1AC

Inherency
Law enforcement agencies currently have no oversight
requirements for drone flights
Connor Friedersdorf, August 28, 2014, The Atlantic,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/08/california-lawmakers-back-a-restrainingorder-on-police-drones/379267/

Imagine that you lived in a house with a relatively private backyard: fences on all
three sides, trees around the perimeter, and no easy way for the neighbors to peek
in. Say you're out there playing with your kids, or sunbathing, or consummating a
romantic encounter in a hot tub that, let's be honest, you rarely use. If I, intrepid
journalist, were to appear overhead in a helicopter with the specific intent of
peering down onto your property, you'd be justified in thinking that I violated your
reasonable expectations of privacy. But your common-sense notions would be at
odds with America's mixed-up Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. "In the 1989 case
Florida v. Riley, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that since airplanes and helicopters
often fly over private property, citizens do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy that their activities will not be observed from the air," Ronald Bailey explains
in Reason. "Consequently, the police were permitted use of evidence obtained
without a search warrant from helicopter observation of a greenhouse in which they
suspected marijuana was being grown." Article Continues After Advertisement At
the time, aerial surveillance was at least constrained in practice by the significant
cost of flying a helicopter. But today, at the dawn of the cheap-drone era,
precedents like the one set in 1989 pose a novel threat to privacy rights. Hence the
effort by California lawmakers to pass added protections into law: Earlier this month
the California State Assembly voted to require police to obtain warrants to use
drones for surveillance except in exigent circumstances. Now the State Senate has
handily passed the legislation with a 25 to 8 vote. If Governor Jerry Brown signs this
law when it crosses his desk, the Golden State will have struck the right balance:
permitting drone surveillance in cases where police obtain an individualized
warrant, while insisting on privacy rights consistent with the original understanding
of the Fourth Amendment, not the diminished version that War on Drugs
jurisprudence has given us. Reuters reports there is opposition to the bill from the
public-employee unions that represent law enforcement, as well as the Los Angeles
District Attorney's office, which calls the law "an inappropriate attempt to impose
search and seizure requirements on California law enforcement agencies beyond
what is required by the 4th Amendment." Without conceding that this law goes
beyond the Fourth Amendment, the district attorney's argument is notably at odds
with the notion that the Bill of Rights was a partial, incomplete articulation of the
minimum rights owed a free people, not an upper bound on protecting liberty.
Privacy-loving residents of other states should urge their legislators to follow suit.

And, in the absence of coherent limitations, federal agencies

have developed fleets of drones groups like the DHS and CBP
are loaning federal drones to local jurisdictions.
Barry, 2013 (Tom, senior policy analyst at Center for International Policy,
Drones Over Homeland, April 23, CIP, Online:
http://www.ciponline.org/research/html/drones-over-the-homeland)

Drones are proliferating at home and abroad. A new high-tech realm is emerging, where
remotely controlled and autonomous unmanned systems do our bidding. Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) commonly known as
drones are already working for us in many ways. This new CIP International Policy Report
reveals how the military-industrial complex and the emergence of the homeland
security apparatus have put border drones at the forefront of the intensifying public
debate about the proper role of drones domestically. Drones Over the Homeland focuses on the
deployment of drones by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is developing
a drone fleet that it projects will be capable of quickly responding to homeland
security threats, national security threats and national emergencies across the
entire nation. In addition, DHS says that its drone fleet is available to assist local
law-enforcement agencies. Due to a surge in U.S. military contracting since 2001, the United States is the
world leader in drone production and deployment. Other nations, especially China, are also rapidly gaining a larger

The United States, however, will remain the

dominant driver in drone manufacturing and deployment for at least another
decade. The central U.S. role in drone proliferation is the direct result of the
Pentagons rapidly increasing expenditures for UAVs. Also fueling drone proliferation is UAV
market share of the international drone market.

procurement by the Department of Homeland Security, by other federal agencies such as NASA, and by local police,
as well as by individuals and corporations. Drones are also proliferating among state-level Air National Guard units.

Despite its lead role in the proliferation of drones, the U.S. government has failed to
take the lead in establishing appropriate regulatory frameworks and oversight
processes. Without this necessary regulatory infrastructure at both the national
and international levels drone proliferation threatens to undermine constitutional
guarantees, civil liberties and international law .

The practice of surveillance is discriminatory. Marginalized

groups are subject to heavy scrutiny
Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies
Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, Totalitarian Paranoia in the
Post-Orwellian Surveillance State, Truthout, February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP]

The practice of surveillance is both separate and unequal. ... Welfare recipients ...
are more vulnerable to surveillance because they are members of a group that is

seen as an appropriate target for intrusive programs. Persistent stereotypes of poor

women, especially women of color, as inherently suspicious, fraudulent, and
wasteful provide ideological support for invasive welfare programs that track their financial
and social behavior. Immigrant communities are more likely to be the site of biometric data
collection than native-born communities because they have less political power to resist it. ... Marginalized people
are subject to some of the most technologically sophisticated and comprehensive forms
of scrutiny and observation in law enforcement, the welfare system, and the low-wage workplace. They also
endure higher levels of direct forms of surveillance, such as stop-and-frisk in New York
City.60 The corporate-surveillance state collects troves of data, but the groups often targeted by traditional and new
forms of digital surveillance are more often than not those who fall within the parameters of either being a threat to authority,
reject the consumer culture or are simply considered disposable under the regime of neoliberal
capitalism. The political, class and racial nature of suppression has a long history in
the United States and cannot be ignored by whitewashing the issue of surveillance as a
form of state violence by making an appeal to the necessity of safety and security.

Racism and biopolitics are co-constitutive, while certain

populations become marked as worthy of preservation, others
become disposable commodities
Mendieta 02-[Eduardo Prof. & Chair of Philosophy at SUNY at Stony Brook To make live and to let die
Foucault on Racism Meeting of the Foucault Circle APA Central Division Meeting Chicago, April 25th2002,
http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/philosophy/people/faculty_pages/docs/foucault.pdf]

The narrative developed by Foucault in these lectures is more fractious and detailed that I am portraying. The canvass that Foucault
is panting in these lectures concerns not just the wars that gave birth to our society, and its novel forms of knowledge, it also
concerns something which I find fascinating, and provocative: the invention of a people. To counter and challenge the power of the
invaders, as well as the power of popes and kings, and using the narratives to unmask their acts of usurpation and tyranny,
elements within a social body begin to appeal to the ideas of a people, which then refers to a race, which then refers to a

the objects of
scientific study are partly constituted by the disciplines that seek to study them. So,
just as psychiatry produces the madman, and sexology the sexual deviant, and so
on, political theory in conjunction with historical discourse, produces a people. But the
discourse of political rationality that emerged since the sixteenth century does not secrete a univocal idea of a people. As the
political rationality of the modern state develops and grows in intensity, as it
augments its claims to power, a people becomes a nation, becomes a population,
becomes a biological phenomenon to be tended by all the sciences at the service of
the state. Analogously to how sexuality became the locus of the production of
control, insofar as it was the pivot of interaction between individuals and their
surrounding social environment, race also became the pivot around which the
biopower state came to exert its claims, so as to be able to produce certain power
effects. What is provocative here is the link that Foucault establishes between the emergence of biopower and the constitution
populations, and then is enshrined in the anodyne notion of society. From a Foucauldian perspective,

of something that we have now become accustomed to calling society, by which we in fact mean a population, a people, a particular
nation. For Foucault the emergence of political rationality is directly linked to the constitution of the object over which it must act.
And here I am able to foreground one of the central lessons of these lectures, namely that political theory has to attend to the
emergence of political rationality in terms not of its rationality, or claims to reason, but in terms of its modalities of operation.
Behind political rationality does not stand reason, or rather, reason is not the alibi of political rationality; instead, political rationality
has to do with the horizon of its enactment. If we accept that Foucault is a historical nominalist, and he is a nominalist through and
through, in the way that Rorty reads him, and correctly I would argue, then there is no reason behind political power. Political power
itself cannot be mystified. There is no power without the horizon of its enactment and the vehicles of its transmission. This is still a
misleading way of putting. The effects produced by a certain way of organizing the social body, of studying it, of policing it, of taking

care of it, of making sure that its health and protection are attended to in the most detailed and careful ways possible, produce a
confrontation of forces, whose momentary stalemates, clashes, subjugations and dispersal, are summarized in the name of power.

The political rationality of the modern state is above all a

rationality grounded in the way it tends to the life of the population . The power of
the biopolitical state is a regulation of life , a tending, a nurturing and management
of the living. The political rationality of the modern total state is management of the
living body of the people. This logic was epitomized in the paroxysm of the Nazi
state, but also in the communist states, withtheir Gulags. I have thus far discussed Foucaults
And that power is the power over life.

triangulation between the discourses of the production of truth, the power that these discourse enact and make available to social
agents, and the constitution of a political rationality that is linked to the invention and creation of its horizon of activity and
surveillance. I want now to focus on the main theme of this courses last lecture. This theme discloses in a unique way the power
and perspicacity of Foucaults method. The theme concerns the kind of power that biopower renders available, or rather, how
biopolitics produces certain power effects by thinking of the living in a novel way. We will approach the theme by way of a contrast :

whereas the power of the sovereign under Medieval and early Modern times was the
power to make die and to let live, the power of the total state, which is the biopower
state, is the power to make live and to let die. Foucault discerned here a telling asymmetry. If the
sovereign exercised his power with the executioners axe, with the perpetual threat of death, then life was abandoned to its devices.
Power was exhibited only on the scaffold, or the guillotine its terror was the shimmer of the unsheathed sword. Power was
ritualistic, ceremonial, theatrical, and to that extent partial, molecular, and calendrical. It was also a power that by its own juridical
logic had to submit to the jostling of rights and claims. In the very performance of its might, the power of the sovereign revealed its
limitation. It is a power that is localized and circumscribed to the theater of its cruelty, and the staging of its pomp. In contrast,
however, the power of the biopower state is over life [expand]. And here Foucault asks how can biopolitics then reclaim the power
over death? or rather, how can it make die in light of the fact that its claim to legitimacy is that it is guarding, nurturing, tending to
life? In so far as biopolitics is the management of life, how does it make die, how does it kill? This is a similar question to the one
that theologians asked about the Christian God. If God is a god of life, the giver of life, how can he put to death, how can he allow
death to descend upon his gift of life why is death a possibility if god is the giver of life? Foucaults answer is that in order to reclaim death, to be able to inflict death on its subjects, its living beings, biopower must make use of racism; more precisely, racism
intervenes here to grant access to death to the biopower state. We must recall that the political rationality of biopower is deployed
over a population, which is understood as a continuum of life. It is this continuum of life that eugenics, social hygiene, civil
engineering, civil medicine, military engineers, doctors and nurses, policeman, and so on, tended to by a careful management of
roads, factories, living quarters, brothels, red-districts, planning and planting of gardens and recreation centers, and the
gerrymandering of populations by means of roads, access to public transformations, placement of schools, and so on.

Biopolitics is the result of the development and maintenance of the hothouse of the
political body, of the body-politic. Society has become the vivarium of the political
rationality, and biopolitics acts on the teeming biomass contained within the
parameters of that structure built up by the institutions of health, education, and
production. This is where racism intervenes, not from without, exogenously, but
from within, constitutively. For the emergence of biopower as the form of a new
form of political rationality, entails the inscription within the very logic of the
modern state the logic of racism. For racism grants, and here I am quoting: the
conditions for the acceptability of putting to death in a society of normalization.
Where there is a society of normalization, where there is a power that is, in all of its
surface and in first instance, and first line, a bio-power, racism is indispensable as a
condition to be able to put to death someone, in order to be able to put to death
others. The homicidal [meurtrire] function of the state, to the degree that the state functions on the modality of bio-power, can
only be assured by racism (Foucault 1997, 227) To use the formulations from his 1982 lecture The Political Technology of
Individuals which incidentally, echo his 1979 Tanner Lectures the power of the state after the 18th century, a power which is
enacted through the police, and is enacted over the population, is a power over living beings, and as such it is a biopolitics. And, to
quote more directly, since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is

Racism, is the
thanatopolitics of the biopolitics of the total state. They are two sides of one same
political technology, one same political rationality: the management of life, the life
of a population, the tending to the continuum of life of a people. And with the
inscription of racism within the state of biopower, the long history of war that Foucault has
been telling in these dazzling lectures has made a new turn: the war of peoples, a war against
invaders, imperials colonizers, which turned into a war of races, to then turn into a
entitled to slaughter it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics. (Foucault 2000, 416).

war of classes, has now turned into the war of a race, a biological unit, against its
polluters and threats. Racism is the means by which bourgeois political power,
biopower, re-kindles the fires of war within civil society. Racism normalizes and
medicalizes war. Racism makes war the permanent condition of society, while at the
same time masking its weapons of death and torture. As I wrote somewhere else, racism
banalizes genocide by making quotidian the lynching of suspect threats to the
health of the social body. Racism makes the killing of the other , of others, an
everyday occurrence by internalizing and normalizing the war of society against its
enemies. To protect society entails we be ready to kill its threats, its foes, and if we
understand society as a unity of life, as a continuum of the living, then these threat
and foes are biological in nature.

Advantage 1: Migrant Rights

Drones are deployed by CBP for surveillance in areas near the
border and deployment is increasing.
Elliot and Brian 14 [Spagat, Elliot, University of San Diego Associated Press
San Diego Skoloff, Brian, University of Tennessee-Knoxville Associated Press
Pheonix, Arizona Drones keep eye on U.S. border; Aircraft's high-resolution
cameras sweep remote areas of the Mexico frontier. 2014.] [MBM]

The U.S. government now patrols nearly half the Mexican border by drones alone in a
largely unheralded shift to control desolate stretches where there are no agents, camera towers,
ground sensors or fences, and it plans to expand the strategy to the Canadian
border. It represents a significant departure from a decades-old approach that emphasized fences and agents.
Since 2000, the number of Border Patrol agents on the 1,954-mile border more than doubled to surpass 18,000, and

Under the new approach, Predator B drones sweep

remote mountains, canyons and rivers with high-resolution video cameras and
return within three days to shoot video in the same spot , two officials with direct
knowledge of the effort said on condition of anonymity because details have not been made public. The
two videos are then compared for analysts who use sophisticated software to identify tiny
changes -- perhaps the tracks of a farmer or cows, perhaps those of immigrants
entering the country or a drug-laden Hummer , they said. About 92% of drone
missions have shown no change in terrain, but the others raised enough questions to
dispatch agents to determine whether someone got away. The agents, who sometimes
arrive by helicopter because an area is so remote, look for any sign of human activity -- footprints,
broken twigs, trash. About 4% of missions have been false alarms , such as tracks of livestock or
farmers, and about 2% are inconclusive. The remaining 2% offer evidence of illegal
crossings from Mexico, which typically results in ground sensors being planted for
closer monitoring. The government has operated about 10,000 drone flights under
the strategy, known internally as Change Detection, since it began in March 2013. The flights
currently cover about 900 miles, much of it in Texas, and are expected to expand to the
Canadian border by the end of 2015. The purpose is to assign agents where illegal activity is highest, said
R. Gil Kerlikowske, commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, the Border Patrol's parent agency,
which operates nine unmanned aircraft across the country . "You have finite resources," he said
fencing multiplied nine times to 700 miles.

in an interview. "If you can look at some very rugged terrain [and] you can see there's not traffic, whether it's tire
tracks or clothing being abandoned or anything else, you want to deploy your resources to where you have a
greater risk, a greater threat." If the video shows the terrain unchanged, Border Patrol Chief Michael Fisher calls it
"proving the negative" -- showing there isn't anything illegal happening there and therefore no need for agents and

is being expanded as President Obama

considers issuing an executive order by the end of this year to reduce deportations and
enhance border security. Rep. Michael McCaul, a Texas Republican who chairs the House Homeland
Security Committee, applauded the approach while saying that surveillance gaps remained. "We can no
longer focus only on static defenses such as fences and fixed [camera] towers,"
[Rep. McCaul] he said. Sen. Bob Corker, a Tennessee Republican who co-wrote legislation last year to add
fences.

The strategy

was launched without fanfare and

20,000 Border Patrol agents and 350 miles of fencing to the Southwest border, said, "If there are better ways of
ensuring the border is secure, I am certainly open to considering those options."

of Sierra Vista, home of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center

Border missions fly out

at Ft. Huachuca, or Corpus Christi,

They patrol at altitudes between 19,000 and 28,000 feet and within 25 to 60
miles of the border. The first step is for Border Patrol sector chiefs to identify areas that are least likely to
Texas.

attract smugglers, typically far from towns and roads. Analysts scour the drone videos at operations centers in

Sierra Vista and Riverside. Privacy advocates have voiced concern

about drones since Customs and Border Protection introduced them in 2006, saying there is
potential to monitor innocent people under no suspicion.
Grand Forks, N.D.,

Drone deployment to detect immigrants has further securitized

the border military leadership, training, and assets have
been drawn into border policing exacerbating border
violence.
Wall and Monahan 11 [Tyler Wall Eastern Kentucky University, USA. Tyler Wall is an Assistant
Professor in the School of Justice Studies as Eastern Kentucky University. He received his Ph.D. in Justice Studies, an
interdisciplinary degree from Arizona State University. He has published his work in academic journals such as
Theoretical Criminology, Social Justice: A Journal of Crime, Conflict, & World Order, Identities: Global Studies in
Culture and Power, and Surveillance & Society, among others. Torin Monahan Vanderbilt University, USA. Torin
Monahan is Associate Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Monahan is an associate editor of the leading academic journal on surveillance, Surveillance & Society.
Surveillance and violence from afar: The politics of drones and liminal security-scapes] [MBM]

UAVs are also being used as technologies of state surveillance and policing and are
deployed in security-scapes other than military combat zones. For instance, in the USA
drones are increasingly being used to police foreign migrants in relationship to its
territorial borderzones, particularly by locating people who are attempting to enter
the country illegally. In addition, as we will detail below, some police depart- ments are now conceiving of
drones as surveillance devices that might prove useful in the routine policing and monitoring of domestic

after President Obama announced in May 2010 that 1200 National Guard
soldiers (Werner and Billeaud, 2010) would be deployed to the already heavily militarized
and surveilled USMexico border (Dunn, 1996; Pallitto and Heyman, 2008), conservative Arizona
Governor Jan Brewer wrote a letter to Obama urging him to send also what she referred to as
aviation assets, specifically military UAVs and helicopters (Lach, 2010). Brewer asserted
that drones have proven effective in US military campaigns over- seas and that they
would therefore assist in securing the US border : I would also ask you, as overseas operations in
territories. Soon

Iraq and Afghanistan permit, to consider wider deployment of UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] along our nations
southern border. I am aware of how effective these assets have become in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom,
and it seems UAVs operations would be ideal for border security and counter-drug missions. (Quoted in Lach,

This appeal for drones at the border obscures the fact that UAVs have already
been providing aerial surveillance over US border regions (Shachtman, 2005; Gilson, 2010).
Since 2006, the USA has spent approximately $100 million for UAVs on both the
southern and northern US borders as part of its efforts to create a so-called virtual fence
(Canwest News Service, 2007). As of 2010 the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was operating
six unarmed Predator drones for overhead surveillance missions along the US
Mexico border, five of which were based in Brewers state of Arizona (Gilson, 2010). Since late
2007 or early 2008, the CBP has been testing drones in US/ Canada border regions
(Canwest News Service, 2007). CBP officials credit their drones with helping bust 15,000 lbs
2010)

of pot and 4,000 illegal immigrants (Gilson, 2010). In the words of a defense executive:
It is quite easy to envision a future in which (UAVs), unaffected by pilot fatigue, provide 247
border and port surveillance to protect against terrorist intrusion ... Other examples
[of possible uses] are limited only by our imagination (McCullagh, 2006). Clearly, drones
have been enlisted in efforts to restrict illegal immigration and combat the war on
drugs. The notion of drug drones has become fashionable in international drug enforcement,
especially for use in maritime operations (Padgett, 2009). For instance, under the name Monitoreo, which is
Spanish for monitoring, the US Southern Command recently conducted a drone testing project that mobilized an
Israeli-made $6.5 million Heron drone from El Salvadors Comalapa Air Base to track down suspected drug cartel
members who were allegedly using the open waters to smuggle drugs into the USA (Padgett, 2009; see also
Shachtman, 2009). By remaining thousands of feet in the air for up to 20-hours while being equipped with a set of
sensors better suited for spotting the subs [mini-submarines] that have become so popular among narco-cartels
(Shachtman, 2009), this particular Heron drone promises to be a longer endurance technology than conventional

If
battlefield drones like the Predator can scan and bomb Taliban targets in the
mountains of Afghanistan, the logic goes, a similar drone like the Heron should be
able to find the go fast boats and submarines used by drug cartels in the waters of
this hemisphere. UAVs are also currently flying in the skies over some cities in both
the USA and United Kingdom. As reported in 2006, one North Carolina county is using a UAV equipped with lowplanes commonly used in drug surveillance. As Time magazine journalist Tim Padgett (2009) writes,

light and infrared cameras to keep watch on its citizens. The aircraft has been dispatched to monitor gatherings of
motorcycle riders at the Gaston County fairgrounds from just a few hundred feet in the airclose enough to identify
facesand many more uses, such as the aerial detection of marijuana fields, are planned. (McCullagh, 2006) In
2007, the Houston Police Department in Texas controversially tested the use of unarmed surveillance drones, with
the eventual objective of monitoring traffic, aiding evacuations during natural disasters, helping with search and
rescue operations, and assisting with other tactical police incidents (Dean, 2007). The Executive Assistant Police
Chief admitted that UAVs over the skies of Houston could include covert police actions and that the police force

a
confidential document revealed that the Las Vegas Police Department may have
been using UAVs above the city of Las Vegas as early as 2007 (Public Intelligence, 2010). The
document further outlines a plan for UAVs to help monitor special events and discusses
ways in which the Las Vegas UAVs are integrated into Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) fusion centers to assist with the investigation of suspicious activity
reports (Public Intelligence, 2010). As noted in other work on the militarization of cities, the
application of drone technologies to urban areas promises to extend the
surveillance networks within which people are caught (Murakami Wood, 2007) and
intensify the policing of cultural difference and political dissent that have historically
marked cities as vibrant, democratic spaces (Graham, 2010). Within the current political and
was not ruling out someday using the drones for writ- ing traffic tickets (Dean, 2007). In another example,

cultural milieu, this particular movement of mili- tary technology to civilian spheres reveals a symbiotic relationship
between the war on crime and war on terror. Jonathan Simon (2007: 11) persuasively argues that in some respects
the war on terror is an unacknowledged continuation of the war on crime, sharing with it similar discourses and

When the rationalities and technologies of the war on terror are

applied to other domains and other perceived threats, there is a heightened danger
that existing legal protections and rights will be vitiated in the process , thereby
ratcheting up cultures of control that already disproportionately harm marginalized
populations (Wacquant, 2009). For instance, DHS fusion centers may have originated as
organizations to share data on terrorist threats, but they have since been linked to
spying on non-violent anti- war protesters, environmentalists, students at
historically black colleges, and others (Monahan, 2011). In contemporary cultures of
control, all populations may be called upon or be responsibilizedto manage risk in highly
individualized ways and through increasingly privatized means (Rose, 1999), but this in no way
indicates a diminished role for the state, or state-corporate apparatuses, in
extending discipline and control into domestic territories (Garland, 2001; Monahan, 2010).
institutional arrangements.

The use of drones in non-combat settings may symbolically transform those sites to
arenas of agonistic engagement and further militarize domestic police departments
and government agencies to the detriment of individual liberties and the public
good.

IMPACT 1: Border securitization intensifies the effects of

structural violence experienced by migrants.
Chvez 12 [Karma R. Chvez, associate professor of rhetoric, politics and culture
at University of Wisconsin-Madison. Ph.D. Arizona State University, 2007. M.A.
University of Alabama, 2003. M.A. University of Alabama, 2002. Border
Interventions: The need to Shift from a Rhetoric of Security to a Rhetoric of
Militarization, 2012] [MBM]

Border Militarization in the broadest sense, militarization refers to the use of military rhetoric and
ideology, as well as military tactics, strategy, technology, equipment, and forces
(Dunn, Militarization of the US Mexico Border 3). More specifically, militarization suggests the intermingling
between police and military forces, so much so that police engage in military
functions and the military engages in police activity. As Timothy J. Dunn argues, one of the
most significant sites of border militarization is the US-Mexico border, as the US
Customs and Border Patrol has increasingly teamed up with US military forces in order to
deter drug trafficking for the past three decades. As a consequence of this relationship, and because the border is also
the stage for concerns over undocumented migration, both migration and drug trafficking have become
central to the development and implementation of militarization policies and
practices. The intentional development of such policies is more than three decades in the making, beginning with the earliest
implementation during the end of US President Carters administration. for example, events such as the Mariel boatlift in 1980,
which landed tens of thousands of Cuban refugees in the United States, provoked alarmist calls for stricter immigration policies.

as immigration gained salience as a social, political, and economic

issue in the United States, the INS budget and staff also increased (Dunn, Militarization of the
US Mexico Border 35). The INS made equipment and technology enhancements, increasing
its enforcement capacities, which were designed to ameliorate concerns over national
security that emerged particularly following Mariel. While Carter set the ground for increased
militarization, President Reagans administration was most responsible for rolling
out the immense infrastructure that would lead to the most drastic border
militarization. As Reagan came into office in the United States, the US approach to the US-Mexico border took
the characteristic of low-intensity conflict doctrine (L i C). Though this approach typically refers to
how the US military managed counter- insurgencies internationally, especially in Central America, it also refers to the
supposedly low level of military involvement (with significant effects) designed for
maintaining social control over targeted civilian populations domestically on the
US-Mexico border (Dunn, Militarization of the US Mexico Border 35). In other words, the militarization of the
US-Mexico border was designed to be relatively minor in the sense that the goal was not to have an overwhelming
military- like presence, but rather one that was visible and tactical enough to suggest control . Spending for
the in S, and especially the Border Patrol, grew tremendously as the number of staff increased 90 percent
and funding 149 percent (Dunn, Militarization of the US Mexico Border 49). Moreover, the Reagan administration
established detention as an appropriate punishment for non-Mexican undocumented migrants
(Mexicans could simply be sent back) and for political asylum seekers. Thus, more detention facilities were
Dunn explains that

established, and as is consistent with L i C doctrine, many nongovernmental organizations housing

resources were used for detention (Dunn, Militarization of the US Mexico Border 59). In addition to this growth,
the Border Patrol also incorporated increased high-tech equipment ranging from M-1
4 and M-16 military rifles to extensive sensor and night-vision systems, television
surveillance, and airborne infrared radar, to name a few of the new technologies . By
the time George H. W. Bush was elected president, the INSs realm of control had greatly
expanded, and most congressional allocations for spending were aimed at the Enforcement Division. The so-called War on
Drugs was in full swing by this time, and it functioned as a convenient excuse to
exacerbate enforcement measures on the US- Mexico border , while also leading to a close
association between drug trafficker and illegal alien among immigration officials
(Dunn, Militarization of the US Mexico Border 87). Additionally, the increased emphasis on targeting
criminal aliens, those immigrants who had committed crimes other than
overstaying visas or making a clandestine crossing into the United States (actions which
are misdemeanors), further linked immigration and crime. Moreover, the reach of this category
was of ten unclear as immigrants who hadnt committed other crimes were
regularly detained alongside so-called criminal aliens at the growing number of
detention facilities in the United States. Under the first Bush administration, reports
emerged of systemic human rights abuses at the hands of Border Patrol agents. The in
S also waged its largest immigration enforcement crackdown since the infamously
named operation Wetback in 1954 in the Lower Rio Grande v al ley in south Texas .
The in Ss strategy, as outlined in a 1989 internal document titled Enhancement Plan for the Southern Border, included: (1)
rigorous enforcement of immigration laws and detention for those who violated laws; (2) quick and thorough processing of asylum
claims; and (3) a media campaign that would work to create pub l ic understanding and acceptance of the difference between
claims [for po l iti cal asylum] ma de from a third country and those made after entry [into the United States] without inspection

The INSs crackdown not only

resulted in human rights violations within the United States (and in parts of Mexico and Central
America due to related information-seeking missions), but also demonstrated the in Ss ability to
engage in carefully targeted militarization tactics without disrupting usual business,
traffic, and life for most local residents in the area. The entrenchment of
militarization policies and practices undoubtedly existed during the first Bush
administration; however, the detrimental impacts on human lives would take a worse
turn during President Clintons administration and in the wake of the north American free Trade
( in S Report 2 as cited in Dunn, Militarization of the US M exico Border 92).

Agreements passage. NAFTA advocated free trade and open foreign investment at the same time that it more or less promoted
closed borders for the movement of people (Johnson, free Trade and Closed Borders). The creation of NAFTA was an impetus to
restrictionist attitudes and anti-migrant legislation on the state and federal levels (Johnson, An Essay on immigration 122). f o r
example, the 1993 in S campaign operation Blockade/Hold the Line sought to deter undocumented migration in El Paso, and the
1994 in S campaign operation Gatekeeper aimed to curb migration from Tijuana to San Diego, both of which represented the
highest traffic areas for undocumented crossings. These federal initiatives were bookends to Californias 1994 ballot initiative,
Proposition 187 (Save our State). At its most basic level, according to the summary prepared by the attorney general, Proposition
187 makes illegal aliens ineligible for public social services, public health care services (unless emergency under federal law), and
public school education (cited in o no and Sloop 169). Ultimately, Proposition 187 was deemed unconstitutional, despite passing
with 59 percent voter approval. Both the overwhelming support and the extensive campaign surrounding the initiative paved a
pathway for additional anti-migrant initiatives and legislative efforts through out the United States. Operation Gatekeeper came on
the tide of the Proposition 187 campaign, and could have even been viewed as a federal response to the proposition ( n e vins 92).

Clintons immigration positions were constantly under conservative fire, and Gatekeeper
functioned to restore integrity of the San Diego- Tijuana border by enforcing the
border more stringently ( n e vins 3). Gatekeeper was a part of a broader four-stage
Southwest Border Strategy that sought to funnel migration out of metropolitan
areas and into desolate areas like the Arizona desert as a means of deterring
crossers, and in fact, in 2001, a General Accounting office report suggested that
shifting traffic was the primary effect of the strategy (Stana and Rezmovic). The rationale for what the
University of Arizona Binational Migration institute describes as the funnel effect was that both the
deaths that would undoubtedly occur as well as the danger posed by the desert

would be enough to prevent people from making the clandestine journey (Arnoldo Garca;
Rubio- Go ldsmith et al.). 2 Though many earlier militarization strategies overtly suggested that the primary goal of militarization
was to enable successes in the War on Drugs, the Southwest Border Strategy expressly states its focus as deterring illegal aliens
(Stana and Rezmovic 1). This focus led to the Border Patrols budget being around $1.2 billion in 2001 and, of the 9,096 Border

The
funnel effect, which pushed crossings to the most desolate and dangerous parts of
the Arizona desert, also led immigration officials to suggest a need for increased
military-like technology in order to find and apprehend border crossers (Rubio- Goldsmith et
Patrol agents in the United States at that time, 93 percent of them being located in sectors on the Southwest border (5).

al.). As of May 2001, around 76 miles of border fence were erected as part of the strategy (Stana and Rezmovic 8). Though the

US Customs and Border Protection suggest that

nearly two decades of border militarization strategies are leading to more security
on US borders and ports of entry, the human consequences of such strategies are
astronomical. The impacts of militarization are most devastating for border crossers.
Department of Homeland Security and, more specifically,

In a 2009 report sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union and Mexicos national Commission of Human Rights, Mara Jimenez

Compiling
data from Mexicos Secretariat of Foreign Relations, the US General Accounting
office, the US Department of Homeland Security Border Safety initiative, and
various news sources, Jimenez reports 23 deaths in 1994, 358 deaths in 1999, and
827 in 2007 (Jimenez 17). 4 On average, between 356 and 529 migrant remains are
recovered each year along the Southwest border. Meanwhile, apprehension rates
have hovered between 723,840 and 1,643,679, with the two lowest years for
apprehensions (2007 and 2008) correlating with the two highest years for remain
recovered. Moreover, as Dunn shows, even as it became clearer that militarization policies and
practices were as much, if not more, about immigration as they were about drug
trafficking, prevention of drugs was used as a rationale for increasingly bringing
members of the military to the Southwest border. In 1989, the military created Joint
Task force- 6 ( JT f- 6), a military operation designed to help patrol the border and collect information for the Border Patrol,
largely to prevent drug activity. Because of the intermixing of drug trafficking and immigration ,
the actions of JT f- 6 pose a serious dilemma for human rights on the border, which
evidences the grave consequences of militarization. Dunn explains that while police forces
such as the Border Patrol are tasked with caring about human and civil rights
though their failures are well documented (see f alcn)military forces are tasked with
diffusing potential hostile situations at virtually any cost. When JT f- 6 soldiers and
marines do the job of the Border Patrol, interacting with civilian populations and
having little training in the Border Patrols operating procedures, the consequences
can be dire (Dunn, Border Militarization). Dunn illustrates this situation through examining the
case of the Redford shooting, in which a marine shot an eighteen- y ear- old US
citizen, Esequiel Hernandez, who was tending his goats and carried a single-shot .22
caliber rifle with him to ward off animal predators. Though one might describe the
Hernandez murder as an isolated incident, it suggests that militarization practices
have been detrimental for citizens and migrants alike.
calculates the numbers of deaths and apprehensions along the Southwest border from fiscal year 1994 to 2008. 3

IMPACT 2: The Drone Stare dehumanizes marginalized

populations and justifies structural violence by distancing
drone operators from the consequences of their actions

Wall and Monahan 11 [Tyler Wall Eastern Kentucky University, USA. Tyler Wall is an Assistant
Professor in the School of Justice Studies as Eastern Kentucky University. He received his Ph.D. in Justice Studies, an
interdisciplinary degree from Arizona State University. He has published his work in academic journals such as
Theoretical Criminology, Social Justice: A Journal of Crime, Conflict, & World Order, Identities: Global Studies in
Culture and Power, and Surveillance & Society, among others. Torin Monahan Vanderbilt University, USA. Torin
Monahan is Associate Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Monahan is an associate editor of the leading academic journal on surveillance, Surveillance & Society.
Surveillance and violence from afar: The politics of drones and liminal security-scapes] [MBM]

The technological mediation vital to what we call the drone stare is most often
framed by advocates of UAV systems as an unproblematic ability to see the truth of
a particular situation (see Rattansi, 2010) or to achieve a totalizing view of the object
under cosmic control. In the words of Robins and Levidow (1995: 121): Enemy threatsreal or
imaginary, human or machinebecame precise grid locations, abstracted from their
human context. To the extent that this description is accurate, it would appear to
hold true for the use of drones in combat as well as non-combat settings. Journalist
Noah Shachtman (2005), who observed drone operators monitoring the USMexico
border, betrays through his description the dehumanizing tendency of dronemediated perceptions: Everyone looks like germs, like ants, from the Hunters
15,000- foot point of view. Especially when the ant hill breaks apart, and everybody
scatters in a dozen different directions. But this particular articulation makes no
distinction between illegal immigrants, political refugees, or Mexican-American
citizens. In this sense, the drone system radically homogenizes these identities into a
single cluster of racialized information that is used for remote-controlled processes
of control and harm. Bodies below become things to track, monitor, apprehend, and
kill, while the pilot and other allies on the network remain differentiated and
proximate, at least culturally if not physically. In the case of the use of military drones for
precision killing, the practical action of firing a Hellfire missile is translated and transformed by the informational
system into a computerized checklist of things to do. As one journalist writes concerning US Air Force drones,
Now, pilots say, it takes up to 17 stepsincluding entering data into a pull-down windowto fire a missile (Drew,
2009). In this respect, as Kevin Haggerty (2006) has pointed out, the speed and mobility of informatized warfare is
perforce slowed by attendant complex systems of control, which is a generalizable finding that presents an
important caution against overdetermined conclusions about inevitable increases in the velocity of war

nonetheless
propagates a dehumanizing abstraction when living human beings are rendered into
mere spatial or tactical coordinates. As Avital Ronell (1992: 75) puts it: the cyborg soldier, located in
command and control systems, exercises on the fields of denial. Killing transpires not only at a
distance but through the routine, banal computerized procedure of typing and
clicking. UAV systems, according to one military drone operator, are pretty simple to operate but, the
technologies. But this step-by-step process of entering data into a computer system

challenge is taking all the information available and fusing it into something thats usable and then practicing and
exercising the constraint or the lethal power to either preserve life or to prosecute an attack. And that is where the
challenge really is, honing that warrior spirit knowing when to say when. (Rattansi, 2010) But as we have

this knowing when to say when is not a decision that is made in a vacuum but is
rather a sovereign act shaped by social and political norms, which are encoded in
both the institutional practices and technological systems of drone warfare. The
state killing enacted by UAV systems exists in a discursive and symbolic context
where a steadfast belief in precision technology helps justify the techno-scientific
violence of the West (Shaw, 2005). Central to common representations of virtuous warfare, and especially
aerial warfare, is the idea that the USA is technologically superior to other countries in its
discussed,

war capabilities, particularly because of its reliance on smart bombs and precision-guided missiles that

in turn, brings about an

expectation that militaries should go to great lengths to use their violence in
discriminatory ways that target combatants while avoiding civilians (Beier, 2003).
Militaries in technologically advanced countries such as the US embrace this rhetoric to assert that
they have the capacity to conduct war in more legal and moral ways than less
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets (Der Derian, 2001). This,

technologically advanced countries (Beier, 2003). Of course, claims to technological sophistication are always
relative ones that can invite hubris on the part of those parties presuming superiority. This was revealed when it
was discovered in 2009 that Iraqi insurgents had accessed unencrypted video footage from US Predator drones
(Gorman et al., 2009). This example, while embarrassing for US military officials, illustrates a paradox in the
construction of the enemy other. Insurgents were apparently presumed too backward and unsophisticated to tap
unen- crypted signals broadcasted by the USA. By intercepting these signals with apparent ease using $26 off-theshelf software (Gorman et al., 2009) and storing the feeds on laptop computers, the enemy effectively elevated its
own symbolic legitimacy as civilized peo- ples, in large part because in the West technological achievement and
ability are often equated with civilization (Adas, 1989). The enemy moreover demonstrated its agency and its

People who are aware of adversarial

monitoring from the skies also engage in tactics to evade the drone stare.
Specifically, subjects of drone surveillance have tried to be stealthier and
camouflage themselves better than they have in the past. In the North Waziristan region of
refusal to become a legible and docile object for western control.

Pakistan where drone surveillance and violence has been heavily concentrated, the standard ways in which
militants have traditionally traveled, slept, and communicated has been significantly altered by the aerial gaze of
UAVs, according to some local sources (Perlez and Shah, 2010). Combatants have allegedly abandoned sat- ellite
phones and large gatherings in favor of communicating by courier and moving stealthily in small groups while also
establishing hide-outs in mountainside tunnels and relying more on civilian-looking transportation as opposed to
all-terrain vehicles (Perlez and Shah, 2010).

In addition, if past ruses of camouflage and spatial

deception employed by undocumented immigrants along US border regions are
good indicators, undocumented migrants seeking entrance to the USA will find new
ways of subverting and disappearing from the gaze of UAVs (Corchado, 2003).

Advantage 2: Biopolitics
Widespread use of drones colonizes civilian space every
aspect of civilian life will be policed at all times, bringing us to
the brink of absolute state power over violence.
Neocleous 13 [Mark Neocleous, PhD Philosophy, MSc Politics and Sociology,
BSc Philosophy and Sociology Department of Politics and History, Brunel University,
Uxbridge UB8 3PH, England. Air power as police power, 2013. Environment and
Planning D: Society and Space 2013, volume 31, pages 578 593] [MBM][AM]

to turn back to my argument concerning air power, what we find is that a form of
technology which has been understood too readily and too easily in military terms
is better understood through the lens of police power. This is not war becoming
police and neither is it the idea that war is being reduced to police (as though war is
somehow something bigger, better, more substantial than police). Neither is it a small wars affair. My
argument is that, understood in terms of the fabrication of order, this particular
technology has always needed to be understood through a warpolice nexus. In what
Thus,

remains of this paper I would like to try and strengthen this argument by using it to try and make sense of perhaps

the fundamental issue in contemporary air power: drones . Conversely, I would like to
use the contemporary development of drone technology to help restate my
argument. Victory through air power As is well known, the air power used in the war on terror has increasingly
been operated through drone technology. The US Department of Defenses UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle)
inventory grew from 167 in 2002 to 7000 in 2010 (Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, 2011, pages 2 and 75). Between 2001 and 2008 the hours of surveillance coverage for US Central
Command encompassing Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen rose by 1431% as a result of the developing drone
technology; in 2010 the US Air Force projected that the combined flight hours of all its drones would exceed 250000
hours, exceeding in one year the total number of hours from 1995 to 2007 (Turse and Engelhardt, 2012, page 37),
while in the UK the Reaper UAV reached a landmark figure of 20 000 flying hours in 2011 (Ministry of Defence,
2011). At the same time, news about drones is now constant, as more and more states (now around fifty) operate

Drones also occupy a key space in debates about the new virtuous warat
the heart of virtuous war is the technical capability and ethical imperative to
threaten and, if necessary, actualize violence from a distance ... with no or minimal
them.

casualties (Der Derian, 2001, page xv, emphasis in the original)and, as a consequence, so too does anger about
them among activists and critical thinkers. One feature of this anger seems to be that the drones are unmanned,
and thus a new step in the technology of military distancing or risk-transfer warfare. This claim has been made so
frequently that a complete list of references would be pointless, so let Eric Hobsbawms more general point stand in
here: one of the features of the age of extremes, notes Hobsbawm, is the new impersonality of warfare, which
turned killing and maiming into the remote consequence of pushing a button or moving a lever. Technology made
its victims invisible, as people eviscerated by bayonets, or seen through the sights of firearms, could not be. One
of Hobsbawms main examples is, unsurprisingly, air power: Far below the aerial bombers were not people about to
be burned an eviscerated, but targets ... the greatest cruelties of our century have been the impersonal cruelties of
remote decision (1994, page 50). The impersonal cruelty of remote killing and unmanned technology seems to be
the essence of one aspect of the criticism of drones: bombings and assassinations by a piece of equipment far
removed from any human operator. From a critical perspective, this seems a rather naive thing to be angry about,
either in terms of the conflicts of world history or in terms of technological possibility, since maximising lethality
while reducing the risk to a states own combatants is inherent to the logic of all military technological advance.

The other major concern people have about drones is that they now patrol the skies
not just in the lands of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan but of the whole planet, and not just in war
zones but in civilian areas. Thus one finds that they now fly over cities engaged in
police operations, from managing emergencies caused by natural disasters to

spying on foreign drug cartels, fighting crime, conducting border control operations,
and general surveillance (Wall and Monahan, 2011, page 240). In the US, following a 2003
decision by the Federal Aviation Authority to grant license to UAVs to fly over
American civilian airspace, more and more American states now work with drones,
and a Congressional Research Service report noted in 2010 that recent UAV
modification is part of an ongoing push by some policymakers and CBP [Customs
and Border Protection] to both expand CBPs UAV resources and open domestic
airspace for UAV operations (Haddal and Gertler, 2010, page 1). In the UK a number of police forces
have trialled the use of drones, over 120 companies have been given blanket permission to fly small drones within
the UK for surveillance purposes, and the UK ASTRAEA programme aims to enable the routine use of UAS
[Unmanned Aircraft Systems] in all classes of airspace without the need for restrictive or specialised conditions of

Hence the criticism, which runs: this is

technology designed for war and it is being used to police civilians; it is another step
in the militarisation of policing. My argument, however, is that air power has
always been police power. On this basis we need to read the drone not as a new
form of military technology that is somehow being allowed to sneak into civilian
spaces but, rather, as a continuation of the police logic inherent in air power since
its inception. Despite the publicity surrounding them the vast majority of drones are not
sophisticated bombing or killing machines but are in fact small and unarmed models
used primarily for battlefield surveillance. Of the 10499 missions flown by Predator and Reaper
operation (ASTRAEA, 2012; also Cole, 2012, page 26).

drones over Iraq and Afghanistan during 2007 and 2008, missiles were fired on only 244 missions (Turse and
Engelhardt, 2012, page 149; Wall and Monahan, 2011, page 242). Their key feature is that they are disposable, a
feature highlighted by the smaller and smaller UAVs, dropped from aircraft, fired into the air by hand, catapult, or
slingshot (Blackmore, 2005, pages 130131; Singer, 2009, pages 116120). This disposability is a reflection of

their main function which is not to bomb or assassinate but to gatherthat is, to construct
knowledge. This explains the surveillance-oriented names for almost all the different drones
Global Hawk, Dragon Eye, Desert Hawk, Gorgon Stare (after the creature in Greek mythology whose main
power resided in the eye), Watchkeeperand goes some way to also explaining why they are spoken
of by the state less as killing machines and more in terms of a range of other abilities,
such as recognizing and categorizing humans and human-made objects, identifying
movements, interpreting footprints, and distinguishing different kinds of tracks on the earths surface. Moreover,

from the wider historical perspective of air

power there are no civilian areas and there are no civilians; the only logic is a police
logic. As soon as air power was created the issue was: what does this do to civilian
space? And, essentially, the answer has been: it destroys it. Air power thus likewise
and more pressingly, we need to understand that

destroys the concept of the civilian. This was the major theme of the air power literature of the 1920s, found in the
work of Mitchell, Seversky, Fuller, and all the others, but the analysis provided in The Command of the Air by Giulio
Douhet, first published in 1921, expanded in 1927, and perhaps the first definitive account of the influence of air
power on world history, is representative: the art of aerial warfare, notes Douhet, is the art of destroying cities, of
attacking civilians, of terrorising the population. In the future, war will be waged essentially against the unarmed

There are no longer soldiers and citizens, or

combatants and noncombatants: war is no longer a clash between armies, but is a
clash between nations, between whole populations. Aerial bombing means war is
now total war (Douhet, 2003, pages 11; 158; 223). The major powers fought against accepting this for some
populations of the cities and great industrial centres.

time. (Or at least, fought against accepting it in their classic doctrine of war as a battle between militarily
industrialised nation-states; the police bombing of colonies was entirely acceptable to them, as we have seen). But
eventually, in the course of World War 2 they conceded, and by July 1945 a US Army assessment of strategic air
power could openly state that there are no civilians in Japan (cited in Sherry, 1987, page 311). This view has been
maintained ever since: There are no innocent civilians, says US General Curtis LeMay
(cited in Sherry, 1987, page 287). Recent air power literature on the enemy as a system continues this very line.
(4) Hence, and contrary to claims made at both ends of the political spectrum that the recent air attacks in Beirut
and Gaza reveal the increasing meaninglessness of the word civilian (Dershowitz, 2006) or mean that we might
be witnessing ... the death of the idea of the civilian (Gregory, 2006, page 633), it has to be said that any

meaningful concept of the civilian was destroyed with the very invention of air power (Hartigan, 1982, page 119).

The point is that seen from the perspective of air power as police power, the use
of drone technology over what some would still like to call civilian spaces was
highly predictable. This allows us to make a far more compelling argument about drones. For like air
power technology in general, the drone serves as both plane and possibility (Pandya,
2010, page 143). And what becomes possible with the drone is permanent police
presence across the territory. Unmanned aircraft have just revolutionized our ability
to provide a constant stare against our enemy, said a senior US military official.
Using the all-seeing eye, you will find out who is important in a network, where
they live, where they get their support from, where their friends are (cited in Barnes,
2009). Much as this might be important geopolitically, with drones being capable of maintaining
nonstop surveillance of vast swathes of land and sea for so long as the technology and fuel supplies allow,
it is also nothing less than the states dream of a perpetual police presence across the
territory (Neocleous, 2000). And it is a police presence encapsulated by the process of
colonisation, captured in the army document StrikeStar 2025 which speaks of the
permanent presence of UAVs in the sky as a form of air occupation (Carmichael et al,
1996, page viii). Drones have been described as the perfect technology for democratic
warfare, combining as they do a certain utilitarian character with an appealing risktransfer (Sauer and Schoring, 2012), but perhaps we need to think of them equally as the
perfect technology of liberal police. When in 1943 Disney sought to popularise the idea of victory
(5)

through air power, the company probably had little idea just quite what this victory might mean, beyond the defeat

if there is a victory through air power to be had on the part of the state it
is surely not merely the defeat of a military enemy but the victory of perpetual
police.
of Japan. But

IMPACT 1: Pedagogybreaking through censorship and

repression is key to curtailing the neoliberal ideology that
causes oppression
Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies
Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, Totalitarian Paranoia in the
Post-Orwellian Surveillance State, Truthout, February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP] edited for ablest language

Some of the most dreadful consequences of neoliberal modernity and cultures of

surveillance include the elimination of those public spheres capable of educating
the public to hold power accountable, and the dissolution of all social bonds that
entail a sense of responsibility toward others. In this instance, politics has not only
become dysfunctional and corrupt in the face of massive inequalities in wealth and
power, it also has been emptied of any substantive meaning. Government not only
has fallen into the hands of the elite and right-wing extremists, it has embraced a
mode of lawlessness evident in forms of foreign and domestic terrorism that
undercuts the obligations of citizenship, justice and morality . As surveillance and
fear become a constant condition of American society, there is a growing
indifference, if not distaste, for politics among large segments of the population. This
distaste is purposely manufactured by the ongoing operations of political repression
against intellectuals, artists, nonviolent protesters and journalists on the left and right.
Increasingly, as such populations engage in dissent and the free flow of ideas, whether online or offline, they

are considered dangerous to the state and become subject to the mechanizations of
a massive security apparatuses designed to monitor, control and punish dissenting
populations. For instance, in England, the new head of MI5, the British intelligence service, mimicking the US government's
distrust of journalists, stated that the stories The Guardian published about Snowden's revelations "were a gift to terrorists,"
reinforcing the notion that whistle-blowers and journalists might be considered terrorists.42 Similar comments about Snowden have
been made in the United States by members of Congress who have labeled Snowden a traitor, including Sens. Dianne Feinstein, a
California Democrat; John McCain, an Arizona Republican; Saxby Chambliss, a Georgia Republican; and House Speaker John Boehner,
as well as former Vice President Dick Cheney.43 Greenwald, one of the first journalists to divulge Snowden's revelations about the
NSA's secret "unaccountable system of pervasive surveillance"44 has been accused by Rep. Peter King of New York along with
others of being a terrorist.45 More ominously, "Snowden told German TV ... about reports that U.S. government officials want to
assassinate him for leaking secret documents about the NSA's collection of telephone records and emails."46 As the line collapses

state and corporate repression intensifies and

increasingly engulfs the nation in a toxic climate of fear and self-censorship in which
free speech, if not critical thought, itself is viewed as too dangerous in which to engage.
The NSA, alone, has become what Scott Shane has called an "electronic omnivore of staggering
between authoritarian power and democratic governance,

capabilities, eavesdropping and hacking its way around the world to strip governments and other targets of their secrets, all while
enforcing the utmost secrecy about its own operations. It spies routinely on friends as well as foes."47 Intelligence benefits are far
outweighed by the illegal use of the Internet, telecommunication companies and stealth malware for data collection and government
interventions that erode civil liberties and target individuals and groups that pose no threat whatsoever to national security. New
technologies that range from webcams and spycams to biometrics and Internet drilling reinforce not only the fear of being watched,
monitored and investigated but also a propensity toward confessing one's intimate thoughts and sharing the most personal of
information. What is profoundly disturbing and worth repeating in this case is the new intimacy between digital technologies and
cultures of surveillance in which there exists a profound an unseen intimate connection into the most personal and private areas as

Surveillance
becomes the order of the day, eradicating free expression
and, to some degree, even thinking itself. In the age of the self-absorbed self and its mirror image, the selfie, intimacy
subjects publish and document their interests, identities, hopes and fears online in massive quantities.48
propped up as the new face of intimacy

becomes its opposite and the exit from privacy becomes symptomatic of a society that gave up on the social and historical memory.

One of the most serious conditions that enable the expansion of the corporate-state
surveillance apparatus is the erasure of public memory. The renowned anthropologist David Price
rightly argues that historical memory is one of the primary weapons to be used against the
abuse of power and that is why "those who have power create a 'desert of
organized forgetting.' "49 For Price, it is crucial to reclaim America's battered public memories as a political and
pedagogical task as part of the broader struggle to regain lost privacy and civil liberties."50 Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11,

America has succumbed to a form of historical amnesia fed by a culture of fear,

militarization and precarity. Relegated to the dustbin of organized forgetting were
the long-standing abuses carried out by America's intelligence agencies and the
public's long-standing distrust of the FBI, government wiretaps and police actions
that threatened privacy rights, civil liberties and those freedoms fundamental to a
democracy. In the present historical moment, it is almost impossible to imagine that wiretapping was once denounced by the
FBI or that legislation was passed in the early part of the 20th century that criminalized and outlawed the federal use of wiretaps.51

illegal
surveillance and disruption campaigns carried out by the FBI and local police forces,
most of which were aimed at anti-war demonstrators, the leaders of the civil rights
movement and the Black Panthers. And while laws implementing judicial oversight for federal wiretaps were put
Nor has much been written about the Church and Pike committees, which in the 1970s exposed a wave of

in place, they were systematically dismantled under the Reagan, Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations. As Price points out,
while there was a steady increase in federal wiretaps throughout the 1980s and 1990s, "in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the

As the historical
memory of such abuses disappeared, repressive legislation such as the USA
PATRIOT Act and growing support for a panoptical surveillance and "homeland" security state
increased to the point of dissolving the line between private and public , on the one hand, and
American public hastily abandoned a century of fairly consistent opposition to govern wiretaps."52

tilting the balance between security and civil liberties largely in favor of a culture of fear and its underside, a managed emphasis on

The violence of organized forgetting has another

component besides the prevalence of a culture of fear and hyper-nationalism that
emerged after 9/11. Since the 1980s, the culture of neoliberalism with its emphasis on the self,
privatization and consumerism largely has functioned to disparage any notion of the public good ,
a one-dimensional notion of safety and security.

social responsibility and collective action, if not politics itself. Historical memories of
collective struggles against government and corporate abuses have been deposited
down the memory hole, leaving largely unquestioned the growing inequalities in
wealth and income, along with the increased militarization and financialization of
American society. Even the history of authoritarian movements appears to have been forgotten as right-wing extremists in
North Carolina, Wisconsin, Maine, Florida and other states attempt to suppress long-established voting rights, use big money to
sway elections, destroy public and higher education as a public good, and substitute emotion and hatred for reasoned arguments.53

Manufactured ignorance spreads through the dominant cultural apparatuses like a

wildfire promoting the financialization of everything as a virtue and ethics as a
liability. The flight from historical memory has been buttressed by a retreat into a
politics of self-help and a culture of self-blame in which all problems are viewed as
"evidence of personal shortcomings that, if left uncorrected, hold individuals back from attaining stability and
security."54 Within the crippling [devastating] "affective and ideological spaces of
neoliberalism," memory recedes, social responsibility erodes, and individual outrage
and collective resistance are [silenced] muted.55 Under such circumstances, public
issues collapse into private troubles and the language of the politics is emptied so
that it becomes impossible to connect the ravages that bear down on individuals to
broader systemic, structural and social considerations. Under such circumstances, historical
memory offers no buffer to the proliferation of a kind of mad violence and paranoid culture of
media-induced fear that turns every public space into a war zone . Consequently, it is not surprising
that the American public barely blinks in the face of a growing surveillance state. Nor is it surprising that intellectuals such as Sean
Wilentz can claim that "the lack of fealty to the imperatives of the surveillance community as demonstrated by Edward Snowden,
Glenn Greenwald, and Julian Assange is an assault on the modern liberal state itself."56 Indeed, what the new apologists for the
surveillance state refuse to recognize is a history of abuse and criminal behavior by US intelligence apparatuses that were less
concerned with implementing the law, arresting criminals and preventing terrorist acts than they were in suppressing dissent and
punishing those groups marginalized by race and class. In a moving account of the use of surveillance by Pinochet under the
Chilean dictatorship, Ariel Dorfman argues that surveillance not only was linked "to a legacy of broken bodies and twisted minds, the
lingering aftermath of executions and torture" but also to an assault on the imagination itself, which under Pinochet's reign of terror
lived in fear that no word, gesture, comment would be "immune from surveillance."57 What is to be learned from this period of
history in which surveillance became central to a machinery of torture and death? Dorfman answers the question with great clarity
and insight, one that should serve as a warning to those so willing to sacrifice civil liberties to security. He writes: Who was to
guarantee that someday, someone might not activate a network like this one all over again? Someday? Someone? Why not right
then and there, in democratic, supposedly post-atrocity Santiago in 2006? Were not similar links and nexuses and connections and
eyes and ears doing the same job, eavesdropping, collecting data and voices and knowledge for a day when the men in the shadows
might be asked once again to act drastically and lethally?And why only in Santiago? What about America today, where, compared to
the data-crunching clout of the NSA and other dis-intelligence agencies, Pinochet's [surveillance state] looks puny and outdated like a samurai sword noticed by an airman above, about to drop a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima? What about elsewhere on this planet,
where democratic governments far and wide systematically spy on their own citizens? Aren't we all in harm's way?58 America is not
simply in harm's way, it stands at the end of precipice about to fall into what Hannah Arendt once called "dark times." As memory
recedes so does political consciousness, particularly the danger that the surveillance state has posed to poor and working-class
Americans who have been monitored for years and as Virginia Eubanks points out "already live in the surveillance future."59 She
writes: The practice of surveillance is both separate and unequal. ... Welfare recipients ... are more vulnerable to surveillance
because they are members of a group that is seen as an appropriate target for intrusive programs. Persistent stereotypes of poor
women, especially women of color, as inherently suspicious, fraudulent, and wasteful provide ideological support for invasive
welfare programs that track their financial and social behavior. Immigrant communities are more likely to be the site of biometric
data collection than native-born communities because they have less political power to resist it. ... Marginalized people are subject
to some of the most technologically sophisticated and comprehensive forms of scrutiny and observation in law enforcement, the
welfare system, and the low-wage workplace. They also endure higher levels of direct forms of surveillance, such as stop-and-frisk in
New York City.60 The corporate-surveillance state collects troves of data, but the groups often targeted by traditional and new forms
of digital surveillance are more often than not those who fall within the parameters of either being a threat to authority, reject the
consumer culture or are simply considered disposable under the regime of neoliberal capitalism. The political, class and racial nature
of suppression has a long history in the United States and cannot be ignored by whitewashing the issue of surveillance as a form of
state violence by making an appeal to the necessity of safety and security. Totalitarian paranoia runs deep in American society, and
it now inhabits the highest levels of government.61 There is no excuse for intellectuals or any other member of the American public
to address the existence, meaning and purpose of the surveillance-security state without placing it in the historical structure of the
times. Or what might be called a historical conjuncture in which the legacy of totalitarianism is once again reasserting itself in new

Historical memory is about more than recovering the past ; it is also about
imputing history with a sense of responsibility , treating it with respect rather than
with reverence. Historical memory should always be insurgent, rubbing "taken-forgranted history against the grain so as to revitalize and rearticulate what one sees
as desirable and necessary for an open, just and life sustaining" democracy and
forms.

future.62 Historical memory is a crucial battleground for challenging a corporatesurveillance state that is motivated by the anti-democratic legal, economic and
political interests. But if memory is to function as a witness to injustice and the practice of criticism and renewal, it
must embrace the pedagogical task of connecting the historical, personal and
social. It is worth repeating that C.W. Mills was right in arguing that those without power need to connect
personal troubles with public issues and that is as much an educational endeavour
and responsibility as it is a political and cultural task.63

The point of no return is the normalization of surveillance- an

affirmative ballot is key to acknowledge the problems inherent
in surveillance cultures and check back the tide of
neoliberalism
Giroux 14

Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural
Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, Totalitarian Paranoia
in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State, Truthout, February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state

The point of no return in the emergence of the corporate-state surveillance apparatus is not strictly
confined to the task of archiving immense pools of data collection to be used in a number of
illegal ways.18 It is in creating a culture in which surveillance becomes trivialized,
celebrated, and legitimated as reasonable and unquestioned behavior. Evidence that diverse forms
of public pedagogy are sanctioning the security state is on full display in postOrwellian America, obvious in schools that demand that students wear radio chips
so they can be tracked.19 Such anti-democratic projects are now also funded by billionaires like Bill Gates who push for
the use of biometric bracelets to monitor students' attentiveness in classrooms.20 The normalization of
surveillance is also evident in the actions of giant Internet providers who use social
messaging to pry personal information from their users. The reach of the surveillance culture can also be seen
in the use of radio chips and GPS technologies used to track a person's movements across time and space. At the same time,

cultures of surveillance work hard to trivialize the importance of a massive

surveillance environment by transforming it into a source of entertainment. This is
evident in the popularity of realty TV shows such as "Big Brother" or "Undercover Boss," which turn the event of constant

The atrophy of democratic intuitions of culture and

governance are evident in popular representations that undermine the meaning of
democracy as a collective ethos that unconditionally stands for social, economic, and political rights.22 One
surveillance into a voyeuristic pleasure.21

example can be found in Hollywood films that glorify hackers such as those in the Matrix trilogy, or movies that celebrate
professionalized modern spying and the government agents using their omniscient technological gizmos to fight terrorists and other

What is lost in the culture of surveillance is that spying and the

unwarranted collection of personal information from people who have not broken the law in the name of
national security and for commercial purposes is a procedure often adopted by totalitarian
states. The surveillance state with its immense data mining capabilities represents a historical rupture from traditional notions of
forces of evil.

modernity with its emphasis on enlightenment, reason, and the social contract. The older modernity held up the ideals of justice,
equality, freedom, and democracy, however flawed. The investment in public goods was seen as central to a social contract that
implied that all citizens should have access to those provisions, resources, institutions, and benefits that expanded their sense of

The new modernity and its expanding surveillance net

subordinates human needs, public goods, and justice to the demands of commerce
and the accumulation of capital, at all costs. The contemporary citizen is primarily a consumer and
agency and social responsibility.

entrepreneur wedded to the belief that the most desirable features of human behavior are rooted in a "basic tendency towards

Modernity is
now driven by the imperatives of a savage neoliberal political and economic system
competitive, acquisitive and uniquely self-interested behavior which is the central fact of human social life."23

that embrace what Charles Derber and June Sekera call a "public goods deficit" in which "budgetary priorities" are relentlessly

pushed so as to hollow out the welfare state and drastically reduce social provisions as part of a larger neoliberal counter revolution

Debates about
the meaning and purpose of the public and social good have been co-opted by a
politics of fear, relegating notions of the civic good, public sphere, and even the very word "public" to the status of a liability,
to lower the taxes of the rich and mega-corporations while selling off public good to private interests.24

if not a pathology.25 Fear has lost its social connotations and no longer references fear of social deprivations such as poverty,

Fear is now personalized,

reduced to an atomized fear that revolves around crime, safety, apocalypse, and
survival. In this instance, as the late Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith once warned, modernity now
privileges "a disgraceful combination of 'private opulence and public squalor.' " 26 This
homelessness, lack of health care, and other fundamental conditions of agency.

is not surprising given the basic elements of neoliberal policy, which as Jeremy Gilbert indicates, include the: privatization of public
assets, contraction and centralization of democratic institutions, deregulation of labor markets, reductions in progressive taxation,
restrictions on labor organization, labor market deregulation, active encouragement of competitive and entrepreneurial modes of

Under the regime of neoliberal capitalism, the

expansion of government and corporate surveillance measures become
synonymous with new forms of governance and an intensification of material and
symbolic violence.28 Rather than wage a war on terrorists, the neoliberal security state wages a
war on dissent in the interest of consolidating class power. How else to explain the merging of
corporate and state surveillance systems updated with the most sophisticated
shared technologies used in the last few years to engage in illicit counterintelligence operations, participate in
industrial espionage29 and disrupt and attack pro-democracy movements such as Occupy and a
range of other nonviolent social movements protesting a myriad of state and
corporate injustices.30 This type of illegal spying in the interest of stealing industrial secrets and closing down dissent by
relation across the public and commercial sectors.27

peaceful protesters has less to do with national security than it has to do with mimicking the abuses and tactics used by the Stasi in
East Germany during the Cold War. How else to explain why many law-abiding citizens "and those with dissenting views within the

Public outrage
seems to disappear, with few exceptions, as the state and its corporate allies do little to
protect privacy rights, civil liberties and a culture of critical exchange and dissent.
Even worse, they shut down a culture of questioning and engage in forms of domestic
terrorism. State violence in this case becomes the preferred antidote to the demanding
work of reflection, analysis, dialogue and imagining the points of views of others.
The war against dissent waged by secret counterintelligence agencies is a mode of
domestic terrorism in which, as David Graeber has argued, violence is "often the preferred
weapon of the stupid."32 Modernity in this instance has been updated, wired and
militarized. No longer content to play out its historical role of a modernized
panopticon, it has become militarized and a multilayered source of insecurity,
entertainment and commerce. In addition, this new stage of modernity is driven not
only by the need to watch but also the will to punish. Phone calls, emails, social networks and almost
law can be singled out for surveillance and placed on wide-ranging watch lists relating to terrorism."31

every other vestige of electronic communication are now being collected and stored by corporate and government organizations
such as the NSA and numerous other intelligence agencies. Snowden's exposure of the massive reach of the surveillance state with
its biosensors, scanners, face recognition technologies, miniature drones, high speed computers, massive data mining capabilities
and other stealth technologies made visible "the stark realities of disappearing privacy and diminishing liberties."33 But the NSA
and the other 16 intelligence agencies are not the only threat to privacy, freedom and democracy. Corporations now have their own
intelligence agencies and data mining offices and use these agencies and new surveillance technologies largely to spy on those who
question the abuses of corporate power. The emergence of fusion centers exemplifies how power is now a mix of corporate, local,
federal and global intelligence agencies, all sharing information that can be used by various agencies to stifle dissent and punish
pro-democracy activists. What is clear is that this combination of gathering and sharing information often results in a lethal mix of
anti-democratic practices in which surveillance now extends not only to potential terrorists but to all law-abiding citizens. Within

this sinister web of secrecy, suspicion, state-sanctioned violence and illegality, the
culture of authoritarianism thrives and poses a dangerous threat to democratic freedoms and rights. It also
poses a threat to those outside the U nited States who, in the name of national security,
are subject to "a grand international campaign with drones and special operations
forces that is generating potential terrorists at every step." 34 Behind this veil of

concentrated power and secrecy lies not only a threat to privacy rights but the very
real threat of violence on both a domestic and global level.

IMPACT 2: Self-Regulation and the crushing of activism leads to

totalitarian government
ONeill 14-Joint Programme Director - Contextual Studies @ the University of Wales [Timi, Michel Foucault predicts the NSA's
cyber Panopticon, Pg. 7-9, DKP]

The first thing we should highlight in our attempt to see the actions of the NSA through the eyes of Foucault should be look at the
work of Jeremy Bentham and his Panopticon prison. This will help us later transfigure this physical prison into something much more
ethereal and cyber; i.e. the Internet. The utilitarian Jeremy Bentham (17481832) created plans to develop a circular prison that
would act as a fairer and more just way of incarcerating prisoners. He was also at the forefront of creating a system whereby
punishment would lead to individuals within society actively altering their behaviour in order to avoid punishment and
imprisonment. In this thought, he developed plans for his

Panopticon prison (Fig.1 below). Although he tried to have

were designed to

prisons such as these built in both Great Britain and Russian, none were erected in the UK. These prisons

maximise surveillance of prisoners and would led, he argued to make prison control safer, more effective,
more humane, and efficient by increasing discipline while reducing staff resources required to maintain it. Prisoners in the
panopticon would work rather than sitting idle, and, in the process, would not only learn the benefits of discipline but also make a

How does this help us understand the current issue of the NSA,
PRISM and the Internet? This requires us to look at the architecture of the Internet. Now granted, the internet does not
profit for the prison itself.

have a centre as envisioned in Benthams prison, but it does have ISPs and companies who monitor (albeit they say loosely)

What we saw with the actions of the NSA could be

seen as the prison guards making us aware of the power of surveillance and their
ability to watch and direct our behaviour; i.e. our patterns and content of our internet searches and
telephone calls. Unlike, Benthams aims however, the effects of such surveillance do little to promote
a fairer society; instead it breeds distrust, paranoia and panic. This could be seen as far as the
internet traffic and management of metadata.

Kremlin where President Putin has issued warnings of the power and function of the Internet, However Moscow has recently
changed its tune, with Mr Putin branding the internet an ongoing "CIA project". 30 This is mirrored in the writings of Foucault where
he argued that the Panopticon, or in our case the internet was used as a way to change peoples behaviour, the

major
effect of the Panopticon [is to] to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. 31 This makes us see
how through observation, the body and mind of the individual is constantly under
interrogation. We need only see how users of facebook curtail their behaviour and body image through the eyes of others.
This impacts on the bio-political aspects of surveillance, but also and perhaps more importantly
it impacts on the way we use the Internet to seek questions to issues that perhaps runs the risk of establishing the
dominant vision of society. This link to power is at the heart of the relevancy of Foucault and the actions of the NSA;
In his famous Discipline and Punish , Foucault argues that we live in a world where the state
exercises power in the same fashion as the Panopticons guards. Foucault called it
disciplinary power; the basic idea is that the omnipresent fear of being watched by the state or judged according to
prevailing social norms caused people to adjust the way they acted and even thought without ever actually punished. People
had become self-regulating agents, people who voluntarily changed who they
were to fit social and political expectations without any need for actual coercion. 32 In
this way, we could argue that the NSA wanted to be seen as being caught out so that the
panic of observation or surveillance would produce a radical movement towards
self-regulating and docile bodies a situation that would in many ways suit the
needs and demands of an elite and their exercise in control , When one undertakes to correct a
prisoner, someone who has been sentenced, one tries to correct the person according to the risk of relapse, of recidivism, that is to
say according to what will very soon be called dangerousness that is to say, again, a mechanism of security. 33 In this way, we
could see that Foucault warns us to see the controversy as one where that the historically determined subject/self is the real victim
in the cyber attacks. By attempting to mould individuals through surveillance and self-regulation, it is possible that we are in the

middle of a needed reset of individuals in a new age. This is supported, perhaps in the following un-sourced quotation from a
George Bush jnr political aide;

We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own

reality.

And while you're studying that reality - judiciously, as you will - we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you
can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors, and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do. 34
In a previous quotation, the use of the word security is one overplayed by western politicians. Whether it be the chemical weapons

Foucaults idea of
surveillance help us see the NSA as prison guards watching over a yet undisciplined
populace. This is indeed a scary thought and one that should be seen within the dynamics of a battle for the control of power
of Assad or the actions of ISIS, the national security card is played regularly. In this sense,

within society. The West prides itself on freedoms and ideas of enlightened thinking, but also politicians know that with such

Sovereignty is exercised
within the borders of a territory, discipline is exercised on the bodies of individuals,
and security is exercised over a whole population. 35 Security here is quite easily be replaced by the
adjective power. When power is exercised over the population, we find ourselves in a
position of seeing the state in many ways as a hidden fascist elite, hell-bent on
controlling the mind, bodies and actions of an enslaved prison populace. one of the
freedoms comes a potential crisis in control, legitimacy and in many ways, sovereignty;

characteristic traits of our society. Its a type of power that is applied to individuals in the form of continuous individual supervision,

in the form of control, punishment, and compensation, and in the form of correction,
that is the moulding and transformation of individuals in terms of certain norms. 3

The impact is the normalization of militant surveillance that

perpetuates totalitarian violence
Giroux 14
Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies
Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, Totalitarian Paranoia in the
Post-Orwellian Surveillance State, Truthout, February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP]

The revelations of whistle-blowers such as Chelsea Manning, Jeremy Hammond and Edward Snowden about government
lawlessness and corporate spying provide a new meaning if not a revitalized urgency and relevance to
George Orwell's dystopian fable 1984. Orwell offered his readers an image of the modern state that had become dystopian - one in which
privacy as a civil virtue and a crucial right was no longer valued as a measure of the robust strength of a healthy and thriving democracy. Orwell
was clear that the right to privacy had come under egregious assault. But the

right to privacy pointed to something more

sinister than the violation of individual rights. When ruthlessly transgressed, the issue of privacy became
a moral and political principle by which to assess the nature, power and severity of an emerging
totalitarian state. As important as Orwell's warning was in shedding light on the horrors of mid-20th century totalitarianism and the endless
regimes of state spying imposed on citizens, the text serves as a brilliant but limited metaphor for mapping the
expansive trajectory of global surveillance and authoritarianism now characteristic of the first decades of
the new millennium. As Marjorie Cohn has indicated, "Orwell never could have imagined that the National Security
Agency (NSA) would amass metadata on billions of our phone calls and 200 million of our text messages every day. Orwell could not have
foreseen that our government would read the content of our emails, file transfers, and live chats from the social media we use."1

IMPACT 3: Structural Violence- Constant targeting of people of

color creates double consciousness where people of color
must self-identify as criminals in order to maintain the dream
of citizenship
Deflem 8-prof of sociology @ University of South Carolina [Mathieu, Citizenship, hyper-surveillance, doubleconsciousness: racial profiling as panoptic governance, Surveillance and Governance: Crime Control and Beyond,
2008, pp. 254-255, aps] ***Modified for gendered language

Any examination of surveillance and governance concerns in a racial state such as the
United States must include the contemporary phenomenon of racial profiling. This chapter examines how the
personal experiences of people of color in racialized encounters with law
enforcement go well beyond the local, micro-level association focused on in the
current racial profiling literature. My respondents clearly reflect on these encounters
as racializing and criminalizing experiences with the state that are experienced as watershed
moments in their lives. The overarching theme that emerges from their narratives is one of a break from citizenship
and the liberty and justice rights frame that encompasses it. In other examinations of how race operates in the criminal justice

Western (2006, p. 193), in his

examination of the role and effects of status differentials in regard to incarceration, views the effects of race and
socioeconomic status as an evolutionary aspect of African-American citizenship
because of the retrenchment of citizenship that results from disenfranchisement
resulting from incarceration (of which racial profiling is a potential precursor to). Yet, as shown by the active and
frequent engagement of the justice and liberty rights frame that many of my respondents engage, my respondents
continue to make claim to the citizenship realm and resist denial of full citizenship
by the racial state. Writing in the late 1800s, DuBois (1986, p. 364) described this same struggle to
reconcile the warring ideals of minority identity and citizen identity imposed by
the racial state with the self-identified sense of being a full citizen. In this regard, the current
study finds that for people of color, the racialized traffic stop is deeply contextualized
within a well-developed base of knowledge about how race operates in the United
States. This goes to the DuBoisian perspective that people of color possess insight into the inner workings of the social world
they know the souls of white folks to a greater extent than Whites understand the
experiences of people of color. My respondents indicate that they assess their encounters with the state by
system, this process is referred to as an attenuation of citizenship (Pettit & Western, 2004).

comparing similarly-situated conditions with Whites or through a process of elimination that racial status is the motivating factor in
their being stopped, among other things. Indeed, many, though not all, respondents articulated initial reluctance to view a
traffic stop (and the criminal justice system generally) as raced, having adopted and believed in much of the liberty and justice

This classic construction of living

in both worlds is very much a part of the contemporary experience of people of
color. Strides that have been made in the years following DuBoiss 1897 treatise may have dulled the demarcation of citizenship
frame that orients our national, and specifically criminal justice, discourse.

that existed in DuBoiss day, but those strides remain outweighed by the restricted substance of citizenship for communities of

As Foucault argues, surveillance as a tool of governance by the state is a form of

disciplinary power that is: exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it
imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is the
subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It is the fact
of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the
disciplined individual in his[their] subjection. And the examination is the technique
by which power, instead of emitting the signs of its potency, instead of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them
in a mechanism of objectification. (Foucault, 1977, p. 187) Foucaults conception of
panopticonism, as argued earlier, is an appropriate backdrop for contextualizing racialized
color.

traffic stops and the more general idea of the criminalization of communities of
color. The obvious connection concerns the foundation of racial profiling processes: the omnipresent eye of the
state on communities of color, especially young minority males. The Panopticon
effect, as discussed, also includes a permanent change in the individual under its effects to
where views of the state (as embodied by the panoptic processes) become
alienated from previously neutral or even positive standpoints. The racial surveillance and governance
that manifests in racial profiling practices complicates the notion that surveillance as a tool of the state
is primarily about crime control. These processes are fundamentally about racialized social control that exploit societys emphasis on

in order to maintain racial ordering spatially, ideologically,

and politically. Ultimately, while my respondents acknowledge that racial governance via
panoptic surveillance processes limits full citizenship, they still engage the promise
of citizenship by self-identifying as such and resisting the criminal identity imposed
upon them by the state.
particularly forms of behavior

Thus, the plan:

The United States Federal Government will substantially curtail
its domestic surveillance by instituting the requirement that
law enforcement agencies obtain search warrants prior to the
operation of drones in surveillance activities.

Solvency
Comprehensive warrant requirements are key to prevent drone
abuse
ACLU 2015 (American Civil Liberties Union, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/domestic-drones)

U.S. law enforcement is greatly expanding its use of surveillance drones, and
private actors are also seeking to use the technology for personal and commercial
use. Drones have many beneficial uses, including in search-and-rescue missions,
scientific research, mapping, and more. But deployed without proper regulation,
drones equipped with facial recognition software, infrared technology, and speakers
capable of monitoring personal conversations would cause unprecedented invasions
of our privacy rights. Interconnected drones could enable mass tracking of vehicles
and people in wide areas. Tiny drones could go completely unnoticed while peering
into the window of a home or place of worship. Surveillance drones have been the
subject of fierce debate among both legislators and the public, giving rise to an
impressive amount of state legislationproposed and enactedto protect
individuals privacy. Uniform rules should be enacted to ensure that we can enjoy
the benefits of this new technology without bringing us closer to a surveillance
society in which our every move is monitored, tracked, recorded, and scrutinized
by the government. The ACLU recommends the following safeguards: Usage
Limits: A drone should be deployed by law enforcement only with a warrant, in an
emergency, or when there are specific and articulable grounds to believe that the
drone will collect evidence relating to a specific criminal act . Data Retention:
Images should be retained only when there is reasonable suspicion that they
contain evidence of a crime or are relevant to an ongoing investigation or trial.
Policy: Usage policy on drones should be decided by the publics representatives,
not by police departments, and the policies should be clear, written, and open to
the public. Abuse Prevention and Accountability : Use of domestic drones should be
subject to open audits and proper oversight to prevent misuse. Weapons:
Domestic drones should not be equipped with lethal or non-lethal weapons.

And, warrants are key to check militarization of domestic

space accountability guarantees transparency & limits the
scope of acceptable drone operations.
Bauer, 2013 (Max, JD @ Boston College Attorney at White & Associates,
Domestic Drone Surveillance Usage: Threats and Opportunities for Regulation,
ACLU Briefing Paper, Online: https://privacysos.org/domestic_drones)

History shows that our response to threats to our physical safety mustn't involve
programs or policies that diminish our core rights. Two centuries ago, during a time of great
national insecurity, the War of 1812, the Constitutions primary author, President James Madison, took virtually no

With the rise of

domestic drones as a cherry on top of an already sprawling surveillance state,
America is headed in the opposite direction . But there is time yet to ensure the
technology doesn't trample all over our rights. If mass drone surveillance is
inescapable, warrant and data collection reporting requirements will provide a
critical check against government abuses. Justice Brandeis has written, Publicity is justly
commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman . [57] Domestic
drones can monitor individuals almost constantly; its therefore essential to have
sunlight shine upon their operators, to monitor their actions. The publicity
necessary to hold their operations accountable to the public requires transparency
and accountability. [58] Drone usage will continue to expand and may not stop even at infrared
steps to diminish civil liberties. Madison's approach did not lead to the nations demise. [56]

camera surveillance and biometric data acquisition. The Guardians Glenn Greenwald has cautioned that

although domestic drones may currently be limited to those outfitted only with
surveillance equipment, given the increasing militarization of domestic law
enforcement, the time may come soon when domestic drones are weaponized . [59]
But even short of that futuristic nightmare, drone surveillance already poses a new
threat to liberty at home. As our Fourth Amendment search protection diminishes
with the progress of technology, [60] legislative initiatives and public outcry may be
the only way to protect the right to privacy in the age of domestic drones.

And, changes in surveillance policy must be grounded in antimilitarist knowledge production its impossible to change
these material conditions without an appreciation for how
militarism structures policymaking and other realities.
Chvez 12 [Karma R. Chvez, associate professor of rhetoric, politics and culture
at University of Wisconsin-Madison. Ph.D. Arizona State University, 2007. M.A.
University of Alabama, 2003. M.A. University of Alabama, 2002. Border
Interventions: The need to Shift from a Rhetoric of Security to a Rhetoric of
Militarization, 2012] [MBM]

Scholars of rhetoric and performance have opened important terrains in the study of immigration and borders
pertaining to subjects such as citizenship, media representation, and migrant identity (Cisneros, (Re)Bordering the
Civic imaginary; DeChaine, Bordering the Civic i maginary; McKinnon; o no and Sloop; Shi). Though a number of

scholars in other academic disciplines within the humanities and social sciences have written about
border militarization (e.g., Andreas, Redrawing the Line; Dunn, Militarization of the US Mexico Border;
nevins), in reviewing rhetoric and communication scholarship pertaining to immigration and borders, with the
exception of a few passing mentions (Demo, Afterimage and Sovereignty Discourse; Carrillo Rowe;
DeChaine, Bordering the Civic imaginary; o no and Sloop), an engagement with the rhetoric of
border militarization is virtually nonexistent. instead, in postSeptember 11, 2001, US
America, where the dominant border rhetorics emerge from the so- called War on Terror,
discourses of border security and national security are the parlance of the day

for rhetoric scholars (e.g., Dunmire, 9/11 Changed Everything and Preempting the future; Gales; i vie; i
vie and Giner; Mirrlees; o no; Rojecki; Ross). Though many of these analyses offer rigorous critiques of
the way security discourses manifest and perpetuate troubling imaginaries of safety and privacy, the
problem with the emphasis scholars place on analyses of the rhetoric of security is that it
enables state apparatuses and conservative ideology to dictate the framing of
discussion and debate. Ono and Sloop argue that discourses construct borders, and i would
extend this to say that discourse constitutes the way immigration , generally, is
understood. If scholars use the states conservative ideographs their ideological building
blocksto talk about matters of public interest (McGee, ideograph), conservative
ideology continues to frame the broader debate in peoples minds. This in turn
suggests that the public may be more willing to support problematic state
policy and action, for no other terms exist by which to understand
important issues. The issue of framing is especially dire in relation to the US- Mexico
border, which has, in the eyes of many politicians, pundits, and citizens alike become the greatest source for
insecurity in the national imaginary. The discourse of national security intertwines with the
War on Terror, the threat of drug smuggling, and the invasion of illegal aliens so
that militarization of regions of the US- Mexico border seems natural and warranted in
order to protect citizens f rom these supposed threats. Moreover, as scholars increasingly note,
everyday militarization aptly describes the ways in which ordinary people accept
the beliefs of militarism and militarization in such a way that upholds state military and
militarization policy (Bernazzoli and f lint). Caren Kaplan quips in an essay on how the popularity of
technology like Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) can lead to militarized consumers and citizens:
for most people in the United States, war is almost always everywhere (693). feminist scholars such
as Cynthia Enloe have long called attention to the way that militarization seeps into ordinary lives as
a regular part of public discourse (Enloe, Does Khaki Become You?, Globalization and Militarism,
Maneuvers ). Because military discourse pervades the everyday, its further expansion in myriad
forms proves for many to be commonplace instead of worrisome. Importantly, militarization of the USMexico border has not occurred in response to the War on Terror; instead, it has been in
the US governments plan at least since the Reagan administration, and has
virtually nothing to do with the events of September 11, 2001 (Dunn, Militarization of the US
Mexico Border ). As one example, the immigration and naturalization Services ( in Ss) four- phase Southwest
Border Strategy, implemented post- NAFTA in 1994, strategically planned to militarize the US- Mexico border in
order to allegedly deter clandestine crossings (Stana and Rezmovic). The events of

September 11, 2001,

provided a convenient rationale to heighten these strategies, which had been in motion for decades;
yet, a context of everyday militarization coupled with the rhetoric of security has
obfuscated an urgent need to focus on the devastation of border militarization on
border crossers and communities specifically, and privacy and civil liberties more generally. Gordon Mitchell
suggests that rhetoric scholars who study social movements should also enable movement with their work. This

the need for border rhetoric scholars to turn the discourse of security
toward a discourse of militarization in the hopes of making a civic intervention into the
broader national debate. If more people understood how militarization works and the careful way
that the rhetoric of security disguises its material impacts , it is likely that the US
government would be forced to be more accountable to its people, and rhetoric scholars
chapter will demonstrate

should lead this charge. I begin this argument by first defining militarization and briefly tracing the increase in
border militarization, specifically on the US-Mexico border since the mid- to late 1 980s. Next, I outline the severity
of the consequences such militarization has had for border communities and border crossers, and what this means
for residents of the United States more broadly. I then argue why the language of militarization is so crucial through
a brief analysis of Secure Border Initiative Monthly, or SBI Monthly, produced by the Secure Border initiative (SB i )
Program Management o ff ice (PM o ) and designed to provide news and information on the SB i and the nowdefunct SB i net, two major programs of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to augment border security.

migration and terrorism are

conflated, similarly to how undocumented migration and drug trafficking were
conflated decades ago, as a justification for increased militarization.
These newsletters evidence the ease with which undocumented