In the Eye of the Storm:

Turkey and the New Security

Equation
by Ian O. Lesser

In Brief: Turkey is in a critical

position as a consequence of both
its proximity to multiple crises and
its unique exposure to deteriorating
security relationships in both the
south and the east. It must keep
regional conflicts from further
undermining the countrys internal
security. It must also strengthen
ties to NATO and EU partners whose
demands on Turkey are set to
increase, but whose cooperation will
be essential to meet proliferating
regional security threats. The
prevailing atmosphere of mutual
suspicion between Ankara and its
Western allies suggests that this will
not be an easy task. But relations
with Turkey are set to become the
most critical in NATO.

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No NATO member has been more deeply affected

by the chaos and conflict on Europes periphery than
Turkey. The country is in a critical position as a consequence of both its proximity to multiple crises and its
unique exposure to deteriorating security relationships in both the south and the east. The collapse of
the regional order around Turkey also poses special
problems of adjustment for a state whose recent
international strategy was predicated on benign conditions and receptive neighbors. Ankara faces a double
challenge. It must keep regional conflicts from further
undermining the countrys internal security. It must
also strengthen ties to NATO and EU partners whose
demands on Turkey are set to increase, but whose
cooperation will be essential to meet proliferating
regional security threats. The prevailing atmosphere
of mutual suspicion between Ankara and its Western
allies suggests that this will not be an easy task. But
it will be an essential one if Turkey, Europe, and the
United States are to deal with new risks emanating
from the Middle East and Russia.
Violent Spillovers and the War Economy
For Turkey, the war in Syria and the turmoil across
the Middle East is seen, first and foremost, through
the lens of internal security. The resurgence of PKK
terrorism in southeastern Anatolia has raised the

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specter of a protracted counter-insurgency campaign

of a kind not seen since the struggle against the PKK
(Kurdistan Workers Party) in the 1990s. Few in the
West remember that this conflict cost at least 35,000
lives inside a NATO country. The experience has left
a searing legacy in Turkey. Many observers fear that
the breakdown of the truce with the PKK and the end
of the Kurdish peace process risks the emergence of
wider inter-communal violence between Turks and
Kurds, something Turkey has so far been fortunate
to avoid. The risk is heightened by the over-heated
climate of nationalism surrounding Turkeys most
recent national elections and public anger over the
surge in terrorism from multiple sources. The overriding focus on the PKK will continue to drive
Ankaras approach to the conflict in Syria, where
Turkish planners have seen the battle against the selfproclaimed Islamic State group (ISIS) as a secondary
concern. The situation is different in northern Iraq
where, in cooperation with the Kurdish Regional
Government, Turkey has now deployed armored
forces near Mosul, poised for joint operations against
ISIS. The tension between Turkish aims and wider
Western priorities, which are firmly fixed on the
struggle against ISIS, is vexing to policymakers on
both sides of the Atlantic. These differences could
wane if Turkish worries about jihadist terrorism and
the ISIS risk to Turkeys regional interests grow. But
real alignment of perceptions and policies will be hard
to achieve.
Ankara has been playing a complicated game in a
multi-faceted proxy war in Syria. For President Recep
Tayyip Erdoan, the struggle against the regime of
Bashar al-Assad has become a personal vendetta,
but Ankaras policy is also bound up with wider
regional dynamics. Turkey has been drawn into a
more sectarian posture in which the competition with
Iran looms large and the sunni regimes of the Gulf
are natural allies. Arguably, Ankaras confidence in its
ability to shape conditions in Syria, born of a decade
of activism in the region, outstripped its ability to
manage a rapidly deteriorating situation. It is diffi-

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cult to judge the extent to which Turkish policy has

bolstered more radical Islamist forces, but the suspicion that Turkey has wittingly or unwittingly done so
is widespread among Western observers. Yet, as the
terrorist bombings in Suruc and Ankara make clear,
Turkey itself is now firmly in the sights of ISIS. Major
Turkish cities are just as exposed to the risk of Islamist
terrorism as other European capitals perhaps more
so.

Major Turkish cities are just

as exposed to the risk of
Islamist terrorism as other
European capitals perhaps
more so.
Turkey is on the front line in other respects. Since
the start of the war in Syria, millions of refugees have
arrived in Turkey. Many have transited to Western
Europe as part of the vast flow of migrants now
confronting EU member states. But many, perhaps
most, are still in Turkey and may never leave. Official
figures refer to at least 2 million refugees in Turkey.
The real number may be closer to 3 million. The social,
economic, and political challenges posed by this influx
are stark, especially against a backdrop of a weakening
Turkish economy. The 3.2 billion package of assistance recently agreed with the EU will help to offset
immediate humanitarian needs. But the sustained
costs to Turkish society will likely be borne by Turks
alone.
The pressure on Ankara to stem the flow of migrants
and asylum seekers is set to become a permanently
operating factor in EU-Turkish relations. There
has been widespread dismay over the failure of the
Turkish authorities to close down the trafficking
networks facilitating the flow of migrants across the
Aegean. In the wake of the Paris terrorist attacks, these

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concerns have reinforced long-standing worries over

the circulation of foreign fighters through Turkey.
Notwithstanding the obvious difficulty of sealing off
Turkeys highly permeable border with Syria, it seems
clear that the Turkish authorities have only recently
cracked down on the passage of foreign fighters from
Europe and the Maghreb. Since the start of 2015,
Turkish authorities have reportedly detained over
1,000 people alleged to have ties to ISIS. At least one of
the conspirators involved in the Paris attacks appears
to have passed through Turkey en route to France. The
November 2015 deal with the EU, under which Turkey
is set to get visa liberalization in return for tightening
its border controls and helping to control the flow of
asylum seekers, is certain to face obstacles in terms of
implementation and political acceptance in an increasingly xenophobic Europe.
Turkeys ability to control its western borders as the
EU demands, and its border with Syria as Washington
demands, will be conditioned by the local war economies that have emerged from the conflict and chaos
in Turkeys neighborhood. Smuggling of people and
goods is rife, including the trade in contraband fuel
that has been the focus of European and U.S. concern
dating back to the period of the Iraq sanctions. Security vacuums and the availability of arms facilitate
criminal activity and vice versa; this is one reason
why drug trafficking flourished at the height of the
PKK insurgency in the mid-1990s. The nexus between
armed conflict and crime is likely to be a key variable
in the security equation confronting Turkey and is
allies in the coming years.

Turkeys ability to control its

western borders as the EU
demands, and its border
with Syria as Washington
demands, will be conditioned
by the local war economies.

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Russian Risks
Even before the Turkish downing of the Russian SU-24
Fencer fighter-bomber on November 24, the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West
placed Ankara in a difficult position. Russia has been
a leading economic partner for Turkey, a relationship
that goes far beyond energy trade. Russian revisionism
and challenges to the territorial order do not sit well
with Turkeys conservative approach to borders and
separatism. Deepening confrontation with Moscow
forces uncomfortable choices on a Turkish leadership
more naturally inclined to a non-aligned approach.
Turkeys NATO membership has not been at the
center of the AKParty worldview over the past decade.
This diffidence toward Western security partners
now seems a dangerous anachronism. In addition to
the risks inherent in air operations in border regions
a problem in the Baltic and Black Seas as well as
the Eastern Mediterranean Ankaras pronounced
sensitivity to questions of sovereignty and the defense
of national territory may have played a role in the
shoot-down incident. With more aircraft operating
over Syria and Iraq, and a parallel build up on naval
forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, these risks are set
to increase.
Allies Look South
Against a background of deep concern about Russian
behavior, NATO has focused heavily on bolstering
deterrence and defense in the East. This requirement is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. But it
is rapidly being overtaken by a very different but no
less challenging set of security concerns in the south,
including terrorism and maritime security. The United
States, France, Britain, Belgium, Germany, and others
are engaged in an active campaign aimed at ISIS in
Syria and Iraq. Turkey is an essential partner in this
endeavor, as a provider of forces, as an operational
hub, and as consumer of security in its own right.
For the first time since 1991, Turkey has allowed
the United States to conduct significant offensive air
operations from Incirlik airbase, and other NATO

|On Turkey|

allies are likely to make increasing use of this and

other Turkish facilities. All of this has cast a spotlight
on Turkeys place in NATO planning, and will give
Ankara a strong stake in shaping Alliance strategy
looking south. The confluence of risks on Turkeys
borders, from ISIS to a highly unstable relationship
with Russia, makes this the most dangerous flashpoint
in the NATO area. Moreover, this is not a transient
question of crisis management, but in all likelihood
a durable problem of chaos and conflict in Turkeys
deeply troubled neighborhood. Relations with Turkey
are set to become the most critical in the Alliance
the 21st century equivalent of the inner German border
of the Cold War years. Recent developments should
concentrate minds in Ankara and Brussels.

The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are

the views of the author alone.

About the Author

Ian Lesser is executive director of the Transatlantic Center, the
Brussels office of the German Marshall Fund of the United
States, where he also directs foreign and security policy programs across GMF. The opinions expressed here are the authors
and do not represent the views of GMF, its staff, or directors.

About the On Turkey Series

GMFs On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about
Turkeys current political situation and its future. GMF provides
regular analysis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and U.S.
writers and intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from onthe-ground Turkish observers. To access the latest briefs, please
visit our web site at www.gmfus.org/turkey.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)
strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and
global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall
Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions
working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and
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