Cause of Action (Rule 2, Sec 1-6)

G.R. No. 170916 April 27, 2007

CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its President ALBERTO RAMOS, III, HERMAN M.
BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R. BENEDICTO vsERNESTO L. TREYES, JR.
Assailed via petition for review are issuances of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
43, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 04-12284, to wit: Order[1] dated August 26, 2005 which dismissed
petitioners complaint for damages on the ground of prematurity, and Order[2] dated January 2, 2006
which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
In issue is one of law whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can file an
independent action for damages arising after the act of dispossession had occurred.
CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto (petitioners) claimed to
have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public land in Barangay Bulanon, Sagay City, Negros Occidental
even before the notarized separate Fishpond Lease Agreement Nos. 5674,[3] 5694[4] and 5695[5] in
their respective favor were approved in October 2000 by the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of
twenty-five (25) years or until December 31, 2024.
On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly forcibly and
unlawfully entered the leased properties and once inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set
up a barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners fishponds, and harvested several tons of
milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by petitioners.

That on succeeding days, defendants men continued their forage on the

fishponds of the plaintiffs by carting and taking away the remaining full grown milkfish,
fry and fingerlings and other marine products in the fishponds. NOT ONLY THAT, even the
chapel built by plaintiff CGR Corporation was ransacked and destroyed and the materials
taken away by defendants men. Religious icons were also stolen and as an extreme act of
sacrilege, even decapitated the heads of some of these icons;
xxxx
XIII
That the unlawful, forcible and illegal intrusion/destruction of defendant
Ernesto Treyes, Jr. and his men on the fishpond leased and possessed by the plaintiffs is
without any authority of law and in violation of Article 539 of the New Civil Code which
states:
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession;
and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession
by the means established by the laws and rules of the Court.[9] (Underscoring supplied)

and praying for the following reliefs:

On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in
Sagay City separate complaints for Forcible Entry With Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary
Injunction And Damages, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 1331,[6] 1332[7] and 1333,[8] against Ernesto
M. Treyes, Sr. and respondent.

1)
Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff CGR Corporation the sum of at
least P900,000.00 and to plaintiffs Herman and Alberto Benedicto, the sum of at
least P300,000.00 each by way of actual damages and such other amounts as
proved during the trial;

In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC a complaint for
damages against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No, 04-12284, alleging, inter alia,

2)
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 each
as moral damages;

xxxx

3)
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 each
as exemplary damages;

V
That prior to the issuance of the fishpond lease agreement in favor of the
plaintiffs, they had already been in open and continuous possession of the same parcel of
land;

4)
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 as
attorneys fees, and to reimburse plaintiffs with all such sums paid to their counsel
by way of appearance fees.[10] (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss[11] petitioners complaint for damages on three
grounds litis pendentia, res judicata and forum shopping.

VI
As lessee and in possession of the above[-]described fishpond, plaintiffs
have continuously occupied, cultivated and developed the said fishpond and since then,
had been regularly harvesting milkfish, shrimps, mud crabs and other produce of the
fishponds;
VII
That the yearly income of the fishpond of the plaintiff corporation is at least
P300,000.00 more or less, while the yearly income of the fishpond of plaintiff Herman
Benedicto, Sr. is at least P100,000.00 more or less, and the yearly income of the fishpond
of plaintiff Alberto Benedicto is at least P100,000.00 more or less;
VIII
That sometime last November 18, 2000 or thereabout, defendant Ernesto
L. Treyes, Jr. and his armed men and with the help of the blue guards from the Negros
Veterans Security Agency forcibly and unlawfully entered the fishponds of the plaintiffs
and once inside barricaded the entrance of the fishpond and set up barb wire fence along
the road going to plaintiffs fishpond and harvested the milkfish and carted away several
tons of milkfish owned by the plaintiffs;
IX

By the assailed Order[12] of August 26, 2005, Branch 43 of the Bacolod RTC dismissed
petitioners complaint on the ground of prematurity, it holding that a complaint for damages may only
be maintained after a final determination on the forcible entry cases has been made.
Hence, the present petition for review.
The only issue is whether, during the pendency of their separate complaints for forcible
entry, petitioners can independently institute and maintain an action for damages which they claim
arose from incidents occurring after the dispossession by respondent of the premises.
Petitioners meet the issue in the affirmative. Respondents assert otherwise.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 17. Judgment. If after trial the court finds that the
allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of
the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as
arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises, attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that
said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to
recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render
judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs

as justice requires. (Emphasis supplied)

The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to rents or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises or fair rental value of the property
and attorneys fees and costs.[13]
The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas[14] reiterates the long-established rule that the only
form of damages that may be recovered in an action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property:
Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to award
actual, moral, and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment
cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.
Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession,
damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have
sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and
occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have
suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material
possession. x x x[15] (Emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied; citations
omitted)

Market Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been in actual, continuous, and
peaceful physical possession of the Subject Premises until 31 October 1992.
xxxx
3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject Premises, is entitled to the peaceful
occupation and enjoyment of the Subject Premises to the exclusion of all others,
including defendants herein.
3.03 Defendants resort to strong arms tactics to forcibly wrest possession of the
Subject Premises from plaintiff and maintain possession thereof through the use
of force, threat, strategy and intimidation by the use of superior number of men
and arms amounts to the taking of the law into their own hands.
3.04 Thus, defendants act of unlawfully evicting out plaintiff from the Subject
Premises it is leasing from defendant PDC and depriving it of possession thereof
through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation should be condemned
and declared illegal for being contrary to public order and policy.
3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from continuing with their
illegal acts and be ordered to vacate the Subject Premises and restore possession
thereof, together with its contents to plaintiff.
xxxx

Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action.[16]

In asserting the negative of the issue, respondent cites the 1999 case of Progressive
Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[17] In this case, Progressive Development
Corporation, Inc. (Progressive), as lessor, repossessed the leased premises from the lessee allegedly
pursuant to their contract of lease whereby it was authorized to do so if the lessee failed to pay monthly
rentals. The lessee filed a case for forcible entry with damages against Progressive before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. During the pendency of the case, the lessee filed an
action for damages before the RTC, drawing Progressive to file a motion to dismiss based on litis
pendentia. The RTC denied the motion.
On appeal by Progressive, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC order denying the
motion to dismiss.
Progressive brought the case to this Court. Citing Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, this Court reversed the lower courts ruling, it holding that all cases for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial Court which shall include not only the plea for
restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs therefrom. In other words, this
Court held that no claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed
separately and independently of the claim for restoration of possession.[18] (Underscoring supplied)

4.07 Considering that defendants act of forcibly grabbing possession of the

Subject Premises from plaintiff is illegal and null and void, defendant should be
adjudged liable to plaintiff for all the aforedescribed damages which plaintiff
incurred as a result thereof.
The amended complaint for damages filed by private respondent alleges
basically the same factual circumstances and issues as bases for the relief prayed
for, to wit:
4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC entered into a Contract of Lease
for a period of ten years or from January 2, 1989 up to April 30, 1998 over a
property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter referred to as
Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA corner McArthur Street, Araneta
Center, Cubao, Quezon City. A copy of the lease contract is attached hereto as
Annex A.
5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical possession of Subject
Premises, and established thereon the now famous Seafood Market Restaurant.
xxxx

In thus ruling, this Court in Progressive made a comparative study of the therein two
complaints, thus:
A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by
private respondent against petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows
that not only are the elements of res adjudicata present, at least insofar
as the claim for actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but also
that the claim for damagesmoral and exemplary in addition to actual and
compensatoryconstitutes splitting a single cause of action. Since this
runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the
second action becomes imperative.
The complaint for forcible entry contains the following
pertinent allegations
2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a contract of lease with defendant
PDC over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter
Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA corner MacArthur Street,
Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of ten (10) years from 02
January 1989 to 30 April 1998.
2.02 Immediately after having acquired actual physical possession of the Subject
Premises, plaintiff established and now operates thereon the now famous Seafood

7. On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant PDC, without the benefit
of any writ of possession or any lawful court order and with the aid of
approximately forty (40) armed security guards and policemen under the
supervision of defendant Tejam, forcibly entered the subject premises through
force, intimidation, threats and stealth and relying on brute force and in a
thunderboltish manner and against plaintiffs will, unceremoniously drew away all
of plaintiffs men out of the subject premises, thereby depriving herein plaintiff of
its actual, physical and natural possession of the subject premises. The illegal
high-handed manner of gestapo like take-over by defendants of subject premises
is more particularly described as follows: x x x x
8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and hold the Subject
Premises, including all the multi-million improvements, fixtures and equipment
therein owned by plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff. The
actuations of defendants constitute an unlawful appropriation, seizure and taking
of property against the will and consent of plaintiff. Worse, defendants are
threatening to sell at public auction and without the consent, of plaintiff and
without lawful authority, the multi-million fixtures and equipment of plaintiff and
at prices way below the market value thereof. Plaintiff hereby attaches as Annex
B the letter from defendants dated August 6, 1993 addressed to plaintiff,
informing the latter that the former intends to sell at an auction on August 19,
1993 at 2:00 p.m. properties of the plaintiff presently in defendants possession.

SO ORDERED.
xxxx
12. Defendants unlawful takeover of the premises constitutes a violation of its
obligation under Art. 1654 of the New Civil Code requiring the lessor to maintain
the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration
of the contract. Hence, plaintiff has filed the present suit for the recovery of
damages under Art. 1659 of the New Civil Code x x x x[19] (Emphasis in the
original; underscoring supplied)
Analyzing the two complaints, this Court, still in Progressive, observed:
Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action, namely,
the alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of which three (3)
reliefs (denominated by private respondent as its causes of action) arose: (a) the
restoration by the lessor (petitioner herein) of the possession of the leased premises to
the lessee, (b) the claim for actual damages due to the losses suffered by private
respondent such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs stored inside the
premises and the deprivation of the use of the premises causing loss of expected
profits; and, (c) the claim for attorneys fees and costs of suit.
On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award consisting
of (a) moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of another
P500,000.00; (b) actual damages of P20,000.00 and compensatory damages of
P1,000,000.00 representing unrealized profits; and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorneys fees
and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased premises by
petitioner. Since actual and compensatory damages were already prayed for in the
forcible entry case before the MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot be relitigated in the
damage suit before the RTC by reason of res adjudicata.
The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed considering
that these sprung from the main incident being heard before the MeTC. x x
x[20] (Italics in the original; Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears noting, however, that as reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in the

complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their claim for damages have no direct relation to their
loss of possession of the premises. It had to do with respondents alleged harvesting and carting away
several tons of milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds, ransacking and destroying of a
chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious icons and even decapitating the heads
of some of them, after the act of dispossession had occurred.
Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia that the identity between the pending
actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment
rendered on one action will, regardless of which is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration is not present, hence, it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners complaint for
damages.[21]
Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction
over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the premises and attorneys fees.[22]
Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages, the
elements of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in the forcible entry case will
not amount to res judicata in the former.[23]
Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a
result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties
could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated August 26, 2005 and January 2, 2006 issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 04-12284 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, is directed to REINSTATE Civil Case No.
04-12284 to its docket and to conduct proceedings thereon with dispatch.

G.R. No. 123555. January 22, 1999

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and WESTIN
SEAFOOD MARKET, INC.
May the lessee which instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court an action for forcible entry
with damages against its lessor file a separate suit with the Regional Trial Court against the same lessor
for moral and exemplary damages plus actual and compensatory damages based on the same forcible
entry?
On grounds of litis pendencia and forum-shopping, petitioner invokes established jurisprudence
that a party cannot by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case
evade the principle that the same cause of action shall not be litigated twice between the same parties
or their privies.[1] Petitioner therefore prays for reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
27 May 1995, as well as its Resolution dated 17 January 1996 denying reconsideration, which upheld
the denial by the Regional Trial Court of petitioner's motion to dismiss private respondent's damage
suit.
The antecedents: On 27 May 1991 petitioner leased to private respondent Westin Seafood
Market, Inc., a parcel of land with a commercial building thereon located at Araneta Center, Cubao,
Quezon City, for a period of nine (9) years and three (3) months, i.e., from 2 January 1989 to 30 April
1998, with a monthly rental of approximately P600,000.00. The contract contained, among others, the
following pertinent terms and conditions:
EFFECT OF VIOLATIONS
25. LESSEE hereby agrees that all the provisions contained in this Contract shall be deemed as
conditions, as well as covenants, and that this Contract shall be automatically terminated and cancelled
without resorting to court action should LESSEE violate any or all said conditions, including the payment
of Rent, CUSA and other charges indicated in the FLP when due within the time herein stipulated and in
any such cases, LESSEE hereby irrevocably appoints LESSOR, its authorized agents, employees and/or
representatives as his duly authorized attorney-in-fact, even after the termination, expiration or
cancellation of this Contract, with full power and authority to open, enter, repossess, secure, enclose,
fence and otherwise take full and complete physical possession and control of the leased premises and
its contents without resorting to court action and/or to summarily disconnect electrical and/or water
services thereof, and that LESSEE hereby irrevocably empowers LESSOR, his authorized agents,
employees and/or representatives to take inventory and possession of whatever equipment, furniture,
articles, merchandise, appliances, etc., found therein belonging to LESSEE, consignors and/or to any
other persons and to place the same in LESSORs warehouse or any other place at LESSORs discretion
for safekeeping; charging LESSEE the corresponding storage fees therefor; that in case LESSEE fails to
claim said equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise, appliances, etc. from storage and
simultaneously liquidate any liability with LESSOR within seven (7) days from date of said transfer to
LESSORs warehouse, LESSOR is likewise hereby expressly authorized and empowered by LESSEE to
dispose of said property/properties in a public sale through a Notary Public of LESSORs choice and to
apply the proceeds thereof to whatever liability and/or indebtedness LESSEE may have to LESSOR plus
reasonable expenses for the same, including storage fees, and the balance, if any, shall be turned over
to LESSEE; that LESSEE hereby expressly agrees that any or all acts performed by LESSOR, his
authorized agents, employees and/or representatives under the provisions of this Section may not be
the subject of any petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Mandatory Injunction in court, and
that LESSOR and/or his authorized agents, employees, and/or representatives shall be free from any
civil and/or criminal liability or responsibility whatsoever therefor.
TERMINATION OF LEASE
26. Upon the automatic termination of this lease contract, as the case may be, LESSEE shall
immediately vacate and redeliver physical possession of the leased premises, including the keys
appertaining thereto, to LESSOR in good, clean and sanitary condition, reasonable wear and tear
excepted, devoid of all occupants, equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise, etc., belonging to
LESSEE or to any other person except those belonging to LESSOR; that should LESSEE fail to comply
with this provision, LESSOR is hereby given the same rights and power to proceed against LESSEE as
expressly granted in the immediately preceding section.
Private respondent failed to pay rentals despite several demands by petitioner. As of 19
October 1992 the arrearages amounted to P8,608,284.66. Admittedly, non-payment of rentals
constituted breach of their contract; thus, pursuant to the express authority granted petitioner under
the above-quoted Secs. 25 and 26 of the lease agreement, petitioner on 31 October 1992 repossessed
the leased premises, inventoried the movable properties found within and owned by private respondent
and scheduled public auction for the sale of the movables on 19 August 1993 with notice to private
respondent.
On 26 November 1992 private respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City

a complaint against petitioner for forcible entry with damages and a prayer for a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.[2] The case was raffled to Branch 40 presided over by
Judge Guillermo L. Loja Jr. who issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from selling
private respondents properties at a public auction.
On 9 December 1992 Judge Loja inhibited himself from trying the case and directed its transfer
to Branch 34 presided over by Judge Joselito SD Generoso. Soon after, petitioner filed an urgent motion
for the inhibition of Judge Generoso and the immediate reraffle of the case arguing that the summary
transfer of the case to Judge Generoso was irregular as it was not done by raffle.
The motion was granted and the case went to Branch 36 presided over by Judge Francisco D.
Villanueva. Thereafter, on 22 December 1992, at the continuation of the hearing on the issuance of a
writ preliminary mandatory injunction, the parties agreed, among others, on the following: (a) private
respondent would deposit with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank in the name of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 36, the amount of P8,000,000.00 to guarantee the payment of its back
rentals; (b) petitioner would defer the sale of the personal properties of the Westin Seafood Market,
Inc., until a final settlement of the case had been arrived at; (c) petitioner shall allow private
respondent to retrieve all the perishable goods from inside the leased premises like frozen meat,
vegetables and fish, all properly receipted for; (d) petitioner shall allow three (3) maintenance
personnel of private respondent to enter the premises at reasonable working hours to maintain the
restaurant equipment; and (e) the parties shall negotiate for the restoration of the premises to private
respondent, and if no settlement be arrived at on or before January 8, 1993, the hearing on the merits
of the case shall proceed and the disposition of the amount deposited representing the rental
arrearages shall be left to the discretion of the court.
This agreement was incorporated in the order of the court dated 22 December 1992[3] which
in effect terminated for all intents and purposes the incident on the issuance of a preliminary writ of
injunction.
Private respondent did not comply with its undertaking to deposit with the designated bank the
amount representing its back rentals. Instead, with the forcible entry case still pending with the MeTC,
private respondent instituted on 9 June 1993 another action for damages against petitioner with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was raffled to Branch 101 presided over by Judge Pedro T.
Santiago.[4]
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the damage suit on the ground of litis pendencia and forum
shopping. On 2 July 1993, instead of ruling on the motion, Judge Santiago issued an order archiving
the case pending the outcome of the forcible entry case being heard at the MeTC for the reason that
"the damages is (sic) principally anchored on whether or not the defendants (petitioner herein) have
committed forcible entry."[5] On 2 August 1993 petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order and
reiterated its motion to dismiss the suit for damages.
Before petitioner's motion to dismiss could be resolved, private respondent filed with the RTC
on 18 August 1993 an amended complaint for damages. On 14 September 1993 it also filed an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for the Grant of a
Preliminary Prohibitory and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. On the very same day, Judge Santiago
issued an order (a) denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, (b) admitting private respondent's amended
complaint, and (c) granting private respondent's application for a temporary restraining order against
petitioner.
Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition on the ground that Judge Santiago acted in excess of his jurisdiction and/or committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the amended complaint of
private respondent and issuing a restraining order against petitioner; in allowing private respondent to
engage in forum shopping; and, taking cognizance of the action for damages despite lack of
jurisdiction.[6]
But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition due to the failure of petitioner to file a motion
for reconsideration of Judge Santiago's order of 14 September 1993 which, it explained, was a
prerequisite to the institution of a petition for certiorari and prohibition. It also found that the elements
of litis pendencia were lacking to justify the dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC because
despite the pendency of the forcible entry case with the MeTC the only damages recoverable thereat
were those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property and not the kind of damages
being claimed before the RTC which had no direct relation to loss of material possession. It clarified that
since the damages prayed for in the amended complaint with the RTC were those caused by the alleged
high-handed manner with which petitioner reacquired possession of the leased premises and the sale of
private respondents movables found therein, the RTC and not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the action
of damages.[7]

Petitioner, aggrieved by the decision of the appellate court, filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that it erred in (a) finding that petitioner failed
to avail of its plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a prior motion for reconsideration with the RTC; (b)
ruling that the trial judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the action
for damages and injunction despite the pendency of the forcible entry case with the MeTC; and, (c)
ruling that private respondent did not commit forum shopping since the causes of action before the RTC
and MeTC were not identical with each other.
There is merit in the petition. While generally a motion for reconsideration must first be filed
before resorting to certiorari in order to give the lower court an opportunity to correct the errors
imputed to it[8] this rule admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied without considering the
circumstances of the case.[9] The filing of the motion for reconsideration before availing of the remedy
of certiorari is not sine qua non when the issue raised is one purely of law,[10] or where the error is
patent or the disputed order is void,[11] or the questions raised on certiorari are the same as those
already squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower court.
In its motion for dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC petitioner raised the ground
that another action for forcible entry was pending at the MeTC between the same parties involving the
same matter and cause of action. Outrightly rejected by the RTC, the same issue was elevated by
petitioner on certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Clearly, under the prevailing circumstance, any
motion for reconsideration of the trial court would have been a pointless exercise.[12]
We now turn to the issue of whether an action for damages filed with the Regional Trial Court
by the lessee against the lessor should be dismissed on the ground of pendency of another action for
forcible entry and damages earlier filed by the same lessee against the same lessor before the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that any person deprived of the possession
of any land or building by force, indimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld, may bring an action in the proper Municipal
Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, together
with damages and costs. The mandate under this rule is categorical: that all cases for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial Court which shall include not only the plea for
restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom. Otherwise
expressed, no claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed
separately and independently of the claim for restoration of possession.
This is consistent with the principle laid down in Sec. 1, par. (e), of Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court which states that the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause is
a ground for dismissal of an action. Res adjudicata requires that there must be between the action
sought to be dismissed and the other action the following elements: (a) identity of parties or at least
such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2) preceding particulars
should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration.[13]
It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that a
party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule,
if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the other or others.
"Cause of action" is defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 2 as the act of omission by which a party violates a right
of another.[14] These premises obtaining, there is no question at all that private respondent's cause of
action in the forcible entry case and in the suit for damages is the alleged illegal retaking of possession
of the leased premises by the lessor, petitioner herein, from which all legal reliefs arise. Simply stated,
the restoration of possession and demand for actual damages in the case before the MeTC and the
demand for damages with the RTC both arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry by
petitioner into the leased premises.
A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against petitioner
before the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are the elements of res adjudicata present, at least
insofar as the claim for actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but also that the claim for
damages - moral and exemplary in addition to actual and compensatory - constitutes splitting a single
cause of action. Since this runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the
second action becomes imperative.
The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent allegations 2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a contract of lease with defendant PDC over a property

designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter Subject Premises) situated at the corner of
EDSA corner MacArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of ten (10) years from
02 January 1989 to 30 April 1998.

premises by petitioner. Since actual and compensatory damages were already prayed for in the forcible
entry case before the MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot be relitigated in the damage suit before the
RTC by reason of res adjudicata.

2.02 Immediately after having acquired actual physical possession of the Subject Premises, plaintiff
established and now operates thereon the now famous Seafood Market Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff
had been in actual, continuous, and peaceful physical possession of the Subject Premises until 31
October 1992.
xxxx
3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject Premises, is entitled to the peaceful occupation and
enjoyment of the Subject Premises to the exclusion of all others, including defendants herein.
3.03 Defendants resort to strong arms tactics to forcibly wrest possession of the Subject Premises from
plaintiff and maintain possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation by
the use of superior number of men and arms amounts to the taking of the law into their own hands.
3.04 Thus, defendants act of unlawfully evicting out plaintiff from the Subject Premises it is leasing
from defendant PDC and depriving it of possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy
and intimidation should be condemned and declared illegal for being contrary to public order and policy.
3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from continuing with their illegal acts and be ordered
to vacate the Subject Premises and restore possession thereof, together with its contents, to plaintiff.
xxxx
4.07 Considering that defendants act of forcibly grabbing possession of the Subject Premises from
plaintiff is illegal and null and void, defendant should be adjudged liable to plaintiff for all the
aforedescribed damages which plaintiff incurred as a result thereof.
The amended complaint for damages filed by private respondent alleges basically the same
factual circumstances and issues as bases for the relief prayed for, to wit:
4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC entered into a Contract of Lease for a period of ten
years or from January 2, 1989 up to April 30, 1998 over a property designated as Ground Floor,
Seafood Market (hereinafter referred to as Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA corner
McArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City. A copy of the lease contract is attached hereto as
Annex A.
5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical possession of Subject Premises, and
established thereon the now famous Seafood Market Restaurant.
xxxx
7. On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant PDC, without the benefit of any writ of
possession or any lawful court order and with the aid of approximately forty (40) armed security guards
and policemen under the supervision of defendant Tejam, forcibly entered the subject premises through
force, intimidation, threats and stealth and relying on brute force and in a thunderboltish manner and
against plaintiffs will, unceremoniously drew away all of plaintiffs men out of the subject premises,
thereby depriving herein plaintiff of its actual, physical and natural possession of the subject premises.
The illegal, high-handed manner and gestapo like take-over by defendants of subject premises is more
particularly described as follows: x x x
8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and hold the Subject Premises, including all the
multi-million improvements, fixtures and equipment therein owned by plaintiff, all to the damage and
prejudice of plaintiff. The actuations of defendants constitute an unlawful appropriation, seizure and
taking of property against the will and consent of plaintiff. Worse, defendants are threatening to sell at
public auction and without the consent of plaintiff and without lawful authority, the multi-million fixtures
and equipment of plaintiff and at prices way below the market value thereof. Plaintiff hereby attaches
as Annex B the letter from defendants dated August 6, 1993 addressed to plaintiff, informing the latter
that the former intends to sell at an auction on August 19, 1993 at 2:00 p.m. properties of the plaintiff
presently in defendants possession.
xxxx
12. Defendants unlawful takeover of the premises constitutes a violation of its obligation under Art.
1654 of the New Civil Code requiring the lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract. Hence, plaintiff has filed the present suit
for the recovery of damages under Art. 1659 of the New Civil Code x x x x

The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed considering that these
sprung from the main incident being heard before the MeTC. Jurisprudence is unequivocal that when a
single delict or wrong is committed - like the unlawful taking or detention of the property of another there is but one single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated,
and all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint as constituting one single cause of action .
[15] In a forcible entry case, the real issue is the physical possession of the real property. The question
of damages is merely secondary or incidental, so much so that the amount thereof does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the unlawful act of a deforciant in taking possession of a piece
of land by means of force and intimidation against the rights of the party actually in possession thereof
is a delict or wrong, or a cause of action that gives rise to two (2) remedies, namely, the recovery of
possession and recovery of damages arising from the loss of possession, but only to one action. For
obvious reasons, both remedies cannot be the subject of two (2) separate and independent actions, one
for recovery of possession only, and the other, for the recovery of damages. That would inevitably lead
to what is termed in law as splitting up a cause of action.[16] In David v. de la Cruz[17] we observed

Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action, namely, the
alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs
(denominated by private respondent as its causes of action) arose: (a) the restoration by the lessor
(petitioner herein) of the possession of the leased premises to the lessee; (b) the claim for actual
damages due to the losses suffered by private respondent such as the deterioration of perishable
foodstuffs stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the use of the premises causing loss of
expected profits; and, (c) the claim for attorney's fees and costs of suit.

This Court likewise elucidated in New Pangasinan Review, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission[24] that there is forum shopping when the actions involve the same transactions, the
same essential facts and circumstances. The reason behind the proscription of forum shopping is
obvious. This unnecessarily burdens our courts with heavy caseloads, unduly taxes the manpower and
financial resources of the judiciary and trifles with and mocks our judicial processes, thereby adversely
affecting the efficient administration of justice. This condemnable conduct has prompted the Court to
issue circulars[25] ordering among others that a violation thereof shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case or cases without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party
concerned.
The records ineluctably show that the complaint lodged by private respondent with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City contained no certification of non-forum shopping. When petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss the case raising among others the ground of forum shopping it pointed out the

On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award consisting of (a)
moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages
of P20,000,000.00 and compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00 representing unrealized profits; and,
(c) P200,000.00 for attorney's fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased

Herein tenants have but one cause of action against their landlord, their illegal ejectment or removal
from their landholdings, which cause of action however entitles them to two (2) claims or remedies - for
reinstatement and damages. As both claims arise from the same cause of action, they should be
alleged in a single complaint.
A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the amount of damages may be
recovered in one case and the rest, in another.[18] In Bachrach v. Icarangal[19] we explained that the
rule was aimed at preventing repeated litigations between the same parties in regard to the same
subject of the controversy and to protect the defendant from unnecessary vexation. Nemo debet bis
vexari pro una et eadem causa.
What then is the effect of the dismissal of the other action? Since the rule is that all such rights
should be alleged in a single complaint, it goes without saying that those not therein included cannot be
the subject of subsequent complaints for they are barred forever.[20] If a suit is brought for a part of a
claim, a judgment obtained in that action precludes the plaintiff from bringing a second action for the
residue of the claim, notwithstanding that the second form of action is not identical with the first or
different grounds for relief are set for the second suit. This principle not only embraces what was
actually determined, but also extends to every matter which the parties might have litigated in the
case.[21] This is why the legal basis upon which private respondent anchored its second claim for
damages, i.e., Art. 1659 in relation to Art. 1654 of the Civil Code,[22] not otherwise raised and cited by
private respondent in the forcible entry case, cannot be used as justification for the second suit for
damages. We note, not without some degree of displeasure, that by filing a second suit for damages,
private respondent was not only able to press a claim for moral and exemplary damages which by its
failure to allege the same in its suit before the MeTC foreclosed its right to sue on it, but it was also able
to obtain from the RTC, by way of another temporary restraining order, a second reprieve from an
impending public auction sale of its movables which it could not anymore secure from the MeTC before
which the matter of the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction was already closed.
The foregoing discussions provide sufficient basis to petitioner's charge that private
respondent and its counsel in the trial courts committed forum shopping. In Crisostomo v. Securities
and Exchange Commission[23] we ruled There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies x x x with respect
to suits filed in the courts x x x in connection with litigations commenced in the court x x x in
anticipation of an unfavorable x x x ruling and a favorable case where the court in which the second suit
was brought, has no jurisdiction.

absence of the required certification. The amended complaint, as well as the second and third amended
complaints, attempted to rectify the error by invariably stating that there was no other action pending
between the parties involving the same causes of action although there was actually a forcible entry
case pending before the MTC of Quezon City. By its admission of a pending forcible entry case, it is
obvious that private respondent was indulging in forum shopping. While private respondent
conveniently failed to inform the RTC that it had likewise sought damages in the MTC on the basis of
the same forcible entry, the fact remains that it precisely did so, which stratagem was being duplicated
in the second case. This is a compelling reason to dismiss the second case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
27 September 1995 and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated 24 September 1993
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to dismiss Civil Case
No. Q-93-16409, "Westin Seafood Market, Inc. v. Progressive Development Corporation, et al.," and
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City to proceed with the proper disposition of Civil Case No.
6589, "Westin Seafood Market, Inc. v. Progressive Development Corporation, et al.," with dispatch
considering the summary nature of the case. Treble costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-41423 February 23, 1989
LUIS JOSEPH vs HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, PATROCINIO PEREZ, ANTONIO SIOSON,
JACINTO PAGARIGAN, ALBERTO CARDENO and LAZARO VILLANUEVA
Petitioner prays in this appeal by certiorari for the annulment and setting aside of the order, dated July
8, 1975, dismissing petitioner's complaint, as well as the order, dated August 22, 1975, denying his
motion for reconsideration of said dismissal, both issued by respondent Judge Crispin V. Bautista of the
former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III.
Petitioner herein is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 50-V-73 entitled "Luis Joseph vs. Patrocinio Perez,
Domingo Villa y de Jesus, Rosario Vargas, Antonio Sioson, Lazaro Villanueva and Jacinto Pagarigan",
filed before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, and presided over by respondent Judge
Crispin V. Bautista; while private respondents Patrocinio Perez, Antonio Sioson, Jacinto Pagarigan and
Lazaro Villanueva are four of the defendants in said case. Defendant Domingo Villa y de Jesus did not
answer either the original or the amended complaint, while defendant Rosario Vargas could not be
served with summons; and respondent Alberto Cardeno is included herein as he was impleaded by
defendant Patrocinio Perez, one of respondents herein, in her cross-claim.

releasing from liability the following parties, viz: Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Alberto
Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan.
On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno and their insurer, the Insurance
Corporation of the Philippines, paid respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for damages to her cargo truck in
the amount of P 7,420.61.
Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and
Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on
the Instant Case", alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P 7,420.61 by way of
damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and
Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable settlement.
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-defs.' motion dated Dec. 2, 1974 and
Counter Motion" to dismiss. The so-called counter motion to dismiss was premised on the fact that the
release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of the other respondents inured to the benefit of
respondent Perez, considering that all the respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.
On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing the case, and a motion for
the reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this appeal, petitioner contending that respondent judge
erred in declaring that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of respondents Sioson,
Villanueva and Pagarigan inured to the benefit of respondent Perez; ergo, it likewise erred in dismissing
the case.
We find the present recourse devoid of merit.
The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the
judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to
the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage, is untenable.
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant
in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. 3 It is true that a single act or omission can be violative
of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate
and distinct legal obligations. However where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single
cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one
person. 4

The generative facts of this case, as culled from the written submission of the parties, are as follows:
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck with Plate No. 25-2 YT Phil. '73 for conveying
cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. On January 12, 1973, said
cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from Pangasinan.
Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P
9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the National
Highway proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise
proceeding in the same direction. At about the same time, a pick-up truck with Plate No. 45-95 B,
supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent
Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process of overtaking the
tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango
tree. As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. 1

The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the- delict or wrong violating the rights of
one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of
action arises. 5 In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on
his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action
against the different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved
although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not
necessarily Identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by
the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the
rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which,
obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.

The following proceedings thereafter took place: 2

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo
truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro
Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and never was an owner of the pick-up truck
and neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the future.

There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to petitioner. On the evidence
presented in the court below, the trial court found them to be so liable. It is undisputed that petitioner,
in his amended complaint, prayed that the trial court hold respondents jointly and severally liable.
Furthermore, the allegations in the amended complaint clearly impleaded respondents as solidary
debtors. We cannot accept the vacuous contention of petitioner that said allegations are intended to
apply only in the event that execution be issued in his favor. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence
which would countenance such a procedure.

On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of court, filed his amended complaint impleading
respondents Jacinto Pagarigan and a certain Rosario Vargas as additional alternative defendants.
Petitioner apparently could not ascertain who the real owner of said cargo truck was, whether
respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario Vargas, and who was the real owner of said pick-up truck,
whether respondents Antonio Sioson or Jacinto Pagarigan.

The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to petitioner, the full payment made by some
of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from any and all liability to petitioner inevitably
resulted in the extinguishment and release from liability of the other solidary debtors, including herein
respondent Patrocinio Perez.

Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim against her co-defendants for indemnity
and subrogation in the event she is ordered to pay petitioner's claim, and therein impleaded crossdefendant Alberto Cardeno as additional alternative defendant.
On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto
Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid petitioner's claim for injuries
sustained in the amount of P 1,300.00. By reason thereof, petitioner executed a release of claim

The claim that there was an agreement entered into between the parties during the pre-trial conference
that, after such payment made by the other respondents, the case shall proceed as against respondent
Perez is both incredible and unsubstantiated. There is nothing in the records to show, either by way of a
pre-trial order, minutes or a transcript of the notes of the alleged pre-trial hearing, that there was
indeed such as agreement.

WHEREFORE, the challenged orders of the respondent judge are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-16797 February 27, 1963
RODRIGO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL vs SOCORRO A. RAMOS, ET AL
Direct appeal on points of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No.
Q-4232.
The record is to the effect that on 24 November 1958, Rodrigo Enriquez and the spouses Urbano Dizon
and Aurea Soriano de Dizon sold to Socorro A. Ramos, by a notarial deed of even date, eleven (11)
parcels of land situated in Bago Bantay, Quezon City, and covered by their corresponding certificates of
title, for the stipulated price of P101,000.00. The vendee paid P5,000.00 down, P2,500.00 in cash, and
P2,500.00 by a check drawn against the Philippine National Bank, and agreed to satisfy the balance of
P96,000.00 within ninety (90) days. To secure the said balance, the vendee Socorro A. Ramos, in the
same deed of sale, mortgaged the eleven parcels in favor of the vendors. By way of additional security,
Socorro A. Ramos, as attorney-in-fact of her children, Enrique, Antonio, Milagros, and Lourdes, and as
judicial guardian of her minor child Angelita Ramos, executed another mortgage on Lot No. 409 of the
Malinta Estate.
Because of the vendee-mortgagor's failure to comply with some conditions of the mortgage, this action
for foreclosure of the mortgage was filed by the vendors-mortgagees in the court below, on 29 April
1959. Defendant Socorro Ramos moved to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs previously had filed
action against her in the Court of First Instance of Manila on 24 February 1959 for the recovery of
P2,500.00 paid by check as part of the down payment on the price of the mortgaged lands; that at the
time this first suit was filed, the mortgage debt was already accrued and demandable; that plaintiffs
were, therefore, guilty of splitting a single cause of action, and under section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court, the filing of the first action for P2,500.00 was a defense that could be pleaded in abatement of
the second suit. Upon opposition by the plaintiffs, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the
motion to dismiss; but defendant Ramos repleaded the averments as a special defense in her answer.
After trial, on 16 December 1959, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City rendered judgment against
defendant Ramos; ordered her to pay P96,000.00, with 12% interest from 24 February 1959 until
payment, 10% of the amount due as attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit; and further decreed the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties in case of non-payment within ninety (90) days.
Socorro Ramos appealed directly to this Court, and here insists that the action should be dismissed on
account of the alleged splitting of appellee's cause of action, and that the obligation not having fixed a
period, although one was intended, the court below should have set first a date of maturity before
ordering payment or foreclosure.
We find no merit in the appeal.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in the Court of First Instance of Manila
shows that it was based on appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of the check for P2,500.00
she had issued in favor of appellees; while the complaint in the present action was for non-payment of
the balance of P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for P2,500.00 was, therefore, a
distinct debt not covered by the security; and since the mortgage was constituted on lands situated in
Quezon City, the appellees could not ask for its foreclosure in the Manila courts. The two causes of
action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.
On the second assignment of error: the stipulation in the mortgage contract that the obligation for
P96,000.00 was to be
without interest, payable within ninety (90) days from this date, provided that in case of default it shall
bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum,
clearly fixes a date of maturity, the stipulated twelve per cent in case of default being nothing more
than a penalty, designed to induce the debtor to pay on or before the expiration of the ninety (90)
days. Hence, there was no call upon the court to set another due date.
Finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2010
ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, CONSORICIA O. PENSON, RADITO V. PADRIGANO, JEAN R. DE MESA,

LEAH P. DELA CRUZ, ANDY V. MACASAQUIT, SENEN B. CORDOBA, ALBERT BRILLANTES,

GLORIA BISDA, JOVITA V. CONCEPCION, TERESITA G. CARVAJAL, ROSANNA T. MALIWANAG,
RICHARD ODERON, CECILIA ESTERNON, BENEDICTO CABRAL, MA. VICTORIA E. LAROCO,
CESAR ANDRA, FELICISIMO GALACIO, ELSA R. CALMA, FILOMENA A. GALANG, JEAN PAUL
MELEGRITO, CLARO G. SANTIAGO, JR., EDUARDO FRIAS, REYNALDO O. ANDAL, NEPHTALIE
IMPERIO, RUEL BALAGTAS, VICTOR R. ORTIZ, FRANCISCO P. REYES, JR., ELISEO M.
BALAGOT, JR., JOSE C. MONSALVE, JR., ARTURO ADSUARA, F.C. LADRERO, JR., NELSON
PADUA, MARCELA C. SAYAO, ANGELITO MALAKAS, GLORIA RAMENTO, JULIANA SUPLEO,
MANUEL MENDRIQUE, E. TAYLAN, CARMELA BOBIS, DANILO VARGAS, ROY-LEO C. PABLO,
ALLAN VILLANUEVA, VICENTE R. VELASCO, JR., IMELDA ERENO, FLORIZA M. CATIIS, RANIEL
R. BASCO, E. JALIJALI, MARIO C. CARAAN, DOLORES M. AVIADO, MICHAEL P. LAPLANA,
GUILLERMO G. SORIANO, ALICE E. SOJO, ARTHUR G. NARNE, LETICIA SORIANO, FEDERICO
RAMOS, JR., PETERSON CAAMPUED, RODELIO L. GOMEZ, ANTONIO D. GARCIA, JR., ANTONIO
GALO, A. SANCHEZ, SOL E. TAMAYO, JOSEPHINE A.M. COCJIN, DAMIAN QUINTO, JR., EDLYN
MARIANO, M.A. MALANUM, ALFREDO S. ESTRELLA, and JESUS MEL SAYO vs EDUARDO R.
ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
INFORMATION AGENCY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER
The present controversy arose from a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 dated October 25, 2004, issued by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo). Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their
own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the National Printing Office (NPO).
The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former President Corazon C.
Aquino (President Aquino), by virtue of Executive Order No. 285[1] which provided, among others, the
creation of the NPO from the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units
of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA). Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 reads:
SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. There is hereby created a
National Printing Office out of the merger of the Government Printing Office and the
relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency. The Office shall have
exclusive printing jurisdiction over the following:
a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable forms of national,
provincial, city and municipal governments, including government corporations;
b.

Printing of officials ballots;

c.
Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette, General
Appropriations Act, Philippine Reports, and development information materials of the
Philippine Information Agency.
The Office may also accept other government printing jobs, including government
publications, aside from those enumerated above, but not in an exclusive basis.
The details of the organization, powers, functions, authorities, and related
management aspects of the Office shall be provided in the implementing details which
shall be prepared and promulgated in accordance with Section II of this Executive
Order.
The Office shall be attached to the Philippine Information Agency.
On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No.
378, amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction
of the NPO over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. The
pertinent portions of Executive Order No. 378, in turn, provide:
SECTION 1. The NPO shall continue to provide printing services to government
agencies and instrumentalities as mandated by law. However, it shall no
longer enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over the printing services requirements of
the government over standard and accountable forms. It shall have to
compete with the private sector, except in the printing of election
paraphernalia which could be shared with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, upon the
discretion of the Commission on Elections consistent with the provisions of the Election
Code of 1987.
SECTION 2. Government agencies/instrumentalities may source printing services

outside NPO provided that:

2.1 The printing services to be provided by the private sector is superior in quality and
at a lower cost than what is offered by the NPO; and
2.2 The private printing provider is flexible in terms of meeting the target completion
time of the government agency.
SECTION 3. In the exercise of its functions, the amount to be appropriated for
the programs, projects and activities of the NPO in the General Appropriations
Act (GAA) shall be limited to its income without additional financial support
from the government. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are
allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to
the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost
compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in
the General Appropriations Act to its income.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees
of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the
executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former
President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378
violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.
We dismiss the petition.
Before proceeding to resolve the substantive issues, the Court must first delve into a
procedural matter. Since petitioners instituted this case as a class suit, the Court, thus, must first
determine if the petition indeed qualifies as one. In Board of Optometry v. Colet,[2] we held that
[c]ourts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the
requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision
secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those
who were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of
due process.
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so
numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them
which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as
to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the
benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to
protect his individual interest.
From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit
are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all
concerned.
In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company,[3] the Court held that:
An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the
pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and
the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should allege the
existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common
interest, and the existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class,
in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of
the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before
the court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in
the class and to determine whether claimants on record adequately represent
the class and the subject matter of general or common interest. (Emphases ours.)
Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected

by the assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor
General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were about 549 employees in the
NPO.[4] The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO employees whom they
claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of Desistance,
while one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition,[5] ostensibly reducing the number of
petitioners to 34. We note that counsel for the petitioners challenged the validity of the desistance or
withdrawal of some of the petitioners and insinuated that such desistance was due to pressure from
people close to the seat of power.[6] Still, even if we were to disregard the affidavit of desistance filed
by some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a sufficient, representative number of NPO
employees have instituted this purported class suit. A perusal of the petition itself would show that of
the 67 petitioners who signed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20 petitioners
were in fact mentioned in the jurat as having duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. In
other words, only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the present case.
Indeed, in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. ,[7]
we observed that an element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of
representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a
class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the
interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to
the total membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to
speak for the rest of the class.
Previously, we held in Ibaes v. Roman Catholic Church[8] that where the interests of the
plaintiffs and the other members of the class they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the
class suit will not prosper.
It is worth mentioning that a Manifestation of Desistance,[9] to which the previously
mentioned Affidavit of Desistance[10] was attached, was filed by the President of the National Printing
Office Workers Association (NAPOWA). The said manifestation expressed NAPOWAs opposition to the
filing of the instant petition in any court. Even if we take into account the contention of petitioners
counsel that the NAPOWA President had no legal standing to file such manifestation, the said pleading
is a clear indication that there is a divergence of opinions and views among the members of the class
sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing the present suit. There is here an apparent
conflict between petitioners interests and those of the persons whom they claim to represent. Since it
cannot be said that petitioners sufficiently represent the interests of the entire class, the instant case
cannot be properly treated as a class suit.
As to the merits of the case, the petition raises two main grounds to assail the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378:
First, it is contended that President Arroyo cannot amend or repeal Executive Order No.
285 by the mere issuance of another executive order (Executive Order No. 378). Petitioners maintain
that former President Aquinos Executive Order No. 285 is a legislative enactment, as the same was
issued while President Aquino still had legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution;[11] thus,
only Congress through legislation can validly amend Executive Order No. 285.
Second, petitioners maintain that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 would lead
to the eventual abolition of the NPO and would violate the security of tenure of NPO employees.
Anent the first ground raised in the petition, we find the same patently without merit.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to
reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents
constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of
the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,[12] the Court pointed out that Executive Order
No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and
redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the
said Code, is explicit:
Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President

Proper,
including
the
immediate
Offices,
the
President
Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other Departments or agencies. (Emphases ours.)
Interpreting the foregoing provision, we held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, thus:
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department
or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the
very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section
31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may transfer
the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President . In
Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization
involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein,
including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB
is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the
President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize.[13]
(Emphasis ours.)
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press
Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press
Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the
President.[14]
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above
authorizes the President (a) to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the
President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa.
Concomitant to such power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices in the Office of the
President Proper and to transfer functions/offices not only among the offices in the Office of President
Proper but also the rest of the Office of the President and the Executive Branch, the President implicitly
has the power to effect less radical or less substantive changes to the functional and internal structure
of the Office of the President, including the modification of functions of such executive agencies as the
exigencies of the service may require.
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its
functions to be transferred to another agency. Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO
remains the main printing arm of the government for all kinds of government forms and publications
but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now compete
with the private sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception of election
paraphernalia which remains the exclusive responsibility of the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, as the Commission on Elections may determine. At most, there was a mere alteration of
the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity of its printing responsibility to election forms.
[15]
There is a view that the reorganization actions that the President may take with respect
to agencies in the Office of the President are strictly limited to transfer of functions and offices as
seemingly provided in Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code significantly provides:

Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides

otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and
functions vested in the President which are provided for under the
laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not
delegated by the President in accordance with law. (Emphasis ours.)
Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch
under Section 31 includes such powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be
sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the Presidents power to reorganize executive offices has
been consistently supported by specific provisions in general appropriations laws.
In the oft-cited Larin v. Executive Secretary,[16] the Court likewise adverted to certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 7645, the general appropriations law for 1993, as among the statutory
bases for the Presidents power to reorganize executive agencies, to wit:
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the
Executive Branch. The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are
hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the
delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished,
subject to civil [service] rules and regulations. x x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out or
abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the
purpose by the Office of the President.
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and
abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of
functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the
subsequent provision of Section 62, which provides that:
Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational changes. Unless otherwise created by
law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in
key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective
organization structures and be funded from appropriations by this Act.
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to
effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or
agency concerned.
The contention of petitioner that the two provisions are riders deserves scant
consideration. Well settled is the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and
unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes.[17]
(Emphases ours)
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,[18] where the Court upheld as valid then
President Joseph Estradas Executive Order No. 191 deactivating the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of the Department of Finance, hewed closely to the reasoning in Larin. The
Court, among others, also traced from the General Appropriations Act[19] the Presidents authority to
effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive structure, thus:
We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the
authority of the President to effect organizational changes in the department or agency
under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of
Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads of departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a
comprehensive review of their respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions,
programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify activities which
are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled
down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the
streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their
respective agencies. Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the actual
streamlining and productivity improvement in agency organization and operation shall
be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the
President. x x x.[20] (Emphasis ours)
Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General Appropriations Act, which was reenacted
in 2004 (the year of the issuance of Executive Order No. 378), likewise gave the President the
authority to effect a wide variety of organizational changes in any department or agency in the

Executive Branch. Sections 77 and 78 of said Act provides:

Section 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by
the President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units
in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational
structures and funded from appropriations provided by this Act.
Section 78. Institutional Strengthening and Productivity Improvement in Agency
Organization and Operations and Implementation of Organization/Reorganization
Mandated by Law. The Government shall adopt institutional strengthening and
productivity improvement measures to improve service delivery and enhance
productivity in the government, as directed by the President of the Philippines. The
heads of departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and other entities of the Executive
Branch shall accordingly conduct a comprehensive review of their respective
mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and systems
and procedures; identify areas where improvements are necessary; and implement
corresponding structural, functional and operational adjustments that will
result in streamlined organization and operations and improved performance
and productivity: PROVIDED, That actual streamlining and productivity improvements
in agency organization and operations, as authorized by the President of the Philippines
for the purpose, including the utilization of savings generated from such activities, shall
be in accordance with the rules and regulations to be issued by the DBM, upon
consultation with the Presidential Committee on Effective Governance: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That in the implementation of organizations/reorganizations, or
specific changes in agency structure, functions and operations as a result of
institutional strengthening or as mandated by law, the appropriation,
including the functions, projects, purposes and activities of agencies
concerned may be realigned as may be necessary: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That any
unexpended balances or savings in appropriations may be made available for payment
of retirement gratuities and separation benefits to affected personnel, as authorized
under existing laws. (Emphases and underscoring ours.)
Implicitly, the aforequoted provisions in the appropriations law recognize the power of
the President to reorganize even executive offices already funded by the said appropriations act,
including the power to implement structural, functional, and operational adjustments in the
executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign appropriations of funds as may be necessary
under such reorganization. Thus, insofar as petitioners protest the limitation of the NPOs appropriations
to its own income under Executive Order No. 378, the same is statutorily authorized by the above
provisions.
In the 2003 case of Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration,[21] we upheld the
streamlining of the National Tobacco Administration through a reduction of its personnel and deemed
the same as included in the power of the President to reorganize executive offices granted under the
laws, notwithstanding that such streamlining neither involved an abolition nor a transfer of functions of
an office. To quote the relevant portion of that decision:
In the recent case of Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo D. Zamora, in
his capacity as the Executive Secretary, et al., this Court has had occasion to also
delve on the Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section
31(2) and (3) of Executive Order No. 292 and the power to reorganize the Office of the
President Proper. x x x
xxxx
The first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. The
succeeding numbered paragraphs are not in the nature of provisos that
unduly limit the aim and scope of the grant to the President of the power to
reorganize but are to be viewed in consonance therewith. Section 31(1) of
Executive Order No. 292 specifically refers to the Presidents power to restructure the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, by abolishing, consolidating
or merging units hereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, while
Section 31(2) and (3) concern executive offices outside the Office of the President
Proper allowing the President to transfer any function under the Office of the President
to any other Department or Agency and vice-versa, and the transfer of any agency
under the Office of the President to any other department or agency and vice-versa.
In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor
transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization under the
general provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the
interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the

authority of the President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of
the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but
accept.[22] (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In the more recent case of Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court
Appeals,[23] which involved a structural and functional reorganization of the Department
Health under an executive order, we reiterated the principle that the power of the President
reorganize agencies under the executive department by executive or administrative order
constitutionally and statutorily recognized. We held in that case:
This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may,
by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of
government entities under the Executive Department. This is also
sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: [T]he
president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also
known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he
may take any of the following actions:
xxxx
In Domingo v. Zamora [445 Phil. 7 (2003)], this Court explained the rationale
behind the Presidents continuing authority under the Administrative Code to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. The law
grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the President
in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his
or her office to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. To remain
effective and efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential
directives and policies.
The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of the
Office of the President Proper and the agencies under it. The agencies under the
Office of the President are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II of the
Administrative Code:
Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.The agencies
under the Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the
chairmanship of the President, those under the supervision and control of
the President, those under the administrative supervision of the Office of the
President, those attached to it for policy and program coordination, and those
that are not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department.
xxxx
The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is likewise
recognized in general appropriations laws. x x x.
xxxx
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the
President to issue. The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative
in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the Presidents
constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported
by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other
statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.[24] (Emphases supplied.)
Subsequently, we ruled in Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive
Secretary[25] that:

of
of
to
is

The Constitutions express grant of the power of control in the President justifies
an executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority
of law.
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with
full knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject. It is thus
reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which places an agency under
the Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and
jurisprudence on the Presidents power to reorganize.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature
necessarily ordains an executive agencys position in the scheme of administrative
structure. Such determination is primary, but subject to the Presidents continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies
or offices in the executive department are concerned, the power of control may
justify the President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law
may expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures. The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law.[26]
The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an exercise of a
delegated legislative power granted by the aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III
of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the continuing authority of the President to
reorganize the Office of the President, in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. This is a
matter already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. The reorganization of such an office through
executive or administrative order is also recognized in the Administrative Code of 1987. Sections 2 and
3, Chapter 2, Title I, Book III of the said Code provide:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory
powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects
of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall
be promulgated in administrative orders. (Emphases supplied.)
To reiterate, we find nothing objectionable in the provision in Executive Order No. 378
limiting the appropriation of the NPO to its own income. Beginning with Larin and in subsequent cases,
the Court has noted certain provisions in the general appropriations laws as likewise reflecting the
power of the President to reorganize executive offices or agencies even to the extent of modifying and
realigning appropriations for that purpose.
Petitioners contention that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 is an invalid exercise
of legislative power on the part of the President has no legal leg to stand on.
In all, Executive Order No. 378, which purports to institute necessary reforms in
government in order to improve and upgrade efficiency in the delivery of public services by redefining
the functions of the NPO and limiting its funding to its own income and to transform it into a selfreliant agency able to compete with the private sector, is well within the prerogative of President
Arroyo under her continuing delegated legislative power to reorganize her own office. As pointed out in
the separate concurring opinion of our learned colleague, Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the
objective behind Executive Order No. 378 is wholly consistent with the state policy contained in
Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act to encourage competitiveness by
extending equal opportunity to private contracting parties who are eligible and qualified.[27]
To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the
Office of the President and the departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not
include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it
must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize the executive
department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence.
In this regard, we are mindful of the previous pronouncement of this Court in Dario v.
Mison[28] that:
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it

is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself
ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as
it may, if the abolition, which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for
political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith,
no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done, is void ab initio. There is an
invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where
claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. (Emphasis ours.)
Stated alternatively, the presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the
executive branch of government is subject to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in
good faith.
If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in
loss of security of tenure of affected government employees, would be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB v. Zamora,[29] we even observed that there was no such thing as an absolute right to hold office.
Except those who hold constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right to an office or salary.[30]
This brings us to the second ground raised in the petition that Executive Order No. 378,
in allowing government agencies to secure their printing requirements from the private sector and in
limiting the budget of the NPO to its income, will purportedly lead to the gradual abolition of the NPO
and the loss of security of tenure of its present employees. In other words, petitioners avow that the
reorganization of the NPO under Executive Order No. 378 is tainted with bad faith. The basic
evidentiary rule is that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it.
[31]
A careful review of the records will show that petitioners utterly failed to substantiate
their claim. They failed to allege, much less prove, sufficient facts to show that the limitation of the
NPOs budget to its own income would indeed lead to the abolition of the position, or removal from
office, of any employee. Neither did petitioners present any shred of proof of their assertion that the
changes in the functions of the NPO were for political considerations that had nothing to do with
improving the efficiency of, or encouraging operational economy in, the said agency.
In sum, the Court finds that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyos issuance of
Executive Order No. 378.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS (RULE 3 SEC 1-22)
G.R. No. 165142 December 10, 2007
EDUARDO L. RAYO vs METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY AND BRANCH 223 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
Before us is a petition for review assailing the Resolutions dated June 15, 2004 [1] and August 23,
2004[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83895 for annulment of judgment.
The pertinent facts are undisputed.
Midas Diversified Export Corp. (Midas), thru its president, Mr. Samuel U. Lee, obtained
six (6) loans from private respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), amounting to
P588,870,000 as evidenced by promissory notes. To secure the payment of an P8,000,000 loan,
Louisville Realty & Development Corporation (Louisville), thru its president, Mr. Samuel U. Lee,
executed in favor of Metrobank, a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land situated at No. 40
Timog Ave., Brgy. Laging Handa, Quezon City, with all the buildings and improvements thereon. The
properties are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. N-163455, N-166349 and N-166350
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
When the debtor-mortgagor failed to pay, Metrobank extra-judicially foreclosed the real estate
mortgage in accordance with Act No. 3135,[3] as amended. Thereafter, in a public auction, Metrobank
was the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale[4] dated December 11, 2000 was duly registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on December 13, 2000. When Louisville refused to turn over the real
properties, on March 17, 2001, Metrobank filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 223,

Quezon City, an ex parte petition[5] for the issuance of a writ of possession docketed as LRC Case No.
Q-13915(01). After presentation of evidence ex parte, the RTC granted the petition in an Order[6]
dated July 5, 2001, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant
petition is hereby GRANTED. Upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ([P]100,000.00), let a Writ of
Possession over the properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. N-163455, N-166349 & N-166350 issue in favor of the petitioner
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY to be implemented by the
Deputy Sheriff of Branch 223, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City by
placing the petitioner in possession over the parcels of land with all its
improvements.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On September 24, 2001, Metrobank posted the required bond. Consequently, a writ of possession was
issued on October 9, 2001. This was partially implemented as to TCT No. N-163455, as evidenced by
the Turn-Over Receipt[8] dated December 13, 2002. The writ over the two remaining properties, under
TCT Nos. N-166349 and N-166350, were subsequently implemented as evidenced by the Turn-Over
Receipt[9] dated December 3, 2003.
Meanwhile, on April 3, 2002, petitioner Eduardo L. Rayo filed a complaint[10] docketed
as Civil Case No. Q02-46514 against Metrobank for Nullification of Real Estate Mortgage Contract(s)
and Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, in the RTC, Branch 99, Quezon City.
On May 13, 2004, petitioner Rayo filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition[11] for Annulment of
Judgment on the ground of absolute lack of due process. Petitioner alleged that his predecessor,
Louisville, was not notified of the proceedings and that Section 7[12] (ex parte motion or petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession) of Act No. 3135 is unconstitutional.
On June 15, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner is neither the registered owner nor the successor-in-interest of the
registered owner; hence, not a real party-in-interest. It also ruled that there is no basis to challenge
the constitutionality of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended as it constitutes a collateral attack
against said provision. Further, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in filing Civil Case No. Q0246514. Petitioner sought reconsideration, but was likewise denied.
Petitioner now comes before us raising the following as primary issue:
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF ACT NO. 3135 IS CONTRARY TO THE DUE
PROCESS PROVISION OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION CONSIDERING THAT
SUCH SECTION 7 OF THE LAW PROVIDES OR ALLOWS, ACCORDING TO THIS
HONORABLE COURT, FOR AN EX-PARTE PROCEEDING WHICH IS A JUDICIAL
PROCEEDING BROUGHT FOR THE BENEFIT OF ONE PARTY ONLY, AND WITHOUT
NOTICE TO, OR CONSENT BY ANY PERSON ADVERSELY INTERESTED OR A
PROCEEDING WHEREIN RELIEF IS GRANTED WITHOUT AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM THE RELIEF IS SOUGHT TO BE HEARD, AS HELD IN
THE CASE OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 169
SCRA 244 @ 255, JANUARY 20, 1989.[13]
He also raises the following as secondary issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER HAS THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SEEK THE
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT IN [THE] SUBJECT LRC CASE NO. Q-13915(01).
II.
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST FORUMSHOPPING WHEN IT DID NOT INFORM THE HONORABLE BRANCH 223 OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY REGARDING THE FILING OF CIVIL CASE NO. Q-02-46514
FOR NULLIFICATION OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE CONTRACT AND THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE SALE OF THE SAME SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES AND THE PENDENCY OF
THE SAME BEFORE THE HONORABLE BRANCH 99 OF THE SAME REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
[14]
Stated simply, the issues raised are: (1) Does petitioner have the legal personality in the
annulment of judgment proceedings? (2) Is Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, unconstitutional?
(3) Is respondent guilty of forum-shopping?
Petitioner insists that contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, he has the legal
personality to institute the annulment of judgment case against Metrobank, considering that the March
25, 2002 deed of assignment he entered into with Louisville and Winston Linwy L. Chua makes him a

co-assignee over the subject real properties.

For its part, Metrobank claims that it was not a party to the deed of assignment among
Louisville, Chua and petitioner, hence, it has no privity of contract with petitioner Rayo. Moreover,
Metrobank points out that the real properties had already been extrajudicially foreclosed when
petitioner and his assignors executed the deed of assignment.
Under Section 2,[15] Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit.[16] A real party-in-interest is one with a present substantial interest which
means such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under the
substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand.[17]
Now, is petitioner Rayo a real party-in-interest? Initially, we recognized herein petitioner
as the co-assignee of the subject real properties as shown in the March 25, 2002 deed of assignment.
However, while petitioner would be injured by the judgment in this suit, we find that petitioner has no
present substantial interest to institute the annulment of judgment proceedings and nullify the order
granting the writ of possession.
First, there was no violation of petitioners right to constitutional due process. In a long
line of cases,[18] we have consistently ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended
is a ministerial duty of the court. The purchaser of the foreclosed property, upon ex parte application
and the posting of the required bond, has the right to acquire possession of the foreclosed property
during the 12-month redemption period and with more reason, after the expiration of the redemption
period.
An ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No.
3135 is not, strictly speaking, a judicial process as contemplated in Article 433[19] of the Civil Code. It
is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of ones right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure
sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a
wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. It is a non-litigious proceeding
authorized in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended, and is
brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or consent by any person adversely
interested. It is a proceeding where the relief is granted without requiring an opportunity for the person
against whom the relief is sought to be heard. No notice is needed to be served upon persons
interested in the subject property.[20]
Second, in the deed of assignment, petitioner also acknowledged that the subject real
properties were already sold at various extrajudicial foreclosure sales and bought by Metrobank.
Clearly, petitioner recognized the prior existing right of Metrobank as the mortgagee-purchaser over
the subject real properties.[21] Actual knowledge of a prior mortgage with Metrobank is equivalent
to notice of registration[22] in accordance with Article 2125[23] of the Civil Code. Conformably
with Articles 1312[24] and 2126[25] of the Civil Code, a real right or lien in favor of Metrobank had
already been established, subsisting over the properties until the discharge of the principal
obligation, whoever the possessor(s) of the land might be. [26] As petitioner is not a party whose
interest is adverse to that of Louisville, there was no bar to the issuance of a writ of possession to
Metrobank. It does not matter that petitioner was not specifically named in the writ of possession
nor notified of such proceedings.
Third, we also note that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in filing Civil Case No.
Q02-46514, for nullification of real estate mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure sale, more than six (6)
months after the issuance of the writ of possession considering the mandate of Section 8 [27] of Act
No. 3135, as amended. Hence, even petitioners action for annulment of judgment cannot prosper as it
cannot be a substitute for a lost remedy.
Now, petitioner is challenging the constitutionality of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended. He avers that Section 7 violates the due process clause because, by the mere filing of an ex
parte motion in the proper cadastral court, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is allowed to obtain
possession of the foreclosed property during the redemption period.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners attempt to challenge the constitutionality of
Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, constitutes a collateral attack that is not allowed. We fully
agree with the appellate courts ruling. For reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of a law cannot
be attacked collaterally.[28]
With regard to forum-shopping; forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose
of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or

where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.[29] The issuance of the
writ of possession being a ministerial function, and summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a
judgment on the merits. It is only an incident in the transfer of title. Hence, a separate case for
annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata.[30]
Clearly, insofar as LRC Case No. Q-13915(01) and Civil Case No. Q02-46514 are concerned,
Metrobank is not guilty of forum-shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions dated
June 15, 2004 and August 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83895 are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 121662-64. July 6, 1999
VLASON ENTERPRISES CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DURAPROOF SERVICES,
represented by its General Manager, Cesar Urbino Sr.
Summons to a domestic or resident corporation should be served on officers, agents or
employees, who are responsible enough to warrant the presumption that they will transmit to the
corporation notice of the filing of the action against it. Rules on the service of motions should be
liberally construed in order to promote the ends of substantial justice. A rigid application that will result
in the manifest injustice should be avoided. A default judgment against several defendants cannot
affect the rights of one who was never declared in default. In any event, such judgment cannot include
an award not prayed for in the complaint, even if proven ex parte.
The Case
These principles were used by this Court in resolving this Petition for Review on Certiorari
before us, assailing the July 19, 1993 Decision[1] and the August 15, 1995 Resolution,[2] both
promulgated by the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:[3]
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, all the three (3) consolidated petitions for
certiorari are hereby GRANTED.
THE assailed Order of respondent Judge Arsenio Gonong of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8,
dated April 5, 1991, in the first petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 24669); the assailed Order of
Judge Bernardo Pardo, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, dated July 6,
1992, in the second petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 28387); and finally, the assailed order or
Resolution en banc of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals Judges Ernesto Acosta, Ramon de Veyra and
Manuel Gruba, under date of October 5, 1992, in the third petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 29317)
are all hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE thereby giving way to the entire decision dated February 18,
1991 of the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 89-51451 which
remains valid, final and executory, if not yet wholly executed.
THE writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court on March 6, 1992 and reiterated on
July 22, 1992 and this date against the named respondents specified in the dispositive portion of the
judgment of the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8 in the first petition for certiorari,
which remains valid, existing and enforceable, is hereby MADE PERMANENT without prejudice (1) to the
[private respondents] remaining unpaid obligations to the herein party-intervenor in accordance with
the Compromise Agreement or in connection with the decision of the respondent lower court in CA-G.R.
SP No. 24669 and (2) to the government, in relation to the forthcoming decision of the respondent
Court of Tax Appeals on the amount of taxes, charges, assessments or obligations that are due, as
totally secured and fully guaranteed payment by the [private respondents] bond, subject to the
relevant rulings of the Department of Finance and other prevailing laws and jurisprudence.
The assailed Resolution ruled:
ACCORDINGLY, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, as well as considering these clarifications, the
three (3) motions aforementioned are hereby DENIED.
The Facts
Poro Point Shipping Services, then acting as the local agent of Omega Sea Transport Company
of Honduras & Panama, a Panamanian company, (hereafter referred to as Omega), requested
permission for its vessel M/V Star Ace, which had engine trouble, to unload its cargo and to store it at
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) compound in San Fernando, La Union while awaiting transhipment
to Hongkong. The request was approved by the Bureau of Customs.[4] Despite the approval, the
customs personnel boarded the vessel when it docked on January 7, 1989, on suspicion that it was the
hijacked M/V Silver Med owned by Med Line Philippines Co., and that its cargo would be smuggled into
the country.[5] The district customs collector seized said vessel and its cargo pursuant to Section 2301,
Tariff and Customs Code. A notice of hearing of SFLU Seizure Identification No. 3-89 was served on its
consignee, Singkong Trading Co. of Hongkong, and its shipper, Dusit International Co., Ltd. of Thailand.
While seizure proceedings were ongoing, La Union was hit by three typhoons, and the vessel

ran aground and was abandoned. On June 8, 1989, its authorized representative, Frank Cadacio,
entered into a salvage agreement with private respondent to secure and repair the vessel at the agreed
consideration of $1 million and fifty percent (50%) [of] the cargo after all expenses, cost and taxes.[6]
Finding that no fraud was committed, the District Collector of Customs, Aurelio M. Quiray, lifted
the warrant of seizure on July 16, 1989.[7] However, in a Second Indorsement dated November 11,
1989, then Customs Commissioner Salvador M. Mison declined to issue a clearance for Quirays
Decision; instead, he forfeited the vessel and its cargo in accordance with Section 2530 of the Tariff and
Customs Code.[8] Accordingly, acting District Collector of Customs John S. Sy issued a Decision
decreeing the forfeiture and the sale of the cargo in favor of the government.[9]
To enforce its preferred salvors lien, herein Private Respondent Duraproof Services filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus[10] assailing the
actions of Commissioner Mison and District Collector Sy. Also impleaded as respondents were PPA
Representative Silverio Mangaoang and Med Line Philippines, Inc.
On January 10, 1989, private respondent amended its Petition[11] to include former District
Collector Quiray; PPA Port Manager Adolfo Ll. Amor Jr; Petitioner Vlason Enterprises as represented by
its president, Vicente Angliongto; Singkong Trading Company as represented by Atty. Eddie
Tamondong; Banco Du Brasil; Dusit International Co., Inc.; Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. and Thai-United
Trading Co., Ltd.[12] In both Petitions, private respondent plainly failed to include any allegation
pertaining to petitioner, or any prayer for relief against it.
Summonses for the amended Petition were served on Atty. Joseph Capuyan for Med Line
Philippines: Angliongto (through his secretary, Betty Bebero), Atty. Tamondong and Commissioner
Mison.[13] Upon motion of the private respondent, the trial court allowed summons by publication to be
served upon the alien defendants who were not residents and had no direct representatives in the
country.[14]
On January 29, 1990, private respondent moved to declare respondents in default, but the trial
court denied the motion in its February 23, 1990 Order,[15] because Mangaoang and Amor had jointly
filed a Motion to Dismiss, while Mison and Med Line had moved separately for an extension to file a
similar motion.[16] Later it rendered an Order dated July 2, 1990, giving due course to the motions to
dismiss filed by Mangaoang and Amor on the ground of litis pendentia, and by the commissioner and
district collector of customs on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[17] In another Order, the trial court
dismissed the action against Med Line Philippines on the ground of litis pendentia.[18]
On two other occasions, private respondent again moved to declare the following in default:
petitioner, Quiray, Sy and Mison on March 26, 1990;[19] and Banco Du Brazil, Dusit International Co.,
Inc., Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. and Thai-United Trading Co., Ltd. on August 24, 1990.[20] There is no
record, however, that the trial court acted upon the motions. On September 18, 1990, petitioner filed
another Motion for leave to amend the petition,[21] alleging that its counsel failed to include the
following necessary and/or indispensable parties: Omega represented by Cadacio; and M/V Star Ace
represented by Capt. Nahon Rada, relief captain. Aside from impleading these additional respondents,
private respondent also alleged in the Second (actually, third) Amended Petition[22] that the owners of
the vessel intended to transfer and alienate their rights and interests over the vessel and its cargo, to
the detriment of the private respondent.
The trial court granted leave to private respondent to amend its Petition, but only to exclude
the customs commissioner and the district collector.[23] Instead, private respondent filed the Second
Amended Petition with Supplemental Petition against Singkong Trading Company; and Omega and M/V
Star Ace,[24] to which Cadacio and Rada filed a Joint Answer.[25]
Declared in default in an Order issued by the trial court on January 23, 1991, were the
following: Singkong Trading Co., Commissioner Mison, M/V Star Ace and Omega.[26] Private
respondent filed, and the trial court granted, an ex parte Motion to present evidence against the
defaulting respondents.[27] Only private respondent, Atty. Tamondong, Commissioner Mison, Omega
and M/V Star Ace appeared in the next pretrial hearing; thus, the trial court declared the other
respondents in default and allowed private respondent to present evidence against them.[28] Cesar
Urbino, general manager of private respondent, testified and adduced evidence against the other
respondents, including herein petitioner. As regards petitioner, he declared: Vlason Enterprises
represented by Atty. Sy and Vicente Angliongto thru constant intimidation and harassment of utilizing
the PPA Management of San Fernando, La Union x x x further delayed, and [private respondent]
incurred heavy overhead expenses due to direct and incidental expenses xxx causing irreparable
damages of about P3,000,000 worth of ship tackles, rigs, and appurtenances including radar antennas
and apparatuses, which were taken surreptitiously by persons working for Vlason Enterprises or its
agents[.][29]

On December 29, 1990, private respondent and Rada, representing Omega, entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement stipulating that Rada would write and notify Omega regarding the demand
for salvage fees of private respondent; and that if Rada did not receive any instruction from his
principal, he would assign the vessel in favor of the salvor.[30]
On February 18, 1991, the trial court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, based on the allegations, prayer and evidence adduced,
both testimonial and documentary, the Court is convinced, that, indeed, defendants/respondents are
liable to [private respondent] in the amount as prayed for in the petition for which it renders judgment
as follows:
1. Respondent M/V Star Ace, represented by Capt. Nahum Rada, [r]elief [c]aptain of the vessel and
Omega Sea Transport Company, Inc., represented by Frank Cadacio[,] is ordered to refrain from
alienating or [transferring] the vessel M/V Star Ace to any third parties;
2. Singkong Trading Company to pay the following:
a. Taxes due the government;
b. Salvage fees on the vessel in the amount of $1,000,000.00 based on xxx Lloyds Standard Form of
Salvage Agreement;
c. Preservation, securing and guarding fees on the vessel in the amount of $225,000.00;
d. Maintenance fees in the amount of P2,685,000.00;
e. Salaries of the crew from August 16, 1989 to December 1989 in the amount of $43,000.00 and
unpaid salaries from January 1990 up to the present;
f. Attorneys fees in the amount of P656,000.00;
3. [Vlason] Enterprises to pay [private respondent] in the amount of P3,000,000.00 for damages;
4. Banco [Du] Brazil to pay [private respondent] in the amount of $300,000.00 in damages; and finally,
5. Costs of [s]uit.
Subsequently, upon the Motion of Omega, Singkong Trading Co. and private respondent, the
trial court approved a Compromise Agreement[31] among the movants, reducing by 20 percent the
amounts adjudged. For their part, respondents-movants agreed not to appeal the Decision.[32] On
March 8, 1991, private respondent moved for the execution of judgment, claiming that the trial court
Decision had already become final and executory.[33] The Motion was granted[34] and a Writ of
Execution was issued.[35] To satisfy the Decision, Sheriffs Jorge Victorino, Amado Sevilla and Dionisio
Camagon were deputized on March 13, 1991 to levy and to sell on execution the defendants vessel and
personal property.
On March 14, 1991, petitioner filed, by special appearance, a Motion for Reconsideration, on
the grounds that it was allegedly not impleaded as a defendant, served summons or declared in
default; that private respondent was not authorized to present evidence against it in default; that the
judgment in default was fatally defective, because private respondent had not paid filing fees for the
award; and that private respondent had not prayed for such award.[36] Private respondent opposed the
Motion, arguing that it was a mere scrap of paper due to its defective notice of hearing.
On March 18, 1991, the Bureau of Customs also filed an ex parte Motion to recall the
execution, and to quash the notice of levy and the sale on execution.[37] Despite this Motion, the
auction sale was conducted on March 21, 1991 by Sheriff Camagon, with private respondent submitting
the winning bid.[38] The trial court ordered the deputy sheriffs to cease and desist from implementing
the Writ of Execution and from levying on the personal property of the defendants.[39] Nevertheless,
Sheriff Camagon issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale on March 27, 1991.[40]
On April 12, 1991,[41] private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify the cease and desist orders of the trial court.[42] Respondent Court
issued on April 26, 1991 a Resolution which reads:[43]
MEANWHILE, in order to preserve the status quo and so as not to render the present petition moot and
academic, a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER is hereby ISSUED enjoining the respondent Judge, the
Honorable Arsenio M. Gonong, from enforcing and/or implementing the Orders dated 22 March 1991
and 5 April 1991 which ordered respondent Sheriff to cease and desist from implementing the writ of
execution and the return thereof, the quashing of the levy xxx on [the] execution [and sale] of the
properties levied upon and sold at public auction by the Sheriff, for reason of grave abuse of discretion
and in excess of jurisdiction, until further orders from this Court.
WITHIN ten (10) days from notice hereof, respondents [petitioner included] are also required to SHOW
CAUSE why the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted.
On May 8, 1991, petitioner received from Camagon a notice to pay private respondent P3
million to satisfy the trial court Decision. Not having any knowledge of the CA case to which it was not
impleaded, petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss ex abutandi ad cautelam on the
grounds that (1) the Petition of private respondent stated no cause of action against it, (2) the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case, and (3) litis pendentia barred the suit.[44]

On May 10, 1991, Camagon levied on petitioners properties, which were scheduled for auction
later on May 16, 1991. Specific descriptions of the properties are as follows:[45]
a) Motor Tugboat DEN DEN ex Emerson-I
Length: 35.67 ms. Breadth: 7.33 ms.
Depth: 3.15 ms. Gross Tons: 205.71
Net tons: 67.78 Official Number 213551
Material: Steel Class License: CWL
License No. 4424
b) Barge - FC99" ex YD-153
Length: 34.15 ms. Breadth: 15.85 m.s.
Depth: 2.77 m.s. Gross Tons: 491.70
Net Tons: 491.70 Official Number 227236
Material: Steel Class License: CWL
License No. 83-0012
c) Barge LAWIN ex Sea Lion 2
Length: 66.92 ms. Breadth: 11.28 ms.
Depth: 4.52 m.s. Gross Tons: 1,029.56
Net Tons: 1,027/43 Official Number 708069
Material: Steel Class License: Coastwise
License No. 81-0059
Petitioner also filed a special appearance before the CA. It prayed for the lifting of the levy on
its properties or, alternatively, for a temporary restraining order against their auction until its Motion for
Reconsideration was resolved by the trial court.[46]
Acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the trial court reversed its Decision of
February 18, 1991, holding in its May 22, 1991 Resolution as follows:[47]
xxx [T]hat xxx Motion For Reconsideration [of the petitioner] was filed on March 14, 1991 (See: page
584, records, Vol.2) indubitably showing that it was seasonably filed within the 15-day time-frame.
Therefore, xxx said default-judgment ha[d] not yet become final and executory when the Writ of
Execution was issued on March 13, 1991 xxx The rules [provide] that [the e]xecution shall issue as a
matter of right upon the expiration of the period of appeal from a judgment if no appeal has been duly
perfected (Sec. 1, R-39, RRC). That being the case, VEC has all the right to file as it did xxx the
aforementioned reconsideration motion calling [the] attention of the Court and pointing therein its
supposed error and its correction if, indeed, any [error was] committed. It is in this light that this Court
made an in-depth reflection and assessment of the premises or reasons raised by [petitioner], and after
a re-examination of the facts and evidence spread on the records, it has come to the considered
conclusion that the questioned default-judgment has been improvidently issued. By the records, the
claim of [private respondent] that his January 29, 1990 Ex-Parte Motion To Declare Defendants In
Default (pp. 174-177, records, Vol. 1) including VEC had been granted is belied by the February 23,
1990 Order (pp. 214-215, records, ibid) par. 2, thereof, reading to wit:
By the foregoing, for reasons stated thereunder respectively, this Court, in the exercise of its judicious
discretion, in the sense that the rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and
to assist the parties, resolves to DENY petitioners Motion to have the Commissioner of Customs AND
OTHER ENUMERATED RESPONDENTS DECLARED IN DEFAULT. [Emphasis ours].
Not even [private respondents] November 23, 1990 Ex-Parte Motion To Present [Evidence] Against
Defaulting Defendants (page 489, records, Vol.2) [can] be deemed as a remedy of the fact that there
never was issued an order of default against respondents including [petitioner] VEC. Having thus
established that there [had] been no order of default against VEC as contemplated by Sec. 1, Rule 18,
in relation to Sec. 9, Rule 13, Revised Rules of Court, there could not have been any valid defaultjudgment rendered against it. The issuance of an order of default is a condition sine qua non in order
[that] a judgment by default be clothed with validity. Further, records show that this Court never had
authorized [private respondent] to adduce evidence ex-parte against [petitioner] VEC. In sum, the
February 18, 1991 decision by default is null and void as against [petitioner] VEC. With this considered
conclusion of nullity of said default judgment in question, this Court feels there is no more need for it to
resolve Arguments I-A & I-B, as well as III-A & III-B, of the March 14, 1991 Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court agrees, however, with said discussions on the non-compliance [with] Sec. 2, Rule 7 (Title of
Complaint) and Sec. I, Rule 8 on the requirement of indicating in the complaint the ultimate facts on
which the party pleading relies for his claim of defense [--] which is absent in the January 9, Amended
Petition (pp. 122-141, records, Vol. I) [--] for it merely mentioned [petitioner] VEC in par. 5 thereof and
no more. It abides, likewise, with [Argument] III-B that the Decision in suit award[ed] amounts never
asked for in instant petition as regards VEC (Sec. 5, Rule 18, RRC). xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, and as prayed for, the February 18, 1991
Judgment by Default is hereby reconsidered and SET ASIDE.
On June 26, 1992, then Executive Judge Bernardo P. Pardo[48] of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila issued an Order[49] annulling the Sheriffs Report/Return dated April 1, 1991, and all
proceedings taken by Camagon.

The CA granted private respondents Motion to file a Supplemental Petition impleading

petitioner in CA-GR 24669.[50] In view of the rampant pilferage of the cargo deposited at the PPA
compound, private respondent obtained from the appellate court a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated
March 6, 1992. The Writ reads:[51]
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the urgent verified motion for preliminary
injunction dated February 11, 1992 is hereby GRANTED. Therefore, let a writ of preliminary injunction
forthwith issue against the respondents and all persons or agents acting in their behalf, enjoining them
not to interfere in the transferring of the aforementioned vessel and its cargoes, or in removing said
cargoes xxx from [the] PPA compound.
On September 15, 1992, Sheriff Amado Sevilla seized petitioners motor tugboat Den Den by
virtue of the Order[52] dated April 3, 1992, issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 26.[53]
On August 6, 1992, the CA consolidated CA-GR SP No. 28387[54] with CA-GR SP No. 24669.
[55] The Court of Tax Appeals issued on October 5, 1992, a Resolution in CTA Case Nos. 4492, 4494
and 4500, which disposed as follows:
Confirming the order in open court on October 5, 1992, the Court hereby RESOLVES to:
1. Order Respondent Commissioner of Customs to assign or detail [a] sufficient number of customs
police and guards aboard, and around the vicinity of, the vessel M/V Star Ace now in anchor at
Mariveles, Bataan or elsewhere, in order to ensure its safety during the pendency of these cases;
2. Direct him to assign personnel and/or representatives to conduct an inventory of part of the vessels
cargo now in the possession of Mr. Cesar S. Urbino, Sr. at 197 Heroes del 96 Street, Caloocan City,
which inventory may be participated in by all the parties interested in said cargo.
To enjoin the CTA from enforcing said Order, private respondent filed before the Court of
Appeals another Petition for Certiorari,[56] which was later also consolidated with CA-GR SP No. 24669.
On July 19, 1993, the CA rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner filed (1) a Motion for
Clarification, praying for a declaration that the trial court Decision against it was not valid; and (2) a
partial Motion for Reconsideration, seeking to set aside the assailed Decision insofar as the latter
affected it.
On July 5, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued the following Resolution:[57]
Pending resolution of the motions for reconsideration, filed by Vlason Enterprises Corporation and
Banco [Du] Brazil, and considering [private respondents] Motion for Entry of Judgment with respect to
respondent PPA having already been granted by this Court as far back as June 17, 1994, pursuant to
the resolution of the Supreme Court dated December 8, 1993 in G.R. No. 111270-72 (Philippine Ports
Authority vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) informing the parties in said case that the judgment sought to be
reviewed has now become final and executory, the lower court may now take appropriate action on the
urgent ex-parte motion for issuance of a writ of execution, filed by [private respondent] on July 15,
1994.
On August 28, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, issued a Writ of Possession
which resulted in private respondent taking possession of petitioners barge Lawin (formerly Sea Lion 2)
on September 1, 1995.[58]
Hence, this Petition.[59]
Ruling of the Respondent Court
As already adverted to, Respondent Court granted the Petition for Certiorari of the private
respondent, which was consolidated with the latters two other Petitions. The court a quo issued the
following rulings:
1. The trial court had jurisdiction over the salvors claim or admiralty case pursuant to
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129.
2. Since the Decision of the trial court became final and executory, never having been
disputed or appealed to a higher court, the trial judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in recalling the Writ of Execution and in quashing the levy and the
execution of the sale of M/V Star Ace and its cargo.
2. Such acts constituted an alteration or a modification of a final and executory
judgment and could never be justified under law and jurisprudence.
3. Civil Case 59-51451 dealt only with the salvors claim without passing upon the
legality or the validity of the undated Decision of the Commissioner of Customs
in the seizure proceeding.
4. Petitioner and his co-respondents could not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against their opponent and, after failing to obtain such
relief, question the courts jurisdiction.

5. Petitioner had no recourse through any of the following judicially accepted means to
question the final judgment:
a. a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38,
b. a direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the questioned judgment, and
c. a collateral attack against the questioned judgment which appears void on its face.
6. A court which has already acquired jurisdiction over a case cannot be ousted by a
coequal court; the res in this casethe vessel and its cargowere placed under the
control of the trial court ahead of the CTA.
7. The admiralty Decision had attained finality while the issue of the validity of the
seizure proceedings was still under determination.
In the assailed Resolution, Respondent Court clarified that there was no need to serve
summons anew on petitioner, since it had been served summons when the Second Amended Petition
(the third) was filed; and that petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was defective and void, because it
contained no notice of hearing addressed to the counsel of private respondent in violation of Rule 16,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
To this second motion, [private respondent] contends that there was no need to serve summons anew
to VEC when the second amended petition was filed impleading VEC, pursuant to the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Asiatic Travel Corp. vs. CA (164 SCRA 623); and that finally, the decision of the court
a quo o[n] February 18, 1991 became final and executory, notwithstanding the timely filing of the
motion for reconsideration of VEC for the reason that the said motion for reconsideration was defective
or void, there being no notice of hearing addressed to the counsel of petitioner. In fact, no motion such
as this instant one can be acted upon by the Court without proof of service of the notice thereof,
pursuant to Rule 16, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
xxxxxxxxx
Finally, we should never lose sight of the fact that the instant petition for certiorari is proper only to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court, or grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an error of law or of
fact which is a mistake of judgment, appeal is the remedy (Salas vs. Castro, 216 SCRA 198). Here,
respondents failed to appeal. Hence, the decision dated February 18, 1991 of the lower court has long
become final, executory and unappealable. We do not and cannot therefore review the instant case as
if it were on appeal and direct actions on these motions. While the proper remedy is appeal, the action
for certiorari will not be entertained. Indeed, certiorari is not a substitute for lapsed appeal.
At any rate, the decision dated July 19, 1993 of this Court on the main petition for certiorari is not yet
final (except with respect to respondent PPA), the Bureau of Customs having filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with the Supreme Court, necessitating
prudence on Our part to await its final verdict.[60]
Assignment of Errors
Before us, petitioner submits the following assignment of errors on the part of Respondent
Court:[61]
I
The Court of Appeals committed serious error in ruling that the entire decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 89-51451 dated 18 February 1991 became final and executory because it was never disputed
or appealed.
A. VEC filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision two days before deadline, which motion
was granted by the trial court.
B. The trial court correctly granted VECs motion for reconsideration and set aside the 18 February 1991
decision xxx against VEC, for:
1. The trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of VEC as to enable it to render any
judgment against it:
(i) VEC was not impleaded as a respondent in Civil Case No. 89-51451;
(ii) Summons was not served on VEC;
2. The trial court improperly rendered judgment by default against VEC;
(i) The trial court never issued an order of default against VEC;
(ii) The trial court never authorized ex-parte presentation of evidence against VEC.
3. The Judgment by default was fatally defective because:
(i) No filing fee was paid by [private respondent] for the staggering amount of damages awarded by the
trial court.
(ii) The 18 February 1991 decision violates the Revised Rules of Court, which prescribe that a judgment
by default cannot decree a relief not prayed for.
II
Since the 18 February 1991 Decision in Civil Case No. 89-51451 is void as against VEC, the recall of the
writ of execution was valid, as far as VEC is concerned.
The Court believes that the issues can be simplified and restated as follows:
1. Has the February 18, 1991 RTC Decision become final and executory in regard to
petitioner?

2.
3.
4.
5.

Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner?

Was the RTC default judgment binding on petitioner?
Was the grant of damages against petitioner procedurally proper?
Was private respondent entitled to a writ of execution?
This Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

First Issue: Finality of the RTC Decision
A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. Its finality becomes a fact when
the reglementary period to appeal lapses, and no appeal is perfected within such period.[62] The
admiralty case filed by private respondent with the trial court involved multiple defendants. This being
the case, it necessarily follows that the period of appeal of the February 18, 1991 RTC Decision
depended on the date a copy of the judgment was received by each of the defendants. Elsewise stated,
each defendant had a different period within which to appeal, depending on the date of receipt of the
Decision.[63]
Omega, Singkong Trading Co. and M/V Star Ace chose to enter into a compromise agreement
with private respondent. As to these defendants, the trial court Decision had become final, and a writ of
execution could be issued against them.[64] Doctrinally, a compromise agreement is immediately final
and executory.[65]
Petitioner, however, is not in the same situation. Said Decision cannot be said to have attained
finality as to the petitioner, which was not a party to the compromise. Moreover, petitioner filed a timely
Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court, thirteen days after it received the Decision or two days
before the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal. A motion for reconsideration tolls the running of
the period to appeal.[66] Thus, as to petitioner, the trial court Decision had not attained finality.
Exception to the Rule on Notice of Hearing
Respondent Court and private respondent argue that, although timely filed, petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper, because (1) it did not contain a notice of hearing
addressed to the current counsel of private respondent, and (2) the notice of hearing addressed to and
served on private respondents deceased counsel was not sufficient. Admittedly, this Motion contained a
notice of hearing sent to Atty. Jesus C. Concepcion who, according to private respondent, had already
died and had since been substituted by its new counsel, Atty. Domingo Desierto. Therefore, the
appellate court ruled that the said Motion did not toll the reglementary period to appeal and that the
trial court Decision became final.
This Court disagrees. Rule 15 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Notice.Notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all parties concerned, at least
three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and
other papers accompanying it. The court, however, for good cause may hear a motion on shorter notice,
specially on matters which the court may dispose of on its own motion.
SEC. 5. Contents of notice.The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the
time and place for the hearing of the motion. [67]
Ideally, the foregoing Rule requires the petitioner to address and to serve on the counsel of
private respondent the notice of hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration. The case at bar, however, is
far from ideal. First, petitioner was not validly summoned and it did not participate in the trial of the
case in the lower court; thus, it was understandable that petitioner would not be familiar with the
parties and their counsels. Second, Atty. Desierto entered his appearance only as collaborating counsel,
[68] who is normally not entitled to notices even from this Court. Third, private respondent made no
manifestation on record that Atty. Concepcion was already dead. Besides, it was Atty. Concepcion who
signed the Amended Petition, wherein petitioner was first impleaded as respondent and served a copy
thereof. Naturally, petitioners attention was focused on this pleading, and it was within its rights to
assume that the signatory to such pleading was the counsel for private respondent.
The Court has consistently held that a motion which does not meet the requirements of
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the
clerk of court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy
of a motion containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory
requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these requirements renders their motions
fatally defective.[69] However, there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These
exceptions are as follows:[70]
xxx Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by this Court in cases (1) where a rigid application
will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice;[71] especially if a party successfully shows
that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or
from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served;[72] (3)

where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the
court;[73] and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate [to] the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[74]
The present case falls under the first exception. Petitioner was not informed of any cause of
action or claim against it. All of a sudden, the vessels which petitioner used in its salvaging business
were levied upon and sold in execution to satisfy a supposed judgment against it. To allow this to
happen simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement which, as already said, was
satisfactorily explained would be a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.
A notice of hearing is conceptualized as an integral component of procedural due process
intended to afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court.
Through such notice, the adverse party is permitted time to study and answer the arguments in the
motion.
Circumstances in the case at bar show that private respondent was not denied procedural due
process, and that the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been served. On the day of the hearing,
Atty. Desierto did not object to the said Motion for lack of notice to him; in fact, he was furnished in
open court with a copy of the motion and was granted by the trial court thirty days to file his opposition
to it. These circumstances clearly justify a departure from the literal application of the notice of hearing
rule.[75] In other cases, after the trial court learns that a motion lacks such notice, the prompt
resetting of the hearing with due notice to all the parties is held to have cured the defect.[76]
Verily, the notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. Procedural due process is
not based solely on a mechanistic and literal application that renders any deviation inexorably fatal.
Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action and proceeding.[77] For the foregoing
reasons, we believe that Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that the Motion for
Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper.
Second Issue: Jurisdiction Over Petitioner
Service of Summons on a Corporation
The sheriffs return shows that Angliongto who was president of petitioner corporation, through
his secretary Betty Bebero, was served summons on January 18, 1990.[78] Petitioner claims that this
service was defective for two reasons: (1) Bebero was an employee of Vlasons Shipping, Inc., which
was an entity separate and distinct from Petitioner Vlason Enterprises Corporation (VEC); and (2) the
return pertained to the service of summons for the amended Petition, not for the Second Amended
Petition with Supplemental Petition, the latter pleading having superseded the former.
A corporation may be served summons through its agents or officers who under the Rules are
designated to accept service of process. A summons addressed to a corporation and served on the
secretary of its president binds that corporation.[79] This is based on the rationale that service must be
made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued, that it is safe to assume that said
representative had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers
served and to relay the same to the president or other responsible officer of the corporation being sued.
[80] The secretary of the president satisfies this criterion. This rule requires, however, that the
secretary should be an employee of the corporation sought to be summoned. Only in this manner can
there be an assurance that the secretary will bring home to the corporation [the] notice of the filing of
the action against it.
In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of Angliongto, who was president of both VSI
and petitioner, but she was an employee of VSI, not of petitioner. The piercing of the corporate veil
cannot be resorted to when serving summons.[81] Doctrinally, a corporation is a legal entity distinct
and separate from the members and stockholders who compose it. However, when the corporate fiction
is used as a means of perpetrating a fraud, evading an existing obligation, circumventing a statute,
achieving or perfecting a monopoly or, in generally perpetrating a crime, the veil will be lifted to expose
the individuals composing it. None of the foregoing exceptions has been shown to exist in the present
case. Quite the contrary, the piercing of the corporate veil in this case will result in manifest injustice.
This we cannot allow. Hence, the corporate fiction remains.
Effect of Amendment of Pleadings on Jurisdiction
Petitioner claims that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it, because the former had
not been served summons anew for the Second Amended Petition or for the Second Amended Petition
with Supplemental Petition. In the records, it appears that only Atty. Tamondong, counsel for Singkong
Trading, was furnished a copy of the Second Amended Petition.[82] The corresponding sheriffs return
indicates that only Omega, M/V Star Ace and Capt. Rada were served summons and copies of said
Petition.[83]

We disagree. Although it is well-settled that an amended pleading supersedes the original one,
which is thus deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record, it does not follow ipso
facto that the service of a new summons for amended petitions or complaints is required. Where the
defendants have already appeared before the trial court by virtue of a summons on the original
complaint, the amended complaint may be served upon them without need of another summons, even
if new causes of action are alleged.[84] After it is acquired, a courts jurisdiction continues until the case
is finally terminated. Conversely, when defendants have not yet appeared in court and no summons has
been validly served, new summons for the amended complaint must be served on them.[85] It is not
the change of cause of action that gives rise to the need to serve another summons for the amended
complaint, but rather the acquisition of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. If the trial court
has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them, a new service of summons for the amended complaint is
required.
In this case, the trial court obviously labored under the erroneous impression that petitioner
had already been placed under its jurisdiction since it had been served summons through the secretary
of its president. Thus, it dispensed with the service on petitioner of new summons for the subsequent
amendments of the Petition. We have already ruled, however, that the first service of summons on
petitioner was invalid. Therefore, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction, and the said court should
have required a new service of summons for the amended Petitions.
Impleading a Party in the Title of the Complaint
Petitioner further claims that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction to render judgment
against it because (1) the title of the three Petitions filed by private respondent never included
petitioner as a party-defendant, in violation of Rule 7; and (2) the Petitions failed to state any allegation
of ultimate facts constituting a cause of action against petitioner.
We disagree with petitioner on the first ground. The judicial attitude has always been favorable
and liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings. Pleadings shall be construed liberally so as to render
substantial justice to the parties and to determine speedily and inexpensively the actual merits of the
controversy with the least regard to technicalities.[86]
The inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement
under Section 3, Rule 7. However, the rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into
the substance, and not to be misled by a false or wrong name given to a pleading. The averments in
the complaint, not the title, are controlling. Although the general rule requires the inclusion of the
names of all the parties in the title of a complaint, the non-inclusion of one or some of them is not fatal
to the cause of action of a plaintiff, provided there is a statement in the body of the petition indicating
that a defendant was made a party to such action.
Private respondent claims that petitioner has always been included in the caption of all the
Petitions it filed, which included Antonio Sy, field manager of petitioner. We checked and noted that in
the caption and the body of the Amended Petition and Second Amended Petition with Supplemental
Petition, Antonio Sy was alleged to be representing Med Line Philippines, not petitioner. Because it was
private respondent who was responsible for the errors, the Court cannot excuse it from compliance, for
such action will prejudice petitioner, who had no hand in the preparation of these pleadings. In any
event, we reiterate that, as a general rule, mere failure to include the name of a party in the title of a
complaint is not fatal by itself.
Stating a Cause of Action in the Complaint
The general rule is allegata et probata -- a judgment must conform to the pleadings and the
theory of the action under which the case was tried.[87] But a court may also rule and render judgment
on the basis of the evidence before it, even though the relevant pleading has not been previously
amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice to the adverse party is thereby caused.[88]
In the case at bar, the liability of petitioner was based not on any allegation in the four
Petitions filed with the trial court, but on the evidence presented ex parte by the private respondent.
Since the trial court had not validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, there was no way
for the latter to have validly and knowingly waived its objection to the private respondents presentation
of evidence against it.
Third Issue: Judgment By Default
The trial court Decision holding petitioner liable for damages is basically a default judgment. In
Section 18, judgment by default is allowed under the following condition:[89]
SEC. 1. Judgment by default.If the defendant fails to answer within the time specified in these rules,
the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff and proof of such failure, declare the defendant in default.
Thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiffs evidence and render judgment granting him
such relief as the complaint and the facts proven may warrant. xxxx.
Thus, it becomes crucial to determine whether petitioner was ever declared in default, and whether the

reception of evidence ex parte against it was procedurally valid.

Petitioner Was Never Declared In Default
Petitioner insists that the trial court never declared it in default.
We agree. The trial court denied the January 29, 1990 Motion of private respondent to declare
all the defendants in default, but it never acted on the latters subsequent Motion to declare petitioner
likewise. During the pretrial on January 23, 1993, the RTC declared in default only Atty. Eddie
Tamondong, as well as the other defendants Hon. Salvador Mison, M/V Star Ace, Omega Sea Transport
Co., Inc. of Panama and Sinkong Trading Co., [but] despite xxx due notice to them, [they] failed to
appear.[90] Even private respondent cannot pinpoint which trial court order held petitioner in default.
More important, the trial court, in its Resolution dated May 22, 1991, admitted that it never
declared petitioner in default, viz.:
xxx It is in this light that this [c]ourt made an in-depth reflection and assessment of the premises or
reasons raised by [petitioner] VEC[;] and after a re-examination of the facts and evidence spread on
the records, it has come to the considered conclusion that the questioned default-judgment has been
improvidently issued. [Based on] the records, the claim of [private respondent] that [its] January 29,
1990 Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants In Default (pp. 174-177, records, Vol. 1) including VEC
had been granted is belied by the February 23, 1990 Order (pp. 214-215, records, ibid) par. 2, thereof,
xxx
xxxxxxxxx
Not even petitioners November 23, 1990 Ex-Parte Motion To Present Evidence Against Defaulting
Defendants (page 489, records, Vol. 2) [can] be deemed as a remedy [for] the fact that there never
was issued an order of default against respondents including [petitioner] VEC. Having thus established
that there ha[d] been no order of default against VEC as contemplated by Sec. 1, Rule 18, in relation to
Sec. 9, Rule 13, Revised Rules of Court, there could not have been any valid default-judgment rendered
against it. The issuance of an order [o]f default is a condition sine qua non in order [that] a judgment
by default be clothed with validity. Further, records show that this [c]ourt never had authorized [private
respondent] to adduce evidence ex-parte against [Petitioner] VEC. In sum, the February 18, 1991
decision by default is null and void as against [Petitioner] VEC. xxxx.
The aforementioned default judgment refers to the February 18, 1989 Decision, not to the
Order finding petitioner in default as contended by private respondent. Furthermore, it is a legal
impossibility to declare a party-defendant to be in default before it was validly served summons.
Trial Court Did Not Allow Presentation of Evidence Ex Parte Against Petitioner
The Order of December 10, 1990, which allowed the presentation of evidence ex parte against
the defaulting defendants, could not have included petitioner, because the trial court granted private
respondents motion praying for the declaration of only the foreign defendants in default. So too, private
respondents ex parte Motion to present evidence referred to the foreign defendants only.[91]
Furthermore, the reception of evidence ex parte against a non-defaulting party is procedurally
indefensible. Without a declaration that petitioner is in default as required in Section 1, Rule 18, the
trial court had no authority to order the presentation of evidence ex parte against petitioner to render
judgment against it by default. The trial judge must have thought that since it failed to appear despite
summons and was in default, it effectively waived any objection to the presentation of evidence against
it. This rule, however, would have applied only if petitioner had submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court. The latter correctly declared, in the Resolution just cited, that the default judgment against
the former had been improvidently rendered.
Fourth Issue: Awards Not Paid and Prayed For
Additional Filing Fees as Lien on the Judgment
Had the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner, nonpayment of docket fees
would not have prevented it from holding petitioner liable for damages. The Court, in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[92] ruled that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee, not upon the amendment of the complaint or the
payment of the docket fees based on the amount sought in the amended pleading. This ruling, however,
was modified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,[93] which added:
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim [through] the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the
Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
fee.
Filing fees for damages and awards that cannot be estimated constitute liens on the awards
finally granted by the trial court. Their nonpayment alone is not a ground for the invalidation of the
award.
Judgment by Default Cannot Grant Relief Not Prayed For

A declaration or order of default is issued as a punishment for unnecessary delay in joining

issues. In such event, defendants lose their standing in court, they cannot expect the trial court to act
upon their pleadings, and they are not entitled to notice of the proceeding until the final termination of
the case.[94] Thus, the trial court proceeds with the reception of the plaintiffs evidence upon which a
default judgment is rendered.
Section 1 of Rule 18 provides that after the defendant has been declared in default, the court
shall proceed to receive the plaintiffs evidence and render judgment granting him such relief as the
complaint and the facts proven may warrant. The reliefs that may be granted, however, are restricted
by Section 5, which provides that a judgment entered against a party in default shall not exceed the
amount or be different in kind from that prayed for.
In other words, under Section 1, a declaration of default is not an admission of the truth or the
validity of the plaintiffs claims.[95] The claimant must still prove his claim and present evidence. In this
sense the law gives defaulting parties some measure of protection because plaintiffs, despite the
default of defendants, are still required to substantiate their allegations in the complaint. The judgment
of default against defendants who have not appeared or filed their answers does not imply a waiver of
all their rights, except their right to be heard and to present evidence in their favor. Their failure to
answer does not imply their admission of the facts and the causes of action of the plaintiffs, because
the latter are required to adduce evidence to support their allegations.
Moreover, the trial court is not allowed by the Rules to receive evidence that tends to show a
relief not sought or specified in the pleadings.[96] The plaintiff cannot be granted an award greater
than or different in kind from that specified in the complaint.[97]
This case should be distinguished, however, from that of defendants, who filed an answer but
were absent during trial. In that case, they can be held liable for an amount greater than or different
from that originally prayed for, provided that the award is warranted by the proven facts. This rule is
premised on the theory that the adverse party failed to object to evidence relating to an issue not
raised in the pleadings.
The latter rule, however, is not applicable to the instant case. Admittedly, private respondent
presented evidence that would have been sufficient to hold petitioner liable for damages. However, it
did not include in its amended Petitions any prayer for damages against petitioner. Therefore, the trial
court could not have validly held the latter liable for damages even if it were in default.
Fifth Issue: Execution of Final Judgment
Section 1 of Rule 39 provides that execution shall issue only upon a judgment that finally
disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution shall issue as a matter of right upon the expiration
of the period to appeal it, if no appeal has been duly perfected.[98]
In the present case, however, we have already shown that the trial courts Decision has not
become final and executory against petitioner. In fact, the judgment does not even bind it. Obviously,
Respondent Court committed serious reversible errors when it allowed the execution of the said
judgment against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they affect petitioner. The levy and the sale
on execution of petitioners properties are declared NULL and VOID. Said properties are ordered
RESTORED to petitioner. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005
NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, PASCUAL G. QUINTO, LUIS B. BUENA, EUSEBIA V. TABLADA,
CANUTO G. TISBE, DAVID R. CARULLO, SOFONIAS E. COLEGADO, FELIX B. BUENA, TORIBIO
C. EVANGELISTA, LEBRADA A. NICOLAS, ALECIA J. RAMOS, MILA G. DE LOS REYES,
SALVADOR I. DE LA TORRE, MOISES CRUZ, RUFINO INFANTE, ALICIA ASTROLOGO,
TRINIDAD LUMIQUED, LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI, & TEODORA C. TEMERAS vs. CARMELINO M.
SANTIAGO

executed by a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez.[3]

According to the Deeds of Assignment, the Subject Property was part of a vast tract of land
called Hacienda Quibiga, which extended to Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, Cavite, Batangas, Pasay,
Taguig, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal; awarded to Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish title. Ismael Favila claimed
to be one of the heirs and successors-in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Acting as Attorney-inFact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by his mga kapatid on 25 February 1965, Ismael
Favila signed the aforementioned Deeds of Assignment, assigning portions of the Subject Property to
the petitioners, each portion measuring around 500 to 1,000 square meters, in exchange for the labor
and work done on the Subject Property by the petitioners and their predecessors.[4]
Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to evict them from the Subject
Property. Two of the petitioners had actually received notices to vacate. Their investigations revealed
that the Subject Property was included in Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) No. 53028, No. 281660,
No. N-39258 and No. 205270, all originating from OCT No. 670, and now in the name of respondent.[5]
OCT No. 670 was issued in the name of respondents mother, Isabel Manahan y Francisco, and
three other individuals, pursuant to Decree No. 10248, dated 13 February 1913, in Case No. 8502 of
the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands. The whole property covered by OCT No. 670
was subsequently adjudicated in favor of Isabel Manahan Santiago (formerly Isabel Manahan y
Francisco). Consequently, OCT No. 670 was cancelled and TCT No. T-53028 was issued exclusively in
the name of Isabel Manahan Santiago. On 28 December 1968, Isabel Manahan Santiago executed a
Deed of Donation transferring the property to her son, respondent herein, who subsequently secured
TCTs No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No. 205270 in his own name.[6]
Petitioners filed with the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an action for declaration of nullity of
respondents certificates of title on the basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious. Among the
defects of OCT No. 670 pointed out by petitioners were that: (1) OCT No. 670 was not signed by a duly
authorized officer; (2) Material data therein were merely handwritten and in different penmanships; (3)
OCT No. 670 was not printed on the Official Form used in 1913, the year it was issued; (4) It failed to
indicate the Survey Plan which was the basis of the Technical Description of the property covered by the
title; (5) Decree No. 10248 referred to in OCT No. 670 was issued only on 11 April 1913, while OCT No.
670 was issued earlier, on 13 February 1913; and (6) Decree No. 10248 was issued over a property
other than the one described in OCT No. 670, although also located in the Province of Rizal.[7]
Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses on
03 July 1996. According to respondent, [t]he allegations in the Complaint would readily and patently
show that the same are flimsy, fabricated, malicious, without basis in law and in fact[8]
As an affirmative defense, respondent claimed that the petitioners had no legal capacity to file
the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and
authentic on its face, then OCT No. 670 and all of respondents land titles derived therefrom, are
incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world.[9]
Citing the consolidated cases of Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muoz, et al.
and Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation v. Hon. Macario Peralta, Jr., et al.,[10]
respondent argued that the Spanish title, on which petitioners based their claim, was neither
indefeasible nor imprescriptible. Moreover, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892, which took effect on 16
February 1976, required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of their lands
under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,[11] within six months from
effectivity of the decree. After the given period, Spanish titles could no longer be used as evidence of
land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens System. [12]
Respondent also raised the affirmative defense of prescription. He pointed out that any action
against his certificates of title already prescribed, especially with regard to OCT No. 670, which was
issued in 1913 or more than 83 years prior to the filing of the Complaint by the petitioners. At the very
least, respondent contended, it must be presumed that the questioned land titles were issued by the
public officials concerned in the performance of their regular duties and functions pursuant to the law.
[13]

In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners pray for the reversal
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64957,[1] affirming the Order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. 1220,[2] dismissing petitioners
Complaint for declaration of nullity of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 670 and all other titles
emanating therefrom.

Even assuming arguendo that the petitioners entered and occupied the Subject Property, they
did so as mere intruders, squatters and illegal occupants, bereft of any right or interest, since the
Subject Property was already covered by Torrens certificates of title in the name of respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest.[14]

In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed parcels of land,
located in Sitio Panayawan, Barangay San Rafael, Montalban (now Rodriquez), Province of Rizal
(Subject Property), by virtue of several Deeds of Assignment, dated 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994,

Lastly, respondent denied knowing the petitioners, much less, threatening to evict them. In
fact, petitioners were not included as defendants in Civil Case No. 783 entitled, Carmelino M. Santiago
v. Remigio San Pascual, et al., which respondent instituted before the same trial court against squatters

occupying the Subject Property. In its decision, dated 01 July 1992, the trial court held that there is no
doubt that the plaintiff (respondent herein) is the owner of the land involved in this case on which the
defendants have built their houses and shanties Although the decision in Civil Case No. 783 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals, it had become final and executory for failure of the defendantsappellants therein to file their appellants brief.[15]
In the instant case, the trial court held a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses as
prayed for by the respondent. During said hearing, petitioners presented their lone witness, Engineer
Placido Naval, a supposed expert on land registration laws. In response to questions from Honorable
Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez of the trial court, Engineer Naval answered that a parcel of land titled
illegally would revert to the State if the Torrens title was cancelled, and that it was the State, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, that should file for the annulment or cancellation of the title.
Respondent, on the other hand, did not present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings and
documents he had so far submitted to the trial court.[16]
After the preliminary hearing, the trial court issued the questioned Order, dated 05 February
1999, dismissing petitioners Complaint. Pertinent portions of the Order of the trial court read:
After considering the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, this Court is inclined not to
grant plaintiffs (sic) prayer. Finding credence and giving weight to plaintiffs (sic) lone but expert
witness, it is crystal clear that, to quote:
1. a parcel of land titled illegally will revert to the State
2. it is the State who must file the corresponding case of annulment of title
through the Office of the Solicitor General, and
3. a land illegally titled in the name of private individual, the State through
the Office of the Solicitor General should file the corresponding
case for cancellation of title. (TSN August 26, 1997).
The above quoted testimony is straight from horse (sic) mouth so to speak as this was the testimony of
the plaintiffs (sic) expert witness. And judging from the said testimony alone aforecited, plaintiffs (sic)
cause [of action] is bound to fail. Plaintiffs (sic) own testimony wrote finis to their case. From the
record, this case was initiated and filed by private individuals, Nemencio Evangelista, et. al.,
contradicting their witness (sic) testimony. To reiterate, this Court finds credence to the testimony of
the plaintiffs (sic) witness, i.e., is (sic) the State through the Office of the Solicitor General who must
initiate and file a case of this nature when title to a land is being claimed to be obtained through fraud
and allegedly spurious.
The opinion of this Court anent the testimony of the witness is not without basis. Explicit is the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the recent case of Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of
Appeals, to wit:
An action for reversion has to be instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 101,
Commonwealth Act No. 141. (282 SCRA 43).
As to the documentary evidence, having gone through with the Deed of Assignment/s purportedly
executed by and between a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez and the plaintiffs, which is the principal if
not the only basis of plaintiffs claim ownership and possession of the subject parcel of land, the same
does not hold water in a manner of speaking, for being self-serving. Assignor Ismael Favila y Rodriguez
claimed in said Deed that he is the Attorney-in-Fact by virtue of an alleged Special Power of Attorney
executed in his favor by his mga kapatid on February 23, 1965, but said Special Power of Attorney was
not presented before this Court, thus there arises a doubt as to its existence and execution not to
mention doubt on the existence of his mga kapatid who as alleged executed said Special Power
Attorney (sic) in his favor.
Even if this Court granting arguendo would admit the authenticity of said Deeds of Assignment/s, that
will not alter the outcome of the pending incident/s before this Court. Why? Because the said Deed of
Assignment/s which were based on Spanish title have lost their evidentiary value pursuant to the
Presidential Decree No. 892 i.e. DISCONTINUANCE OF THE SPANISH MORTGAGE SYSTEM OF
REGISTRATION AND OF THE USE OF SPANISH TITLES AS EVIDENCE IN LAND REGISTRATION
PROCEEDINGS.
There is no need to elaborate on the above-cited provisions of PD 892 as they are self-explanatory.
Suffice it to say that there is no showing, that plaintiffs complied with the said law i.e. to apply for
registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six
(6) months from the effectivity of this decree (February 16, 1976). Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be
used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens System.
This being the case and likewise being clear that plaintiffs were not the lawful owners of the land
subject of this case, for they did not comply with PD 892, the said plaintiffs do not have the legal
standing to bring before this Court the instant complaint

Moreover, the principal issue in this case is for the declaration of nullity of defendants title, which has
nothing to do with plaintiffs (sic) claim of ownership and possession even if we set aside, albeit
momentarily, the truth that plaintiffs (sic) claim were based on barred Spanish Title/s, and thus
plaintiffs were never the owners of the parcel of land subject of this case.
Further, defendants (sic) title especially so with the mother title OCT 670 was entered and issued in
1913 or more than Eighty Three (83) years ago, the same not having been questioned by any party.
Only now that it is being questioned, but sad to say, plaintiffs who are on the offensive and relying on
their lone expert witness, instead of bolstering their case, unwittingly sealed their fate [17]
After the trial court denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Order, dated 20 July
1999,[18] petitioners appealed both Orders of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 July 2002,[19] affirmed the Order of the trial
court, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners Complaint. The Court of Appeals denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution, dated 14 February 2003.[20]
Thus, petitioners filed this Petition for Review [21] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising
the following issues and praying for the reversal of the aforementioned Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the Order of dismissal of the trial court:
I. Whether the lower courts dismissal of the petitioners complaint should be proscribed by
the rules of evidence it being based inter alia on Engr. Navals testimony, which was
indisputably not based on facts but conclusion of law.
II. Whether the lower courts dismissal of petitioners complaint should be proscribed by the
rules of evidence it being done sans ample evidence except bare allegations of
respondent.
III. Whether the provision of P.D. 892, i.e., Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land
ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system, holds of an
exception.
IV. Whether an action for quieting of title, specifically where petitioners are in possession of
subject land, can be subject of prescription.
In his Comment,[22] the respondent, for the most part, reiterated the findings of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.
The Court believes that the trial court rightfully dismissed petitioners Complaint, but for
reasons different from those relied upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
According to the respondent, petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus,
the Complaint filed before the trial court stated no cause of action.
Before anything else, it should be clarified that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue[23]
and the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action[24] are two different grounds for a
motion to dismiss or are two different affirmative defenses. Failure to distinguish between the lack of
legal capacity to sue from the lack of personality to sue is a fairly common mistake. The difference
between the two is explained by this Court in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[25]
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue
and that the complaint states no cause of action. Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is
not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case,
or does not have the character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for
lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded
on failure to state a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the
term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to sue, such as
on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest.
Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal
capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact
that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
In the present case, this Court may assume that the respondent is raising the affirmative
defense that the Complaint filed by the petitioners before the trial court stated no cause of action
because the petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being the real party-in-interest. It is the
respondents contention that only the State can file an action for annulment of his certificates of title,
since such an action will result in the reversion of the ownership of the Subject Property to the State.
The affirmative defense that the Complaint stated no cause of action, similar to a motion to
dismiss based on the same ground, requires a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the

Complaint. In the case of Garcon v. Redemptorist Fathers,[26] this Court laid down the rules as far as
this ground for dismissal of an action or affirmative defense is concerned:
It is already well-settled by now that, in a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of
action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations of fact
made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action, and not on whether these allegations of fact are
true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint; that the
test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of said
complaint. Stated otherwise, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear in the face of the
complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground, for in the determination of whether or not a
complaint states a cause of action, only the facts alleged therein and no other matter may be
considered, and the court may not inquire into the truth of the allegations, and find them to be false
before a hearing is had on the merits of the case; and it is improper to inject in the allegations of the
complaint facts not alleged or proved, and use these as basis for said motion.
In resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case stated a cause of action, the trial
court should have limited itself to examining the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. It was
proscribed from inquiring into the truth of the allegations in the Complaint or the authenticity of any of
the documents referred or attached to the Complaint, since these are deemed hypothetically admitted
by the respondent. The trial court evidently erred in making findings as to the authenticity of the Deeds
of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in favor of petitioners on 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994; and
questioning the existence and execution of the Special Power of Attorney in favor of said Ismael Favila
by his siblings on 25 February 1965. These matters may only be resolved after a proper trial on the
merits.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint, and respondent hypothetically admitted that: (1)
Petitioners predecessors-in-interest, in the concept of owners, had been in actual, physical, open,
continuous and adverse possession of the Subject Property against the whole world since time
immemorial; (2) The Subject Property was part of the vast tract of land called Hacienda Quibiga
awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain by virtue of a Spanish title; (3) Ismael
Favila, an heir and successor-in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, acting as Attorney-in-Fact
pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by his mga kapatid on 25 February 1965, executed
Deeds of Assignment covering the Subject Property in favor of petitioners; (4) Petitioners still occupied
and possessed the Subject Property, on which their houses were erected, when they discovered that the
Subject Property was already covered by Torrens certificates of title in the name of respondent; and (5)
That petitioners filed the Complaint to prevent their eviction by the respondent. To determine whether
these allegations are sufficient to constitute a cause of action, it is important for this Court to establish
first the nature of petitioners action.
Indeed, petitioners Complaint filed before the trial court was captioned as an action for
declaration of nullity of respondents certificates of title. However, the caption of the pleading should not
be the governing factor, but rather the allegations therein should determine the nature of the action,
because even without the prayer for a specific remedy, the courts may nevertheless grant the proper
relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and the evidence introduced.[27]
The trial court believed that petitioners action was ultimately one for reversion of the Subject
Property to the public domain. Based on the testimony of Engineer Naval and the case of Nagao v.
Court of Appeals,[28] it declared that the State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, is
the party-in-interest in an action for cancellation of a certificate of title illegally issued in the name of a
private individual, because the eventual effect of such cancellation is the reversion of the property to
the State.
The Court disagrees in this pronouncement of the trial court, and calls for a far closer review of
its decision in Nagao v. Court of Appeals,[29] wherein the Court held that
It is then clear from the allegations in the complaint that private respondents claim ownership of the
2,250 square meter portion for having possessed it in the concept of an owner, openly, peacefully,
publicly, continuously and adversely since 1920. This claim is an assertion that the lot is private land, or
that even assuming it was part of the public domain, private respondents had already acquired
imperfect title thereto under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as
amended by R.A. No. 1942
Under Section 48, a subject lot is, for all legal intents and purposes, segregated from the public
domain, because the beneficiary is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Consequently, merely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, the lot in question is apparently
beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the Bureau of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free
Patent. Hence, dismissal of private respondents complaint was premature and trial on the merits should
have been conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters.

It would have been entirely different if the action were clearly for reversion, in which case, it would
have to be instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 101 of C.A. No. 141, which provides:
Sec. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in
the proper courts, in the name of the [Republic] of the Philippines.
In the more recent case of Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of Honorio Dacut,[30] the
difference between an action for declaration of nullity of land titles from an action for reversion was
more thoroughly discussed as follows:
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the same
as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of
ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent
allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land. Hence, in Gabila vs.
Barriga [41 SCRA 131], where the plaintiff in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the
cancellation or amendment of the defendants title because even if the title were canceled or amended
the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment would revert
to the public domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and that the only person or entity
entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands.
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would
require allegations of the plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free
patent and certificate of title as well as the defendants fraud or mistake, as the case may be, in
successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a
case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained
therefore is consequently void ab initio. The real party-in-interest is not the State but the plaintiff who
alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of
title to the defendant
In their Complaint, petitioners never alleged that the Subject Property was part of the public
domain. On the contrary, petitioners asserted title over the Subject Property by virtue of their actual,
physical, open, continuous and adverse possession thereof, in the concept of owners, by themselves
and through their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The Deeds of Assignment executed
in their favor and attached to their Complaint referred to a Spanish title granted by the Queen of Spain
to their predecessor-in-interest, Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Clearly, petitioners are asserting private
title over the Subject Property, and consequently, their action could not be one for reversion.
In their instant Petition, petitioners further averred that rather than an action for nullity of
respondents certificates of title, theirs was more appropriately an action to remove a cloud on or to
quiet their title over the Subject Property.
Article 476 of the Civil Code, on removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, provides that:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in
truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an
action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any
interest therein.
Respondents certificates of title over the Subject Property appeared valid or effective; but
according to the petitioners, they were fake, spurious and/or fraudulent, and a cloud on their title to the
same property that needed to be removed. A cloud on title has been defined as follows:
Cloud on Title. A cloud on title is an outstanding instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is actually invalid or inoperative, but which may nevertheless impair or affect
injuriously the title to property. The matter complained of must have a prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy. The cloud on title is a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but
which is in fact unfounded. The invalidity or inoperativeness of the instrument is not apparent on the
face of such instrument, and it has to be proved by extrinsic evidence[31]
Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action was one for removal of a cloud
on or quieting of title, it does arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that petitioners had no personality to file the said action, not being the parties-in-interest, and their
Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause of action.
According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action to remove a cloud on or to
quiet title, must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the subject
matter of the action.[32] Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that they had any legal or
equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify their right to file an
action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.

Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the
right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule,
assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.[33]
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property by virtue of their actual and
continuous possession of the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in their favor,
attached to and an integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners predecessors-in-interest
based their right to the Subject Property on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to the Subject Property
on their possession thereof since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title granted
to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since time immemorial carried the presumption that the land
had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the
Spanish conquest.[34] If the Subject Property was already private property before the Spanish
conquest, then it would have been beyond the power of the Queen of Spain to award or grant to
anyone.
The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-in-interest
could be traced only as far back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners, having
acquired portions of the Subject Property by assignment, could acquire no better title to the said
portions than their predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title can only be based on the same
Spanish title.
Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners from invoking the Spanish title
as basis of their ownership of the Subject Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the Torrens system by
discontinuing the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring
all lands recorded under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title, unregistered lands. It
further provides that within six months from its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should
apply for registration of their land under what is now P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in
any registration proceedings under the Torrens system. [35] Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the
Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing ownership over real property.
P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez had only until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the Subject
Property. In the absence of an allegation in petitioners Complaint that petitioners predecessors-ininterest complied with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed
to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined
from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration
proceedings.
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest title, but only confirm
and record title already created and vested.[36] By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration
proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded from accepting, confirming and recording a
Spanish title. Reason therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from accepting and
indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some other form of action brought before them ( i.e., removal
of cloud on or quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording or registration. To rule otherwise
would open the doors to the circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the existence of land titles,
recognized and affirmed by the courts, but would never be recorded under the Torrens system of
registration. This would definitely undermine the Torrens system and cause confusion and instability in
property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to eliminate.
Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may still be presented as proof of ownership on the
basis of the exception provided in the fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads:
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens
system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by
proof of actual possession; . . .
Since Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession of the Subject Property, then they could
still present the Spanish title as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property. [37]
This Court cannot sustain petitioners argument. Actual proof of possession only becomes
necessary because, as the same whereas clause points out, Spanish titles are subject to prescription. A
holder of a Spanish title may still lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually
possesses the same for the required prescriptive period.[38] Because of this inherent weakness of a
Spanish title, the applicant for registration of his Spanish title under the Torrens system must also

submit proof that he is in actual possession of the real property, so as to discount the possibility that
someone else has acquired a better title to the same property by virtue of prescription.
Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole,
and not just a particular provision alone. A word or phrase taken in the abstract may easily convey a
meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated. An apparently general provision may have a limited
application if read together with other provisions of the statute.[39]
The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be interpreted and harmonized with the
other provisions of the whole statute.[40] Note that the tenor of the whole presidential decree is to
discontinue the use of Spanish titles and to strip them of any probative value as evidence of ownership.
It had clearly set a deadline for the filing of applications for registration of all Spanish titles under the
Torrens system (i.e., six months from its effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after which, the Spanish
titles may no longer be presented to prove ownership.
All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications for registration of their title on or
before 14 August 1976. In a land registration proceeding, the applicant should present to the court his
Spanish title plus proof of actual possession of the real property. However, if such land registration
proceeding was filed and initiated after 14 August 1976, the applicant could no longer present his
Spanish title to the court to evidence his ownership of the real property, regardless of whether the real
property was in his actual possession.
Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject Property when
they filed the Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the
application of P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of
the Subject Property, whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or
to quiet title.
The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish titles from claiming ownership of the
real property on some other basis, such as those provided in either the Land Registration Decree[41] or
the Public Land Act.[42] Petitioners though failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their
Complaint aside from possession of the Subject Property from time immemorial, which this Court has
already controverted; and the Spanish title, which is already ineffective to prove ownership over the
Subject Property.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the petitioners lacked the
personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was
properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the case on this
ground, it is already unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of prescription of the action.
Wherefore, this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 29 July 2002, and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77,
dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners Complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161065. April 15, 2005
EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO, CELSO D. GANGAN, PACASIO S. BANARIA, SOFRONIO B. URSAL,
ALBERTO P. CRUZ, MARIA L. MATIB, RACHEL U. PACPACO, ANGELO G. SANCHEZ, and
SHERWIN A. SIP-AN vs. HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, in his capacity as Chairman,
Commission on Audit, HON. EMMANUEL M. DALMAN and HON. RAUL C. FLORES, in their
capacities as Commissioners, Commission on Audit
Judicial power is the power to hear and decide cases pending between parties who have the
right to sue in courts of law and equity.[1] Corollary to this dictum is the principle of locus standi of a
litigant. He who is directly affected and whose interest is immediate and substantial has the standing to
sue. Thus, a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that
can be redressed by a favorable decision in order to warrant an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and
justify the exercise of judicial power on his behalf.
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the legality of Resolution No. 2002-05 of the
Commission on Audit (COA) providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan. The above-named
petitioners basically alleged therein that this Plan is intrinsically void for want of an enabling law
authorizing COA to undertake the same and providing for the necessary standards, conditions,
restrictions, limitations, guidelines, and parameters. Petitioners further alleged that in initiating such
Organizational Restructuring Plan without legal authority, COA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

At this point, it is pertinent to state that the COA is a quasi-judicial body and that its decision,
order or ruling may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party.[2]

matter of public concern, imbued with public interest. Second, the individual petitioners, as taxpayers,
asserted a material interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly used.

Petitioners Eufemio C. Domingo, Celso C. Gangan, Pascasio S. Banaria are retired Chairmen,
while Sofronio B. Ursal, and Alberto P. Cruz are retired Commissioners of COA. All claim to maintain a
deep-seated abiding interest in the affairs of COA,[3] especially in its Organizational Restructuring Plan,
as concerned taxpayers.

Here, petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation. In fact, they admitted that
they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the
respondents and are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from
respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain. Clearly, they do not have any legal
standing to file the instant suit.

The other petitioners are incumbent officers or employees of COA. Maria L. Matib and Angelo
G. Sanchez are State Auditor III and State Auditor II, respectively, assigned to the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR). Prior to the implementation of the questioned COA Organizational
Restructuring Plan, they were Resident Auditors and later Audit Team Leaders. Petitioner Rachel U.
Pacpaco is a State Auditor III assigned to CAR and a Team Supervisor, while petitioner Sherwin A. Sipian is a State Auditor I also assigned at the CAR. These petitioners claim that they were
unceremoniously divested of their designations/ranks as Unit Head, Team Supervisor, and Team Leader
upon implementation of the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan without just cause and without due
process, in violation of Civil Service Law. Moreover, they were deprived of their respective
Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA), thus causing them undue financial prejudice.
Petitioners now invoke this Courts judicial power to strike down the COA Organizational
Restructuring Plan for being unconstitutional or illegal.
Initially, for our resolution is the issue of whether petitioners have the legal standing to
institute the instant petition.
Petitioners invoke our ruling in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[4] Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[5] and Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v.
Commission on Elections[6] that where the subject matter of a case is a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest, then this fact alone gives them legal standing to institute the instant
petition. Petitioners contend that the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan is not just a mere
reorganization but a revamp or overhaul of the COA, with a spillover effect upon its audit performance.
This will have an impact upon the rest of the government bodies subject to its audit supervision, thus,
should be treated as a matter of transcendental importance. Consequently, petitioners legal standing
should be recognized and upheld.
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counter that petitioners have
no legal standing to file the present petition since following our ruling in Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor
Center v. Garcia, Jr.,[7] they have not shown a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an actual
or potential injury that can be redressed by our favorable decision. Petitioners themselves admitted that
they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the said
respondents and are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from
respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain. It is clear then that petitioners failed
to show any present substantial interest in the outcome of this case, citing Kilosbayan v. Morato.[8] Nor
may petitioners claim that as taxpayers, they have legal standing since nowhere in their petition do
they claim that public funds are being spent in violation of law or that there is a misapplication of the
taxpayers money, as we ruled in Dumlao v. Comelec.[9]
Petitioners reliance upon our rulings in Chavez,[10] Agan, Jr.,[11] and Information Technology
Foundation[12] is flawed.
In Chavez, we ruled that the petitioner has legal standing since he is a taxpayer and his
purpose in filing the petition is to compel the Public Estate Authority (PEA) to perform its constitutional
duties with respect to: (a) the right of the citizens to information on matters of public concern; and (b)
the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable
lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first is to compel PEA to disclose
publicly information on the sale of Government lands worth billions of pesos, as mandated by the
Constitution and statutory law. The thrust of the second is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain, thereby compelling it to comply with a constitutional
duty to the nation. We held that these matters are of transcendental public importance.[13]
In Agan, Jr., we held that petitioners have legal standing as they have a direct and substantial
interest to protect. By the implementation of the PIATCO contracts, they stand to lose their source of
livelihood, a property right zealously protected by the Constitution. Such financial prejudice on their
part is sufficient to confer upon them the requisite locus standi.[14]
In Information Technology Foundation, there were two reasons why petitioners standing was
recognized. First, the nations political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the
outcome of the 2004 elections. Accordingly, the award for the automation of the electoral process was a

We are well aware of the averments of petitioners Matib, Pacpaco, Sanchez, and Sipi-An that
they were demoted and unceremoniously divested of their previous designations as Unit Head, Team
Supervisor, or Team Leader; that they were deprived of their RATA; that they were relegated to being
mere Team Members, entitled to only a reimbursable transportation allowance; and that they were
denied due process.
Such averments lack merit. Actually, they were not demoted. Under Section 11, Rule VII of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, a demotion is the movement
from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties,
responsibilities, status, or rank which may or may not involve reduction in salary.[15] A demotion by
assigning an employee to a lower position in the same service which has a lower rate of compensation
is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it.[16]
Here, there have been no new appointments issued to Matib, Pacpaco, Sanchez, and Sipi-An
under the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. Thus, their contention that they have been demoted
is baseless.
Moreover, the change in their status from COA auditors (receiving monthly RATA) to COA
auditors (receiving only reimbursable RATA) cannot be attributed to the COA Organizational
Restructuring Plan but to the implementation of the Audit Team Approach (ATAP), pursuant to COA
Resolution No. 96-305 dated April 16, 1996.
Under the ATAP, an audit team, not a resident auditor, is deployed to conduct an audit. An
audit team may be composed of two (2) or more members under an Audit Team Leader. Whenever
practicable, an Audit Team Supervisor supervises at least three (3) audit teams. The composition of an
audit team is not permanent. Hence, an Audit Team Member may be designated or assigned as an Audit
Team Leader for one assignment and subsequently as a Team Member in another engagement. The
designation depends upon the position or rank of the one who is designated as an Audit Team Leader.
Thus, a State Auditor III who may have been assigned as an Audit Team Leader in one engagement
may find himself relegated to being an Audit Team Member in another engagement, if a State Auditor
IV or State Auditor V is designated as the Audit Team Leader.
Pursuant to the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan, the COA issued Memorandum No.
2002-034[17] providing for the guidelines regarding the payment of RATA, thus:
1. All holders of State Auditor IV position shall be entitled to fixed commutable RATA
wherever they are assigned.
2. Henceforth, only State Auditors IV shall be assigned as new Unit Heads or Team
Leaders.
3. State Auditors below State Auditor IV assigned as Unit Heads or Team Leaders who
have been receiving fixed RATA shall continue to be designated as such and to
receive the RATA until relieved of the designation for incompetence, inefficiency,
or misconduct.
All others who collect RATA on reimbursable basis, including those paid on a daily basis under COA
Resolution No. 99-007 dated June 7, 1999, are likewise entitled thereto.
Matib, Pacpaco, Sanchez, and Sipi-An are not qualified to be Audit Team Leaders or to receive
fixed monthly RATA since none of them holds the rank or position of State Auditor IV. But this does not
mean that they are not entitled to receive reimbursable RATA if they are designated as Audit Team
Leaders. It is clear from the text of the said COA Memorandum that the principle of non-diminution of
benefits has been upheld.
Thus, in the implementation of the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan, we fail to see how
petitioners could have sustained personal injury as they have not shown to have a personal stake
therein. Accordingly, they are wanting in legal standing to institute the instant petition. Corollarily, we
find no reason to delve into the constitutionality or legality of the COA Organizational Restructuring
Plan.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and
NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and
represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor,
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO
JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE
CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE,
all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE
VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and
TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented
by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA,
CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented
by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and
ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and
VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed
BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INCvs.THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.,
in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology
which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have
a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs
therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in
concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original
defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The
complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of
the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate
that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for
that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has
a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant
rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests
contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial;
scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land
area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six

per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of
the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes,
(d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and
other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for
domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation
are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial
logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph
6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their
successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource
treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property
he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled
to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren
and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been
abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of
the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos

and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and wellbeing. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to
the Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient
use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,
id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the
issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that
(1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the
action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In
the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that
the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to selfpreservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise
submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they
may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see
nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae."
Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the
theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question
which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They
therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by
the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of
the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue
with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject
matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all
the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means
the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently,
the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of
the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the
issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and
rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short
of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or
a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color
and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing
violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint
itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the

fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of
the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta
and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water and
noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as
well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10
June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for
the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable
use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, offshore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and
the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system
including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,
15
specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of
the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,
specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of
the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment
Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop,
maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable
harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter
statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O.
No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of
the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth
of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may
the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there
is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to
be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof,
they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that
insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants,
the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation
or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.
What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of
section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law,
distinguished member of this Court, says:

22

Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to
rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their
acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch,
of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand
or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that
now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides: . . .

of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations
of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if
the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest.

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law. 24

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke
in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with
utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to
the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the
said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands
of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director
of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged
Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of
the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J.
168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area
and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further
that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose,
such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose

31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of
yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a
matter of right.

Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which,
to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal
principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the
natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to
myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that
their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest
which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the
concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in
the country whether now or in the future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to
benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with
the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of
action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether
some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be
shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably
is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that
"the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that
it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to
"a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into
rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of
dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to
rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction

of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so
on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June
1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June
1977 all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements
of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the
right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other
hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine
Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and subheadings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to
contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form.
The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too
large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right
a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public
respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the
relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more
specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles
found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court
should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and
effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation
is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right
to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel
courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast
area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical
competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and executive
departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms
and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not
dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and

conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those
companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which,
to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal
principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the
natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to
myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that
their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest
which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the
concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in
the country whether now or in the future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to
benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with
the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of
action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether
some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be
shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably
is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that
"the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that
it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to
"a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into
rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of
dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to
rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction
of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so
on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June
1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June
1977 all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements
of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the
right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other
hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give

rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine
Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and subheadings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to
contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form.
The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too
large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right
a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public
respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the
relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more
specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles
found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court
should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and
effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation
is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right
to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel
courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast
area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical
competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and executive
departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms
and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not
dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and
conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those
companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
G.R. No. 154745. January 29, 2004
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION vs. HERBERT MARKUS
EMIL SCHEER
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71094 granting the respondents petition for
certiorari and prohibition annulling the order of arrest issued by the petitioner, and permanently
enjoining her from deporting the respondent from the Philippines. Through its decision, the CA virtually
reversed the Summary Deportation Order[2] of the Board of Commissioners (BOC) and its Omnibus
Resolution[3] denying the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of said Order, and enjoining
the petitioner from deporting the respondent.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

Respondent Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a native of Ochsenfurt, Germany, was a frequent
visitor of the Philippines. On July 18, 1986, his application for permanent resident status was granted.
[4] The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) issued in favor of the respondent Alien Certificate
of Registration No. B-396907 dated September 16, 1987[5] and Immigration Certificate of Residence
No. 256789 dated February 24, 1988.[6] The Commissioner stated that the granting of the petition
would redound to the benefit of the Filipino people.[7] During his sojourn in the Philippines, the
respondent married widowed Edith delos Reyes[8] with whom he had two daughters. They had a son,
Herbert Scheer, Jr., but he passed away on November 13, 1995.[9] They resided in Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan, where the respondent established and managed the Bavaria Restaurant. On May 21, 1991, he
was appointed Confidential Agent by then NBI Director Alfredo S. Lim.[10]
In a Letter dated June 29, 1995, Vice Consul Jutta Hippelein informed the Philippine
Ambassador to Bonn, Germany, that the respondent had police records and financial liabilities in
Germany.[11]
The Department of Foreign Affairs received from the German Embassy in Manila Note Verbale
No. 369/95 dated July 26, 1995, informing it that the respondent was wanted by the German Federal
Police; that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him; and that the respondent will be served
with an official document requesting him to turn over his German passport to the Embassy which was
invalidated on July 2, 1995.[12] The Embassy requested the Department of Foreign Affairs to inform
the competent Philippine authorities of the matter. The BOC thereafter issued a Summary Deportation
Order dated September 27, 1997. The penultimate paragraph of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Board of Commissioners hereby orders the following:
1. Cancellation of respondents permanent residence visa;
2. Respondents summary deportation and permanent exclusion from the
Philippines; and
3. Inclusion of his name on the Bureaus Blacklist.
PROVIDED, however that said summary deportation should be held in abeyance in case said alien has a
pending final and executory criminal conviction where the imposed penalty is imprisonment, in which
case, he has to serve first such imposed penalty, and/or has a pending criminal, civil or administrative
action and a Hold Departure Order has been issued or that his presence in said action is indispensable.
In such instances, the alien should remain in the custody of the Bureau until his turnover to the proper
authorities in case he has to serve imprisonment or in case of pendency of civil or criminal
administrative action, he shall remain in the custody of the Bureau until such time that his pending
cases shall have been decided, terminated or settled, as the case may be, unless circumstances
demand the immediate implementation of this summary deportation.
...
SO ORDERED.[13]
In issuing the said order, the BOC relied on the correspondence from the German Vice Consul
on its speculation that it was unlikely that the German Embassy will issue a new passport to the
respondent; on the warrant of arrest issued by the District Court of Germany against the respondent for
insurance fraud; and on the alleged illegal activities of the respondent in Palawan.[14] The BOC
concluded that the respondent was not only an undocumented but an undesirable alien as well.
When the respondent was apprised of the deportation order, he forthwith aired his side to then
BID Commissioner Leandro T. Verceles. The Commissioner allowed the respondent to remain in the
Philippines, giving the latter time to secure a clearance and a new passport from the German Embassy.
[15] Then Presidential Assistant Teodorico K. Imperial wrote a Testimonial dated November 24, 1995, in
behalf of the respondent addressed to Commissioner Verceles. Nonetheless, the respondent, through
counsel, filed on December 5, 1995 an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation
Order of the BOC.[16] In his motion, the respondent alleged, inter alia, that:
1. The elementary rules of due process require notice and opportunity to be heard before a person can
be lawfully deprived of his right (Ute Paterok vs. Bureau of Customs, 193 SCRA 132). In the instant
case, although it is acknowledged that the Honorable Office may conduct summary deportation
proceedings, respondent was not given notice and opportunity to be heard before said Summary
Deportation Order was issued. Respondents right to procedural due process was therefore violated.
Consequently, the Summary Deportation Order is invalid.
2. In issuing, the Summary Deportation Order, this Honorable Office relied on Note Verbal No. 369/95
issued by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Manila, notifying the Department of Foreign
Affairs and this Honorable Office about the warrant of arrest against respondent for alleged illegal
insurance fraud and illegal activities. However, a close scrutiny of said note verbal shows that nowhere
therein does it state that respondent was involved in insurance fraud or in any kind of illegal activities in
Germany or anywhere else in the world, such as in Palawan. Therefore, the main basis of the Summary
Deportation Order is incompetent as evidence against respondent who is, like every Filipino, presumed
to be innocent until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
3. The power to deport alien is a police power measure necessary against undesirable alien whose
presence in the country is injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the country (Board of

Commissioner Commission on Immigration vs. De la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853). It is respectfully submitted
that respondent is not an undesirable alien. He has stayed in the Philippines for more or less than (10)
years. He has married a Filipina and has three (3) minor children. He has established his business in
Palawan and he has no police record whatsoever. Respondent has considered the Philippines his second
home and he has nowhere else to go back to in Germany. Under the circumstances and for
humanitarian considerations, respondent is not an undesirable alien whose deportation is warranted.
Likewise, the mere fact that his passport was not renewed by the German Embassy does not also
automatically justify the deportation of respondent.[17]
However, the BOC did not resolve the respondents motion. The respondent was neither
arrested nor deported.
Meanwhile, on February 15, 1996, the District Court of Straubing rendered a Decision
dismissing the criminal case against the respondent for physical injuries.[18] The German Embassy in
Manila, thereafter, issued a temporary passport to the respondent.
In a Letter dated March 1, 1996, the respondent informed Commissioner Verceles that his
passport had been renewed following the dismissal of the said criminal case. He reiterated his request
for the cancellation of the Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, 1995 and the restoration
of his permanent resident status.[19] Subsequently, on March 12, 1996, the German Embassy issued to
the respondent a regular passport, to expire on March 11, 2006.
The BOC still failed to resolve the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Commissioner Verceles did not respond to the respondents March 1, 1996 Letter. The respondent
remained in the Philippines and maintained his business in Palawan. On March 20, 1997, the
Department of Labor and Employment approved his application for Alien Employment Registration
Certificate as manager of the Bavaria Restaurant in Puerto Princesa City.
In the meantime, petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed office.
She wrote the German Embassy and inquired if the respondent was wanted by the German police. On
April 12, 2002, the German Embassy replied that the respondent was not so wanted.[20] At about
midnight on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives and BID agents apprehended the respondent in his
residence on orders of the petitioner. He was whisked to the BID Manila Office and there held in custody
while awaiting his deportation. Despite entreaties from the respondents wife[21] and his employees,
the petitioner refused to release the respondent.[22]
Shocked at the sudden turn of events, the respondent promptly communicated with his lawyer.
The latter filed with the BID a motion for bail to secure the respondents temporary liberty. On June 11,
2002, the respondents counsel filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with a prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin
the petitioner from proceeding with the respondents deportation.[23] The respondent (petitioner
therein) alleged, inter alia, that his arrest and detention were premature, unjust, wrongful, illegal and
unconstitutional, effected without sufficient cause and without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. He asserted that there was no speedy remedy open to him in the ordinary course of law[24]
and that his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC had not
yet been resolved despite the lapse of more than six years. The respondent averred that he was a fully
documented alien, a permanent resident and a law-abiding citizen. He, thus, prayed as follows:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that:
1. Upon the filing of this Petition, this Honorable Court issue a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin
respondent Commissioner from enforcing any order to deport petitioner;
2. After due hearing, a writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction be correspondingly issued to
maintain the status quo pending resolution of the Petition on the merits.
3. After hearing, judgment be rendered:
a) Directing and mandating respondent Commissioner and the body she heads to resolve the Motion
for Reconsideration filed in 1995, in his favor, and nullifying or suspending the implementation of any
order, oral or written, she may have issued or issue to deport petitioner; and
b) Making the injunction in petitioners favor permanent.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other and further relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the
premises, such as directing respondent, if Herbert Scheer is deported before the matter is heard on
notice, to authorize his return.[25]
The BOC ruled that its September 27, 1995 Order had become final and executory after the
lapse of one year, citing our rulings in Sy vs. Vivo,[26] and Lou vs. Vivo.[27] The BOC also held that it
was not competent to reverse the September 27, 1995 Order, citing our ruling in Immigration
Commissioner vs. Fernandez.[28] It declared that the respondent may seek the waiver of his exclusion
via deportation proceedings through the exceptions provided by Commonwealth Act No. 613,[29]
Section 29 (a)(15), but that his application for the waiver presupposes his prior removal from the

Philippines.
In a parallel development, the respondent procured a letter from the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Puerto Princesa City certifying that he had no pending criminal record.[30] The
Puerto Princesa City Philippine National Police (PNP) also issued a certification that the respondent had
no pending criminal or derogatory records in the said office.[31]
Meanwhile, on June 26, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a status quo order restraining the
petitioner from deporting the respondent on a bond of P100,000.00.[32] On July 18, 2002, the BOC
issued an Omnibus Resolution dated June 14, 2002, pendente lite denying the respondents Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Bail/Recognizance, and the Letter dated June 11, 2002. The
decretal portion of the resolution reads:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing circumstances, we deny the prayers of the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of 5 December 1995, the Motion for Bail/Recognizance dated 7 June 2002 and the
Letter of 11 June 2002. Further, we hereby order the following:
1. Subject to the submission of appropriate clearances, the summary deportation order the respondent
Herbert Scheer, German, under BI Office Memorandum Order No. 34 (series of 1989) and the BOC
Summary Deportation Order of 27 September 1995;
2. Permanent exclusion of Herbert Scheer from the Philippines under C.A. No. 613, Section 40 (a)(15).
3. Inclusion of the name of Herbert Scheer in the Immigration Black List; and
4. Forfeiture of the bail bond, if any, of Herbert Scheer under C.A. No. 613, Section 40 (a)(15).
...
IT IS SO ORDERED.[33]
During the hearing of the respondents plea for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
before the CA on July 22, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that the State had
no opposition to the respondents re-entry and stay in the Philippines, provided that he leave the
country first and re-apply for admission and residency status with the assurance that he would be readmitted.[34] The respondents counsel manifested to the appellate court that he had just been
informed by the OSG of the Omnibus Resolution of the BOC dated June 14, 2002.
In her Comment on the Petition, the petitioner (the respondent therein) alleged, inter alia, the
following:
1) that the BOC was an indispensable party to the petition;
2) the petitioners failure to implead the BOC warranted the denial of the petition;
3) the allowance by then Immigration Commissioner Leandro Verceles for the
petitioner therein to renew his passport and secure clearances, even if
proved, was not binding on the BOC;
4) the September 27, 1995 Order of the BOC was already executory when the
respondent filed her petition in the CA;
5) the German Embassys issuance of a new passport did not legalize the respondents
stay in this country, which became illegal on July 2, 1995 when his
passport expired;
6) the respondent therein did not act with abuse of discretion in causing the arrest
and detention of the respondent based on the BOCs Summary Deportation
Order; and
7) the BOC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Summary
Deportation Order and Omnibus Resolution and such order and resolution
were not mooted by the German Embassys issuance of a new passport in
favor of the respondent.
In view of the Omnibus Resolution of the BOC, the respondent (petitioner therein) in his
Memorandum prayed for the nullification of the BOCs Order, as well as its Omnibus Resolution denying
his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration considering that with the issuance of a new passport, there was
no more basis for his deportation, thus:
RELIEF
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that:
1. Upon the filing of this Memorandum, this Honorable Court forthwith direct and authorize the
immediate release of petitioner, even on undersigneds recognizance, until further orders from this
Honorable Court;
2. The Summary Deportation Order of September 27, 19[9]5, affirmed by respondent allegedly on June
14, 2002 and made known only yesterday, be nullified to the extent that it directs the deportation of
petitioner, who has removed the very basis of said Order of not having a valid passport, and that the
Resolution of June 14, 2002 be nullified in toto; and,
3. The Temporary Restraining Order of June 26, 2002 be converted into a permanent injunction or writ
of prohibition.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other and further relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the
premises.[35]

Surprisingly, the respondents counsel received on July 24, 2003 a Letter from the petitioner
dated July 16, 2002 stating that, the BOC was in the course of reviewing the deportation case against
Mr. Scheer, and that its findings would be given in due time.[36]

Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo was impleaded as the sole respondent was not enough, as she is only
one of the four Commissioners. Furthermore, the assailed Orders were issued by the Board, and not by
the Immigration Commissioner alone.

On August 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent
granting his petition for certiorari and prohibition and permanently enjoining the petitioner from
deporting the respondent. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, any order, oral or written, issued by respondent Commissioner Domingo against petitioner,
in relation to his deportation, is hereby ANNULLED, and respondent Commissioner Domingo is hereby
permanently enjoined/prohibited from deporting petitioner, in so far as this case is concerned.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner be released from his confinement/detention in the Bureau of
Immigration UNLESS there is/are fresh new grounds/cases that will warrant his continued detention.
SO ORDERED.[37]

The respondent counters that the petitioner is already estopped from raising this issue. He
argues that In quite a number of jurisprudence, only the Immigration Commissioner is impleaded to decide whether
an alien may stay here or not. The bottom line is petitioner, head of the Bureau of Immigration, was
more than fully heard on its institutional position, a Bureau which speaks with a single voice in this
case. She is in estoppel for not raising the issue earlier, either in a timely Comment or during the oral
argument[41]
In Caruncho III v. Comelec, it was held that[O]rdinarily, the nonjoinder of an indispensable party or real party in interest is not by itself a ground
for the dismissal of the petition. The court before which the petition is filed must first require the
joinder of such party. It is the noncompliance with said order that would be a ground for the dismissal
of the petition.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the German Embassys subsequent issuance of passport to the
respondent before the BOCs issuance of its Omnibus Resolution had mooted the September 27, 1995
Summary Deportation Order, as well as the arrest and detention of the respondent. According to the
court, it made no sense to require the respondent to leave the country and thereafter re-apply for
admission with the BOC. Furthermore, since the grounds cited by the BOC in its Summary Deportation
Order no longer existed, there was no factual and legal basis to disqualify the respondent from staying
in the country.
On the issue of whether the members of the BOC were indispensable parties, the CA ruled as
follows:
a) There are quite a number of cases in relevant jurisprudence wherein only the Immigration
Commissioner was impleaded to decide whether an alien may stay or be deported, such as in the case
of Vivo vs. Arca (19 SCRA 878) and Vivo vs. Cloribel (22 SCRA 159).
b) In the case of Caruncho III vs. COMELEC (315 SCRA 693), it was pronounced that: Ordinarily, the
nonjoinder of an indispensable party or the real party interest is not by itself a ground for the dismissal
of the petition. The court before which the petition is filed must first require the joinder of such party. It
is the noncompliance with said order that would be a ground for the dismissal of the petition.
thus, c) respondent may be estopped for not raising such issue earlier.[38]
Aggrieved, the respondent therein, now the petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed to us for relief. The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred on a question
of law in granting the respondents petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 71094.[39]
In support of his contention, the Solicitor General has submitted the following arguments:
I. THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION TO RESOLVE RESPONDENTS URGENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER, CONSIDERING THAT IT IS THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, AND
NOT THE COMMISSIONER ALONE, WHICH HAS AUTHORITY TO MAKE SAID RESOLUTION.
II. THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, CONSIDERING THAT IT IS THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, AND NOT THE
COMMISSIONER ALONE, WHICH ISSUED THE SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER AND THE OMNIBUS
RESOLUTION.
III. THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, PROHIBITING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER AND THE
OMNIBUS RESOLUTION, CONSIDERING THAT THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS WAS NOT IMPLEADED
AS PARTY-RESPONDENT IN THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 71094.
IV. ASSUMING BUT WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS WAS PROPERLY
IMPLEADED AS PARTY-RESPONDENT IN THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 71094, NEVERTHELESS, THE
SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER AND THE OMNIBUS RESOLUTION WERE NOT ISSUED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF (SIC)
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
V. FURTHER ASSUMING BUT WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS WAS
PROPERLY IMPLEADED AS PARTY-RESPONDENT IN THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 71094, THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION DID NOT ACT WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN IMPLEMENTING THE SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER AND THE OMNIBUS
RESOLUTION.[40]
Elucidating on his first three arguments, the petitioner maintains that the respondents petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals should have been dismissed
because he failed to implead the real party-in-interest as mandated by Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of
Court, as amended; in this case, the BOC. According to the Solicitor General, this was a fatal procedural
error. The inclusion of the BOC as respondent in the case was necessary in order that its actions could
be directly attacked and for the court to acquire jurisdiction over it. The fact that Immigration

But even as the Court of Appeals did not require respondent of such joinder of parties, the respondent,
in fact, begged leave, ad cautelam, in its Reply Memorandum dated July 31, 2002 to implead the Board
which speaks with a single voice anyway in this case, and therefore, no claim can be made that a valid
point of view has not been heard[42]
Moreover, according to the respondent, the petitioner is clearly the BIDs chosen
instrumentality for the relevant purpose. What the respondent ultimately questioned are the acts or
orders of the petitioner for the arrest and immediate deportation of the respondent by way of
implementing the BOCs Summary Deportation Order.
By way of reply, the Office of the Solicitor General asserted that the Summary Deportation
Order and Omnibus Resolution were collegial actions of the BOC and not of the petitioner alone.
Although its Chairperson, the petitioner, is merely a member thereof, her decisions and actions are still
subject to the collective will of the majority.[43]
The Ruling of the Court
The BOC is an
Indispensable
Party
We agree with the petitioners contention that the BOC was an indispensable party to the
respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals. The respondent
was arrested and detained on the basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC. The petitioner
caused the arrest of the respondent in obedience to the said Deportation Order. The respondent, in his
Memorandum, prayed that the CA annul not only the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC but also
the latters Omnibus Resolution, and, thus, order the respondents immediate release. The respondent
also prayed that the CA issue a writ of mandamus for the immediate resolution of his Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. The said motion had to be resolved by the BOC as the order sought to be resolved and
reconsidered was issued by it and not by the petitioner alone. The powers and duties of the BOC may
not be exercised by the individual members of the Commission.[44]
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, as amended, requires indispensable parties to be
joined as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the
presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality.[45]
Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court.[46] The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. Lack of authority to act
not only of the absent party but also as to those present.[47] The responsibility of impleading all the
indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.[48]
However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and/or such times as are just.[49] If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefor.[50] The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to
be indispensable.[51] In this case, the CA did not require the respondent (petitioner therein) to implead
the BOC as respondent, but merely relied on the rulings of the Court in Vivo v. Arca,[52] and Vivo v.
Cloribel.[53] The CAs reliance on the said rulings is, however, misplaced. The acts subject of the
petition in the two cases were those of the Immigration Commissioner and not those of the BOC;
hence, the BOC was not a necessary nor even an indispensable party in the aforecited cases.
The Non-joinder of an
Indispensable Party is not
a Ground for the Dismissal

of the Petition
The Court may be curing the defect in this case by adding the BOC as party-petitioner. The
petition should not be dismissed because the second action would only be a repetition of the first.[54]
In Salvador, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[55] we held that this Court has full powers, apart from
that power and authority which is inherent, to amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings and
decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the real party-in-interest. The Court has the power to avoid
delay in the disposition of this case, to order its amendment as to implead the BOC as partyrespondent. Indeed, it may no longer be necessary to do so taking into account the unique backdrop in
this case, involving as it does an issue of public interest.[56] After all, the Office of the Solicitor General
has represented the petitioner in the instant proceedings, as well as in the appellate court, and
maintained the validity of the deportation order and of the BOCs Omnibus Resolution. It cannot, thus,
be claimed by the State that the BOC was not afforded its day in court, simply because only the
petitioner, the Chairperson of the BOC,[57] was the respondent in the CA, and the petitioner in the
instant recourse. In Alonso v. Villamor,[58] we had the occasion to state:
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were created, not to
hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration of justice. They do not constitute the
thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best
adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character
of the one and become the other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly
remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.
The CA had Jurisdiction
Over the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus
We do not agree with the petitioners contention that the issue before the CA, as to the power
of the President to determine whether an alien may remain or be deported from the Philippines, is
beyond the appellate courts competence to delve into and resolve. The contention of the petitioner is
based on a wrong premise.
The settled rule is that the authority to exclude or expel aliens by a power affecting
international relation is vested in the political department of the government, and is to be regulated by
treaty or by an act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to the
regulations so established, except in so far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or
by statute, or is required by the Constitution to intervene.[59] The judicial department cannot properly
express an opinion upon the wisdom or the justice of the measures executed by Congress in the
exercise of the power conferred on it,[60] by statute or as required by the Constitution. Congress may,
by statute, allow the decision or order of the Immigration Commissioner or the BOC to be reviewed by
the President of the Philippines or by the courts, on the grounds and in the manner prescribed by law.
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested judicial power in the Supreme Court and
the lower courts such as the Court of Appeals, as established by law. Although the courts are without
power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their
own judgment from that of Congress or of the President,[61] the Court may look into and resolve
questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act
of the legislative or executive department violates the law or the Constitution. In Harvy Bridges v. I.F.
Wixon,[62] the United States Federal Supreme Court reversed an Order of Deportation made by the
Attorney General for insufficiency of evidence and for improper admission of evidence. In Nging v.
Nagh,[63] the United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit Court) held that conclusions of administrative
offices on the issues of facts are invulnerable in courts unless when they are not rendered by fairminded men; hence, are arbitrary. In Toon v. Stump,[64] the Court ruled that courts may supervise the
actions of the administrative offices authorized to deport aliens and reverse their rulings when there is
no evidence to sustain them. When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency are involved, a petition
for certiorari or prohibition may be filed in the Court of Appeals as provided by law or by the Rules of
Court, as amended.[65]
In this case, the respondent alleges that the petitioner acted arbitrarily, contrary to law and
with grave abuse of discretion in causing his arrest and detention at a time when his Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the BOCs Summary Deportation Order had yet to be resolved. There was no factual
or legal basis for his deportation considering that he was a documented alien and a law-abiding citizen;
the respondent, thus, prayed for a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner, the Chairperson of the
BOC, to resolve the said motion. The petition before the CA did not involve the act or power of the
President of the Philippines to deport or exclude an alien from the country. This being so, the petition
necessarily did not call for a substitution of the Presidents discretion on the matter of the deportation of
the respondent with that of the judgment of the CA.

Irrefragably, the CA had jurisdiction over the petition of the respondent.

The BOC Committed a Grave
Abuse of Discretion Amounting
To Lack or Excess of Jurisdiction
In Issuing its Summary Deportation
Order and Omnibus Resolution; The
Petitioner Committed a Grave Abuse
Of Her Discretion Amounting to
Lack or Excess of Jurisdiction in
Causing the Arrest and Detention
Of The Private Respondent
On the Solicitor Generals fourth and fifth arguments, we are convinced that the BOC
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing its
Summary Deportation Order and Omnibus Resolution, and that the petitioner committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in causing the arrest and detention of the private
respondent.
The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a
matter of grace; such privilege is not absolute nor permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens
may be expelled or deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by
the Constitution, the Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant
thereto. In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,[66] we held, thus:
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law a part of the law of Nation. And in a resolution entitled Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a
member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other
fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that All
human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights (Art. 1); that Everyone is entitled to all the
rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status
(Art. 2); that Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law (Art. 8); that No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (Art. 9); etc.
In this case, the BOC ordered the private respondents deportation on September 27, 1995
without even conducting summary deportation proceedings. The BOC merely relied on the June 29,
1995 Letter of the German Vice Consul and of the German Embassys Note Verbale No. 369/95 dated
July 26, 1995. It issued the Summary Deportation Order on September 27, 1995 allegedly under
paragraph 3 of Office Memorandum Order No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 which reads:
3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the
alien loses the privilege to remain in the country, under the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15
(Schonemann vs. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461, 30 May 1989). The automatic loss of the privilege
obviates deportation proceedings. In such instance, the Board of Commissioners may issue summary
judgment of deportation which shall be immediately executory.
However, as gleaned from the Summary Deportation Order, the respondent was ordered
deported not only because his passport had already expired; the BOC speculated that the respondent
committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in the Philippines and would not, thus, be issued a new
passport. This, in turn, caused the BOC to conclude that the respondent was an undesirable alien.
Section 37(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, provides that:
No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation or without
being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
Under paragraphs 4 and 5 of Office Memorandum Order No. 34, an alien cannot be deported
unless he is given a chance to be heard in a full deportation hearing, with the right to adduce evidence
in his behalf, thus:
4. All other cases shall be tried in full deportation hearing, with due observance of the pertinent
provisions of Law Instruction No. 39.
5. In all cases, the right of the alien to be informed of the charges against him, to be notified of the
time and place of hearing, when necessary, to examine the evidence against him, and to present
evidence in his own behalf, where appropriate, shall be observed.
The respondent was not afforded any hearing at all. The BOC simply concluded that the
respondent committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in Palawan without any evidence. The
respondent was not afforded a chance to refute the charges. He cannot, thus, be arrested and deported
without due process of law as required by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. In Lao Gi v. Court of
Appeals,[67] we held that:
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however,

considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and
liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus,
the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable
to deportation proceedings.
It must be noted that the respondent was a permanent resident before his passport expired on
July 2, 1995. In Chew v. Colding,[68] the United States Federal Supreme Court ruled:
It is well established that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and remains
physically present there, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. He may not be
deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law. Although it later may be established,
as respondents contend, that petitioner can be expelled and deported, yet before his expulsion, he is
entitled to notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing at least before an executive or
administrative tribunal. Although Congress may prescribe conditions for his expulsion and deportation,
not even Congress may expel him without allowing him a fair opportunity to be heard.
As Mr. Justice Murphy said in his concurring opinion in Bridges v. Wixon:[69]
The Bill of Rights belongs to them as well as to all citizens. It protects them as long as they reside
within the boundaries of our land. It protects them in the exercise of the great individual rights
necessary to a sound political and economic democracy.
According to Vattal,[70] an alien who is a permanent resident in a country is a member of the
new society, at least as a permanent inhabitant, and is a kind of citizen of inferior order from the native
citizens; but is, nevertheless, limited and subject to the society, without participating in all its
advantages. Sir Robert Philconse called them de facto, though not de jure citizens of the country of
their domicile.[71]
Such permanent resident[72] may be classified as a denizen, a kind of middle state between
alien and a natural-born subject and partakes of both. Paraphrasing Justice Brewer in his dissenting
opinion in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,[73] when the right to liberty and residence is involved, some
other protection than the mere discretion of the petitioner or the BOC is required. We recall the warning
of the United States Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States:[74]
Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering
to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally
construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to a gradual
depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of the courts
to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis.
In sum, the arrest and detention of the respondent and his deportation under the Summary
Deportation Order of the BOC for insurance fraud and illegal activities in Palawan violated his
constitutional and statutory rights to due process.
The Respondents Arrest and
Detention was Premature,
Unwarranted and Arbitrary
We agree that the Immigration Commissioner is mandated to implement a legal and valid
Summary Deportation Order within a reasonable time. But in this case, the arrest of the respondent in
his house, at near midnight, and his subsequent detention was premature, unwarranted and arbitrary.
Like a thunderbolt in the sky, the BID agents and marines arrested the respondent on June 6, 2002, on
orders of the petitioner based on the September 27, 1995 Summary Deportation Order. Under the basic
rudiments of fair play and due process, the petitioner was required to first resolve the respondents
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order, which was filed more than six years before or on
December 5, 1995.
It may be argued that respondents filing of an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration did not ipso
facto suspend the efficacy of the BOCs deportation order. However, such an argument cannot be
sustained in this case because of the extant and peculiar factual milieu. It bears stressing that more
than six years had elapsed, from the time the Summary Deportation Order was issued, until the
respondent was finally arrested. Supervening facts and circumstances rendered the respondents arrest
and detention unjust, unreasonable, barren of factual and legal basis. The BOC should have set the
respondents motion for hearing to afford him a chance to be heard and adduce evidence in support
thereon. It was bad enough that the BOC issued its Summary Deportation Order without a hearing; the
BOC dealt the respondent a more severe blow when it refused to resolve his motion for reconsideration
before causing his arrest on June 6, 2002.
As aforestated, the BOC ordered the deportation of the respondent after a summary

proceeding without prior notice on the following grounds: (a) the respondents German passport had
expired; (b) there was a pending criminal case for physical injuries against him in Germany; (c) the
respondent indulged in illegal activities in Palawan; (d) that in all likelihood, the respondents passport
will not be renewed by the German Embassy as he was wanted for insurance fraud in Germany; and,
(e) he was an undesirable alien. But then, in response to the written query of no less than the
petitioner herself, the German Embassy declared that the respondent was not wanted by the German
police for any crime, including insurance fraud. This could only mean that the warrant of arrest issued
by the German Federal police mentioned in Note Verbale No. 369/95 had been lifted, and that the
respondent was not involved in any illegal activities in Germany. The criminal case against the
respondent for physical injuries, which does not involve moral turpitude, was dismissed by the German
District Court. Furthermore, there was no evidence of insurance fraud against the respondent.
The BOC issued its Summary Deportation Order without affording the respondent the right to
be heard on his motion and adduce evidence thereon. It merely concluded that the respondent was
involved in illegal activities in Palawan. What made matters worse was that the BOC indulged in sheer
speculation, that the German Embassy is unlikely to issue a new passport to the respondent. The
deportation of aliens should not be based on mere speculation or a mere product of procrastinations as
in this case. As it turned out, the German Embassy re-issued the respondents passport; he was issued
a temporary passport, and, thereafter, a regular passport, yet to expire on March 12, 2006. The
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this matter because the respondent himself, six years before he
was arrested, informed then Immigration Commissioner Verceles in a Letter dated March 1, 1996. The
respondents letter forms part of the records of the BOC. There is no evidence on record that the
respondent committed any illegal activities in Palawan. He was even designated as special agent of the
NBI, and was, in fact, issued clearances by the PNP and the NBI no less. Despite all the foregoing, the
petitioner ordered and caused the arrest and detention of the respondent.
What is most nettlesome is the apparent antedating of the BOC Omnibus Resolution. The
records show that the petitioner sought to assuage the respondents concern on the belated resolution
of his pending urgent motion for reconsideration in a Letter to the latters counsel dated July 18, 2002 in
which the petitioner assured the respondent that the BOC will provide him of its action on the said
motion:
Dear Atty. Sagisag,
We respond to your letter of 17 June 2002 by informing you that the case of Mr. Herbert Scheer is being
evaluated by the Board of Commissioners (BOC). The BOC will provide you of the results of its collegial
action in due time.
V
ery truly
yours,
(
Sgd.) ANDREA D.
DOMINGO
C
ommissioner
[75]
However, the Omnibus Resolution of the BOC was dated June 14, 2002, although on its face it
was filed with the Records Division of the BID only on July 18, 2002.
The foregoing gave reason for the CA to suspect that the Omnibus Resolution of the BOC was
antedated.[76] The petition of the respondent in the CA must have jolted the petitioner and the BOC
from its stupor because it came out with its Omnibus Resolution on July 18, 2002, which was, however,
dated as early as June 14, 2002. The respondent had to wait in anxiety for the BOC to quench his quest
for justice. The BOCs wanton acts amounted to an abdication of its duty to act and/or resolve
cases/incidents with reasonable dispatch. To recall our ruling in Board of Commissioners v. De la Rosa,
[77] citing Sheor v. Bengson,[78] thus:
This inaction or oversight on the part of the immigration officials has created an anomalous situation
which, for reasons of equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor herein involved.
The petitioner and the BOC should have taken to heart the following pronouncement in
Commissioner of Immigration v. Fernandez:[79]
In the face of the disclosure that Teban Caoili had been all along working in the Avenue Electrical
Supply Co. (Avesco), located at No. 653 Rizal Avenue, Manila, until his arrest, and the documentary
evidence showing that he had been issued a Philippine Passport; had regularly paid his Residence Tax
Certificates (A & B), and filed Income Tax Returns, a finding of fact is necessary whether the
Commissioner really had intended to notify Teban Caoili of the exclusion proceedings the Board had
conducted in his absence. While it may be true that the proceedings is purely administrative in nature,
such a circumstance did not excuse the serving of notice. There are cardinal primary rights which must
be respected even in proceedings of administrative character, the first of which is the right of the party

interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.[80]
...
Since the proceedings affected Caoilis status and liberty, notice should have been given. And in the light
of the actuations of the new Board of Commissioners, there is a necessity of determining whether the
findings of the Board of Special Inquiry and the old Board of Commissioners are correct or not. This
calls for an examination of the evidence, and, the law on the matter.[81]

We agree with the petitioner that a foreign embassys cancellation of the passport it had issued
to its citizens, or its refusal to issue a new one in lieu of a passport that has expired, will result in the
loss of the aliens privilege to stay in this country and his subsequent deportation therefrom. But even
the BOC asserted in its Summary Deportation Order that an embassys issuance of a new passport to
any of its citizens may bar the latters deportation, citing the resolution of this Court in Schonemann v.
Commissioner Santiago.[91]

Apparently, the BOC did not bother to review its own records in resolving the respondents
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It anchored its Omnibus Resolution only on the following: the
membership of the BOC had changed when it issued its September 27, 1995 Summary Deportation
Order and under Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 27(b); the BOC is precluded from reversing a
previous order issued by it;[82]and, the September 27, 1995 Order of the BOC had become final and
could no longer be reviewed and reversed by it after the lapse of one year.[83] However, the rulings
cited by the petitioner are not applicable in the instant case, as the said cases cited involve appeals to
the BOC from the decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI). In Sy v. Vivo[84] and Lou v. Vivo,
[85] we ruled that under Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, the Decision of the
BOC on appeal from the decision of the BSI becomes final and executory after one year:
(b) A board of special inquiry shall have authority (1) to determine whether an alien seeking to enter or
land in the Philippines shall be allowed to enter or land or shall be excluded, and (2) to make its
findings and recommendations in all the cases provided for in section twenty-nine of this Act wherein
the Commissioner of Immigration may admit an alien who is otherwise inadmissible. For this purpose,
the board or any member thereof, may administer oaths and take evidence and in case of necessity
may issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum. The hearing of all cases brought before a board of
special inquiry shall be conducted under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of
Immigration. The decision of any two members of the board shall prevail and shall be final unless
reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners as hereafter stated, or in the absence of an appeal,
unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu propio, of the entire
proceedings within one year from the promulgation of the decision.

Irrefragably, Commissioner Verceles was mandated to cause the arrest of the respondent
preparatory to his deportation from the Philippines. However, there was no fixed period in the Order
within which to comply with the same. The Commissioner is not mandated to deport an alien
immediately upon receipt of the BOCs deportation order. It is enough that the Commissioner complies
with the Order within a reasonable time, which, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,[92] we held to connote
as follows:
The meaning of reasonable time depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining
a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements with the governments
concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away; but the Court warned that under
established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

In Commissioner of Immigration v. Fernandez,[86] we held that the BOC composed of new

members is precluded from reversing, motu proprio, the decision of the BOC on appeal from a BSI
decision. But not to be ignored was our ruling that at any rate, the issue of authority should be made in
accordance with the procedure established by law, with a view to protecting the rights of individuals.
[87]
In this case, the Summary Deportation Order was issued by the BOC in the exercise of its
authority under Office Memorandum Order No. 34, and not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction of
BSI decisions. There is no law nor rule which provides that a Summary Deportation Order issued by the
BOC in the exercise of its authority becomes final after one year from its issuance,[88] or that the
aggrieved party is barred from filing a motion for a reconsideration of any order or decision of the BOC.
The Rules of Court may be applied in a suppletory manner to deportation proceedings[89] and under
Rule 37, a motion for reconsideration of a decision or final order may be filed by the aggrieved party.
Neither is there any law nor rule providing that the BOC, composed of new members, cannot
revise a Summary Deportation Order previously issued by a different body of Commissioners. The BOC
that issued the Summary Deportation Order and the BOC which resolved the respondents Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration are one and the same government entity, with the same powers and duties
regardless of its membership. Similarly, an RTC judge who replaces another judge who presided over a
case may review the judgment or order of his predecessor as long as the said judgment or order has
not as yet become final or executory. The act subject of review is not the act of the judge but the act of
the court.
The petitioners contention that it failed to resolve the respondents motion for reconsideration
because of the change of administration in the BOC was branded by the CA as flimsy, if not bordering
on the absurd:
Firstly, it was issued three days (June 14, 2002) after petitioner filed this instant petition on June 11,
2002 or almost seven years from the time the motion for reconsideration was filed;
Secondly, respondents counsels excuse that it took such time to resolve it because it was only later that
the motion for reconsideration was discovered because of change of administration, is flimsy, if not
bordering on the absurd;[90]
The Issuance of a New and Regular
Passport to the Respondent
Rendered the Summary
Deportation Order Moot and
Academic, and the Omnibus
Resolution of the BOC Lacking
in Legal Basis

In this case, the BOC had yet to act on the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The
respondent was also given a chance to secure a clearance and a new passport with the German
Embassy. After all, the possibility that the German Embassy would renew the respondents passport
could not be ruled out. This was exactly what happened: the German Embassy issued a new passport to
the respondent on March 12, 1996 after the German District Court dismissed the case for physical
injuries. Thus, the respondent was no longer an undocumented alien; nor was he an undesirable one
for that matter.
The petitioner even admits that there is no longer a legal or factual basis to disqualify the
respondent from remaining in the country as a permanent resident. Yet, the OSG insists that he has to
be deported first so that the BOCs Summary Deportation Order could be implemented. This contention
was rejected by the CA, thus:
During the hearing of petitioners prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before Us,
respondents counsel from the Office of the Solicitor General had the occasion to manifest in open court
that the State has no opposition to petitioners stay in the country provided he first leave and re-enter
and re-apply for residency if only to comply with the Summary Deportation Order of 1995. That, to Our
mind, seems preposterous, if not ridiculous. An individuals human rights and rights to freedom, liberty
and self-determination recognize no boundaries in the democratic, free and civilized world. Such rights
follow him wherever he may be. If presently, there is no factual or legal impediment to disqualify
petitioner in his stay in the country, other than allegedly those relied upon in the Summary Deportation
Order of 1995 (as hereinbefore discussed, had ceased to exist), requiring petitioner to leave the
country and re-enter and re-apply for residency makes little sense or no sense at all, more so, in the
case of petitioner who, for many years past, had lived herein and nurtured a family that is Filipino.
Thus, opined, We, therefore, believe and hereby rule, that there is presently every reason to
enjoin/prohibit the Bureau of Immigration, respondent Commissioner Domingo in particular, from
presently deporting petitioner.[93]
We agree with the Court of Appeals. The Summary Deportation Order had been rendered moot
and academic upon the German Embassys issuance of a new passport to the respondent. The
respondent had been in the Philippines as a permanent resident since July 18, 1986, and had married a
Filipino citizen, with whom he has two children. He is not a burden to the country nor to the people of
Palawan. He put up, and has been managing, the Bavaria Restaurant with about 30 employees. He has
no pending criminal case; nor does he have any derogatory record. The respondent was allowed by
then Immigration Commissioner Verceles to renew his passport and was given time to secure a
clearance from the German Embassy. The respondent was able to do so. The case against him for
physical injuries was dismissed by the German District Court. Thus, the inceptual basis for the
respondents deportation had ceased to exist.
The power to deport is a police matter against undesirable aliens, whose presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good. We believe that the deportation of the respondent
late in the day did not achieve the said purpose. The petitioner admitted that there is no longer a
factual and legal basis to disqualify the respondent from staying in the country. He is not an undesirable
alien; nor is his presence in the country injurious to public good. He is even an entrepreneur and a
productive member of society.
Arrest, detention and deportation orders of aliens should not be enforced blindly and
indiscriminately, without regard to facts and circumstances that will render the same unjust, unfair or
illegal.[94] To direct the respondent to leave the country first before allowing him re-entry is downright
iniquitous.[95] If the respondent does leave the country, he would thereby be accepting the force and
effect of the BOCs Summary Deportation Order with its attendant infirmities. He will thereby lose his
permanent resident status and admit the efficacy of the cancellation of his permanent resident visa.

Moreover, his entry into the country will be subject to such conditions as the petitioner may impose.
The deportation of an alien is not intended as a punishment or penalty. But in a real sense, it
is. In Bridges v. Wixon,[96] Mr. Justice Murphy declared that the impact of deportation upon the life of
an alien is often as great if not greater than the imposition of a criminal sentence. In dealing with
deportation, there is no justifiable reason for disregarding the democratic and human tenets of our legal
system and descending to the practices of despotism. As Justice Brewer opined in Fong Yue Ting v.
United States,[97] deportation is a punishment because it requires first, an arrest, a deprivation of
liberty and second, a removal from home, from family, from business, from property. To be forcibly
taken away from home, family, business and property and sent across the ocean to a distant land is
punishment; and that oftentimes is most severe and cruel. It would be putting salt on the respondents
woes occasioned by the BOCs ineptitude. Considering the peculiar backdrop and the equities in this
case, the respondents deportation and the cancellation of his permanent resident visa as a precondition
to his re-entry into this country is severe and cruel; it is a form of punishment.
Our ruling in Vivo v. Cloribel,[98] has no application in this case, precisely because the factual
milieu here is entirely different. In that case, the Commissioner of Immigration required the
respondents to leave the country on or before September 12, 1962, because their stay in the country
as approved by the Secretary of Justice had been cancelled. Our ruling in Bing v. Commission on
Immigration,[99] even buttresses the case for the respondent since we ruled therein that an alien
entitled to a permanent stay cannot be deported without being accorded due notice and hearing.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168979 December 2, 2013
REBECCA PACAA-CONTRERAS and ROSALIE PACAA vs ROVILA WATER SUPPLY, INC., EARL
U KOKSENG, LILIA TORRES, DALLA P. ROMANILLOS and MARISSA GABUYA
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 4 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the decision2 dated January 27, 2005 and the resolution3 dated June 6, 2005 of the Courts
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 71551. The CA set aside the orders dated February 28, 2002 4 and
April 1, 20025 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Cebu City, which denied the motion to
dismiss for reconsideration respectively, of respondents Rovila Water Supply, Inc. (Rovilla, Inc.), Earl U.
Kokseng, Lialia Torres, Dalla P. Romanillos and Marissa Gabuya.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Petitioners Rebecca Pacaa-Contreras and Rosalie Pacaa, children of Lourdes Teves Pacaa and
Luciano Pacaa, filed the present case against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and Marisa for accounting
and damages.6
The petitioners claimed that their family has long been known in the community to be engaged in the
water supply business; they operated the "Rovila Water Supply" from their family residence and were
engaged in the distribution of water to customers in Cebu City. The petitioners alleged that Lilia was a
former trusted employee in the family business who hid business records and burned and ransacked the
family files. Lilia also allegedly posted security guards and barred the members of the Pacaa family
from operating their business. She then claimed ownership over the family business through a
corporation named "Rovila Water Supply, Inc." (Rovila Inc.) Upon inquiry with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the petitioners claimed that Rovila Inc. was surreptitiously formed with
the respondents as the majority stockholders. The respondents did so by conspiring with one another
and forming the respondent corporation to takeover and illegally usurp the family business registered
name.7

amended complaint remained the same.12

On October 10, 2000, Luciano also died.13
The respondents filed their Answer on November 16, 2000. 14
The petitioners sister, Lagrimas Pacaa-Gonzales, filed a motion for leave to intervene and her answerin-intervention was granted by the trial court. At the subsequent pre-trial, the respondents manifested
to the RTC that a substitution of the parties was necessary in light of the deaths of Lourdes and
Luciano. They further stated that they would seek the dismissal of the complaint because the
petitioners are not the real parties in interest to prosecute the case. The pre-trial pushed through as
scheduled and the RTC directed the respondents to put into writing their earlier manifestation. The RTC
issued a pre-trial order where one of the issues submitted was whether the complaint should be
dismissed for failure to comply with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which requires that every
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. 15
On January 23, 2002,16 the respondents again filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, among others,
that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest to institute and prosecute the case and that they
have no valid cause of action against the respondents.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC denied the respondents motion to dismiss. It ruled that, save for the grounds for dismissal
which may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a motion to dismiss based on the grounds
invoked by the respondents may only be filed within the time for, but before, the filing of their answer
to the amended complaint. Thus, even granting that the defenses invoked by the respondents are
meritorious, their motion was filed out of time as it was filed only after the conclusion of the pre-trial
conference. Furthermore, the rule on substitution of parties only applies when the parties to the case
die, which is not what happened in the present case. 17
The RTC likewise denied the respondents motion for reconsideration. 18
The respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA, invoking
grave abuse of discretion in the denial of their motion to dismiss. They argued that the deceased
spouses Luciano and Lourdes, not the petitioners, were the real parties in interest. Thus, the petitioners
violated Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on the substitution of parties. 19
Furthermore, they seasonably moved for the dismissal of the case 20 and the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners as heirs of Lourdes and Luciano. 21
THE CA RULING
The CA granted the petition and ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion as the
petitioners filed the complaint and the amended complaint as attorneys-in-fact of their parents. As
such, they are not the real parties in interest and cannot bring an action in their own names; thus, the
complaint should be dismissed22 pursuant to the Courts ruling in Casimiro v. Roque and Gonzales. 23
Neither are the petitioners suing as heirs of their deceased parents. Pursuant to jurisprudence, 24 the
petitioners should first be declared as heirs before they can be considered as the real parties in interest.
This cannot be done in the present ordinary civil case but in a special proceeding for that purpose. The
CA agreed with the respondents that they alleged the following issues as affirmative defenses in their
answer: 1) the petitioners are not the real parties in interest; and 2) that they had no legal right to
institute the action in behalf of their parents.25
That the motion to dismiss was filed after the period to file an answer has lapsed is of no moment. The
RTC judge entertained it and passed upon its merit. He was correct in doing so because in the pre-trial
order, one of the submitted issues was whether the case must be dismissed for failure to comply with
the requirements of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, in Dabuco v. Court of Appeals, 26 the Court held
that the ground of lack of cause of action may be raised in a motion to dismiss at anytime. 27

In forming the respondent corporation, the respondents allegedly used the name of Lourdes as one of
the incorporators and made it appear in the SEC documents that the family business was operated in a
place other than the Pacaa residence. Thereafter, the respondents used the Pacaa familys receipts
and the deliveries and sales were made to appear as those of the respondent Rovila Inc. Using this
scheme, the respondents fraudulently appropriated the collections and payments. 8

The CA further ruled that, in denying the motion to dismiss, the RTC judge acted contrary to established
rules and jurisprudence which may be questioned via a petition for certiorari. The phrase "grave abuse
of discretion" which was traditionally confined to "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment" has
been expanded to include any action done "contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence[.]" 28

The petitioners filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie was authorized by Lourdes
through a sworn declaration and special power of attorney (SPA). The respondents filed a first motion
to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over an intra-corporate controversy.9

THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS

The petitioners filed the present petition and argued that, first, in annulling the interlocutory orders, the
CA unjustly allowed the motion to dismiss which did not conform to the rules. 29

The RTC denied the motion. On September 26, 2000, Lourdes died 10 and the petitioners amended their
complaint, with leave of court, on October 2, 2000 to reflect this development. 11

Specifically, the motion was not filed within the time for, but before the filing of, the answer to the
amended complaint, nor were the grounds raised in the answer. Citing Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court, the respondents are deemed to have waived these grounds, as correctly held by the RTC. 30

They still attached to their amended complaint the sworn declaration with SPA, but the caption of the

Second, even if there is non-joinder and misjoinder of parties or that the suit is not brought in the
name of the real party in interest, the remedy is not outright dismissal of the complaint, but its
amendment to include the real parties in interest. 31
Third, the petitioners sued in their own right because they have actual and substantial interest in the
subject matter of the action as heirs or co-owners, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 32
Their declaration as heirs in a special proceeding is not necessary, pursuant to the Courts ruling in
Marabilles, et al. v. Quito.33
Finally, the sworn declaration is evidentiary in nature which remains to be appreciated after the trial is
completed.34
The respondents reiterated in their comment that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest. 35
They likewise argued that they moved for the dismissal of the case during the pre-trial conference due
to the petitioners procedural lapse in refusing to comply with a condition precedent, which is, to
substitute the heirs as plaintiffs. Besides, an administrator of the estates of Luciano and Lourdes has
already been appointed.36
The respondents also argued that the grounds invoked in their motion to dismiss were timely raised,
pursuant to Section 2, paragraphs g and i, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, the nature and
purposes of the pre-trial include, among others, the dismissal of the action, should a valid ground
therefor be found to exist; and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.
Finally, the special civil action of certiorari was the proper remedy in assailing the order of the RTC. 37
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy for a denial of a motion to dismiss attended by
grave abuse of discretion
In Barrazona v. RTC, Branch 61, Baguio City,38 the Court held that while an order denying a motion to
dismiss is interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to address
an order of denial made without or in excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is granted to keep an
inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The history and development of the ground "fails to state a cause of action" in the 1940, 1964 and the
present 1997 Rules of Court Preliminarily, a suit that is not brought in the name of the real party in
interest is dismissible on the ground that the complaint "fails to state a cause of action." 39
Pursuant to jurisprudence,40 this is also the ground invoked when the respondents alleged that the
petitioners are not the real parties in interest because: 1) the petitioners should not have filed the case
in their own names, being merely attorneys-in-fact of their mother; and 2) the petitioners should first
be declared as heirs. A review of the 1940, 1964 and the present 1997 Rules of Court shows that the
fundamentals of the ground for dismissal based on "failure to state a cause of action" have drastically
changed over time. A historical background of this particular ground is in order to preclude any
confusion or misapplication of jurisprudence decided prior to the effectivity of the present Rules of
Court. The 1940 Rules of Court provides under Section 10, Rule 9 that:
Section 10. Waiver of defenses- Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived; except the defense of failure to state a cause of action, which may be
alleged in a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the
trial on the merits; but in the last instance, the motion shall be disposed of as provided in section 5 of
Rule 17 in the light of any evidence which may have been received. Whenever it appears that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it shall dismiss the action. [underscoring supplied]
This provision was essentially reproduced in Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1964 Rules of Court, and we
quote:
Section 2. Defenses and objections not pleaded deemed waived. Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived; except the failure to state a
cause of action which may be alleged in a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment
on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits; but in the last instance, the motion shall be disposed of
as provided in section 5 of Rule 10 in the light of any evidence which may have been received.
Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it shall dismiss the
action. [underscoring supplied]
Under the present Rules of Court, this provision was reflected in Section 1, Rule 9, and we quote:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. [underscoring supplied]
Notably, in the present rules, there was a deletion of the ground of "failure to state a cause of action"
from the list of those which may be waived if not invoked either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer.
Another novelty introduced by the present Rules, which was totally absent in its two precedents, is the
addition of the period of time within which a motion to dismiss should be filed as provided under
Section 1, Rule 16 and we quote:
Section 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: xxx [underscoring
supplied]
All these considerations point to the legal reality that the new Rules effectively restricted the dismissal
of complaints in general, especially when what is being invoked is the ground of "failure to state a cause
of action." Thus, jurisprudence governed by the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court to the effect that the
ground for dismissal based on failure to state a cause of action may be raised anytime during the
proceedings, is already inapplicable to cases already governed by the present Rules of Court which took
effect on July 1, 1997. As the rule now stands, the failure to invoke this ground in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer would result in its waiver. According to Oscar M. Herrera, 41 the reason for the deletion
is that failure to state a cause of action may be cured under Section 5, Rule 10 and we quote:
Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues not raised
by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not effect the result of
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with
liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
With this clarification, we now proceed to the substantial issues of the petition.
The motion to dismiss in the present case based on failure to state a cause of action was not timely
filed and was thus waived
Applying Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which provides for the grounds for the dismissal of a civil case,
the respondents grounds for dismissal fall under Section 1(g) and (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
particularly, failure to state a cause of action and failure to comply with a condition precedent
(substitution of parties), respectively. The first paragraph of Section 1, 42
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the period within which to file a motion to dismiss under the
grounds enumerated. Specifically, the motion should be filed within the time for, but before the filing of,
the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. Equally important to this provision is Section
1,43
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for the following grounds: 1) the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) litis pendencia; 3) res judicata; and 4) prescription. Therefore,
the grounds not falling under these four exceptions may be considered as waived in the event that they
are not timely invoked. As the respondents motion to dismiss was based on the grounds which should
be timely invoked, material to the resolution of this case is the period within which they were raised.
Both the RTC and the CA found that the motion to dismiss was only filed after the filing of the answer
and after the pre-trial had been concluded. Because there was no motion to dismiss before the filing of
the answer, the respondents should then have at least raised these grounds as affirmative defenses in
their answer. The RTCs assailed orders did not touch on this particular issue but the CA ruled that the
respondents did, while the petitioners insist that the respondents did not. In the present petition, the
petitioners reiterate that there was a blatant non-observance of the rules when the respondents did not
amend their answer to invoke the grounds for dismissal which were raised only during the pre-trial and,
subsequently, in the subject motion to dismiss. 44
The divergent findings of the CA and the petitioners arguments are essentially factual issues. Time and
again, we have held that the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45, such as the present case, is limited only to questions of law, save for certain exceptions. One of
these is attendant herein, which is, when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based.45
In the petition filed with the CA, the respondents made a passing allegation that, as affirmative
defenses in their answer, they raised the issue that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest. 46

On the other hand, the petitioners consistently argued otherwise in their opposition 47 to the motion to
dismiss, and in their comment48 and in their memorandum49 on the respondents petition before the CA.
Our examination of the records shows that the CA had no basis in its finding that the respondents
alleged the grounds as affirmative defenses in their answer. The respondents merely stated in their
petition for certiorari that they alleged the subject grounds in their answer. However, nowhere in the
petition did they support this allegation; they did not even attach a copy of their answer to the petition.
It is basic that the respondents had the duty to prove by substantial evidence their positive assertions.
Considering that the petition for certiorari is an original and not an appellate action, the CA had no
records of the RTCs proceedings upon which the CA could refer to in order to validate the respondents
claim. Clearly, other than the respondents bare allegations, the CA had no basis to rule, without proof,
that the respondents alleged the grounds for dismissal as affirmative defenses in the answer. The
respondents, as the parties with the burden of proving that they timely raised their grounds for
dismissal, could have at least attached a copy of their answer to the petition. This simple task they
failed to do. That the respondents did not allege in their answer the subject grounds is made more
apparent through their argument, both in their motion to dismiss 50 and in their comment, 51 that it was
only during the pre-trial stage that they verbally manifested and invited the attention of the lower court
on their grounds for dismissal. In order to justify such late invocation, they heavily relied on Section
2(g) and (i), Rule 1852 of the Rules of Court that the nature and purpose of the pre-trial include, among
others, the propriety of dismissing the action should there be a valid ground therefor and matters which
may aid in the prompt disposition of the action. The respondents are not correct. The rules are clear
and require no interpretation. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss
based on the grounds invoked by the respondents may be waived if not raised in a motion to dismiss or
alleged in their answer. On the other hand, "the pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all
issues necessary to the disposition of a case are properly raised. The purpose is to obviate the element
of surprise, hence, the parties are expected to disclose at the pre-trial conference all issues of law and
fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may involve privileged or impeaching
matter."53
The issues submitted during the pre-trial are thus the issues that would govern the trial proper. The
dismissal of the case based on the grounds invoked by the respondents are specifically covered by Rule
16 and Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which set a period when they should be raised; otherwise, they are
deemed waived.
The Dabuco ruling is inapplicable in the present case; the ground for dismissal "failure to state a cause
of action" distinguished from "lack of cause of action"
To justify the belated filing of the motion to dismiss, the CA reasoned out that the ground for dismissal
of "lack of cause of action" may be raised at any time during the proceedings, pursuant to Dabuco v.
Court of Appeals.54
This is an erroneous interpretation and application of Dabuco as will be explained below.
First, in Dabuco, the grounds for dismissal were raised as affirmative defenses in the answer which is in
stark contrast to the present case.
Second, in Dabuco, the Court distinguished between the dismissal of the complaint for "failure to state
a cause of action" and "lack of cause of action." The Court emphasized that in a dismissal of action for
lack of cause of action, "questions of fact are involved, [therefore,] courts hesitate to declare a plaintiff
as lacking in cause of action. Such declaration is postponed until the insufficiency of cause is apparent
from a preponderance of evidence.
Usually, this is done only after the parties have been given the opportunity to present all relevant
evidence on such questions of fact."55
In fact, in Dabuco, the Court held that even the preliminary hearing on the propriety of lifting the
restraining order was declared insufficient for purposes of dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of
action. This is so because the issues of fact had not yet been adequately ventilated at that preliminary
stage. For these reasons, the Court declared in Dabuco that the dismissal by the trial court of the
complaint was premature. In the case of Macaslang v. Zamora, 56 the Court noted that the incorrect
appreciation by both the RTC and the CA of the distinction between the dismissal of an action, based on
"failure to state a cause of action" and "lack of cause of action," prevented it from properly deciding the
case, and we quote:
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other. On the
one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground
for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause [of] action refers to
a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Justice
Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the distinction: xxx What is
contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of action which is provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16.
This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was also included as the last

mode for raising the issue to the court, refers to the situation where the evidence does not prove a
cause of action. This is, therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a cause of
action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move for
dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence, hence reference
to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. The procedure would consequently be to
require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to
file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted. [italics supplied]
Based on this discussion, the Court cannot uphold the dismissal of the present case based on the
grounds invoked by the respondents which they have waived for failure to invoke them within the
period prescribed by the Rules. The Court cannot also dismiss the case based on "lack of cause of
action" as this would require at least a preponderance of evidence which is yet to be appreciated by the
trial court. Therefore, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders
denying the respondents motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration. The Court shall not resolve
the merits of the respondents grounds for dismissal which are considered as waived.
Other heirs of the spouses Pacaa to be impleaded in the case.
It should be emphasized that insofar as the petitioners are concerned, the respondents have waived the
dismissal of the complaint based on the ground of failure to state a cause of action because the
petitioners are not the real parties in interest. At this juncture, a distinction between a real party in
interest and an indispensable party is in order. In Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, et al., 57 the Court
clarified these two concepts and held that "[a] real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. On the
other hand, an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action, in contrast to a necessary party, which is one who is not indispensable but who ought
to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. xxx If a suit is not brought in the name
of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action. However, the dismissal on this ground entails an examination of
whether the parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation, and not whether
all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded. The latter query is relevant in discussions
concerning indispensable and necessary parties, but not in discussions concerning real parties in
interest. Both indispensable and necessary parties are considered as real parties in interest, since both
classes of parties stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit."
At the inception of the present case, both the spouses Pacaa were not impleaded as parties-plaintiffs.
The Court notes, however, that they are indispensable parties to the case as the alleged owners of
Rovila Water Supply. Without their inclusion as parties, there can be no final determination of the
present case. They possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily
affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Their interest in the
subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with that of the other
parties.58
Jurisprudence on the procedural consequence of the inclusion or non-inclusion of an indispensable party
is divided in our jurisdiction. Due to the non-inclusion of indispensable parties, the Court dismissed the
case in Lucman v. Malawi, et al.59 and Go v. Distinction Properties Development Construction, Inc.,60
while in Casals, et al. v. Tayud Golf and Country Club et al., 61 the Court annulled the judgment which
was rendered without the inclusion of the indispensable parties. In Arcelona et al. v. Court of Appeals 62
and Bulawan v. Aquende, 63 and Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Alejo et al. 64 the Court ruled that
the burden to implead or order the impleading of an indispensable party rests on the plaintiff and on
the trial court, respectively. Thus, the non-inclusion of the indispensable parties, despite notice of this
infirmity, resulted in the annulment of these cases. In Plasabas, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 65 the
Court held that the trial court and the CA committed reversible error when they summarily dismissed
the case, after both parties had rested their cases following a protracted trial, on the sole ground of
failure to implead indispensable parties. Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. However, in
the cases of Quilatan, et al. v. Heirs of Quilatan, et al. 66 and Lagunilla, et al. v. Monis, et al.,67 the Court
remanded the case to the RTC for the impleading of indispensable parties. On the other hand, in Lotte
Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz, 68 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Emerald Pizza, 69 and Valdez Tallorin, v. Heirs of Tarona, et
al.,70 the Court directly ordered that the indispensable parties be impleaded. Mindful of the differing
views of the Court as regards the legal effects of the non-inclusion of indispensable parties, the Court
clarified in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,71 that the failure to implead
indispensable parties is a curable error and the foreign origin of our present rules on indispensable
parties permitted this corrective measure. This cited case held:
Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the Government to implead
the sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a procedural aberration xxx, slight reflection
would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the defect is not fatal, but one correctible under

applicable adjective rules e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the remedy of
amendment during trial to authorize or to conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing
amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting omission of so-called necessary or
indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It is relevant in this context to
advert to the old familiar doctrines that the omission to implead such parties "is a mere technical defect
which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings even after judgment"; and that, particularly in the
case of indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the very life of the
action, for without them no judgment may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to
implead them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this
Court, where it appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character as such
indispensable parties." Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder of indispensable
parties in fact led to the dismissal of the suit or the annulment of judgment, such cases do not jibe with
the matter at hand. The better view is that non-joinder is not a ground to dismiss the suit or annul the
judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable parties is founded on equity. And the spirit of the law is
reflected in Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit
on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at
any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. Likewise,
jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of Procedure, from which our Section 7, Rule 3 on indispensable
parties was copied, allows the joinder of indispensable parties even after judgment has been entered if
such is needed to afford the moving party full relief. Mere delay in filing the joinder motion does not
necessarily result in the waiver of the right as long as the delay is excusable.
In Galicia, et al. v. Vda. De Mindo, et al.,72 the Court ruled that in line with its policy of promoting a just
and inexpensive disposition of a case, it allowed the intervention of the indispensable parties instead of
dismissing the complaint. Furthermore, in Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer,73 the Court cited Salvador,
et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. 74 and held that the Court has full powers, apart from that power and
authority which are inherent, to amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings and decisions by
substituting as party-plaintiff the real party in interest. The Court has the power to avoid delay in the
disposition of this case, and to order its amendment in order to implead an indispensable party. With
these discussions as premises, the Court is of the view that the proper remedy in the present case is to
implead the indispensable parties especially when their non-inclusion is merely a technical defect. To do
so would serve proper administration of justice and prevent further delay and multiplicity of suits.
Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties may be added by order of the court on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action. If the plaintiff refuses to implead
an indispensable party despite the order of the court, then the court may dismiss the complaint for the
plaintiffs failure to comply with a lawful court order.75
The operative act that would lead to the dismissal of the case would be the refusal to comply with the
directive of the court for the joinder of an indispensable party to the case. 76
Obviously, in the present case, the deceased Pacaas can no longer be included in the complaint as
indispensable parties because of their death during the pendency of the case. Upon their death,
however, their ownership and rights over their properties were transmitted to their heirs, including
herein petitioners, pursuant to Article 774 77 in relation with Article 77778 of the Civil Code.
In Orbeta, et al. v. Sendiong, 79 the Court acknowledged that the heirs, whose hereditary rights are to
be affected by the case, are deemed indispensable parties who should have been impleaded by the trial
court. Therefore, to obviate further delay in the proceedings of the present case and given the Courts
authority to order the inclusion of an indispensable party at any stage of the proceedings, the heirs of
the spouses Pacaa, except the petirioners who are already parties to the case are Lagrimas PacaaGonzalez who intervened in the case, are hereby ordered impleaded as parties-plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 27, 2005 and the resolution date
June 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71551 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The heirs
of the spouses Luciano and Lourdes Pacaa, except herein petitioner and Lagrimas Pacaa-Gonzalez,
are ORDERED IMPLEADED as parties plaintiffs and the RTC is directed tp proceed with the trial of the
case with DISPATCH.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187714 March 8, 2011
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.,
MANUEL B. VILLAR,
JOKER P. ARROYO,
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN,
PIA S. CAYETANO, and
ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition1 with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order filed by Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator Pimentel),
Manuel B. Villar (Senator Villar), Joker P. Arroyo, Francis N. Pangilinan, Pia S. Cayetano, and Alan Peter
S. Cayetano (petitioners). Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole (respondent)
from conducting further hearings on the complaint filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal
(Senator Madrigal) against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 706 (P.S. Resolution 706)
on the alleged double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General
Appropriations Act.
The Antecedents
On 15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege speech entitled
Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!2 In his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the
congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act, particularly the P200 million
appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat Luzon
Expressway to Sucat Road in Paraaque City including Right-of-Way (ROW), and another P200 million
appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including ROW. Senator Lacson stated that C-5 is what was
formerly called President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue and that the second appropriation covers the same
stretch from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Paraaque City. Senator Lacson inquired from
DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the double entry and was informed that it was on account of
a congressional insertion. Senator Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail leading
to the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President.
On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706,3 the full text of which reads:
WHEREAS the Senate President has repeatedly and publicly advocated (sic) the
construction of the C-5 Road/Pres. C.P. Garcia Avenue Extension linking Sucat
Road in Paraaque City to the South Luzon Expressway;
WHEREAS it was discovered that there was a double insertion of P200 million for
the C-5 Road Extension project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act;
WHEREAS Committee on Finance Chair Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile confirmed that the
double insertion for the C-5 Road Extension Project was made by the Senate
President;
WHEREAS this double insertion is only the tip of the iceberg;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President,
from the time he was member of the House of Representatives, used his influence
on the executive to cause the realignment of the C-5 Road Extension project to
ensure that his properties in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City and Barangays
Pulang Lupa and Mayuno Uno, Las Pias would be financially benefited by the
construction of the new road;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President,
through his corporations, negotiated the sale of his properties as roads right of
way to the government, the same properties affected by the projects he
proposed;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President
caused the sale of his landholdings to government as a grossly overpriced cost
prejudicial to other lot owners in the area, the government, and the Filipino
people;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, in
the overpriced sale of another property, used his power and influence to extort
from the original landowner the profit made from the overprice by the Villar
owned corporations;
WHEREAS these acts of the Senate President are in direct violation of the
Constitution, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards of Public Officers;
WHEREAS the Senate President has violated the public trust of the people in
order to serve his personal interests thereby sacrificing the peoples welfare;

WHEREAS the illegal and unethical conduct of the Senate President has betrayed
the trust of the people, and by doing so has shamed the Philippine Senate;

1. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator
Villars constitutional right to equal protection;
2. The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the
investigation of the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator
Villar is violative of Senator Villars right to due process and of the majority
quorum requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution; and
3. The Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due process
clause of the Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole in spite of its own provision [which]
require[s] its effectivity upon publication.13

WHEREAS it is incumbent upon the members of the Senate now to reclaim the
peoples trust and confidence and show that the illegal conduct of any of its
member, even of its leaders, shall not go unpunished;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, TO DIRECT THE
COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PRIVILEGES TO INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF
SENATE PRESIDENT MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. FOR USING HIS POSITION OF
POWER TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN RELOCATING THE C-5 ROAD
EXTENSION PROJECT TO DELIBERATELY PASS THRU HIS PROPERTIES, AND TO
NEGOTIATE THE OVERPRICED PURCHASE OF ROAD RIGHTS OF WAY THRU
SEVERAL PROPERTIES ALSO OWNED BY HIS CORPORATIONS REDOUNDING IN
HUGE PERSONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS FOR HIM TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE, THEREBY RESULTING IN A BLATANT CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
Adopted,
(Sgd.)
M.A. MADRIGAL4
On even date, P.S. Resolution 706 was referred to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Ethics
Committee) which at that time was composed of the following members:
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.

Pia S. Cayetano - Chairperson

Loren Legarda - Member in lieu of Sen. Madrigal
Joker Arroyo - Member
Alan Peter Cayetano- Member
Miriam Defensor-Santiago- Member
Gregorio Honasan - Member
Panfilo Lacson - Inhibited and replaced by Sen. Rodolfo Biazon

On 17 November 2008, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) was elected Senate President. The
Ethics Committee was reorganized with the election of Senator Lacson as Chairperson, and Senators
Richard Gordon, Gregorio Honasan, Loren Legarda, and Mar Roxas as members for the Majority. On 16
December 2008, Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name their representatives
to the Ethics Committee.5 After consultation with the members of the Minority, Senator Pimentel
informed the body that there would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics Committee.6 On 26
January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate their representatives to
the Ethics Committee.7 Senator Pimentel stated that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any
of their members to the Ethics Committee, but he promised to convene a caucus to determine if the
Minoritys decision on the matter is final.8 Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate
Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Committee Rules) which was published in the Official Gazette on
23 March 2009.9
On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech10 where he stated that he would answer
the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. On 27 April 2009,
Senator Lacson delivered another privilege speech11 where he stated that the Ethics Committee was
not a kangaroo court. However, due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with
fairness on Senator Villars case, Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee
be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was approved with ten
members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.12
Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4 May 2009, with eleven
Senators present, and on 7 May 2009, with eight Senators present. On both hearings, petitioners
objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole.
In particular, petitioners questioned the determination of the quorum. On 11 May 2009, petitioners
proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that would constitute the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were adopted. On 14 May 2009,
Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole. On even date, respondent proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on P.S.
Resolution 706. On 18 May 2009, the Chairman submitted a report on the Preliminary Inquiry with a
directive to all Senators to come up with a decision on the preliminary report on 21 May 2009. On 21
May 2009, respondent declared that there was substantial evidence to proceed with the adjudicatory
hearing. The preliminary conference was set on 26 May 2009.
Petitioners came to this Court for relief, raising the following grounds:

In its Comment, respondent argues that:

1. The instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an
indispensable party. In the alternative, the instant petition should be archived until such
time that the said indispensable party has been joined or impleaded and afforded the
opportunity to be heard;
2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee;
3. Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of prohibition for failure to prove grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Committee of the Whole;
4. The principle of separation of powers must be upheld;
5. The instant petition must be dismissed for being premature. Petitioners failed to
observe the doctrine or primary jurisdiction or prior resort;
6. It is within the power of Congress to discipline its members for disorderly behavior;
7. The determination of what constitutes disorderly behavior is a political question
which exclusively pertains to Congress;
8. The Internal Rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion; [and]
9. The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have been duly published and adopted[,]
allow the adoption of supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory hearings.14
The Issues
The issues for the Courts resolution are the following:
1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an
indispensable party in this petition;
2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction or prior resort;
3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villars right to
equal protection;
4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is a violative of Senator Villars right to due process and of the
majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and
5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required
for their effectivity.
The Ruling of this Court
Indispensable Party
Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 7 Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or
defendants.
The test to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as follows:
An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or
affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of
the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be

made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that
its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It
has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence
there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is
effective, complete or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who must be
included in an action before it may properly go forward.
A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy
or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not
necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice
between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would
merely permit a complete relief between him and those already parties to the action,
or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason
to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple
litigation.15
In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it
may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706,
the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of
the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigals interest. The nature of Senator
Madrigals interest in this case is not of the nature that this case could not be resolved without her
participation.
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction simply calls for the determination of
administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions of fact, by administrative agencies rather than
by courts of justice.16 Citing Pimentel v. HRET,17 respondent avers that primary recourse of
petitioners should have been to the Senate and that this Court must uphold the separation of powers
between the legislative and judicial branches of the government.

Reviewing the events that led to the constitution of the Senate Committee of the Whole, the Court
notes that upon the election of Senator Enrile as Senate President on 17 November 2008, the Ethics
Committee was also reorganized. Senator Lacson, who first called the Senates attention to the alleged
irregularities committed by Senator Villar, was elected as Chairperson. On 16 December 2008, when
Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name their representatives to the Ethics
Committee, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from the Minority in
the Ethics Committee. On 26 January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to
nominate their representatives to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel informed him that it is the
stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel
promised to convene a caucus to determine if the Minoritys decision on the matter is final but the
records did not show that a caucus was convened.
On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where he stated that he would answer the
accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. It was because of the
accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villars case that Senator
Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate acting as a
Committee of the Whole, which motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against,
and five abstentions.
The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that all matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges,
safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges.22 However, in this case, the refusal of
the Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while
ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the
jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the
investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator
Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would answer the accusations
against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of
the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics
Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate.
Adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee
by the Senate Committee of the Whole

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has ruled:
x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in
character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative
bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are
involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is
within the proper jurisdiction of the court. x x x18
The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent
for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the
competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve.19
As regards respondents invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that the inviolate
doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by
no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental
power assigned to it by the sovereign people.20 Thus, it has been held that the power of judicial review
is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be
remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of
separation of powers.21 The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by
the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the
resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
Transfer of the Complaint from the Ethics Committee
to the Senate Committee on the Whole
Petitioners allege that the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar to the Senate Committee of
the Whole violates his constitutional right to equal protection. Petitioners allege that the Senate
Committee of the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the
complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory and removed
Senator Villars recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as a body.

Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of
the Whole is violative of Senator Villars right to due process.
We do not agree.
Again, we reiterate that, considering the circumstances of this case, the referral of the investigation by
the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not
violate Senator Villars right to due process. In the same manner, the adoption by the Senate
Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villars right to
due process.
The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized
and affirmed by this Court. Thus:
First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: Each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings.
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary
authority to the House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of
its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial
supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.
x x x. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which, under the
Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to his constitutional grant of
virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to
alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives
of quorum, voting and publication.23
The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum,
voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the Court will
not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.

We do not agree with petitioners.

Prior Publication

Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent
counters that publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted
the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009.
Respondent alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the
Senate Committee of the Whole.
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,24 the Court
declared void unpublished rules of procedure in Senate inquiries insofar as such rules affect the rights
of witnesses. The Court cited Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution which mandates:
Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court explained in the Resolution25 denying the motion for reconsideration:
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be
conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical.
It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules of its legislative inquiries in each
Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be
effective in the subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to
sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be
effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it
had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued
or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those
that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null
and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the
rights of the witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and
effective.26 (Emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al.,27 the
Court further clarified:
x x x inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the
sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly
publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to
the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitutions
directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Taada v. Tuvera.
Taada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor
had kept a tight rein on the Constitutions intentions as expressed through the
allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the
issuances.28
The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of
the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules
need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the
rules can take effect.
In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the
Senate since the proceedings involve the Senates exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its
members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate.
However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides:
Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.29
Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the
Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required
under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required
because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. The majority of the members of the Senate
approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the publication requirement which they
adopted should be considered as the will of the majority. Respondent cannot dispense with the

publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been published in
the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole expressly require
publication before the Rules can take effect. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate
must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected.
Incidentally, we note that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole30 is an
exact reproduction of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and
Privileges31 which states that the Ethics Committee shall be composed of seven members, contrary to
the fact that the Senate Committee of the Whole consists of all members of the Senate. In addition,
Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole32 is an exact reproduction of
Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges33 which states that
only two members of the Ethics Committee shall constitute a quorum, contrary to respondents
allegation in its Comment that eight members of the Senate Committee of the Whole shall constitute a
quorum.34
However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required
to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution.35
Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution on quorum
requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require modification to
comply with requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case.
In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the
Constitution, the latter will of course prevail.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the complaint by the Committee on
Ethics and Privileges to the Senate Committee of the Whole shall take effect only upon publication of
the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152272
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.--- repeated

G.R. No. L-63559 May 30, 1986

NEWSWEEK, INC. vs THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
SUGARCANE PLANTERS INC., BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
ASOCIACION DE AGRICULTORES DE LA CARLOTA, LA CASTELLANA y PONTEVEDRA, INC.,
DONEDCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION INC., ARMANDO GUSTILO, ENRIQUE ROJAS, ALFREDO
MONTELIBANO, JR., PABLO SOLA, JOSE MONTALVO, VICENTE GUSTILO, JOSEPH MARANON,
ROBERTO CUENCA, JOSE SICANGCO, FLORENCIO ALONSO, MIGUEL GATUSLAO, PEDRO YULO,
MARINO RUBIN and BENJAMIN BAUTISTA
Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, in this
special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeks to annul the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court dated December 17, 1982 sustaining the Order of the then Court of First
Instance of Bacolod City which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint for libel filed by
private respondents (Civil Case No. 15812), and the Resolution dated March 10, 1983 which denied its
Motion for Reconsideration.
It appears that on March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters
in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed Civil
Case No. 15812 in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the
province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of petitioners' non-resident
correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came. The complaint alleged that petitioner and the
other defendants committed libel against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in
the February 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek. The article supposedly
portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or
sugarcane planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane
workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them with imprunity. Complainants therein alleged that
said article, taken as a whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation
and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put them (sugarcane planters) in bad light, expose them
to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Philippines and abroad, and make them objects
of hatred, contempt and hostility of their agricultural workers and of the public in general. They prayed
that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual and compensatory damages, and such amounts
for moral, exemplary and corrective damages as the court may determine, plus expenses of litigation,
attorney's fees and costs of suit. A photo copy of the article was attached to the complaint.
On November 5, 1981, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the printed article
sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that state,

much less support a cause of action. It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and,
consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Private respondents filed an
Opposition to the motion to dismiss and petitioner filed a reply.
On March 17, 1982, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds on which the
motion to dismiss are predicated are not indubitable as the complaint on its face states a valid cause of
action; and the question as to whether the printed article sued upon its actionable or not is a matter of
evidence. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on May 28, 1982.
On June 18, 1982, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court (CA-G. R. No. 14406)
seeking the annulment of the aforecited trial court's Orders for having been issued with such a grave
abuse of discretion as amounting to lack of jurisdiction and praying for the dismissal of the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action.
As earlier stated, respondent Court affirmed the trial court's Orders in a Decision dated December 17,
1982 and ordered the case to be tried on the merits on the grounds that -(1) the complaint contains
allegations of fact which called for the presentation of evidence; and (2) certiorari under Rule 65 cannot
be made to substitute for an appeal where an appeal would lie at a proper time. Subsequently, on
March 10, 1983, the respondent Court denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
decision, hence this petition.
The proper remedy which petitioner should have taken from the decision of respondent Court is an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not the special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of said Rules. However, since the petition was filed on time within fifteen days
from notice of the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, we shall treat the same as a
petition for review on certiorari. The two (2) issues raised in the petition are: (1) whether or not the
private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action; and (2) whether or not the petition for
certiorari and prohibition is proper to question the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action.
First, petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because the
complaint made no allegation that anything contained in the article complained of regarding sugarcane
planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents; that libel can be committed only
against individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is claimed to have been directed at a group,
there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do
damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation.
We agree with petitioner.
In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to maintain a libel
suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772, November 30, 1962),
although it is not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case, this Court declared
that" ... defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity of the person upon whom the imputation
is cast, affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have Identified
the personality of the individual defamed." (Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons 42 Phil. 760).
This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance, especially where a group or class of
persons, as in the case at bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that the larger the
collectivity, the more difficult it is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks
apply to him. (Cf. 70 ALR 2d. 1384).
In the case of Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen , 32 Phil. 624, this Court held as follows:
Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language only, are not actionable
by individuals composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping; and it is very probable
that even then no action would lie where the body is composed of so large a number of persons that
common sense would tell those to whom the publication was made that there was room for persons
connected with the body to pursue an upright and law abiding course and that it would be unreasonable
and absurd to condemn all because of the actions of a part. (supra p. 628).
It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a
group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to
every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or
group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the
action separately, if need be.
We note that private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane
planters of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues that the absence of any actionable basis
in the complaint cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar planters.
We find petitioner's contention meritorious.

The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all
(Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of class
interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an
actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a
separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in
the subject matter of the controversy.
The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be libelous
never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated that the victim had
been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of
Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it does to an official act performed by an elective public
official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and press.
The article further stated that Sola and the commander of the special police unit were arrested. The
Court takes judicial notice of this fact. (People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393.)
The second issue to be resolved here is whether or not the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition
is available to petitioner whose motion to dismiss the complaint and subsequent motion for
reconsideration were denied.
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of
appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 4 1). The ordinary procedure to be
followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue
on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash,
except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of
acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or
motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then
certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to
undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash
is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such
cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples
of the exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus vs. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against
the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez vs. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of
jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent
court from further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez vs. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper
venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking
cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo vs. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior
judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the
case.
In Yuviengco vs. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the
Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas vs. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to
quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from
further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People vs. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was
set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.
Respondent Court correctly stated the general rule and its exceptions. However, it ruled that none of
the exceptions is present in the case at bar and that the case appears complex and complicated,
necessitating a full-blown trial to get to the bottom of the controversy.
Petitioner's motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action

against it by pointing out the non-libelous nature of the article sued upon. There is no need of a trial in
view of the conclusion of this Court that the article in question is not libelous. The specific allegation in
the complaint, to the effect that the article attributed to the sugarcane planters the deaths and
brutalization of sugarcane workers, is not borne out by a perusal of the actual text.
The complaint contains a recital of the favorable working conditions of the agricultural workers in the
sugar industry and the various foundations and programs supported by planters' associations for the
benefit of their workers. Undoubtedly, the statements in the article in question are sweeping and
exaggerated; but, paraphrasing the ruling in the Uy Tioco case above quoted, it would be unreasonable
and absurd to condemn the majority of the sugarcane planters, who have at heart the welfare of their
workers, because of the actions of a part. Nonetheless, articles such as the one in question may also
serve to prick the consciences of those who have but are not doing anything or enough for those who
do not have.
On the other hand, petitioner would do well to heed the admonition of the President to media that they
should check the sources of their information to ensure the publication of the truth. Freedom of the
press, like all freedoms, should be exercised with responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed and the complaint in Civil
Case No. 15812 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental is dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140954
HEIRS OF BERTULDO--- repeated

G.R. No. 162788. July 28, 2005

Spouses JULITA DE LA CRUZ and FELIPE DE LA CRUZ vs. PEDRO JOAQUIN
The Rules require the legal representatives of a dead litigant to be substituted as parties to a
litigation. This requirement is necessitated by due process. Thus, when the rights of the legal
representatives of a decedent are actually recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal
compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of the promulgated decision. After all, due process
had thereby been satisfied.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August
26, 2003 Decision[2] and the March 9, 2004 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV
No. 34702. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed decision accordingly
AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.[4]
On the other hand, the trial courts affirmed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. D) and Kasunduan (Exhibit B), to be a sale with right
of repurchase;
b) ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of P9,000.00 by way of repurchasing the
land in question;
c) ordering the defendants to execute a deed of reconveyance of said land in favor of the plaintiff
after the latter has paid them the amount of P9,000.00 to repurchase the land in question;
d) ordering the defendants to yield possession of the subject land to the plaintiff after the latter
has paid them the amount of P9,000.00 to repurchase the property from them; and
e) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages; the amount of P5,000[.00] as exemplary damages; the amount of
P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation and the amount of P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.[5]
The Facts
The case originated from a Complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership, the
cancellation of title, and damages, filed by Pedro Joaquin against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court
of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.[6] Respondent alleged that he had obtained a loan from them in
the amount of P9,000 on June 29, 1974, payable after five (5) years; that is, on June 29, 1979. To
secure the payment of the obligation, he supposedly executed a Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners.
The Deed was for a parcel of land in Pinagpanaan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, covered by TCT No. T-111802.
The parties also executed another document entitled Kasunduan. [7]
Respondent claimed that the Kasunduan showed the Deed of Sale to be actually an equitable

mortgage.[8] Spouses De la Cruz contended that this document was merely an accommodation to allow
the repurchase of the property until June 29, 1979, a right that he failed to exercise.[9]
On April 23, 1990, the RTC issued a Decision in his favor. The trial court declared that the
parties had entered into a sale with a right of repurchase.[10] It further held that respondent had made
a valid tender of payment on two separate occasions to exercise his right of repurchase.[11]
Accordingly, petitioners were required to reconvey the property upon his payment.[12]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sustaining the trial court, the CA noted that petitioners had given respondent the right to
repurchase the property within five (5) years from the date of the sale or until June 29, 1979.
Accordingly, the parties executed the Kasunduan to express the terms and conditions of their actual
agreement.[13] The appellate court also found no reason to overturn the finding that respondent had
validly exercised his right to repurchase the land.[14]
In the March 9, 2004 Resolution, the CA denied reconsideration and ordered a substitution by
legal representatives, in view of respondents death on December 24, 1988.[15]
Hence, this Petition.[16]
The Issues
Petitioners assign the following errors for our consideration:
I. Public Respondent Twelfth Division of the Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in dismissing the
appeal and affirming in toto the Decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. SD-838;
II. Public Respondent Twelfth Division of the Honorable Court of Appeals likewise erred in denying
[petitioners] Motion for Reconsideration given the facts and the law therein presented.[17]
Succinctly, the issues are whether the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death
of Pedro Joaquin, and whether respondent was guilty of forum shopping.[18]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction
Petitioners assert that the RTCs Decision was invalid for lack of jurisdiction.[19] They claim
that respondent died during the pendency of the case. There being no substitution by the heirs, the trial
court allegedly lacked jurisdiction over the litigation.[20]
Rule on Substitution
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished,[21] the Rules of
Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by Section 16 of
Rule 3, which reads thus:
Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim
is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30)
days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative
or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted
within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall
fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified
time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased, and
the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring
such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every partys right to due process.
[22] The estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly represented in the suit through the
duly appointed legal representative.[23] Moreover, no adjudication can be made against the successor
of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is denied.[24]
The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of the
legal representatives of the deceased, but also the resulting judgments.[25] In those instances, the
courts acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or the heirs upon whom no
judgment was binding.[26]

This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they
themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased.
[27] These actions negate any claim that the right to due process was violated.
The Court is not unaware of Chittick v. Court of Appeals,[28] in which the failure of the heirs to
substitute for the original plaintiff upon her death led to the nullification of the trial courts Decision. The
latter had sought to recover support in arrears and her share in the conjugal partnership. The children
who allegedly substituted for her refused to continue the case against their father and vehemently
objected to their inclusion as parties.[29] Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the case,
they were bound to substitute for the defendant also. The substitution effectively merged the persons
of the plaintiff and the defendant and thus extinguished the obligation being sued upon.[30]
Clearly, the present case is not similar, much less identical, to the factual milieu of Chittick.
Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a
requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the
representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with
the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.[31] Mere failure to substitute for a
deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial courts decision. The alleging party must
prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
Substitution in
the Instant Case
The records of the present case contain a Motion for Substitution of Party Plaintiff dated
February 15, 2002, filed before the CA. The prayer states as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Heirs of the deceased plaintiff-appellee as represented by
his daughter Lourdes dela Cruz be substituted as party-plaintiff for the said Pedro Joaquin.
It is further prayed that henceforth the undersigned counsel[32] for the heirs of Pedro Joaquin be
furnished with copies of notices, orders, resolutions and other pleadings at its address below.
Evidently, the heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary appeared and participated in the case. We
stress that the appellate court had ordered[33] his legal representatives to appear and substitute for
him. The substitution even on appeal had been ordered correctly. In all proceedings, the legal
representatives must appear to protect the interests of the deceased.[34] After the rendition of
judgment, further proceedings may be held, such as a motion for reconsideration or a new trial, an
appeal, or an execution.[35]
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Motion for Substitution may be deemed to have
been granted; and the heirs, to have substituted for the deceased, Pedro Joaquin. There being no
violation of due process, the issue of substitution cannot be upheld as a ground to nullify the trial courts
Decision.
Second Issue:
Forum Shopping
Petitioners also claim that respondents were guilty of forum shopping, a fact that should have
compelled the trial court to dismiss the Complaint.[36] They claim that prior to the commencement of
the present suit on July 7, 1981, respondent had filed a civil case against petitioners on June 25, 1979.
Docketed as Civil Case No. SD-742 for the recovery of possession and for damages, it was allegedly
dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for lack of interest to prosecute.
Forum Shopping Defined
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one
or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[37] Forum shopping may be resorted to by a
party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek
a favorable opinion in another, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.[38]
Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of
justice, and congests court dockets.[39] Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground
for the summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt of court.[40]
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in another.[41]
We note, however, petitioners claim that the subject matter of the present case has already been
litigated and decided. Therefore, the applicable doctrine is res judicata.[42]
Applicability of Res Judicata
Under res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all points

and matters determined in the previous suit.[43] The term literally means a matter adjudged, judicially
acted upon, or settled by judgment.[44] The principle bars a subsequent suit involving the same
parties, subject matter, and cause of action. Public policy requires that controversies must be settled
with finality at a given point in time.
The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) it must have been rendered on the merits of the controversy; (3) the court that rendered it must
have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must have been -- between
the first and the second actions -- an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.[45]
Failure to Support Allegation
The onus of proving allegations rests upon the party raising them.[46] As to the matter of
forum shopping and res judicata, petitioners have failed to provide this Court with relevant and clear
specifications that would show the presence of an identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of
action between the present and the earlier suits. They have also failed to show whether the other case
was decided on the merits. Instead, they have made only bare assertions involving its existence without
reference to its facts. In other words, they have alleged conclusions of law without stating any factual
or legal basis. Mere mention of other civil cases without showing the identity of rights asserted and
reliefs sought is not enough basis to claim that respondent is guilty of forum shopping, or that res
judicata exists.[47]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150135 October 30, 2006
SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA G.R. No. 150135
and LORENCITA S.J. ALGURA vs THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ATTY.
MANUEL TEOXON, ENGR. LEON PALMIANO,
NATHAN SERGIO and BENJAMIN NAVARRO, SR.
Anyone who has ever struggled with poverty
knows how extremely expensive it is to be poor.
James Baldwin
The Constitution affords litigantsmoneyed or poorequal access to the courts; moreover, it
specifically provides that poverty shall not bar any person from having access to the courts.[1]
Accordingly, laws and rules must be formulated, interpreted, and implemented pursuant to the intent
and spirit of this constitutional provision. As such, filing fees, though one of the essential elements in
court procedures, should not be an obstacle to poor litigants opportunity to seek redress for their
grievances before the courts.
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the annulment of the September 11, 2001 Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 27, in Civil Case No. 99-4403 entitled Spouses Antonio
F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, et al. , dismissing
the case for failure of petitioners Algura spouses to pay the required filing fees.[2] Since the instant
petition involves only a question of law based on facts established from the pleadings and documents
submitted by the parties,[3] the Court gives due course to the instant petition sanctioned under Section
2(c) of Rule 41 on Appeal from the RTCs, and governed by Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Facts
On September 1, 1999, spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a Verified Complaint
dated August 30, 1999[4] for damages against the Naga City Government and its officers, arising from
the alleged illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house and for payment of lost income
derived from fees paid by their boarders amounting to PhP 7,000.00 monthly.
Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants,[5] to which
petitioner Antonio Alguras Pay Slip No. 2457360 (Annex A of motion) was appended, showing a gross
monthly income of Ten Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Four Pesos (PhP 10,474.00) and a net pay of
Three Thousand Six Hundred Sixteen Pesos and Ninety Nine Centavos (PhP 3,616.99) for [the month
of] July 1999.[6] Also attached as Annex B to the motion was a July 14, 1999 Certification[7] issued by
the Office of the City Assessor of Naga City, which stated that petitioners had no property declared in
their name for taxation purposes.
Finding that petitioners motion to litigate as indigent litigants was meritorious, Executive Judge Jose T.

Atienza of the Naga City RTC, in the September 1, 1999 Order,[8] granted petitioners plea for
exemption from filing fees.
Meanwhile, as a result of respondent Naga City Governments demolition of a portion of
petitioners house, the Alguras allegedly lost a monthly income of PhP 7,000.00 from their boarders
rentals. With the loss of the rentals, the meager income from Lorencita Alguras sari-sari store and
Antonio Alguras small take home pay became insufficient for the expenses of the Algura spouses and
their six (6) children for their basic needs including food, bills, clothes, and schooling, among others.
On October 13, 1999, respondents filed an Answer with Counterclaim dated October 10, 1999,[9]
arguing that the defenses of the petitioners in the complaint had no cause of action, the spouses
boarding house blocked the road right of way, and said structure was a nuisance per se.
Praying that the counterclaim of defendants (respondents) be dismissed, petitioners then filed their
Reply with Ex-Parte Request for a Pre-Trial Setting[10] before the Naga City RTC on October 19, 1999.
On February 3, 2000, a pre-trial was held wherein respondents asked for five (5) days within which to
file a Motion to Disqualify Petitioners as Indigent Litigants.
On March 13, 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing
Fees dated March 10, 2000.[11] They asserted that in addition to the more than PhP 3,000.00 net
income of petitioner Antonio Algura, who is a member of the Philippine National Police, spouse Lorencita
Algura also had a mini-store and a computer shop on the ground floor of their residence along Bayawas
St., Sta. Cruz, Naga City. Also, respondents claimed that petitioners second floor was used as their
residence and as a boarding house, from which they earned more than PhP 3,000.00 a month. In
addition, it was claimed that petitioners derived additional income from their computer shop patronized
by students and from several boarders who paid rentals to them. Hence, respondents concluded that
petitioners were not indigent litigants.
On March 28, 2000, petitioners subsequently interposed their Opposition to the Motion[12] to
respondents motion to disqualify them for non-payment of filing fees.
On April 14, 2000, the Naga City RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants on
the ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal fees and to
comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Courtdirecting them to
pay the requisite filing fees.[13]
On April 28, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 14, 2000 Order. On May 8,
2000, respondents then filed their Comment/Objections to petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
On May 5, 2000, the trial court issued an Order[14] giving petitioners the opportunity to
comply with the requisites laid down in Section 18, Rule 141, for them to qualify as indigent litigants.
On May 13, 2000, petitioners submitted their Compliance[15] attaching the affidavits of petitioner
Lorencita Algura[16] and Erlinda Bangate,[17] to comply with the requirements of then Rule 141,
Section 18 of the Rules of Court and in support of their claim to be declared as indigent litigants.
In her May 13, 2000 Affidavit, petitioner Lorencita Algura claimed that the demolition of
their small dwelling deprived her of a monthly income amounting to PhP 7,000.00. She, her husband,
and their six (6) minor children had to rely mainly on her husbands salary as a policeman which
provided them a monthly amount of PhP 3,500.00, more or less. Also, they did not own any real
property as certified by the assessors office of Naga City. More so, according to her, the meager net
income from her small sari-sari store and the rentals of some boarders, plus the salary of her husband,
were not enough to pay the familys basic necessities.
To buttress their position as qualified indigent litigants, petitioners also submitted the affidavit of Erlinda
Bangate, who attested under oath, that she personally knew spouses Antonio Algura and Lorencita
Algura, who were her neighbors; that they derived substantial income from their boarders; that they
lost said income from their boarders rentals when the Local Government Unit of the City of Naga,
through its officers, demolished part of their house because from that time, only a few boarders could
be accommodated; that the income from the small store, the boarders, and the meager salary of
Antonio Algura were insufficient for their basic necessities like food and clothing, considering that the
Algura spouses had six (6) children; and that she knew that petitioners did not own any real property.
Thereafter, Naga City RTC Acting Presiding Judge Andres B. Barsaga, Jr. issued his July 17, 2000[18]
Order denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Judge Barsaga ratiocinated that the pay slip of Antonio F. Algura showed that the GROSS
INCOME or TOTAL EARNINGS of plaintiff Algura [was] 10,474.00 which amount [was] over and above
the amount mentioned in the first paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 for pauper litigants residing

outside Metro Manila.[19] Said rule provides that the gross income of the litigant should not exceed PhP
3,000.00 a month and shall not own real estate with an assessed value of PhP 50,000.00. The trial
court found that, in Lorencita S.J. Alguras May 13, 2000 Affidavit, nowhere was it stated that she and
her immediate family did not earn a gross income of PhP 3,000.00.
The Issue
Unconvinced of the said ruling, the Alguras instituted the instant petition raising a solitary issue for the
consideration of the Court: whether petitioners should be considered as indigent litigants who qualify
for exemption from paying filing fees.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
A review of the history of the Rules of Court on suits in forma pauperis (pauper litigant) is necessary
before the Court rules on the issue of the Algura spouses claim to exemption from paying filing fees.
When the Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, the rule on pauper litigants was found in Rule
3, Section 22 which provided that:
SECTION 22. Pauper litigant.Any court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his
action or defense as a pauper upon a proper showing that he has no means to that
effect by affidavits, certificate of the corresponding provincial, city or municipal
treasurer, or otherwise. Such authority[,] once given[,] shall include an exemption
from payment of legal fees and from filing appeal bond, printed record and printed
brief. The legal fees shall be a lien to any judgment rendered in the case [favorable]
to the pauper, unless the court otherwise provides.
From the same Rules of Court, Rule 141 on Legal Fees, on the other hand, did not
contain any provision on pauper litigants.
On July 19, 1984, the Court, in Administrative Matter No. 83-6-389-0 (formerly G.R. No. 64274),
approved the recommendation of the Committee on the Revision of Rates and Charges of Court Fees,
through its Chairman, then Justice Felix V. Makasiar, to revise the fees in Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
to generate funds to effectively cover administrative costs for services rendered by the courts.[20] A
provision on pauper litigants was inserted which reads:
SECTION 16. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of court fees.Pauper-litigants
include wage earners whose gross income do not exceed P2,000.00 a month or
P24,000.00 a year for those residing in Metro Manila, and P1,500.00 a month or
P18,000.00 a year for those residing outside Metro Manila, or those who do not own
real property with an assessed value of not more than P24,000.00, or not more than
P18,000.00 as the case may be.
Such exemption shall include exemption from payment of fees for filing appeal bond,
printed record and printed brief.
The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment rendered in favor
of the pauper-litigant.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the pauper-litigant shall execute an
affidavit that he does not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor own any real
property with the assessed value afore-mentioned [sic], supported by a certification
to that effect by the provincial, city or town assessor or treasurer.
When the Rules of Court on Civil Procedure were amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
(inclusive of Rules 1 to 71) in Supreme Court Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803 dated April 8, 1997,
which became effective on July 1, 1997, Rule 3, Section 22 of the Revised Rules of Court was
superseded by Rule 3, Section 21 of said 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:
SECTION 21. Indigent party.A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or
defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is
satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for
food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.

attached to the litigants affidavit.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful
fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be
furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was
exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable
to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before
judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing
that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or
property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by
the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution
shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the
court may impose.
At the time the Rules on Civil Procedure were amended by the Court in Bar Matter No. 803, however,
there was no amendment made on Rule 141, Section 16 on pauper litigants.
On March 1, 2000, Rule 141 on Legal Fees was amended by the Court in A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC, whereby
certain fees were increased or adjusted. In this Resolution, the Court amended Section 16 of Rule 141,
making it Section 18, which now reads:
SECTION 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.Pauper litigants (a)
whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed four thousand
(P4,000.00) pesos a month if residing in Metro Manila, and three thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos a month if residing outside Metro Manila, and (b) who do not own real property
with an assessed value of more than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be
exempt from the payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the
pauper litigant, unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit
that he and his immediate family do not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor
do they own any real property with the assessed value aforementioned, supported by
an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigants affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause
to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability
may have been incurred.
It can be readily seen that the rule on pauper litigants was inserted in Rule 141 without revoking or
amending Section 21 of Rule 3, which provides for the exemption of pauper litigants from payment of
filing fees. Thus, on March 1, 2000, there were two existing rules on pauper litigants; namely,
Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 18.
On August 16, 2004, Section 18 of Rule 141 was further amended in Administrative Matter No. 04-204-SC, which became effective on the same date. It then became Section 19 of Rule 141, to wit:

SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.INDIGENT

LITIGANTS (A) WHOSE GROSS INCOME AND THAT OF THEIR IMMEDIATE
FAMILY DO NOT EXCEED AN AMOUNT DOUBLE THE MONTHLY MINIMUM WAGE
OF AN EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY WITH A FAIR MARKET
VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF MORE THAN THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM PAYMENT
OF LEGAL FEES.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the
indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an
affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income
abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value
aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting
to the truth of the litigants affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be

Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to
dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without
prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. (Emphasis supplied.)
Amendments to Rule 141 (including the amendment to Rule 141, Section 18) were made to implement
RA 9227 which brought about new increases in filing fees. Specifically, in the August 16, 2004
amendment, the ceiling for the gross income of litigants applying for exemption and that of their
immediate family was increased from PhP 4,000.00 a month in Metro Manila and PhP 3,000.00 a month
outside Metro Manila, to double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the maximum value
of the property owned by the applicant was increased from an assessed value of PhP 50,000.00 to a
maximum market value of PhP 300,000.00, to be able to accommodate more indigent litigants and
promote easier access to justice by the poor and the marginalized in the wake of these new increases in
filing fees.
Even if there was an amendment to Rule 141 on August 16, 2004, there was still no amendment or
recall of Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigants.
With this historical backdrop, let us now move on to the sole issuewhether petitioners are exempt from
the payment of filing fees.
It is undisputed that the Complaint (Civil Case No. 99-4403) was filed on September 1, 1999. However,
the Naga City RTC, in its April 14, 2000 and July 17, 2000 Orders, incorrectly applied Rule 141,
Section 18 on Legal Fees when the applicable rules at that time were Rule 3, Section 21 on
Indigent Party which took effect on July 1, 1997 and Rule 141, Section 16 on Pauper Litigants
which became effective on July 19, 1984 up to February 28, 2000.
The old Section 16, Rule 141 requires applicants to file an ex-parte motion to litigate as a pauper
litigant by submitting an affidavit that they do not have a gross income of PhP 2,000.00 a month or PhP
24,000.00 a year for those residing in Metro Manila and PhP 1,500.00 a month or PhP 18,000.00 a year
for those residing outside Metro Manila or those who do not own real property with an assessed value of
not more than PhP 24,000.00 or not more than PhP 18,000.00 as the case may be. Thus, there are two
requirements: a) income requirementthe applicants should not have a gross monthly income of more
than PhP 1,500.00, and b) property requirementthey should not own property with an assessed value
of not more than PhP 18,000.00.
In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras submitted the Affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura and
neighbor Erlinda Bangate, the pay slip of petitioner Antonio F. Algura showing a gross monthly income
of PhP 10,474.00,[21] and a Certification of the Naga City assessor stating that petitioners do not have
property declared in their names for taxation.[22] Undoubtedly, petitioners do not own real property as
shown by the Certification of the Naga City assessor and so the property requirement is met. However
with respect to the income requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 of
petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita Algura when combined, were
above the PhP 1,500.00 monthly income threshold prescribed by then Rule 141, Section 16 and
therefore, the income requirement was not satisfied. The trial court was therefore correct in
disqualifying petitioners Alguras as indigent litigants although the court should have applied Rule 141,
Section 16 which was in effect at the time of the filing of the application on September 1, 1999. Even if
Rule 141, Section 18 (which superseded Rule 141, Section 16 on March 1, 2000) were applied, still the
application could not have been granted as the combined PhP 13,474.00 income of petitioners was
beyond the PhP 3,000.00 monthly income threshold.
Unrelenting, petitioners however argue in their Motion for Reconsideration of the April 14, 2000 Order
disqualifying them as indigent litigants[23] that the rules have been relaxed by relying on Rule 3,
Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure which authorizes parties to litigate their action as
indigents if the court is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. The trial court did not give
credence to this view of petitioners and simply applied Rule 141 but ignored Rule 3, Section 21 on
Indigent Party.
The position of petitioners on the need to use Rule 3, Section 21 on their application to litigate as
indigent litigants brings to the fore the issue on whether a trial court has to apply both Rule 141,
Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21 on such applications or should the court apply only Rule 141, Section
16 and discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having been superseded by Rule 141, Section 16 on Legal Fees.
The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule 141, Section
18 on March 1, 2000 and subsequently amended by Rule 141, Section 19 on August 16, 2003, which is

now the present rule) are still valid and enforceable rules on indigent litigants.
For one, the history of the two seemingly conflicting rules readily reveals that it was not the intent of
the Court to consider the old Section 22 of Rule 3, which took effect on January 1, 1994 to have been
amended and superseded by Rule 141, Section 16, which took effect on July 19, 1984 through A.M. No.
83-6-389-0. If that is the case, then the Supreme Court, upon the recommendation of the Committee
on the Revision on Rules, could have already deleted Section 22 from Rule 3 when it amended Rules 1
to 71 and approved the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. The fact that
Section 22 which became Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigant was retained in the rules of procedure,
even elaborating on the meaning of an indigent party, and was also strengthened by the addition of a
third paragraph on the right to contest the grant of authority to litigate only goes to show that there
was no intent at all to consider said rule as expunged from the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, Rule 141 on indigent litigants was amended twice: first on March 1, 2000 and the
second on August 16, 2004; and yet, despite these two amendments, there was no attempt to delete
Section 21 from said Rule 3. This clearly evinces the desire of the Court to maintain the two (2) rules
on indigent litigants to cover applications to litigate as an indigent litigant.
It may be argued that Rule 3, Section 21 has been impliedly repealed by the recent 2000 and 2004
amendments to Rule 141 on legal fees. This position is bereft of merit. Implied repeals are frowned
upon unless the intent of the framers of the rules is unequivocal. It has been consistently ruled that:
(r)epeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed, unless it is manifest
that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation
and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to
conclude that in passing a statute[,] it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate
any former law relating to same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is
not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the
language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or
unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed. Hence, every
effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction they
can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.[24]
(Emphasis supplied).
Instead of declaring that Rule 3, Section 21 has been superseded and impliedly amended by Section 18
and later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that the two rules can and should be harmonized.
The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is a settled principle
that when conflicts are seen between two provisions, all efforts must be made to harmonize them.
Hence, every statute [or rule] must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes [or rules] as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence.[25]
In Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enunciated that in the interpretation of
seemingly conflicting laws, efforts must be made to first harmonize them. This Court thus ruled:
Consequently, every statute should be construed in such a way that will harmonize it
with existing laws. This principle is expressed in the legal maxim interpretare et
concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi, that is, to interpret and to do it in
such a way as to harmonize laws with laws is the best method of interpretation.[26]

authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly
discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after
hearing, that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the
proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is
not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees
shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards while Rule 3, Section 21 does
not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the exemption. Knowing that the litigants may abuse
the grant of authority, the trial court must use sound discretion and scrutinize evidence strictly in
granting exemptions, aware that the applicant has not hurdled the precise standards under Rule 141.
The trial court must also guard against abuse and misuse of the privilege to litigate as an indigent
litigant to prevent the filing of exorbitant claims which would otherwise be regulated by a legal fee
requirement.
Thus, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the Alguras after their
affidavits and supporting documents showed that petitioners did not satisfy the twin requirements on
gross monthly income and ownership of real property under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the
Alguras as indigent litigants, the trial court should have called a hearing as required by Rule 3, Section
21 to enable the petitioners to adduce evidence to show that they didnt have property and money
sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for them and their family.[27] In that
hearing, the respondents would have had the right to also present evidence to refute the allegations
and evidence in support of the application of the petitioners to litigate as indigent litigants. Since this
Court is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether
petitioners can be considered as indigent litigants using the standards set in Rule 3, Section 21.
Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary
and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is
mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then
the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the indigency test under
Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.
Access to justice by the impoverished is held sacrosanct under Article III, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. The Action Program for Judicial Reforms (APJR) itself, initiated by former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., placed prime importance on easy access to justice by the poor as one of its six
major components. Likewise, the judicial philosophy of Liberty and Prosperity of Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban makes it imperative that the courts shall not only safeguard but also enhance the rights of
individualswhich are considered sacred under the 1987 Constitution. Without doubt, one of the most
precious rights which must be shielded and secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by
the poor, the underprivileged, and the marginalized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the April 14, 2000 Order granting the disqualification of
petitioners, the July 17, 2000 Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, and the September
11, 2001 Order dismissing the case in Civil Case No. RTC-99-4403 before the Naga City RTC, Branch 27
are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the Naga City RTC is ordered to set the Ex-Parte Motion
to Litigate as Indigent Litigants for hearing and apply Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure to determine whether petitioners can qualify as indigent litigants.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the two (2) rules can stand together and are
compatible with each other. When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall
scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the
applicant complies with the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule
141that is, the applicants gross income and that of the applicants immediate family do not exceed an
amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does not own real
property with a fair market value of more than Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP 300,000.00). If the
trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property requirements, the authority to litigate
as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right.

G.R. No. 122846

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION TITANIUM CORPORATION and
STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE
CASTRO,
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM

However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a
hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. In that hearing, the adverse
party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after
which the trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence adduced. In addition,
Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[1] the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the
operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition
at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from
offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or wash up rates for such abbreviated stays. Our
earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process
and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present petition.

With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court
is confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in
tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality.

This Petition[2] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the
Decision[3] in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission
Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance).

(TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to
admit attached complaint-in-intervention[7] on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their
business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.[8] The three companies are
components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in
Metro Manila.[9]
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.[10] The RTC also
notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.[11]

I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.[4] The
Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government
to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in
general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as An Ordinance prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in
the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or
other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging
of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms
more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers
of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this
ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both
such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a]
juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation
thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the
same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or
contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order ( TRO)[5] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as
defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim.[6] MTDC prayed that
the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in
Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short
time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation

On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw.[12] The RTC issued a TRO on
January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.[13] The City
filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police
power.[14]
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the
enforcement of the Ordinance.[15] A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his
Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without
trial as the case involved a purely legal question.[16] On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a
decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is
hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The RTC noted that the ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.[18] Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the
right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the
Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[19] where
the legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected
through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.[20] The
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court
treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.[21]
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities,
among other local government units, the power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports.[22]
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article
III, Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such
others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which
shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine
and imprisonment for a single offense.[23]
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the
right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an

unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
Ordinance.[24] First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of
movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for
short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a
lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since
it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to
operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents
in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty
is regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.[25] In their petition and
Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of Appeals.
They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of
establishments offering wash-up rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the
Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also
being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have the
requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient
connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the
case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers,[26]
sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions
rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly
from the Constitution.[27] The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts
which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition.[28] In this jurisdiction, the extancy of a
direct and personal interest presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a
petitioner's standing.[29] In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated
on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and
redressability in Allen v. Wright.[30]
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth
doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of
transcendental importance.[31]
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth
doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,[32] the United States Supreme Court wrote that: We have
recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important
criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact, thus giving him or her a
"sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close
relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his
or her own interests."[33] Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise
injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability
which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in
constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties
Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit.[34]
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to
advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes
of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,[35] the United States Supreme Court
held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them
as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available to their patients. The Court
held that:
The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be
diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in
a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to
them."[36]
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,[37] wherein the United States
Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim of

a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of
21 and to females under the age of 18. The United States High Court explained that the vendors had
standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or
function."[38]
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to
assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis,
challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally
applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a
statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.[39] In this case, the petitioners
claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can
see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to
patronize their establishments for a wash-rate time frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila
ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon.
City Mayor of Manila.[40] Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a
prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and
occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to
the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in ErmitaMalate was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity
of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view
of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This
could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the
services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case
about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.[41]
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in
the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such
implements as the general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an
efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.[42] Police power is based upon the concept of
necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.[43] Police power has
been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the
regulation of dance halls,[44] movie theaters,[45] gas stations[46] and cockpits.[47] The awesome
scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our
nations legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of
these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the
Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights
stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities
animated by his cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal
protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of
government as they exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or
legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same

passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is
compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government.
We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral
arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of
rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and
far-reaching constitutional questions of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as
guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.[48]
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty
and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary
regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their
property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct
restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due
process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life,
liberty, or property.[49] Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the
established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form
of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.

[64]
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its
effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law
which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury
that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard the rational basis test. Yet as earlier
stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their
patrons those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the
lodging establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are
trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished
rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights
does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those trivial yet fundamental freedoms which the people
reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence that
accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a
fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or
what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored
under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner
innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
D.

If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of
arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process
completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has
sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.[50]

The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has
reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental
freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous
level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been
predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the
libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process
clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine
the proper metes and bounds for its application.

The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we
upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot
be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed
by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare."[[65]] In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of
liberty.[[66]]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of
Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:

C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is
best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in
U.S. v. Carolene Products.[51] Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the
judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a discrete and insular
minority or infringement of a fundamental right.[52] Consequently, two standards of judicial review
were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political
process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted
by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender[53] and legitimacy.[54]
Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig,[55] after the Court declined to do
so in Reed v. Reed.[56] While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it
has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal
protection challenges.[57] Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they
rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.[58] Under intermediate review, governmental
interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.[59]
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard
for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of
fundamental freedoms.[60] Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection.[61] The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict
scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,[62] judicial access[63] and interstate travel.

While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . .
guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a
Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty"
must be broad indeed.[67] [Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of
sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments have gained
notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and fornications in Manila since they provide the necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ideal haven for prostitutes
and thrill-seekers.[68] Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be
denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is
constitutionally protected[69] will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding
therein retains significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual
whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As the case of
Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his
isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on
which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his
isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built

out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he

surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of
himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense
free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was
recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a
compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.[70]

charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan
that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned
the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day
with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or
impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a
day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is
momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have
a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons
in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or
using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement
of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.[77]
The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle.[78] The
advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in
law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a
society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the pursuit
of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests.[79]

E.

To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that you cannot legislate morality
is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more
accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance
with public attitudes about right and wrong.[80] Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral
traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong, they will
remain so oriented.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights
and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights.[71] It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.[72]
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject
to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.[73] However, this is not in any way meant to
take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.
[74]
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to
candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument.[75] The Ordinance makes no distinction
between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate
actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A
plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus
deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified
prohibition.

The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its
longtime home,[76] and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city the Pearl of the
Orient as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick
Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities,
will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common
problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived
decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive
themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of
individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could
in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the
proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in
easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing
prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit
activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by

Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of
the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of
life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive
elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual
liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. Independent and fairminded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the
rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and
because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.[81]
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to
governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of
liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government
to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED.
Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN
and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIOL, for and in his own behalf vs THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP),
represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY
CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in
his capacity as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
(OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the
peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao
between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a
bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the
Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds
within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to
the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution
in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.
I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the

Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late
Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur
Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF
away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations. 1
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon
motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOAAD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior
agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began.
On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of
Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August
27, 1998.
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same
contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and
respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict,
and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on
the substantive agenda are on-going.2
Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF
peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities
in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.3 In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against
the MILF.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was
suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a
leading MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the
Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to
return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the
matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.4
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian
government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the
Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its
military actions.5
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome
of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic
principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation
Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in
Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next
meeting."
A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with
the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001
leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on
the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was
signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence
between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.
Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by
Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace
negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.6
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to
the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August
5, 2008.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied in an instrument the MOA-AD which is assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591,
183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962.

Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain 7 and the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato 8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.9 Invoking the right to information on matters
of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete
and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the
MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation
thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. 10
This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for Mandamus
and Prohibition11 filed by the City of Zamboanga, 12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and
Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover
pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void.
By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and
directing public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD. 13
The Court also required the Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners the official copy of
the final draft of the MOA-AD,14 to which she complied.15
Meanwhile, the City of Iligan16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R.
No. 183893, praying that respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had
already been signed, from implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioners herein additionally implead Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent.
The Province of Zamboanga del Norte,17 Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep.
Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members 18 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, 19
docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and
without operative effect, and that respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for
Prohibition,20 docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently
enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement
derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal.
Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by
its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal.
Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-/comments-inintervention. Petitioners-in-Intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President
Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela21 and Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the
Province of Sultan Kudarat 22 and Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del
Norte,23 Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member
Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo
Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal Assistance
Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development
(MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention.
By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions. Respondents filed
Comments on the petitions, while some of petitioners submitted their respective Replies.
Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive Department
shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled
against it, and thus moved to dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of pleadings, respondents'
motion was met with vigorous opposition from petitioners.
The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the following
principal issues:
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final
draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and
(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is
considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA
vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;
4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987

Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act
No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]
If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an
appropriate remedy;
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING
itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly
Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines;
6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and
Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected
Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and
7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines.24
The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most of the parties
submitted their memoranda on time.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD
As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject five petitions and
six petitions-in-intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as the two comments-in-intervention in favor
of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an overview of the MOA.
The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.
Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier agreements
between the GRP and MILF, but also two agreements between the GRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli
Agreement, and the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement,
signed on September 2, 1996 during the administration of President Fidel Ramos.
The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes - the organic act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 25 and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), 26 and several international
law instruments - the ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries in relation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter,
among others.
The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rights entrenchment emanating
from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under
peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device."
During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world through a simple
dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The
first referred to those lands where Islamic laws held sway, while the second denoted those lands where
Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or ineffective. 27 This way of viewing the
world, however, became more complex through the centuries as the Islamic world became part of the
international community of nations.
As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States and intergovernmental organizations, the classical division of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb
eventually lost its meaning. New terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving non-Muslim
territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada (land of compact) and dar-ul-sulh (land of treaty)
referred to countries which, though under a secular regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative
relations with Muslim States, having been bound to each other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-aman
(land of order), on the other hand, referred to countries which, though not bound by treaty with Muslim
States, maintained freedom of religion for Muslims. 28
It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada
and dar-ul-sulh simply refers to all other agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government
- the Philippines being the land of compact and peace agreement - that partake of the nature of a
treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as "any solemn agreement in writing that sets out
understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that
elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]."29
The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS," and starts
with its main body.

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles,
Territory, Resources, and Governance.
A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros.'" It defines " Bangsamoro people"
as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the
Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full
blood, including their spouses.30
Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only " Moros"
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, 31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What
this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the ownership of which is vested
exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. 32 Both parties to the
MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.33
The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right is said to
be rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates
and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states or "karajaan/kadatuan"
resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-state in the modern sense. 34
The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain
authority of the sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled
by several sultanates and, specifically in the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw,
a confederation of independent principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of
whom was supreme over the others.35
The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation' with defined territory and
with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations."
The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that territory,
particularly those known as Indians. In Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to
be called "First Nation," hence, all of them are usually described collectively by the plural "First
Nations."36 To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" suggesting its exclusive entitlement to that designation - departs from the Canadian usage of the term.
The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it
grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the
Bangsamoro.37
B. TERRITORY
The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it,
embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.38
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM - thus
constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City.
Significantly, this core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in
the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.39
Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are
grouped into two categories, Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a
plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas are to be
subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD. 40
Category B areas, also called "Special Intervention Areas," on the other hand, are to be subjected to a
plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate agreement - the Comprehensive
Compact.41
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within
its "internal waters," defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; 42
that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to
the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao;
and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably
with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources. 43
Notably, the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint."
The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central
Government and the BJE, in favor of the latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation

agreement.44 The activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct on the territorial waters are
enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of natural resources, regulation of
shipping and fishing activities, and the enforcement of police and safety measures. 45 There is no similar
provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with respect to the internal waters of the
BJE.
C. RESOURCES
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with
foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such
relationships and understandings, however, are not to include aggression against the GRP. The BJE may
also enter into environmental cooperation agreements. 46
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The
Central Government is also bound to "take necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in
international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. The
BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of
border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and
revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral
domain.47
With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy,
petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in
the BJE "as the party having control within its territorial jurisdiction." This right carries the proviso that,
"in times of national emergency, when public interest so requires," the Central Government may, for a
fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct the
operation of such resources.48
The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural
resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.49
The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust
dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization
shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible, reparation is to be in such form as
mutually determined by the Parties.50
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements,
mining concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management
Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine Government, including
those issued by the present ARMM.51
D. GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the
implementation of the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for the
effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation" of the MOAAD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party shall not in any way affect
the status of the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. 52
The "associative" relationship between the Central Government and the BJE
The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative,"
characterized by shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to
be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with defined powers and
functions in the Comprehensive Compact.
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall
take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments,
with due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to
be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. As will be discussed later, much of the present
controversy hangs on the legality of this provision.
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil
service, electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal
security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the
negotiation of the comprehensive compact.
As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and
Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively.
Notably, the penultimate paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as "the representatives of
the Parties," meaning the GRP and MILF themselves, and not merely of the negotiating panels.53 In

addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD states that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd
Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, "ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry,
Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace
Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of
Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of
whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August 5, 2008.
Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the provinces,
municipalities, and barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the
strand on TERRITORY.
IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. RIPENESS
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. 54 Courts decline to issue
advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. 55 The
limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to
the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government.56
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.
There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing
law and jurisprudence. 57 The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a
proper case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination. 58
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it.59 For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, 60 and
the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action.61 He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act complained of.62
The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the
present petitions, reasoning that
The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and legislative
enactments as well as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply
put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does not automatically create legally demandable rights
and obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly complied with. x x x
xxxx
In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon
issues based on hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete bases.
Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are no concrete acts that could possibly
violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights since the acts complained of are mere contemplated steps
toward the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury,
if at all, is merely imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere conjectures.
(Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General cites63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD:
TERRITORY
xxxx
2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations:
xxxx
d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government stipulates to
conduct and deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the signing
of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as
Category A attached herein (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral part of this framework
agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all
outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the
MOA-AD.
xxxx
GOVERNANCE
xxxx
7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD
shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur
effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into
force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the

legal framework with due regard to non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated
timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. 64 (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.
Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. In Pimentel,
Jr. v. Aguirre,65 this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
xxxx
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. 66
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,67 the United States Supreme Court held that the
challenge to the constitutionality of the school's policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before
games was ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer had yet been led under the policy, because the
policy was being challenged as unconstitutional on its face. 68
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in New York
v. United States,69 decided in 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State
of New York challenging the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe for
adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take effect until January 1, 1996, because the
parties agreed that New York had to take immediate action to avoid the provision's consequences. 70
The present petitions pray for Certiorari, 71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are
remedies granted by law when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is
proceeding, in the case of prohibition, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 72 Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. 73 Certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. 74
The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on
February 28, 2001.75 The said executive order requires that "[t]he government's policy framework for
peace, including the systematic approach and the administrative structure for carrying out the
comprehensive peace process x x x be governed by this Executive Order." 76
The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the
MOA-AD without consulting the local government units or communities affected, nor informing them of
the proceedings. As will be discussed in greater detail later, such omission, by itself, constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3.
Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOAAD provides that "any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework
shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework," implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the
MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution. Such
act constitutes another violation of its authority. Again, these points will be discussed in more detail
later.
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by
violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions
make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy
ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute.77
B. LOCUS STANDI
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 78
Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other
persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question
raised.79

When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.80 When the issue concerns a public
right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws. 81
For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally
disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. 82 The Court retains discretion whether or not to allow
a taxpayer's suit.83
In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 84
An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members, 85 but the mere invocation
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve
the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing. 86
As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest
of its own, and of the other LGUs.87
Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the
requirements of the law authorizing intervention, 88 such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties.
In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given the
liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,89 where
technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount
public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. 90 The Court's forbearing stance on locus standi on
issues involving constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of fundamental rights.
In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine whether the
other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws
and have not abused the discretion given them, has brushed aside technical rules of procedure. 91
In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of
Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga
(G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and
Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that they, as
LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended
domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which
would be expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt.
In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would
have no standing as citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied some
right or privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a former Senator, an
incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence.
Considering their invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court
grants them standing.
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that
government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to
delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their allegation that
the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable transcendental importance" clothes them with
added basis for their personality to intervene in these petitions.
With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate
and a citizen to enforce compliance by respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of
the MOA-AD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success or failure
of either of the parties. He thus possesses the requisite standing as an intervenor.
With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3 rd district of Davao City,
a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan
chapter, citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal
interest in the present petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the procedural
technicality on locus standi given the paramount public interest in the issues at hand.

Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an

advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and
Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers, allege
that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the resolution of the petitions
concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated . Such
legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing.
B. MOOTNESS
Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of all the
reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that
"[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA." 92
In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President had
already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel.93
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,94 this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not being a
magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 95 (b) the situation is
of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; 96 (c) the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 97 and (d) the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.98
Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary cessation of
the activity complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily
ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear and
determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or
prays for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation. 99
The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of judicial
review. The grounds cited above in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not
only in David, but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo 100 and Manalo v. Calderon101 where the Court
similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same
moot notwithstanding.
Petitions not mooted
Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual
dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the
signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the Court's issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order.
Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of consensus
points," especially given its nomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties
concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional implications of these "consensus
points," foremost of which is the creation of the BJE.
In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents
to amend and effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain provisions
of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to the terms and
provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future negotiations and agreements necessary
for its realization. The petitions have not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the
public disclosure of the MOA-AD, 102 the manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding
of the GRP Panel not withstanding.
Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest
There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a
significant part of the country's territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs.
The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible
Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the
government and its negotiating entity.

factual circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in the controversy.
The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements
In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to
carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said
Tripoli Agreement is the third such component to be undertaken following the implementation of the
Security Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May
2002.
Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor
General, has stated that "no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will
not sign the MOA[-AD]," mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001.
Need to formulate principles-guidelines
Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could
contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the Executive
Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an agreement that is both constitutional and
equitable because that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be assured," it is minded to render a
decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF
regarding Ancestral Domain.
Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Reyes104 in which he stated that the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet
evading review" can override mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or
continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance." They contend that the Court
must have jurisdiction over the subject matter for the doctrine to be invoked.
The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original
jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory
Relief, the Court will treat it as one for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications and raises
questions that need to be resolved. 105 At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest
of the petitions.
Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine
immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases. 106 There is a reasonable
expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and
Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again
be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in
another or any form.
It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot, respondents
having, by Compliance of August 7, 2008, provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the
final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished, or have procured for
themselves, copies of the MOA-AD.
V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues
to be resolved, one relating to the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other
relating to its provisions, viz:
1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to
information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD?
2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?

Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.103 where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues which no
longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to
the nation as a whole."

ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as
provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.107

The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and
eventually cancelled was a stand-alone government procurement contract for a national broadband
network involving a one-time contractual relation between two parties-the government and a private
foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved specific government procurement policies and
standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the

As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,108 the Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and
inspect public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional status.
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987
Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right. 109
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,110 the Court ruled that access to public records is

predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern since,
undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political
significance.
x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free
exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to
information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with
the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is
interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." x x x 111
In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving
them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation 112 so that they may be able to
criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective
manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed
public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people. 113
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern 114 faces no
serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern.115 In
previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of
Deeds,116 the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, 117 the civil service eligibility of a
public employee,118 the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public
officials,119 the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, 120 and the identity of party-list
nominees,121 among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the
present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial
character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled:
x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the
exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be
grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the
Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in
the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill
of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of
its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." 122 (Emphasis and
italics in the original)
Intended as a "splendid symmetry"123 to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of
public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. 124
The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of
access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.125
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in
a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the
State to be accountable by following such policy.126 These provisions are vital to the exercise of the
freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people. 127
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
so disclose:
MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will not be in
force and effect until after Congress shall have provided it.
MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately but, of course, the
implementing law will have to be enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer.128
The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the issue, is
enlightening.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the

Gentleman correctly as having said that this is not a self-executing provision? It would require a
legislation by Congress to implement?
MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment from
Commissioner Regalado, so that the safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause "as may
be provided by law"
MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and
Congress may provide for reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national interest?
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediately
influence the climate of the conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no longer
pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking this principle, which is inconsistent with this
policy.129 (Emphasis supplied)
Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a
statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable
safeguards." The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both
provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader 130 right to information on matters of
public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions
involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point
to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and
be responsive to the people's will. 131 Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and
disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to participate?
Will the government provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can participate and
can react where the existing media facilities are not able to provide full feedback
mechanisms to the government? I suppose this will be part of the government implementing
operational mechanisms.
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses take place.
There is a message and a feedback, both ways.
xxxx
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence?
I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public officials
but also network of private business o[r] community-based organizations that will be
reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more credence or credibility on the private network of
volunteers and voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not think we are afraid that there will
be another OMA in the making.132 (Emphasis supplied)
The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the
"marching orders" to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct
public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. 133 The
preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of
civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people's participation.
One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be
community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall
be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all
Filipinos as one community."134 Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is
consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes "continuing consultations on both
national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and
facilitation of people's participation in the peace process."135
Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate
"continuing" consultations, contrary to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more than
sufficient consultation."136
Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to
"[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek
relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports
on the progress of the comprehensive peace process." 137 E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the
NPF to be "the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates,
peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the
implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue
and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives."138
In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a

corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure.

PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion
The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to
and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary
and despotic exercise thereof.
The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way or
manner. It may, however, require him to comply with the law and discharge the functions within the
authority granted by the President.139
Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retort in justifying
the denial of petitioners' right to be consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by which
they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such disregard of the express
mandate of the President is not much different from superficial conduct toward token provisos that
border on classic lip service. 140 It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined.
As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable under the
premises. The argument defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on
continuing consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels. The executive order even
recognizes the exercise of the public's right even before the GRP makes its official
recommendations or before the government proffers its definite propositions.141 It bear emphasis that
E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant advice, information, comments and recommendations from the
people through dialogue.
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their
unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally
complying with the Court's August 4, 2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the document's disclosure in
camera, or without a manifestation that it was complying therewith ex abundante ad cautelam.
Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy to
"require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the
community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions" 142 is welltaken. The LGC chapter on intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy:
Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities
unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such
projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been
provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 143 (Italics and underscoring supplied)
In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Pao,144 the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted provision of
the LGU apply only to national programs or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local
community. Among the programs and projects covered are those that are critical to the environment
and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing
in the locality where these will be implemented.145 The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro
people,146 which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a
great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose interests are
represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have,
under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect
their rights, lives and destinies. 147 The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to
justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act, 148 which entails, among
other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.
Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition
of the ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all other stipulations or
"consensus points" necessarily must fail. In proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral
domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD,
respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority. As it seems, even the heart
of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on
Governance suspends the effectivity of all provisions requiring changes to the legal framework, such
clause is itself invalid, as will be discussed in the following section.
Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and
available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain democratic, with

sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them. 149
ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all be
accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the
oral arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the existing
legal framework to render effective at least some of its provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter
that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity because any provisions therein which are inconsistent
with the present legal framework will not be effective until the necessary changes to that framework are
made. The validity of this argument will be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon how
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to
the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local
government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing
some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn
first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely,
the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept,
indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph
4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it
to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity
shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of
governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers
and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a
comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the
BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in
the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of
"association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in
its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to
bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD.
Keitner and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the
basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the
principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a
middle ground between integration and independence. x x x150 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia
(FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 151 are associated
states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in these countries is the
U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents,
which is a mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN
Security Council and by their admission to UN membership.
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the
capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such
as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The
U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of
the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or
affecting either government.
In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the
authority and obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government,
moreover, has the option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within these associated
states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country from having access to these
territories for military purposes.
It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as
an international association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is
subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and each party may terminate the
association consistent with the right of independence. It has been said that, with the admission of the
U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free
association is actually based on an underlying status of independence. 152

In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional
device of former colonies on their way to full independence . Examples of states that have passed
through the status of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla,
Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become independent states. 153
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal
concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade
relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's
participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing
responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate
in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection,
and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming
part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands
to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
"associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any
state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status
that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its
validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but
name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention ,154 namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with
other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the
BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the
specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with
the Constitution and the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for
the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis supplied)
As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is
covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD
would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the
present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which
voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan
and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the
areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the

ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not
render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted
for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
The MOA-AD, moreover, would notcomply with Article X, Section 20 of the Constitution
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region. (Underscoring supplied)
Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would
require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new
legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any
new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other
provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE
with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which
states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign
countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression
against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is
only the President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary155 instructs:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign
nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with
respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with
foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations,
enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of
treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in
the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and
promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development." (Underscoring supplied) An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity.
While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the
national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in
international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to
national unity.
Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing
statutory law, among which are R.A. No. 9054156 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.157
Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition
of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states:
1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are
natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the
Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full
blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the
Indigenous people shall be respected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the
Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous
peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal
peoples, as follows:
"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens
residing in the autonomous region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them
from other sectors of the national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained
some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions."

Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro
people is a clear departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties simply agree
that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic
territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the
aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic
region."
Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in the
following provisions thereof:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be
done in accordance with the following procedures:
xxxx
b) Petition for Delineation. - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the
NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP,
by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;
c) Delineation Proper. - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all
community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon
filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with the
community concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and participation by the
members of the communities concerned;
d) Proof Required. - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or
community under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or
occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which shall be
any one (1) of the following authentic documents:
1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;
2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;
3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred
places and old villages;
4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the
ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs;
5) Survey plans and sketch maps;
6) Anthropological data;
7) Genealogical surveys;
8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds;
9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges,
hills, terraces and the like; and
10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community.
e) Preparation of Maps. - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the
Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical
descriptions, and a description of the natural features and landmarks embraced therein;
f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. - A complete copy of the preliminary census and a
report of investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;
g) Notice and Publication. - A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of
the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A
copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and
shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to
allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication:
Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid
substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio
station are not available;
h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the
Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim
that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral
Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and
verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the
applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall
be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims
among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause
the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the
conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section below.
xxxx
To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system, a
discussion of not only the Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international law is in order,
for
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the generally

accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land."

Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,158 held that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part of the law of the land on account of which it ordered the
release on bail of a detained alien of Russian descent whose deportation order had not been executed
even after two years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin v. Edu159 applied the aforesaid constitutional
provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals.
International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples," understood not
merely as the entire population of a State but also a portion thereof. In considering the question of
whether the people of Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian Supreme
Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC160 had occasion to acknowledge that "the right of a
people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle
has acquired a status beyond convention' and is considered a general principle of international law."
Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 161 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 162 which state, in Article 1 of both
covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of self-determination, "freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."
The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral
right of secession. A distinction should be made between the right of internal and external selfdetermination. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:
"(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination
126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a
people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its
political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing
state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of
the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and,
even then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x
External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the
Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra, as
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration
with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined
by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.
(Emphasis added)
127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of
respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various international documents that
support the existence of a people's right to self-determination also contain parallel statements
supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent
threats to an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states.
x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external selfdetermination can arise, namely, where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination
or exploitation outside a colonial context, and - less definitely but asserted by a number of
commentators - is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to internal self-determination. The
Court ultimately held that the population of Quebec had no right to secession, as the same is not under
colonial rule or foreign domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom to make political choices and
pursue economic, social and cultural development, citing that Quebec is equitably represented in
legislative, executive and judicial institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent positions
therein.
The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND ISLANDS
QUESTION.163 There, Sweden presented to the Council of the League of Nations the question of whether
the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands should be authorized to determine by plebiscite if the archipelago
should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council,
before resolving the question, appointed an International Committee composed of three jurists to
submit an opinion on the preliminary issue of whether the dispute should, based on international law,
be entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. The Committee stated the rule as follows:
x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of disposing of
national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. Positive
International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate
themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish , any
more than it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the
grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of determining its own political fate
by plebiscite or by some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of
every State which is definitively constituted. A dispute between two States concerning such a
question, under normal conditions therefore, bears upon a question which International Law leaves
entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned. Any other solution would amount to

an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a
lack of stability which would not only be contrary to the very idea embodied in term "State," but would
also endanger the interests of the international community. If this right is not possessed by a large or
small section of a nation, neither can it be held by the State to which the national group wishes to be
attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question which is
left by international law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception rather
than the rule elucidated above. Its ground for departing from the general rule, however, was a very
narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation originated at a time when Finland was undergoing
drastic political transformation. The internal situation of Finland was, according to the Committee, so
abnormal that, for a considerable time, the conditions required for the formation of a sovereign State
did not exist. In the midst of revolution, anarchy, and civil war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national
government was disputed by a large section of the people, and it had, in fact, been chased from the
capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed camps and the police were
divided into two opposing forces. In light of these circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant
time period, a "definitively constituted" sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found that Finland
did not possess the right to withhold from a portion of its population the option to separate itself - a
right which sovereign nations generally have with respect to their own populations.
Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in
scholarship as well as international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with distinct
cultures, histories, and connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly
incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as "indigenous" since they are
the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Otherwise stated,
indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups that find themselves
engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest. 164 Examples of groups who have
been regarded as indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of
Canada.
As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a
general right to independence or secession from those states under international law, 165 but they do
have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination.
In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly
Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among those in favor, and
the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. The Declaration clearly
recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to
autonomy or self-government, to wit:
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or
self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and
means for financing their autonomous functions.
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic,
social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the
political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.
Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has been
understood as equivalent to "internal self-determination." 166 The extent of self-determination provided
for in the UN DRIP is more particularly defined in its subsequent articles, some of which are quoted
hereunder:
Article 8
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or
destruction of their culture.
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct
peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or
resources;
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or
undermining any of their rights;
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;
(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination
directed against them.

Article 21
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and
social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and
retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing
improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and
special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities.
Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and
resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as
well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such
recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of
the indigenous peoples concerned.
Article 30
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified
by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples
concerned.
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through
appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using their
lands or territories for military activities.
Article 32
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the
development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their
own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval
of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and
appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or
spiritual impact.
Article 37
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have
States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous
peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.
Article 38
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures,
including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.
Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be regarded as
embodying customary international law - a question which the Court need not definitively resolve here the obligations enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people,
through the instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD.
Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its
application by the different States.
There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples
their own police and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will
provide protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands - a
function that is normally performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to
indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the
protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is
there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and
atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or
acquired.
Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate
States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights
recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person
any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations
or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair,
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States.
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of

the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance
with other laws unnecessary.
It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be
reconciled with the Constitution and the laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer,
however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or grave
abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent
with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD
strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced below for convenience:
7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD
shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur
effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into
force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe
to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into
force until the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected. While the word
"Constitution" is not mentioned in the provision now under consideration or anywhere else
in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is certainly broad enough to include the
Constitution.
Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the
MOA-AD the provisions thereof regarding the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government, have already violated the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1,
2001, which states that the "negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied)
Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons
already discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an
independent status already prevailing.
Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective because the
suspensive clause is invalid, as discussed below.
The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3,
Section 5(c), which states that there shall be established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for
negotiations with different rebel groups to be "appointed by the President as her official emissaries to
conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions with rebel groups." These negotiating
panels are to report to the President, through the PAPP on the conduct and progress of the
negotiations.
It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem through its
negotiations with the MILF, was not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the
laws as they presently stand. One of the components of a comprehensive peace process, which E.O.
No. 3 collectively refers to as the "Paths to Peace," is the pursuit of social, economic, and political
reforms which may require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3,
which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No. 125,167 states:
SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise
the processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and not
mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated
fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited to, the following:
a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous
implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the
root causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require administrative
action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to address,
pursuant to this provision of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O.
authorized them to "think outside the box," so to speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set on
signing the MOA-AD that included various social, economic, and political reforms which cannot,
however, all be accommodated within the present legal framework, and which thus would require new
legislation and constitutional amendments.
The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause," however, cannot stop here, because it must be
asked whether the President herself may exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace
Panel under E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4(a).
The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President, in the
course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and
constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the

present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a discussion of the extent of the
President's power to conduct peace negotiations.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary,168 in issue was the authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion - an authority
which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The Court held thus:
"In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the
Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor.
The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the President's
. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which
are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the
avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the
President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of
specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive power.
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her
powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-inChief powers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as
Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general
responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to
prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. 169
As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict will show,
however, peace is rarely attained by simply pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes, changes as farreaching as a fundamental reconfiguration of the nation's constitutional structure is required. The
observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit:
x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must form the core of any
post-conflict peace-building mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti over the last ten years,
conflict cessation without modification of the political environment, even where state-building is
undertaken through technical electoral assistance and institution- or capacity-building, is unlikely to
succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of states emerging from conflict return to conflict.
Moreover, a substantial proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies.
The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in the
political and governance transition. Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to create a
common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to get there. The constitution can be
partly a peace agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy will
operate.170
In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal status of peace
agreements, observed that the typical way that peace agreements establish or confirm mechanisms for
demilitarization and demobilization is by linking them to new constitutional structures addressing
governance, elections, and legal and human rights institutions. 171
In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and constitution-making has been
recognized by no less than the framers of the Constitution. Behind the provisions of the Constitution on
autonomous regions172 is the framers' intention to implement a particular peace agreement, namely, the
Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the GRP and the MNLF, signed by then Undersecretary of National
Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari.
MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I will reserve my
right to ask them if they are not covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions.
I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists in the Muslim
region; it is working very well; it has, in fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my question
is: since that already exists, why do we have to go into something new?
MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right
that certain definite steps have been taken to implement the provisions of the Tripoli
Agreement with respect to an autonomous region in Mindanao. This is a good first step, but
there is no question that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli Agreement itself and
to the fuller standard of regional autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by
state policy.173(Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have, to the

credit of their drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the
reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the President is to be expected
to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she
must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require
changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct
peace negotiations with rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature
of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities.
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but
she may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if
it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and
revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the
Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional
convention, or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may
submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation
of constituent powers.
In Sanidad v. COMELEC,174 in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of directly submitting
proposals for constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing the interim National Assembly
which was the body vested by the 1973 Constitution with the power to propose such amendments.
President Marcos, it will be recalled, never convened the interim National Assembly. The majority
upheld the President's act, holding that "the urges of absolute necessity" compelled the President as the
agent of the people to act as he did, there being no interim National Assembly to propose constitutional
amendments. Against this ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muoz Palma vigorously dissented. The
Court's concern at present, however, is not with regard to the point on which it was then divided in that
controversial case, but on that which was not disputed by either side.
Justice Teehankee's dissent,175 in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the President may
directly submit proposed constitutional amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a
recognition that he would have upheld the President's action along with the majority had the President
convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee
opined:
"Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government,
defines and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and
the constituent power has not been granted to but has been withheld from the President or Prime
Minister, it follows that the President's questioned decrees proposing and submitting constitutional
amendments directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in
whom the power is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis." 176 (Emphasis
supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of
conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that require
changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention
of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.
Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose amendments
through initiative and referendum, the President may also submit her recommendations to the people,
not as a formal proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad,
but for their independent consideration of whether these recommendations merit being formally
proposed through initiative.
These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's suggestions to
the people, for any further involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its
character as a genuine "people's initiative." The only initiative recognized by the Constitution is that
which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court stated in Lambino v. COMELEC:177
"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the people's voice.' However, the Lambino Group
unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the
COMELEC, that ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms.' The Lambino Group thus admits that their people's'
initiative is an unqualified support to the agenda' of the incumbent President to change the
Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of people's voice' or sovereign will' in
the present initiative."
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, 178 only to preserve
and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to

change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she
limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments,
since her authority to propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice
for Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the more prominent instances the
practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress.
Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill has always been based on the budget prepared by the
President, which - for all intents and purposes - is a proposal for new legislation coming from the
President.179
The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards
Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even
be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations
either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which cannot be
reconciled with the present Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework." This
stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive condition - defined in civil law as a future and
uncertain event - but of a term. It is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal
framework will be effected, but when. That there is no uncertainty being contemplated is plain from
what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state that the contemplated changes shall be "with due
regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in
the Comprehensive Compact."
Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal
framework contemplated in the MOA-AD - which changes would include constitutional amendments, as
discussed earlier. It bears noting that,
By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted among the
"prior agreements" from which there could be no derogation.
What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing details
for these "consensus points" and, notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the
legal framework.
Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President's
authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution
and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the
"consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a similar provision appearing in the
1996 final peace agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most instructive.
As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in two
phases. Phase I covered a three-year transitional period involving the putting up of new administrative
structures through Executive Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and
the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), while Phase II covered the
establishment of the new regional autonomous government through amendment or repeal of R.A. No.
6734, which was then the Organic Act of the ARMM.
The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the expanded
autonomous region envisioned by the parties. To that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the
MOA-AD. There is, however, a crucial difference between the two agreements. While the MOA-AD
virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the legal framework" will be put in
place, the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement states thus: "Accordingly, these provisions [on Phase II]
shall be recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in the amendatory or repealing law."
Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international law
obligation on the part of the Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground
that it may be considered either as a binding agreement under international law, or a unilateral
declaration of the Philippine government to the international community that it would grant to the
Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in
international law, however.
The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign dignitaries as
signatories. In addition, representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala
Lumpur. These circumstances readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have had the status

of a binding international agreement had it been signed. An examination of the prevailing principles in
international law, however, leads to the contrary conclusion.
The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom Accord Amnesty180 (the Lom Accord case) of the
Special Court of Sierra Leone is enlightening. The Lom Accord was a peace agreement signed on July
7, 1999 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel
group with which the Sierra Leone Government had been in armed conflict for around eight years at the
time of signing. There were non-contracting signatories to the agreement, among which were the
Government of the Togolese Republic, the Economic Community of West African States, and the UN.
On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN Secretary-General and the Sierra
Leone Government, another agreement was entered into by the UN and that Government whereby the
Special Court of Sierra Leone was established. The sole purpose of the Special Court, an international
court, was to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November
30, 1996.
Among the stipulations of the Lom Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the members of the
RUF with respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that
organization since the conflict began.
In the Lom Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an internationally binding
obligation not to prosecute the beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other
things, the participation of foreign dignitaries and international organizations in the finalization of that
agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this argument, ruling that the Lome Accord is not a
treaty and that it can only create binding obligations and rights between the parties in municipal law ,
not in international law. Hence, the Special Court held, it is ineffective in depriving an international
court like it of jurisdiction.
"37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed conflict it is easy to
assume and to argue with some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the defendants
seem to have done, that the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the
document formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of state or their
representatives and representatives of international organizations, means the agreement of
the parties is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law.
xxxx
40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict and the mediator or facilitator
of the settlement, or persons or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took place but who are
not at all parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties and who do not claim any obligation from
the contracting parties or incur any obligation from the settlement.
41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State and the RUF
which has no status of statehood and is to all intents and purposes a faction within the state.
The non-contracting signatories of the Lom Agreement were moral guarantors of the
principle that, in the terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace agreement is
implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties". The moral guarantors
assumed no legal obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its representative appended, presumably
for avoidance of doubt, an understanding of the extent of the agreement to be implemented as not
including certain international crimes.
42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations regulated by
international law so that a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international law which
will also provide principle means of enforcement. The Lom Agreement created neither rights nor
obligations capable of being regulated by international law. An agreement such as the Lom
Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates a factual
situation of restoration of peace that the international community acting through the
Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not convert it to an international
agreement which creates an obligation enforceable in international, as distinguished from
municipal, law. A breach of the terms of such a peace agreement resulting in resumption of internal
armed conflict or creating a threat to peace in the determination of the Security Council may indicate a
reversal of the factual situation of peace to be visited with possible legal consequences arising from the
new situation of conflict created. Such consequences such as action by the Security Council pursuant to
Chapter VII arise from the situation and not from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it.
Such action cannot be regarded as a remedy for the breach. A peace agreement which settles an
internal armed conflict cannot be ascribed the same status as one which settles an
international armed conflict which, essentially, must be between two or more warring
States. The Lom Agreement cannot be characterised as an international instrument. x x x"
(Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and international

organizations not parties to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character
under international law.
In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral declaration of
the Philippine State, binding under international law, that it would comply with all the stipulations
stated therein, with the result that it would have to amend its Constitution accordingly regardless of the
true will of the people. Cited as authority for this view is Australia v. France,181 also known as the
Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of France's nuclear tests in
the South Pacific. France refused to appear in the case, but public statements from its President, and
similar statements from other French officials including its Minister of Defence, that its 1974 series of
atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to dismiss the case. 182 Those statements, the ICJ
held, amounted to a legal undertaking addressed to the international community, which required no
acceptance from other States for it to become effective.
Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be bound to the
international community in issuing its public statements, viz:
43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual
situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often
are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should
become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character
of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of
conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an
intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding.
In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the
declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take
effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical
act by which the pronouncement by the State was made.
44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a
certain position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being bound-the
intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States make statements by
which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.
xxxx
51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French
Government conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively
to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take note of these
statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements and their legal
consequences must be considered within the general framework of the security of
international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential in the relations among
States. It is from the actual substance of these statements, and from the circumstances
attending their making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act must be deduced. The
objects of these statements are clear and they were addressed to the international
community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an undertaking possessing
legal effect. The Court considers *270 that the President of the Republic, in deciding upon the
effective cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to the international community to which
his words were addressed. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative may
be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements
were clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound to that
community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be
detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in
peculiar circumstances.
The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case decided by the
ICJ entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali,183 also known as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public
declaration subject of that case was a statement made by the President of Mali, in an interview by a
foreign press agency, that Mali would abide by the decision to be issued by a commission of the
Organization of African Unity on a frontier dispute then pending between Mali and Burkina Faso.
Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's President was not a unilateral
act with legal implications. It clarified that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar
circumstances surrounding the French declaration subject thereof, to wit:
40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken of all the
factual circumstances in which the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court
took the view that since the applicant States were not the only ones concerned at the
possible continuance of atmospheric testing by the French Government, that Government's
unilateral declarations had conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its
intention effectively to terminate these tests (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para.
53). In the particular circumstances of those cases, the French Government could not

express an intention to be bound otherwise than by unilateral declarations. It is difficult to

see how it could have accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each of the applicants
without thereby jeopardizing its contention that its conduct was lawful. The circumstances
of the present case are radically different. Here, there was nothing to hinder the Parties from
manifesting an intention to accept the binding character of the conclusions of the
Organization of African Unity Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal
agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since no agreement of this kind was concluded between the
Parties, the Chamber finds that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration made by Mali's head of
State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral act with legal implications in regard to the present case.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral
declaration on the part of the Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did
not draft the same with the clear intention of being bound thereby to the international community as a
whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were States and international organizations
involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated
merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lom Accord case, the mere
fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of
states and international organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as to
create obligations in international law.
Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such
commitments would not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse - to the trust and
confidence essential in the relations among States.
In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina Faso
wherein, as already discussed, the Mali President's statement was not held to be a binding unilateral
declaration by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine panel, had it
really been its intention to be bound to other States, to manifest that intention by formal agreement.
Here, that formal agreement would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear
commitment to be legally bound to the international community, not just the MILF, and by an equally
clear indication that the signatures of the participating states-representatives would constitute an
acceptance of that commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not have resulted in a
loss of face for the Philippine government before the international community, which was one of the
difficulties that prevented the French Government from entering into a formal agreement with other
countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it had no
intention to be bound to the international community. On that ground, the MOA-AD may not be
considered a unilateral declaration under international law.
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law
notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal
framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies
not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a
state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino
people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.
The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to
the Moros for the sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the
change is not inconsistent with what, in international law, is known as Jus Cogens.184 Respondents,
however, may not preempt it in that decision.
SUMMARY
The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units
or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3.
Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter
for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents
the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual
dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present
petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of

the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest;
(c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the
fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present
MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly
dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the
respondents' action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of
the MOA-AD and its annexes.
The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the
Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the
right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same
self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.
An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for
feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public
rights.
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the
people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser
on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result
to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things,
the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement or compromise.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or
the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of
executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally
disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No.
7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted
runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present
legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its
defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the
BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The
President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is
worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will
eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make
such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent
powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the
process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment
process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

The facts: On 16 July 1991, the Mindanao Kris, a newspaper of general circulation in Cotabato City,
published in its front page the news article captioned "6-Point Complaint Filed vs. Macumbal," and in its
Publisher's Notes the editorial, "Toll of Corruption," which exposed alleged anomalies by key officials in
the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. 3

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on
the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself,
already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.
WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are
GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED.

On 2 September 1991, the City Prosecutor's Office dismissed the criminal case thus 5
"WHEREFORE . . . this investigation in the light of Agbayani vs. Sayo case finds that it has no
jurisdiction to handle this case and that the same be filed or instituted in Cotabato City where
complainant is officially holding office at the time respondents caused the publication of the complained
news item in the Mindanao Kris in Cotabato City, for which reason it is recommended that this charge
be dropped for lack of jurisdiction."

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

In the interim, the civil complaint for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 385-91 and raffled to Branch
10 of the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City, was set for Pre-Trial Conference. The defendants therein
had already filed their respective Answers with Counterclaim.

VENUE OF ACTIONS

On 18 November 1991, petitioner Diaz moved for the dismissal of the action for damages on the ground
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. He vehemently argued that the
complaint should have been filed in Cotabato City and not in Marawi City. 6

G.R. No. 106847. March 5, 1993

PATRICIO P. DIAZ vs. JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, RTC, Br. 8, Marawi City, SULTAN MACORRO L.
MACUMBAL, SULTAN LINOG M. INDOL, MACABANGKIT LANTO and MOHAMADALI ABEDIN
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; VENUE OF LIBEL CASE WHERE OFFENDED PARTY IS AN PUBLIC
OFFICIAL. From the provision of Article 360, third paragraph of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by R.A. 4363, it is clear that an offended party who is at the same time a public official can only
institute an action arising from libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the place
where the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published.
2. ID.; ID.; IMPROPER VENUE; MUST BE RAISED IN A NOTION TO DISMISS PRIOR TO A RESPONSIVE
PLEADING. Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss prior to a
responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid since, for all practical
intents and purposes, the venue though technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to the
parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVED IN CASE AT BAR BY FILING ANSWER. Petitioner Diaz then, as defendant in
the court below, should have timely challenged the venue laid in Marawi City in a motion to dismiss,
pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, petitioner had already submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he filed his Answer to the Complaint with
Counterclaim. His motion to dismiss was therefore belatedly filed and could no longer deprive the trial
court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant civil action for damages. Well-settled is the rule that
improper venue may be waived and such waiver may occur by laches. Sec. 1 of Rule 16 provides that
objections to improper venue must be made in a motion to dismiss before any responsive pleading is
filed. Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and set up defenses. Consequently,
having already submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioner may no longer
object to the venue which, although mandatory in the instant case, is nevertheless waivable. As such,
improper venue must be seasonably raised, otherwise, it may be deemed waived.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELATES TO TRIAL AND NOT TO JURISDICTION. Indeed, the laying of venue is
procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather
than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
VENUE in the instant civil action for damages arising from libel was improperly laid; nonetheless, the
trial court refused to dismiss the complaint. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, assailing that order of denial 1 as well as the order denying
reconsideration. 2

On 22 July 1991, the public officers alluded to, namely, private respondents Sultan Macorro L.
Macumbal, Sultan Linog M. Indol, Atty. Macabangkit M. Lanto and Atty. Mohamadali Abedin, instituted
separate criminal and civil complaints arising from the libel before the City Prosecutor's Office and the
Regional Trial Court in Marawi City. The publisher-editor of the Mindanao Kris, petitioner Patricio P. Diaz,
and Mamala B. Pagandaman, who executed a sworn statement attesting to the alleged corruption, were
named respondents in both complaints. 4

Pending action on the motion, the presiding judge of Branch 10 inhibited himself from the case which
was thereafter reraffled to the sala of respondent judge.
On 15 June 1991, respondent judge denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. Diaz
thereafter moved for reconsideration of the order of denial. The motion was also denied in the Order of
27 August 1991, prompting petitioner to seek relief therefrom.
Petitioner Diaz contends that the civil action for damages could not be rightfully filed in Marawi City as
none of the private respondents, who are all public officers, held office in Marawi City; neither were the
alleged libelous news items published in that city. Consequently, it is petitioner's view that the Regional
Trial Court in Marawi City has no jurisdiction to entertain the civil action for damages.
The petitioner is correct. Not one of the respondents then held office in Marawi City: respondent
Macumbal was the Regional Director for Region XII of the DENR and held office in Cotabato City;
respondent Indol was the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer of Lanao del Norte and
held office in that province; respondent Lanto was a consultant of the Secretary of the DENR and, as
averred in the complaint, was temporarily residing in Quezon City; and, respondent Abedin was the
Chief of the Legal Division of the DENR Regional Office in Cotabato City. 7 Indeed, private respondents
do not deny that their main place of work was not in Marawi City, although they had sub-offices therein.
Apparently, the claim of private respondents that they maintained sub-offices in Marawi City is a mere
afterthought, considering that it was made following the dismissal of their criminal complaint by the
City Prosecutor of Marawi City. Significantly, in their complaint in civil Case No. 385-91 respondents
simply alleged that they were residents of Marawi City, except for respondent Lanto who was then
temporarily residing in Quezon City, and that they were public officers, nothing more. This averment is
not enough to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City and may be properly
assailed in a motion to dismiss.
The Comment of private respondents that Lanto was at the time of the commission of the offense
actually holding office in Marawi City as consultant of LASURECO can neither be given credence because
this is inconsistent with their allegation in their complaint that respondent Lanto, as consultant of the
Secretary of the DENR, was temporarily residing in Quezon City.
Moreover, it is admitted that the libelous articles were published and printed in Cotabato City. Thus,
respondents were limited in their choice of venue for their action for damages only to Cotabato City
where Macumbal, Lanto and Abedin had their office and Lanao del Norte where Indol worked. Marawi
City is not among those where venue can be laid.
The third paragraph of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4363, specifically
requires that
"The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, that

where one of the offended parties is a public officer . . . (who) does not hold office in the City of Manila,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance (Regional Trial Court) of the province or city where
he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and
first published and in case one of the the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published . . . . " (emphasis
supplied)
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that an offended party who is at the same time a public official
can only institute an action arising from libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and
the place where the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published.
Private respondents thus appear to have misread the provisions of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, when they filed their criminal and civil complaints in Marawi City. They deemed as
sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City the allegation that "plaintiffs
are all of legal age, all married, Government officials by occupation and residents of Marawi City." 8 But
they are wrong.
Consequently, it is indubitable that venue was improperly laid. However, unless and until the defendant
objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss prior to a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be
said to have been improperly laid since, for all practical intents and purposes, the venue though
technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on
venue had been devised. 9
Petitioner Diaz then, as defendant in the court below, should have timely challenged the venue laid in
Marawi City in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately,
petitioner had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he filed his Answer to
the Complaint with Counterclaim. 10
His motion to dismiss was therefore belatedly filed and could no longer deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant civil action for damages. Well-settled is the rule that
improper venue may be waived and such waiver may occur by laches. 11
Petitioner was obviously aware of this rule when he anchored his motion to dismiss on lack of cause of
action over the subject matter, relying on this Court's ruling in Time, Inc. v. Reyes. 12 Therein, We
declared that the Court of First Instance of Rizal was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil
Case No. 10403 because the complainants held office in Manila, not in Rizal, while the alleged libelous
articles were published abroad.
It may be noted that in Time, Inc. v. Reyes, the defendant therein moved to dismiss the case without
first submitting to the jurisdiction of the lower court, which is not the case before Us. More, venue in an
action arising from libel is only mandatory if it is not waived by defendant. Thus
"The rule is that where a statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy
is exclusive; and where it confers jurisdiction upon a particular court, that jurisdiction is likewise
exclusive, unless otherwise provided. Hence, the venue provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 should be
deemed mandatory for the party bringing the action, unless the question of venue should be waived by
the defendant . . . . " 13
Withal, objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived; it does not, after all,
involve a question of jurisdiction. Indeed, the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive,
relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. 14 Venue
relates to trial and not to jurisdiction.
Finally, Sec. 1 of Rule 16 provides that objections to improper venue must be made in a motion to
dismiss before any responsive pleading is filed. Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative
relief and set up defenses. Consequently, having already submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, petitioner may no longer object to the venue which, although mandatory in the instant case,
is nevertheless waivable. As such, improper venue must be seasonably raised, otherwise, it may be
deemed waived.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining
Order heretofore issued is LIFTED.
This case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106920 December 10, 1993
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION VS HON. SALVADOR S. TENSUAN, Judge of Regional
Trial Court of Makati, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 146; CIRCLE FINANCIAL
CORPORATION, AVELINO E. DEATO, JR., MIGUEL F. VIOLAGO, BENJAMIN F. SANTIAGO,
SOCORRO R. GOMEZ, NERISSA T. GLORIA, FILEMON C. MARQUEZ, DOMINGO SANTIAGO AND
HILARIO P. LOPE

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner asks us to review and set aside the Order of Judge
Salvador A. Tensuan dated 3 August 1992, dismissing petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 91-2220
entitled "Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Circle Financial Corporation, et al."
Petitioner Philippine Banking Corporation (hereafter "Bank") is a commercial banking corporation with

principal office at Makati, Metro Manila. Petitioner Bank instituted a complaint for collection of a sum of
money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It appears from
the allegations of the Bank's complaint that respondent Circle Financial Co. (hereafter "Circle"),
sometime in 1983 and 1984, through its representatives, obtained several loans aggregating
P1,000,000.00 from petitioner. Respondent Circle, for value received, delivered to petitioner Bank four
(4) promissory notes, each of which contained the stipulation that:
I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may
arise out of this promissory note.
As security for the re-payment by respondent Circle of the sums loaned by petitioner Bank, eight (8)
individuals, who were impleaded as defendants in the complaint namely, Avelino Deato, Miguel
Violago, Benjamin Santiago, Socorro Gomez, Nerissa Gloria, Filemon Marquez, Domingo Santiago and
Hilario Lopez executed a Continuing Surety Agreement and undertook topay jointly and severally
respondent Circle's obligations. Only five (5) out of eight (8) individual obligors are respondents in
present case, namely: Domingo Santiago, Hilario Lopez, Avelino Deato, Benjamin P. Santiago and
Socorro Gomez.
On their due dates, Circle failed to pay its obligations under the promissory notes. Thereupon,
petitioner Bank demanded payment from the eight (8) individual sureties conformably with their
promises contained in the Continuing Surety Agreement; the individual obligors, however, also failed to
pay.
Petitioner moved for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, alleging that respondent Circle had
become insolvent and had been placed under receivership by the Central Bank. The trial judge granted
the motion and issued a writ of preliminary attachment. The sheriff's return indicated, however, that no
properties belonging to the respondent Circle and the individual obligors could be found. Per sheriff's
return, summons was served upon Domingo Santiago, 1 Hilario P. Lopez, 2 Avelino Deato, 3 Benjamin P.
Santiago, 4 and Socorro Gomez. 5 The sheriff failed to serve summons on (a) Miguel Violago, who had
died; (b) Nerissa T. Gloria 6 and Filemon Marquez, 7 whose whereabouts were unknown; and (c) Circle,
which had ceased to engage in business at the address given by petitioner and could not be located.
A motion to dismiss was filed by the respondents (Circle and the five [5] individual sureties served with
summons) and averred that the venue of the action was improperly laid since an agreement had fixed
the venue of actions arising from the promissory notes in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, only. Respondents
called the trial court's attention to the stipulation contained in the promissory note, quoted in limine.
Acting upon respondent's motion, respondent Judge Tensuan issued the challenged Order which read as
follows:
Acting on defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of improper venue in relation with actionable
promissory notes which stipulate that the parties "expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila any legal action which may arise", and,
Finding said motion to be impressed with merit consistent withSec. 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as
well as in line with the doctrinal rule in Bautista vs. Hon. Juan de Borja, et al. (18 SCRA 474) that the
proper venue for an action is that stipulated in a document "in case of any litigation herefrom or in
connection herewith" upon a rationale that had the parties intended to reserve the right to choose
venue under Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, such reservation should have been reflected in
the document as against the rationale in Polytrade Corporation vs. Blanco (30 SCRA 187) which should
allow choice of venue where an actionable document does not set forth qualifying or restrictive words in
point, and
In order to more clearly define the parameters of the rule on proper venue vis-a-vis a clear perception
that a stipulation to "expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila"
amount to unequivocal agreement to sue and be sued in Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the motion to be meritorious, same is hereby granted
and the above-entitled case is accordingly dismissed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the above Order of the trial court, without success.
Hence, this Petition.
We consider that the Petition is meritorious.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that the parties, by written agreement, may change or transfer the venue
of an action from one province to another. 9 We have many times sustained the validity and
enforceability of contractual stipulations concerning venue, it is, of course, the tenor of their agreement
which is of critical relevance. The relevant task, in other words, is determining the intent of the parties
as manifested in the words employed by them and, where such words are less than clear, in other
recognized indicators of the will of the contracting parties.
Petitioner Bank contends that the stipulation contained in the promissory notes is merely an agreement
to add the courts of Valenzuela to the tribunals to which the parties may resort. Petitioner thus insists
that the venue stipulation set out in the notes did not restrict or limit the permissible venue of actions

arising out of those notes to the courts of Valenzuela, to the exclusion of all the other courts recourse to
any one of which is authorized or permitted under the Rules of Court. Thus, venue was properly laid by
petitioner Bank in the place where its principal offices are located: i.e., Makati, Metropolitan Manila.
Private respondents, in opposition, aver that the words used in the stipulation here involved are clear
and unambiguous. A promise to submit to the jurisdiction of a specific court, without an express
reservation of the right to resort to one or more of the tribunals otherwise accessible under the Rules of
Court, is an agreement definitely fixing the permissible venue in only one place, i.e., Valenzuela, to the
exclusion of other competent courts.
A careful reading of the terms of the stipulation "I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of
the courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may arise out of this promissory note" shows that the
stipulation does not require the laying of venue in Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily. The plain or
ordinary import of the stipulation is the authorizing of, or permission to bring, suit in Valenzuela; there
is not the slightest indication of an intent to bar suit in other competent courts.
Permissive stipulations like the one here considered have invariably received judicial approval and we
have declared that either of the parties is authorized to lay venue of an action in the court named in the
stipulation. The stipulation her does not purport to deprive either party of it right to elect, or option to
have resort to, another competent court as expressly permitted by Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court, should such party choose to initiate a suit. The stipulation here merely operated to confer or
confirm a right upon a party to elect recourse to the courts of Valenzuela or, alternatively, to go before
any of the tribunals envisaged by the rules on venue, i.e., the courts of Makati, Quezon City and
Bulacan. 10
In principle, the stipulation on venue here involved must be distinguished from stipulations which
purport to require or compel the parties to lay venue of an action in a specified place, and in that
particular place only. The lattertype of venue stipulation must clearly indicate, through qualifying and
restrictive words, that the parties deliberately intended to exclude causes or actions from the operation
of the ordinary permissive rules on venue, 11 and that they intended contractually to designate a
specific venue to the exclusion of any other court also competent and accessible to the parties under
the ordinary rules on the venue of actions. Stipulations of this exclusionary nature may, under certain
circumstances, be characterized as unreasonable or as contrary to public policy 12 and, accordingly, not
judicially enforceable.
In practice, the task, as noted earlier, of this Court when confronted with issues of this kind is always
basically that of contract interpretation. In the case at bar, neither qualifying nor restrictive words (e.g.,
"must," "only" or "exclusively") were employed which could yield an intent on the part of the parties
mandatorily to restrict the venue of actions arising out of the promissory notes to the courts of
Valenzuela only. Private respondents suggest that the use of words "any legal action" expressed a
supposed agreement to bar actions before any court other than a Valenzuela court. We do not agree,
for we see no necessary or customary connection between the words "any legal action" and an intent
strictly to limit permissible venue to the Valenzuela courts. Intent so to establish an inflexible restriction
of otherwise permissible venue to one single place is not lightly to be presumed or inferred from
stipulations which, like that here before us, include no qualifying or exclusionary terms. Express
reservation of the right to elect venue under the ordinary rules was, accordingly, unnecessary in the
case at bar.
Such is the thrust of the great bulk of the caselaw of this Court where this issue was directly raised and
discussed.
In Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, 13 the stipulation on venue there involved read:
The parties agree to sue and be sued in the courts of Manila
The Court, in upholding that stipulation and ruling that venue had been properly laid in the then Court
of First Instance of Bulacan (the place of defendant's residence), speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez,
said:
. . . An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, "The parties agree to sue and be sued in the
Courts of Manila," does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The
plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words
which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent therefrom. We cannot
read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant bound themselves to file suits with respect to the last
two transactions in question only or exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or

transfer venue. It simply is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as
tribunals to which they may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts
specifically mentioned in Section 2 (b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non praesumitir. 14 (Emphasis supplied)
In Nicolas v. Reparations Commission, 15 the stipulation on venue provided that:
All legal actions arising out of this contract . . . may be brought in and submitted to the jurisdiction of
the proper courts in the City of Manila. 16
This Court read the above stipulation as merely permissive, relying upon and reinforcing Polytrade:
. . . the venue in personal actions is fixed for the convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses and to
promote the ends of justice. We cannot conceive how the interests of justice may be served by
confining the situs of the action to Manila, considering that the residences or offices of all the parties,
including the situs of the acts sought to be restrained or required to be done, are all within the
territorial jurisdiction of Rizal.
While the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to the jurisdiction of the Manila courts, there is
nothing in the language used . . . which clearly shows that the intention of the parties was to limit the
venue of the action to the City of Manila only. Such agreements should be construed reasonably and
should not be applied in such a manner that it would work more to the inconvenience of the parties
without promoting the ends of justice. 17 (Emphasis supplied)
In Lamis Enterprises v. Lagamon, 18 the promissory note sued on had the following stipulation:
In case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the courts of Davao City. 19
The collection suit was instituted in the then Court of First Instance of Tagum, Davao. The Supreme
Court rejected the defense of improper venue and held:
. . . it is alleged that the proper venue for Civil Case No. 1395 should be Davao City where the plaintiff
resides and as stipulated in the promissory note dated February 26, 1979 and in the chattel mortgage
dated February 27, 1979. However, the respondent judge found that Maningo has not only legal
residence but also physical and actual residence in Busaon, Tagum, Davao and we are not inclined to
disturb this finding. Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the venue, suffice it to say
that a stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant under Section 2(b), Rule 4, Rules of Court, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words
in the agreement which would indicate that the place named is the only venue agreed upon by the
parties. The stipulation did not deprive Maningo of his right to pursue remedy in the court specifically
mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Courts, Renuntiatio non praesumitir. . . . 20
In Western Minolco v. Court of Appeals, 21 the clause on venue read:
The parties stipulate that the venue of the actions referred to in Section 12.01 [Article XII of the
Agreement] shall be in the City of Manila.
The initial action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet. This Court took
the occasion to reiterate once more the Polytrade doctrine:
. . . In any event, it is not entirely amiss to restate the doctrine that stipulations in a contract, which
specify a definite place for the institution of an action arising in connection therewith, do not, as a rule,
supersede the general rules on the matter set out in Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, but should be
construed merely as an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
It is not necessary top pretend that the decisions of the Supreme Court have been absolutely consistent
in this regard. There have been a few decisions notably Bautista v. de Borja 23 and Hoechst
Philippines v. Torres 24 which are not easy to reconcile with the line of cases beginning with Polytrade
discussed above. It is useful therefore to make clear that to the extent Bautista and Hoechst Philippines
are inconsistent with Polytrade (an en banc decision later in time than Bautista) and subsequent cases
reiterating Polytrade, Bautista and Hoechst Philippines have been rendered obsolete by the Polytrade
line of cases.
We note, finally, that no one of the private respondents has claimed to have been put to undue hardship
or inconvenience as a result of the institution of the action in Makati. Venue relates to the trial and
touches more upon the convenience of the parties rather than upon the substance or merits of thecase.
25

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Orders
dated 3 August 1992 and 28 August 1992 of public respondent Judge Salvador S. Tensuan are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for resolution on the
merits, with all deliberate dispatch. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.