A Feasibility Study on Connecting Two 57 MVA,

LM6000 Gas Turbine Generator Sets at

Springdale Substation

August 1999
Prepared by Allegheny Power's Operations Planning Section of the System Planning and
Operations Business Unit

Introduction and Background ___________________________________________________ 3

Project Description _____________________________________________________________ 4
Results _________________________________________________________________________ 5
Assumptions ____________________________________________________________________ 7
Study Methodology and Procedure ______________________________________________ 8
Short Circuit Studies ____________________________________________________________ 9
Stability Considerations ________________________________________________________ 10
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B

Introduction and Background

Allegheny Energy Unit 1 and unit 2, LLC as agent for the unregulated generation
business unit Energy Supply Division (ESD) has contacted System Planning and
Operations on the feasibility of interconnecting two 57 MVA LM6000 Gas Turbine
Generator sets (GT sets) to the Springdale Power Station 138 kV bus. The request was
made to begin producing power and have the GT sets in-service by July 1, 1999. Since
the original request was received, a delay in the delivery of materials that are required
to complete the interconnection, and the need for air quality permits from Allegheny
County, have delayed the in-service date to October 15, 1999.
Studies performed prior to 1996 indicated that Springdale could serve as a
primary site to install Gas Combustion Turbine Generation, when and if Allegheny Power
System (APS) ever decided to install such generation.
Beginning in 1996 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued
Rules 888 and 889. With these rulings came the advent of the Open Access
Transmission Tariff (OATT) and the isolation within electric utilities of their generation
from their transmission operations. Allegheny Power (AP) was no exception and
beginning on January 1, 1996 AP had created business units designed for compliance
with the FERC rulings.
To further complicate the issue, beginning on January 1, 1999 Pennsylvania
customers representing one-third of the West Penn Power load, and on January 2, 1999
two-thirds of the West Penn Power load were allowed to select an electric supplier other
than West Penn Power Company. As a result, AP chose to unregulate a portion of the
West Penn Power Company generation equivalent to that customer load. Allegheny
created the ESD business unit to market the unregulated generation.
This document is a report prepared for Allegheny Energy Unit 1 and Unit 2, LLC
and ESD to address their request to interconnect two 57 MVA LM6000 GT sets at
Springdale Substation.

Project Description
The concept is shown on the sketch on the following page. As indicated, the two
57 MVA GT sets would be located about 1000 ft from the Springdale 138 kV bus. Each
generator would consist of 48 MW winter or 44 MW summer, gas combustion turbines
operating at 0.85 power factor. The units are designated as peaking units and will
probably operate during peak usage hours, approximately 2,000 hours per year per
unit. Service to the units will be provided by a single 138 kV line terminating on a
single 138 kV circuit breaker, and will include a 138 kV metering package. The
destination of output from the generators has not been designated and, therefore,
many assumptions were required in order to complete the study. They are listed in the
next section.

RIVER-

WPPCO

CUSTOMER

FIGURE NO. 1
CROSSING
STRUCTURES
RIVER-

NUG

1000 ft

CROSSING

HILL

STRUCTURE

STRUCTURE

KIT
TAN
NIN
G
KIS
KI V
ALL
EY

GOBAIN

SPRINGDALE

N.O.

T.
LS
RA
E
D
FE

EY
LL
VA

138 kV

HU
NT
IN
GD
YU
ON
KO
N

RIVER

TE
HI
W

NO.1A

HARWICK

YARD
TOWER

YARD
TOWER

WPPCO
DLCO

INSTALL A 138 kV BREAKER AND 138 kV METER

CHESWICK

138 kV

10/15/99

SOURCE

SPRINGDALENUG.PPT
REVIEWED

DATE

SPRINGDALE SUBSTATION
INSTALL 138 kV BREAKER AND METER TO
INTERCONNECT WITH NON UTILITY GENERATION
ARNOLD SERVICE CENTER

8-25-99
P. L. ZAWELENSKY

CHKD

SCALE

NS
AUTHORIZATION

REV

APPROVED

PL A N

DRAWN

PLAN NUMBER

CAD FILE

Allegheny Power

99-x-W

T. V. SPENCER

Results
The Feasibility Study (FS) results indicate that AP can accommodate the
Allegheny Energy Unit 1 and Unit 2, LLC\ESD request for interconnection of two 57 MVA
LM6000 GT sets.
Both power flow and short circuit studies indicate that the installation has no
detrimental effect on the AP transmission system. However, Allegheny Energy Unit 1
and Unit 2, LLC and ESD need to be aware that in the event that there is congestion on
the Eastern Interconnection, generation dispatch out of Springdale at times might be
restricted. In that case, AP will follow the North American Electric Reliability Council's
(NERC) Transmission Line Loading Relief Procedure (TLR) and the guidelines set forth
within that procedure. A copy of this procedure can be downloaded via the Internet
from the NERC website at http://www.nerc.com. Additionally, Allegheny Energy Unit 1 and
Unit 2, LLC or ESD may choose to implement the NERC Market Re-dispatch or the AP
Security Coordinator might implement the Lake Erie Emergency Re-dispatch (LEER)
procedures that may require the units at Springdale to operate. Allegheny Energy (AE)
has incorporated these procedures in its Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT).
More information on the NERC market re-dispatch procedure can be obtained from the
NERC website at http://www.nerc.com. Information on the LEER can be obtained from
your companys representative to the Lake Erie Security Process committee, or from the
FERC-filed LEER proposal.

Assumptions
All future studies require assumptions concerning the control area load, facility
additions and transmission sales. This analysis is no exception. The most recent
System models, the 1998 series, from the base case database for the 1999 summer,
2003 summer and 2008 summer seasons were selected as those to be tested. AP
control area loads in those models ranged from 7,200 MW in the 1999 summer model
to more than 8,000 MW in the 2008 summer model. Facility additions were assumed to
be those as planned in the 1998 series of cases that followed the 1998-planning guide.
Note that during the period studied there is no expectation that the existing Springdale
Units 7 & 8 will be reenergized; so they were not modeled in this analysis. A quick
review of data indicates that AP, PJM, FE and DQE plan no major facility additions.
However, AEP and VP are planning to install major system additions in the Appalachian
Power Company Area of AEP and the northern area of Virginia Power Company. Those
planned facilities are modeled in the 2008 summer model but not in the 1999 summer
or the 2003 model. Transmission sales modeled for those years are those included in
the summer base case models and include only confirmed firm service reservations.
The destination of the power output from the proposed GT sets at Springdale is
unknown. Therefore, several transfer scenarios were assumed. Output from the GT
sets was assumed to stay within the AP control area, or alternatively to be sold offsystem to the west or to the east. Those additional tests modeling the output from the
Springdale site to the east assumed the power was being sold to PJM, while those that
took the power west modeled a transfer into DQE.

Study Methodology and Procedure

The in-service date for the gas turbine project is tentatively set for
October 1, 1999. As a result, power flow study models were selected and completed
for the years 1999, 2003 and 2008. The assumptions listed above for forecasted
control area loads, maintenance schedules, confirmed Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
reservations and generation dispatch, were all used during the analysis.
The destination of the power output from the proposed GT sets at Springdale is
unknown. Therefore several transfer scenarios were assumed. Output from the GT
sets was assumed to stay within the AP control area, or alternatively to be sold offsystem to the west or to the east. Those additional tests modeling the output from the
Springdale site to the east assumed the power was being sold to PJM, while those that
took the power west modeled a transfer into DQE.
Power flow cases were created and contingency tests were evaluated based
upon the AP planning criteria reported in FERC Form 715 Part 4 (See Appendix A).
These criteria were applied to studies using the current years model, as well as those
using the 2003 and 2008 models, in order to evaluate the long-term effect the power
output from Springdale might have on the AP transmission system in and around the
Springdale site. If required, additional study work was to be performed to determine
what if any limiting facility would require system upgrades to accommodate the
installation of the GT sets.
Prior to 1999, Springdale had two generators that were included in the AP
Integrated Resource Plan. Total capacity of Springdale Units 7 and 8 was 207 MW.
The proposed GT sets together totaled 114 MVA at an 85 % power factor, or about
96 MW. The studies looked for adverse loading due to the proposed installation and
unit output, and its effect on system transfer capability.
In all, fourteen transfer test scenarios were completed and analyzed. Results of
the single contingency tests concluded that with the Springdale (AP)-Cheswick (DQE)
138 kV tie open, which is a normal operating situation, the installation had little effect
on the 138 kV lines in the study area. If the tie were closed, the 138 kV tie-line was
the thermal limit to regional and inter-regional transfers as well as intra-regional
transfers, regardless of whether the proposed GT sets were in-service or not.
Therefore, it is recommended that the operating practice of allowing the Springdale
(AP)-Cheswick (DQE) 138 kV tie line to be operated normally open should remain in
effect for the foreseeable future.
Although the proposed generation addition is small and the effect it has on
system transfer capability is minimal with the operating procedure in place, the effect
on system losses was also considered. Power flow evaluations indicate that with the
two GT sets at Springdale dispatched at maximum output the AP system losses are
reduced by two MW.
8

Short Circuit Studies

Results of the short circuit evaluation are tabulated below. The fault current
values determined in the study indicate that the substation equipment at Springdale
and neighboring substations is adequate, and that the addition of two 71.2 MVA** GT
sets at Springdale will not cause any of the equipment to exceed short circuit ratings.
JUNE 1999 SYSTEM CONDITIONS
CHESWICKSPRINGDALE 138 kV LINE IN SERVICE
2@36/48/60 MVA, 138/13.8 kV Transformer(Z1=10%,Z0=8.5% @36 MVA)
(With the new CTs)
Z1=12.4% @71.2 MVA
BASE CONDITIONS
Z2=16.6% @71.2 MVA
(Without the new CTs)
Z0=9.0% @ 71.2MVA
(3-phase symmetrical faults) (3-phase symmetrical faults)

Springdale 138 kV
Three Phase Fault
Phase to Ground
Fault
Springdale (G1)
13.8 kV

35724 Amps -83.25

37569 Amps -83.50

27128 Amps -81.40

27782 Amps -81.48

14453 Amps -87.17

38474 Amps -88.94

0 Amps 0

80.0 Amps -0.15 *

14453 Amps -87.17

38474 Amps -88.94

0 Amps 0

80.0 Amps -0.15 *

Three Phase Fault

Phase to Ground
Fault
Springdale (G2)
13.8 kV
Three Phase Fault
Phase to Ground
Fault

* Note: It was assumed that a grounding resistor of 100 ohms is installed on generator

neutral.
**Note: The value used for the short circuit study (71.2 MVA) differs from the value
used for the steady state power flow analysis (57 MVA). This is necessary
because of differently sized equipment in the generation facilities.

Stability Considerations
The transmission system is designed so that generating units remain in
synchronism and that cascading outages do not occur for credible contingencies such as
electrical faults or sudden network changes caused by fault clearing and line reclosings.
Transient stability simulations are made to assess expected performance of
generating units when the transmission network is subjected to severe disturbances.
Test results are used to determine critical fault clearing times and the ability of the
system to prevent cascading outages. They are also used to study the effectiveness of
alternative transmission plans to optimize the system's transient performance. Since it
is impossible to anticipate and test for all combinations of contingencies that could
occur on an interconnected network, those cases judged to be less severe, using APS
transient stability criteria as a guide, are not routinely tested.
There are also many areas of the system, which are considered strong enough to
support the proposed amounts of generation without the need for stability analysis. It
may, therefore, be deemed unnecessary to perform any stability simulations and will be
evaluated on a case by case assessment.
Transient stability testing was not done as part of this study because the Project
generators are relatively small and, therefore, should not cause stability concerns for
any APS units.
When the proposed generating station is designed and dynamics data for turbine
generators are available, the Developer should perform a transient stability study to
determine critical fault clearing times and effects of line reclosings on the transient
stability of the Project units. In addition, any updated dynamic machine data should be
forwarded to Allegheny Power.

10

APPENDIX A-Part 4:FERC FORM 715

11

FERC FORM NO. 715

PART 4
Transmission Planning Reliability Criteria
Contents
Page
1.

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 4-3

2.

Thermal and Voltage Criteria........................................................................................................................... 4-6

2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8

3.

System Stability Criteria ..................................................................................................................................4-13

3.1
3.2

4.

System Normal Criteria

Line Out Criteria

Additional System Performance Criteria..........................................................................................................4-15

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4

5.

Transmission System Facility Ratings

Normal System Conditions
Single Contingency Testing
Double Contingency Testing
Multiple Contingency Testing
Reliability Coordination Plan (RCP)
NERC Transmission Line Loading Relief (TLR) Procedure
Reactive Power Requirements

Transfer Capability
Fault Currents
Switching Surges
Power Quality

Line and Substation Configuration Criteria .....................................................................................................4-18

5.1
5.2

EHV (345 kV and up)

Area (100 kV to 230 kV)

Appendix A - ECAR Document No. 1 ....................................................................................................................4A-1

Appendix B - NERC Reliability Principles and Guides ..........................................................................................4B-1
Appendix C - Reliability Coordination Plan............................................................................................................4C-1
Appendix D - NERC Transfer Capability Definitions.............................................................................................4D-1
Appendix E - Voltage Flicker and Harmonic Distortion Limits.............................................................................. 4E-1

12

1.

INTRODUCTION
Bulk power planning and operating procedures consistently include reliability as one of the essential measures
of system performance. AP meets the need to expand and upgrade its transmission system by developing plans
using criteria that provide for continued reliable operation consistent with economic and regulatory constraints.
This document presents the reliability criteria used by AP to expand and upgrade the bulk power system of
lines and substations above 100 kV.
Transmission system expansion plans are developed with the goal of minimizing revenue requirements, which
include both capital and operating costs while meeting planning criteria that deal with maintaining acceptable
system performance. The proper application of transmission planning criteria requires substantial engineering
judgment based upon numerous and extensive studies of the system by the planning engineer. Prudently
managed utilities rely on their planning engineers' knowledge, experience, and judgment in applying the
criteria to specific circumstances on the transmission system. For this reason, it is simply not possible to
document all the criteria that may be used to decide the way in which a system is developed and expanded.
To understand reliability in system performance requires an understanding of how reliability affects a system.
The primary reliability objectives are adequacy and security. They can be defined as follows:
Adequacy - which is the capacity to meet system demand within major component ratings in
the presence of scheduled and unscheduled outage of generation and transmission
components or facilities, and
Security - which is a system's capability to withstand system disturbances arising from faults
and unscheduled removal of bulk power supply elements without further loss of facilities or
cascading outages.
In order to evaluate the reliability of a system, it is necessary to have benchmarks or criteria to determine the
levels of adequacy and security in a system.

13

1.

INTRODUCTION (continued)
The criteria in this document are based on AP and industrywide experience with equipment performance and
acknowledges the need to provide operating flexibility for maintenance outages while limiting customer
interruptions and the time required to restore service. Thus, various segments of the supply system will have
increasingly stringent reliability criteria as one moves from lower to higher system voltages involving greater
numbers of customers. Determination of the level of reliability that is acceptable depends upon what our
customers are willing to pay for and ultimately upon the regulatory commissions and their decisions granting
construction licenses and rate increases.
The following general planning objectives evolved and have been refined through years of experience to
achieve the objectives of maintaining acceptable system performance through an adequate and secure system
for the least cost. These objectives define the conditions under which a facility reinforcement would be added
to the transmission system.

The facility must represent an economical method to provide dependable service to our customers within
the constraints of regulatory, environmental, and political guidelines.

The facility should be sized to meet growth needs according to the AP load forecast while providing an
optimum level of reserve capability.

The facility installation should be timed to maintain reliability and minimize cost.

All feasible alternatives should be considered in planning a new facility. This includes, but is not
limited to, new technology, innovative applications of existing technology, controlling load growth, and
automation of controls.

14

1.

INTRODUCTION (continued)
Interconnected transmission facilities, in addition to meeting AP criteria, must meet or exceed reliability
criteria as established by the East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement (ECAR) Document No. 1
and the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Planning Standards. These documents provide
reliability criteria that are designed to test the ability of ECAR member systems to withstand certain
contingencies without triggering a breakup and collapse of any major part of their bulk power supply network.
ECAR Document No. 1 is included in these criteria as Appendix A and the NERC Reliability Principles and
Guides as Appendix B.
Existing regulatory and environmental constraints such as the inability to obtain right-of-way can lead to
conditions that do not meet our planning criteria. The degradation of reliability levels caused by these
conditions must be recognized as such and not used as examples to justify subversion of reliability levels in
other areas of the system.
The testing done on the transmission system is by mathematically modeling the system and solving the various
simulated conditions on a computer using the power flow and transient stability programs.
The following represent the AP transmission planning criteria and are more fully discussed in Sections 2
through 5.

Thermal and Voltage Criteria

System Stability Criteria
System Performance Criteria
Line and Substation Configuration Criteria

15

2.

THERMAL AND VOLTAGE CRITERIA

2.1

Transmission System Facility Ratings

Transmission line facilities within AP are rated for both summer and winter for continuous, 6-hour, and
2-hour periods of service while transformers use a one-hour, short-time emergency rating. The ratings
make use of manufacturers' recommendations, industry standards, and in case of overhead conductor, a
rating program by ECAR. The ratings that are developed take into account all of the elements which
make up the facility including conductors, transformers, structures, terminal facilities, hardware, as well
as relaying facilities and their settings, which protect the operation of the system.
AP uses a summer ambient temperature of 90F (32.2C), and winter ambient of 50F (10C). A
continuous wind speed of two feet per second at a right angle to the conductor is assumed for both
winter and summer ratings. The ratings needed to analyze the system are supplied as part of the power
flow data.

2.2

Normal System Conditions

Normal system conditions are defined as all transmission and generation facilities in service except those
known to be unavailable due to scheduled maintenance or a prolonged outage. All APS scheduled firm
power sales and purchases with and between other systems are assumed to be in effect, as are outside
inter-system transfers which impact the AP transmission system. Normal conditions for the seasonal
operating base cases will differ somewhat from planning cases in that they will typically include some
assumed non-firm economy sales in addition to firm sales.
Computer power flow system analyses are conducted for peak load conditions since that is the likely
critical period for the transmission system.
The criteria for acceptable system performance for normal system conditions may include, but are not
limited to:
2.2.1

Generation
All available generators are fully dispatchable to their normal seasonal operating capacity and
can regulate to the scheduled voltage.

16

2.

THERMAL AND VOLTAGE CRITERIA (continued)

2.2

Normal System Conditions (continued)

2.2.2

EHV Transmission System

(765 kV, 500 kV, and 345 kV lines and associated step-down substations)
All EHV system facilities operating within their normal (continuous) seasonal thermal
capabilities, and within their normal voltage operating range of +10% to -2% of nominal
voltage. Nominal voltages are 765 kV, 500 kV, and 345 kV.

2.2.3

Area Transmission System

(230 kV, 138 kV, and 115 kV lines and associated step-down substations)
All area transmission system facilities operating within their normal (continuous) seasonal
thermal capabilities, and area transmission system voltages within +5% to -10% of nominal
voltage for each voltage classification. Nominal voltages are 230 kV, 138 kV, and 115 kV.

2.3

Single Contingency Testing

A single contingency is the sudden outage of any single generation or transmission element (generator,
line, or transformer) while performing a system function during normal system conditions.
The criteria for acceptable system performance during single contingency outages are as follows:
2.3.1

Generation and Interconnections

No generator output restrictions are caused by the contingency unless the generator or its
associated facilities is the contingency element outaged. Generators and interconnections have
sufficient capability to compensate for power loss until the loss can be restored by rescheduling
internal generation or outside purchases can be arranged.

2.3.2

EHV Transmission System

All EHV transmission system lines remain within continuous seasonal thermal capability after
any necessary system adjustments, and EHV transmission system voltages remain within 5% of
their pre-contingency values.

17

2.

THERMAL AND VOLTAGE CRITERIA (continued)

2.3

Single Contingency (continued)

2.3.3

Area Transmission System

All area transmission line facilities are operating within their continuous seasonal loading
capabilities. A six-hour seasonal rating is acceptable for transformer loading. This loading is
limited to one six-hour period, after which the load on the transformer must be reduced to its
continuous rating. Area transmission system voltages should remain within 10% of nominal
and should not vary more than 10% from their pre-contingency level.

2.3.4

Customer Loads
No customer should be interrupted by the contingency unless directly connected to the outaged
facility.

2.4

Double Contingency Testing

A double contingency is the outage of any combination of two lines, transformers, or generators. The
outages may be simultaneous or sequential; however, the second outage occurs before system
adjustments can be made. While the probability of a double contingency is less than a single
contingency, the consequences, the effect on system reliability, can be much more severe.
The AP transmission system is designed to withstand the single contingency conditions described under
Section 2.3. However, double contingency tests are also used to assess the strength of the system. If the
double contingency tests indicate severe overloading or precipitous voltage drops that extend beyond the
immediate area of the outage, then area reinforcement or system upgrading is considered.

2.5

Multiple Contingency Testing

Multiple contingencies are a combination outage of more than two lines, transformers, or generators.
Such events are less probable than single or double contingencies, but because they are credible,
multiple contingencies must be considered in any analysis of transmission system reliability to
demonstrate the basic strength of a system. In some cases, it is the consequence of a multiple
contingency testing that determines whether system reinforcements can be justified.
ECAR Document No. 1 (Appendix A) describes the criteria to be used for simulated testing of multiple
contingency conditions. The Document No. 1 criteria are intended to assure that the ECAR bulk power
supply network can survive and will not suffer cascading outages that could cause uncontrolled areawide power interruptions during credible multiple contingencies. Since the AP operating companies are
members of ECAR, the AP bulk power transmission system must be planned to withstand Document
No. 1 criteria.

18

2.

THERMAL AND VOLTAGE CRITERIA (continued)

2.5

Multiple Contingency Testing (continued)

Multiple contingencies listed in ECAR Document No. 1 include, but are not limited to:

2.6

Outage of transmission line, including double circuit tower line, when various generators are
unavailable.

Outage of substation, including loss of any directly connected generation.

Sudden outage of a major load center.

Outage of all lines on a common right-of-way.

Reliability Coordination Plan (RCP)

The AP EHV transmission system is firmly interconnected to neighboring systems by numerous tie lines
at various voltage levels. These ties provide instantaneous mutual assistance for AP and its neighbors
during emergency conditions but they can also allow the rapid spread of an electrical disturbance across
system boundaries. Voluntary coordination of transmission planning activities among companies is
essential to assure that reliable and economic operation can be maintained.
The RCP is a coordinated plan originally conceived and implemented by AP, PJM, and Virginia Power
to assure that both thermal and voltage conditions on the interconnected system, specifically the APPJM-VP interface, are controlled to maintain reliable operation on the bulk power system. It is a plan
for coordinated operation to control transfers across the interregional interfaces, but it is also applicable
to future planning since it basically provides loading criteria in much the same way a thermal line rating
would. The RCP is kept up to date by periodic reviews, which reflect any change in system
configuration or schedules. The RCP is included in these criteria as Appendix C.
In recent years the RCP was frequently invoked to shed transactions scheduled through APs network
due to parallel flows caused by contract path schedules on other systems. NERCs TLR procedure has
provided the means for properly identifying transactions causing congestion and AP seldom experiences
conditions requiring curtailments now. The RCP remains available as a local procedure for maintaining
reliability.

2.7

NERC TLR

The FERC Transmission Line Loading Relief (TLR) procedure provides the means by
which transfers can be controlled and or removed to maintain transmission system
security. Substantial amounts of power continue to flow through the transmission
system and are considered inadvertent flows caused by power transfers that are not
contracted through the AP transmission system. With the implementation of the
NERC TLR, AP has been able to seek relief during periods of heavy transfers but may
19

have only limited control of these transfers for reliability considerations.

2.

THERMAL AND VOLTAGE CRITERIA (continued)

2.8

Reactive Power Requirements

Although the primary function of the transmission system is the transport of real power (megawatts), the
transmission planner must be cognizant of the equally important reactive power (megavars)
requirements of the system. Without an adequate reactive power supply, the ability of the transmission
system to carry real power may be severely limited. In extreme cases of deficient reactive power supply,
rapidly deteriorating voltage conditions could trigger a cascading blackout over a wide area.
The reactive power sources commonly available to supply the reactive loads and losses include
generators, the capacitive line charging component of lines, static capacitors, synchronous condensers,
and static var compensators.
The following criteria generally describe the AP reactive planning philosophy:
2.8.1

System reactive compensation with adequate controls will be planned to supply the reactive
load and loss requirements of the system and to maintain acceptable voltage profiles as defined
in Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter for:
2.8.1.1

Normal conditions.

2.8.1.2

Single contingency outage conditions.

2.8.2

Currently shunt capacitors are used in conjunction with generators and line
charging reactance to supply transmission system var requirements. Static var
compensators and synchronous condensers may be used if instantaneous
reactive response is required for widely varying var load and where their very
high costs can be justified.

2.8.3

Each area or system should provide its own reactive load and reactive loss
under normal operating conditions.

2.8.4

Switched capacitors should not cause more than a 3% voltage rise under normal conditions
with all facilities in service.

20

requirements

3.

SYSTEM STABILITY CRITERIA

The bulk power transmission system is designed to meet ECAR Document No. 1 criteria such that no
uncontrolled cascading outages take place.
In addition, it is also designed so that the generating units remain in synchronism and all generator power
swings are well damped following credible contingencies such as electrical faults and sudden network changes
caused by fault clearing and successful or unsuccessful line reclosing. These criteria should be met for all
operating load levels, taking due consideration for the relaying and automatic switching practices. The
following criteria are used to test system stability:
3.1

System Normal Criteria

Generating units at any power output level before the disturbance should remain stable for the following
tests of normal clearing:

3.2

3.1.1

A permanent three-phase or single-phase-to-ground fault on any line or transformer cleared by

the primary protective relaying scheme followed where applicable by an unsuccessful high
speed reclosure for line faults.

3.1.2

Breaker failure: a permanent three-phase or single-phase-to-ground fault on any line or

transformer cleared by backup breakers due to the failure of the primary breaker to interrupt the
fault.

3.1.3

Protective relaying overtrip: a permanent three-phase or single-phase-to-ground fault on any

line or transformer cleared by the primary protective relay and any adjacent line trip due to
relaying overtrip followed where applicable by appropriate reclosings.

3.1.4

Primary protective relaying scheme inoperative: a permanent three-phase or single-phase-toground fault on any line or transformer cleared by primary protective relaying at one end of the
line, and backup or slower relaying at the other end.

Line Out Criteria

With one critical line or transformer out of service, and the system at peak load, generating units at any
power output level before disturbance should remain stable for:
3.2.1

A permanent three-phase fault on any line or transformer cleared by primary protective

relaying scheme followed where applicable by an unsuccessful high speed reclosure for line
faults except for a fault that separates a unit from the power system without an accompanying
load island. Operating restrictions, such as limiting predisturbance real power output of a
generator or generating station, may be considered for extraordinary situations to satisfy this
criteria.

21

4.

ADDITIONAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CRITERIA

4.1

Transfer Capability
Transfer capability is used to assess and test the ability of the interconnected transmission network to
move power between entities, companies, regions, subregions, pools, etc. Sufficient transfer capability
is typically based on the ability to receive support from nonaffiliates during a generation capacity
emergency.
The criteria used by AP were adopted from the NERC transfer capability definition as recommended in
the NERC publication, "North American Electric Reliability Council Transmission Transfer Capability
(Appendix D). These criteria also are commonly used by interregional study groups such as the
VACAR-ECAR-MAAC (VEM) and MAAC-ECAR-NPCC (MEN) study committees. The First
Contingency Incremental Transfer Capability (FCITC) is defined by NERC as the power, incremental
above base transfers, that can be transferred in a reliable manner under the following conditions:

4.2

4.1.1

With all transmission facilities in service, all facility loadings are within normal ratings, and all
voltages are within normal limits.

4.1.2

The bulk power system is capable of absorbing the dynamic power swings and remaining
stable following a disturbance resulting in the loss of any single generation unit, transmission
circuit, or transformer.

4.1.3

After the dynamic power swings following a disturbance resulting in the loss of any single
generating unit, transmission circuit, or transformer, but before operator-directed system
adjustments are made, all transmission facility loadings are within emergency ratings and all
voltages are within emergency limits.

Fault Currents
Three-phase and single-line-to-ground short circuit currents and sequence voltages during faults are
calculated for each bus on the transmission system. Fault current values are used to check the short
circuit adequacy of equipment for system protection and protective coordination, and to determine
electrical system strength at various locations on the system.

4.3

Switching Surges
Switching surge studies are performed to determine transient and dynamic overvoltages and circuit
breaker recovery voltages during switching. These studies provide recommendations for switching
devices and allowable switching sequences which limit overvoltages on transmission system
components to levels within the equipment manufacturer's specified operating range. The studies also
facilitate selection of surge protection devices that provide proper protection and have adequate power
dissipation capacity.
Existing equipment capabilities and insulation coordination requirements determine acceptable transient
and dynamic overvoltage limits.

22

4.

ADDITIONAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CRITERIA (continued)

4.4

Power Quality
The transmission system is designed to provide acceptable power quality. In addition
to optimal adequacy and security of the power supply, the system is designed so that voltage fluctuations
or total harmonic distortions of voltages are limited to the following levels:
4.4.1

Voltage Fluctuations
Voltage fluctuations or voltage flicker due to rapidly changing load is limited to a level, which
will not exceed the company guidelines shown in Appendix E.

4.4.2

Harmonic Limits
The harmonic currents that an individual customer injects into the AP transmission system, as
measured at the point of common coupling, shall not exceed the limits established by the
company as shown in Appendix E.

4.4.3

Negative Sequence Currents

Negative sequence current studies are conducted so that damage to equipment resulting from
negative sequence currents can be avoided. Unbalanced currents are caused by
nonsymmetrical phase arrangements in transmission lines, unbalanced loads, or unequal
transformer impedance. Negative sequence currents can produce excessive heating in the
metallic wedges and retaining rings of turbine-generator rotors.
Due to the close proximity and strong influence of adjacent company interconnected EHV
systems, negative sequence current studies for the EHV network are normally conducted on a
multi-company basis. Negative sequence currents in generators should be limited to less than
5% of the positive sequence currents.

4.4.4

Negative Sequence Voltages

Negative sequence voltages should not exceed 22% of positive sequence voltages. A
customer's load directly supplied from the transmission system should not cause more than
22% voltage unbalance.

4.4.5

Facility Outages
Lower levels of power quality can be tolerated when significant elements of the supporting
transmission system are out of service.

23

5.

LINE AND SUBSTATION CONFIGURATION CRITERIA

5.1

EHV
5.1.1

5.1.2

5.2

Lines
5.1.1.1

For reliability reasons, AP prefers to use only single circuit tower construction for
500 kV lines and will use single or double circuit construction on 345 kV as the
need arises.

5.1.1.2

EHV lines should be routed on exclusive right-of-way in which any parallel lines
are of a lower voltage class, the exception being the approach to a substation.

5.1.1.3

Line crossings should be avoided and EHV lines should always occupy the highest
position when crossing lower voltage lines.

Substations
5.1.2.1

The preferred bus configuration for EHV substations is "breaker and a half" when
more than four lines terminate on the bus. Most stations start out as ring buses and
evolve to "breaker and a half" as terminal positions are added.

5.1.2.2

Transformer positions can be located on the buses, in the "string," or split between
the two.

5.1.2.3

Source lines and load lines should occupy alternate positions around a ring bus or
be paired together on a "breaker and a half string."

5.1.2.4

Transformer loading is controlled as follows:

5.1.2.4.1

The second transformer is added when the first transformer loads

above its normal rating during single contingency events or the local
areas supply experience line loading above their continuous rating
when the transformer is removed.

5.1.2.4.2

Third and fourth transformers are added when the loss of one
transformer causes the remaining ones to load above their continuous
rating.

Area
5.2.1

Line Configuration
5.2.1.1.

Optimum Line Supply to Substations

When possible, a substation is supplied with two separate transmission lines with
individual terminal facilities located within the substation.

24

5.

LINE AND SUBSTATION CONFIGURATION CRITERIA (continued)

5.2

Area (continued)
5.2.1

Line Configuration (continued)

5.2.1.2

Double Circuit Lines

Consistent with sound engineering, economic and environmental considerations,
double circuit transmission supply sources may be justified based on the
unavailability of a suitable separate line supply as a second source. The length of a
double circuit line is minimized for reliability reasons.

5.2.1.3

Radial Lines
Radial or a single transmission line supply to substations may be justified for an
interim period when existing lower voltage lines can supply the substation load for
the outage of the radial line.
When the substation load exceeds the capability of the lower voltage supply to
provide backup for loss of the transmission supply, a second transmission supply is
planned. Justification of a second line is based on reliability versus economic
constraints with consideration given to the probability and timing of future area
loads.

5.2.1.4

Multiple Rights-of-Way and Tower Lines

Whenever possible, it is preferable to have separate rights-of-way for critical
supply lines in an area. In cases where it is necessary to have multiple circuits on
the same right-of-way, the consequence of a structure failure or an outage that
forces both circuits out of service must be weighed against the probability of such
an event occurring and the cost and environmental impact of alternate routing
configurations.

5.2.2

Substation Configuration
Substations are an integral part of the area transmission network and interface the transmission
system with the subtransmission and distribution systems. Substations are developed in
coordination with the area transmission system to meet thermal, voltage, and other reliability
criteria.
5.2.2.1

Optimum Design
An area transmission substation is designed for two or more transmission line
terminals, multiple bus sections, and at least four transformers to serve a minimum
of 100 MVA load. The load may be served from local distribution circuits, the area
subtransmission system, or a combination of both.

25

5.

LINE AND SUBSTATION CONFIGURATION CRITERIA (continued)

5.2

Area (continued)
5.2.2

Substation Configuration (continued)

5.2.2.2

Line Terminals
Terminal switching facilities for the transmission lines are either automatic
switches, circuit switchers, or circuit breakers as determined by system
configuration and the ability of the protective relaying scheme to isolate a faulted
line, bus section, or transformer.

5.2.2.3

Bus Sections
Bus sections are connected by automatic bus tie switches or circuit breakers as
determined by system configuration and the ability of the protective relaying
system to isolate a faulted line, bus section, or transformer. An effort is made to
minimize the number of lines and transformers connected to each bus section.

5.2.2.4

Transformers and Sizing

Each transmission substation will have from four to six transformers when fully
developed. The transformers will be protected on the high side by an automatic
switch, circuit switcher, or breaker, and on the low side by a manual switch or
breaker as required to isolate the faulted unit. Additional transformers are added as
required for reliability and economic reasons.
Transformers supplying the subtransmission system are standard impedance triplerated OA/FA/FA units. Depending on the location of the system, they may require
automatic load-tap changing equipment.
Transformers serving distribution loads are triple-rated OA/FA/FA units with
automatic load-tap changing equipment. Some units may require nonstandard
impedance in order to limit fault current.

26

APPENDIX A
ECAR DOCUMENT NO. 1

RELIABILITY CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION AND

SIMULATED TESTING OF THE ECAR BULK POWER
SUPPLY SYSTEMS

Approved by the Coordination Review Committee

September, 1967
Revised October, 1980
Revised May 27, 1998

Approved by the ECAR Executive Board

October, 1967
Revised November 6, 1980
Revised July 27, 1998
(Included by reference.)

Copies of this reference document can be viewed, printed or printed from the ECAR home page on the internet @
http:\\www.ecar.org.

Approved by the Engineering Committee: November 30, 1993

North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)

PLANNING STANDARDS

September 1997

(Included by reference.)

Copies of this reference document can be viewed, printed or printed from the NERC home page
on the internet @ http:\\www.nerc.com. Or can be obtained from the North American Electric
Reliability Council (NERC) by request from the following address:
NERC
116-390 Village Boulevard
Princeton, New Jersey 08540-5731
Telephone: (609) 452-8060
Fax: (609) 452-9550

APPENDIX C
RELIABILITY COORDINATION PLAN

APS/PJM/VAPWR
RELIABILITY COORDINATION PLAN
(RCP)
REVISION 4

From
APV Operations Analysis Group
On
December 11, 1992

As Approved By
The APS/PJM/VAPWR SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
STEERING COMMITTEE
On
January 26, 1993

Effective February 1, 1993

Rev. 0 Rev. 1 Rev. 2 Rev. 3 -

6/01/88
8/17/88
6/01/90
11/01/90
A:\RCP\COVER.293
cdm:02/93

APS/PJM/VaPwr
RELIABILITY COORDINATION PLAN (RCP)
Rev. 0
Rev. 1
Rev. 2
Rev. 3
Rev. 4

6/88
8/88
5/90
11/90
12/92

1.0 PURPOSE
The RCP outlines steps to be taken to avoid or remedy unreliable operation on the interregional bulk power
transmission system.
2.0 GENERAL
2.1 THERMAL OPERATION - The APS/PJM/VaPwr bulk power transmission system shall be operated so
that no bulk power transmission facilities exceed their normal rating on an actual basis and so that no facility will
exceed its emergency rating (as determined by the "control area" owning the facility) following the sudden loss of
any single generation or transmission facility.
2.2 VOLTAGE/REACTIVE OPERATION - The APS/PJM/VaPwr bulk power transmission system shall be
operated so that the actual and post-contingency voltage/reactive requirements of the control area owning the facility
are not violated.
2.3 NOTIFICATION - It is the intent of this plan that the initiating control area will notify all other
participants of implementation or cancellation of any level of this plan. The participants are defined as AEP, APS,
CEI, DL, OE, PJM, and VaPwr. In addition, the ORNS teletype should be used to notify ORNS members of the
implementation or cancellation of Levels II and IV. It is the responsibility of each control area to notify their
appropriate operating company personnel.
2.4 APS, PJM, and VaPwr Operation Planning groups shall regularly examine system conditions and provide
the system operators with procedures and methods to assure that the system will be operated reliably.
2.5 APS, PJM, and VaPwr System Operations shall communicate the current and expected reliability status
of their system to all neighboring systems.
2.6 APS, PJM, and VaPwr System Operators shall react as requested when a reliability violation is declared
by another system. However, a control area may notify the requesting control area that it is unable to comply if the
requested action will cause a reliability violation on its own system. The requesting control area should supply as
much information as is readily available about the system conditions. Disputes and any in-depth analysis questions
should be resolved after actions have been taken and the system has returned to a reliable state.
3.0 APS/PJM/VaPwr TRANSMISSION LIMITS
The operation of APS, PJM, and VaPwr can be affected by internal or external transmission limits. These
limits can be of a thermal nature (actual or post-contingency overloads), of a reactive nature (actual or
post-contingency voltage criteria violations), or of a steady-state stability nature (large system angular differences).
The system owning the limiting facility is responsible for detecting the problem, determining the indicator of
the limit and initiating the levels of this plan required to assure reliable operation. When possible, limiting
conditions should be anticipated in advance of each operating season and reviewed for appropriateness by all
participants of this agreement. Identification of anticipated limits and preliminary corrective strategies should be
included as a part of this document.

4.0 SUDDEN SYSTEM CHANGES

Sudden voltage and MW flow changes can be an indication that transmission switching or sudden generation
loss may have occurred on the bulk power system. Loss of generation or transmission facilities can affect the
reliable operation of the interconnected system. Information on actual switching occurrences or generation loss
(scheduled or unscheduled) should be exchanged with interconnected systems as soon as possible after the
occurrence. The impact of these changes on the reliable condition of the interconnected system should be
considered in reliability evaluations.
If a transmission line tripped and did not automatically reclose, the transmission system should be analyzed
and operated assuming that the facility is "locked out." Appropriate system adjustments should be made to protect
for the next contingency.
Recognition should be given to the expectation that a generation loss will be compensated for by generation
increases on the bulk power system. Curtailments should be delayed for ten minutes to allow internal generation to
compensate for a reported unit loss.
5.0 DEFINITIONS:
The method for controlling to a limit, when external assistance is required, shall be a four level plan. The
following is a definition of each level of the Reliability Coordination Plan.
LEVEL I (Controlled Loading Level) - is the point determined by the initiating control area where the
increase in transfers should be controlled in anticipation of a deteriorating reactive or thermal situation.
LEVEL II (Small Block Curtailments) - is the point determined by the initiating control area to result in
marginally acceptable post-contingency operation, while anticipating increased transmission loading. Transfers are
frozen or may be curtailed up to 500 MW per pass in anticipation of a deteriorating reactive or thermal situation.
LEVEL III (Large Block Curtailments) - is the point determined by the initiating control area to result in the
minimum acceptable post-contingency operation. Curtailments may be up to 1000 MW per pass.
LEVEL IV (Emergency Operations) - is the point where probable voltage collapse or cascading thermal
overloads will result if critical single contingency should occur.
Participating control area must reduce their imports within a reasonable time (20 min.) using all available
means including emergency procedures such as voltage reduction, interruptible curtailments, starting of combustion
turbines, and load shed. Upon notification of load shed by an importing utility (PJM, VaPwr), APS will also shed
load to maintain system reliability.
Level IV-A should only be experienced after the occurrence of a less critical contingency or when
curtailments were not of sufficient magnitude in previous levels.
LEVEL IV-B (Emergency Load Shed) - is the point that analysis has shown may result in imminent voltage
collapse or cascading thermal overload. A critical contingency has occurred and load shedding by APS, PJM, and
VaPwr should be initiated immediately to avoid a collapse.
6.0 TRANSFER CURTAILMENT PROCEDURE
The following procedure applies the general principles stated above to the specific case of west-to-east
transfers that cause a limiting condition within the APS system or an importing system (PJM and VaPwr). The
participants have agreed that each shall observe an appropriate Curtailment Reference Value (CRV) for this
procedure, taking into account existing obligations (among the participants and between the participants and others)

to maintain reliable and, to the extent consistent therewith, economical operations. Until superseded by revision of
this RCP, the agreed Curtailment Reference Value for each participant is:
PJM
Rev. 4
12/11/92

= 2245 MW
APS-VAPWR
VAPWR

= 300 MW
= 1300 MW

Prior to implementation of any step of this plan, the control area initiating the plan shall verify that all
actions or coordination that do not involve an economic penalty have been utilized to mitigate this condition. This
includes the use of "Heavy" Reactive Support under the Voltage Coordination Plan (VCP).

6.1 LEVEL I - (CONTROLLED LOADING LEVEL)

When the stated Level I is reached, the initiating control area shall notify all participants in the agreement
that no additional transfers be loaded or scheduled that would increase loading on the limiting facilities, without
prior consent by the initiating control area. The control is to be exercised in such a manner as to not exceed Level I
and/or not anticipated to cause large cuts in Level II. The initiating control area shall request a listing of net western
transactions in effect at this time. The net western total includes transactions from or through ECAR to PJM and
VaPwr. The initiating control area shall contact all participants when Level I is declared and whenever transactions
are adjusted within Level I. The initiating control area shall maintain a log of these transactions and identify actions
requested and performed as a result of initiating this plan.
NOTE: If a control area is near Level I when a large block of transfers is scheduled to ramp in, the affected control
area may request that the transfers be picked-up in smaller increments to avoid overshooting Levels I and
II which would result in the need for immediate curtailments.
OPERATION AT THIS LEVEL IS ACCEPTABLE
Restoration -

As conditions permit, purchase restorations shall be permitted in Level I. All cuts from
Level II and III actions are restored in Level I. If curtailments took imports below CRV
for one or both control areas, one control can restore up to the same percent of CRV as
the other control area before sharing the restoration in the ratio of the curtailments. After
all cuts are restored, notify ORNS that we are no longer requesting a restriction of
transfers.

Increases -

After all cuts have been restored and as conditions permit, purchases that are to be
increased are in the ratio as defined for the current contingency limit and transfer level.
Purchases to increase a participant's imports up to its CRV will be permitted prior to the
increase of purchases that would exceed a participant's CRV. If both control areas are
held below their CRV, the one with the lowest percent of CRV loaded may first increase
its purchases up to the same percent of CRV as the other. The two control areas would
then be allowed to increase purchases in the curtailment ratio as defined for the current
contingency limit.

NOTE: The initiating control area is responsible for contacting each importing area each time an increment of
transfers can be safely added to the schedules. No controlled transfers may be restored or added without
the consent of the declaring area. Level I is ended after all desired schedules have been loaded and
critical facility loading are stabilized below the current Level I trigger point.

6.2 LEVEL II - (SMALL BLOCK CURTAILMENTS)

When the stated Level II is reached, the initiating control area shall notify all participants and the ORNS
members to request the following actions in the sequence shown below.
1. Request that no additional transfers be loaded that would increase flows on the critical facilities (freeze
transfers).
2. Request control areas to shift generation internally to alleviate contingency problem. If no action
possible, proceed to #3.
3. Request control areas to reduce purchases from west up to 500 MW. If both control areas have purchases
greater than their Curtailment Reference Values, curtailments will be shared in the ratio in effect for the
anticipated contingency. If only one control area has purchases greater than its Curtailment Reference
Value, it must reduce those purchases by up to 500 MW or to its Curtailment Reference Value.
Purchases from the west above the Curtailment Reference Values must be curtailed by all areas prior to
curtailment of any purchases below the Curtailment Reference Value for any area.
If no action possible or additional action is needed, go to #4.
4. Request control areas to curtail purchases below their CRV. If both control areas are not loaded up to
their CRV, only the control area with the highest percent CRV loading curtails until both areas are at
equal percent of CRV. They then curtail together based on the curtailment ratio in effect for the
anticipated contingency. Contracts to be curtailed are the choice of the purchasing control area. If a
control area cannot comply because the imports are needed to serve customer load, it should make every
attempt to purchase from or through another control area including the remaining plan participant. Care
should be taken so that the replacement purchase does not aggravate the current problem. If the control
area cannot purchase power from any other control area, the remaining control area in the plan should
take the full curtailment unless the imports are needed to serve customer load.
The goal of Level II actions is to prevent critical facility loading from reaching Level III. Level II actions 3
and/or 4 may be repeated as necessary to accomplish this goal. At the time of any actions in Level II, the initiating
control area should record western purchases and all actions taken. Curtailments for each pass through Level II are
not expected to exceed 500 MW.

OPERATION AT THIS LEVEL IS ACCEPTABLE

Readjustment -

Continue to review conditions. If conditions initially prevented a control area from full
compliance of Level II curtailments, move toward redistribution of curtailments to the
intended ratios as conditions permit.

Restoration -

Level II is ended whenever critical facility loading have dropped and stabilized below
the current Level II trigger point. All participants should be notified when Level II is
canceled. ORNS is not notified until all cuts have been restored in Level I.
Restoration of any curtailments or adding of any previously frozen transfers will take
place in Level I.

NOTE: If Level I was not implemented prior to Level II, then the initiating control area shall execute Level I actions
in conjunction with Level II.

6.3 LEVEL III - (LARGE BLOCK CURTAILMENTS)

When the stated Level III is reached, the initiating control area shall notify all participants and request large
block (up to 1000 MW) transfer curtailments. The initiating control area shall request immediate curtailments of up
to 1000 MW allocated to each control area in the curtailment ratio for the contingency associated with
implementation of Level III. If both control areas have purchases greater than their Curtailment Reference Values
curtailments will be shared in the ratio in effect for the anticipated contingency. If only one control area has
purchases greater than their Curtailment Reference Value, it must reduce those purchases by up to 1000 MW or to
their Curtailment Reference Value.
Purchases from the west above the Curtailment Reference Value must be curtailed by all areas prior to any
curtailment of any purchases below the Curtailment Reference Value for any area.
Each control area requested to curtail should make every effort to comply immediately. This includes
making an effort to purchase replacement power from other utilities provided that such purchases do not aggravate
the situation.
The goal of Level III actions is to return the critical facilities to or below Level II and remain out of Level
III. Repeat curtailments as necessary to achieve this goal. Curtailments for each pass through Level III are not
expected to exceed 1000 MW.
If a control area cannot comply because the imports are needed to serve customer load, it should make every
attempt to purchase from or through another control area including the remaining plan participant. Care should be
taken so that the replacement purchase does not aggravate the current problem. If the control area cannot purchase
power from any other control area, the remaining control area in the plan should take the full curtailment if it does
not jeopardize serving its load.
OPERATION AT THIS LEVEL IS UNDESIRABLE
Readjustment -

If Levels I and II were not implemented prior to Level III, it is permissible to allow
control areas to readjust curtailments to reflect their curtailment ratio and/or their
preferred operating configuration. This is to be done after situation has stabilized and
could involve generation shifts and changes in purchases.

Restoration -

Level III is ended whenever critical facility loading have dropped and stabilized below
the current Level III trigger point. Restoration of any curtailments or adding any
previously frozen transfers will take place in Level I.

6.4 LEVEL IV - (EMERGENCY CONDITIONS)

LEVEL IV-A (EMERGENCY OPERATIONS) - The actual conditions have reached a point where a critical
single contingency would cause probable voltage collapse or cascading thermal overloads. That is, the control area
is operating in the area beyond Level III on a pre-contingency basis. At this time, all participating control areas
MUST reduce their imports by their share of 1000 MW within a reasonable time period (=20 min.). Curtailment
shares are based on the curtailment ratio defined for the critical contingency encountered and without regard to the
CRV. The control areas must use all available means including all applicable Emergency Procedures such as voltage
reduction, interruptible curtailments, starting combustion turbines, emergency transfers, and load shed. All
participants and ORNS shall be notified of Level IV-A and any requested actions.
Upon notification of load shed by an importing utility (PJM or VaPwr), AP will shed load to maintain
system reliability.
Level IV-A should only be experienced after the occurrence of a less critical contingency or when
curtailments of imports were not of sufficient magnitude in previous levels. The goal of Level IV-A is to restore to
Level III conditions or better.

OPERATION AT THIS LEVEL IS UNACCEPTABLE

Readjustment -

After system conditions have stabilized at Level III or better, adjustments to purchases
can be made so long as the total import from ECAR does not increase. These
adjustments should result in purchase levels that would have resulted if curtailments
had been made recognizing each control area's CRV and applicable curtailment ratio.

Restoration -

As soon as conditions permit, system loads shall be restored in the same proportion as
the load shed. Purchases necessary to restore load and end emergency procedures may
be restored while in Level III.
Additional purchases beyond those needed to restore load and end emergency
procedures should not be restored until Level I or better conditions are achieved.
Purchases should then be restored as specified under restoration in Level I.
Notify all plan participants and ORNS when Level IV is canceled.

LEVEL IV-B (EMERGENCY LOAD SHED) - a critical contingency has occurred and conditions in the
initiating control area have reached the minimum survivable operating point.
The initiating control area shall request APS, PJM, and VaPwr to shed load immediately and in an equal
amount specified on the limit sheet.
Coincident with load shedding, all remaining transactions that are judged to adversely affect the problem
should be brought to zero. Emergency purchases that could be beneficial in alleviating the condition or could be
used to restore load without adverse effect should be made coincident with other actions in Level IV. All
participants and ORNS should be notified of these actions as soon as possible. The goal of Level IV-B is to restore
the system to Level III conditions.
OPERATION AT THIS LEVEL IS UNACCEPTABLE
All actions are judged necessary to avert a system collapse.
Readjustment -

After system conditions have stabilized at Level III or better, adjustments to purchases
can be made so long as the total import from ECAR does not increase. These
adjustments should result in purchase levels that would have resulted if curtailments
had been made recognizing each control area's CRV and applicable curtailment ratio.

Restoration -

As soon as conditions permit, system loads shall be restored in the same proportion as
the load shed. Purchases necessary to restore load and end emergency procedures may
be restored while in Level III.
Additional purchases beyond those needed to restore load and end emergency
procedures should not be restored until Level I or better conditions are achieved.
Purchases should then be restored as specified under restoration in Level I.
Notify all plan participants and ORNS when Level IV is canceled.

Rev. 1 Rev. 2 Rev. 3 Rev. 4 -

8/88 5/90 11/90 12/92 -

CRV language added

Redefine Level I and II actions. Other minor changes as noted above.
Redefine curtailment methods for CRV.
Rename the ODEC CRV as APS-VaPwr.
FILE:A:RCPREV4.WR1:cdm
Rev.4, 12/14/92

North American Electric Reliability Council

Transmission Transfer Capability

A Reference Document for Calculating and Reporting

the Electric Power Transfer Capability of
Interconnected Electric Systems
May 1995

(Included by reference.)

Copies of this reference document can be viewed, printed or printed from the NERC home page on the internet @
http:\\www.nerc.com. Or can be obtained from the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) by request
from the following address:

NERC
116-390 Village Boulevard
Princeton, New Jersey 08540-5731
Telephone: (609) 452-8060
Fax: (609) 452-9550

APPENDIX E
VOLTAGE FLICKER AND HARMONIC DISTORTION LIMITS
VOLTAGE FLICKER
The voltage fluctuations (flicker) a customer's load causes at the point of common coupling shall remain
below the Voltage Flicker Limits of Figure #1. APS uses UHP International, Inc. Network
Flicker/Harmonic Analyzer, using the RMS unweighted scale, to determine compliance with this limit.

FIGURE #1

HARMONIC DISTORTION LIMITS

General
Two criteria are used to determine harmonic distortion. The first is the limitation on the harmonic current
that a user can transmit into the utility system. The second is to limit the amount of voltage distortion at the
metering point of any customer. The following tables are provided as limits for these amounts and are for
continuous, steady state operations of ten minutes or more. For transients of one minute to ten minutes, the
values can be increased to 1.25 times the levels in the table and for less than one minute, to 1.50 times the
levels.
Current Distortion
The following tables list the harmonic current limits based on the load current with respect to the short
circuit strength of the power system to which it is connected. The tables list the maximum amount of
harmonic current distortion from non-linear loads, in percent with respect to the 60 Hz current at the meter
location.

TABLE 1
Maximum Harmonic Current Distortion Levels (in % IL)
For Each Individual Odd Harmonic (NOTE 1)
Where Service Voltage is Less Than 69 kV

ISC/IL

DC Note 3

<11

11#H<17

17#H<23

23#H<35

35#H

THD

#20
(NOTE 2)

4.0

2.0

1.5

0.6

0.3

5.0

>20 & #50

7.0

3.5

2.5

1.0

0.5

8.0

>50 & #100

10.0

4.5

4.0

1.5

0.7

12.0

>100&#1000

12.0

5.5

5.0

2.0

1.0

15.0

>1000

15.0

7.0

6.0

2.5

1.4

20.0

TABLE 2
Maximum Harmonic Current Distortion (in %IL)
For Each Individual Odd Harmonic (NOTE 1)
Where Service Voltage is 69 kV But #138 kV

ISC/IL

DC Note 3

<11

11#H<17

17#H<23

23#H<35

35#H

THD

#20
(NOTE 2)

2.0

1.0

0.75

0.3

0.15

2.5

>20 & #50

3.5

1.75

1.25

0.5

0.25

4.0

>50 & #100

5.0

2.25

2.0

0.75

0.35

6.0

>100&#1000

6.0

2.75

2.5

1.0

0.50

7.5

>1000

7.5

3.5

3.0

1.25

0.7

10.0

TABLE 3
(NOTE 4)
Maximum Harmonic Current Distortion Levels (In % IL)
For Each Individual Odd Harmonic (NOTE 1)
Where Service Voltage is Greater Than 138 kV

ISC/IL

DC Note 3

<11

11#H<17

17#H<23

23#H<35

35#H

THD

#50

2.0

1.0

0.75

0.3

0.15

2.5

>50

3.0

1.5

1.15

0.45

0.22

3.75

Where:
H

Order of Harmonic (Multiple of Fundamental)

THD

Total Harmonic Distortion in Percent where:

1/2

( 2 + 2 + 2 + ...+ I h 2 )
THD = I dc I 2 I 3
* 100
IL

ISC

Maximum 60 Hz RMS short circuit current at the metering point.

IL

60 Hz (Fundamental Frequency) RMS load current at the meter location during the time
of harmonic analysis. For new connections, IL is calculated from the size of the
transformer to be installed.

IH

RMS Magnitude of the harmonic current at frequencies above the fundamental.

And:

% I H = I H x100
IL
The values of THD and %IH as calculated above should be less than or equal to those listed in
Tables 1-3.
NOTES:
1.

Even harmonic limits are 25% of odd harmonic values.

2.

All power generation equipment is limited to these values regardless of ISC/IL.

3.

Current distortions that result in DC offset are not allowed.

4. Data applies to power generation equipment in addition to load equipment.

Voltage Distortion
For limitations on the amount of voltage distortion, which may result at the customer's meter location, the
following table will apply:

TABLE 4
Maximum Harmonic Voltage Distortion (in % V1)
at the Customer's Meter Location

< 69 kV

69 to #138 kV

>138 kV

Maximum for Individual Odd

and Even Harmonics

3.0

1.5

1.0

THD

5.0

2.5

1.5

Where:
THD

Total Harmonic Distortion in Percent where:

1/2

THD =

( V dc 2 +V 2 2 + V 32 + ...+ V h 2 )
V1

* 100

VH

Magnitude of each harmonic voltage at frequencies above the fundamental (RMS)

V1

60 Hz RMS Voltage

And:

V
% V H = H x100
V1
Both V1 and VH have to be checked phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground.
The values of THD and %VH as calculated above should be less than or equal to those listed in
Table 4.

Commutation Notches
Commutation action, which is a transient short circuit resulting from thyristor's switching from one phase
to the next is a source of harmonic current and voltage distortion. The voltage distortion is more important,
because many thyristor packages use the voltage (assumed sinusoidal) zero crossing for control, and will
thus be limited at the user's meter location as follows:
1.

Depth of the commutation notch should not exceed 20% of the peak voltage magnitude.

2.

The area of the commutation notch, which is equal to the width of the notch in microseconds times the
average depth of the notch in volts, should not exceed 22,800 for a 480 volt service. For other service
voltages, this limit will be multiplied by VLL/480.

3.

As in Table 4, the total harmonic distortion of the voltage at the service panel shall not exceed 5%.

APPENDIX B- Information Provided by Developer