario, Reynaldo Alcantara and Lauro Sandoval (the SANTOS GROUP), docketed as SEC
Case No. 3806. (The SANTOS GROUP were nominees of Rovels who, by virtue of the shares of
stock issued pursuant to the December 29, 1975 Resolution, proceeded to act as directors and
officers of TTTDC). In their petition, the SILVA GROUP prayed that they be declared the true and
lawful stockholders and incumbent directors and officers of TTTDC.
On July 6, 1993, SEC Hearing Officer Alberto P. Atas rendered a Decision12 in favor of the SILVA
GROUP, thus:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners (SILVA GROUP) and
against the respondents (SANTOS GROUP), as follows:
a. Declaring petitioners as the lawful stockholders, directors and officers of Tagaytay Taal
Tourist Development Corporation;
b. Declaring respondents, to be not stockholders of Tagaytay Taal Tourist Development
Corporation;
c. Declaring respondents to be not directors or officers of Tagaytay Taal Tourist Development
Corporation;
d. The writ of preliminary injunction issued on November 6, 1990 is hereby made permanent;
and
e. Ordering the Records Division of this Commission to purge the records of Tagaytay Taal
Tourist Development Corporation of all papers and documents filed by respondents
purportedly in behalf of Tagaytay Taal Tourist Development Corporation." (emphasis and words
in parentheses added)
The above Decision became final and executory on September 1, 199413 as no appeal was
interposed by either the SILVA GROUP or the SANTOS GROUP.
However, Rovels, to whom the TTTDC shares of stock (worth P108,000.00) were transferred,
claimed that it became aware of the July 6, 1993 SEC Decision only in June of 1995. So on
September 6, 1995, it filed a petition with the SEC,14 docketed as SEC Case No. 09-95-5135,
praying that it be declared the majority stockholder of TTTDC as against respondents Ocampo,
Silva, Leviste, Sr., Calalang and Carreon (belonging to the SILVA GROUP). The material
allegations of the petition state that: (1) TTTDC passed a Resolution dated December 29, 1975
authorizing the transfer of its unissued shares to Rovels as the latters construction fee;15 (2)
Pursuant to that Resolution, TTTDC shares of stock worth P692,000.00 were transferred to
Rovels;16 (3) While TTTDC, in its March 1, 1976 Resolution, repealed the December 29, 1975
Resolution, such repeal does not bind Rovels for lack of notice;17 (4) Several "interrelated cases"
(SEC Case Nos. 1322 and 3806) were filed with the SEC involving the SILVA and SANTOS
GROUPS;18 (5) Rovels is not bound by the SEC Decisions since it was not impleaded as a party in
said cases.19
Forthwith, the SILVA GROUP filed a motion to dismiss 20 the petition on the following grounds:
(1) Rovels has no cause of action since TTTDCs December 29, 1975 Board Resolution was
repealed by its March 1, 1976 Resolution;21 (2) the petition is barred by the prior SEC Decisions
in SEC Case No. 1322 declaring that the issuance of TTTDCs shares of stock to Rovels is valid,
and the SEC Decision in 3806 declaring the SILVA GROUP as the lawful stockholders of
TTTDC;22 and (3) the petition is barred by estoppel, prescription and laches since it was filed
long after Rovels was notified of the repeal of the December 29, 1975 TTTDC Resolution. 23
In an Order dated April 22, 199624 in SEC Case No. 09-95-5135, SEC Hearing Officer Manuel P.
Perea dismissed Rovels petition on the grounds of lack of cause of action, res judicata,
estoppel, laches and prescription. This Order was affirmed by the SEC en banc in its Decision
dated January 20, 199725 in SEC AC No. 560.
Upon a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 43260, the Court of Appeals, in its
Decision dated June 5, 1998,26 affirmed the January 20, 1997 SEC en banc Decision. Rovels
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.27
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari,28 alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:
I
IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER ROVELS HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS; and
II
IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IN SEC CASE NO. 09-95-5135 IS BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT
(RES JUDICATA), LACHES, PRESCRIPTION AND ESTOPPEL.29
The petition is unmeritorious.
On the first assigned error, we find that the Court of Appeals is correct in affirming the dismissal
of Rovels petition in SEC Case No. 09-955135 for lack of cause of action.
A cause of action is defined as the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by a person in
violation of the right of another.30 A cause of action exists if the following elements are present:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such
right, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiffs right. 31 The test is
whether the material allegations of the complaint, assuming them to be true, state ultimate
facts which constitute plaintiffs cause of action, such that plaintiff is entitled to a favorable
judgment as a matter of law.32
The pertinent portions of Rovels petition filed with the SEC read:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"5. x x x. On December 29, 1975, TTTDC in a Resolution signed by majority members of the
Board of Directors resolved that TTTDC pay its creditors through a debt-to-equity swap;
xxx
xxx
xxx
"9. x x x the relation between the Silva faction and the Santos faction became adversarial. The
Silva faction attempted to form an alleged new board of directors and repealed the Board
Resolution dated December 29, 1975 Resolution regarding the debt to equity swap. Thus, it
resolved:
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the Resolution of December 29, 1975 authorizing the
payment of creditors with unissued shares of the corporation be as it is hereby repealed:
Resolved further that the matter as well as the amount of the creditors claims be given
adequate study and consideration by the Board. x x x
"10. That what is clear from the above Resolution of March 1, 1976 is the admission that indeed
TTTDC owes certain amount of money from its creditors. The creditors became stockholders of
record as a result of shares of stock issued in implementation of the debt to equity conversion.
Corresponding shares of stock were issued and signed by then president of the corporation
Roberto Roxas and then corporate secretary Francisco N. Carreon, Jr.
"Copy of said Certificate of Stocks are hereto attached and marked as Annexes D to P and
made an integral part hereof.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"12. That several interrelated cases were filed by Eduardo L. Santos (SEC Case No. 1322), on one
hand, and Expedito M. Leviste, Francisco Carreon, Felicisimo Ocampo and Jose M. Silva (SEC
Case No. 3806) and vice versa on the other. Petitioner, Rovels Enterprises, Inc. was never made
a party in any of these cases and its nominees in the Board of Directors of TTTDC continued to
exercise its function from 1976.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"19. That to implement the decision in SEC CASE 3806, which declared the Silva Group as the
duly authorized directors and officers, without looking deeply into the records of the case, i.e.
the sub-poened authentic Stock and Transfer Book of TTTDC and the earlier decision in PED
Case No. 89-0644, will constitute irreparable damage to the petitioner. Specially so, Silva
executed an affidavit showing 5 Directors of TTTDC but the stock certificates were not signed by
the corporate secretary who died in 1982.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"21. That petitioner which became duly registered majority stockholder thru debt to equity
swap had been an innocent party to such controversy between the aforesaid 2 ruling thereof,
hence, petitioner remains as is on a status quo basis as majority stockholder of TTTDC.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"PRAYER
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner prays that this Honorable Commission render
judgment in favor of petitioner and against respondents (SILVA GROUP):
xxx
xxx
xxx
"2. After due notice and hearing, re-declaring petitioner lawful registered majority stockholder
of TTTDC x x x;
"3. Ordering respondents to desist from sitting in the Board of Directors of TTTDC as they are
not lawful registered stockholders in the books of the said corporation.
xxx
xxx
x x x33
A reading of the above petition (paragraph 5) shows that Rovels prayer to be declared the
majority stockholder of TTTDC is anchored on the December 29, 1975 TTTDC Board Resolution
transferring its shares of stock to Rovels as construction fee. This Resolution could have vested
in Rovels a right to be declared a stockholder of TTTDC. However, the same petition
(paragraphs 9 and 10) concedes that the December 29, 1975 Resolution was repealed by the
March 1, 1976 Resolution. The petition likewise alleges (paragraphs 12 and 19) that there were
prior "interrelated cases" filed with the SEC between the SILVA and SANTOS GROUPS, namely:
(1) SEC Case No. 1322 (wherein the SEC en banc in its Decision dated September 2, 1982
nullified the TTTDC Board Resolution dated December 29, 1975, which Decision was affirmed
with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 61863) and (2) SEC Case No. 3806 (wherein the SEC
declared the SILVA GROUP as the legitimate stockholders of TTTDC, not Rovels nominees [the
SANTOS GROUP]). Clearly, on the face of its petition, Rovels cannot claim to be the majority
stockholder of TTTDC.
Relative to the second assigned error, Rovels contends that it is not bound by the SEC Decision
in SEC Case Nos. 1322 and 3806 and in G.R. No. 61863 as it was "never a party in any of these
cases." This contention brings us to the issue of res judicata.
The requisites of res judicata,34 also known as the rule on bar by prior judgment, are:
1) the former judgment must be final;
2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
3) the judgment must be on the merits; and
4) there must be between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action.
The first three (3) requisites of res judicata are present in this case. This is not disputed by the
parties and is, in fact, established by the record. The controversy arises as to whether there is
identity of the parties in the present SEC Case No. 09-95-5135, on the one hand, and in prior
SEC Case Nos. 1322 and 3806, on the other.
Contrary to its claim, Rovels is bound by the previous SEC Decisions. It must be noted that
Eduardo Santos, President of Rovels, was one of the respondents in both SEC Case Nos. 1322
and 3806. Clearly, Rovels and Eduardo Santos, being its President, share an identity of interests
sufficient to make them privies-in-law, as correctly found by the Court of Appeals in its assailed
Decision, thus:
"In the case at bench, there can be no question that the rights claimed by petitioner and its
stockholders/directors/officers who were parties in SEC Case Nos. 1322 and 3806 are identical
in that they are both based on the December 29, 1975 Resolution. Stated differently, they
shared an identity of interest from which flowed an identity of relief sought, namely, to be
declared owners of the stocks of TTTDC, premised on the same December 29, 1975 Resolution.
x x x. This identity of interest is sufficient to make them privies-in-law, one to the other, and
meets the requisite of substantial identity of parties."35
It bears stressing that absolute identity of parties is not required for the principle of res
judicata, or the rule on bar by prior judgment, to apply. Mere substantial identity of parties, or
a community of interests between a party in the first case and a party in the subsequent case
even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case, is sufficient. 36
Rovels cannot take refuge in the argument that, as a corporation, it is imbued with personality
separate and distinct from that of the respondents in SEC Case Nos. 1322 and 3806. The legal
fiction of separate corporate existence is not at all times invincible and the same may be
pierced when employed as a means to perpetrate a fraud, confuse legitimate issues, or used as
a vehicle to promote unfair objectives or to shield an otherwise blatant violation of the
prohibition against forum-shopping. While it is settled that the piercing of the corporate veil
has to be done with caution, this corporate fiction may be disregarded when necessary in the
interest of justice.37
The doctrine of res judicata states that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause
of action.38 This is founded on public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigations, and on the principle that an individual should
not be vexed twice for the same cause.39
Just recently, we emphatically declared in In Re: Petition Seeking for Clarification as to the
Validity and Forceful Effect of Two (2) Final and Executory but Conflicting Decisions of the
Honorable Supreme Court:40 "Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes
final, executory and unappealable. This is a fundamental and immutable legal principle. For
(j)ust as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning
party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the
execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the life of the law. Any attempt to thwart
this rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the fruit of his victory, must
immediately be struck down."
Finally, this Court sustains the Appellate Courts finding that the filing of Rovels petition in the
instant SEC Case No. 09-95-5135 is barred by estoppel, prescription and laches. There is no
merit to Rovels claim that it was only in June of 199541 when it became aware of the repeal of
the December 29, 1975 TTTDC Resolution and of the consequent nullification of the transfer of
its shares of stock.
It is undisputed that Eduardo Santos was present in the March 1, 1976 TTTDC Board meeting
wherein the December 29, 1975 Resolution was repealed. We hold that Eduardo Santos, being
the President of Rovels, is considered as its (Rovels) agent. As such, his knowledge of the repeal
of the December 29, 1975 Resolution, under the theory of imputed knowledge, is ascribed to
his principal (Rovels).
It was only on September 6, 1995, or almost twenty (20) years from the time Eduardo Santos
learned of the March 1, 1976 Resolution, that Rovels filed its petition in SEC Case No. 09-955135. Within that long period of time, Rovels did nothing to contest the March 1, 1976 TTTDC
Resolution to protect its rights, if any. Obviously, such inaction constitutes estoppel,
prescription and laches. As stated by Rovels itself, Article 1149 of the New Civil Code limits the
filing of actions, whose periods are not fixed therein or in any other laws, to only five (5) years.
In addition, the principle of laches or "stale demands" provides that the failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.42
In sum, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in its
challenged Decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June
5, 1998 and its Resolution dated December 21, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 43260, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 153031
December 14, 2006
PCL SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. and U-MING MARINE TRANSPORT

CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and STEVE RUSEL, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 18, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No.
59976, which affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated
March 22, 2000 in NLRC NCR CA No. 018120-99; and the Resolution of the CA dated April 10,
2002, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 2
The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:
In April 1996, Rusel was employed as GP/AB seaman by manning agency, PCL Shipping
Philippines, Inc. (PCL Shipping) for and in behalf of its foreign principal, U-Ming Marine
Transport Corporation (U-Ming Marine). Rusel thereby joined the vessel MV Cemtex
General (MV Cemtex) for the contract period of twelve (12) months with a basic
monthly salary of US$400.00, living allowance of US$140.00, fixed overtime rate of
US$120.00 per month, vacation leave with pay of US$40.00 per month and special
allowance of US$175.00.
On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he slipped, and as a
consequence thereof, he suffered a broken and/or sprained ankle on his left foot. A
request for medical examination was flatly denied by the captain of the vessel. On
August 13, 1996, feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle, Rusel jumped off the vessel
using a life jacket and swam to shore. He was brought to a hospital where he was
confined for eight (8) days.
On August 22, 1996, a vessel's agent fetched Rusel from the hospital and was required
to board a plane bound for the Philippines.
On September 26, 1996, Rusel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
wages, overtime pay, claim for medical benefits, sick leave pay and damages against PCL
Shipping and U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. In their answer,
the latter alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by jumping off the vessel.
On July 21, 1998, the labor arbiter rendered his decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
Wherefore, above premises duly considered we find the respondent liable for
unjust repatriation of the complainant.
Accordingly, the following award is hereby adjudged against the respondent:
1. The amount of $2,625.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment
representing three (3) months salary of the complainant due to his illegal
dismissal.
2. The amount of $1,600.00 or its peso equivalent, representing sick wage
benefits.
3. The amount of $550.00 or its peso equivalent, representing living allowance,
overtime pay and special allowance for two (2) months.
4. The amount of $641.66 or its peso equivalent, representing unpaid wages
from August 11 to 22, 1996.
5. Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.
The rest of the claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.3
Aggrieved by the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, herein petitioners appealed to the NLRC. In its
Decision dated March 22, 2000, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter but
modified the appealed Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is as it is hereby ordered
MODIFIED in that the amount representing three months salary of the complainant due
to his illegal dismissal is reduced to US$1,620.00. Further the award of sick wage benefit
is deleted.
All other dispositions are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same in its Decision of
May 3, 2000.5
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.6 In its Decision dated December 18, 2001,
the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the NLRC Decision. 7
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution
dated April 10, 2002.8
Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors:
I. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent was illegally dismissed
from employment.
xxxx
II. Likewise, the Court of Appeals erred in not upholding petitioners' right to preterminate private respondent's employment.
xxxx
III. The private respondent is not entitled to other money claims, particularly as to the
award of attorney's fees.9
As to their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the CA erred in affirming the findings of
the NLRC that Rusel's act of jumping ship does not establish any intent on his part to abandon
his job and never return. Petitioners argue that Rusel's very act of jumping from the vessel and
swimming to shore is evidence of highest degree that he has no intention of returning to his
job. Petitioners further contend that if Rusel was indeed suffering from unbearable and
unmitigated pain, it is unlikely that he is able to swim two (2) nautical miles, which is the
distance between their ship and the shore, considering that he needed to use his limbs in
swimming. Petitioners further assert that it is error on the part of the CA to disregard the
entries contained in the logbook and in the Marine Note Protest evidencing Rusels' offense of
desertion because while these pieces of evidence were belatedly presented, the settled rule is
that additional evidence may be admitted on appeal in labor cases. Petitioners also contend
that Rusel's act of desertion is a grave and serious offense and considering the nature and situs
of employment as well as the nationality of the employer, the twin requirements of notice and
hearing before an employee can be validly terminated may be dispensed with.
As to their second assigned error, petitioners contend that assuming, for the sake of argument,
that Rusel is not guilty of desertion, they invoked the alternative defense that the termination
of his employment was validly made pursuant to petitioners' right to exercise their prerogative
to pre-terminate such employment in accordance with Section 19(C) of the Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels,
which provision was incorporated in Rusel's Contract of Employment with petitioners.
Petitioners assert that despite the fact that this issue was raised before the CA, the appellate
court failed to resolve the same.
Anent the last assigned error, petitioners argue that it is error on the part of the CA to affirm
the award of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance for two months
because Rusel failed to submit substantial evidence to prove that he is entitled to these awards.
Petitioners further argue that these money claims, particularly the claim for living allowance,
should not be granted because they partake of the nature of earned benefits for services
rendered by a seafarer. Petitioners also contend that the balance of Rusel's wages from August
11-22, 1996 should be applied for the payment of the costs of his repatriation, considering that
under Section 19(E) of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, when a seafarer is discharged for any just
cause, the employer shall have the right to recover the costs of his replacement and
repatriation from the seafarer's wages and other earnings. Lastly, petitioners argue that the
award of attorney's fees should be deleted because there is nothing in the decision of the Labor
Arbiter or the NLRC which states the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded.
In his Comment, private respondent contends that petitioners are raising issues of fact which
have already been resolved by the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA. Private respondent argues
that, aside from the fact that the issues raised were already decided by three tribunals against
petitioners' favor, it is a settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. While there are exceptions to this rule,
private respondent contends that the instant case does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Private respondent asserts that petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the former is
guilty of desertion. Private respondent further contends that the right to due process is
available to local and overseas workers alike, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution on
labor and equal protection as well as the declared policy contained in the Labor Code. Private
respondent argues that petitioners' act of invoking the provisions of Section 19(C) of the POEA
Contract as an alternative defense is misplaced and is inconsistent with their primary defense
that private respondent was dismissed on the ground of desertion. As to the award of
attorney's fees, private respondent contends that since petitioners' act compelled the former
to incur expenses to protect his interest and enforce his lawful claims, and because petitioners
acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy private respondent's lawful claims, it is
only proper that attorney's fees be awarded in favor of the latter. Anent the other monetary
awards, private respondent argues that these awards are all premised on the findings of the
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that private respondent's dismissal was improper and illegal.
The Court finds the petition without merit.
Anent the first assigned error, it is a settled rule that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised in this Court. 10 Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a
re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based
its determination.11 Firm is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies
with greater force in labor cases.12 Factual issues may be considered and resolved only when
the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those of
the NLRC and the CA.13 The reason for this is that the quasi-judicial agencies, like the Arbitration
Board and the NLRC, have acquired a unique expertise because their jurisdiction are confined to
specific matters.14 In the present case, the question of whether private respondent is guilty of
desertion is factual. The Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA are unanimous in their findings that
private respondent is not guilty of desertion and that he has been illegally terminated from his
employment. After a review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds no cogent reason
to depart from the findings of these tribunals.
Petitioners assert that the entries in the logbook of MV Cemtex General15 and in the Marine
Note Protest16 which they submitted to the NLRC confirm the fact that private respondent
abandoned the vessel in which he was assigned. However, the genuineness of the Marine Note
Protest as well as the entries in the logbook are put in doubt because aside from the fact that
they were presented only during petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed with the NLRC,
both the Marine Note Protest and the entry in the logbook which were prepared by the officers
of the vessel were neither notarized nor authenticated by the proper authorities. Moreover, a
reading of these entries simply shows that private respondent was presumed to have deserted
his post on the sole basis that he was found missing while the MV Cemtex General was
anchored at the port of Takehara, Japan. Hence, without any corroborative evidence, these
documents cannot be used as bases for concluding that private respondent was guilty of
desertion.
Petitioners also question the findings and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that
what caused private respondent in jumping overboard was the unmitigated pain he was
suffering which was compounded by the inattention of the vessel's captain to provide him with
the necessary treatment inspite of the fact that the ship was moored for about two weeks at
the anchorage of Takehara, Japan; and, that private respondent's act was a desperate move to
protect himself and to seek relief for his physical suffering. Petitioners contend that the findings
and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which were affirmed by the CA are based on
conjecture because there is no evidence to prove that, at the time he jumped ship, private
respondent was really suffering from an ankle injury.
It is true that no substantial evidence was presented to prove that the cause of private
respondent's confinement in a hospital in Takehara, Japan was his ankle injury. The Court may
not rely on the letter marked as Annex "B" and attached to private respondent's Position Paper
because it was unsigned and it was not established who executed the same. 17 However, the
result of the x-ray examination conducted by the LLN Medical Services, Inc. on August 26, 1996,
right after private respondent was repatriated to the Philippines, clearly showed that there is a
soft-tissue swelling around his ankle joint.18 This evidence is consistent with private
respondent's claim that he was then suffering from an ankle injury which caused him to jump
off the ship.
As to petitioners' contention that private respondent could not have traversed the distance
between the ship and the shore if he was indeed suffering from unbearable pain by reason of
his ankle injury, suffice it to say that private respondent is an able-bodied seaman and that with
the full use of both his arms and the help of a life jacket, was able to reach the shore.
As correctly defined by petitioners, desertion, in maritime law is:
The act by which a seaman deserts and abandons a ship or vessel, in which he had
engaged to perform a voyage, before the expiration of his time, and without leave. By
desertion, in maritime law, is meant, not a mere unauthorized absence from the ship,
without leave, but an unauthorized absence from the ship with an intention not to
return to her service; or as it is often expressed, animo non revertendi, that is, with an
intention to desert.19 (emphasis supplied)
Hence, for a seaman to be considered as guilty of desertion, it is essential that there be
evidence to prove that if he leaves the ship or vessel in which he had engaged to perform a
voyage, he has the clear intention of abandoning his duty and of not returning to the ship or
vessel. In the present case, however, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to
show that when private respondent jumped ship, he no longer had the intention of returning.
The fact alone that he jumped off the ship where he was stationed, swam to shore and sought
medical assistance for the injury he sustained is not a sufficient basis for petitioners to conclude
that he had the intention of deserting his post. Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the
burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid
cause.20 The case of the employer must stand or fall on its own merits and not on the weakness
of the employee's defense.21 In the present case, since petitioners failed to discharge their
burden of proving that private respondent is guilty of desertion, the Court finds no reason to
depart from the conclusion of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that private respondent's
dismissal is illegal.
In their second assigned error, petitioners cite Section 19(C) of POEA Memorandum Circular No.
055-9622 known as the Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels as their alternative basis in
terminating the employment of private respondent. Said Section provides as follows:
Section 19. REPATRIATION
xxxx
C. If the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three months before the
expiration of his contract, the master/ employer may repatriate the seafarer from such
port provided that the seafarer shall be paid all his earned wages. In addition, the
seafarer shall also be paid his leave pay for the entire contract period plus a termination
pay equivalent to one (1) month of his basic pay, provided, however, that this mode of
termination may only be exercised by the master/employer if the original contract
period of the seafarer is at least ten (10) months; provided, further, that the conditions
for this mode of termination shall not apply to dismissal for cause.
The Court is not persuaded. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 took effect on January 1,
1997 while the contract of employment entered into by and between private respondent and
petitioners was executed on April 10, 1996. Hence, it is wrong for petitioners to cite this
particular Memorandum because at the time of petitioners' and private respondent's execution
of their contract of employment Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 was not yet effective.
What was in effect at the time private respondent's Contract of Employment was executed was
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989. It is clearly provided under the second
paragraph of private respondent's Contract of Employment that the terms and conditions
provided under Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989 shall be strictly and faithfully
observed. Hence, it is Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989 which governs private
respondent's contract of employment.
Section H (6), Part I of Memorandum Circular No. 41, which has almost identical provisions with
Section 19 (C) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96, provides as follows:
SECTION H. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
xxxx
6. If the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three (3) months before
the expiration of the Contract, the master/employer may repatriate the seaman from
such port provided that the seaman shall be paid all his earned wages. In addition, the
seaman shall also be paid his leave pay for the entire contract period plus a termination
pay equivalent to one (1) month of his basic pay, provided, however, that this mode of
termination may only be exercised by the master/employer if the original contact period
of the seaman is at least ten (10) months; provided, further, that the conditions for this
mode of termination shall not apply to dismissal for cause.
The Court agrees with private respondent's contention that petitioners' arguments are
misplaced. Petitioners may not use the above-quoted provision as basis for terminating private
respondent's employment because it is incongruent with their primary defense that the latter's
dismissal from employment was for cause. Petitioners may not claim that they ended private
respondent's services because he is guilty of desertion and at the same time argue that they
exercised their option to prematurely terminate his employment, even without cause, simply
because they have the right to do so under their contract. These grounds for termination are
inconsistent with each other such that the use of one necessarily negates resort to the other.
Besides, it appears from the records that petitioners' alternative defense was pleaded merely
as an afterthought because it was only in their appeal with the NLRC that they raised this
defense. The only defense raised by petitioners in their Answer with Counterclaim filed with the
office of the Labor Arbiter is that private respondent was dismissed from employment by
reason of desertion.23 Under the Rules of Court,24 which is applicable in a suppletory character
in labor cases before the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC pursuant to Section 3, Rule I of the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC25, defenses which are not raised either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer are deemed waived.26
Granting, for the sake of argument, that petitioners may use Section H (6), Part I of
Memorandum Circular No. 41 or Section 19(C) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 as basis for
terminating private respondent's employment, it is clear that one of the conditions before any
of these provisions becomes applicable is when the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a
period of three (3) months before the expiration of the contract of employment. In the present
case, private respondent's contract was executed on April 10, 1996 for a duration of twelve
months. He was deployed aboard MV Cemtex General on June 25, 1996 and repatriated to the
Philippines on August 22, 1996. Hence, it is clear that petitioners did not meet this condition
because private respondent's termination was not within a period of three months before the
expiration of his contract of employment.
Moreover, the Court finds nothing in the records to show that petitioners complied with the
other conditions enumerated therein, such as the payment of all of private respondent's
earned wages together with his leave pay for the entire contract period as well as termination
pay equivalent to his one month salary.
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the charges against
him and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his
side. However, petitioners contend that the twin requirements of notice and hearing applies
strictly only when the employment is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly
observed in cases of international maritime or overseas employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which
afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines
or abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the
contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. 27 In the present case, it is not disputed that the
Contract of Employment entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent was
executed here in the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with its implementing rules and
regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. 28 Accordingly, as to the
requirement of notice and hearing in the case of a seafarer, the Court has already ruled in a
number of cases that before a seaman can be dismissed and discharged from the vessel, it is
required that he be given a written notice regarding the charges against him and that he be
afforded a formal investigation where he could defend himself personally or through a
representative.29 Hence, the employer should strictly comply with the twin requirements of
notice and hearing without regard to the nature and situs of employment or the nationality of
the employer. Petitioners failed to comply with these twin requirements.
Petitioners also contend that the wages of private respondent from August 11-22, 1996 were
applied to the costs of his repatriation. Petitioners argue that the off-setting of the costs of his
repatriation against his wages for the aforementioned period is allowed under the provisions of
Section 19(E) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 which provides that when the seafarer is
discharged for any just cause, the employer shall have the right to recover the costs of his
replacement and repatriation from the seafarer's wages and other earnings.
The Court does not agree. Section 19(E) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 has its
counterpart provision under Section H (2), Part II of Memorandum Circular No. 41, to wit:
SECTION H. REPATRIATION
xxxx
2. When the seaman is discharged for disciplinary reasons, the employer shall have the
right to recover the costs of maintenance and repatriation from the seaman's balance of
wages and other earnings.
xxxx
It is clear under the above-quoted provision that the employer shall have the right to recover
the cost of repatriation from the seaman's wages and other earnings only if the concerned
seaman is validly discharged for disciplinary measures. In the present case, since petitioners
failed to prove that private respondent was validly terminated from employment on the ground
of desertion, it only follows that they do not have the right to deduct the costs of private
respondent's repatriation from his wages and other earnings.
Lastly, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contention that the private respondent is not
entitled to his money claims representing his living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and
special allowance as well as attorney's fees because he failed to present any proof to show that
he is entitled to these awards.
However, the Court finds that the monetary award representing private respondent's three
months salary as well as the award representing his living allowance, overtime pay, vacation
pay and special allowance should be modified.
The Court finds no basis in the NLRC's act of including private respondent's living allowance as
part of the three months salary to which he is entitled under Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No.
8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995." The
pertinent provisions of the said Act provides:
Sec. 10. Money Claims
xxxx
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause
as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of
his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
xxxx
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that what is included in the computation of the
amount due to the overseas worker are only his salaries. Allowances are excluded. In the
present case, since private respondent received a basic monthly salary of US$400.00, he is,
therefore, entitled to receive a sum of US$1200.00, representing three months of said salary.
As to the awards of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance, it is
clearly provided under private respondent's Contract of Employment that he is entitled to these
benefits as follows: living allowance of US$140.00/month; vacation leave with pay equivalent to
US$40.00/month; overtime rate of US$120.00/month; and, special allowance of
US$175.00/month.30
With respect, however, to the award of overtime pay, the correct criterion in determining
whether or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not whether they were on board and can
not leave ship beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but whether they actually
rendered service in excess of said number of hours.31 In the present case, the Court finds that
private respondent is not entitled to overtime pay because he failed to present any evidence to
prove that he rendered service in excess of the regular eight working hours a day.
On the basis of the foregoing, the remaining benefits to which the private respondent is
entitled is the living allowance of US$140.00/month, which was removed in the computation of
private respondent's salary, special allowance of US$175.00/month and vacation leave with pay
amounting to US$40.00/month. Since private respondent rendered service for two months
these benefits should be doubled, giving a total of US$710.00.
As to the award of attorney's fees, this Court ruled in Reyes v. Court of Appeals,32 as follows:
x x x [T]here are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called
ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the
latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his
agreement with the client. In its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees are deemed
indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation.
The instances where these may be awarded are those enumerated in Article 2208 of the
Civil Code, specifically par. 7 thereof which pertains to actions for recovery of wages,
and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the
award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. The
extraordinary concept of attorney's fees is the one contemplated in Article 111 of the
Labor Code, which provides:
Art. 111. Attorney's fees. (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the
culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the
amount of wages recovered x x x
The afore-quoted Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of strict
construction in the awarding of attorney's fees. Although an express finding of facts
and law is still necessary to prove the merit of the award, there need not be any
showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the
wages. There need only be a showing that the lawful wages were not paid accordingly,
as in this case.
In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing
regulations, the employee's welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as provided in Article 4 of the Labor Code which states
that "[a]ll doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of [the
Labor] Code including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor
of labor", and Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that "[i]n case of doubt, all
labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and
decent living for the laborer."33 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, it is true that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC failed to state the reasons
why attorney's fees are being awarded. However, it is clear that private respondent was
illegally terminated from his employment and that his wages and other benefits were withheld
from him without any valid and legal basis. As a consequence, he is compelled to file an action
for the recovery of his lawful wages and other benefits and, in the process, incurred expenses.
On these bases, the Court finds that he is entitled to attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated December
18, 2001 and Resolution dated April 10, 2002 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect
that the award of US$1620.00 representing private respondent's three months salary is
reduced to US$1200.00. The award of US$550.00 representing private respondent's living

allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance for two months is deleted and in
lieu thereof, an award of US$710.00 is granted representing private respondent's living
allowance, special allowance and vacation leave with pay for the same period.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171448

In Criminal Case No. 16427-R, GUILTY beyond

In Criminal Case No. 16430-R, GUILTY beyond

provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are

In Criminal Case No. 16431-R, GUILTY beyond

In Criminal Case No. 16432-R, GUILTY beyond

In Criminal Case No. 16434-R, GUILTY beyond

In Criminal Case No. 16436-R, GUILTY beyond

In Criminal Case No. 16438-R, GUILTY beyond

In Criminal Case No. 16439-R, GUILTY beyond

Criminal Cases Nos. 16428-R; 16429-R; 16433-R;

Running in parallel vein is what the CA wrote in its appealed decision:[16]

established in jurisprudence that

BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER G.R. Nos. 182978-79

SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA G.R. Nos. 184298-99

- versus WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. Promulgated:

and BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER

On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service

Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.

According to letter No. 199, dated 27.2.1419H, issued by Al-Birk Police

1. The Police Report on the Death

Sex: Female Age: 25 years Relg: Christian

3. Diagnosis and Opinion: Halt in blood circulation respiratory system and

Name: Jasmin Cuaresma

1. Report of the Police on the death

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (Commission) reversed the

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. Accordingly,

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GAVE MORE

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ON THE BASIS OF THE

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN

ADMISSIONS THAT IQAMA INSURANCE WAS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR SINCE

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN AND

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PROVISIONS

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN REDUCING THE DEATH

1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;

Transportation to and from work;

Free living accommodations;

Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental operations,

Eight days public holidays per year;

labor and social

1) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as moral damages;

2) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as exemplary

Republic of the Philippines

October 17, 2002

ROVELS ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,

Republic of the Philippines

December 14, 2006

PCL SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. and U-MING MARINE TRANSPORT

reduced to US$1200.00. The award of US$550.00 representing private respondent's living

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