Você está na página 1de 8


Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2014.

Thing (Res) as a Transcendental

St. Thomas Aquinas expressly mentions that thing (res) is a transcendental in his
Commentary on the Sentences (Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2): res
est de transcendentibus, et ideo se habet communiter ad absoluta et ad relata, and also in his
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 39, a. 3, ad 3: hoc nomen res est de transcendentibus. Thing (res),1 is
also one of the transcendentals listed in St. Thomas Aquinass De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, where he
writes concerning res: This mode (common and consequent upon every being) can be taken in
two ways: first, as following upon every being considered absolutely; second, as following upon
every being considered in relation to another. In the first, the term is used in two ways, because it
expresses something in the being either affirmatively or negatively. However, one cannot find
anything that is predicated affirmatively and absolutely of every being except its essence,
according to which it is said to be, and is given the name thing (res). For, as Avicenna explains
[Metaph., I, 6], thing differs from being (ens) in this, that being is named after the act of
being, whereas thing expresses the quiddity or the essence of the being.2
Commenting on the above passage of De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1 concerning transcendental
thing (res), Leo Elders explains that in his deduction of the transcendental concepts, Thomas
notes that one may add to being a general positive mode which expresses that which is found
within all beings, namely, essential content.3 In this way the concept thing (res) is obtained. For
the distinction between the concept of being and that of thing Aquinas refers to Avicenna.4 He
uses the term res (thing) to signify being as having a particular content. The concept of thing
comes second, after that of being: at the first the intellect is struck by the being real of things and
expresses it in a first, most general and common concept; the term res, on the other hand,
signifies being as having a certain determinate content. Hence it expresses the fact that being has
an essence.5
As to why Aquinas doesnt have thing (res) frequently on his lists of transcendentals
throughout his works, Elders observes the following: In some of his treatises Thomas uses the
term res as a transcendental concept, although it has been suggested by Suarez and others that as

Studies on transcendental thing (res): S. DUCHARME, Note sur le transcendental res selon Saint Thomas,
Revue de lUniversit dOttawa, 10 (1940), section spciale, pp. 85-99 ; J. VAN DE WIELE, Res en ding.
Bijdrage tot een vergelijkende studie van de zijnsopvatting in het Thomisme en bij Heidegger, Tijdschrift voor
Filosofie, 24 (1962), pp. 427-506 ; L. OEING-HANHOFF, Res comme concept transcendental et surtranscendental, in Res, III Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, Rome, 1982, pp. 285-296 ; J.
HAMESSE, Res chez les auteurs philosophiques des 12 et 13 sicles ou le passage de la neutralit la spcificit,
in M. Fattori and M. Bianchi (eds.), Res, III Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, Rome,
1982, pp. 91-104.
De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1.
See the Metaphysica, I, 6, 72va (Van Riet, Liber de philosophia prima, I, p.33ff.).
L. ELDERS, The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Historical Perspective, Brill, Leiden, 1993, p.

a transcendental res is of minimal importance to Thomas. This assertion is apparently based on

the sporadic references to it in Aquinas works, whereas unity, truth and goodness occur
frequently. To this one might reply that what the term stands for is so basic that it is presupposed
by Thomas in all his analyses: that being has a content and meaning is evident and need not be
dwelled upon further. The concept of being (ens) develops into that of thing, while the
concept of being real is expressed by the verb to be which is derived from the noun being.6
It is important to draw attention to the De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1 which states that the concept of res
is acquired by the addition to being of a general mode. This means that the term does not
signify quiddity alone but being as having an essential content. Therefore, res ordinarily
expresses existing things7
On Whether Thing (Res) is Not Just a Transcendental Notion But Also a
Transcendental Property of Being
Many interpreters of the metaphysical thought of St. Thomas deny that thing (res) is a
transcendental property of being, saying that thing (res) is merely synonymous with being (ens)
and hence cannot be a property or attribute of being.8 For example, Peter Coffey writes: There
do not seem to be any other transcendental properties of being besides the three enumerated
(unity, truth, and goodness). The terms reality, thing, something, are synonymous
expressions of the concept of being itself, rather than of properties of being.9 Celestine Bittle
states: There are six transcendental concepts: being, thing, something, one, true, good (ens, res,
aliquid, unum, verum, bonum). But of these being, thing (reality), and something are
synonymous; there is no real difference of meaning between them, since all merely signify the
opposite of non-entity.10 However, against the position of Coffey and Bittle, we affirm that res
and aliquid are not simply synonymous with the notion being (ens) but are rather notionally
distinct from being (ens): if being (ens) is that which is, thing (res) is being (ens) with an
essential content, being (ens) with an essence (essentia); if ens is taken from esse, res is taken
from essentia. And something (aliquid) as another something (aliud quid) is being (ens) as
separate and divided off from other beings (entia). Aside from stating that aliquid as aliud quid
is a property of being (ens),11 Luis Clavell, who wrote the second half of the 2006 Metafisica
EDUSC, Rome book (which includes the chapters on the transcendentals), also mentions that
thing (res) is not synonymous with the notion of being (ens): Se si considera lente in se stesso,
quasi in modo isolato senza paragonarlo n metterlo in relazione con altroin modo
affermativosi pu dire che ogni ente una cosa (o res). Ogni realt in quanto ha latto di
essere in un modo o in un altro, ha unessenza. qualcosa che necessariamente spetta ad ogni

In I Peri hermenaias, lectio 5, no. 50: id quod est fons et origo ipsius esse, scilicet ipsum ens. The concept of
being is formed due to the contact of the intellect, through the senses, with existing things. The concept of being
(esse) is formed from that of ens
L. ELDERS, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
For example: A. LOBATO, Ontologia, Pars Prima, Pontificia Universit di San Tommaso, Rome, 1991, pp. 187189.
P. COFFEY, Ontology, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1926, p. 115.
C. BITTLE, Ontology, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1941, pp. 131-132.
L. CLAVELL, Aliquid in L. Clavell and M. Prez de Laborda, Metafisica, EDUSC, Rome, 2006, p. 189:
Aliquid accentua la distinzione di un ente rispetto a ci che non esso, la sua traduzione pi adeguata sembra
essere altro che o qualcosa daltro (aliud quid), ed esprime la propriet dellente di essere diverso da tutti gli
altri, nellambito delluniverso degli enti: questuomo altro rispetto a quello.

realt creata. Lente preso in astratto, non si d mai. Vi sono diamanti, alberi, cardellini, uomini,
ciascuno con un modo di essere specifico, a seconda della rispettiva essenza. Tale contrazione in
un modo di essere determinato, veniva indicato in latino dal termine res, che pu essere tradotto
in italiano oggi, a seconda dei contesti, con le parole cosa o realt. I termini res ed ente
non sono quindi sinonimi. Infatti, mentre il nome di ente si desume dallatto di essere, quello di
res si riferisce allessenza dellente, alla sua restrizione a un grado e modo di essere specifico e
Sofia Vanni Rovighi, in her Elementi di filosofia, did not consider thing (res) to be a
transcendental property of being since, for her, res merely signifies being (ens) taken absolutely,
in itself: Ora parliamo delle propriet trascendentali dellessere o, come si dice pi brevemente,
dei trascendentali. S. Tommaso ne enumera cinque: res, unum, aliquid, verum, bonum; ma il
primo, res, non significa se non lessere preso assolutamente, e aliquid implica lunum, quindi le
propriet trascendentali dellessere si riducono a tre: unum, verum, bonum.13 However, in
response to the position of Vanni Rovighi concerning res, we say, instead, that one cannot deny
that thing (res) is a transcendental attribute or property of being just because one affirms that it
merely signifies being (ens) taken absolutely. Jason Mitchell, for example, states that thing (res)
is a transcendental property of being as being (ens qua ens), a transcendental property of ens in
se.14 Now, one can consider a being (ens) in itself, that is, without comparing or relating it to
another being (ens) or beings (entia) in a positive way, and we get transcendental thing (res),
which is different from the notion of being (ens), which is that which is, which is taken from
esse; res, which is being (ens) with an essence, being (ens) with an essential content, instead,
stresses essence (essentia), is taken from essence (essentia). Or, if being (ens) is considered in
itself in a negative way, that is, by denying internal division, then we get the transcendental
notion of one (unum), which is also called transcendental unity, which is being (ens) as
undivided or being (ens) in its indivision. But to affirm, as Vanni Rovighi does, that thing (res)
cannot be a transcendental property of being because it merely means being (ens) considered
absolutely or in itself, is mistaken, since the focus should be rather on whether res notionally
adds something to the notion of being (ens), making it notionally distinct from the notion of
being (ens), and like we have just shown, it does.
Henry Koren, at first, affirms that there are five transcendental concepts apart from being
itself: thing, one, otherness, true, and good.15 But then, distinguishing transcendental concepts
from transcendental properties (which, he explains, cannot be entirely synonymous with being
and must flow immediately from the concept of being), he subsequently eliminates thing (res)
which he thinks is generally considered to be synonymous with being. So, for Koren, there are in
fact only four transcendental properties of being: aliquid as not-nothing (and not aliquid as
aliud quid), one, true, and good.
Koren writes that the reason why he thinks thing (res) is merely a transcendental notion
and not a transcendental property of being lies in that thing (res) is generally considered to be

L. CLAVELL, La distinzione dei trascendentali, in L. CLAVELL and M. Prez de Laborda, op. cit., pp. 183-184.
S. VANNI ROVIGHI, Elementi di filosofia, vol. 2 (Metafisica), La Scuola, Brescia, 1964, p. 25.
J. A. MITCHELL, Aquinas on the Ontological and Theological Foundation of the Transcendentals, Alpha
Omega, 16.1 (2013), pp. 39 and 78.
Cf. H. J. KOREN, Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1965, p. 52.

synonymous with being, it merely puts the stress on the essence of the being rather than on the
act of being,16 and this would be unacceptable, since the transcendental properties of being are
not mere tautologies, but are indeed noetically distinct from being itself. Koren explains the
difference between a transcendental concept (of which res falls under) and a transcendental
property of being (which he denies to res): Not every transcendental concept is a property of
being, as a little reflection will show. A concept which has the same extension as being itself is
either entirely synonymous with being or not. If it is entirely synonymous with being, it cannot
be said to be a property of being; for the attribute expressed by it cannot be said to flow from
being, but is being itself, just as rational animal cannot be said to flow from man, but is
man. Consequently, a property of being must be an attribute which is not entirely synonymous
with being. The reality expressed by it is the same as the reality expressed by being, but it
expresses this reality in its own way. The reality of being contains aspects which the concept of
being itself does not express. Our intellect can turn its attention to each of these aspects and
express the reality implied by being in a new concept which has such an aspect as its focal point.
Hence this new concept merely expresses in a special way being in general, and the attribute
which it represents is distinct from being by a logical (virtual) distinction. Obviously, such a
concept will be analogous in the same way as being itself, i.e., by analogy of proportionality.17
Regis Jolivet agrees with Koren regarding thing (res), denying that it is a transcendental
property of being because of its being synonymous with being.18 R. P. Phillips also negates that
thing (res) is a transcendental property of being, stating that res is the same as ens nomen
being taken as a noun and so it too is excluded from being a property.19 For Phillips, the
transcendental properties of being are four in number: something (aliquid), one, true, and good.20
Robert J. Kreyche also negates that thing (res) is a transcendental property of being, but in
contrast with the position of Phillips, he denies that something (aliquid) is a transcendental
property of being, stating that although certain terms are genuinely transcendental, they are little
more than synonyms for being. We are referring here to the terms thing and something.
These terms are transcendental because they may be applied to anything that is real: whatever
exists may rightly be spoken of as a thing or as something.21 However, these terms are of
minor importance because they do not significantly add to our understanding of being. Of far
greater importance are those terms which, though transcendental, are not synonymous with
being. We are referring now to the terms one, true, and good. Though interchangeable with
being these terms add something to our knowledge of being which this knowledge does not by
itself express. These latter notions are often referred to as the transcendental properties or


H. J. KOREN, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
R. JOLIVET, Metafisica (Ontologia e Teodicea), Morcelliana, Brescia, 1960, pp. 84-85.
R. P. PHILLIPS, Modern Thomistic Philosophy, volume 2 (Metaphysics), The Newman Press, Westminster, MD,
1957, p. 174.
Kreyche adds: Although we may indifferently refer to anything real as a being, a thing, or simply as
something, each of these terms has a connotation of its own. The term being primarily refers to the fact that the
thing in question exists; the term thing places emphasis on the fact that the reality under consideration is a being of
a certain kind that is, a subject having a definite essence or nature: the term something marks off the thing in
question from other things that are real. (R. KREYCHE, First Philosophy, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New
York, 1959, p. 168).

attributes of being. More commonly, we shall speak of them as transcendental perfections or

modes, or simply as transcendentals.22
Battista Mondin writes in one book that thing (res) and something (aliquid) are
transcendentals, transcendentals being properties of being, and in two other later books he takes
the position of Coffey, Bittle, Koren, Kreyche, Phillips and Jolivet denying that res is a
transcendental property of being, because it is simply synonymous with the notion of being (ens).
But, then, in his 2002 book on the metaphysics of Aquinas, he reverts back to his original 1985
position. In his 1985 Il sistema filosofico di Tommaso dAquino, Mondin does admit that Thomas
included in his list of transcendentals both thing (res) and something (aliquid), stating that by
transcendentals we mean the transcendental properties of being having the same extension of
being though not having the same connotation.23 However, in his 1991 Dizionario enciclopedico
del pensiero di S. Tommaso dAquino, he takes the position of Coffey, Bittle, Koren and
company, writing that res and aliquid are simply synonymous with being: In qualche caso san
Tommaso include tra i trascendentali anche res (cosa) e aliquid (qualcosa), che tuttavia, come
nota lo stesso san Tommaso, non possono essere trattati come veri trascendentali, ossia come
propriet dellessere (ente), perch sono semplicemente dei sinonimi di ens (De Veritate, q. 1, a.
1).24 And in his manual of metaphysics published in 1999, he writes that res and aliquid are not
universal properties of being but are simply two linguistic expressions that are of a universal
character.25 However, in his 2002 book on the metaphysics of Aquinas, La metafisica di san
Tommaso e i suoi interpreti, Mondin reverts back to, and further develops, his original 1985
position in Il sistema filosofico di Tommaso dAquino which holds that, for St. Thomas in De
Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, res (and aliquid) are included as transcendental attributes or properties of
John F. Wippel writes in his The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (2000) that,
for Aquinas in his De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, res and aliquid as aliud quid are transcendental
properties of being.27 And Henri Grenier holds that thing (res) is not just a transcendental notion
but also a transcendental property of being, writing: The transcendentals are five in number:
thing, unity, otherness, truth, and goodness (res, unum, aliquid, verum, bonum). Some
scholastics claim that there are only four transcendentals: unity, otherness, truth, and goodness;
and others claim that there are only three: unity, truth, and goodness. They maintain that thing,
though it is one of the transcendentals, is synonymous with being, and therefore is not a property

R. KREYCHE, op. cit., pp. 168-169.

Cf. B. MONDIN, Il sistema filosofico di Tommaso dAquino, Massimo, Milan, 1985, p. 107.
B. MONDIN, Dizionario enciclopedico del pensiero di S. Tommaso dAquino, Edizioni Studio Domenicano,
Bologna, 1991, p. 610.
Cf. B. MONDIN, Ontologia. Metafisica, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 1999, pp. 224: S. Tommaso
insegna che allessere in quanto essere (come pure allente in quanto ente, vale a dire in quanto partecipa allessere)
spettano di diritto tutte quelle propriet che si possono convertire con esso, ossia quelle propriet che hanno la
stessa estensione dellessere, anche se non la medesima connotazione. Tali sono lunit, la verit, la bont. Questa
lenumerazione pi comune o frequente che S. Tommaso d dei trascendentali ; ma qualche volta (per es. nel De
veritate, q.1, a.1) fornisce una enumerazione pi ampia, che oltre a verit, bont e unit include anche cosa (res) e
qualcosa (aliquid). Ma res e aliquid, di fatto, non sono propriet universali ma semplicemente due espressioni
linguistiche di carattere universale.
B. MONDIN, La metafisica di san Tommmaso e i suoi interpreti, ESD, Bologna, 2002, pp. 456-457 and 463-466.
Cf. J. F. WIPPEL, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University of America Press,
Washington, D.C., 2000, pp. 193-194.

of being. Others hold the same opinion in regard to otherness. But we reply that all the
transcendentals express a general mode of being which the term being does not express, and
therefore they are properties of being. Hence, just as the transcendentals are five in number, so
too are the properties of being five in number.
A general mode of being can result from being in itself, or from being in relation to
another. If it results from being in itselfexpressing something in being in an affirmative
manner, in this case we have thing, which expresses the essence, i.e., the quiddity of being, or, in
other words, being as having its own essence, being as something ratified and firm in nature.2829
On the other hand, for William Wallace, thing (res) is indeed a transcendental notion, but
he thinks that it is not a transcendental property of being, for thing (res) doesnt stand out as a
special attribute in contrast to the others, but is rather co-constituted with them.30 Wallace adds:
Thing goes with being because being bespeaks something that accompanies being; this
something, or subject of being, is in fact exactly the same as whatness or essence.31
While admitting that thing (res) is a transcendental notion, Joseph Owens denies that it is
a transcendental property of being, writing: Whatever exists is a thing. The notion thing,
accordingly, is a transcendental. But it can hardly be considered a property of being. In finite
things it is rather a potency to being. Every act of existence that proceeds from the first cause
inevitably requires its proper potency, which is other than itself. In that way a thing is proper to
every finite existential act. But this is a rather different sense of proper from that found in the
sequence of unity, truth, and goodness upon being. Though a transcendental, then, it should not
be called a transcendental property of being, unless a different sense is first explained for the
term property. In subsistent being, moreover, it can in no sense be considered a property, for
there the thing that exists and the existence are not even conceptually distinct. The one cannot
follow upon the other as a property. In all other things the two are entitatively distinct. The
entitative distinction serves as the basis for conceiving the same object first as a thing and then as
a being. In this way there is a conceptual distinction between a thing and a being, for being is
now conceived in the concrete.32 The basis for distinguishing a thing and a being, consequently,
does not at all correspond to the basis for distinguishing the other transcendentals.33
The Dominican H. D. Gardeil affirms that there are five transcendental notions besides
being, namely, thing, one, something, true, and good (res, unum, aliquid, verum, bonum), but as
to whether res is to be considered a transcendental property of being, he writes that the term
thing, does not, it seems, say anything that is not explicitly said by the notion of being, for it

Cf. In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, c.; In II Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, c.

H. GRENIER, Thomistic Philosophy, volume 3 (Metaphysics), St. Dunstans University, Charlottetown, Canada,
1950, p. 33.
Cf. W. WALLACE, The Elements of Philosophy, Alba House, Staten Island, N.Y., 1977, p. 93.
It is clear from the already stated reason, not only that they are one in reality, but that they differ in aspectthe
term thing is applied from the quiddity only; the term a being is applied from the act of being; and the term one
from order or undividedness. But it is the same thing that has essence, and that is undivided in itself. Hence these
three, thing, a being, one, signify entirely the same reality, but accordingly to different aspects(In IV Metaphys.,
lect. 2, no. 553).
J. OWENS, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, Center for Thomistic Studies, Houston, 1985, pp. 124-125.

does no more than express the aspect of essence in things; some authors, as a matter of fact, do
not consider it a transcendental property in the truest sense,34 though he adds that granted the
authenticity of thing and something as transcendental properties of being, it is doubtful that
they command the same philosophical interest as does the triad of the one, the true, and the good,
deservedly recognized as the classical three.35
Charles Hart maintains that thing (res) is more properly seen as a constitutive principle
of being rather than as a transcendental property: Thing (Res) and Identity. If the principle of
identity may be considered as a statement of the necessary relation between being and its
transcendental oneness, what may be said of the other absolute transcendental, thing (res),
which, being affirmatively asserted of each being taken by itself, appears before the negative
note of undividedness or oneness? Thing pertains to the essence or nature of a being: Each being
is a thing (its own essence). We have already suggested that thing is so close to being as to be
more constitutive of it than an additional aspect. This is particularly true in the metaphysics of
existence, which nevertheless constantly insists that it is always a nature or essence, a thing (res),
which exercises the act of to be.
In Thomistic existentialism essence or thing is never denied, as is the case in the
extreme existentialism of contemporary thought. Further this thingness may be properly
considered as the foundation for the indivision we announce when we declare the beings
oneness. What one says negatively, thing says positively. Thing, as St. Thomas says,
denotes the firmness in a being, against all philosophies of pure becoming. Thing holds the
being to what it is, why it is this, and not that. It is expressed in the principle of contradiction.
The formal expression of the consequent unity is made in the principle of identity. The only
reason we can suggest why the relation between being and thing does not constitute a separate
first principle is the one we have already indicated. Thing is more properly seen as a constitutive
principle of being rather than as a transcendental property and is therefore, like being, the
foundation for the other attributes.36


H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 4 (Metaphysics), B. Herder, St.
Louis, 1967, p. 126.
C. HART, Thomistic Metaphysics, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1959, pp. 340-341. Luis Clavell, in the
2006 Metafisica EDUSC, Rome book states concerning res: Certamente, luso dellespressione italiana cosa (e di
altre di alcune lingue moderne: chose, thing, Ding) non coincide pienamente con luso filosofico di res, poich viene
usata sopratutto per indicare gli enti materiali non viventi (in opposizione allirreale, alle realt non sostanziali, a
quelle viventi e alle persone). Cosa dunque non ha un significato cos ampio come res: un termine piuttosto
sostanzialista, che significa sostanze inanimate; inoltre non include un riferimento alla conoscenza.
Quando ora parliamo di cosa in un contesto filosofico, dunque, dobbiamo tener conto che usiamo lespressione
in un senso pi ampio che nel linguaggio comune, in un uso pi specifico, nel quale cosa significa tutto ci che .
Tenendo conto della sua origine etimologica, possiamo comprendere che lespressione latina res non
esprimeva una propriet dellente in quanto tale, ma soltanto il nome che gli conveniva in quanto possiede
unessenza determinata. Luso di res come diverso di ente, presuppone una molteplicit di principi intrinseci,
vale a dire, la distinzione tra essere e essenza; questa almeno la considerazione che Avicenna ci ha lasciato. Perci,
in senso stretto, questa nozione di res non pu venire attribuita a Dio, che lo stesso Essere sussistente e quindi non
ricevuto in unessenza. Con questo non si vuol dire che Dio non abbia essenza. In Dio, per, lessenza non
principio potenziale limitatore dellessere: lessenza e lessere divini si identificano; lessenza di Dio il suo stesso
essere (Cfr. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 4). Nelle creature, invece, il nome res evidenzia, con maggior forza
rispetto alla nozione di ente, la compozione e la limitazione che lessenza provoca nellatto di essere.

Inoltre, dalla nozione di res deriva quella di realt. questa una nozione, espressa con un sostantivo astratto,
che si risolve in quella di ente: qualcosa reale perch ; spesso, comunque, si utilizza il termine reale per indicare
in modo esplicito che un ente non di ragione, ma extramentale, o per contrapporlo allapparente(L. CLAVELL,
Res in L. Clavell and M. Prez de Laborda, op. cit., pp. 187-188). And Clavell states concerning aliquid: la
nozione di aliquid presuppone una molteplicit di enti: non si pu essere diverso da un altro se non c un altro dal
quale essere diverso. La nozione di aliquid, dunque, propria solo dellessere degli enti finiti, dove regna la
molteplicit. Certamente, in un certo senso aliquid potrebbe venire anche riferito a Dio, poich Egli lAltro per
eccellenza, in quanto infinitamente superiore e trascendente il mondo. In questo modo, per, vi il pericolo di porre
luomo o il mondo come punti di riferimento assoluti, rendendo cos Dio qualcosa di relativo, poich Dio verrebbe
visto come altro in riferimento alluniverso e alle persone. In realt, il creato laltro rispetto a Dio, che Assoluto.
Invece unit, verit, bont e bellezza sono propriet dellessere in tutta la sua universalit e si trovano anche nella
Pienezza di Essere(L. CLAVELL, Aliquid, in L. Clavell and M. Prez de Laborda, op. cit., p. 190).