STATE OF MICHIGAN

IN THE 86TH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF GRAND TRAVERSE

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

PLAINTIFF,

FILE NO. 15-0919-ST

ALYSSA MICHELE GOCH,

HON. THOMAS J. PHILLIPS

DEFENDANT.
/

Kit Tholen (P76948)

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
324 Court Street
Traverse City, MI 49684
(231) 922-4600
Jesse L. Williams (P69264)
Attorney for Defendant
2899 Benzie Hwy. PO Box 30
Benzonia, MI 49616
(231) 929-8340
/
PEOPLE'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE
PURSUANT TO MRE 402
The People of the State of Michigan respectfully request that This Court preclude
Defendant from seeking to admit evidence at trial which is not legally relevant "to the
determination of the action." In support of this Motion, The People state as follows:
Facts
Defendant is charged with two counts of Moving Violation Causing Death, violations of
MCL 257.601d. These charges arose from a traffic crash that occurred on August 2nd, 2015
along M-37. The People allege that Defendant was driving southbound in her passenger vehicle

and that the victims, Anthony and Deanna Erving, were traveling northbound on a motorcycle.
The People allege that Defendant entered a curve and failed to maintain control of her vehicle.
The result of this loss of control was that Defendant crossed the centerline, collided with
Anthony and Deanna Erving, and the Ervings were killed.
A speed calculation could not be reliably performed due to several factors and Defendant
did not have a GPS module in her vehicle. There was an Electronic Data Recorder in her vehicle
but it did not record her speed at or near the time of the collision.
Shortly before the collision Ms. Goch had passed a man named Brandon Collins. Mr.
Collins was traveling the same direction as Defendant and had his cruise control set at the speed
limit-55. Mr. Collins can therefore infer that Defendant was traveling above the speed limit at
the time she passed him but he does not, however, know her speed when she crossed the
centerline.
Mr. Collins as well as his wife and another gentleman did witness Defendant's vehicle
travel left-of-center and cause the collision. Defendant admitted to Deputy Nick White that she
did drive left-of-center. Based on roadway evidence Sergeant Charles Jetter of the Grand
Traverse County Sheriff's Office, a crash reconstruction expert, determined that Defendant was
left-of-center at the time of the collision.
On October 30th, 2015, defense counsel sent a letter to the Prosecuting Attorney's Office
and to This Court as part of a stipulation between the parties to adjourn the jury selection and
trial. In this letter defense counsel states "included is a FOIA request that I sent to Michigan's
Department of Transportation today requesting data that is crucial to my defense strategy in this
matter." This letter is attached as Attachment 1. The referenced FOIA request is attached as
Attachment 2 and requests the following items, all in relation to M-37 at or near the location of

the crash: (1) information related to a recent changes to the roadway surface; (2) information
related to other times that changes to the roadway were considered since "the 1980's;" (3)
information related to other crashes at the portion of road in question, and; (4) information
related to plans to change the road's path in the future.
The People contend that none of the requested information is admissible at Defendant's
trial.
Law
The crime that Defendant is charged with states: "A person that commits a moving
violation that causes the death of another person is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not more than $2,000, or both."1
The Court of Appeals, interpreting this statute, stated: "We conclude that the Legislature
impliedly intended to make MCL 257.601d a strict liability offense."2
"Moving violation" is defined as: "an act or omission prohibited under this act or a local
ordinance substantially corresponding to this act that involves the operation of a motor vehicle,
and for which a fine may be assessed."3
Moving violations relevant to this case include: "When a roadway has been divided into 2
or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following rules in addition to all others consistent
with this act apply: (a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single
lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the operator has first ascertained that the
movement can be made with safety."4
Also, "The state highway commission and county road commissions shall determine
1 MCL 257.601d(1).
2
People v Pace, Unreported, Docket No. 322808, 2015 WL 3511912 (Mich Ct App June 4, 2015). The People are
not aware of any published cases which address this issue. This case is attached as Attachment 3.
3 MCL 57.601d(4).
4 MCL 257.642.

those portions of a highway under their jurisdiction where overtaking and passing or driving to
the left of the roadway would be especially hazardous, and by appropriate signs or markings on
the roadway shall indicate the beginning and end of those zones . . . ."5 "A person who fails to
obey the traffic-control devices installed pursuant to this section is responsible for a civil
infraction."6
Argument
There is no reasonable doubt regarding whether Defendant crossed the centerline and
caused the deaths of Anthony and Deanna Erving. As is often the case, however, there could be
doubt regarding the "mens rea" of Defendant at the time that she committed the "actus reus." No
one contends that the crash was intentional on the part of Defendant, but whether it was reckless,
negligent, or neither is open to dispute.
At the trial of criminal case, however, the degree of Defendant's culpability is not legally
relevant. Nowhere in: the charged statute, Standard Jury Instruction 15.18, or the relevant
Legislative History is there a requirement that the accused be found negligent or otherwise.
Consequently, MCL 257.601d is a "strict liability" offense and evidence that Defendant was
not negligent has no bearing on any element of the offense or "fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action."' (It is, however, relevant at sentencing.)
The People's statutory interpretation is supported not only by the statute, jury instruction,
and Legislative History8 but is also the holding of People v Pace, an unpublished 2015 Michigan
Court of Appeals case9. In Pace the defendant was charged with Moving Violation Causing

MCL 257.640(1).
MCL 257.640(3).
MRE 401.
8 Bill analyses from the House and Senate attached as Attachment 4. The relevant Legislative History is also
contained in Footnote 1 in Pace.
9 Pace, supra.
5

Serious Impairment of a Bodily Function, in violation of MCL 257.601d(2). The statutory

language in subsection (2) is no different than subsection (1) as it pertains to any mens rea
requirement for criminal liability. The Court analyzed the statutory language, reviewed the
Legislative History, discussed the history and legality of strict liability offenses in Michigan, and
concluded that "the Legislature impliedly intended to make MCL 257.601d a strict liability
offense."I
As support for the conclusion in Pace the Court of Appeals also cited to People v Jones, a
published Court of Appeals case." In Jones the defendant had been ticketed for disobeying a
stop sign. He argued that since the roads were icy he had not been negligent in sliding through
the stop sign. It seems that this fact was not in dispute and The People did not believe that the
defendant had been negligent. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant
was liable for the violation. "Courts in this country have almost universally held that traffic
violations are strict liability offenses, in which the motorist's negligence or lack of intent to
commit the infraction is irrelevant."I2
Based on the statute, case law, and Legislative History, it is clear that the Legislature
intended MCL 257.601d to be strict liability. Consequently, evidence which tends to show that
she was not negligent, or perhaps less negligent, is not relevant at trial. This would include not
only evidence of roadway surface changes or plans to change the roadway's path but also
evidence of other crashes at that location. None of that evidence has any bearing on the elements
of the charges, namely:
(1) First, that the defendant committed the following moving
violation [describe the moving violation].

Pace, supra, at *1.

People v Jones, 132 Mich App 368 (1984).
12 Jones at 370.
10
11

(2) The moving violation of [describe the moving violation] was a

cause of the death of [name deceased]. To "cause" the victim's
death, the defendant's operation of the vehicle must have been a
factual cause of the death, that is, but for the defendant's operation
of the vehicle, the death would not have occurred. In addition,
operation of the vehicle must have been a proximate cause of
death, that is, death or serious injury must have been a direct and
natural result of operating the vehicle. 13
Those two elements are the sole elements of the charged offense and the evidence at trial should
be limited to what is relevant towards proving or refuting them.
Conclusion / Relief
Michigan Compiled Laws 257.601d creates a strict liability criminal offense for
motorists who commit a moving violation, and that moving violation is the cause of either death
or serious impairment to another person. This conclusion is supported by numerous sources, all
persuasive, but not least of which is the well-reasoned Court of Appeals case that is directly on
point.
Consequently, evidence that tends to minimize how negligent or culpable Defendant was
should be barred at trial. Such evidence is relevant to determining an appropriate sentence but it
does not go to any element of the charged offense or "fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action."

Respectfully submitted,

November 12, 2015

Kit Tholen (P76948)
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Grand Traverse County

13

CJ12d 15.18.

ATTACHMENT 1

JESSE L. WILLIAMS
JESSE L. WILLIAMS, PLLC
2899 I3enzie Hwy P.O. Box 30
Benzonia, MI 49616-0030
231-929-8340 Office / 231-944-4911 Cellular
231-929-8341 Facsimile
j I wdefense@gmail.com
October 30, 2015
Hon: Thomas J. Phillips
86111 DistrictCourt for Grand Traverse County
280 Washington Street
Traverse City, MI 49684
Sent via fax: (231) 922-4454
RE:

People v ALYSSA GOCH

Case No.: 15-0919-ST

Dear Judge Phillips,

Included with this fax is my proposed stipulation and order adjoining the status
conference and jury trial scheduled on November 4, 2015. Also included is a FOIA request that I
sent to Michigan's Department of Transportation today requesting data that is crucial to my
defense strategy in this matter. I've mailed the copy, with my original signature, to the court.
Mr. Tholen has agreed, in principle to the requested adjournment in this matter and I
believe he will be signing it and submitting it to the court for your endorsement. I have
forwarded a copy of this letter to him along with said FOIA request. I'm estimating that it will
be several weeks before I obtain the data I'm seeking from MDOT and then. I'll need additional
time to analyze the information and potentially consult with an expert to assist me in this matter.
1 also want you to be aware that I will be vacationing out of state from November 12
through December 7.
For these reasons, I'd ask that you set this matter for a two-day jury selection and trial in
late January or early February, 2016.
Thank you,

CC: Christopher Kit Tholen, via email, at: ktholen@grandtraverse.org

ATTACHMENT 2

JESSE L. WILLIAMS
JESSE L. WILLIAMS, PLLC
2899 Benzie Hwy P.O. Box 30
Benzonia, MI 496164)030
231-929-8340 Office / 231-944-4911 Cellular
231-929-8341 Facsimile
j lwdelense(thgmail.com
October 30, 2015
To: Michigan Department of Transportation's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Coordinator
Attn: Richard E. Liptak, Manager
Sent via fax: 231-941-1512
Attn: James Lake, Communications Representative
Sent via e-mail: lakejl@miehigan.gov
I am hereby requesting under Michigan's FOIA the following:
1. All public records, writings, emails, communications and invoices related to the curve
on M37 and Center Rd. in Grand Traverse County where road crews recently applied
a high friction surface on the roadway, which is a layer of epoxy and small stones.
For reference, see: UpNorthLivc article: littp://upnorthlive.cominews/locallindot!ix i rig-dangerous-curve-to-improve-safety -conditions.
2. All public records, writings, emails, communications and invoices regarding
Michigan's Department of Transportation looking to improve the safety conditions of
said curve on M37 since the 1980s..
3. All public records, writings, emails, conununications and invoices regarding the 27
crashes including four fatalities that occurred in the vicinity of said curve on M37 that
occurred within the last five years.
4. All public records, writings, emails, communications and invoices regarding any
discussions or plans to realign said curve on M37 in the future.
1 am requesting that, whenever possible, all responsive materials be provided in scanned,
digital format (i.e. PDFs) and emailed to me at: jlwdefensaD,gmail.com. Any responsive
materials that cannot be provided in digital format can be mailed to my above address.

ATTACHMENT 3

People v. Pace, N.W.2d

(2015)

2015 WL 3511912
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
Court of Appeals of Michigan.
PEOPLE of the State of
Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Joshua Matthew PACE, Defendant-Appellee.
Docket No. 322808. I June 4, 2015.
Washtenaw Circuit Court; LC No. 14-000272-AR.
Before: WILDER, P.J., and SERVITTO and STEPHENS, JJ.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
In this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution appeals by leave
granted an order entered by the Washtenaw Circuit Court
denying plaintiffs application for leave to appeal a district
court order which granted defendant's motion for a specific
jury instruction. We reverse and remand.
The basic facts of this case are not in dispute. On June 5,
2013, as Michael John Bly, walked across Church Street in
Ann Arbor along a pedestrian crosswalk, defendant made
a left-hand turn onto Church Street, striking Bly with his
vehicle in the process. As a result of the collision, Bly suffered
head trauma that left him permanently disabled. Defendant
was charged with the misdemeanor offense of committing
a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body
function pursuant to MCL 257.601d(2).
Prior to trial, defendant moved the district court for a jury
instruction requiring the prosecution to prove, as an element
of the charged offense, that defendant was negligent in
the operation of his vehicle. The prosecution argued, in
contrast, that the applicable jury instruction, M Crim JI 15.19,
provides that to prove the charge of committing a moving
violation causing serious impairment of a body function, the
prosecution is required to prove only (1) that the defendant
committed a moving violation; and (2) that the defendant's
operation of the vehicle caused a serious impairment of a
body function to the victim. According to the prosecution,
this standard jury instruction accurately stated the law and
that there was no requirement that the prosecution also prove
that defendant was negligent in his actions. The district

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court granted defendant's motion, citing People v, Tombs,

472 Mich. 446; 697 NW2d 494 (2005) and reasoning that
the Legislature did not expressly indicate that it sought to
dispense with negligence as an element of the offense.
The prosecution subsequently filed an application for leave
to appeal the district court's order in the Washtenaw
Circuit Court, which denied the application. We granted the
prosecution's application for leave to appeal the Washtenaw
Circuit Court's denial of its application. In addition to the
issue of whether negligence is an element of the offense of
committing a moving violation causing serious impairment
of a body function, this Court directed the parties to address
two additional issues: "(1) if negligence is not an element of
committing a moving violation causing serious impairment of
a body function, 1vICL 257.601d(2), then what, if any, mens
rea is required for conviction of this offense; and (2) if no
mens rea is required, is the statute constitutional?" People
v. Pace, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
October 7, 2014 (Docket No. 322808).
On appeal, the prosecution contends that MCL 257.601d
encompasses a pre-existing negligence component such that
the district court's requirement of proof of negligence as
a separate, distinct element was superfluous and contrary
to legislative intent. Alternatively, the prosecution contends
that the statute is a constitutional, strict liability offense. We
conclude that that the Legislature impliedly intended to make
MCL 257.601d a strict liability offense.
Matters of statutory construction are questions of law, which
this Court reviews de novo. People v. Williams, 491 Mich.
164, 169; 814 NW2d 270 (2012). Determining the elements
of a crime is also a question of law that we review de novo.
People v. Hollschlag, 471 Mich. 1, 4-5; 684 NW2d 730
(2004).
MCL 257.601d(2) provides:
(2) A person who commits a
moving violation that causes serious
impairment of a body function
to another person is guilty of
a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 93
days or a fine of not more than
$500.00, or both.
MCL 257.601d(4) states:

final

People v. Pace, N.W.2d

(2015)

protection of the public which shall

render violation impossible.

As used in this section, "moving

violation" means an act or omission
prohibited under this act or a local
ordinance substantially corresponding
to this act that involves the operation
of a motor vehicle, and for which a fine
may be assessed.
Thus, MCL 257.601d(2) clearly requires the prosecutor to
prove (1) the commission of a moving violation; (2) another
person suffered a serious impairment of a body function; and
(3) a causal link between the bodily injury and the moving
violation, i.e., factual and proximate causation. The statutory
provision is silent with regard to fault or intent. However,
"the failure to include a fault element in the statute does not
end our inquiry. Where the statute does not include language
expressly requiring fault as an element, this Court must focus
on whether the Legislature nevertheless intended to require
fault as a predicate to guilt." People v. Adams, 262 Mich.App
89, 93; 683 N W2d 729 (2004).
In Tombs, 472 Mich. at 452- 453, our Supreme Court noted
that criminal offenses that do not require a criminal intent
are disfavored. "The Court will infer the presence of the
element unless a statute contains an express or implied
indication that the legislative body wanted to dispense with it.
Moreover, the Court has expressly held that the presumption
in favor of a criminal intent or mens rea requirement
applies to each element of a statutory crime." Id. at 454455.
According to Tombs, if there were no mens rea element in a
criminal offense, "the statute could punish otherwise innocent
conduct." Id. at 458.
However, as Justice Cooley early observed in People v. Robv,
52 Mich. 577, 579; 18 NW 365 (1884):
I agree that as a rule there can be no
crime without a criminal intent, but
this is not by any means a universal
rule. One may be guilty of the high
crime of manslaughter when his only
fault is gross negligence, and there are
many other cases where mere neglect
may be highly criminal. Many statutes
which are in the nature of police
regulations, as this is, impose criminal
penalties irrespective of any intent to
violate them, the purpose being to
require a degree of diligence for the

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Our Supreme Court still recognizes that there are

circumstances where the lack of criminal intent does not
preclude a criminal prosecution. In Holtschlag. 471 Mich.
1, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the
mens rea associated with manslaughter when the prosecutor
proceeded on a theory of gross negligence. Citing to People v.
Townsend, 214 Mich. 267. 273-274; 183 NW 177 (1921), and
its discussion regarding the proofs necessary to demonstrate
the "unlawful-act" theory of involuntary manslaughter and
the "lawful-act" theory, the Holtschlag court noted that under
the "unlawful-act" theory:
[I]f the defendant committed an
unlawful act that resulted in death, it is
sufficient to allege the commission of
the unlawful act and the resulting death
whereas, if the defendant committed
a lawful act resulting in death, the
prosecutor must specifically allege
the manner in which the defendant's
actions were grossly or culpably
negligent. That is, under Townsend,
lawful-act manslaughter requires that
the defendant acted with a mens
rea of culpable negligence; whereas
unlawful-act manslaughter does not
require that the defendant acted with
a specific mens rea-all that is required
is that the defendant committed the
unlawful act. [Holtschlag, 471 Mich.
at l7](emphasis in original).
Thus, as observed in Holtschlag, under some circumstances,
the fact that a defendant committed an unlawful act has been
found sufficient to form the basis of a criminal charge, even
where a specific mens rea is absent.
This Court also noted in People v. Janes, 302 Mich.App
34, 42; 836 NW2d 883 (2013), that the Legislature can
constitutionally enact offenses that impose criminal liability
without regard to fault and that whether the Legislature
intended to enact such an offense is generally a matter of
statutory interpretation. These offenses, called strict liability
offenses, are ones "in which the prosecution need only prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the prohibited act, regardless of the defendant's intent and
regardless of what the defendant actually knew or did not

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orig,..11U.f.:

People v. Pace, N.W.2d

(2015)

know." Janes, 302 Mich.App at 41-42 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The distinction between a strict-liability
crime and a general-intent crime is that, for a general-intent
crime, the people must prove that the defendant purposefully
or voluntarily performed the wrongful act, whereas, for a
strict-liability crime, the people merely need to prove that the
defendant performed the wrongful act, irrespective of whether
he intended to perform it. People v. Lardie, 452 Mich. 231,
241; 551 NW2d 656, 660 61 (1996), overruled on other
grounds by People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich. 418; 703 NW2d
774 (2005).
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246; 72 S. Ct 240,
246; 96 L. Ed 288 (1952) discusses the origin of criminal
offense charges which disregard any intent. Citing to the
industrial revolution, increased traffic, congestion of cities,
and wide distribution of goods, the Morissette Court noted
that as dangers increased so did duties and regulations and that
lawmakers sought to make the duties and regulations more
effective by imposing criminal sanctions in some cases. Id. at
252-255. These "public welfare offenses" do not necessarily
result in a direct or immediate injury to person or property
"but merely create the danger or probability of it which the
law seeks to minimize." Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256.
[W]hatever the intent of the violator,
the injury is the same, and
the consequences are injurious or
not according to fortuity. Hence,
legislation applicable to such offenses,
as a matter of policy, does not specify
intent as a necessary element. The
accused, if he does not will the
violation, usually is in a position
to prevent it with no more care
than society might reasonably expect
and no more exertion than it might
reasonably exact from one who
assumed his responsibilities. Also,
penalties commonly are relatively
small, and conviction does not grave
damage to an offender's reputation.
Under such considerations, courts
have turned to construing statutes and
regulations which make no mention of
intent as dispensing with it and holding
that the guilty act alone makes out the
crime. [Id. at 256.]

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The purpose of imposing criminal penalties in this class

of regulation is "to require a degree of diligence for
the protection of the public which shall render violation
impossible." Id. at 257. Examples of such strict-liability
offenses include narcotics laws, traffic laws, adulterated food
or drug laws, criminal nuisances, and liquor control laws.
People v. Nasir, 255 Mich.App 38, 42; 662 NW2d 29 (2003).
"Courts in this country have almost universally held that
traffic violations are strict liability offenses, in which the
motorist's negligence or lack of intent to commit the infraction
is irrelevant." People v. Jones, 132 Mich.App 368, 370; 347
NW2d 235 (1984). For example, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed an Ohio statute defining involuntary
manslaughter as causing death during the commission of a
misdemeanor driving offense, without a separate mens rea
requirement in Stanley v. Turner, 6 F3d 399 (CA 6, 1993).
The Sixth Circuit noted that:
[w]here a criminal statute prohibits
and punishes conduct not innocent or
innocuous in itself, the criminal intent
element may be dispensed with if the
criminal statute is designed for the
protection of the public health and
safety and if it has no common law
background that included a particular
criminal intent. Because citizens are
presumed to know the ordinary traffic
safety laws and that violating them
is dangerous and wrong, Ohio's
involuntary manslaughter statute, as
applied in this case, is based on the
obviously wrongful and blameworthy
conduct of violating traffic safety
laws. [Id. at 404.]
As the Court in Stanley recognized, our Legislature is entitled
to enact public welfare statutes, such as those regulating
traffic, that dispense with the requirement of mens rea on the
basis that citizens are presumed to know the ordinary traffic
safety laws and that violating them is dangerous. Id.
Based upon the above, it may be inferred from the
Legislature's use of the term "moving violation," without
any reference to a mens rea requirement, that it intended
to dispense with the criminal intent element and make
committing a moving violation causing serious impairment
of a body function a strict liability offense. The Legislature

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People v. Pace, --- N.W.2d

(2015)

is presumed to be aware of and to legislate in harmony with

existing jurisprudence. People v. Cash, 419 Mich. 230, 241;
351 NW2d 822 (1984). The requirement that a defendant have
committed a moving violation in order to be charged with and
convicted of a violation of MCL 257.601d clearly indicates
that public welfare is at issue. "[I]it is the motorist's duty in the
use and operation of his automobile to exercise ordinary and
reasonable care and caution, that is, that degree of care and
caution which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would
exercise under the same or similar circumstances." Zarzecki
v. Hatch, 347 Mich. 138, 141; 79 NW2d 605 (1956). The
commission of a moving violation indicates that the motorist
failed to do so, regardless of intent, and, as previously
indicated, the violation of a traffic law is typically a strictliability offense. Nasir, 255 Mich.App at 42. Thus, MCL
257.601d is strict liability offense. 1
Because the Legislature impliedly intended to make MCL
257.601d a strict liability offense, the prosecution is required
to prove solely (1) the commission of a moving violation;
(2) another person suffered a serious impairment of a body
function; and (3) a causal link between the bodily injury and
the moving violation, i.e., factual and proximate causation.
The prosecution is not required to also prove that defendant
operated his vehicle in a negligent manner, and the trial court
erred in so concluding.
After reaching the conclusion that the prosecution is not
required to prove negligence, we next consider whether
MCL 257.601d is constitutional. Constitutional questions are
generally reviewed de novo by this Court. People v. Conat,
238 Mich.App 134, 144; 605 NW2d 49 (1999).
"[T]he United States Supreme Court has recognized as a
general matter that the constitution does not preclude the
enactment of even strict liability criminal statutes." People
v. Quinn, 440 Mich. 178, 185; 487 NW2d 194 (1992), citing
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225; 78 S. Ct 240; 2 L. Ed
2d 228 (1957). See also Janes, 302 Mich.App at 42, citing
Quinn, 440 Mich. at 188 ("Our Supreme Court has recognized
that the Legislature can constitutionally enact offenses that
impose criminal liability without regard to fault."). This
is especially the case with public welfare regulations, as
previously discussed. There does not appear to be a wellsettled test for determining when such a strict liability crime
offends due process. However, this Court has previously
stated that " '[t]he elimination of the element of criminal
intent does not violate the due process clause where (1) the

penalty is relatively small, and (2) where conviction does not

gravely besmirch.' " People v. Olson, 181 Mich.App 348,
352; 448 NW2d 845 (1989), quoting United States v. Wulff
758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (CA 6, 1985). See also Lardie, 452 Mich.
at 255 (noting that penalties for public welfare offenses are
generally "relatively small" and do no "grave damage to an
offender's reputation").
There is no question that the Legislature has the constitutional
authority to enact MCL 257.601d as a strict liability offense
concerning public welfare. Lambert, 355 U.S. 225; Quinn,
440 Mich. at 188; Janes, 302 Mich.App at 42. We are satisfied
that imposing strict liability for the offense of committing
a moving violation causing serious impairment of a body
function does not offend due process. First, the offense is
a misdemeanor; that is, despite the severe harm that such
an offense inflicts upon the victim, it is punishable only by
imprisonment for not more than 93 days and/or a fine of
not more than $500. The penalty is thus relatively small.
See People v. Adams, 262 Mich.App 89, 98-99; 683 NW2d
729 (2004) (upholding a strict liability crime of failing to
pay child support despite a potential four-year jail term);
People v. Motor City Hosp. & Surgical Supply, Inc., 227
Mich.App 209, 210; 575 NW2d 95 (1997) (upholding a strict
liability crime despite a potential punishment of four years'
imprisonment and a $30,000 fine). Second, because the crime
is a misdemeanor only, it is far less likely to "besmirch"
the defendant. Cf Wulff, 758 F.2d at 1125 ("[A] felony
conviction irreparably damages one's reputation[.]"). Thus,
we conclude that it does not offend due process to hold
individuals strictly liable for committing moving violations
that cause serious impairment to a body function in another
individual.
In sum, MCL 257.601d imposes strict liability upon a
motorist who commits a moving violation causing serious
impairment of a body function to another person and the
statute is constitutional. The prosecution is not required to
prove that defendant operated his vehicle in a negligent
manner, and the trial court erred in so concluding.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

All Citations
---N.W.2d

2015 WL 3511912

.3stliavvNexft' 2015 Thom ,on Ret tiers No or ;'n to onginal U.S. ,over-, nerd Works.

People v. Pace, --- N.W.2d -- (2015)

Footnotes
This conclusion is also supported by the legislative history. We recognize that Legislative bill analyses "are 'generally
unpersuasive tool [s] of statutory construction' " and "do not necessarily represent the views of any individual legislator."
Kinder Morgan Mich, LLC v. Jackson, 277 Mich.App 159, 170; 744 NW2d 184 (2007) (citation omitted). However, they
"do have probative value in certain, limited circumstances." Id.
MCL 257.601d was added to the Motor Vehicle Code by 2008 PA 463, effective October 31, 2010. At the same time that
MCL 257.601d was added, the offenses of Felonious Driving, MCL 750.325, and Negligent Homicide, MCL 257.626c,
were repealed. The Legislative bill analyses, attached to the prosecution's brief, suggest that the changes were made
in response to concerns by legislators that
[t]he current standard for determining whether a person is guilty of negligent homicide or felonious driving is
ambiguous, based on whether the person operated the vehicle in a careless, reckless or negligent manner. The
language prescribing those offenses is antiquated and based on common law notions of negligence. Applying
those concepts to criminal law creates some uncertainty about what constitutes a violation, leading to inconsistent
enforcement of the law. For example, a driver who loses control of a car on an icy overpass and is involved in a
fatal accident could have foreseen the possibility that the bridge might be icy, and therefore could be charged with

negligent homicide, although most people would not consider that to be appropriate in such a case. The bill would
remove that ambiguity, and instead enact prohibitions under which a person would not be guilty of a criminal offense
unless a moving violation had occurred. This would reduce inconsistencies in the application of the law and clarify
proscribed conduct.[Senate Fiscal Analysis, SB 104 (as passed by the senate), August 5, 2008, available at http://
www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2007-2008/ billanalysis/Senate/htm/2007SFA-0104B.htm (accessed March
26, 2015).]
The above analysis supports a conclusion that in enacting MCL 257.601 and repealing the Felonious Driving and
Negligent Homicide statutes, the Legislature sought to erase uncertainty as to what conduct was punishable by
removing any consideration of whether a motorist's conduct was careless, reckless, or negligent, and instead focusing
solely on whether the motorist committed a moving violation.
-
2015
1
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Reuters.
No
claim
to
original U.S. Government Works.
(c)

End of Document

Next'' 21

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ATTACHMENT 4

Legislative Analysis
MOVING VIOLATIONS: DEATH OR INJURY

Mitchell Bean, Director

Phone: (517) 373-8080
http://www.house.mi.gov/hfa

House Bill 6627 as enrolled

Public Act 444 of 2008
Sponsor: Rep. Fred Miller

Senate Bill 1578 as enrolled

Public Act 442 of 2008
Sponsor: Sen. Valde Garcia

House Bill 6629 as enrolled

Public Act 466 of 2008
Sponsor: Rep. Frank Accavitti, Jr.

Senate Bill 1580 as enrolled

Public Act 446 of 2008
Sponsor: Sen. Michael Switalski

House Bill 6630 as enrolled

Public Act 467 of 2008
Sponsor: Rep. Paul Opsommer

Senate Bill 1581 as enrolled

Public Act 465 of 2008
Sponsor: Sen. Jason E. Allen

Senate Bill 1576 as enrolled

Public Act 468 of 2008
Sponsor: Sen. Valde Garcia

Senate Bill 104 as enrolled

Public Act 463 of 2008
Sponsor: Sen. Valde Garcia

House Committee: Transportation

Senate Committee: Transportation
Complete to 7-24-09
A SUMMARY OF HOUSE BILLS 6627, 6629-6630, AND SENATE BILLS 104, 1576, 1578,
1580-1581 AS ENROLLED
Each of the House bills is tie-barred to Senate Bill 104, which would amend the Michigan
Vehicle Code to establish penalties for moving violations that seriously injure or kill another
person, and would repeal existing sections of law that provide penalties for felonious driving
and negligent homicide. (Senate Bill 104 is described in more detail later.)
The House bills, and a set of accompanying Senate bills, would amend other acts to make
complementary amendments, including requiring background checks that would prohibit the
employment of individuals in certain kinds of health care facilities if they have been
convicted of a moving violation that caused the death of another person within the previous
five years. Most of the bills take effect October 31, 2010.
The main bill in the package is Senate Bill 104, which amends the Michigan Vehicle Code to
establish penalties for moving violations that seriously injure or kill another person, as
follows:
o

A moving violation that causes serious impairment of a body function of another

person is a misdemeanor punishable by up imprisonment for to 93 days or a
maximum fine of $500, or both.
A moving violation that causes the death of another person is a misdemeanor
punishable by imprisonment for up to one year or a maximum fine of $2,000, or both.

Analysis available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov

Page 1 of 4

o Reckless driving that causes serious impairment of a body function of another person
is a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to five years or a fine of between
$1,000 and $5,000, or both, and vehicle immobilization.
o Reckless driving that causes the death of another person is a felony punishable by
imprisonment for up to 15 years or a fine of $2,500 to $10,000, or both, and vehicle
immobilization.
Senate Bill 104 also does the following:
o Requires the Secretary of State (SOS) to assign six points to a person's driving record
for any of the above offenses, and four points for a moving violation resulting in an
at-fault collision.
o Requires a person convicted of any of the above offenses to pay a $1,000 driver
responsibility fee each year for two consecutive years.
o Requires the SOS to revoke a person's license if he or she is convicted of reckless
driving that causes the death or serious impairment of a body function of another
person.
o Requires the SOS to suspend a person's license for one year if he or she is convicted
of a moving violation that causes the death or serious impairment of a body function
of another person.
o Eliminates the offenses of felonious driving and negligent homicide.
o Requires the SOS to suspend a person's license for one year if he or she is convicted
of operating a vehicle which a blood alcohol content of 0.17 grams or more. -Permits the SOS, 45 days after suspending a person's license under that provision, to
issue the person a restricted license to operate a vehicle with an ignition interlock
device.
o Requires the civil fine for a moving violation that resulted in an at-fault collision to
be increased by $25, not to exceed $100.
For additional information on Senate Bill 104, see the documents from the Senate Fiscal
Agency (including the summary of the bill as enacted dated 6-29-09 and an earlier, more
detailed explanation of the issue and of the Senate-passed version of the bill dated 8-5-08.)
The following are the associated House and Senate bills.
House Bill 6627 amends the Public Health Code (MCL 333.20173a), to prohibit certain
health facilities and agencies, psychiatric hospitals, and intermediate care facilities for people
with mental retardation from employing, independently contracting with, or granting clinical
privileges to an individual who provided services to or had regular access to patients or
residents in the facility or agency, if the individual had been convicted of a moving violation
that caused the death of another person within the previous five years.
House Bill 6629 amends the Code of Criminal Procedure (MCL 769.1t) to permit the court to
order reimbursement to the state or local unit of government for related expenses incurred in
relation when an individual is convicted either of either a moving violation that caused the
death of or serious injury to another person or of reckless driving that caused the death of or
serious injury to another person.

Analysis available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov

Moving Violations package Page 2 of 4

House Bill 6630 amends the Code of Criminal Procedure (MCL 777.12g and 777.16p) to
revise sentencing guidelines for violations involving the operation of a motor vehicle,
creating two new crimes having statutory maximum penalties of 5 and 15 years in prison,
respectively.
Senate Bill 1576 amends the Insurance Code to require the automobile insurance placement
facility, as part of its merit-based insurance plan, to include a surcharge for a moving
violation that causes the death of another person.
Senate Bill 1578 amends the Adult Foster Care Facility Licensing Act to prohibit an adult
foster care facility from employing or contracting with an individual who provides services to
or has regular access to residents of the facility if the individual was convicted of a moving
violation that caused the death of another person within the previous five years.
Senate Bill 1580 amends the Mental Health Code to prohibit psychiatric hospitals and
intermediate care facilities for people with mental retardation from employing, independently
contracting with, or granting clinical privileges to an individual who provides services to or
has regular access to patients or residents, if the individual was convicted of a that caused the
death of another person within the previous five years.
Senate Bill 1581 amended Part 821 (Snowmobiles) of the Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Act (NREPA) to require the SOS to order a person not to operate a
snowmobile for one year if he or she has been convicted of reckless driving that causes the
death of or serious injury to another person.
Senate Bill 1581 took effect on January 1, 2009. The remaining bills will take effect on
October 31, 2010.
FISCAL IMPACT:
In general, the bills would not appear to have a significant fiscal impact on the state or local
units of government. House Bill 6629 would have an indeterminate, but likely positive,
fiscal impact on state and local government.
For Senate Bill 104 and House Bill 6630, the bills' fiscal impact on state and local justice
systems would depend on how they affected numbers of misdemeanor and felony convictions
and severity of sentences. Statute establishing the two-year misdemeanor of negligent
homicide would be repealed, as would the provision for the two-year offense of felonious
driving. New felonies associated with reckless driving causing death or serious impairment
would be created, as would new misdemeanors for moving violations that caused death or
serious impairment.
Changes in the number of felons sentenced to prison or probation would affect the
Department of Corrections (MDOC). The average annual cost of prison incarceration is
about $32,000 per prisoner, a figure that includes various fixed operational and
administrative costs. Annual costs of parole and probation supervision (exclusive of any
costs of electronic tether) average about $2,100 per supervised offender. Changes in the
numbers of felons sentenced to jail would affect counties; those costs vary by county.

Analysis available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov

Moving Violations package Page 3 of 4

Generally, misdemeanor sanctions are a local responsibility; costs associated with increases
in the number of misdemeanants sentenced to jail or misdemeanor probation supervision are
borne by local units and vary with jurisdiction. Unlike other misdemeanors, however, twoyear misdemeanors are subject to sentencing guidelines and offenders placed on probation for
two-year misdemeanors are supervised by MDOC probation agents; counties can incur costs,
however, if such offenders are sentenced to jail.
There are no data to indicate how many offenders might be affected by new misdemeanors
and felonies to be created by the legislation. However, in 2007, there were 93 sentences for
negligent homicide and 35 sentences for felonious driving. Of the 93 sentences for negligent
homicide, 18 were to prison, 53 were to probation, 13 were to jail, and 9 were to some other
sanction such as the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act. Of the 35 sentences for felonious
driving, 5 were prison, 24 were probation, 3 were jail, and 3 "other."
Any changes in collections of penal fine revenues could affect local libraries, which are the
constitutionally-designated recipients of those revenues.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION:
These bills address concerns that the standards for determining whether a person is guilty of
negligent homicide or felonious driving are ambiguous, leading to inconsistent enforcement
and uncertainty among members of the public as to what the penalties for certain actions will
be. Further, it has been recommended that driving offenses causing death or serious injury
should carry higher penalties than exist currently, to discourage reckless behavior while
operating a vehicle and to reduce the number of fatal or injurious accidents. Concerns have
also been expressed that the language describing those two offenses is outmoded and should
be replaced with updated language in the Vehicle Code that would be consistent with other
provisions of that statute.
For additional information on Senate Bill 104, see the documents from the Senate Fiscal
Agency (including the summary of the bill as enacted dated 6-29-09 and an earlier, more
detailed explanation of the issue and of the Senate-passed version of the bill dated 8-5-08.)

Legislative Analyst: J. Hunault

Fiscal Analyst: Ben Gielczyk
Margaret Alston
Kevin Koorstra
Marilyn Peterson
This analysis was prepared by nonpartisan House staff for use by House members in their deliberations, and does
not constitute an official statement of legislative intent.

Analysis available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov

Moving Violations package Page 4 of 4

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TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS: PENALTIES S.B. 104 (S-3):

ANALYSIS AS PASSED BY THE SENATE
[Please see the PDF version of this analysis, if available, to view this image.]

Senate Bill 104 (Substitute S-3 as passed by the Senate)

Sponsor: Senator Valde Garcia
Committee: Transportation

Date Completed: 8-5-08

RATIONALE

Reckless driving, which involves operating a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of
people or property, is a misdemeanor under the Michigan Vehicle Code. Felonious driving under the
Vehicle Code, and negligent homicide under the Michigan Penal Code, are similar violations that
involve the serious injury or death of another person, respectively. Some are concerned that the
standards for determining whether a person is guilty of negligent homicide or felonious driving are
ambiguous, leading to inconsistent enforcement and uncertainty among members of the public as to
what the penalties for certain actions will be. In addition, some have suggested that the language
describing those two offenses is outmoded, and should be replaced with updated language in the
Vehicle Code that would be consistent with other provisions of that statute. Further, it has been
suggested that driving offenses causing death or serious injury should carry higher penalties than
exist currently, to discourage reckless behavior while operating a vehicle and to reduce the number
of fatal or injurious accidents.
CONTENT

The bill would amend the Michigan Vehicle Code to establish penalties for moving violations
that seriously injured or killed another person, as follows:
-- A moving violation that caused serious impairment of a body function of another person
would be a misdemeanor punishable by up to 93 days and/or $500.
-- A moving violation that caused the death of another person would be a misdemeanor
punishable by imprisonment for up to one year or a maximum fine of $2,000, or both.
-- Reckless driving that caused serious impairment of a body function of another person
would be a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to five years or a fine of at least $1,000
but not more than $5,000, or both, and vehicle immobilization.
-- Reckless driving that caused the death of another person would be a felony punishable by
imprisonment for up to 15 years or a fine of at least $2,500 but not more than $10,000, or
both, and vehicle immobilization.

Also, for the offenses described above, the bill would require the Secretary of State to do the
following:
-- Suspend or revoke the offender's driver license.
-- Assess a driver responsibility fee of $1,000 each year for two consecutive years. -- Record
six points on the offender's driving record.
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In addition, for a moving violation resulting in an at-fault collision with another vehicle, a
person, or any other object, the bill would increase the civil penalty from $100 to $125 and
require the SOS to record four points.
The bill would repeal sections of the Vehicle Code and the Michigan Penal Code that prescribe
penalties for felonious driving and negligent homicide, respectively.
The bill would take effect October 31, 2010, and is described in detail below.

Reckless Driving

Under the Michigan Vehicle Code, a person who drives a vehicle on a highway, parking area, frozen
lake, stream or pond, or other place open to the public, in willful or wanton disregard for the safety
of people or property is guilty of reckless driving, a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for
up to 93 days or a maximum fine of $500, or both.

Under the bill, if a person operated a vehicle in violation of this provision and by the operation of
the vehicle caused serious impairment of a body function to another person, the violator would be
guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to five years or a fine of not less than $1,000
or more than $5,000, or both.

If a person who operated a vehicle in violation of the reckless driving provision and by the
operation of the vehicle caused the death of another person, the violator would be guilty of a felony
punishable by imprisonment for up to 15 years or a fine of at least $2,500 but not more than
$10,000, or both. In a prosecution under this provision, the jury could not be instructed regarding
the crime of moving violation causing death.

In either case, the judgment of sentence could impose the sanction permitted under Section 625n of
the Code. (Under that section, a sentence for certain violations may require the forfeiture of the
vehicle if it is owned by the defendant, or the return of the vehicle to the lessor if the defendant
leases the vehicle.) If the vehicle were not ordered forfeited, the court would have to order vehicle
immobilization in the judgment of sentence.

In addition, the SOS would have to record six points on the person's driving record.

Moving Violation Causing Death or Serious Impairment

Under the bill, a person who committed a moving violation that caused the death of another person
would be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to one year or a maximum
fine of $2,000, or both. A person who committed a moving violation that caused serious impairment
of a body function to another person would be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment
for up to 93 days or a maximum fine of $500, or both.

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As used in these provisions, "moving violation" would mean an act or omission prohibited under the
Code or a substantially corresponding local ordinance that occurred while a person was operating a
motor vehicle, and for which the person was subject to a fine.

These provisions would not prohibit the person from being charged with, convicted of, or punished
for any other violation of law.

In addition, the SOS would have to record six points on the person's driving record.

Suspension & Revocation

The bill would require the SOS to suspend a person's license for one year upon receiving a record of
the person's conviction for a moving violation that caused serious impairment of a body function to
another person or the death of another person.

Currently, the SOS must suspend a person's license for one year for a violation of the reckless
driving provision (Section 626 of the Code). The bill would retain that provision, although the SOS
would have to revoke a person's license and deny issuance of a license to a person who had been
convicted of reckless driving that caused serious impairment of a body function to another person
or the death of another person.

Driver Responsibility Fee

The Code requires the SOS to assess a driver responsibility fee of $500 each year for two
consecutive years for an individual who is found guilty of reckless driving. The bill would retain that
provision but require the SOS to assess a driver responsibility fee of $1,000 each year for two
consecutive years for reckless driving or a moving violation that caused the death or serious
impairment of a body function of another person. (The $1,000 fee currently applies to negligent
homicide, manslaughter, or a felony resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle.)

Vehicle Immobilization; Prior Conviction

Under the Code, the court must order vehicle immobilization for a minimum of one and a maximum
of three years for a conviction of certain violations related to driving while intoxicated, driving while
visibly impaired, or driving after ingesting a Schedule 1 controlled substance, within 10 years after
two or more prior convictions. The bill would remove the 10-year limit for the prior convictions, and
would include as a "prior conviction" a conviction for reckless driving or a moving violation that
caused the death or serious impairment of a body function of another person.

Such a conviction also would be considered a prior conviction in provisions concerning license
suspension or revocation, and penalties for drunk driving offenses.

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Under the Code, if a person admits responsibility for a civil infraction "with explanation", the judge
or district court magistrate may order the person to pay a civil fine of up to $100 and court costs.

Under the bill, if the civil infraction were a moving violation that resulted in an at-fault collision with
another vehicle, a person, or any other object, that fine would be increased by $25.

Also, for a moving violation that resulted in an at-fault collision with another vehicle, a person, or
any other object, the SOS would have to record four points on the operator's driving record.

Chemical Testing

Under the bill, a person who was arrested for reckless driving or a moving violation that caused the
death or serious impairment of a body function of another person would be considered to have
given consent to chemical tests of his or her blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining
the amount of alcohol or presence of a controlled substance in his or her blood or urine.

Currently, this applies to a person arrested for felonious driving or negligent homicide, terms the
bill would replace.

Repeals

The bill would repeal Section 626c of the Vehicle Code, which provides that a person who operates a
vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor
vehicles, carelessly and heedlessly in willful and wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others,
or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner that endangers or is likely
to endanger any person or property, that results in the serious impairment of a body function of a
person but does not cause death, is guilty of felonious driving punishable by imprisonment for up to
two years or a maximum fine of $2,000, or both.

The bill also would repeal Sections 324 and 325 of the Michigan Penal Code. Section 324 establishes
a penalty for negligent homicide. Under that section, any person who causes the death of another,
by operation of a vehicle at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent
manner, but not willfully or wantonly, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for
up to two years or a maximum fine of $2,000, or both.

Under Section 325, the crime of negligent homicide must be deemed to be included within every
crime of manslaughter charged to have been committed in the operation of any vehicle, and in any
case in which the defendant is charged with manslaughter committed in the operation of any
vehicle, if the jury finds the defendant not guilty of manslaughter, it may render a verdict of guilty
of negligent homicide.

MCL 257.303 et al.

ARGUMENTS (Please note: The arguments contained in this analysis originate from sources outside
the Senate Fiscal Agency. The Senate Fiscal Agency neither supports nor opposes legislation.)
Supporting Argument The current standard for determining whether a person is guilty of negligent
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homicide or felonious driving is ambiguous, based on whether the person operated the vehicle in a
careless, reckless or negligent manner. The language prescribing those offenses is antiquated and
based on common law notions of negligence. Applying those concepts to criminal law creates some
uncertainty about what constitutes a violation, leading to inconsistent enforcement of the law. For
example, a driver who loses control of a car on an icy overpass and is involved in a fatal accident
could have foreseen the possibility that the bridge might be icy, and therefore could be charged
with negligent homicide, although most people would not consider that to be appropriate in such a
case. The bill would remove that ambiguity, and instead enact prohibitions under which a person
would not be guilty of a criminal offense unless a moving violation had occurred. This would reduce
inconsistencies in the application of the law and clarify proscribed conduct.

The penalties under the bill also would be an increase over the current penalties for felonious
driving and negligent homicide, which could deter drivers from driving recklessly. The current
penalties are too low and do not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offenses. Injuries
sustained in an automobile accident can have a life-changing impact on the injured party, while the
person responsible for the accident might be subject only to a traffic citation. Motorcyclists in
particular are at risk of serious injury or death in an accident, and although there have been various
initiatives to alert drivers to motorcyclists, one effective way to reduce the incidence of accidents
would be to make drivers aware that they could be subject to significant criminal penalties for a
traffic violation that resulted in the serious injury or death of another person.

The penalties under the bill also would be consistent with the enhanced penalties for drivers who
cause injury to or the death of a highway construction worker in a work zone or agricultural worker
moving farm equipment on a highway, enacted under Public Acts 103 and 104 of 2001.

Legislative Analyst: Curtis Walker FISCAL IMPACT

The bill would have an indeterminate fiscal impact on State and local government. Local units would
incur the cost of misdemeanor probation and incarceration in local facilities, which vary by county.
The State would incur the cost of felony probation at an average annual cost of $2,000, and the cost
of incarceration in a State facility, at an average annual cost of $31,000. Penal fine revenue would
benefit public libraries.

There would be minimal programming costs to update the Secretary of State's computer systems in
order to code them for the violations in question. The bill could generate license reinstatement fee
revenue. The $125 reinstatement fee remains within the Secretary of State's budget to be used at
the discretion of the Secretary of State.

Fiscal Analyst: Joe Carrasco

Lindsay Hollander
Analysis was prepared by nonpartisan Senate staff for use by the Senate in its deliberations and does not constitute an official
statement of legislative intent. sb104/ 0708

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STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE 86TH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF GRAND TRAVERSE
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
File No.: 15-0919-ST
Hon. Thomas J. Phillips

PLAINTIFF,

PROOF OF SERVICE

ALYSSA MICHELE GOCH,

DEFENDANT.
KIT THOLEN (P76948)
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
324 Court Street
Traverse City, MI 49684
(231) 922-4600
JESSE L. WILLIAMS (P69264)
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 30
Benzonia, MI 49616
(231) 929-8340

I certify that on the date below, I served a copy of PEOPLE'S MOTION IN LIMINE
TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO MRE 402, via e-mail, upon Jesse L.
Williams, Attorney for Defendant, at jlwdefenseggmail.com.
I declare that the statements above are true to the best of my information, knowledge
and belief.
November 12, 2015
Nancy E. S dlacek, Misd Legal Secretary
Grand Traverse County Prosecutor's Office
324 Court Street
Traverse City, MI 49684
(231) 922-4601