PROPERTY

ART. 449-457
CASE DIGEST BY M0GARCIA
MWSS VS CA
MWSS vs. CA
Facts:
The City of Dagupan filed a complaint against NAWASA (now MWSS) for the recovery of
the ownership and possession of Dagupan Waterworks System. NAWASA interposed as one if its
special defenses RA 1383 which vested upon it ownership, possession, and control of all
waterworks systems throughout the Philippines. TC found that NAWASA is a possessor in bad faith
and hence not entitled to reimbursement claimed by it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a possessor in bad faith has the right to remove useful improvements
RULING:
Negative. This is based on Art 449 of the NCC. As a builder in bad faith, MWSS lost
whatever useful improvements it had made without right to indemnity. Art 546: Only a possessor
in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed. Art
547: Only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if this can be done without
damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers the possession does not exercise
the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given to a possessor in bad faith to
remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided
the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by
paying the value they have at the time he enters into possession.
SABIDO VS. IAC
FACTS:
The present case originated from an action for quieting of title which was
filed by the spouses Dasal and Pecunio against herein petitioner Sabido on the
questions of ownership over two parcels of land otherwise known as lots B and
D. The petioners herein case was declared as the rightful ownerof the lands in
dispute. However, when the decision was being carried out in possession of lot b,
the sheriff found 3 persons occupying the aforesaid lot. One of them is dominador
sta. ana, he claims that he purchased the land in question from one Prudencio
Lagarto. In its issued resolution RTC found that there was privity between private
respondent sta. ana and the spouses Dasal. For that reason, Sta.Ana is bound by the final
decision against Dasal and thus subject to the order of execution and is bound to vacate the land in
question.
A motion of execution was filed by petitioners Sabido but Sta. Ana appealed saying that the grant
of the motion deprived him of the alternative choice of paying the value of the disputed area.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent has the option of exercising the alternative choice of
staying in the disputed land
HELD:

No. The private respondent has to remove all his constructions over Lot B and vacate the
premises. This is his only option. Being adjudged with privy with the spouses Dasals, he cannot
avail himself of the rights granted to a builder in good faith. He, therefore, must remove all his
useful improvements over Lot B at his own expense and if the same have already been removed,
he cannot be entitled to the right of retention or to any reimbursement.
MANOTOK REALTY VS. TECSON
FACTS:
Petitioner Manotok filed for recovery of possession against private respondent
Nilo Madlangawa builder of improvements on the lot located at Clara Tambunting
Subd.( structure made by petitioner have been gutted by fire after filing of the case)
CFI ruled in favor of respondent, on appeal petitioner filed a motion to
exercise option to appropriate the improvements introduced by the private
respondent , to the property, and thereafter private respondent be ordered to
deliver possession of the property to the petitioner. Judge Tecson denied motion for
reconsideration.
However, PD 1669 was issued providing for the expropriation of the
Tambunting Estate, the decree was challenged before the court hence the decision
in herein case was hold subject to the resolution on the constitutionality of PD 1669.
The decree was later on held as unconstitutional for being violative of the due
process.
On its motion for mandamus the petitioner company argues that since the
judgment of the trial court has already become final, it is entitled to the execution of
the same and that moreover, since the house of the private respondent was gutted
by fire, the execution of the decision would now involve the delivery of possession
of the disputed area by the private respondent to the petitioner.
Issue:
WON the destruction of improvement of a builder in good faith extinguishes
his right to retain the premises until reimbursed.
Held:
Yes. Since the improvements have been gutted by fire, and therefore, the
basis for private respondent's right to retain the premises has already been
extinguished without the fault of the petitioner, there is no other recourse for the
private respondent but to vacate the premises and deliver the same to herein
petitioner.
Furthermore, the private respondents goodfaith ceased after the filing of the
complaint by the petitioner. Thus, the repairs and improvements introduced by the
respondents after the complaint was filed cannot be considered to have been built
in good faith.
Art. 453
FELICES VS IRIOLA
FACTS:

Felices was a grantee of a homestead, a month following the issuance of his

patent (Sale of Homestead within prohibitive period null and void under sec. 118
Public Land Law); he conveyed a portion of his homestead to Iriola. The conveyance
expressly states that after the lapse of 5 years or as soon as may be allowed by law
the vendor would execute a deed of absolute sale with the vendee. However, two
years after sale Felices decided to recover the land. Iriola, recognizing the right of
Felices to redeem insisted that he may first be reimbursed the value of the
improvements he made. The court however found that the improvements were
made after the plaintiff informed him of his intent to recover.
ISSUE:
WON the vendee is entitled to reimbursement on improvements made in bad
faith.
HELD:
No. while both grantee and vendee acted in bad faith because they knew that
the sale was illegal and void , and consequently, under art 453 of the civil code,
their rights should be the same as though both had acted in good faith, however the
vendee in this case cannot recover the value of the improvements he introduced
because they were made only after the grantee made his intent to recover the land
in question. By so doing, he acted in bad faith and as a penalty forfeits his
improvements without any right to reimbursement under art. 449 of the NCC which
states: He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another loses
what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
FLOREZA VS. EVANGELISTA
FACTS:
Maria and Sergio Evangelista, who are mother and son borrowed from Floreza
the amount of P100. With the consent of the respondents, Floreza occupied the lot
and built a house of light materials without any agreement as to payment for the
use of said lot. Again, respondents obtained another loan from Floreza totaling to
740. Floreza on the other hand demolished the house of light materials and decided
to build one with strong materials (no rentals was paid as before). Consequently the
Evangelistas decided to sell the lots to Floreza in the amount of 1000(740 loan +
260 cash) with the right to repurchase within a period of 6 years.
The respondent paid in full the purchase price but Floreza refused to vacate
unless he was first reimbursed the value of his house.
ISSUE:
WON Floreza is a builder in good faith under Art. 448 and thereby entitled to
reimbursement on improvements made.
HELD:
No. Art. 448 is inapplicable. Said provision applies only when the builder,
planter or sower believes he had the right to build, plant or sow because he thinks
he owns the land or believes himself to have claim of title. In this case, Floreza
makes no pretense of ownership whatsoever. He concedes that he was a builder in
bad faith but maintains that the respondents should also be held in bad faith, so

that both of them being in bad faith, article 453 should apply. However, art. 453 is
neither applicable to this case.
Since, Floreza cannot also be considered a vendee on a pacto de retro sale
his rightrs is akin to those of a usufructuary under Art. 579.
REPUBLIC VS. CA
FACTS:
Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco Imperial and
Mario Tancinco herein private respondents filed an application for registration on 3
lots adjacent their fishpond.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando Vicente in representation of the Bureau of lands
filed a written opposition to the application for registration. On 1975, private
respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application with respect to lot 3 in line
with the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the court to the case.
Trial proceeded with regards to lot 1 and 2. The trial court in its decision grants the
application on the finding that there is no accretion to speak under Art. 457 of the
CC because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply
transferred their dikes further down the riverbed of Meycauayan River, and thus, if
there is any accretion to speak of , it is manmade and artificial and not the result of
the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.
ISSUE:
WON accretions due to special works or manmade intervention, maybe
registered under Art. 457 of the NCC.
HELD:
NO. Art. 457 of the NCC require the concurrence of three requisite before an
accretion covered by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are
1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) that it be made through the
effects of the current of the water; and 3) that the land where accretion takes place
is adjacent to the banks and rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of
the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the NCC all deposits
caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the
instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said
property was made gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan
and Bocaue Rivers.
BINALAY VS. MANALO
FACTS:
Guillermo Manalo bought 2 lots which are consolidated in 1 title hereby
declared as lot 307. Part of such land was submerged in water during rainy season
and reappeared during dry season. The submerged portion was unsurveyed, as the
castral survey was conducted during the rainy season where a portion of the land is
submerged in water forming an elongated strip of land formed by the western and
the eastern branches of Cagayan.

When the strip of land was surveyed it was found to have a total area of 22.7209
hectares and was designated as lot 821 and 822. Lot 821 is located directly
opposite lot 307 and is separated from the latter only by the eastern branch of the
Cagayan river during the rainy season and during the dry season, by the exposed,
dry river bed, being a portion of the one of the land consolidated under lot 307.
Respondent Manalo claimed that lot 821 belongs to him by way of accretion to the
submerged property to which it is adjacent. Binalay who is in possession of lot 821,
insist that they own lot 821 as they occupy the outer edges of lot 821 along the
river banks the fertile portion f which they plant agricultural products. This situation
compelled Manalo to file a case for forcible entry and paryed that judgment be
rendered declaring him as the owner of lot 821.
ISSUE:
WON a sudden and forceful action like flooding is an alluvial process
contemplated under art. 457.
HELD:
NO. Accretion as a mode of acquiring ownership requires the concurrence of 3
requisites: 1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) that it be made
through the effects of the current of the water; and 3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks and rivers.
The claimed accretion lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to lot 307 but
directly opposite lot 307 across the river. Also, the flooding mentioned which is a
sudden and forceful action which causes the land to reappear is hardly the alluvial
process contemplated under art. 457. It is the slow and hardly perceptible
accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner.
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO VS. IAC
FACTS:
SINFOROSO PASCUAL
1ST APPLICANT

E. NAVARRO

HEIRS OF E. NAVARRO

PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST

Applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be

registered. The registered property is bounded on the east by the Talisay river, on
the west by the Bulacan river, and on the north by the Manila bay. The Talisay river
and Bulacan river flow down towards the Manila bay and acts as boundaries of the
applicants registered land in the east and on the west.
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the
applicants land. Applicants land was bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.
ISSUE:
WON the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense
that it naturally accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be
considered as foreshore land.
HELD:
The land in question is a foreshore land. The disputed land is an accretion not
on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of manila
bay which adjoined private respondents own tract of land on the northern side. As

such, the applicable law is not article 457 but article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866 which states:
Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed
by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for
the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the
Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates
adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
(Art. 457 refers only to accretions on rivers )