G.R. No.

201443
April 10, 2013
PEOPLE vs BETTY SALVADOR
DECISION
REYES, J.:
- Appeal from the Decision of CA affirming RTC convicting Betty Salvador, et al. for having conspired in kidnapping
Albert Yam y Lee (Albert) for the purpose of extorting ransom. The RTC and the CA, however, acquitted accusedappellants of kidnapping a certain Pinky Gonzales (Pinky), who, from the account of some of the prosecution
witnesses, was likewise taken with Albert during the same abduction incident.
- In the evening, in the vicinity of the Cainta Cockpit Arena, Cainta, kidnapped and took away Pinky and Albert
against their will, forced to board a Toyota Hi-Ace van, brought to an undisclosed location in Caloocan City where
she was kept for six (6) days; During the trial, the prosecution witnesses, with their corresponding testimonies,
were:
(a) Albert, married to Evangeline Lim-Yam (Evangeline), holds a Marketing degree from De La Salle University. He
also took some units under the Ateneo de Manila Universitys Masters in Business Administration program. He is
engaged in printing and financing business. He is also a breeder of fighting cocks and race horses. On February
2002, he took over, with a partner, the operations of the New Cainta Coliseum (Coliseum), a cockpit arena.
Albert testified6 that the lens grade of his eye glasses is 275. With eye glasses on, his vision is normal. Without the
glasses, he can clearly see objects one to two meters away from him, but beyond that, his vision becomes blurry. 7
On April 7, 2002, at around 7:30 p.m., Albert rode his Toyota Prado (Prado) with Plate No. UTJ-112 and drove out of
the Coliseums parking lot. Ahead was a white Honda Civic car (Civic), while behind was a Toyota Hi-Ace van (HiAce). Upon reaching Imelda Avenue, the Hi-Ace overtook the Civic. Albert was about to follow suit, but the Hi-Ace
suddenly stopped and blocked the Civic. Six men with long firearms alighted from the Hi-Ace. Jubert and Morey
approached the Civic, which was just about two to two and a half meters away from Albert, 8 pointed their guns at
the driver, who turned out to be Pinky, 9 and motioned for her to step out of the car and ride the Hi-Ace. Two men
ran after the "watch-your-car" boy in a nearby parking lot, but Albert no longer noticed if the two still returned to
the Hi-Ace.10 Roger and Robert came near the Prado and gestured for Albert to likewise alight from the vehicle and
ride the Hi-Ace.
When Albert rode the Hi-Ace, he saw Marcelo in the drivers seat and beside him was Ricky. Morey was behind the
driver. So too were Jubert. Roger and Robert rode the Hi-Ace after Albert did.
Albert and Pinky were handcuffed together and made to wear dark sunglasses. The men took Alberts wallet
containing PhP 9,000.00, his drivers license and other documents. They also took his Patek Philippe watch which
costs PhP 400,000.00.
While inside the Hi-Ace, Albert and Pinky were ordered to duck their heads. Notwithstanding the position, Albert
saw the lights emanating from the blue eagle figure at the Ateneo gym. He also heard one of the men telling the
driver to pass by Balara. After around 20 minutes, Albert also noticed having passed by the vicinity of SM Fairview.
They arrived in their destination 10 to 15 minutes after and were handcuffed separately. Albert and Pinky stayed
in the house and were fed food mostly bought from Jollibee until they were rescued on April 12, 2002.
Albert described the house as "half constructed". 11 They were made to stay in the basement around three and a
half by four meters in size, with a stairway, small sofa, bed, table and four chairs. Behind the table was a sink and
a comfort room. There was a large window about three by five feet in size, but it was covered with a blanket and a
plastic sack. Albert identified Monico as the person who was beside him, pulling him up when he fell while
descending the basement stairs.12 Albert claimed that he was still handcuffed then and was made to wear dark
eye glasses. The kidnappers allowed him to remove the dark eye glasses when he laid down in bed on the first
night of their detention.13 On April 8, 2002, his own eye glasses were returned to him upon his request. 14
Albert told the men that he was the only person they should talk to if they wanted ransom money. The men
inquired how much he can give. Albert replied that he can shell out PhP 500,000.00. The men asked for Alberts
phone and pin number to be able to call the latters wife. He was ordered to write a letter to his wife informing her
that he was abducted and indicating therein the names of persons from whom she could borrow money to be paid
to the accused-appellants as ransom. Albert also claimed that he got to talk, through the telephone, to the
person, whom the accused-appellants seemed to consider as their boss. The boss demanded USD 1,000,000.00
for Alberts release. One of the persons posted as guards in the safehouse threatened Albert that the latter would
be killed unless ransom money be paid by Friday, April 12, 2002. 15
Albert had seen Jose a few times in the Coliseum. Albert also recalled that immediately prior to his abduction, Jose
accompanied him to his Prado and had asked for "balato". 16 Albert identified Jose as the "tipster" who acted as a
look-out during the abduction incident. 17 Albert likewise stated that he had seen Ricky in the Coliseum on April 7,
2002 and on several other instances as the latter worked as a "kristo" or bet taker. 18 Albert recognized Marcelo as
a bettor.
Albert identified Betty as the person who brought them food and who, in one occasion, had inquired from the
guard how Albert and Pinky were faring in the basement.19
On April 11, 2002, at around 6:00 a.m., 20 seven persons came down to the basement to threaten Albert and
Pinky.21 Albert later identified them as Jubert and Morey, 22 Marcelo, Ricky, Lowhen and Jose, 23 and Nelson Ocampo
y Ruiz @ Joselito Estigoy24 (Nelson). Thereafter, the men left behind Nelson and Lowhen to remain as guards, who
took their posts in the stairway.25 At around lunch time, Betty gave food to one of the guards, who in turn handed

the same to Albert and Pinky. Albert was then sitting in the sofa, which was just a little over a meter away from
the stairway.26
Albert remembered having stayed in the basement until the early hours of April 12, 2002. On that day, he heard
the ferocious barking of a dog, footsteps in the second floor, and then a gun shot. Albert and Pinky stayed inside
the comfort room until a uniformed man brought them out. One person, who acted as among those guarding
Albert and Pinky while they were detained, was killed in the rescue operations. He was subsequently identified as
Nelson. Another guard left in the evening of April 10, 2002 and he never went back. 27 Albert did not see Betty and
Monico in the premises of the safehouse on the day the rescue operations were conducted by the police. He only
saw the couple in Camp Crame around 5:00 p.m. while the former was making a statement. 28
Albert and Pinky were brought to Camp Crame between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. of April 12, 2002. Some time
after lunch, a police line-up with about 15 men was presented. 29 Albert identified seven persons, to wit, Marcelo,
Ricky, Jubert, Morey, Jose, Robert and Roger, as among his abductors. At that time, he was not yet able to pinpoint
the rest of the accused-appellants because they were not presented to him in the police line-up. 30
(b) Senior Inspector Arnold Palomo (S/Insp. Palomo), who is assigned at the Anti-Organized Crime for
Businessmens Concern Division of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Camp Crame, testified
that on April 12, 2002, at around 6:30 a.m., he was in the vicinity of No. 3, Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision,
Caloocan City, where they had just rescued Pinky, a victim of kidnapping. Around an hour later, Betty arrived and
introduced herself as the owner of the house. She inquired why the police officers were shooting at her house. She
was invited by the police to Camp Crame to answer queries anent why a crime was committed in her house. While
in Camp Crame, Albert and Pinky identified her as the person who brought them food while they were detained in
the safehouse. Betty was thus arrested.31
(c) Police Inspector Marites Bugnay (P/Insp. Bugnay), Assistant Chief of the Firearms Identification Division of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, testified that at around 9:30 a.m. of April 12, 2002, she and her
team, with six members, went to Amparo Subdivision where a rescue operation had just taken place. They
recovered a 5.56 mm Elisco rifle without serial number, a 9 mm Chinese made pistol, two long and three short
magazines for a caliber 5.56 mm rifle, 188 live ammunitions, 24 pieces of cartridges fired from four different
caliber 5.56 mm rifles, two lifted latent prints, among others. She made a Spot Report of the physical evidence
recovered by her team. P/Insp. Bugnay, however, stated that some of the police officers, who participated in the
rescue operations, also carried caliber 5.56 mm firearms. 32
(d) Evangeline, Alberts wife, testified 33 having received seven phone calls 34 between April 7, 2002 and April 11,
2002 from the kidnappers informing her that they took Albert and demanding USD 1,000,000.00 as ransom
money.35 On April 11, 2002, she was instructed by the kidnappers to go to Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe. The
kidnappers were supposed to hand to her a letter from her husband. A police operative acted as her driver. She
and the police operative got to the place between 11:30 and 11:45 in the morning. 36 The kidnappers called her
and ordered her driver to go to the restrooms to retrieve a letter taped in one of the toilet bowls. Evangeline went
back to her car. While she was inside, three men tried to forcibly open her car. She panicked, bowed down and
screamed. She was, however, only able to see the suspects from theirs chests down. 37 Thereafter, P/Insp.
Ferdinand Vero (Major Vero) approached the car and informed her that they were able to apprehend three
suspects. She went home. The next morning, she received a call, got to talk to Albert, and thereafter proceeded to
Camp Crame.
(e) PO1 Paul Pacris (PO1 Pacris) stated that he and four other police officers from the CIDG were the ones who
assisted Evangeline when she met with Alberts kidnappers in Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe. They arrived in the
area at around 11:00 a.m. and after about two hours, they arrested Ricky, Jose and Marcelo who tried to forcibly
open Evangelines car. They recovered from Jose a .38 caliber Armscor with six live ammunitions. The policemen
frisked the three without opposition from the latter. 38
(f) PO3 Manuel Cube (PO3 Cube) corroborated39 PO1 Pacris testimony relative to the arrest of Ricky, Jose and
Marcelo. PO3 Cube further stated that while it was not his team which arrested the suspects, after Jose and Ricky
were turned over to them, they brought the two to Camp Crame. 40 While in the investigation room, he heard Jose
and Ricky admit knowledge of Alberts abduction. 41 Jose and Ricky were then not assisted by counsel. 42 Chief
Police Superintendent Zolio M. Lachica (Col. Lachica) briefed PO3 Cube and the other policemen that the arrested
suspects divulged an information that the Hi-Ace with Plate No. WNW-180 used in
Alberts abduction was going to pass by Road C-5, Commonwealth Avenue on April 12, 2002. 43 PO3 Cube, Major
Vero and other police officers riding four to five vehicles went to the place. At around 5:45 a.m., they spotted the
Hi-Ace, chased it and blocked it with a police car. 44 Robert and Roger were inside the Hi-Ace, and the former had a
shotgun. After the policemen drew their guns, the suspects surrendered.
(g) PO2 Arvin Garces (PO2 Garces), a field operative and an in-house bomb technician assigned at the CIDGs
Anti-Organized Crime and Businessmens Concern Division, testified 45 that on April 12, 2002, between 8:00 a.m.
and 8:30 a.m., he and 20 policemen went to Sitio GSIS, Barangay San Martin de Porres, Paraaque to arrest
Lowhen, Jubert and Morey. Their team leader knocked on the door of the target house, which was partially open.
Lowhen came out. Jubert and Morey were in the adjacent room, which was about five meters away from where
Lowhen was.46 PO2 Garces was uncertain though if the said adjacent room was part of the same house where
Lowhen was found.47 The three suspects were informed that they were being implicated for Alberts kidnapping
and would thus be taken for investigation.

Following were among the object evidence likewise offered by the prosecution: (a) sketches prepared by Albert
depicting the (1) exact location where the kidnapping took place, 48 (2) positions of Albert and Pinky relative to the
kidnappers while inside the Hi-Ace, 49 and (3) interior of the basement room where Albert and Pinky were
detained;50 (b) dark glasses wrapped with black tape and handcuffs worn by Albert and Pinky while they were
detained;51 (c) Alberts handwritten note dated April 10, 2002 addressed to "Vangie" and signed by "Boogs"; 52 and
(d) Sinumpaang Salaysay53 and Supplemental Affidavit54 executed by Albert on April 13, 2002 and April 15, 2002,
respectively.
The Case for the Defense
The defense witnesses with their testimonies were:
(a) Marcelo, resident of Sta. Ana Compound, Manila East Road, Taytay, Rizal, testified that he owns a beer house
and a billiard hall. He also renders mechanical services. He claimed that from 12:00 noon until 9:00 p.m. of April
7, 2002, he was repairing a motor bike at home. Marcelo was with a certain Bogs, the owner of the motor bike,
and Jober, the formers helper.55
From April 8 to 9, 2002, Marcelo just stayed home with his daughter. 56
On April 10, 2002, at around 7:00 a.m., Marcelo was in his bedroom making an accounting of the earnings of his
beer house. He heard knocks at the door of his billiard hall. Thereafter, around six unidentified men entered,
punched, tied him up, and threw him at the back of a white Revo without a plate. Even when Rosario, Marcelos
daughter, was slapped and kicked by the unidentified men after she inquired about their identities, she insisted
that she be taken with her father. Marcelo and Rosario were brought to Camp Crame. They were made to sit down
in a room with a hazy glass window. Rosario was thereafter ordered to leave the room and when she refused, she
was dragged out. The men started showing Marcelo photographs and asking him questions. When he denied
knowing any of the persons in the photographs, he was blindfolded with a packing tape and got kicked every time
he refused to answer the mens queries. A plastic bag was likewise placed over his head making it difficult for him
to breathe. His ordeal lasted for an hour, after which somebody told him that if he had PhP 100,000.00, he would
be released.57
At around 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m., Marcelo asked Rosario to go home and look for a lawyer. At around 10:00 a.m.
of the following day, April 11, 2002, Rosario came back with a certain Atty. Platon. Marcelo narrated to Atty. Platon
the circumstances surrounding his arrest. 58 Atty. Platon informed Marcelo that the latter was being charged of
kidnapping.59 Not long after, at around 10:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m., a certain Dr. Arnold de Vera (Dr. de Vera) arrived
and conducted an examination of Marcelos injuries and bruises. 60 Marcelo asked Atty. Platon if he can file a
complaint against the men who mauled him. Atty. Platon replied in the affirmative, but as of even date, no
complaint had been filed yet as Marcelo had to attend to other pressing matters relative to the kidnapping case. 61
Atty. Platon and Dr. de Vera left while Marcelo and Rosario stayed in Camp Crame for two nights. 62
On April 12, 2002, at around 3:00 p.m. or 4:00 p.m., Marcelo was brought to a building in Camp Crame and was
made to stand up alongside nine people with whom he was not acquainted. There were cameras around and a
Chinese man and a woman started pointing at them.63
Marcelo denied personal acquaintance with Albert,64 PO1 Pacris,65 Jubert, Monico and Betty.66 He admitted having
been to the Coliseum as he was into cock fighting. The Coliseum, located in Cainta, is only about two kilometers
away from Taytay.67
Marcelo offered the testimony of Dr. de Vera, 68 a plastic surgeon from St. Lukes Medical Center, Quezon City, to
prove that in the morning of April 11, 2002, the former was already under the CIDGs custody. The foregoing is
contrary to the prosecutions claim that between 11:30 a.m. and 12:00 noon of the said date, Marcelo was
arrested in Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe while trying to forcibly open Evangelines car. Dr. de Vera stated that in
the afternoon of April 10, 2002, Marcelos daughter called asking for his help as her father was allegedly being
manhandled. Dr. de Vera went to the CIDG office in the morning of April 11, 2002. He made a visual examination
of Marcelos body and saw hematoma in the sternum and fresh abrasions in both hands of the latter, but he did
not reduce his observations into writing. 69 To stop Marcelos manhandling, Dr. de Vera sought audience with the
PNP Chief, but the latter was not around.70
During cross-examination, Dr. de Vera stated that once in a while, he sings and drinks in Marcelos beer house in
Taytay.71
SPO2 Eduardo Peales testimony was dispensed with since the parties stipulated that he was the officer who, on
April 10, 2002, at around 8:35 a.m., received and recorded in the logbook of the Taytay Police Station a report
from a certain Jover Porras y Perla that Marcelo was abducted by unidentified men earlier at 7:20 a.m. 72
(b) Ricky is a "kristo" or bet taker in Araneta Coliseum and U-Cap Cockpit in Mandaluyong, and "mananari" or
gaffer residing in San Luis Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. 73 He was still asleep in bed with his wife on April 10,
2002, at around 9:45 a.m.74 when he heard somebody knocking on the door. When he opened it, a man pointed a
gun at him and told him not to ask any questions but just to go with them. There were two men and they brought
him to a white Revo where he saw three other people. The owner of the house saw Ricky being taken. 75
Ricky was brought to Camp Crame, was asked if he knew certain persons from the photographs shown to him, and
was mauled when he replied in the negative.76
In the morning of April 12, 2002 while still detained in Camp Crame, one of the men, who forcibly took Ricky from
his rented room on April 10, 2002, informed the latter that if he had PhP 20,000.00, he would be released. In the
afternoon of April 12, 2002, Ricky was handcuffed and placed in a police line-up without being informed of the
reason for his inclusion therein.77

Ricky denied being among those who abducted Albert on April 7, 2002 and being present in the safehouse in
Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002. 78 He did not know Albert personally and had not
seen him before. However, Ricky admitted having been to the Coliseum and knowing that Albert was renting the
same.79 Ricky was unaware of any grudge Albert, PO1 Pacris or PO3 Cube may have against him. 80 Ricky did not
have any document to prove that he was detained in Camp Crame on April 10, 2002 and his Booking and Arrest
Sheet were both dated April 12, 2002.81
Rickys wife, May, testified82 that after the former was taken by the unidentified men, she went to Valenzuela
Police Station and an officer opined that her husband may be in Camp Crame. 83 She went as suggested and found
her husband, who assured her that he would be released. 84 She went home but got back to Camp Crame at 12:00
noon of April 11, 2002, during which time she was not anymore allowed to talk to Ricky. 85 She stayed in Camp
Crame until past 10:00 p.m. and saw from TV Patrol that Ricky was involved in a kidnapping incident. She got to
talk to her husband only on April 13, 2002.86
During cross-examination, May stated that Ricky was with her at around 7:00 p.m. of April 7, 2002. 87
Ritchelda Tugbo (Tugbo), a 63-year old widow and Rickys landlady, testified 88 that at around 9:30 a.m. of April 10,
2002, while she was eating breakfast, three unidentified men entered her house and took Ricky from his rented
room.89
Sabina Poliquit (Poliquit), an unemployed 50-year old widow, and Rodolfo Buado (Buado), a 60-year old retired
employee, who were both Rickys neighbors, corroborated Tugbos statements. 90
(c) Jose is a trainer gaffer, breeder of fighting cocks, part-time private martial during derbies, and a resident of
San Isidro, Fairview, Quezon City. During the trial, he stated 91 that in the evening of April 9, 2002, he went to UCap Cockpit in Mandaluyong, where a derby sponsored by a certain Pol Estrellado was being held, to find
prospective buyers of fighting cocks and to place bets. 92 He left the place at around 1:00 a.m. of April 10, 2002.
While waiting for a cab, a white Revo stopped in front of him, and three gun-toting men alighted therefrom. 93 He
was shoved in the front seat in between the driver and another man. While inside the Revo, Joses eyes were
covered with packing tape. His wallet, money, watch, necklace and ring were taken, and the men stepped on his
head to keep him down. A plastic bag was placed over his head making it difficult for him to breathe, and he was
repeatedly punched when he denied involvement in Alberts kidnapping. 94
When Jose regained consciousness, he did not know where he was but there was a boy of around 16 years of age
removing the packing tape from his eyes. Adelantar only learned that he was in Camp Crame when he was
brought to a room with a police line-up at around 6:00 p.m. of April 12, 2002. 95 He insisted that from April 10,
2002 onwards, he was held by the police in Camp Crame, hence, he could not have been present at 6:00 a.m. of
April 11, 2002 in the safehouse where Albert was detained, and at 11:00 a.m. of the same day in Jollibee along
EDSA Guadalupe.96 The boy who removed the packing tape from his eyes could attest to the foregoing, but Jose
did not know his name and had not seen him anymore. 97 Further, Jose had never been to the Coliseum and had
not personally met Albert and Pinky. 98 Jose alleged that he and the rest of the accused-appellants were mere fall
guys.99 Jose claimed that he only met Marcelo after they were both placed in the police line-up and in the same
detention cell.100 Jose admitted that he was acquainted with Ricky, whom he had recommended to be a
"kristo" in Araneta Cockpit.101 Out of fear, Jose had neither informed his lawyer that he was mauled by the
policemen nor filed any action against them.102
(d) Betty and her husband Monico have been residing for about 33 years in 224 Malanting Street, Amparo
Subdivision, Caloocan City. Betty, an elementary school graduate, is a housewife tending a sari-sari store and a
piggery. Monico is a drilling contractor and plumber. Betty and Monico own the house in Lumbang Street, Amparo
Subdivision, Caloocan City, where Albert and Pinky were detained from April 7 to 12, 2002.
Betty testified103 that due to her busy schedule, she had not visited their house in Lumbang Street during the
alleged period of Albert and Pinkys detention. Betty and Monico had rented out for PhP 3,000.00 per month the
said house to Roger since the late afternoon of April 7, 2002.
Roger was recommended to the spouses by a certain Pidok Igat (Igat), their acquaintance. Betty saw Roger once
but the latter was wearing sunglasses.104
Betty stated that from April 7 to 12, 2002, Monico was contracted to build a deep well in Narra Street, Amparo
Subdivision, Caloocan City. In the morning of April 12, 2002, Igat told her that the house in Lumbang Street was
being fired at by the policemen. She first instructed Monico to report the incident to the police, then, she ran
towards the said house. She was still at a certain distance from the house when the policemen held her by the
arms after finding out that she owned it. She denied knowledge of the kidnapping incident, but she was still
invited by the police officers to go with them to Camp Crame. 105
Betty was not allowed to go home but was detained by the police in Camp Crame. At around 6:00 p.m. of April 12,
2002, after Albert and Pinky arrived, Betty, Roger, Jose, Marcelo, Ricky and other suspects were placed in a police
line-up composed of ten people. Monico, Jubert and Morey were not among those in the line-up yet. Albert and
Pinky did not pinpoint Betty from the line-up, but a police officer insisted that she be included because she owned
the safehouse. Betty identified the officer as SPO1 Polero, but she was uncertain of the name, albeit describing
the latter as the one who took Albert and Pinkys statements. 106 Betty did not see Albert and Pinky being brought
out of the house during the rescue operations on April 7, 2002. Betty did not personally know Albert, but first saw
him in Camp Crame in the evening of April 12, 2002. 107
During cross-examination, Betty stated that Monico and Jubert were included in the police line-up. 108

(e) Monico stated109 that he received PhP 3,000.00 from Roger and handed it to Betty as rental for their house in
Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City. The said house is about four streets away from Bettys sarisari store and piggery in Malanting Street. The amount was a mere deposit and he was promised that before the
end of the month, PhP 6,000.00 would be paid as rental. 110 Monico did not visit the house from April 7 to 11, 2002,
hence, he did not know if Roger actually occupied it. Within the same period, Monico was not able to talk to Igat,
who was the person who referred Roger to him and Betty.111
Monico testified that he was in Bettys store in the night of April 7, 2002 and denied having assisted Albert in
descending to the basement of the safehouse.112
When their house in Lumbang Street was fired at by the police in the early morning of April 11, 2002, he was
instructed by Betty to report the matter to the authorities. He went to the Novaliches Police, but was informed
that Amparo Subdivision is not within the said stations jurisdiction. Monico got to Bagong Silang Police Station at
around 9:00 a.m., and an officer took notes while talking to him, but the former was not sure if it was a blotter.
Monico was instructed to wait. At around 3:00 p.m., a superior officer arrived, asked Monico questions and
informed the latter that he knew about the shooting incident. He stayed in the police station until 6:00 p.m. The
officer told Monico that the latter would be brought to Camp Crame to be interviewed and will be allowed to go
home after.113 In Camp Crame, Monico was informed that he was being implicated in Albert and Pinkys
kidnapping. Although he and Betty denied any involvement in the charges against them, to date, for lack of
opportunity on their part as they are both detained, no complaints had been filed against the officers who
implicated them.114
(f) Jubert, a carpenter and a college undergraduate from Asibanglan, Pinukpok, Kalinga Province, testified 115 that
he came to Manila to look for a job on January 2002. 116 For two months, from February to March 2002, he was
among those who worked in constructing the Globe Telecommunications tower in Sucat. He resided in the house
of his uncle, Daniel Balanay (Balanay), in Bicutan, Taguig. 117
Jubert met Lowhen, a resident of Paraaque, while applying for a job to make cabinets for Perma Wood Industries
on March 27, 2002.118
At around 4:00 p.m. of April 11, 2002, Jubert went to Lowhens house to inquire about the requirements in
applying as a security guard, but the latter was not home yet. Lowhen arrived at around 5:00 p.m. Morey, whom
Jubert met for the first time, was also there. Lowhen bought drinks for the three of them and Jubert stayed
overnight in the house of Morey, which was just about 50 meters away. While they were sleeping, men barged in,
ordered them to lay face down, and handcuffed them. Jubert and Morey were taken out of the house where they
saw Lowhen, who was likewise boarded into a car. Out of fear of the men who seemed angry, Lowhen, Jubert and
Morey were no longer able to ask why they were being taken. They were brought to Camp Crame. Jubert denied
being among those who abducted Albert and Pinky on April 7, 2002, and guarding the latter two who were
detained in the basement of Betty and Monicos house in Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City. 119 Jubert insisted that
on April 7, 2002, he was fixing the house of his uncle, Balanay, in Bicutan, Taguig, and with him were the latters
brother and two ladies.120 However, none of the mentioned persons executed affidavits to corroborate Juberts
claim as to his whereabouts on April 7, 2002. 121 Jubert vehemently denied having seen Albert prior to April 12,
2002, the day the former was arrested.122
(g) Robert, a farmer from Isabela, a driver since 1986, and resident of Western Bicutan, Taguig since 1990,
alleged123 that on April 7, 2002, he was in Bontoc, Mountain Province. 124 From March 4 to April 8, 2002, he was
driving for Engineer Raymundo Vargas, Sr. (Engr. Vargas), a contractor engineer. 125 Robert offered as evidence a
certification, dated November 6, 2003, issued by the Pines Community Developers and General Services
Corporation, signed by Engr. Vargas, stating that he was employed from February 10, 1987 to April 8, 2002, and
five cash vouchers showing that he was paid for his services. 126 The cash voucher for the payment of PhP
2,500.00, dated April 8, 2002, which was allegedly received by Robert himself, 127 contained erasures. Engr. Vargas
justified the erasures by stating that the typewriter, which was initially used, did not yield very clear impressions
on paper.128 Copies of the cash vouchers were, however, secured by his wife only much later upon his lawyers
instructions.129
On April 11, 2002, Robert was arrested in his house in Bicutan by CIDG officers contrary to the prosecutions claim
that he was riding the Hi-Ace with Roger and carrying a shotgun when seized by the police in Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City on April 12, 2002.130 Robert is not engaged in cockfighting.
Angelita Alto (Alto), a member of the Barangay Auxiliary Force of Western Bicutan, Taguig, testified 131 that at
around 7:45 a.m. of April 11, 2002, a van parked in the corner of Sunflower and Calantas Streets, Western
Bicutan, Taguig, and persons clad in dark suits alighted therefrom. 132 They proceeded to Roberts house where
Altos cousin stays as a boarder. The men kicked and broke the door, handcuffed, blindfolded and took Robert to
the van. Alto was about three meters away from where the events transpired. When the van left, Alto took two
pictures of the broken door, called up Roberts wife and recorded the events in page 1056 of the barangays
logbook.133
Engr. Vargas from Baguio City corroborated 134 Roberts claim that they were together in Bontoc, Mountain Province
from February 10 to April 8, 2002. It takes 12 to 14 hours to reach Manila from Bontoc. 135 Robert was with Engr.
Vargas on April 7, 2002, but the former went to Baguio at 10:00 a.m. of the following day supposedly to collect
rentals. Robert said he would be back in two days, but no longer showed up after. Engr. Vargas only found out in
October 2003 that Robert was being implicated in a kidnapping incident after being informed by the latters
wife.136

(h) Roger, a businessman residing in Signal Village, Bicutan, Taguig, claimed 137 that on April 11, 2002, at around
6:00 a.m., he was walking along Bravo Street in Signal Village. 138 He was on his way to his brothers wake when he
was taken by four armed men wearing civilian clothes, whom he later found out were police officers from the
CIDG.139 He only met his co-accused-appellants in Camp Crame on April 11, 2002. 140 He saw Albert for the first
time on April 12, 2002 when the police line-up was presented to the latter. 141
(i) Morey, a warehouse care taker from Barangay Sinakbat, Bacong, Benguet, stated 142 that he was in Burnham,
Baguio City tending coconuts on April 7, 2002. The warehouse closed at 6:00 p.m., after which he went to his
uncles house in Trinidad, Benguet.143
At 1:00 p.m. of April 8, 2002, Morey and a certain Harris Batawang (Batawang) left Baguio for Manila. Morey was
contracted to watch over a house bought by Batawang in GSIS Village, Paraaque. They got to Manila at around
9:00 p.m., spent the night in Paraaque, and the following morning, Batawang called Lowhen and introduced him
to Morey.144
On April 10, 2002, Morey and Batawang bought materials for the repair of the latters house. At 2:00 p.m. of the
following day, Batawang returned to Baguio to recruit workers to help Morey in repairing the formers house. 145
In the evening of April 11, 2002, Lowhen called Morey and informed him that the latter has a province mate who
was staying in the formers house. Lowhen was referring to Jubert. Morey went to Lowhens house. The three
drunk the gin bought by Lowhen. Lowhen slept at 11:00 p.m., leaving Morey and Jubert behind. Morey and Jubert
slept in Batawangs house. The following day, men barged into Batawangs house and handcuffed Morey and
Jubert. The men asked if the two knew a certain Lito, ordered them to surrender their guns, and ransacked
Batawangs house. Lowhen, Morey and Batawang were boarded into a Revo and brought to Camp Crame. 146
Morey denied being acquainted with the other accused-appellants apart from Lowhen and Morey. Morey initially
saw Albert during the first day of hearing of the kidnapping case. 147
(j) Lowhen, a resident of Paraaque City, stated 148 that he had been employed by Regioner Security and
Investigation Agency (Regioner) as a guard since 1993. He was posted in Perma Wood Industries Corporation in
Marian Road 2, Paraaque from March 4 to April 11, 2002. He worked on a 24-hour shift, usually starting at 7:00
a.m.149
On April 10, 2002, Lowhen reported for work in Perma Wood Industries at 7:30 a.m. 150 He offered an uncertified
photocopy of his daily time record (DTR) from March 16 to 31, 2002 with his signature on it. 151 Anent the DTR from
April 1 to 15, 2002, it was unsigned by Lowhen because at that time, he was already arrested by CIDG officers. 152
Logbook entries signed by Lowhen and a certain "S/G Pacete RA," the outgoing guard, indicating that the former
assumed his posts at 7:00 a.m. of April 4, 6, 8 and 10, 2002 were likewise presented. 153 Lowhen got off from work
at 7:45 a.m. of April 11, 2002,154 but was no longer able to assume duties the next day because he was already
taken by the CIDG officers.155 He just walked and got home at 8:00 a.m., ate breakfast and went to visit a certain
Roger Batersal (Batersal) in Malugay Street, Paraaque to have a picture frame repaired. Batersal, Lowhens
brother-in-law, was then having coffee, so Lowhen went inside the house, laid down in the sofa, turned on the
television and slept till 4:00 p.m. The picture frame was already assembled and Lowhen went home where he saw
Jubert waiting for him.156 Jubert asked Lowhen about the requirements in applying for a security guard position.
Lowhen bought gin and while the two were drinking, he found out that Jubert speaks Kalinga and Ilocano. Lowhen
called Morey, who hailed from Baguio and who was then a boarder in the house of the formers brother. Morey
joined the drinking session but Lowhen left at around 11:00 p.m. as the latter was already dizzy and still had to
assume his post at 7:00 a.m. of the following day.157
At 6:30 a.m. of April 12, 2002, Lowhens wife woke him up, but he went back to sleep. Thereafter, Lowhen heard
noises from the gate of the house, then somebody shouted ordering for men to get out. When Lowhen opened his
eyes, a man wearing black was pointing a long firearm at him. Lowhen went out of the house and was directed to
place his hands behind his head and lie face down on the floor. The men searched Lowhens house. Lowhen,
Morey and Jubert were taken to the nearby United Paraaque Subdivision and after about 15 to 20 minutes, they
were boarded into a green Revo without a plate. Lowhens wife wanted to tag along but she was informed that she
could no longer be accommodated in the Revo, but she could just proceed on her own to Camp Crame. 158
When they reached Camp Crame, Lowhen, Jubert and Morey were separated from each other. 159 Lowhen was
brought into a room and a police officer asked him if he knew a certain Lito. Lowhen replied in the negative, then
he was questioned if he knew that a man and a woman had been kidnapped. The officer stepped out of the room,
but he came back later with a bald Chinese man. 160 The Chinese man stood near the door, looked at the officer,
shook his head, then left. The officer tapped Lowhens shoulder and asked the latter to cooperate with the police
by being a star witness, for which he would be paid PhP 10,000.00 a month, or be hanged. The officer typed an
affidavit, but Lowhen refused to receive it. Lowhen told the officer that he could not do what was demanded of
him, then the latter left. Lowhen remained in the room until 6:30 p.m. of April 12, 2002 when he was put
alongside more than 10 other persons in a police line-up.161 Albert did not point at Lowhen in the line-up. 162 Prior to
April 11, 2002, Lowhen did not personally know Albert.163
During cross-examination, Lowhen stated that he was on duty in the early morning of April 11, 2002, hence, he
could not have been in the basement of the safehouse where Albert was detained at around the same time. 164
Redentor Pacete (Pacete), a construction worker who used to work as a reliever guard at Regioner, testified 165 that
he met Lowhen when they were both assigned in Perma Wood Industries. 166 Pacetes signatures were affixed in
Regioners logbook indicating the times he assumed his posts before or after Lowhen.

Domingo De Guzman (De Guzman), Lowhens supervisor in Regioner, was called by the defense to the witness
stand to point out to the court that he was the one who photocopied the logbook entries and the DTR referred to
by Lowhen and Pacete in their testimonies.167 However, the originals cannot anymore be presented to the court
because Regioner had ceased its operations in 2004 and the records were no longer available. 168 De Guzman
brought two index cards, prepared by Regioners secretary, indicating Lowhens assignments from April 27, 1993
to April 11, 2002,169 and 27 payroll sheets likewise including Lowhens name covering the period from February 1,
2000 to April 15, 2002.170
The testimony171 of Elsie Batersal (Elsie), Lowhens sister, to the effect that her brother went to her house at
around 8:30 a.m. of April 11, 2002 and slept there until 4:00 p.m., was dispensed with after the prosecution
agreed to stipulate and admit the same.
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC rendered a Decision172 on September 27, 2007. In Criminal Case No. Q-02-108834, the accusedappellants were acquitted from the charges of kidnapping and serious illegal detention of Pinky. The accusedappellants were, however, convicted of conspiring the kidnapping of, and demanding of ransom from Albert in
Criminal Case No. Q-02-108835. The RTC imposed upon the accused-appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and a solidary obligation to pay Albert the amount of PhP 100,000.00 as moral damages. The RTC ratiocinated
that:
Very critical in this case is the testimony of Albert Yam. He testified about how the kidnapping was perpetrated; he
testified that a Toyota Hi-Ace van with eight (8) occupants blocked the path of the Honda Civic car colored white
driven by Pinky Gonzales; he (Albert Yam) was driving a Toyota Prado vehicle that was behind the Honda Civic car
of Pinky Gonzales; Albert Yam identified and named before this court four (4) of those who alighted from the van;
he testified that accused Morey Dadaan and accused Jubert Banatao after going down from their van, approached
the Honda Civic car of Pinky Gonzales; he also identified and named Roger Pesado accompanied by Robert
Gonzales who went down from their van and approached his car; he testified that it was Roger Pesado who told
him (Albert Yam) to come out of his vehicle; he further testified about he and Pinky Gonzales being boarded in the
Toyota Hi-Ace van and identified accused Marcelo Llanora as the driver of the van, Ricky Pea who is seated
beside the driver x x x. Albert Yam also testified that after their kidnapping ordeal, he learned that accused Jose
Adelantar acted as look out when they were being kidnapped along the road coming from the Cainta cockpit; x x x
he also testified that when the ransom was being demanded, seven (7) of their kidnappers went down to talk to
him and in court gave the name[s] of six (6) of the accused, namely: Jubert Banatao, Morey Dadaan, Marcelo
Llanora, Ricky Pea, Jose Adelantar and Lowhen Almonte; Albert also testified that at the instance when he fell
down the steps of the stairs, it was the accused Monico Salvador who was escorting him and held him; in his
testimony, he stated that accused Betty Salvador brought the food that they ate and on one occasion, saw her
asking another accused about their condition; x x x Albert Yam testified that the ransom demanded by the
accused is in the amount of One Million Dollars and there were possibly fifteen (15) people who were involved in
the kidnapping; he further testified about the rescue operation and was able to identify seven (7) of the accused
in the police line-up but mentioned in his testimony the names of eight (8) accused as among those whom he
identified in the police line-up; x x x Albert Yam explained in his testimony that he also identified the accused
Lowhen Almonte after the police line-up because said accused was not among those included during the police
line-up and this is in accordance with a Supplemental Affidavit which Albert Yam identified in court. x x x The
Court was able to deduce from the testimony of Albert Yam that Monico Salvador and Betty Salvador who are
admittedly the owners of the place where Albert Yam and Pinky Gonzales were kept during the kidnapping ordeal,
were not present at the precise time that the rescue was conducted by the police.
xxxx
Where there is no evidence, as in this case, to indicate that the prosecution witness was actuated by improper
motive, the presumption is that he is not so actuated and that his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Also
jurisprudence holds that if an accused had really nothing to do with a crime, it would be against the natural order
of events and human nature and against the presumption of good faith that a prosecution witness would falsely
testify against him. x x x
xxxx
Direct Proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy. It may be deduced
from the mode, method and manner in which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. x x x
xxxx
Here, we find a closeness of personal association and a concurrence towards a common unlawful purpose. x x x
x x x There were very minor loose ends in the chain of events and the testimony of these other witnesses besides
Albert Yam completed the narration of facts for the prosecution. These other witnesses, most of whom are police
officers, provided the proofs for the prosecution as to how the kidnapping case was solved and why the accused
were apprehended.
xxxx
Denial is a self-serving negative defense that cannot be given greater weight than the declaration of a credible
witness who testifies on affirmative matters. x x x
Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of
truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. x x x

xxxx
Among the documentary evidence presented which gives credence to the testimony of Albert Yam are the three
(3) sketches which he prepared x x x for the prosecution. x x x Two (2) pieces of dark glasses wrapped with black
tape x x x, the two sets of handcuffs x x x, and the handwritten note of Albert Yam addressed to his wife x x x.
Elisco 5.56 mm rifle, 9mm pistol, Armscor cal. 38 revolver, a shotgun, magazines for the firearms, live
cartridges/ammunition and spent shells x x x.
x x x It must be emphasized that Pinky Gonzales never testified in court so how could the prosecution establish
that she is indeed a kidnap victim. x x x173 (Citations omitted and underscoring ours)
The Appeals Filed Against the RTC Decision and the Office of the Solicitor Generals (OSG) Opposition Thereto
The accused-appellants interposed separate appeals 174 essentially reiterating their respective factual claims,
which were in turn refuted175 by the OSG.
The OSG argued that the supposed eye defect ascribed to Albert was not severe as to hinder his ability to identify
his kidnappers. The dark eye glasses, which the kidnappers had ordered Albert to put on, were loose and even
slipped as he descended the basement stairs, giving him the chance to see Monico. Besides, Alberts eye glasses
were returned to him on April 8, 2002. Further, it is settled that when thrust into exceptional circumstances,
victims of crimes strive to remember the important details and to see the faces of their assailants. Anent Betty
and Monicos claim that it was unnatural for a person involved in the commission of an offense to proceed to the
scene and report the matter to the police, the OSG interpreted the foregoing as defensive acts intended to
mislead the authorities in the conduct of the investigation.
Jubert offered no corroborative testimonies regarding his whereabouts from April 7 to 11, 2002.
Roberts alibi that he was in Bontoc, Mountain Province driving for Engr. Vargas should be supported by clear and
convincing evidence. The said alibi weighs weaker vis--vis Alberts positive testimony relative to Roberts
participation in the abduction. Engr. Vargas only testified on Roberts employment. Alto merely witnessed the
circumstances of Roberts arrest on April 11, 2002.
Lowhens post in Perma Wood Industries was not that far from the locations where the acts of kidnapping were
committed, hence, no physical impossibility to get from one place to the other. The logbook, index cards and
payroll sheets offered by Lowhen had no evidentiary value for being mere photocopies. Lowhen claimed that
Albert did not identify him from the police line-up. However, Albert testified that he did not see Lowhen from the
line-up. Besides, even if Lowhen was indeed included in the line-up, Albert, at that time, had just been rescued,
thus, stressed and confused. Albert had modified his initial lapse by categorically stating in his amended affidavit
that Lowhen was among those who went to the basement in the early morning of April 11, 2002.
The OSG emphasized that Albert remained unfazed and unwavering in his testimony and so were the rest of the
prosecution witnesses. The OSG likewise stressed that the RTCs evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is
entitled to the highest respect and should be upheld in the absence of proof that the said court had overlooked
facts which if duly regarded, may alter the result of the case.
The Ruling of the CA
On February 25, 2011, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision denying the appeal of the accusedappellants. However, the CA modified the RTC ruling by expressly stating the accused-appellants non-eligibility
for parole. Further, the accused-appellants were ordered to solidarily pay Albert PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity and
PhP 100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The CA declared that:
The crucial issue in this case involves the assessment of credibility of witnesses. Could the version succinctly
narrated by the victim, his wife and the police officers who participated in the operation for the rescue of the
kidnap victims possibly be concocted as so alleged by the appellants?
x x x Unless otherwise specifically required, the testimony of a single eyewitness if credible and trustworthy is
sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. And since the determination of credibility is within
the province of the trial court which has the opportunity to examine and observe the demeanor of witnesses,
appellate courts will not generally interfere in this jurisdiction. x x x
xxxx
The most crucial evidence submitted in this case was the positive testimony of kidnap victim Albert Yam
recognizing appellants as his abductors. Common experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take
place, it is natural for persons to remember many of the important details. x x x The most natural reaction of
victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in
which the crime is committed.
Yam positively identified appellants as his captors. x x x
xxxx
The evidence also shows that the accused-appellants acted in concert in perpetrating the kidnapping. x x x
xxxx
x x x The fact that accused Betty Salvadors role was limited to giving victims their food is immaterial whether she
acted as a principal or as an accomplice because the conspiracy and her participation therein have been
established. In fact, she was the owner of the safehouse where the victims were kept. In conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all and the conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime.
xxxx

x x x Police officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions in the
absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary or proof that they were moved by ill will. x x x. 176 Citations
omitted and underscoring ours)
Incidents after the Rendition of the CA Decision
The records of this case were elevated to us pursuant to the Resolution 177 issued by the CA on February 9, 2012
giving due course to the notices of appeal filed by the accused-appellants, except Betty and Monico.
In compliance with our Resolution178 dated July 2, 2012, a Supplemental Brief179 was filed by the Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) in behalf of the accused-appellants, except Betty and Monico. In lieu of a supplemental brief, the OSG
filed a Manifestation180 stating that it is adopting the arguments it had previously raised in the Consolidated
Brief181 filed with the CA.
The Issue
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom despite the prosecutions failure to overthrow the constitutional presumption of
innocence in their favor.182
The Supplemental Brief filed by the PAO once again presented the accused-appellants factual claims in the
proceedings below relative to the alleged mauling, irregular arrests and extortion attempts committed by CIDG
officers against Marcelo and Ricky. The PAO stressed anew the alibis that on April 7, 2002, Morey was in his
uncles warehouse in Baguio, Robert was in Bontoc, Mountain Province driving for Engr. Vargas, while Lowhen
assumed his security guard duties in Perma Wood Industries in Paraaque. The PAO also maintained that Roger
was arrested at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002 in Bicutan, and not on April 12, 2002 in Commonwealth Avenue.
Our Ruling
The instant appeal lacks merit.
The CA correctly found that the
essential elements comprising the
crime of kidnapping for ransom
were present and that the accusedappellants conspired in its commission.
People v. Uyboco,183 enumerated the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom, viz:
In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime,
namely: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense
any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it
is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose
of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.184
In the case at bar, the accused-appellants, who were indicted for forcibly abducting Albert, are all private
individuals. Albert was taken on April 7, 2002 and his detention lasted for six days, during which period, threats to
kill him and demand for ransom were made.
In affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, we are guided by four-settled doctrines enunciated in People
v. Martinez,185 viz:186
(a) The trial court[]s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded great respect owing to its
opportunity to observe and examine the witnesses conduct and demeanor on the witness stand;
(b) When there is no evidence to show that the prosecution witness is actuated by an improper motive,
identification of the accused-appellants as the offenders should be given full faith and credit; 187
(c) Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof of prior agreement by the parties to commit a crime but
that it may be inferred from the acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the commission of the
crime which indubitably point to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest; and
(d) The respective alibis proffered by the accused-appellants cannot prevail over the unequivocal testimony of the
victim categorically and positively pointing to them as his abductors, and for the defense of alibis, to be given full
credit, they must be clearly established and must not leave room for doubt. 188
The accused-appellants all denied being personally acquainted with Albert or having knowledge of any grudge
which the latter may harbour against them. The RTC and the CA found Alberts testimony on the participation of
the accused-appellants as conspirators in the kidnapping incident, and the manner by which he had subsequently
identified them, as clear and categorical.
Albert testified:
PROS. FADULLON:
Q: Mr. Witness, will you please tell this Honorable Court where you were on April 7, 2002 between the hours of
7:00 and 7:30 in the evening?
A: I was at the New Cainta Coliseum.
xxxx
Q: Will you please tell us, Sir, if you recall if there was anything unusual that happened that evening as you were
leaving the New Cainta Coliseum on your way home?

A: I was kidnapped that evening.

xxxx
Q: Now, Sir, will you please tell this Honorable Court what happened when you notice that the Toyota Hi-Ace van
stopped abruptly the path of the Honda Civic car?
A: I saw six (6) men coming down from the Hi-Ace with long firearms.
xxxx
Q: Now tell us, Sir, what happened when six (6) men armed with long firearms alighted from the vehicle, Toyota
Hi-Ace van?
A: I saw two (2) of those people went to the white car and motioned the driver with a gun pointed motioning the
driver of the white vehicle to go down.
Q: You mentioned earlier that there were six (6) armed men who alighted. You accounted for, two (2) went to the
driver side of the white Honda Civic car, what about the others, do you know what happened?
A: They were there and two (2) of them I think ran after the watch-your-car boy and two of them went to my car,
Sir.189
When asked to identify the two men who approached the Civic, Albert pointed to Jubert and Morey. Albert named
those who approached his Prado as Roger and Robert. Roger and Robert gestured for him to alight from the Prado
and brought him to the Hi-Ace, where he saw Marcelo in the drivers seat and Ricky in the front passengers
seat.190
At around 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002, seven men went to the basement of the safehouse where Albert and Pinky
were detained. They threatened Albert with bodily harm should he not accede to their demand for ransom. Albert
identified them as Jubert, Morey, Marcelo, Ricky, Lowhen, Jose and Nelson. Five of the men left but Nelson and
Lowhen were left behind to guard Albert and Pinky.191
The overt acts of the accused-appellants Jubert, Morey, Marcelo, Ricky, Robert, Roger, Lowhen and Jose were
undoubtedly geared towards unlawfully depriving Albert of his liberty and extorting ransom in exchange for his
release.
Albert was able to identify Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Morey, Jose, Lowhen, Robert and Roger from a police line-up of
around 15 persons presented to him in Camp Crame on April 12, 2002. 192 During cross-examination, Albert
clarified that Lowhen was not among the seven persons he had identified as among his captors from the initial
police line-up of 15 persons presented to him. Albert justified the omission by stating that he saw Lowhen only
after the line-up was presented and after he had already executed his April 12, 2002 affidavit. 193
In their defense, Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Robert, Morey, Lowhen, Jose and Roger offered their respective alibis,
which fail to persuade.
Marcelo claimed that from 12:00 noon to 9:00 p.m. of April 7, 2002, he was at home repairing a motor bike. On his
part, Jubert insisted that he was fixing his uncles house in Bicutan, Taguig on the same day. Morey averred that
he was in a coconut warehouse in Burnham, Baguio City, and he left the place at around 6:00 p.m. to go to his
uncles house in Trinidad, Benguet. Noticeably, Marcelo, Jubert and Morey offered no corroborative evidence to
support their bare allegations.
Ricky and his wife, May, alleged that they were likewise at home on April 7, 2002. However, Mays testimony does
not carry much weight in view of her relation to Ricky.
Robert posited that he was in Bontoc, Mountain Province driving for Engr. Vargas from February 10, 2002 to April
8, 2002. Robert left at 10:00 a.m. of April 8, 2002 on the pretext that he would just collect rentals in Baguio. He
informed Engr. Vargas that he would be back in two days. Robert testified and Alto corroborated his statement
that the former was arrested by CIDG officers in Bicutan, Taguig on April 11, 2002.
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and
consistent with the experience of mankind; whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies
outside of judicial cognizance.194 It defies logic to figure out why Engr. Vargas was informed that Robert was
implicated in Alberts kidnapping only on October 2003, or around one and a half years after the latters
indictment. If Roberts alibi were true, it would have been more in accord with human experience if he promptly
told Engr. Vargas about his predicament for the latter was then in the best position to corroborate the formers
allegations. It is likewise perplexing why Robert, who had been driving for Engr. Vargas for five years, was in
Taguig on April 11, 2002 and so lightly regarded his commitment to the latter that he would be back in two days.
No explanations were offered to justify Roberts unreasonable omissions.
Lowhen insisted that he assumed his 24-hour duty in Perma Wood Industries in Paraaque from 7:00 a.m. of April
10, 2002 to 7:45 a.m. of April 11, 2002. He got home at 8:00 a.m., ate breakfast, and thereafter proceeded to his
sister Elsies house where he slept in the sofa until 4:00 p.m. The testimonies of Pacete, De Guzman and Elsie
were offered to support Lowhens claims. However, we find more credence in the positive and categorical
statements of Albert, against whom no ill motive was ascribed by the defense, on one hand, than in the
testimonies of persons, who are in one way or another are related to Lowhen. Further, there is no proof of
absolute physical impossibility for Lowhen to be in Amparo Subdivision in the morning of April 11, 2002,
considering that Paraaque is not very far off. In Alberts testimony, he merely made an estimate of the time in
the morning of April 11, 2002, when Lowhen, along with six other men, went to the basement. Although Albert
testified that it was around 6:00 a.m., he could have miscalculated the time considering that he no longer had a
watch and they were in a basement. Besides, Lowhen was the link between Jubert and Morey, whose
participations in the kidnapping incident on April 7, 2002 were clearly established. This renders dubious Lowhens

claim of having introduced Jubert and Morey to each other only on April 11, 2002, or four days after the latter two
had taken part in the abduction of Pinky and Albert near the Coliseum.
Jose and Roger proffered nary an explanation anent where they were on April 7, 2002. Jose anchored his defense
upon his presence at U-Cap Cockpit in Mandaluyong from the night of April 9, 2002 until 1:00 a.m. of April 10,
2002. While waiting for a cab going home, Jose claimed that CIDG officers arrested him and brought him to Camp
Crame where he remained under the polices custody. He thus claimed that contrary to Alberts claim, he could
not have been in the basement of the safehouse at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002. On the other hand, Roger alleged
that at around 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002, while he was walking along Bravo Street, Signal Village,Bicutan, Taguig
on his way to his brothers wake, he was arrested by CIDG officers. However, like in the cases of Marcelo, Jubert
and Robert, Jose and Rogers averments were bare and unsupported by any corroborative evidence.
All told, we find that the RTC and the CA did not overlook essential facts or circumstances which may otherwise
justify the acquittal of Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Robert, Morey, Lowhen, Jose and Roger for having conspired in
kidnapping Albert for the purpose of extorting ransom. That no ransom was actually paid does not negate the fact
of the commission of the crime, it being sufficient that a demand for it was made. 195
We note Marcelo, Ricky, Jose and Lowhens claims of having been subjected to mauling, illegal arrest, intimidation
and extortion attempts committed by the police authorities.
It is settled that irregularities attending the arrest of the accused-appellants should have been timely raised in
their respective motions to quash the Informations at any time before their arraignment, failing at which they are
deemed to have waived their rights to assail the same.196 No such motions were filed by the accused-appellants.
Further, without meaning to downplay or take the allegations of the accused-appellants lightly, we, however, note
that these were unsubstantiated as to the identities of the offenders and uncorroborated by other pieces of
evidence. To date, no complaints against the supposed abusive police officers had yet been filed by the accusedappellants. If the abuses were indeed committed, we exhort the accused-appellants to initiate the proper
administrative and criminal proceedings to make the erring police officers liable. We stress that while the criminal
justice system is devised to punish the offenders, it is no less the States duty to ensure that those who
administer it do so with clean hands.
Betty and Monico are to be held as
co-conspirators because they
knowingly provided the venue for
Alberts detention.
In implicating Monico, Albert testified:
PROS. FADULLON:
Q: And you said you were first handcuffed according to you, you were handcuffed with Miss Gonzales and
removed it and a new set of handcuffs were placed on you. Will you please tell us what happened after that?
A: So with my both hands handcuffed, this time I was asked to get out of the vehicle and I was led to a sort of like
underground house something like that, I had to go down a couple of steps.
Q: What happened, Sir, as you were going down, as you were led inside, what you claimed to be an underground
house and as you were going down several steps?
A: Because I was handcuffed and I didnt know where to go to pass at that time, I fell and a person held on my
arm.
Q: What happened to your glasses as you claimed you fell as you were going downstairs?
A: My glasses went down also, Sir.
Q: And you said that there was a person who held on to you, how close or how far that person from you, Sir?
A: He was just beside me, Sir.
Q: And this person can you give us his description?
A: About 50s, about 59" and has a [sic] very coarse hands, Sir.
Q: This person whom according to you held on to you as you slipped you were being led downstairs, if you will see
him again, will you be able to recognize him, Sir?
xxxx
Witness pointed to Monico in the courtroom.
xxxx
Q: What happened, Sir, when you slipped and this person now identified as accused Monico Salvador held on to
you, what happened after that?
A: He held me up and led me to the stairway proceeding down to the house, Sir. 197 (Underscoring ours)
When asked during cross examination about what transpired while he was descending the basement stairs, Albert
stated:
ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: Now, immediately after you catch [sic] the glasses, what exactly did you do?
A: I told him, "Pare, alalayan mo naman ako ng maayos pababa pala tayo nun."
Q: You told him that you should be carefully assisted. You told him that because you were not in a position to see
where you were walking?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxxx
Q: Now, did you try to get hold of the hands of Monico Salvador after the incident?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you found out that the hands were "magaspang"?
A; Yes, Sir.
Q: And that would make you very sure that he was the one who assisted you?
A: Even more sure because I saw him also.
Q: Now, after you get [sic] hold of that [sic] glasses you said to him, "Alalayan mo naman ako."?
A: Because I fell already. So, I said, "Pare alalayan mo naman ako ng maayos." That was when he was here beside
me.
Q: Besides [sic] you?
A: Yes.
Q: I thought that he was at your back holding your armpit?
A: He was here beside me. How do you carry somebody?
Q: If he was beside you, you were only able to recognize the left portion of his face?
A: I was able to see his face, Sir.
Q: The whole face?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: I thought that he was beside you?
A: He was beside me.
Q: Did you go in front of him and tried to look at the features of his face?
xxxx
A: I can see him even on my side.
Q: My question is, did you go in front of the person who assisted you?
A: No, I did not face him.198 (Underscoring ours)
When asked who handed him the food that he ate while in detention, Albert answered:
PROS. FADULLON:
Q: Now Mr. Witness, on that day, April 11, 2002, right after in the early morning, do you remember if there was
any other incident that happened in that place where you and Miss Gonzales were being kept?
A: At lunch time, I saw a woman who brought down some foods,
Sir.
Q: Lunch time of what date?
A: April 11, 2002, Sir.
Q: April 11 at around lunch time a woman brought down your food?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where were you at that time, Mr. Witness, when this woman according to you came down and brought down
your food?
A: At the sofa, Sir.
Q: Tell us, Mr. Witness, what happened when this woman brought down your food?
A: She gave the food to the guard and the guard gave the food to us, Sir.
Q: How far away from this woman Sir when you saw her handing the foods to one of the guards?
A: The stairway was just beside the sofa so you can see her, Sir.
Q: That would be again approximately 2 meters or little over a meter?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Can you give us the description of this woman Sir who according to you came down and brought down handed
over your food in [sic] one of the guards?
A: She was in her 50s, Sir.
xxxx
[Yam pointed to Betty in the courtroom.]
PROS. CHUA CHENG:
Q: Do you know, Mr. Witness, what kind of food that this accused you identified as Betty Salvador served that
lunch time?
A: Jollibee, Sir.
Q: Tell us, Sir when for the first time you see accused Betty Salvador?
A: The night before, Sir.
Q: The night before referring to what date, Sir?
A: April 10, Sir.
Q: Could you tell us under what circumstances did you see the accused Betty Salvador?
A; I was having a conversation with the guard who was at the stairway at that time when I heard a woman asking
questions to the guard, Sir.
Q: What question did she ask to the guard if you remember, Sir?
A: "Kumusta sila?".
Q: After that, what happened?
A: She gave the food to the guard, Sir.
Q: What food was this given to you that evening?
A: That was the only time Jollibbe was not served, it was corned beef, Sir.

PROS. FADULLON:
Q: That would be dinner time of April 10, 2002?
A: Yes, Sir.199 (Underscoring ours)
During cross examination, Albert testified having seen Betty, thus:
ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: Now, how did you see her at the time that she uttered the words, "Kumusta na sila?"
A: She was in front of me.
Q: Right in front of you?
A: I mean, she was going up the stairway. I can see her.
Q: So you want to tell us that she went down?
A: I did not say she went down. She was up there in the stairway coming down and she was about to talk to the
guard who was guarding us. So, when she saw the guard and said, "Kumusta sila?", I was right there at the edge
of the, at the foot of the stairway. So, I saw her.
Q: So you saw her?
A: Yes, sir.200
Albert categorically stated that on the night of April 7, 2002, Monico assisted him in descending the stairs leading
to the basement of the safehouse. Albert likewise named Betty as the woman who brought him and Pinky corned
beef for dinner on April 10, 2002, and food items from Jollibee for lunch on April 11, 2002.
This Court has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the features
and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is committed. 201 It is also settled that the
victims in-court identification is more than sufficient to establish the identities of accused-appellants as among
the malefactors,202 and previously executed affidavits are generally considered inferior to statements that the
victim gives in open court. 203 Hence, we hold that notwithstanding Alberts failure to identify Betty and Monico
from the police line-up presented on April 12, 2002, in which the spouses were allegedly included,
no reasonable doubt is cast upon the complicity of the latter two in the kidnapping. Further, Betty and Monicos
postulation that if they were indeed involved, they should not have proceeded to the scene of the rescue
operations and to the police station, likewise deserves scant consideration. There is no established doctrine to the
effect that, in every instance, non-flight is an indication of innocence. 204 It is possible for the culprits to pursue
unfamiliar schemes or strategies to confuse the police authorities. 205
We stress though that conspiracy transcends companionship. 206 Mere presence at the locus criminis cannot by
itself be a valid basis for conviction, and mere knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the
crime.207
In the case at bar, Monicos assistance extended to Albert when the latter descended the basement stairs and
Bettys visit to the safehouse to bring food could not automatically be interpreted as the acts of principals and
conspirators in the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
People of the Philippines v. Garcia 208 is instructive anent the distinctions between a conspirator and an
accomplice, viz:
In People v. De Vera, we distinguished a conspirator from an accomplice in this manner
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design.
Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of
action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they
agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely
concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan
and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their
instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.
xxxx
x x x As we have held in Garcia v. CA, "in some exceptional situations, having community of design with the
principal does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the
homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor character." x x x. 209 (Citations omitted)
Monicos assistance to Albert when the latter descended the basement stairs and Bettys visit to the safehouse to
bring Jollibee food items were not indispensable acts in the commission of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. If
to be solely considered, these acts, being of minor importance, pertain to those committed by mere accomplices.
Betty and Monico were not among those persons who forcibly abducted Albert while the latter was in the vicinity
of the Coliseum. Neither did the spouses perform positive acts to actively detain Albert. What spells the difference
on why we still find the Betty and Monico as principals and co-conspirators in the kidnapping is the circumstance
that their acts coincide with their ownership of the safehouse.
Absent his knowledge, consent or concurrence in the criminal design, the owner of a place, which was used to
detain kidnapped victims, cannot necessarily be considered as either a conspirator or an accomplice in the crime
of kidnapping for ransom. However, in the case of Betty and Monico, their claim of ignorance relative to Alberts
detention in the basement of the safehouse is belied by their presence therein. Albert positively and repeatedly
testified on the matter.
In a conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the place where the victim is to be detained is
logically a primary consideration. In the case of Betty and Monico, their house in Lumbang Street, Amparo

Subdivision has a basement. It can be reasonably inferred that the house fitted the purpose of the kidnappers.
Albert's detention was accomplished not solely by reason of the restraint exerted upon him by the presence of
guards in the safehouse, but by the circumstance of being put in a place where escape became highly
improbable. In other words, Betty and Monico were indispensable in the kidnapping of Albert because they
knowingly and purposely provided the venue to detain Albert. The spouses' ownership of the safehouse, Monico's
presence therein during Albert's arrival on the evening of April 7, 2002 and Betty's visits to bring food reasonably
indicate that they were among those who at the outset planned, and thereafter concurred with and participated in
the execution of the criminal design.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
February 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03279 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
insofar as the amount of civil indemnity awarded to Albert Yam y Lee, to be solidarily paid by the accusedappellants, is increased from PhP 50,000.00 to PhP 75,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence 210
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO
L.
REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 128106-07
January 24, 2003
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GONZALO BALDOGO, accused-appellant.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment,[i] dated October 18, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
52, Puerto Princesa City, finding accused-appellant Gonzalo Baldogo alias "Baguio" guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 12900 and Kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 12903. The trial
court imposed on accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. 12900 and reclusion
perpetua in Criminal Case No. 12903.
I. The Indictments
Two Informations were filed against accused-appellant and Edgar Bermas alias "Bunso" which read:
"That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1996 in the evening at the residence of Mr. Julio Camacho of
Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused who were both convicted by final judgment of the offense of Homicide and while
already serving sentence, committed the above name offense by conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and while
armed with a bolo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and hack one

JORGE CAMACHO, hitting him and inflicting upon him mortal wounds at the different parts of his body,
which was the direct and immediate cause of his death shortly thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident[,] premeditation and
recidivism. Puerto Princesa City, Philippines, March 5, 1996." 1
x
x
x
"That on Thursday, February 22, 1996 at more or less 8:15 in the evening at the Victim's residence, Iwahig
Prison and Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused while serving sentence at the Central Sub-Colony both for the offense of Homicide,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, commits (sic) another offense,
kidnapping one JULIE E. CAMACHO, a girl 12 years of age, and brought her to the mountains, where said
Julie E. Camacho was detained and deprived of her liberty fro [sic] more than five days.
CONTRARY TO LAW and attended by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism." 2
Accused-appellant was arraigned on June 28, 1996 and entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. 3 Edgardo
Bermas died before he could be arraigned. 4 The two cases were ordered consolidated and a joint trial thereafter
ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Julie Camacho, Dr. Edilberto Joaquin, Esteban Mamites and
Julio Camacho, Sr., and offered documentary and object evidence on its evidence-in-chief.
II. The Antecedent Facts
Julio Camacho, Sr. and his wife, Heather Esteban, had four children, namely: Julio, Jr., a student of the Palawan
State University in Puerto Princesa City and who stayed in Guaygo, Puerto Princesa City; Jorge, who was fourteen
years old;5 Julie, who was 12 years old and a grade six elementary pupil at the Iwahig Elementary School and
Jasper, who was eight years old. Julio Sr. was employed as a security guard in the Iwahig Prison and Penal Colony.
He and his family lived in a compound inside the sub-colony. Edgardo Bermas alias " Bunso," an inmate of the
penal colony, was assigned as a domestic helper of the Camacho spouses. Accused-appellant alias "Baguio," also
an inmate of the colony, was assigned in January 1996 as a domestic helper of the Camacho family. Both helpers
resided in a hut located about ten meters away from the house of the Camacho family.
In the evening of February 22, 1996, accused-appellant and Bermas served dinner to Julio Sr., Jorge and Julie in
the house of the Camachos. At about 7:30 p.m., Julio Sr. left the house to attend a bible study at the dormitory in
the Agronomy Section of the Penal Farm. Heather and her son, Jasper, were in Aborlan town. Only Jorge and his
sister Julie were left in the house.
After Julio Sr. had left the house, Julie went to the sala to study her assignment. Momentarily, Bermas called Julie
from the kitchen saying: "Jul, tawag ka ng kuya mo." Julie ignored him. After five minutes, Bermas called her again
but Julie again ignored him. Julie was perturbed when she heard a loud sound, akin to a yell, "Aahh! Ahh!" coming
from the kitchen located ten meters from the house. This prompted Julie to stand up and run to the kitchen. She
was appalled to see Jorge sprawled on the ground near the kitchen, face down and bloodied. The vicinity was
lighted by a fluorescent lamp. Standing over Jorge were accused-appellant and Bermas, each armed with a bolo. 6
The shirt of Bermas was bloodied. 7 Julie was horrified and so petrified that although she wanted to shout, she
could not. She ran back to the sala with accused-appellant and Bermas in pursuit. Accused-appellant overtook
Julie, tied her hands at her back with a torn t-shirt and placed a piece of cloth in her mouth to prevent her from
shouting for help from their neighbors. Bermas went to the room of Julie's brothers. Accused-appellant dragged
Julie outside the house and towards the mountain. Bermas tarried in the house.
With the aid of a flashlight, accused-appellant, with Julie in tow, walked for hours towards the direction of the
mountain. About a kilometer away from the house of the Camachos, accused-appellant and Julie stopped under a
big tamarind tree at the foot of the mountain. After about thirty minutes, Bermas arrived with a kettle and raw
rice. Accused-appellant and Bermas retrieved a bag containing their clothing and belongings from the trunk of the
tamarind tree. They untied Julie and removed the gag from her mouth. The three then proceeded to climb the
mountain and after walking for six hours or so, stopped under a big tree where they spent the night. When the
three woke up in the morning of the following day, February 23, 1996, they continued their ascent of the
mountain. Seven hours thereafter, they started to follow a descending route. Accused-appellant and Bermas told
Julie that they would later release her. At about 3:00 p.m., Bermas left accused-appellant and Julie. However,
accused-appellant did not let go of Julie. The two survived on sugar and rice cooked by accused-appellant. Once,
they saw uniformed men looking for Julie. However, accused-appellant hid Julie behind the tree. She wanted to
shout but he covered her mouth.
In the early morning of February 28, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie that he was leaving her as he was going to
Puerto Princesa City. He told her to fend for herself and return to the lowland the next day. After their breakfast,
accused-appellant left Julie alone to fend for herself. A few hours after accused-appellant had left, Julie decided to
return to the lowlands. She found a river and followed its course toward Balsaham until she saw a hut. She called
upon its occupant who introduced himself as Nicodemus. Julie sought help from him. When asked by Nicodemus if
she was the girl whom the police authorities were looking for, she replied in the affirmative. Nicodemus brought
Julie to Balsaham where they met some personnel of the penal colony and police officers, and Nicodemus turned
Julie over for custody to them.
Meanwhile, Julio, Sr. arrived home after his bible study at about 9:00 p.m. on February 22, 1996. He noticed that
the television set was switched on but no one was watching it. He looked for his children but they were nowhere
to be found. He then proceeded to the hut occupied by accused-appellant and Bermas but he also failed to find

them. Julio Sr. then rushed to the house of his older brother, Augusto Camacho, to look for his children, but
Augusto told him that Jorge and Julie were not there. Julio Sr. then sought the help of Romualdo Esparagoza, a
trustee of the penal farm. The two rushed back to the Camacho residence and proceeded to the kitchen where
they noticed blood on the floor. The two proceeded to the dirty kitchen and saw the bloodied body of Jorge
dumped about three meters away from the dirty kitchen. Julio Sr. and Esparagoza then brought Jorge to the Iwahig
Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival at 12:40 a.m. of February 23, 1996. Dr. Edilberto Joaquin
examined the cadaver and found that the victim was stabbed on the breast once and at the back seven times. He
sustained a lacerated wound on the neck. The layers of the neck, trachea and esophagus of Jorge had been cut.
Jorge did not sustain any defensive wound. Dr. Joaquin performed an autopsy of the cadaver and signed a medical
certificate with his findings, thus:
"MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
GENERAL DATA:
JORGE CAMACHO y ESTEBAN, 14 years old, student, resident of Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm,
approximately 5'3 inches in-height, was brought to the hospital, (DOA) dead on arrival at 12:40 AM, 23
February 1996, approximate time of death 8:00 P.M. February 22, 1996.
FINDINGS
1. Stab wound, deep, penetrating, approximately 1 inch in length, at the level of the xyphoid
process, anteriorly.
2. Stab wound, chest, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, level of the 3rd
rib.
3. Stab wound, back, right midclavicular line, level of the 5th rib.
4. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length level of the 5th rib, left midclavicular line.
5. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, 6th rib.
6. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, level of the 4th lumbar
region.
7. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch in length, right third lumbar region, deep, penetrating
involving the liver.
8. Stab wound, back, approximately 3/4 inch, at the level of the 2nd lumbar region.
9. Lacerated wound, neck, anteriorly, deep, penetrating, cutting the layers of the neck and the
trachea and esophagus.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Hypovolemia due to severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and laceration of the
neck."8
Wounds numbers 7 and 9 were fatal. It was possible that two sharp-edged and sharp pointed weapons were used
in stabbing Jorge and that two assailants stabbed the victim. 9
On February 29, 1996, Julie gave her sworn statement and a supplemental sworn statement to the police
investigators.10 Julio Sr. suffered mental anguish and sleepless nights because of the death of Jorge.
The prosecution adduced in evidence excerpts of the personal file of accused-appellant kept in the penal colony
showing that he had been convicted of homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and that he
commenced serving sentence on November 19, 1992 and that the minimum term of his penalty was to expire on
August 16, 1997.11
III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant
Accused-appellant denied killing Jorge and kidnapping Julie. Accused-appellant asserted that Julie implicated him
because she was coached and rehearsed. He testified that he was assigned as a helper in the house of Augusto
Camacho, the Chief of the Industrial Section of the colony and the older brother of Julio Sr. Augusto told accusedappellant that his brother, Julio Sr., wanted to have accused-appellant transferred as his domestic helper.
However, accused-appellant balked because he had heard from Edgardo Bermas, the helper of Julio Sr., that the
latter was cruel and had been maltreating Bermas. Nonetheless, in December 1995, accused-appellant was
transferred as a domestic helper of Julio Sr. Accused-appellant confirmed that indeed Julio Sr. was cruel because
whenever the latter was angry, he maltreated accused-appellant by spanking and boxing him. These would occur
about two times a week.
On February 22, 1996, at about 6:30 p.m., accused-appellant took his dinner in the kitchen. At about 7:00 p.m.,
while he was already in his quarters and preparing to sleep, Bermas arrived, armed with a bloodied bolo
measuring about 1 feet long and told accused-appellant that he (Bermas) had just killed Jorge to avenge the
maltreatment he received from Julio Sr. Bermas warned accused-appellant not to shout, otherwise he will also kill
him. Petrified, accused-appellant kept silent. Bermas then brought accused-appellant to the kitchen in the house
of the Camachos where accused-appellant saw the bloodied body of Jorge sprawled near the kitchen. Bermas
called Julie three times, telling her that her brother was calling for her but Julie at first ignored Bermas. Julie later
relented and went to the kitchen where Bermas grabbed her and threatened to kill her if she shouted. Bermas tied
the hands of Julie with a piece of cloth and placed a piece of cloth around her face to prevent her from shouting.
Bermas, still armed with his bolo tucked on his waist and a knife on his hand, brought accused-appellant and Julie
outside the house. The three then trekked towards the mountain. On the way, Bermas picked a bag containing
food provisions and his and accused-appellant's clothings. Accused-appellant thought of escaping but could not
because Bermas was watching him. With the help of a flashlight brought by Bermas, the three walked towards the

mountain, with Julie walking ahead of accused-appellant and Bermas. After walking for hours, they stopped by a
tree to which Bermas tied Julie. At one time, while Bermas and accused-appellant were scouring for water, Bermas
kicked accused-appellant and pushed him into a ten feet deep ravine. The right hand and foot of accusedappellant sustained bruises. He likewise sustained a sprain on his foot. Bermas left accused-appellant and Julie
after 1 days.
In the meantime, accused-appellant managed to climb out of the ravine and heard Julie calling his name. Julie
later told accused-appellant that before Bermas left, the latter told her that he was going to kill accusedappellant.
Accused-appellant and Julie remained in the mountain after Bermas had left. At one time, accused-appellant and
Julie saw soldiers who were looking for her. Accused-appellant did not reveal his and Julie's location to the soldiers
because he was afraid that he might be killed. On February 25, 1996, accused-appellant untied Julie. He told her
that he will set her free as soon as his foot shall have healed.
On February 27, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie that she can go home already. He ordered her to go down the
mountain and proceed to Balsaham on her way back home. Although his foot was still aching, accused-appellant
went down from the mountain ahead of Julie and proceeded to Balsaham. He then walked to Irawan where he took
a tricycle to the public market in the poblacion in Puerto Princesa City. He then took a passenger jeepney and
alighted at Brooke's Point where he was arrested after one week for the killing of Jorge and the kidnapping of Julie.
Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt Julie or deprive her of her liberty. He averred that
during the entire period that he and Julie were in the mountain before Bermas left him, he tried to protect her
from Bermas. Accused-appellant asserted that he wanted to bring Julie back to her parents after Bermas had left
them and to surrender but accused-appellant was afraid that Julio Sr. might kill him.
IV. The Verdict of the Trial Court
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered its decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, a Joint Judgment is hereby rendered in:
A. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12900 finding the accused Gonzalo Baldogo, alias Baguio, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of murder as defined and penalized in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659, and appreciating against him the specific
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage and use of superior strength, without any mitigating
circumstance to offset the same, and pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph, No. 1, of Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to death in the manner prescribed by law; to pay the
heirs of the deceased Jorge Camacho;
1.
Actual
and
compensatory
damages:
For expenses incurred for funeral
and other expenses incident to his
death --P45,000.00
2.
Moral
----------------------------

damages

100,000.00

3. Civil indemnity for the death of

the
victim,
Jorge
-------------------

Camacho 50,000.00

or the aggregate amount of 195,000.00

------------B. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12903 finding the accused GONZALO BALDOGO, alias, 'Baguio,' guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and
penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, and
there being no modifying circumstance appreciated and pursuant to the provisions of the second
paragraph, No. 2, of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, and not being entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of
civil interdiction for life, and of perpetual absolute disqualification; to pay the offended party, Julie
Camacho for physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and moral shock, moral damages of
P100,000; and to pay the costs.
The case as against co-accused Edgar Bermas is ordered dismissed by reason of extinction of criminal
liability occasioned by his death pending conclusion of the proceedings as against him.
SO ORDERED."12
V. Assignment of Error
In his appeal brief, accused-appellant avers that:
"I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF MURDER AND KIDNAPPING.
II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL.

III

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION AND GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE SAME.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN THE (SIC)
CRIMINAL CASE #12900."13
VI. Resolution of this Court
The first two assignments of errors being interrelated, the Court will delve into and resolve the same
simultaneously.
Accused-appellant avers that he had nothing to do with, and hence should not be claimed for, the death of Jorge
and the kidnapping and detention of Julie. Accused-appellant claims that he was acting under duress because he
was threatened by Bermas with death unless he did what Bermas ordered him to do. Accused-appellant was even
protective of Julie. He insists that the latter was not a credible witness and her testimony is not entitled to
probative weight because she was merely coached into implicating him for the death of Jorge and her kidnapping
and detention by Bermas.
We find the contention of accused-appellant farcical. At the heart of the submission of accused-appellant is the
credibility of Julie, the 12-year old principal witness of the prosecution and the probative weight of her testimony.
This Court has held in a catena of cases that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment of the probative weight of the collective evidence of the
parties and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court great respect, if not
conclusive effect. The raison d'etre of this principle is that this Court has to contend itself with the mute pages of
the original records in resolving the issues posed by the parties:
"x x x The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance,
like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter
of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have
darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort
or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in
feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations
arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict." 14
In contrast, the trial court has the unique advantage of monitoring and observing at close range the attitude,
conduct and deportment of witnesses as they narrate their respective testimonies before said court. Echoing a
foreign court's observation, this Court declared:
"Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a printed abstract in a court of last
resort. She oft hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the mind's eye of the judge who tries the case. To
him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or
sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of
the schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching overeagerness of the swift witness, as well as the
honest face of the truthful one, are alone seen by him."15
The rule, however, is not iron clad. This Court has enumerated exceptions thereto, namely: (a) when patent
inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court; (b) when the conclusions arrived at
are clearly unsupported by the evidence; (c) when the trial court ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or
misconstrued facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case. 16 In
this case, the trial court found the youthful Julie credible and her testimony entitled to full probative weight.
Accused-appellant has not sufficiently demonstrated to this Court the application of any of the aforestated
exceptions.
The Court agrees with accused-appellant that the prosecution was burdened to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of the felonies for which he is charged. This Court has held that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. It
is incumbent on the prosecution to prove the corpus delicti, more specifically, that the crimes charged had been
committed and that accused-appellant precisely committed the same. The prosecution must rely on the strength
of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused. 17 The reasonable standard rule
which was adopted by the United States way back in 1978 is a requirement and a safeguard, in the words of Mr.
Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court, "of due process of law in the historic, procedural
content of due process." The United States Supreme Court emphasized in Re: Winship 18 that in a criminal
prosecution, the accused has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he
may lose his liberty or even his life upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by
the conviction.
In the cases at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove that accused-appellant killed Jorge.
However, the prosecution adduced indubitable proof that accused-appellant conspired with Bermas not only in
killing Jorge but also in kidnapping and detaining Julie.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy if two or more persons agree to commit a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.

Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony
pointing to a joint purpose and design and community of intent. 19 It is not required that there be an agreement for
an appreciable period prior to the commission of a felony; rather, it is sufficient that at the time of the commission
of the offense, all the conspira`tors had the same purpose and were united in its execution. 20 In a conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all.21 All the accused are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their
participation.22 For a conspirator to be criminally liable of murder or homicide, it is not necessary that he actually
attacks or kills the victim. As long as all the conspirators performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim,
all the conspirators are criminally liable for the death of said victim. 23
In these cases, the prosecution adduced conclusive proof that accused-appellant indeed conspired with Bermas to
kill Jorge and kidnap Julie as shown by the following cogent facts and circumstances:
1. When Julie responded to the repeated calls of Bermas for her to go to the kitchen on his pretext that Jorge
wanted to talk to her, Julie saw accused-appellant and Bermas, each armed with a bolo, about half a meter from
Jorge who was sprawled on the ground, bloodied all over.24
2. Even as Julie fled from the kitchen for dear life to the sala of their house, accused-appellant and Bermas ran
after her. Accused-appellant tied the hands of Julie with a piece of cloth and inserted a piece of cloth into her
mouth to prevent her from shouting for help from their neighbors. 25
3. With a flashlight on hand, accused-appellant then exited from the house, dragged Julie towards the direction of
the mountain while Bermas remained in the house to rummage through the things in the bedroom of her brothers.
Accused-appellant stopped for a while for Bermas to join him.26
4. Before the killing of Jorge, accused-appellant and Bermas placed their clothing and personal belongings in a
bag and buried the bag under a tree, and when accused-appellant and Bermas were on their way to the mountain
after killing Jorge, they excavated and retrieved the bag from under the tree. 27
5. Accused-appellant and Bermas brought with them to the mountain a kettle filled with raw rice which they
cooked in the forest.28
6. When Julie saw uniformed men who were looking for her and wanted to shout for help, accused-appellant
covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting for help.29
7. Even after Bermas had left accused-appellant and Julie in the forest in the afternoon of February 23, 1991,
accused-appellant continued detaining Julie in the forest until February 27, 1996, when he abandoned Julie in the
forest to fend for herself.
The evidence of the prosecution was even buttressed by the judicial admissions of accused-appellant, thus:
1. After releasing Julie on February 27, 1996, accused-appellant proceeded to Puerto Princesa City and on to
Brooke's Point where he was arrested a week after said date. 30
2. Both accused-appellant and Bermas had a motive to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie, that is, to avenge the repeated
maltreatment and physical abuse on them by Julio Sr., the father of Jorge and Julie. 31
The flight of both accused-appellant and Bermas from the house of Julio Sr. to the mountain where they found
refuge after killing Jorge, and their motive to kill Jorge Jr. and kidnap and detain Julie in conjunto constitute potent
evidence of their confabulation and of their guilt for the death of Jorge and kidnapping and detention of Julie. 32
The bare denial by accused-appellant of criminal liability for the crimes charged is inherently weak. Accusedappellant's claims that he even protected Julie from harm and that he was forced by Bermas to kidnap Julie are of
the same genre.33 The bare denial by accused-appellant of the crimes charged constitutes self-serving negative
evidence which cannot prevail over the categorical and positive testimony of Julie and her unequivocal
identification of accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged. 34
Accused-appellant's insistence that he was forced by Bermas, under pain of death, to cooperate with him in killing
Jorge and kidnapping and detaining Julie is merely an afterthought. For duress to exempt accused-appellant of the
crimes charged, "the fear must be well-founded, and immediate and actual damages of death or great bodily
harm must be present and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused for
escape or interpose self-defense in equal combat." 35 Accused-appellant is burdened to prove by clear and
convincing evidence his defense of duress. He should not be shielded from prosecution for crime by merely
setting up a fear from, or because of, a threat of a third person." 36 As Lord Dennan declared in Reg. Vs. Tyler,37 "No
man from fear of circumstances to himself has the right to make himself a party to committing mischief on
mankind." In these cases, in light of the testimony of Julie and the inculpatory acts of accused-appellant no less,
there is no doubt that the latter acted in concert with Bermas and is himself a principal by direct participation.
That accused-appellant abandoned Julie after six days of captivity does not lessen his criminal culpability much
less exempt him from criminal liability for the killing of Jorge and the kidnapping and detention of Julie.
Accused-appellant failed to prove his claim that Julie was coached on how and what to testify on. Indeed, when
asked to identify the person or persons who coached Julie, accused-appellant failed to mention any person:
"Q
You heard the testimony of Julie Camacho that she is pointing to you to have kidnapped her and
participated in the killing of her brother Jorge, what can you say to that?
A
That is not true.
Q
You donot (sic) know the reason why? In fact you treated her well, why she pointed you as one of
the authors of the crime?
A
Maybe somebody coached her.
Q
Who do you think coached her?

A
I cannot mention the name but I am sure that somebody coached her." 38
It bears stressing that when she testified, Julie was merely 12 years old. The Court has repeatedly held that the
testimony of a minor of tender age and of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of an
older person so that once it is established that they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath,
their testimony should be given full credence and probative weight. 39 Julie had no ill motive to tergiversate the
truth and falsely testify against accused-appellant. Hence, her testimony must be accorded full probative weight. 40
VII. Crimes Committed by Accused-Appellant
The Court shall now delve into and resolve the issue of what crime or crimes accused-appellant is guilty of. The
trial court convicted accused-appellant of two separate crimes and not the special complex crime of kidnapping
with murder or homicide under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act 7659.41 The trial court is correct. There is no evidence that Jorge was kidnapped or detained first by
accused-appellant and Bermas before he was killed. The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Code is applicable
only if kidnapping or serious illegal detention is committed and the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
Re: Criminal Case No. 12900
(For Murder)
The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, based on the following findings and ratiocination:
"The slaying of Jorge Camacho took place about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of February 22, 1996. It was
carried out after the accused have been through tidying-up the kitchen, the dining room and the kitchen
wares the family of the Camachos used in their early dinner before 7:00 o'clock that evening. But even
before dinner, the accused have already made preparations for their flight, shown by the fact that they
already had their clothes, other personal belongings and food provisions stacked in their respective
travelling bags then placed in a spot where they can just pick them up as they take to flight." 42
The trial court also appreciated against accused-appellant the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength with the following disquisition:
"The victim, Jorge Camacho, is a lad only 14 years of age and unarmed when brutally slain. On the
contrary, both accused are of age and confirmed convicted felons. Any one of them would already be
superior in strength and disposition to their hapless and innocent victim. How much more with the
combined strength and force of the two of them.
Their choice of the object of their brutality is indicative of their unmistakable intent of taking advantage of
their superior strength. The likely object of their resentment, for purported cruelty to them, is Prison Guard
Julio Camacho, father of the victim. They could have directed their criminal intent on Julio Camacho
himself. But Julio Camacho could be a match in strength and agility to any of them or even to the
combined force of both of them. So, to insure execution of their criminal intent without risk to them for the
defense which the offended party might put up, they directed their criminal acts against the deceased who
is very much inferior in physical combat even only to any one of them." 43
While the Court agrees that accused-appellant is guilty of murder, it does not agree with the rulings of the trial
court that the crime was qualified by evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. To warrant a finding of
evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following requisites:
"x x x (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that
the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and
the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. x x x" 44
The qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, like any other qualifying circumstance, must
be proved with certainty as the crime itself. A finding of evident premeditation cannot be based solely on mere
lapse of time from the time the malefactor has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he actually
commits it.45 The prosecution must adduce clear and convincing evidence as to when and how the felony was
planned and prepared before it was effected. 46 The prosecution is burdened to prove overt acts that after deciding
to commit the felony, the felon clung to his determination to commit the crime. The law does not prescribe a time
frame that must elapse from the time the felon has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he commits it.
Each case must be resolved on the basis of the extant factual milieu.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation. The barefaced fact that accused-appellant and
Bermas hid the bag containing their clothing under a tree located about a kilometer or so from the house of Julio
Sr. does not constitute clear evidence that they decided to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie. It is possible that they hid
their clothing therein preparatory to escaping from the colony. There is no evidence establishing when accusedappellant and Bermas hid the bag under the tree. The prosecution even failed to adduce any evidence of overt
acts on the part of accused-appellant, nor did it present evidence as to when and how he and Bermas planned
and prepared to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie and to prove that the two felons since then clung to their determination
to commit the said crimes. Although accused-appellant and Bermas were armed with bolos, there is no evidence
that they took advantage of their numerical superiority and weapons to kill Jorge. Hence, abuse of superior
strength cannot be deemed to have attended the killing of Jorge. 47 Nighttime cannot likewise be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance because there is no evidence that accused-appellant and Bermas purposely sought
nighttime to facilitate the killing or to insure its execution or accomplishment or to evade their arrest. 48 Neither is

dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was killed in their house or taken from their house
and killed outside the said house.
In light of the evidence on record, it is clear that the killing of Jorge was qualified by treachery. When Jorge was
killed by accused-appellant and Bermas, he was barely 14 years old. The Court has previously held that the killing
of minor children who by reason of their tender years could not be expected to put up a defense is attended by
treachery.49 Since treachery attended the killing, abuse of superior strength is absorbed by said circumstance. 50
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 is reclusion
perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the commission of the crime,
accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 51 Conformably with current jurisprudence,
accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00
and the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages. Although Julio Sr. testified that he spent P45,000.00
during the wake and burial of the victim, the prosecution failed to adduce any receipts to prove the same. Hence,
the award of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages has no factual basis and should thus be deleted.
Re: Criminal Case No. 12903
(For Kidnapping)
The trial court convicted accused-appellant of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court is correct.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was taken from Article 267 of the Spanish Penal Code, which reads:
"Art. 267Detencin ilegal grave.Ser castigado con la pena de reclusin temporal el particular que
secuestrare o encerrare a otro o en cualquier forma le privare de libertad."
"Secuestrare" means sequestration.52 To sequester is to separate for a special purpose, remove or set apart,
withdraw from circulation.53 It also means to lock-up or imprison. "Encerrare" is a broader concept than
secuestrare.54 Encerrare includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in
whatever form and for whatever length of time. As explained by Groizard, "encerrar" es meter una persona
cosa en parte de donde no pueda salir"; detener o arrestar, poner en prisin, privar de la libertad alguno." He
continued that "la detencin, la prisin, la privacin de la libertad de una persona, en cualquier forma y por
cualquier medio por cualquier tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el libre ejercicio de su
actividad."55 On his commentary on the Spanish Penal Code, Cuello Calon says that the law "preve dos
modalidades de privacion de libertad, el encierro y la detencion. Encerrar significa recluir a una persona en un
lugar de donde no puede salir, detener a una persona equivale a impedirle o restringirle la libertad de
movimiento. Para que el sujeto pasivo no quiera permanecer en el sitio donde esta recluido, pues no es posible
llamar encierro ni detencion a la estancia de un a persona en lugar del que no quiere salir."56
In this case, Julie, a minor, was not locked up. However, she was seized and taken from her house through force
and dragged to the mountain. Since then, she was restrained of her liberty by and kept under the control of
accused-appellant and Bermas. She was prevented from going back home for a period of about six days. Patently
then, accused-appellant is guilty of kidnapping and illegally detaining Julie. The crime was aggravated by dwelling
because Julie was taken from their house by accused-appellant and Bermas. However, dwelling was not alleged in
the Information as an aggravating circumstance as required by Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure which reads:
"SEC. 9. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it."57
Even if dwelling is proven but is not alleged in the Information as an aggravating circumstance, the same will not
serve to aggravate the penalty.58
Quasi-recidivism as defined in Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code 59 is alleged in both Informations. Accusedappellant is alleged to have committed murder and kidnapping while serving sentence in the penal colony by final
judgment for the crime of homicide. Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance. 60 The prosecution is
burdened to prove the said circumstance by the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. In the present
case, to prove quasi-recidivism, the prosecution was burdened to adduce in evidence a certified copy of the
judgment convicting accused-appellant of homicide and to prove that the said judgment had become final and
executory.61 The raison d'etre is that:
"x x x Since the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to such information, there was a joinder of
issues not only as to his guilt or innocence, but also as to the presence or absence of the modifying
circumstances so alleged. The prosecution was thus burdened to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt and the existence of the modifying circumstances. It was then grave error for the trial
court to appreciate against the accused-appellant the aggravating circumstance of recidivism simply
because of his failure to object to the prosecution's omission as mentioned earlier." 62
In this case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely the excerpt of the prison record of accused-appellant
showing that he was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 10357-R by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
(Branch 6) with a penalty of from six years and one day as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day
as maximum and that the sentence of accused-appellant commenced on November 19, 1992 and that the
minimum term of the penalty was to expire on August 16, 1997. 63 The excerpt of the prison record of accusedappellant is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court 64 to prove the judgment

of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and to prove that said judgment had become final and executory. Said
excerpt is merely secondary or substitutionary evidence which is inadmissible absent proof that the original of the
judgment had been lost or destroyed or that the same cannot be produced without the fault of the prosecution.
The barefaced fact that accused-appellant was detained in the penal colony does prove the fact that final
judgment for homicide has been rendered against him. 65 There being no modifying circumstances in the
commission of the crime, accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with
Article 63 of the Revised penal Code.66
VIII. Civil Liability of Accused-Appellant for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
The trial court awarded the amount of P100,000.00 to Julie by way of moral damages for the felony of kidnapping
with serious illegal detention, predicated on her having suffered serious anxiety and fright when she was
kidnapped and dragged to the mountain where she was detained for several days. The trial court is correct. Julie
is entitled to moral damages.67 In light of the factual milieu in this case, the amount is reasonable. Julie is also
entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. 68
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION:
1. In Criminal Case No. 12900, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there
being no modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the felony. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered
to pay to the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the amount of P50,000.00 as of
moral damages. The award of P45,000.00 as of actual damages is deleted.
2. In Criminal Case No. 12903, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention defined in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, and
there being no modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the felony is hereby meted the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay moral damages to the victim, Julie Camacho, in
the amount of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 138033

January 30, 2007

RENATO
BALEROS,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

JR.,

Petitioner,

RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
In this Motion for Partial Reconsideration, 1 petitioner-movant Renato Baleros, Jr., through counsel, seeks
reconsideration of our Decision of February 22, 2006, acquitting him of the crime of attempted rape, thereby
reversing an earlier decision of the Court of Appeals, but adjudging him guilty of light coercion and sentencing
him to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the
costs.

It is petitioners submission that his conviction for light coercion under an Information for attempted rape, runs
counter to the en banc ruling of the Court in People v. Contreras 2 where the Court held:
The Solicitor General contends that accused-appellant should be held liable for unjust vexation under Art. 287(2)
of the Revised Penal Code. However, the elements of unjust vexation do not form part of the crime of rape as
defined in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, the circumstances stated in the information do not
constitute the elements of the said crime. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot be convicted of unjust vexation.
Petitioners reliance on Contreras is misplaced. There, the 12 identical Informations 3 substantially alleged:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses IAN CONTRERAS Y EROY, based on the sworn declaration of one
ANGELIC OCRENAS y CONTRERAS assisted by NELENE DIAZ y OCRENAS of the crime of "STATUTORY RAPE IN
RELATION TO R.A. 7610," committed as follows:
That between the period from May to June 1996 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with one ANGELIC OCRENAS y CONTRERAS, age 6 years old.
Contrary to law.
Unlike the 12 separate Informations in Contreras, the indicting Information for attempted rape against the
petitioner in the instant case contains averments constituting and thus justifying his conviction for unjust
vexation, a form of light coercion, under Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. Here, the Information reads:
That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano
with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commenced the commission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge
with her but was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against her will and consent to her damage and
prejudice. (Italics ours.)
Contrary to law.
The aforequoted Information states all the facts and ingredients that fully apprised the petitioner of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, in compliance with his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
of the charges against him.
Petitioner argues, however, that the Information, as quoted above, does not allege that the complained act of
covering the face of the victim (Malou) with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical caused her annoyance, irritation,
torment, distress and disturbance. We wish to stress that malice, compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in
an Information for unjust vexation. Unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for
the reason that the term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some
physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person. 4 As pointed out in the Decision
sought to be reconsidered:
The paramount question [in a prosecution for unjust vexation] is whether the offender's act causes annoyance,
irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. That Malou, after the
incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact
that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed, by the acts
of the petitioner.
For being a mere rehash of those already passed upon and found to be without merit in the Decision sought to be
reconsidered, the other grounds relied upon by the petitioner in his Motion for Partial Reconsideration in support
of his plea for a complete acquittal need not be belabored anew.
WHEREFORE, the motion under consideration is DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 110097 December 22, 1997

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ARNULFO ASTORGA, accused-appellant.

PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee,

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Actual detention or "locking up" is the primary element of kidnapping. If the evidence does not adequately prove
this element, the accused cannot be held liable for kidnapping. In the present case, the prosecution merely
proved that appellant forcibly dragged the victim toward a place only he knew. There being no actual detention or
confinement, the appellant may be convicted only of grave coercion.
The Case
The foregoing principle is used by this Court in resolving the appeal of Arnulfo Astorga challenging the March 31,
1993 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao convicting him of kidnapping.
In an Information 2 dated March 24, 1992 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8243, Appellant Arnulfo Astorga was
charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about December 29, 1991 in the Municipality of Tagum, Province of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and by
means of force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Yvonne Traya, a minor, 8
years of age, thereby depriving her of her liberty against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said
offended party.
Arraigned on February 24, 1993, Appellant Astorga, duly assisted by his counsel, 3 pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial on the merits ensued. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision 4 reads as follows: 5
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the guilt of accused ARNULFO ASTORGA having been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, pursuant to Article 267 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, [he] is hereby sentenced
to Reclusion Perpetua to be served at the National Penitentiary, [Muntinlupa].
This appeal was filed directly with this Court in view of the penalty imposed. 6
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution was narrated in the Decision of the trial court, as follows: 7
Prosecution witnesses extant from their testimonies categorically assert that around 6:30 P.M. children of
neighbors were near the store of the grandparents of Yvonne Traya.
Incidentally, there was a brown out that evening hence candle was used. The daughter and nephew of her
aunt Bebeth were quarelling [sic] about the possession of a flashlight until the glass got lost. Accused or
"Boy" Astorga, went near and asked her daughter Jane what happened. Glenda or Bebeth grabbed her
baby and went home.
Accused told Yvonne to go with him to buy candy. She did not answer and accused immediately grabbed
and hold [sic] her hand. Accused placed his hand on her shoulder and covered his [sic] mouth.
Yvonne was only eight (8) years old on 29 December 1991 when she was brought by the accused allegedly
to buy candy. Some stores were closed; others were opened. Accused never went inside the store to buy
candy. Instead she [sic] held and dragged Yvonne until they went inside the compound of Maco Elementary
School. They were walking inside the perimeter fence, [while the accused was] holding closely the child.
Later, there being no person around the gate, accused brought her out to the highway and walked towards
the direction of Tagum.
Yvonne stays with her grandparents and so with her parents at Sitio Binuangan, Maco. She asked him
where they were going and accused answered that they were going home. She told him that they were
already on the opposite direction because her grandparent's house is at Binuangan, while their route was
going towards Tagum. Indeed, it was an opposite direction. Notwithstanding the assertion of Yvonne that
they were on the wrong direction, accused placed his hands on her shoulder and dragged her. She cried
and protested that she must go home. Accused did not heed her plea and while she was forced to walk she
continued crying.
While accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation as described, somewhere near the Luponlupon
bridge they met some group of men. Having met on their opposite direction, the two, were noticed by the
group of youngsters. The group were bound to Maco Catholic Church to see a drama. Having met the two
and as noticed by the group accused keep [sic] on looking back at them. The group were suspicious about
the man who was bringing a child. The group decided to follow them. Accused hurriedly walked fast with
Yvonne, and to prevent from being overtaken, he carried the victim and ran. They were chased. After a
distance of half a kilometer they were overtaken.
Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions with others in chasing, asked the accused
where they were bound. He answered towards Binuangan. The group noticed something suspicious
because their destination was already towards Tagum which is an opposite direction to Binuangan.
When asked who is the child, accused answered Traya. Jonathan one of those who chased knew the family.
He got from the accused Yvonne who showed some resistance. Nevertheless, the group brought her home
at Binuangan. Likewise, accused was also brought by them to Yvonne's home. The house of accused and
Yvonne were five (5) meters away. Accused wanted to talk to the parents of the victim, but he was driven
by her aunt and adviced [sic] to leave otherwise he will be stabbed by Yvonne's father. He left and never
talked with the family.
Evidence for the Defense
The facts as viewed by the defense are presented in the Appellant's Brief, 8 dated December 10, 1993:
The defense consisted of the testimonies of Arbeth Nalcot and the accused-appellant himself.
Arbeth Nalcot, a resident of Tagum, Davao, testified tht [sic] in the afternoon of December 29, 1991, she
was at the Municipal Hall of Maco, Davao. She saw Astorga with two (2) companions. They were drinking
Red Horse and were already drunk. When they finished drinking, she went with Astorga to the latter's
house. (TSN, pp. 7-8 and 18, March 23, 1993). The house of Astorga is about 5 meters away from the
house of the complainant[.] Yvonne came and asked money from the accused to buy candy. The two went
together and she was left behind. She told them to hurry up. When they failed to return, she looked for

them, but because it was already dark. She did not find them. She went back to the house of the accused.
(Ibid., pp. 10-11).
Arnulfo Astorga, a resident of Maco, Davao and a gold panner testified that "at around 1:00 P.M. of
December 29, 1991, he arrived at Maco from Tagum. Upon arrival his two friends, Vicvic and Anding were
already at his home. They decided to drink, hence they proceeded to Adecor Cottage and drank two
gallons of Tuba. At around 2:00 P.M., they were at the market place and drink beer grande. At 5:00 P.M. on
the same day, the three proceeded near the municipal hall and with some persons, they again continued
their drinking spree taking up Red Horse wine". (Decision, p. 3).
At about 6:00 P.M., he was already drunk and he went home. Yvonne approached him and asked him
money to buy candy. He told her that they will buy. They were not able to buy because the two stores
where they went were already closed. (TSN, pp. 12 and 13, March 24, 1993). He took her for a stroll for his
drunkeness [sic] to subside. They walked inside the school premises which was about 20 meters away from
the second store. They went out of the school compound going towards Lupon-lupon because due to his
drunkneness [sic], he thought it was the way towards their house. (Ibid, pp. 14-15) They reached Luponlupon bridge, crossed it twice thinking that it was the bridge near the municipal hall. After reaching Purok,
they met several persons, he was asked were (sic) they were heading, and he answered to Tagumpay, but
he was told that they [sic] way was already going to Tagum. He requested those persons to guide them to
Tagumpay. They asked him who was the child he was carrying. He answered that it was Traya's child, (Ibid,
pp. 16-17). He was carrying the child because he was already crying she already wanted to go home. The
group of persons, men and women, guided them. Yvonne was being held by the women. They arrived at
Yvonne's house. He talked to the auntie of the child and told her that he would converse with her but he
was advised to go away because the father of Yvonne might hack him. So he went home. (Ibid, pp. 18-19)
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court justified its finding of guilt with the following discussion: 9
Accused insisted [that] he was already drunk hence when he took Yvonne to buy candy, he strolled
with her so that his drunkenness be subsided.
All these defense version was rebutted by Yvonne when she categorically declared that she did not
smell liquor on the accused.
His defense of intoxication has no leg to stand [on].
Consider these facts.
Never did he present Vicvic and Anding to corroborate that he was intoxicated that afternoon and at
dusk because of their drinking spree from 1:00 P.M. until 5:00 P.M.
He did not rebut the testimonies of Fabila that when they noticed his actions suspicious bringing
with him a child, he walked fast dragging Yvonne. When he noticed that the group of youngsters
were chasing him, he carried Yvonne and ran until they covered a distance of half a kilometer in
chasing them, until they had overtaken him.
If he was that intoxicated, being under stupor and weakened by liquor, he could not ran that fast
carrying Yvonne for half a kilometer.
Moreover, Yvonne categorically in straight forward testimony asserted that she did not smell liquor
on the accused.
Accused, naivety [sic], that because of his intoxication, he got lost and was not able to proceed with
Yvonne to Binuangan was a shallow afterthought.
It must be recalled that Yvonne told him they were already going at opposite direction from home.
Instead they were heeding towards Tagum. Accused did not change course.

xxx xxx xxx

Again, not only force was employed in having Yvonne as captive by dragging, slapping her mouth
and was holding her tight, but accused also used psychological means of scaring her about a red
eyed ghost.
Through this means and efforts, Yvonne was deprived of her liberty and was by force prevented to
go home to her parents.
On rebuttal, Yvonne denied that she asked money from accused to buy candy. She also denied as
testified by defense witness Arbeth Nalcot that she went to the house of the accused on 29
December 1991 or on any other dates to ask money from Astorga for candy.
Defense evidence are [sic] punctured with unbelievability in his off tangent and incredible theory of
drunkardness. His alleged being lost in the direction of Binuangan in spite of Yvonne's insistence
and that of the person they met that he was on the wrong way considering that there are no criss
crossing roads except the highway is preposterous.
The Issues
Appellant imputes the following errors to the trial court: 10
I
The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses which
were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions.
II
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that Yvonne Traya was not
detained, locked-up or deprived of her liberty.
III
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that appellant had no motive to
kidnap Yvonne Traya.
In the main, appellant challenges the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the legal characterization
of the acts imputed to him.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only of grave coercion, not kidnapping.
First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are not worthy of credence because
they were inconsistent and improbable. He cites the following:
Glenda Chavez testified that she was present when the accused told Yvonne that they will buy
candy. She sensed that the accused was drunk. (TSN, pp. 10-11, March 10, 1993). These
testimonies were contradicted by Yvonne Traya when she declared that Glenda Chavez had already
went [sic] inside their house when [the] accused told her that they will buy candy (TSN, pp. 10,
March 16, 1993). She testified that she did not smell liquor on the accused. (Decision, pp. 3-4)
Edwin Fabila testified that their group was able to overtake the accused at a distance of 2 fathoms
and they [sic] him about 15 to 20 meters (TSN, p. 35, March 10, 1993) Arnel Fabila, on the other

hand, testified that they overtook the accused after chasing him at a distance of half kilometer
(TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993).
Yvonne Traya testified that the accused could not ran fast carrying her because she was heavy.
(TSN, p. 19, March 16, 1993). However, Arnel Fabila declared that they were able to overtake the
accused only after chasing him at a distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993) meaning
accused was running fast. 11
We hold, however, that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses concerning minor details and
collateral matters, like the examples cited by appellant, do not affect the substance, veracity or weight of
their declarations. These inconsistencies reinforce, rather than weaken, their credibility, for different
witnesses of startling events usually perceive things differently. 12 Indeed, the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses cannot be expected to be uniform to the last detail.
The testimony of Glenda Chavez that the accused was drunk at that time allegedly contradicted Yvonne's
statement that the accused did not smell of liquor. This does not detract from the credibility of either
witness. Yvonne, then an eight-year-old child, 13 and her Aunt Glenda, then twenty-seven years old, 14 do
not have the same experiences or level of maturity; hence, their perceptions of events differ. More
important, whether the accused was drunk or not is an insignificant detail that does not substantially affect
the testimonies of these witnesses.
Further, the discrepancy in the witnesses' estimate of the distance covered by the men who chased
appellant does not render their testimonies incredible. 15 Quite the contrary, such discrepancy shows their
candor and sincerity, demonstrating that their testimonies were unrehearsed. 16 Yvonne testified that when
appellant noticed the group of men following them, he carried her and ran. Yvonne's testimony is in accord
with that of Arnel Fabila a member of the group who chased appellant that they were able to overtake
appellant after chasing him half a kilometer. 17
Appellant's challenge to the credibility of the prosecution account is also premised on the alleged failure of
the
trial
court
to
consider
the
following
points: 18
a) that the alleged victim admitted that she and the accused casually moved around the school
premises, as if they were strolling; That when they were already in the highway, they were also
walking openly and casually until they were met by a group of youngster[s].
Edwin Fabila, one of the prosecution's witnesses, corroborated the fact that the two were walking
casually along the highway when he first saw them;
b) That it is highly incredible that accused and the alleged victim will not be seen or noticed by the
people travelling or those persons residing along the highway if it was true that the accused was
dragging her and she was continuously crying from her residence up to a distance of more than one
kilometer;
c) That the accused and the alleged victim were travelling at a very slow pace; a distance of barely
a kilometer for a period of more than two hours;
d) That the accused was very drunk, having been drinking different kinds of intoxicating liquors
from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., causing him to be confused on which way they should take in going
home.
e) That the accused was not hurt by the group of youngsters who allegedly rescued the child, nor
was immediately brought to the municipal hall which was just near the house of the victim for the
filing of the necessary charge; this [sic] actuations only confirm the fact that the accused merely
sought their help in guiding them home, and
f) That it took more than one week for the complainant and her parents to file the case at the
Fiscal's Office.

We cannot sustain these contentions. The charge is not belied by the one-week delay in the filing of the
complaint. It has been held that delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily
weaken the credibility of a witness where such delay is satisfactorily explained. 19 In the present case, one
week was reasonable, considering that the victim was a resident of Binuangan and that the case was filed
in Tagum, Davao.
Furthermore, the group whom appellant met did not hurt or bring him to the municipal hall, because they
deemed it more urgent at the time to rescue Yvonne and to bring her home, which they actually did. 20
There is no settled rule on how a group of young men should react upon seeing a young girl snatched by
an older man. Verily, violence is not the only normal reaction of young men who see a girl being forcibly
taken.
Appellant's claim that he and Yvonne were merely strolling and walking casually does not negate the fact
that Yvonne was deprived of her will. As noted by the trial court, appellant used physical force and
psychological means in restraining her. 21 Despite her young age, Yvonne was able to clearly recount the
events that transpired on that fateful night.
Moreover, there is no merit in the argument that the people travelling or living along the highway should
have noticed appellant and Yvonne. The fact is that a group of men actually noticed and ultimately chased
them.
All in all, appellant utterly fails to justify a departure from the long settled rule that the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses should be accorded great respect on appeal. 22
Second Issue: No Motive to "Kidnap"
Petitioner contends that "[t]here was no evidence presented to prove why the accused should kidnap
Yvonne Traya." He submits that "the prosecution had failed to prove [any] motive to support the alleged
kidnapping incident, thus, making the theory of the defense more credible and believable." 23
The contention is insignificant. Motive is not an element of the crime. Furthermore, motive becomes
material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a
crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it. Indeed, motive is totally irrelevant
when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 24 In this
case, the identity of appellant is not in question. He himself admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco Central
Elementary School.
Third Issue: Kidnapping or Coercion?
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove one essential element of kidnapping the fact of
detention or the deprivation of liberty. The solicitor general counters that deprivation of liberty is not
limited to imprisoning or placing the victim in an enclosure. Citing People vs. Crisostomo, 25 he argues:
(T)he act proven in the record constitutes (kidnapping). It is no argument against this conclusion
that the accused deprived the offended party of her liberty without placing her in an inclosure;
because illegal detention, as defined and punished in our Code, may consist not only in imprisoning
a person but also in detaining her or depriving her in any manner of her liberty. 26
We agree with appellant's contention this time.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, 27 the elements of kidnapping are as follows:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.

4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
5. That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or
6. That it committed simulating public authority; or
7. That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats
to kill him are made; or
8. That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses the terms "lockup" ( encerrar) rather
than "kidnap" (secuestrar or raptar). Lockup is included in the broader term of "detention," which refers not
only to the placing of a person in an enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to any other deprivation of
liberty which does not necessarily involve locking up. 28 Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was originally
approved and enacted in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in cases of conflict with the
English version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised Administrative Code. 29
A review of the events as narrated by the prosecution witnesses ineluctably shows the absence of "locking
up." Victim Yvonne Traya testified: 30
Q And after that what happened next?
A When Auntie Bebeth went inside her house she was already bringing her child and
bringing with her candle. And Arnulfo Astorga told me that we will buy candy, sir.
Q And after that?
A And while I was not answering the question he immediately grabbed me.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And after that, after he held your hand, what did he do next?
A He placed his hands on my shoulder and also covering [sic] my mouth.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And after that what did he do next?
A He brought me to the school.
Q What school did Boy Astorga bring you? What is the name of the school?
A Maco Central Elementary School.
Q How far is Maco Central Elementary School from your house?
A A little bit near.
Q When Boy Astorga brought you to school, was it dark?
A Yes, sir.
Q Exactly where in Maco Elementary School did Boy Astorga bring you?
A Inside the gate, sir.

Q And once inside the gate what did he do to you?

A We were going around the school?
xxx xxx xx
Q Do you know why you were going around the school?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why, what did he do?
A We were going around and when he saw that there is no person in the gate we
passed at that gate.
Q And where did he go after passing that gate?
A Towards Lupon-lupon, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about you, did you talk to him?
A I asked him where we were going and he told me that we are going home and I told
him that this is not the way to our house, and we did not pass this way. (Witness
gesturing a certain direction).
Q And so when you said that that is not the way, when you said that is not the way
because our house is towards Binuangan. . .
By the way, you said you were going to Lupon-lupon, do you know to what direction is
going to Lupon-lupon, to what place is Lupon-lupon going to?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A Going to my place.
Q Do you know the place where it was going? What is that place?
A On the road going to Tagum.
Q Now, what, about your house, where is it going?
A To Binuangan.
Q And so when you . . . what did he do next when you said that is not the place going
to your house?
A We continued walking and he also placed his hands on my shoulder and dragged
me, sir.
Q What about you, what did you do when he was dragging you?
A I was crying, sir.

Q Did you say any word to him when you were crying?
A Yes, I told him that we are going home.
Q And what did Boy Astorga say?
A He told me that we will be going home, and told me not to make any noise because
if I will make any noise we will be lost on our way.
Q And so, what did you do?
A I continued crying, sir.
Q And after that, what happened?
A We continued walking and we met a person and he asked Boy Astorga where we
are going, sir.
Q What did that man ask Boy Astorga?
A The man asked Boy Astorga where are you going, and Boy Astorga answered, to
Binuangan, but the man continued to say that this way is going to Tagum and not to
Binuangan any more.
Q What else did the man ask, if any?
A I further said that we will already leave, and we will be the ones to go to
Binuangan, and after that, Boy Astorga put me down because he urinated. So, at that
instance, I ran, but, after he urinated, he already took hold of me not to run any more
because there is a ghost.
Q When you said you ran away after Boy Astorga left you when he urinated, where
did you run?
A Towards Binuangan, sir.
Q Towards the direction of your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were overtaken again by Boy Astorga?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he do to you when you were overtaken by Boy Astorga?
A He took hold of me again and he told me, he threatened me that there is [ sic] a red
eyes but I answered him that is [sic] not a red eyes of the ghost but that is a light
coming from the vehicle.
Q Now, what happened next?
A He placed a necklace on me, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
A He was dragging me and I was crying when he was dragging me.

Q While you were being dragged did you make any plea to him?
A Yes, I told him that I will go home.
Q And what did he say?
A He said that we will go home but I know [sic] that place we are [sic] heading to is
[sic] not a way to our home but it is [sic] the opposite.
Q So, what happened next?
A He continued dragging me and after that we met plenty of persons and I shouted
for help and at that instance, he slapped my mouth and after a few steps he already
carried me.
xxx xxx xxx
A He continued walking and I also continued crying and I told him that I want to go
home and he told me that we are heading towards home, but I told him that the way
we are going to is not the way to our house.
Q By the way, when you shouted [for] help, was it loud?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, what happened next?
A He continued running and he stopped several vehicles but they did not stop, so, we
just continued walking.
Q After that, what happened next?
A He moved closer to the banana plants. He looked back and he saw that persons
were already chasing him and after that he carried me and ran.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant and the victim were constantly on the move. They went to
Maco Elementary School and strolled on the school grounds. When nobody was at the Luponlupon bridge,
appellant took the victim to the highway leading to Tagum, Davao. At that time, Yvonne pleaded with
appellant that she really wanted to go home to Binuangan, but appellant ignored her pleas and continued
walking her toward the wrong direction. Later on, the group of Witness Arnel Fabila spotted them.
Appellant Astorga carried the victim and ran, but Fabila's group chased and caught up with them.
This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the victim, which is the
primary element of kidnapping. 31 Appellant's apparent intention was to take Yvonne against her will
towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not materialize, however, because Fabila's group
chanced upon them. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that
he actually detained her. Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to
be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup." Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code. Grave
coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong;
(b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it
as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that
the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the
restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. 32 When appellant

forcibly dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant
presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any.
The present case should be distinguished from People vs. Rosemarie de la Cruz. 33 Here, Appellant Astorga
tricked Yvonne to go with him by telling her that they were going to buy candy. When Yvonne recognized
the deception, she demanded that she be brought home, but appellant refused and instead dragged her
toward the opposite direction against her will. While it is unclear whether Appellant Astorga intended to
detain or "lock up" Yvonne, there is no question that he forced her to go with him against her will. In
Rosemarie de la Cruz, Victim Whiazel voluntarily went with accused. Furthermore, the accused in that case
failed to consummate the crime of kidnapping because of the timely intervention of the victim's neighbor.
Thus, the Court held in that case: 34
In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the latter's
liberty, in any manner, needs to be established by indubitable proof (People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85
[1993]). The acts held by the trial court, and maintained by the People, as consummating the crime
of kidnapping in this case are those when accused-appellant held the victim's hand and refused to
let go when the victim asked to go over to her neighbor, who by then already saw what was
happening. This happened for only a very brief span of time and the evidentiary record shows that
there were a good number of people present at that time, that a guard was stationed at the gate,
and that there was at least a teacher nearby. The child could have just as easily shouted for help.
While it does not take much to scare the wits out of a small child like Whiazel, under the attendant
circumstances, we cannot say with certainty that she was indeed deprived of her liberty. It must
further be noted that up to that brief moment when Cecilia saw them, and the child asked to be let
go, the victim had gone with accused-appellant voluntarily. Without any further act reinforcing the
inference that the victim may have been denied her liberty, even taking cognizance of her minority,
the Court hesitates to find that kidnapping in the case at bar was consummated. While it is a wellentrenched rule that factual findings of trial courts, especially when they concern the appreciation
of testimony of witnesses, are accorded great respect, by exception, when the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts, as we perceive in the case at bar, the Court may choose to
substitute its own findings (People vs. Padua, 215 SCRA 266 [1992]).
The Information, dated March 24, 1992, filed against Astorga contains sufficient allegations constituting
grave coercion, the elements of which were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. Hence, a conviction for
said crime is appropriate under Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the
evidence, and the offenses as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense
charged included in that which is proved.
At the time the felony was committed on December 29, 1991, the penalty imposed by law for grave
coercion was arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos. 35 The Indeterminate Sentence
Law does not apply here because the maximum penalty does not exceed one year. 36 However, appellant
has been imprisoned for more than six (6) months. He has more than served the penalty imposable for
such an offense. 37
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Appellant is CONVICTED only of grave coercion
and is sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor. Unless he is being detained for any other valid cause,
his IMMEDIATE RELEASE is herewith ordered, considering that he has more than served the maximum
penalty imposable upon him. That director of prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five days
from receipt of this Decision, of the actual date the appellant is released. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152997

of

November 10, 2004

the

Philippines
COURT

SALVADOR
MARZALADO,*
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

JR.,

petitioner,

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated November 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals, in CAG.R. CR No. 22645, which affirmed the Decision 2 dated November 5, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 79, in Criminal Case No. Q-98-74695. The RTC upheld the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 35, convicting herein petitioner Salvador Marzalado, Jr., for violation of Article 280 3 of the
Revised Penal Code on Qualified Trespass to Dwelling, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of two (2) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P500 and to pay the costs. 4 This petition likewise assails the
Resolution5 dated April 23, 2002, of the Court of Appeals, denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Cristina N. Albano was the lessee of a unit in the house owned by Luz Marzalado, the mother of herein petitioner,
Salvador Marzalado, Jr. Sometime in February 1993, Luz Marzalado filed an ejectment case against Albano.
Judgment was rendered against Albano, who was ordered to vacate the leased premises and to pay the unpaid
rentals. Albano appealed to the RTC.
In September 1993, during the pendency of the appeal, the electricity supply of the unit was cut off due to nonpayment of bills. As a result, Albano transferred her children to her father's house, four houses away, leaving a
maid to sleep in the unit.
Albano claims that on November 2, 1993, at around 1:00 p.m., she went to her unit. She noticed that the lead
pipe she used to hang clothes to dry was missing. When she returned at about 8:00 a.m. the following day,
November 3, 1993, she discovered the padlock of the main door changed, preventing her from entering the
premises. She went to see petitioner but he was not around.
On November 4, 1993, Albano again returned to her unit. She peeked through the window jalousies and saw that
the place was already empty. She immediately reported the matter to the barangay officials, who in turn, advised
her to go to the police. Thereafter, she filed a complaint for grave coercion, qualified trespass to dwelling and
theft against petitioner.
On November 14, 1993, Albano tried to see the accused, but again failed. This time she noticed that the roofing of
her unit had been removed and the main door locked from the inside. She was informed that on November 1,
1993, Marzalado, Jr., and his female companion took her lead pipe and on November 2, 1993, Marzalado, Jr., took
her personal belongings and brought them inside his house.
Accordingly, Albano filed a suit for trespass to dwelling with the MeTC of Quezon City against Marzalado, Jr., thus:
The undersigned accuses SALVADOR MAR[Z]ALADO, JR., of the crime of Trespass to Dwelling, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
without any justifiable cause, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the dwelling
place of CRISTINA N. ALBANO located at No. 241 Road 1, Pag-Asa, this City, against the latter's will and
without her consent or any members of the household, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended
party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Quezon City, Philippines, March 16, 1994.6
On May 12, 1994, the accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge. A summary hearing followed,
with Albano and her witness, Narciso Raniedo, testifying for the prosecution.
Raniedo, the owner of the house fronting Albano's unit, testified that at around 5:00 p.m., on November 1, 1993,
he was about to enter his house, when he glanced at the unit leased by Albano. He saw Marzalado, Jr., take a lead
pipe and hand it to a woman waiting at the terrace of Marzalado, Jr.'s house. Raniedo further said that on
November 2, 1993, sometime between 4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. he was relaxing in front of his house, when he
heard noises coming from Albano's apartment. There he saw Marzalado, Jr., forcibly open the door of the unit,
bring out the belongings of Albano, and take these to his own house.
For his defense, Marzalado, Jr., testified that after the MeTC ruled against Albano in the MeTC ejectment case filed
by his mother and because of the disconnection of the electricity, Albano already vacated the leased unit and
moved to her father's place. According to petitioner, on November 3, 1993, he was on his way home when he saw
water in a continuous stream flowing out of Albano's unit. He then searched for Albano but to no avail. He
reported the matter to the barangay officers and asked for two barangay tanods to accompany him to the vacated
unit. They went inside the unit where they found an open faucet, with water flooding the floor. He accused Albano
of deliberately leaving the faucet open. He claimed Albano filed the criminal case of trespass to dwelling to harass
him and to retaliate against him and his family.
On October 28, 1997, the MeTC handed down the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Salvador Mar[z]alado, Jr. "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of
Qualified Trespass To Dwelling under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced the

penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Arresto Mayor and to pay a fine of P 500.00 and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.7
The trial court observed that the defense would have been "a good defense" had the alleged entry been made on
November 2, 1993, the date stated in the Information, instead of November 3, 1993, the date the accused said he
entered the premises because Albano deliberately left the faucet open.
Marzalado, Jr., appealed to the RTC, which ruled the matter in this wise:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision dated October 28, 1997, the same is
hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.8
Undaunted, Marzalado, Jr., elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22645. The Court of
Appeals found no error in the challenged RTC decision and held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the lower court's decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the instant
petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, petitioner comes to this Court assigning as errors of the court a quo the following:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONS OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BOTH OF QUEZON CITY BECAUSE THE INCIDENT HAPPENED ON
NOVEMBER 3, 1993, AND NOT NOVEMBER 2, 1993, AND THE PETITIONER'S ENTRY IN THE PREMISES IS
FULLY JUSTIFIED BECAUSE HE WAS ASSISTED BY THEIR BARANGAY SECRETARY AND TWO BARANGAY
TANOD[S] AND THE ENTRY IS FOR A VALID PURPOSE. HENCE, THERE IS NO TRESPASS TO DWELLING.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE INFORMATION THAT THE ALLEGED
TRESPASS TO DWELLING HAPPENED ON NOVEMBER 2, 1993. THUS, WITH DUE RESPECT TO THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THERE WAS A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, AND IT SHOULD NOT HAVE
ADOPTED THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. 10
The foregoing may be reduced to one issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the conviction of
Marzalado, Jr., for qualified trespass to dwelling?
The petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in sustaining the lower court, since in
the proceedings below, there was a grave misapprehension of facts by both the MeTC and RTC in finding that he
committed trespass to dwelling despite the glaring proof that his entry was justifiable under paragraph 4, Article
11 of the Revised Penal Code11 - to prevent an imminent danger to property. He stresses that while he did enter
the unit, he did so with the aid of barangay officers and for the sole purpose of turning off the faucet that was
causing the flooding of the unit. He adds that the Information filed against him should be considered fatally
defective for having stated that his entry was on November 2, 1993, when in fact it was on November 3, 1993.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that petitioner's entry cannot be justified since the flooding of
the floor was not a danger to life nor property. Rather, the OSG claims that the flooding of the unit could have
been averted had the petitioner resorted to merely turning off the inlet valve of the water source. The OSG also
stresses petitioner's failure to refute the charge that he entered the complainant's unit on November 2, 1993.
Moreover, the OSG asserts that the exact time of the commission of the crime in the Information need not be so
accurate to preclude other dates near the actual date. It is sufficient that the Information states a time as near to
the actual date, more so, where the time is not an essential element of the offense, as in this case.
Anent the Information, the contention of petitioner that the Information is defective is untenable. Admittedly,
there is a discrepancy on the precise date of the alleged trespass - the Information charges petitioner Marzalado,
Jr., with trespass to dwelling allegedly committed on November 2, 1993, while petitioner's defense relate to an
entry made the following day. The discrepancy however, does not make the information defective. Facts and
circumstances necessary for inclusion in the information are determined by reference to the definition and
elements of the specific crime.12 In trespass to dwelling, the elements are: (1) the offender is a private person; (2)
that he enters the dwelling of another; and (3) such entrance is against the latter's will.
The exact date when the alleged trespass occurred is not an essential element of the offense of trespass. It is
sufficient that the Complaint or Information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as
possible to the date of its actual commission. 13 Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that it is not
necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time the offense was committed except when time
is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to
the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. A variance
between the time set out in the indictment and that established by the evidence during trial does not constitute
an error so serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction solely on that score. 14 Thus, the error invoked by the
petitioner in the date of the alleged trespass in the Information is of no grave import, for it is far from being the
decisive issue in this case.
However, still incumbent upon the prosecution is to establish the criminal intent and the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Criminal cases rise and fall on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not
the weakness of the evidence of the defense or the lack of it. 15 In the prosecution for trespass, the material fact or

circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the trespass. The gravamen of the crime is violation of
possession16 or the fact of having caused injury to the right of the possession. 17
To prove trespass, the prosecution presented as witness Narciso Raniedo who testified that he saw petitioner
enter the unit at around 4:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on November 2 and take out Albano's belongings. No other
eyewitness corroborated Raniedo's testimony. However, by her own account, Albano declared that she discovered
the trespass in the evening of November 3, 18 the same day the barangay certified Marzalado, Jr.'s entry. This
obviously does not discount the fact that although the exact date of entry varied as between petitioner and
respondent, they both were referring to the same entry.
What remains now is the issue of whether the entry of petitioner Marzalado, Jr., was legally justified. We rule that
it is, based on the circumstances of this case.
As certified by Barangay Lupon Secretary Romulo E. Ragaya, the unit rented by Albano was "forcibly opened by
the owner because of the strong water pressure coming out of the faucet" 19 As Albano herself admitted, she and
her children already left the unit when the electricity supply was cut off in the month of September. Hence,
nobody was left to attend to the unit, except during some nights when Albano's maid slept in the unit. Clearly,
Marzalado, Jr., acted for the justified purpose of avoiding further flooding and damage to his mother's property
caused by the open faucet. No criminal intent could be clearly imputed to petitioner for the remedial action he
had taken. There was an exigency that had to be addressed to avoid damage to the leased unit. There is nothing
culpable concerning Marzalado, Jr.'s judgment call to enter the unit and turn off the faucet instead of closing the
inlet valve as suggested by the OSG.
Thus, we find the evidence on record insufficient to hold petitioner guilty of the offense charged. Palpable doubt
exists in our mind as to the guilt of petitioner. In our view, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court and of the Metropolitan Trial Court when it found petitioner guilty of Qualified Trespass to
Dwelling. In a situation of ambiguity, where the act of the accused permits of two possible signification, one
culpable and another innocent, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the accused. The evidence in this
case simply fails to convince us of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 22645, and its Resolution dated April 23, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner SALVADOR MARZALADO, JR., is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge against him for lack of
evidence to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 207949

July 23, 2014

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS, and
RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON, Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 finding accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo y Ebron (Armando), Renato Dionaldo y
Ebron (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos (Mariano), and Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (Rodolfo) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Facts
At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his brother Edwin
Navarro (Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he received a text message
from another brother who told him that Edwin had been kidnapped.2 Records show that three (3) men, later
identified as Armando, Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and
pushed him inside a dark green Toyota car with plate number UKF 194.3 Upon receiving the message, Roderick
immediately reported the incident to the police. At around 10 oclock in the morning of the same day, he received
a phone call from Edwins kidnappers who threatened to kill Edwin if he should report the matter to the police.4
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded the payment of ransom
money in the amount of P15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no such money, as he only had P50,000.00.
On May 19, 2003, after negotiations over the telephone, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for
the amount of P110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring the money to Batangas and wait for their next
call.5
At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver the ransom
money, the kidnappers called and instructed him to open all the windows of the car he was driving and to turn on
the hazard light when he reaches the designated place. After a while, Roderick received another call directing him
to exit in Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5 until he arrives at the Centennial Village. He was told to park beside
the Libingan ng mga Bayani. After several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car with plate number DEH 498 pulled up in
front of his vehicle where four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile phone and upon
uttering the word "alat," the men returned to their car and drove away.6
Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin, headed by SPO3 Romeo Caballero
(SPO3 Caballero) and PO3 Nestor Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of the Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency
Response (PACER). During the course of the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym,
confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off
Mariano, Renato, Armando and a certain Virgilio7 Varona8 (Virgilio) on the condition that he will be given a share
in the ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their arrest on June
12, 2003. In the early morning of the following day or on June 13, 2003, the PACER team found the dead body of
Edwin at Sitio Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified.9
Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information10 which reads:

That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then
private persons, did then and there by force and intimidation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of
motor vehicle and superior strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will,
for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand of P15,000,000.00 was made as a condition of the
victims release and on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted.
Contrary to law.
During arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty11 and interposed the defenses of denial and alibi.
Except for Rodolfo, they individually claimed that on said date and time, they were in their respective houses
when they were taken by men in police uniforms, then subsequently brought to Camp Crame, and there allegedly
tortured and detained. On the other hand, Rodolfo, for himself, averred that at around 8 oclock in the evening of
June 12, 2003, while walking on his way home, he noticed that a van had been following him. Suddenly, four (4)
persons alighted from the vehicle, boarded him inside, blindfolded him, and eventually tortured him. He likewise
claimed that he was made to sign an extrajudicial confession, purporting too that while a certain Atty.
Nepomuceno had been summoned to assist him, the latter failed to do so.12
During trial, the death of the victim, Edwin, was established through a Certificate of Death13 with Registry No.
2003-050 (subject certificate of death) showing that he died on May 19, 2003 from a gunshot wound on the head.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated June 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129 (RTC), in Crim. Case
No. C-68329, convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, sentencing
each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
It gave credence to the positive and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which clearly
established that it was the accusedappellants who forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin into a car and,
consequently, deprived him of his liberty.15 In light thereof, it rejected accused-appellants respective alibis and
claims of torture, which were not substantiated. It also held that the crime of Kidnapping had been committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom, which is punishable by death. However, in view of the suspended imposition of
the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 9346,16 only the penalty of reclusion perpetua was
imposed.17 Further, the RTC found that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as the accusedappellants individual participation was geared toward a joint purpose and criminal design.18
Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that the victim Edwin was
abducted, deprived of liberty, and eventually killed,19 a fact which is supported by the subject certificate of
death, it did not consider said death in its judgment. The CA Ruling
In a Decision20 dated February 15, 2013, the CA affirmed in toto the RTCs conviction of accused-appellants,
finding that the prosecution was able to clearly establish all the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for
more than three days; (2) it is committed simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is
a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.21 It likewise sustained the
finding that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, as sufficiently proven by the
testimony of the brother of the victim.22 Moreover, the CA affirmed that conspiracy attended the commission of
the crime, as the acts of accused-appellants emanated from the same purpose or common design, and they were
united in its execution.23
Separately, the CA found that accused-appellants claims of torture were never supported, and that Rodolfo
voluntarily signed the extrajudicial confession and was afforded competent and independent counsel in its
execution.24
Aggrieved by their conviction, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not accusedappellants are guilty of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. Its
assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and it is conclusive and binding unless shown
to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
has not been considered. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his
assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by the appellate court.25
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, which they found to be straightforward and consistent. Through these testimonies, it was clearly
established that accused-appellants, who were all private individuals, took the victim Edwin and deprived him of
his liberty, which acts were illegal, and for the purpose of extorting ransom.26 Thus, seeing no semblance of
arbitrariness or misapprehension on the part of the court a quo, the Court finds no compelling reason to disturb its
factual findings on this score.1wphi1
Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, the Court likewise finds the conclusion of
the RTC in this regard, as affirmed by the CA, to be well-taken. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and when conspiracy is
established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally liable
regardless of the extent of their respective participations.27 In this relation, direct proof is not essential to
establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint
purpose, design, concerted action, and community of interests.28 Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case
clearly show that accused-appellants acted in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and that their
acts emanated from the same purpose or common design, showing unity in its execution,29 the CA, affirming the
trial court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among them.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as
the crime the accusedappellants have committed does not, as the records obviously bear, merely constitute
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide. This is in view of the victims (i.e., Edwins) death, which was (a) specifically charged in the
Information,30 and (b) clearly established during the trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was not among
the issues raised before the Court, the same should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule
that in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the
appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.31
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article 267 of the same Code
now provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or
in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if
threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer;

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (Emphases supplied)
The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado:32
In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for ransom and
murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found
the accused guilty of the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph
of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of special complex crime of kidnapping
with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where
the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim
was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person
kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was
merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be
treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267,
as amended by RA No. 7659.33 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom,
accused-appellants conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to the special
complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the penalty of death. As earlier intimated,
the enactment of RA 9346 had suspended the imposition of the death penalty. This means that the accusedappellants could, as the CA and trial court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
To this, the Court adds that the accused-appellants are not eligible for parole.34
On a final note, the Court observes that the RTC and the CA failed to award civil indemnity as well as damages to
the family of the kidnap victim. In People v. Quiachon,35 the Court explained that even if the death penalty was
not to be imposed on accused-appellants in view of the prohibition in RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity was
nonetheless proper, not being dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the crime.36
In the present case, considering that both the qualifying circumstances of ransom and the death of the victim
during captivity were duly alleged in the information and proven during trial, civil indemnity in the amount of
P100,000.00 must therefore be awarded to the family of the victim, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.37
Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral damages is warranted in this case. Under Article 2217 of the
Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings,
moral shock and similar injury, while Article 2219 of the same Code provides that moral damages may be
recovered in cases of illegal detention. It cannot be denied, in this case, that the kidnap victims family suffered
mental anguish, fright, and serious anxiety over the detention and eventually, the death of Edwin. As such, and in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,38 moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 must perforce be
awarded to the family of the victim.
Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in view of the confluence of the aforesaid qualifying
circumstances and in order to deter others from committing the same atrocious acts. In accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence,39 therefore, the Court awards exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the
family of the kidnap victim.
In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the
date of finality of judgment until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.40
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02888 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that all the accusedappellants herein are equally
found GUILTY of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, and are sentenced to each
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and severally, the family

of the kidnap victim Edwin Navarro the following amounts: (1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as
moral damages; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529

March 28, 1969

ROSAURO
REYES,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

petitioner,

Jose
F.
Maacop
for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor
Antonio M. Martinez for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case is before us on appeal by certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that a the
municipal court of Cavite City, convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave threats and grave oral defamation,
and sentencing him, in the first case (Criminal Case No. 2594), to four (4) months and ten (10) days of arresto
mayor and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and in the second case
(Criminal Case No. 2595), to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year
and eight (8) months of prison correccional and to pay Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with
costs in both cases.
The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point,
Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of
about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at
Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con
Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla
bos con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting;" and others. The base commander, Capt.
McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge

of preserving harmonious relations between personnel of the naval station and the civilian population of Cavite
City. Capt. McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet the demonstrators.
Col. Monzon went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura upon learning that the
demonstration was not directed against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for
their having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to
them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that they would like the people in the
station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him, however, that they did not intend to use
violence, as "they just wanted to blow off steam."
At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station. When he learned about the demonstration
he became apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel thereupon escorted
Hallare, his brother, and another person in going out of the station, using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once
outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed down to accommodate the request of Reyes. He told Hallare to take a good
look at the demonstrators and at the placards they were carrying. When the demonstrators saw Hallare they
shouted, "Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook passed the
car while the other to led behind. After Hallare and his companions had alighted in front of his residence at 967
Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away.
The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice
Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his
left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin
lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile,
Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.lwphi1.et
On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and
grave oral defamation, respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595, Municipal Court of Cavite City), as
follows;
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats, as
defined by Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by paragraph 2 of the same Article,
committed as follows:
That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
orally threaten to kill, one Agustin Hallare.
Contrary to law.
Cavite City, July 24, 1961.
DEOGRACIAS
City Fiscal
BY:
(SGD.)
Special Counsel

S.

BUEN

SOLIS

N.

GUTIERREZ

The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law, accuses Rosauro
Reyes of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, as defined and penalized by Article 358 of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, without any justifiable motive but with the intention to
cause dishonor, discredit and contempt to the undersigned complainant, in the presence of and within
hearing of several persons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously utter to the undersigned
complainant the following insulting and serious defamatory remarks, to wit: "AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO".
which if translated into English are as follows: "Agustin, Your mother is a whore."
Contrary to law.

Cavite City, July 25, 1961.

(SGD.)
Complainant

AGUSTIN

HALLARE

Subscribed and sworn to before me this. 25th day of July, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.)
BUEN
Special Counsel

N.

GUTIERREZ

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the cases were set for joint trial. On the
day of the hearing the prosecution moved to amend the information in Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats
by deleting therefrom the word "orally". The defense counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the
accused had already been arraigned on the original information and that the amendment "would affect materially
the interest of the accused." Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint trial proceeded.
From the judgment of conviction the accused appeal to the Court of Appeals, which returned a verdict of
affirmance. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the accused brought this appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the proceedings in the lower court allowing the
substantial amendment of the information for grave threats after petitioner had been arraigned on the original
information; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the case of grave threats without first requiring petitioner to enter
his plea on the amended information; (3) in convicting petitioner of both offenses when he could legally be
convicted of only one offense, thereby putting him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense; (4)
in convicting petitioner of grave threats when the evidence adduced and considered by the court tend to establish
the offense of light threats only; and (5) in convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation when the evidence tend
to establish that of simple slander only.
On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused has pleaded the information may be amended as to
all matters of form by leave and at the discretion of the court when the same can be done without prejudice to the
rights of the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules of Court). Amendments that touch upon matters of
substance cannot be permitted after the plea is entered.
After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that all the elements of the crime of grave
threats as defined in Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged
therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2)
that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a condition. Hence, petitioner
could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that under the aforementioned provision the particular
manner in which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word
"orally" did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic
theory of the prosecution that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to
undergo any material change or modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the concurrence of
the Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after the amendment to the danger of conviction under
paragraph 1 of Article 282, which provides for a different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended
information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our view the deletion of the word "orally" was
effected in order to make the information conformable to the evidence to be presented during the trial. It was
merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.
Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment was properly allowed, the trial court
committed a reversible error in proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him to enter his plea
to the amended information. Considering, however, that the amendment was not substantial, no second plea was
necessary at all.
The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed together. Petitioner avers that the appellate court
erred in affirming the decision of the trial court erred in affirming him of grave threats and of grave oral
defamation when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, and in convicting him of grave threats at all
when the evidence adduced and considered by the court indicates the commission of light threats only.

The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that
placards with threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a
motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats
flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that the threats were made "with the
deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried
into effect." 2 Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon,
who had to escort him home, wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that
the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the
dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court was correct in
upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a
common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger
or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of
a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin
Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this
Court said:
The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to
threaten is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they
be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other words, the libelous
remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the
latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense committed
by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the
offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the statements therein
derogatory to the person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the writer
maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be considered as part of the more
important offense of threats.
The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio,
insofar as Criminal Case No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with respect
to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave threats, with costs against petitioner.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179187

July 14, 2009

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
RENATO TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

PHILIPPINES,

Appellee,

By Decision of May 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals 1 affirmed the conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 199 of Las Pias City of Renato Talusan y Panganiban (appellant) of kidnapping with rape of AAA, 2 a minor
of six years.
The Information filed against appellant, together with one "Eljoy Salonga," reads:
That during the period from January 15, 2004 up to January 23. 2004, in the City of Las Pinas, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
with one ELJOY SALONGA, whose true identity and present whereabout is still unknown, without legal authority or
justifiable motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away, detain and deprive
AAA, a SIX (6) year old, minor, of her liberty, against her will and consent, and the said detention lasted for eight
(8) days, and while accused RENATO TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN @ Nato, @ Roxell B. Verga, Jr., was in custody of
AAA and armed with a gun, by means of force, threat, or intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA for several instances against her will and consent thereby
subjecting her to sexual abuse, which is prejudicial to her physical and psychological development.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Salongas "true identity and . . . whereabout[s]" were, as stated in the Information, unknown.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered:
In the early morning of January 14, 2004, as AAA was on her way to school, appellant, who was sitting by a tree in
Las Pias, pulled her aside and cajoled her into joining him by telling her that they would go to Jollibee. AAA
obliged as she knew appellant to be a fellow attendee of Sunday Bible classes. Appellant brought AAA, however,
to a house in Imus, Cavite occupied by one El Joy Salonga and two unidentified individuals to whom he introduced
her as his daughter.
AAA was thereafter under appellants control and custody for eight days during which he abused her by inserting
his finger inside her vagina on a daily basis before breakfast, despite her resistance.
AAA having failed to return home by noon of January 14, 2004, her stepfather BBB went to her school to inquire.
As nobody knew her whereabouts, BBB decided to report the matter to the Las Pias City Police Station. A
neighbor then informed him that he saw appellant sitting by a tree at the same time that AAA was on her way to
school.
BBB thereupon went around the community to elicit information about appellant. A former co-worker of appellant
gave BBB an address in Imus, Cavite, prompting BBB to report on January 22, 2004 to the Imus Police Station the
disappearance of AAA.
At dawn of the following day, January 23, 2004, appellant, who was with AAA, was apprehended.
For inquest purposes, Dr. Pierre Paul Carpio, medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, conducted an initial medico-legal examination which revealed the following
Findings:
- Hymen: Deep fresh 3 & 9oclock position
- Vestibule congested
Conclusion:
- Subject compatible with recent loss of virginity
- There are no ext. signs of application of any form of trauma 4 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the filing of the Information for kidnapping with rape.

Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of guilty. The lower court
thereupon conducted a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of appellants plea, and despite repeated
questions and just as repeated answers showing that appellant understood his plea and its consequences, the
trial court still ordered the prosecution to, as it did, present evidence.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, noting that AAAs "detailed account of her ordeal is a manifestation of
her honesty and forthrightness,"5 convicted appellant, disposing in its Decision of June 7, 2004 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussions and finding the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt by his voluntary and spontaneous plea of guilty, while the undersigned Presiding Judge does not believe in
the imposition of death penalty as a form of punishment, nevertheless, in obedience to the law which is his duty
to uphold, this Court finds the accused, RENATO TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt
for the special complex crime of KIDNAPPING with RAPE and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH.
The Court did not consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty because the penalty imposable
is single and indivisible and this is regardless of its presence. x x x
Accused is hereby ordered to pay the victim AAA, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and an
additional amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages which by case law is automatically awarded to rape
victims without need of proof. x x x
SO ORDERED.6 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
The case was forwarded to this Court on automatic review due to the death penalty imposed. Per People v.
Mateo,7 however, the Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals by Resolution of November 22, 2005 for
intermediate disposition.
By Decision of May 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals, upholding with modification appellants conviction, disposed
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 07 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 199, Las Pinas City is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Renato Talusan y Panganiban @ Natol @ Roxell B. Vergara, Jr. is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, conformably with R.A. No. 9346, without eligibility for parole and is ordered to
indemnify the AAA the following: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs de oficio. (Underscoring supplied)
SO ORDERED.8
By Resolution of December 3, 2007, the Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective
Supplemental Briefs if they so desired within thirty (30) days from notice. 9 In compliance, the parties submitted
their respective Manifestations that the Appeal Briefs they had earlier filed would suffice.
In his lone assignment of error, appellant faults the trial court for convicting him on the basis of an improvident
plea of guilt as it failed, so he claims, to judiciously follow the guidelines set forth in People v. Pastor.10
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In Pastor, the Court, holding that "there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a
searching inquiry," nevertheless came up with the following guidelines:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he
had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c)
under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule
out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual
threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating
robes.

2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely
explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status,
and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the
certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a
lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter
penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused
does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the
admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that
increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the elements of
the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of
his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his
right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must
be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details. 11
There is thus no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry." As long as the voluntary
intent of the accused and his full comprehension of the consequences of his plea are ascertained, as was done in
the present case, the accuseds plea of guilt is sustained. Consider the following transcript of stenographic notes
of the proceedings taken during appellants arraignment:
ATTY. CABARDO
Accused is ready for arraignment, Your Honor.
COURT
Arraign the accused in Tagalog.
(Accused is arraigned and he pleads Guilty to the Criminal Information)
COURT
What is his plea? Hes pleading guilty?
COURT INTERPRETER
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
This Court will conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of his plea.
Q Mr. Renato Talusan, what is your educational attainment?
ACCUSED
A I reached 2nd year High School, Your Honor.

Q Do you know how to read and write?

A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What is your occupation?
A Im a driver, Your Honor.
Q When you were arraigned today, you pleaded Guilty as charged in the Criminal Information. Did you
plead Guilty voluntarily, freely without anyone forcing or intimidating you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did Atty. Cabardo, your counsel explained [sic] to you the effects and consequences if you will plead
Guilty to the Criminal Information as charged?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Is it the understanding of the Court that Atty. Cabardo explained to you fully your rights under the
Constitution before you plead Guilty to the Criminal Information?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you know Mr. Talusan that, if you will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information, this Court will
immediately sentence you and confine you at the National Penitentiary?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did Atty. Cabardo exert pressure on you or influence you so that you will plead Guilty to the Criminal
Information?
A No, Your Honor.
Q Are you saying, Mr. Talusan that you are doing this voluntarily, freely and of your own volition?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did Fiscal assigned in this Court, State Prosecutor Napoleon A. Monsod intimidate you or exert pressure
on you so that you will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information?
A No, Your Honor.
COURT
Please speak louder.
ACCUSED
A No, Your Honor.
COURT
Q Did anyone outside or inside of this courtroom threaten you, exert pressure on you so that you will plead
Guilty as charged to the Criminal Information?
A None, Your Honor.

Q So, it is therefore true that on January 15, 2004 up to January 23, 2004, you kidnapped, detained one
AAA, a six (6) year old minor against her will and consent?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And that while in your custody, by means of force intimidation, you inserted your finger inside the vagina
of the said minor for several instances against her will?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q For the last time, Mr. Renato Talusan, despite the admonition given to you by this Court, do you still insist
and reiterate your pleading Guilty to the Criminal Information as charged for Kidnapping with Multiple
Rape?
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
The Court is convinced. I admire you Mr. Talusan for taking the responsibilities and I hope that you will be
completely reformed.
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
Fiscal, inspite of [sic] the fact that the accused has pleaded Guilty as charged in the Criminal Information, I
am directing the Prosecution to present evidence to determine the culpability of the accused. 12 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
But even assuming arguendo that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilt when arraigned, there is no
compulsion to remand the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence. While the Court has set aside
convictions based on improvident pleas of guilt in capital offenses, which pleas had been the sole basis of the
judgment, where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether the accused erred in admitting
his guilt, the manner in which the plea is made loses legal significance for the simple reason that the conviction is,
independently of the plea, based on evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged.
In the present case, even without the plea of guilt of appellant, the evidence presented by the prosecution
supports his guilt beyond reasonable doubt 13 of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. 14 Thus in People v. Larraaga15 the Court
held:
Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a
special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with
homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or
homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of
the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of
separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by
adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or
is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives
rise to a special complex crime. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)1avvphi1
A review of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the actual confinement, restraint and rape of AAA were
proven.
Thus, AAA, a minor whose testimony is given full faith and credit, youth and immaturity being generally badges of
truth and sincerity,16 declared:

Q: Did you go voluntarily with the accused?

A: He forced me, Your Honor.
Q: Why did you say that the accused forced you to go with him, what did the accused do to you?
A: He told me that we are going to Jollibee but it turned out that it was not true.
Q: When you went with the accused and boarded a tricycle, you really wanted to go to Jollibee, is that the
understanding of the Court?
A: I did not want to, Your Honor.
Q: What did you do when you say that you do not want to go with the accused?
A: Nothing, Your Honor.
Q: Did you cry?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: How did you cry?
A: I was just crying, Your Honor.17
xxxx
Q: Can you remember how many nights and days you have not seen your mother and father?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many nights?
A: Eight (8) nights, sir.
Q: After you were brought to the wake, where there is a dead person and at the club, where else were you
taken by Kuya Renato?
A: At coastal mall, sir.
Q: A while ago, AAA, you said that kuya Renato abused you and Kuya Renato inserted his penis in your
vagina, do you recall that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Which was inserted, his penis or his finger?
A: His finger, sir.
xxxx
Q: When it was inserted inside, did you cry?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you say to Kuya Renato?

A: I told him that it was painful.

18

AAAs stepfather BBB testified on her disappearance for eight days and the measures he took in order to recover
her. And the initial medico-legal report conducted for inquest purposes shows that AAA suffered deep fresh
lacerations in her hymen which are "compatible with recent loss of virginity."
The qualifying circumstance of minority was alleged and established with the presentation of AAAs certificate of
live birth, hence, the death penalty imposed by the trial court is in order. In view, however, of the enactment in
the interim of Republic Act 9346, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the
appellate court correctly modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
A word on the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the
award of civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape, and the award of moral damages
even without need of proof as it is presumed that the victim suffered moral injuries, 19 are both increased from
P50,000 to P75,000.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of May 25, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
the separate awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are increased from P50,000 to P75,000. In all other
respects, the Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 138281. July 12, 1999]

ANTONIO MILITAR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
FIRST DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 12, 1999.
G.R. No. 138281 (Antonio Militar vs. People of the Philippines.)
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 23 October 1998, in the case of People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Militar (CA-G.R. No. 21386) and its
Resolution, dated 19 April 1999, which denied the motion for reconsideration of the cited decision.
Petitioner Senior Inspector Antonio Militar was charged with the crime of Grave Threats under Article 282 of the
Revised Penal Code with the Metropolitan Trial Court of manila, Branch 7. After the trial, petitioner was convicted
of the crime charged for uttering the words: "Putang-ina mo Peejay, mag-iingat ka sa akin, papatayin kita."

Petitioner appealed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court with the Regional Trial Court. On appeal, the
decision of the lower court was affirmed. The Regional Trial Court sentenced petitioner to a penalty of
imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to four (4) months of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of three
hundred (P300.00) pesos.1 [CA Decision, Rollo, p. 45.] Unrattled by this defeat, petitioner filed a petition for
review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court with the Court of Appeals. Finding no reason to reverse the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with modification as to the
penalty. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the decision dated October
16, 1997 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the penalty of "fine of THREE
HUNDRED (P300.00) PESOS x x x," should be "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency." x x x
SO OREDERED.2 [Id., at 61.]
Hence, the recourse to this Court.
Petitioner presents for resolution of the Court the following issues:
1. The rule giving weight to the trial court's findings on credibility of witnesses is not
applicable to the present case;
2. The irreconcilable inconsistencies on substantial matters greatly affect the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses;
3. It is not probable for the herein petitioner to have declared the threat "Putang ina mo
Peejay, mag-iingay ka sa akin, papatayin kita," and;
4. The declaration "Putang ina mo Peejay, mag-iingat ka sa akin, papatayin kita," does not
constitute the crime of Grave Threat.
We find the petition devoid of merit. The Court of Appeals correctly upheld the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court.
Except for the last issue presented by petitioner, all the rest of the issues are factual in nature and is beyond the
scope of review of this Court. Well-entrenched in this jurisdiction is the principle that factual findings of the trial
court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal.3 [GSIS vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 128471, March 6, 1998.] This Court finds no justifiable reason or exception
sufficient to deviate from his rule as to cause a reversal of the judgments rendered by both the trial and appellate
courts. Corollary thereto, the findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses are accorded with respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal, in the absence of any showing that some fact or circumstances of weight or
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of
the case.4 [People vs. Bersabe, G.R. No. 122768, April 27, 1998.] Indeed, the trial court is in a better position to
assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, as it has the opportunity to observe the witness firsthand
and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude while on the witness stand.5 [Ibid.] In the case at bar, both the
Court of Appeals and the trial court accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of the sixteen year-old
complainant rationalizing that the same was delivered clearly and convincingly.
Pitted against the unwavering testimony of the complainant is petitioner's denial and alibi. As correctly ruled by
the Court of Appeals, the defenses set up by petitioner cannot outweigh the convincing declaration by
complainant who pointed to, and positively identified petitioner as the person who threatened him. It is settled
that alibi cannot prevail over the prosecution witness' positive identification of the accused.6 [People vs. Cabebe,
G.R. No. 125910, May 21, 1998.]
With regard to the argument of petitioner that the uttered words do not constitute the crime of Grave
Threats,7 [Art. 282. Grave Threat.- Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person,
honor or property of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:

1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to commit, if the
offender shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though not
unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have attained his purpose,
the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed.
If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500 pesos, if the threat shall have been made subject
to a condition.] the same cannot be sustained. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, all the elements
of the crime were established by the prosecution. Petitioner threatened complainant with the infliction of a crime
upon his person. The threat was made without petitioner attaining his purpose. Lastly, the threat was not subject
to a condition.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court