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Analysis of
Incident
Incident
Investigation
Investigation
Report
End
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What happened
How it happened
Why it happened
1.
2.
Nature of Injury.
Foreign body
Cut
Bruises
Fracture
Burns
Amputation
Puncture wound
Hernia
Dermatitis
Abrasions
Others
Part of Body.
Head &neck (scalp, eyes, ears, mouth, teeth, neck, face, skull, etc.)
Upper extremities (shoulders, arms, elbows, forearms, wrists, hands, fingers,
thumbs, palms, etc.)
Body, back, chest, abdomen, groin, etc.
Lower extremities (hips, thighs, legs, knees, ankles, feet, toes, etc.)
3.
Accident Type.
Stuck against rough / sharp object
Struck by flying objects
Struck by sliding, falling or other moving
objects
Caught in or in between
Falls (on same level or to different level)
Over exertion
Slip, Burns
Contact with temperature extremes
Inhalation, absorption, ingestion, poisoning
Electric shock
H|S|E|Q Trainers, Consultants and Risk Management Advisors
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Hazardous Condition.
Improperly / inadequately guarded or unguarded
Defective tools, equipment, substances
Unsafe design or construction
Hazardous arrangement / layout / congested area
Improper illumination / ventilation
Improper dress / PPE
Poor housekeeping
5.
6.
Agency of Accident.
Machines
Vehicles
Hand tools
Hoists / cranes
Chemicals
Electrical apparatus
Fire
Stairs/ladders/platforms/ scaffoldings
Unsafe Acts.
Operating without authority
Operating at off-design conditions
Making safety devices inoperative
Failure to warn / secure
Using defective equipment / materials/ tools / vehicles
Failure to use proper personal protective equipment
Poor housekeeping
Unsafe loading / placing / mixing
Horseplay
Unsafe lifting / carrying
Taking an unsafe position
Adjusting / cleaning machinery in motion
7.
Contributing Factors.
Disregard of instructions
Bodily defects
Lack of knowledge or skill
Act of other than injured
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Positions
People
Parts
Paper
Positions
This is the most fragile of all evidence as it can
be easily moved / altered. It includes, among
other things:
Hand notes,
Sketches, maps & measurements
Photographs
As little time as possible should be lost between the moment of an accident or near
miss and the beginning of the investigation. In this way, one is most likely to be able to
observe the conditions as they were at the time, prevent disturbance of evidence, and
identify witnesses. The tools that members of the investigating team may need (pencil,
paper, camera, film, camera flash, tape measure, etc.) should be immediately available
so that no time is wasted.
The physical environment, and especially sudden changes to that environment, are
factors that need to be identified. The situation at the time of the accident is what is
important, not what the "usual" conditions were. For example, accident investigators
may want to know:
Before attempting to gather information, examine the site for a quick overview, take
steps to preserve evidence, and identify all witnesses. Physical evidence is probably
the most non-controversial information available. It is also subject to rapid change or
obliteration; therefore, it should be the first to be recorded. Based on your knowledge
of the work process, you may want to check items such as:
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damage to equipment
housekeeping of area
weather conditions
lighting levels
noise levels
You may want to take photographs before anything is moved, both of the general area
and specific items. Later careful study of these may reveal conditions or observations
missed previously. Sketches of the accident scene based on measurements taken may
also help in subsequent analysis and will clarify any written reports. Broken equipment,
debris, and samples of materials involved may be removed for further analysis by
appropriate experts. Even if photographs are taken, written notes about the location of
these items at the accident scene should be prepared.
People
In some situations witnesses may be your primary
source of information because you may be called
upon to investigate an accident without being able to
examine the scene immediately after the event.
Because witnesses may be under severe emotional
stress or afraid to be completely open for fear of
recrimination, interviewing witnesses is probably the
hardest task facing an investigator.
Witnesses should be interviewed as soon as practicable after the accident. If witnesses
have an opportunity to discuss the event among themselves, individual perceptions
may be lost in the normal process of accepting a consensus view where doubt exists
about the facts.
Witnesses should be interviewed alone, rather than in a group. You may decide to
interview a witness at the scene of the accident where it is easier to establish the
positions of each person involved and to obtain a description of the events. On the
other hand, it may be preferable to carry out interviews in the quiet of an office where
there will be fewer distractions. The decision may depend in part on the nature of the
accident and the mental state of the witnesses.
This category of evidence includes:
Direct Witnesses
Injured / Co-workers
Others in area
Indirect Witnesses
Contractors
Maintenance Personnel
Equipment Designers
Spares Purchasers
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For most of these questions, an important follow-up question is "If not, why not?"
The physical and mental condition of those individuals directly involved in the event
may be explored. The purpose for investigating the accident is not to establish blame
against someone but the personal characteristics still need to be considered. Some
factors will remain essentially constant while others may vary from day to day:
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emphasize the real reason for investigation, to determine what happened and why
DO NOT...
interrupt
prompt
Ask open-ended questions that cannot be answered by simply "yes" or "no". The actual
questions you ask the witness will naturally vary with each accident, but there are
some general questions that should be asked each time:
What were the environmental conditions (weather, light, noise, etc.) at the time?
If you were not at the scene at the time, asking questions is a straightforward approach
to establishing what happened. Obviously, care must be taken to assess the credibility
of any statements made in the interviews. Answers to a first few questions will
generally show how well the witness could actually observe what happened.
Generally, people aren't used to being interviewed. After a traumatic experience, a
witness may not be able to recall the details. But, witnesses should be interviewed as
soon as possible. People react differently. Don't be surprised if a witness who was
close to the incident has an entirely different story from someone who saw it at a
distance. Witnesses may remember more clues after the shock has worn off, so be
open to follow-up sessions. Some witnesses may offer biased testimony if they feel a
need to influence the findings. Witnesses may omit entire sequences of events if they
don't realize their importance. Finally, eyesight, hearing, reaction time, and the general
condition of each witness may affect his or her ability to observe.
H|S|E|Q Trainers, Consultants and Risk Management Advisors
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Have you obtained preliminary statements as soon as possible from all witnesses?
Has each witness located his or her position on a map of the site (including the
direction of view)?
Have you told the witnesses that the investigation's purpose is accident
prevention?
Have you introduced the team and tried to make the witness comfortable?
Are your questions worded carefully, and do you ensure the witness understands
each question?
Do you ask open-ended questions requiring more than a "yes" or "no" reply?
Do you take notes without distracting the witness and use a tape recorder only with
the witness' consent?
Are you polite and careful not to lead the witness or to argue?
Let each witness speak freely & take notes without distracting witness (avoid use of
tape recorder).
Provide feedback but dont lead the witness or put the person on defensive or give
a true-false test.
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Parts
The third category of evidence is parts and includes physical evidence such as:
Again, each time the answer reveals an unsafe condition, the investigator must ask
why this situation was allowed to exist.
Paper
This is the last category of evidence and includes:
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These are seldom at the scene of the incident & hence, are often neglected.
Consequently, it is often an overlooked source of information, All available and relevant
information must be extracted and recorded from documents such as technical data
sheets, maintenance reports, past accident reports, formalized safe-work procedures,
and training reports. Any pertinent information should be studied to see what might
have happened, and what changes might be recommended to prevent recurrence of
similar accidents.
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Hard Evidence.
Data that usually cannot be disputed, e.g., time & place of accident, logs & other
written reports & the position of physical evidence (providing investigators can
establish that it has not been moved).
Witness Statement.
Statements from persons who saw the accident happen & from those who came upon
the scene immediately afterwards
Circumstantial Evidence.
The logical interpretation of facts that leads to a single, but un-proven conclusion.
Critical Factors
An investigator who believes that incidents are caused by unsafe conditions will likely
try to uncover conditions as causes. On the other hand, one who believes they are
caused by unsafe acts will attempt to find the human errors that are causes. Therefore,
it is necessary to examine briefly some underlying factors in a chain of events that
ends in an accident.
The important point is that even in the most seemingly straightforward incidents,
seldom, if ever, is there only a single cause. For example, an "investigation" which
concludes that an accident was due to worker carelessness, and goes no further, fails
to seek answers to several important questions such as:
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install mirrors at blind corners where required throughout the worksite (general)
Never make recommendations about disciplining persons who may have been at fault.
This would not only be counter to the real purpose of the investigation, but it would
jeopardize the chances for a free flow of information in future accident investigations.
In the unlikely event that you have not been able to conclusively determine the causes
of an accident, you probably still have uncovered safety weaknesses in the operation.
It is appropriate that recommendations be made to correct these deficiencies.
If your organization has a standard form that must be used, you will have little choice in
the form that your written report is to be presented. Nevertheless, you should be aware of,
and try to overcome, shortcomings such as:
If a limited space is provided for an answer, the tendency will be to answer in that
space despite recommendations to "use back of form if necessary."
Headings such as "unsafe condition" will usually elicit a single response even when
more than one unsafe condition exists.
Your previously prepared draft of the sequence of events can now be used to describe
what happened. Remember that readers of your report do not have the intimate
knowledge of the accident that you have so include all pertinent detail. Photographs and
diagrams may save many words of description. Identify clearly where evidence is based
on certain facts, eyewitness accounts, or your assumptions.
If doubt exists about any particular part, say so. The reasons for your conclusions should
be stated and followed by your recommendations. Weed out extra material that is not
required for a full understanding of the accident and its causes such as photographs that
are not relevant and parts of the investigation that led you nowhere. The measure of a
good accident report is quality, not quantity.
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bound
The ECRA Initial Incident Reporting Form should be submitted by the Project
Company or owner to the office of Vice Governor Regulatory Affairs within two
business days of the occurrence of an Incident.
H|S|E|Q Trainers, Consultants and Risk Management Advisors
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The ECRA Incident Investigation Report should be submitted by the project company
or owner to the office of Vice Governor Regulatory Affairs within 20 business days of
the occurrence of an Incident or any other shorter period as decided by the ECRA.
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The ECRA Final Close-out Report should be submitted to the office of Vice Governor
Regulatory Affairs within the period agreed with the Authority.
As a minimum, the final close-out report shall contain:
1. a summary of the incident;
2. a review of the main and contributory causes;
3. a review of key issues identified and preventative action taken and
4. a table listing original recommendations, action parties and action taken to closeout each point.
5. Basic information regarding equipments to the incident occurring.
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All final written investigation reports shall be completed and approved within 3 weeks
(15 working days) of the incident occurrence by the incident investigation team leader.
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CONDITIONS:
Work exposures
Taking short-cuts
Do not use examples such as carelessness or not using common sense. (These are
neither visible not measurable)
Examples of unsafe conditions:
Ergonomic Hazards
Environmental hazards
Inadequate housekeeping
Blocked walkways
Improper or damaged PPE
Inadequate machine guarding
Physical capability
Physical condition
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Mental state
Mental Stress
Behavior
Skill level
JOB FACTORS:
Engineering / design
Work planning
Work rules/policies/standards/procedures(PSP)
Communication
Physical stress
Mental stress
Improper motivation
Inadequate leadership
Inadequate engineering
Inadequate purchasing
Inadequate maintenance
There are several techniques available for carrying out Root Cause Analysis each
having its own advantages and disadvantages and specific areas of application. We
will use the Comprehensive List of Causes (CLC) as our primary technique using the
CLC Chart and the Glossary to the Chart given at the end of this manual.
However, we will also have an overview of the other common techniques used for
conducting a root cause analysis. Some of the significant techniques include:
Documentation Review
Legislation Review
5 Why
Fish Bone
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Causal-sequence models
Process models
Energy model
Logical tree models
Human information-processing models
SHE management models
These techniques are generally used for complex accidents with multiple system
failures.
In addition to these, certain Specific Analytical Techniques include:
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The Figure below shows a simplified event and causal factors chart in general.
H|S|E|Q Trainers, Consultants and Risk Management Advisors
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Barrier analysis
Barrier analysis is used to identify hazards associated with an accident and the barriers that
should have been in place to prevent it. A barrier is any means used to control, prevent, or
impede the hazard from reaching the target.
Barrier analysis addresses:
Barriers that were in place and how they performed
Barriers that were in place but not used
Barriers that were not in place but were required
The barrier(s) that, if present or strengthened, would prevent the same or similar accidents
from occurring in the future.
The following Figure shows types of barriers that may be in place to protect workers from
hazards.
Physical barriers are usually easy to identify, but management system barriers may be less
obvious (e.g. exposure limits). The investigator must understand each barriers intended
function and location, and how it failed to prevent the accident. There exists different ways in
which defences or barriers may be categorized, i.e. active or passive barriers (see e.g.
Kjelln, 2000), hard or soft defences (see e.g. Reason, 1997), but this topic will not be
discussed any further in this report.
H|S|E|Q Trainers, Consultants and Risk Management Advisors
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Change analysis
Change is anything that disturbs the balance of a system operating as planned. Change is
often the source of deviations in system operations.
Change analysis examines planned or unplanned changes that caused undesired outcomes.
In an accident investigation, this technique is used to examine an accident by analysing the
difference between what has occurred before or was expected and the actual sequence of
events.
The investigator performing the change analysis identifies specific differences between the
accidentfree situation and the accident scenario. These differences are evaluated to
determine whether the differences caused or contributed to the accident.
The change analysis process is described in the following Figure.
When conducting a change analysis, investigators identify changes as well as the results of
those changes. The distinction is important, because identifying only the results of change
may not prompt investigators to identify all causal factors of an accident. When conducting a
change analysis, it is important to have a baseline situation that the accident sequence may
be compared to.
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The investigators should first categorize the changes according to the questions shown in
the left column of the worksheet, i.e., determine if the change pertained to, for example, a
difference in:
What events, conditions, activities, or equipment were present in the accident situation that
were not present in the baseline (accident-free, prior, or ideal) situation (or vice versa)
When an event or condition occurred or was detected in the accident situation versus the
baseline situation
Where an event or condition occurred in the accident situation versus where an event or
condition occurred in the baseline situation
Who was involved in planning, reviewing, authorizing, performing, and supervising the
work activity in the accident versus the accident-free situation.
How the work was managed and controlled in the accident versus the accident-free
situation.
To complete the remainder of the worksheet, first describe each event or condition of
interest in the second column. Then describe the related event or condition that occurred (or
should have occurred) in the baseline situation in the third column. The difference between
the event and conditions in the accident and the baseline situations should be briefly
described in the fourth column. In the last column, discuss the effect that each change had
on the accident.
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Before starting to analyse the events and conditions noted on the chart, an investigator must
first ensure that the chart contains adequate detail.
Examine the first event that immediately precedes the accident. Evaluate its significance in
the accident sequence by asking:
If this event had not occurred, would the accident have occurred?
If the answer is yes, then the event is not significant. Proceed to the next event in the chart,
working backwards from the accident. If the answer is no, then determine whether the event
represented normal activities with the expected consequences. If the event was intended
and had the expected outcomes, then it is not significant. However, if the event deviated
from what was intended or had unwanted consequences, then it is a significant event.
Carefully examine the events and conditions associated with each significant event by
asking a series of questions about this event chain, such as:
Why did this event happen?
What events and conditions led to the occurrence of the event?
What went wrong that allowed the event to occur?
Why did these conditions exist?
H|S|E|Q Trainers, Consultants and Risk Management Advisors
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A fault tree analysis may be qualitative, quantitative, or both. Possible results from the
analysis may be a listing of the possible combinations of environmental factors, human
errors, normal events and component failures that may result in a critical event in the system
and the probability that the critical event will occur during a specified time interval.
The strengths of the fault tree, as a qualitative tool is its ability to break down an accident
into root causes.
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MORT
MORT provides a systematic method (analytic tree) for planning, organizing, and conducting
a comprehensive accident investigation. Through MORT analysis, investigators identify
deficiencies in specific control factors and in management system factors. These factors are
evaluated and analyzed to identify the causal factors of the accident.
Basically, MORT is a graphical checklist which contains generic questions that investigators
attempt to answer using available factual data. This enables investigators to focus on
potential key causal factors. The upper levels of the MORT diagram are shown in the Figure.
MORT requires extensive training to effectively perform an in-depth analysis of complex
accidents involving multiple systems. The first step of the process is to select the MORT
chart for the safety program area of interest. The investigators work their way down through
the tree, level by level. Events should be coded in a specific color relative to the significance
of the accident. An event that is deficient or Less Than Adequate (LTA) in MORT
terminology is marked red. The symbol is circled if suspect or coded in red if confirmed. An
event that is satisfactory is marked green in the same manner. Unknowns are marked in
blue, being circled initially and colored if sufficient data do not become available, and an
assumption must be made to continue or conclude the analysis.
When the appropriate segments of the tree have been completed, the path of cause and
effect (from lack of management control, to basic causes, contributory causes, and root
causes) can easily be traced back through the tree. The tree highlights quite clearly where
controls and corrective actions are needed and can be effective in preventing recurrence of
the accident.
PET (Project Evaluation Tree) and SMORT (Safety Management and Organisations Review
Technique) are both methods based on MORT but simplified and easier to use. PET and
SMORT will not be described further. PET is described by DOE (1999) and SMORT by
Kjelln et al (1987).
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The result of an accident is loss, e.g. harm to people, properties, products or the
environment. The incident (the contact between the source of energy and the victim) is the
event that precedes the loss.
The immediate causes of an accident are the circumstances that immediately precede the
contact. They usually can be seen or sensed. Frequently they are called unsafe acts or
unsafe conditions, but in the ILCI-model the terms substandard acts (or practices) and
substandard conditions are used. Substandard acts and conditions are listed in the Figure
below.
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Basic causes are the diseases or real causes behind the symptoms, the reasons why the
substandard acts and conditions occurred. Basic causes help explain why people perform
substandard practices and why substandard conditions exists. An overview of personal and
job factors are given in the following Figure.
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The above STEP-diagram also shows the use of arrows to link tested relationships among
events in the accident chain. An arrow convention is used to show precede/follow and logical
relations between two or more events. When an earlier action is necessary for a latter to
occur, an arrow should be drawn from the preceding event to the resultant event. The
thought process for identifying the links between events is related to the change of state
concepts underlying STEP methods. For each event in the worksheet, the investigator asks,
Are the preceding actions sufficient to initiate this actions (or event) or were other actions
necessary? Try to visualize the actors and actions in a mental movie in order to develop
the links.
MTO-analysis
The basis for the MTO-analysis is that human, organizational, and technical factors should
be focused equally in an accident investigation. The MTO-analysis is based on three
methods:
1. Structured analysis by use of an event- and cause-diagram.
2. Change analysis by describing how events have deviated from earlier events or common
practice.
3. Barrier analysis by identifying technological and administrative barriers in which have
failed or are missing.
The first step in an MTO-analysis is to develop the event sequence longitudinally and
illustrate the event sequence in a block diagram. Identify possible technical and human
causes of each event and draw these vertically to each event in the diagram.
Further, analyze which technical, human or organizational barriers that have failed or was
missing during the accident progress.
Assess which deviations or changes in which differ the accident progress from the normal
situation. These changes are also illustrated in the diagram.
The basic questions in the analysis are:
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TRIPOD
The idea behind TRIPOD is that organisational failures are the main factors in accident
causation. These factors are more latent and, when contributing to an accident, are always
followed by a number of technical and human errors. The following diagram shows the logic.
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See above.
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1.4 Procedure not available: the person doing This can be addressed either by reinforcing
the work did not have access to the procedure Stop work when not sure or by making the
and consequently relied on memory to do the procedure available.
work properly.
1.5 Procedure was not understood: the
person relying on the procedure could not
comprehend the procedure, due to language,
technical capability or complexity.
See above.
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Conditions
There are four major categories of conditions, with an additional level of detail under each of
the major categories. In conditions, we are focused on the physical working space and the
equipment.
5. Protective systems
5.1 Guards or protective devices not effective: This is typically an equipment issue and
guards or protective devices needed to protect requires an equipment solution.
the worker were present & working, but did not
prevent the incident. For example, a highway
guardrail failed to stop a vehicle or a machinery
guard did not restrain flying pieces.
5.2 Defective guards or protective devices:
guards or protective devices needed to protect
the worker were present, but failed when they
were needed. For example, a handrail
collapsed when a person fell against it.
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See above.
See above.
See above.
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See above.
See above.
See above.
8. Workplace layout
8.1 Congestion: the layout of the workplace
did not provide enough clearance from
hazards, accessibility to equipment or tools
was obstructed, or persons working could not
achieve a correct posture.
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See above.
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See above.
See above.
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See above.
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13. Behaviour
Note: Investigators need to understand the behavior of those involved.
This is best done by performing a structured A-B-C Analysis.
13.1 Antecedent not present: antecedents are
the things present before a person behaves in
some way. Examples include signage,
training, procedures and the expectations of
others.
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Job factors
There are nine categories of job factors, with an additional level of detail.
15. Training/knowledge transfer
Note: Training is used to increase knowledge on a specific issue.
15.1 No training provided: the person was not
trained in a specific subject. Examples can
include not identifying necessary training,
reliance on out of date or inaccurate training
records, a change in work methods or a
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See above.
See above.
See above.
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18. Engineering/design
Note: This category refers to the design of our facilities.
18.1 Technical design not correct: the design
of the facilities involved in the incident was not
suitable for the intended use. (Note this does
not cover misuse or facilities which have
deteriorated.) Examples would include
inappropriate metallurgy for the intended
service or incorrect support for the intended
load. This would also include designs which
were not risk assessed, where management of
change was not followed, or where inherently
safer design issues were not considered.
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This is likely a behavioral issue and an A-BC analysis can be used to help understand
why the undesired behavior was present.
This is likely a behavioral issue and an A-BC analysis can be used to help understand
why the undesired behavior was present.
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23. Communication
Note: Can be written or verbal.
23.1 Horizontal communication between peers
not effective: the people involved in the
incident did not communicate important
information between peers and colleagues.
See above.
See above.
See above.
23.7 Incorrect information: the person involved This is likely a knowledge issue, especially
in the incident was given information, but that if the person did not recognize the
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