San Lorenzo Village vs.

CA
Almeda Development and Equipment Corp (ADEC) is the owner of the parcel of
land with buildings and improvements situated at Pasay Road, San Lorenzo,
Village, Makati, embraced in TCT 47348.
In TCT 47448, there appears Entry No. 59599 which has some annotated
retsrictions on the said property and stating that the owner and successor is
automatically a member of San Lorenzo Village Assoc.
ADEC prayed for the issuance of TRO directing San Lorenzo Company and its
agents to cease and desist from making ADEC a member of the SLVAI, prohibiting
the construction of taller building on its lot and SLVAI from collecting membership
fee and monthly dues and assessments. It also prayed to cancel Entry No. 59599 in
TCT 47348.
SLVAI filed MTD on the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of ADEC's
personality to sue alleging that ADEC was a registered owner of the parcel in TCT
47348 and sale by Ponciano Almeda to ADEC could not bind third parties, that
ADEC had no reason to pray for cancellation of Entry in 59599 not being the
owner of the land nor a member of SLVAI but simply a stranger that had no
demandable right against the SLVAI.
ADEC opposed the MTD contending that it had cause of action because as the new
owner of the lot involved, it cannot be compelled to be a member of the SLVAI for
to do so would unduly limit its use of property, it also had the capacity and
personality because the actual notice of the sale was equivalent to registration.
RTC denied MTD, plaintiff had the capacity and personality as successor in
interest of the original registered owner, stepping into the shoes of the latter.
SLVAI filed MR alleging that third persons were not bound by the deed of sale
entered into between ADEC and Ponciano Almeda, as said deed was not registered.
ADEC opposed the MR contending that said motion was pro forma merely
reiterating the arguments in the MTD, also citing Article 709 of the CC which
states that (t)he titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which

are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice
third persons.
In its reply to the opposition, SLVAI countered that the term third persons in
Article 709 was broad enough to cover everybody who did not participate in the
disputed act, contract or deed. It asserted that, while it had a lien over unpaid
association dues and garbage fees, ADEC was not the real party in interest in the
suit for cancellation of restrictions on the title that was still in the name of Almeda
and therefore the case should have been dismissed outright for lack of cause of
action. Moreover, while ADEC claimed to be the owner of the property, it had not
explained why it had not registered the deed of sale and secured a separate title to
the property.

MR denied. On petition for certiorari, CA denied, the allegation of ADEC that it is

the owner of the property on the strength of the deed of sale should be deemed
hypothetically admitted, giving it capacity to file the proceedings below.
ISSUE: whether or not the petition below alleges a cause of action against
petitioner.
HELD:
The Rules of Court requires that the complaint must make a concise statement of
the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A
fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the
cause of action insufficient.
A complaint states a cause of action where it contains the three (3) essential
elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant
in violation of said legal right. If these elements are absent, the complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
If the allegations are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, the
defendants recourse is not a motion to dismiss but a bill of particulars.

A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the

complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. However, the
hypothetical admission is limited to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in
the complaint and inferences fairly deductible therefrom. The admission does not
extend to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact
the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice.
In the instant case, the complaint asserts that plaintiff purchased the property in
question from the person admittedly holding title thereto. It then infers that by this
mode, it became the successor-in-interest of the vendor, if not indeed the owner of
the property. Hence, the restrictions in the title should be nullified not only because
it is contrary to law but also because the conditions under which they were
imposed had ceased to exist.
In fact, the averments in the complaint like the title of ADECs vendor, the
execution of the sale by said vendor to ADEC, the latters status as the vendors
successor-in-interest, and the altered physical environment along Pasay Road, are
allegations well within the hypothetical-admission principle. These averments
satisfy the three (3) elements of a cause of action. In other words, the complaint did
state a cause of action.
In view of such, SLVAI cannot successfully invoke the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action in its motion to dismiss.
Regarding the third issue of whether ADEC is a real party in interest, said issue is
likewise not a proper ground for a motion to dismiss. Certainly, as successor-ininterest of the original vendor, who is the unquestioned title holder, ADEC has the
prerogative to assert all the latters rights, including the impugnation of the
restrictions on the title. The tenability of the grounds for that impugnation, while
proper under the pleadings, should be threshed out at the trial on the merits.
The only other issue raised is that even assuming ADEC became owner of the
property, it cannot seek cancellation because, under SLVAIs rules, the cancellation
process can only be initiated by members of the SLVAI who are the registered
owners of the lots in the village and by their two-thirds vote. However, those rules
were not dealt with in the complaint at all. They may thus be raised only by way of

defense in the Answer, but not as ground for a motion to dismiss available as cause
for dismissal of the action at this early stage.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be DISMISSED and the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals should be AFFIRMED.
Dela Cruz vs. CA
Private complainant Victor Bellosillo was introduced to the accused Erlinda Dela
Cruz by Johny Cruz and Gabby Viudez in Roxas Blvd., Manila resulting the
accused and private complainant to execute an Agreement of Undertaking whereby
the accused, as seller, undertook to cause the release from the Bureau of Customs
of 832 pieces od used gasoline engines and spare parts which private complainant,
as buyer, agreed to pay for P700,000.00.
Private complainant paid P300,00.00 upon signing of the agreement and the
balance of P400,00.00 is payable within three (3) days after the date of the
completion of the delivery of the merchandise. There were other several payments
which private complainant made to the accused through misrepresentation and
inducement of the accused: to fund the payment of demurrage and storage fees of
the five container vans for P100,000.00, release of the Mercedes Benz car for
P140,000.00 and P175,000.00 for demurrage and storage fees of such Mercedes
Benz. However, accused failed to deliver any of those in spite repeated demands,
thus, charging the accused of estafa.
Trial court convicted the accused sentencing him of an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from 4 years to 2 months of priccion correccional in its medium
period- 8 years of prision mayor in its minimum period, as the maximum, plus 69
years considering that the amount defrauded exceeds the sum P22,000.00,
computed at one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 out of theP693,000.00
excess thereof, but the penalty to be suffered by the accused shall not exceed
twenty (20) years; with all the accessory penalties provided for by law; to
indemnify private complainant Victor B. Bellosillo the amount of P715,000.00, and
to pay the costs.
CA affirmed AFFIRMED in all other respects.

Accused filed a petition claiming that the prosecution FAILED to prove its
affirmative allegations in the indictment regarding the elements of the crime as
well as the attendant circumstances. (Read the case for Issues and Rulings)

LA MALLORCA vs. CA
Plaintiffs Mariano (husband) and wife, together with their minor children, Milagros
(13), Raquel (4) and Fe (2), boarded Pambusco Bus owned and operated by the
defendant, at San Fernando Pampanga to Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. When it
reached Anao, they all went down to a shaded spot on the left pedestrians side four
or five meters away from the vehicle. However, Mariano went back to the bus to
get his bayong not knowing that his child Raquel followed him, causing the latter
to be ran over by the bus when the vehicle started mowving forward
notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the customary
signal to start since Mariano at that time was still attending to the baggage.
Lower court found defendat liable for breach of contract of carriage and ordered to
pay P3k for the death of the child and P400.00 as compensatory damages
representing burial expenses and costs.
CA claimed there could not be a breach on contract in the case for the reason that
when the child met her death, she was no longer a passenger of the bus, therefore,
the contract of carriage had already termninated, nevertheless, it found the
defendant-appellant guilty of quasi-delict, thus, liable for damages for the
negligence of the driver in accordance with Article 2180 of the CC, increasing the
damages to P6k.
ISSUE:
1. WON LA MALLORCA is liable for quasi-delict considering that the complaint
was for breach of contract
2. in raising the award from P3k to P6k.
RULING:
1. Yes. It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger
does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a
place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the
carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this
rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. The inclusion of this averment

for quasi-delict, while incompatible with the other claim under the contract of
carriage, is permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court,
which allows a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they
compatible with each other or not, to the end that the real matter in controversy
may be resolved and determined.
The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim
was predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel
Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of
the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and
their agent." This allegation was also proved when it was established during the
trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and
while there were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to
run off the vehicle.
2. The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the Court
of Appeals, however, cannot be sustained. Generally, the appellate court can only
pass upon and consider questions or issues raised and argued in appellant's brief.
Plaintiffs did not appeal from that portion of the judgment of the trial court
awarding them on P3,000.00 damages for the death of their daughter. Neither does
it appear that, as appellees in the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs have pointed out in
their brief the inadequacy of the award, or that the inclusion of the figure
P3,000.00 was merely a clerical error, in order that the matter may be treated as an
exception to the general rule.5Herein petitioner's contention, therefore, that the
Court of Appeals committed error in raising the amount of the award for damages
is, evidently, meritorious.