legal-ethics-cases

1. 1. 1 1. )G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974 2. Get Homework/Assignment Done 3.

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https://www.homeworkping.com/ 13. 14. click here for freelancing tutoring sites ADELINO H.
LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent. Adelino H. Ledesma in his
own behalf. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf. FERNANDO, J.:p What is assailed in
this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner
to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the grounds for such a motion was
his allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on
Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The
denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants,
was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It was likewise noted that the
prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his
designation in the former category being precisely to protect him in his new position without
prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal
of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of
the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should
tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious
reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio.
Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is
likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk
an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The
petition is clearly without merit.
2. 2. 2 According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed
Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and
there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the
accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as
such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counselde
oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent
motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the
Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of
work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A
motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. 3 As
noted at the outset, the petition must fail. 1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying
the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with
a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings

having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge
spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the
prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for
the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the
Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses
who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for
postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar
on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today.
Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he
is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained
postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963,
November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and
September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11, 1964:
"Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial
of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is
reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that
the government witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was
noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the
accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the
Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and
requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already
rested its case." 6 2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly
mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially
the neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For
those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence
welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession
dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high
degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine
is found in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay
stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility
to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those
enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of
the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case
of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that
his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal.
Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete
for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a
high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either
3. 3. 3 to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de
oficio must be fulfilled." 8 So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9
where respondent was de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making
clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous

performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those
duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10 Justice
Sanchez in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a
court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty
to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of
the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person
assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of
him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a
vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and
a little less of self-interest." 12 The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident. 3. If
respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension
that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the
welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered
nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado
in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given
an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does
not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel,
he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish
his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.
It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not
enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough
to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to
procure an attorney of his own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The
present Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused
"shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16 Thus is
made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused.
Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as
counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task
entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election
registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at
present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be
assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself
sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to
erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The
admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are
times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the

promptings of self-interest. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs

against petitioner.
4. 4. 4 LEDESMA VS CLIMACO DIGEST Facts: Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel
de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On October
13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros
Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his
position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge not only denied the motion but also
appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 3, 1964, petitioner
filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy
of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or
pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. On November 6, Judge denied the motion. Hence, Ledesma instituted this certiorari
proceeding. Issue: Whether or not a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio
due to appointment as Election Registrar. Held: The ends of justice would be served by
requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio because: the case has been postponed
at least 8 times at the defense's instance; there was no incompatibility between duty of
petitioner to defend the accused, and his task as an election registrar. There is not likely at
present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. Ledesma's
withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty required of the legal
profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions.
The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer
may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of
justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's
zeal. In People v. Holgado: In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of
little avail if it does not
5. 5. 5 include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel,
he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish
his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.
It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not
enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough
to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to
procure an attorney of his own. The present Constitution provides not only that the accused
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel but further provides that Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and
to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. This made manifest the
indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of the accused. Thus, Ledesma
should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to

remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those
enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when
duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest. 2.) [A.C. No.
5161. April 14, 2004] ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S.
TORRES, respondent. R E S O L U T I O N PER CURIAM: In a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed
on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra Ting- Dumali charges respondent
Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to, and
failure to advise against, the forgery of complainants signature in a purported Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting
from such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial
ethics.
6. 6. 6 The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and
Vicente Ting. Her siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who
is married to herein respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died
intestate and left several parcels of land, to wit: a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco
de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 43,908 square meters more or less, and covered at
that time by TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite; b) Lot 1603 of
the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 16,073 square meters, more or
less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite; c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 22,131
square meters, more or less and covered at that time by TCT No. T- 1869 of the Registry of
Deeds of Cavite. According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his
relationship with her and her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was
lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act.
She attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions: 1. The respondent
participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury committed by his wife
Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole
heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same
was false. He presented that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of
the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel
Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by, Felicisima and
Miriam. 2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the
forgery of complainants signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17
March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an
overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsified document to the Register of Deeds
of Cavite to transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law
Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel
Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina. 3. In
LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy and
Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds
for the Province of Cavite, filed by complainants sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24
October 1995, the respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to

the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of the late
spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their
names. With the reconstituted title, and with the express conformity of the respondent,
Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100
and profited from the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment was even
received pending the reconstitution proceedings. 4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent
made gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he
requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for Lot 1605
under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released within a month when he
knew that it would be impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case
only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used the stationery
of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.
7. 7. 7 In his Comment,[2] the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts
that he did not take advantage of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of
the estate left by his parents-in-law. Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms
that Felicisima and Miriam were not motivated by any desire to solely profit from the sale.
Neither can he be faulted by the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17
March 1995 involving Lot 1603 because he had no part in the execution of the document. All
the while he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to
dispose of the said lot. If ever complainants signature was affixed on that document, it was
done in good faith. The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera,
et. al., in LRC Case No. 5964 for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony of
Marcelina in that case that she and Felicisima were the only children of spouses Vicente Ting
and Julita Reynante could not be faulted on him because such was a clear oversight.
Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and his
wife. His conformity through his signature was pro-forma because the property was a
paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife. Anent his alleged gross and false
misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution would be released by the end of November
1996, suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the Clerk of Court, Mr. Rosauro
Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usually uncontested and granted by courts.
Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in bombarding him
with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for Annulment
of Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages; and a criminal case for Estafa and
Falsification of Public Documents. In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka
or verbal will allegedly made by her mother and allegedly implemented by their eldest brother
Eliseo in view of the following circumstances: (1) her mother met a sudden death in 1967;
and partition of the properties in total disregard of their father was morally reprehensible,
since the latter was still alive; (2) when their mother died, four of the siblings were still minors
including respondents wife herself; (3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in
response to the previous letter of Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam, denying the existence of
a toka. She further states that the respondent was not merely a passive onlooker but, as he
admitted, the administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses. On 14 June 2000, this
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report,

and recommendation or decision.[3] On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration
of the issues presented by both parties, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the respondent to be
violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from
the practice of law.[4] In its Resolution No. XV-2003-333[5] of 21 June 2003, the Board of
Governors of the IBP approved and adopted Commissioner San Juans report, but reduced
the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for six years. We fully agree with the
Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of culpability. The
respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the
exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he
must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court
inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus: LAWYER'S OATH
8. 8. 8 I, , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as
a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. SO HELP ME GOD. This oath to which all lawyers
have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a
mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words,
drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times.
By swearing the lawyers oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as
instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice.[6] This oath is firmly echoed and
reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: CANON 1 A lawyer
shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. . . . CANON 7 A lawyer shall at
all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. . . . CANON 10 A lawyer
owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to
be misled by any artifice. All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our
legal system. When the respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he
made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably
failed. The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate dated 11 November 1986 that they are the children of Julita Reynante and thus
adjudicated only between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their other siblings.[7] There

was concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to the estate of the
deceased. Significantly, the respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to
complainants sister, he knew of his wifes siblings. In fact, he declared that the complainant
stayed with them while she was in the Philippines.[8] Yet, the respondent presented that
document to the Register of Deeds of General
9. 9. 9 Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife
and his sister-in-law Miriam. It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted[9]
regarding the falsification of complainants signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement[10] dated
17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which contains a purported waiver by the complainant of
her right over the property. Marcelina admitted that she signed complainants name in that
document.[11] Such act of counterfeiting the complainants signature to make it appear that
the complainant had participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to
falsification of a public document.[12] Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written
special power of attorney and against committing falsification, he presented[13] such
document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and
his wife.[14] He himself, therefore, may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified
document to the damage of the complainant and her other co- heirs.[15]Notably, he also
admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal documents for the
transfer of Lot 1603.[16] Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing
acts which are contrary to law. He must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a
lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the
Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The Code of Professional Responsibility
underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.[17]
For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has
entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.[18] As such, he should
make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate.[19] He should not, therefore, engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.[20] He makes himself unfit to remain in
the profession who commits any such unbecoming act or conduct.[21] Respondents
argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his sister- in-law Marcelina of the other
siblings in LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a mere
oversight does not deserve credence in view of the following circumstances: First, the
petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners when there were six
siblings who were heirs of the unpartitioned lot.[22] Second, during the hearing of said case
when the respondent asked Marcelina whether she has brothers and sisters other than
Felicisima, the latter said none. The transcript of that hearing reads: ATTY. TORRES: Q
Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps. Vicente Ting, Jr.
and Julita Reynante? WITNESS: A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I. Q Do you
have other brothers and sisters? A None, sir.[23] The respondent allowed Marcelina to
commit a crime by giving false testimony[24] in court, and he never corrected the same
despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the case.[25] Moreover, in
knowingly offering in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of
false testimony.[26] Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a

lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by
any artifice.[27] This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he
permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when
he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.
10. 10. 10 The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court
called upon to assist in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument
to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on his part that obstructs and impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.
[28] It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offered in
evidence an Affidavit of Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During
the hearing of this administrative case, Marcelina admitted that her statement in that affidavit
that the title was in her possession was false, as she was never in possession of the title[29]
and would not, therefore, know that the same was lost. Moreover, in a letter dated 20
November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent requested the release of
50% of the remaining balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc.,
through Mrs. Ong that he was assured by the Clerk of Court that the order directing the
reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be released within the month.[30] Respondents
information was misleading because he presented evidence only on 12 August 1997, or
almost a year after he sent the letter.[31] Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and
honesty on the part of the respondent. Respondents acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws
and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to
do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. In the determination of the
imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into account the primary
purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and
reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.[32] While the assessment
of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to our sound discretion, the sanction
should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice.
Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity
and independence of the bar.[33] Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only
in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring
attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it.[34] Verily,

given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondents
gross misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice law for life, and we
therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner. IN VIEW OF
ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the
legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is
ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. Let copies of this Resolution
be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal
files of the respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar
11. 11. 11 of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.
A. 2 ISIDRA TING-DUMALI VS TORRES DIGEST The parents of Isidra Ting-Dumali died
intestate and they left several properties including two parcels of land Lot 1586 and Lot 1603
both in Malabon. Isidra has 5 other siblings. In 1986 however, two of her siblings, Felicisima
Ting-Torres and Miriam Ting-Saria, executed two Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement. They
were assisted by Felicisimas husband, Atty. Rolando Torres who was also the
administrator of the Ting Estate. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement covering Lot 1586,
they made it appear that Felicisima and Miriam were the only heirs of the Tings. Atty. In the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement covering Lot 1603, the signature of Isidra was forged to
make it appear that she was a party to the Deed. Torres then presented the Deeds to the
Registry of Deeds of Cavite for the purpose of transferring the titles into the name of Miriam
and Felicisima. Thereafter, Felicisima and Miriam sold the lands to a corporation.
Consequently, Isidra filed several complaints. One of the complaints is this disbarment case
against Atty. Torres. Torres, in his defense, averred that he acted in good faith in allowing his
wife and Miriam to execute the Deeds; that he thought that the Deeds were agreed to by the
other siblings pursuant to a toka or verbal will left by Isidras mother and as implemented by
their eldest brother, Eliseo Ting; that the exclusion of the other heirs was merely an oversight.
Isidra denied the existence of the toka. Eliseo also said there was no such toka. ISSUE:
Whether or not Torres should be disbarred for allowing the exclusion of the other heirs from
the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement despite his knowledge of their presence. HELD: Yes.
He violated his oath as he engaged in deceitful conduct. He has committed falsehood. By
letting his wife and Miriam declare in a public document that they are the only heirs to the
estate when in fact there are other compulsory heirs and then later presenting these Deeds
to the Registry of Deeds, Atty. Torres failed to advise that the two were doing acts contrary to
law. He participated in the making of these Deeds as well as to the subsequent transactions
involving the sale of the properties covered by the Deeds. His acts facilitated a wrong against
the other heirs. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
12. 12. 12 EN BANC 3.) A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995 WELLINGTON REYES, complainant, vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent. PER CURIAM: This administrative complaint for
disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice
and willful violation of his oath as an attorney. I On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M.
complainant reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the

victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a
complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had
given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other
occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in
respondent's office at the City Hall. An entrapment was set up by the NBI. Complainant
furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper bills
were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to
complainant for the use in the entrapment. When complainant went to respondent's office, he
was told that the latter would not return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI
agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with
respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to
see respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant
answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa
kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to respondent the marked money which he placed
inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the
NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found
positive of the yellow florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent
was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he
was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a sworn
statement to explain his side of the case, invoking his right against self-incrimination. On the
same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of Section 3(b)
of R.A. No. 3019. On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the
filing of administrative charges and the institution of disbarment proceedings against him. On
April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending investigation
and disposition of his administrative case (Case No. 74).
13. 13. 13 Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases
were earlier filed against respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave
Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was found
guilty as charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative Case No. 10-A.
for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending resolution. In his
answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously
planted the marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent. He further said
that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI at the instance of
complainant was still pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In
connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminal complaint
for incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted corruption of a public official against
complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila. In reply to the answer, complainant denied that
the several cases against respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will.
He said that the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by
respondent against him. In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to
refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court.,
the case was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition. On

March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said
recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution dated March
26, 1994. II We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. In the case
at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked
money from complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted
in his arrest and the subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his
defense, respondent merely denied the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked
money was planted by complainant. It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater
weight than negative testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]). When the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm,
Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still maintains that degree
of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals,
103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]). Where the
misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a
member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]). The
extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court,
Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every lawyer
the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations
and its violation
14. 14. 14 is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal
Ethics 66-67 [1983]). WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered
STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of
respondent. SO ORDERED. 4.) SECOND DIVISION EPIFANIA Q. BANTOLO, Adm. Case
No. 6589 Complainant, Present: PUNO, J., Chairman, - versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. ATTY. EGMEDIO B. CASTILLON, JR.,
Respondent. Promulgated: December 19, 2005 D E C I S I O N TINGA, J.: In a lettercomplaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dated 02 October 1997,[1] Epifania
Q. Bantolo charged Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. of violating the lawyers oath and Section
20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for having (i) wittingly or willingly performed, promoted,
or sued any groundless, false or unlawful suit, and or giving aid or consent to the same; (ii)
delayed the just execution of the suit without legal or justifiable cause and employing illegal
means and unlawful force to do so; (iii) blatantly showed disrespect to the Regional Trial
Court by disobeying its lawful orders; and (iv) for employing unlawful and illegal means to
attain his ends. According to complainant, respondent is the lawyer and one of the
defendants in a case involving a parcel of land in Valderrama, Antique.[2] The case was
decided in favor of the complainant and her co-plaintiffs, and thereafter, a writ of execution
was issued, by virtue of which, defendants were ejected from the property. However,

respondents, with his co-defendants subsequently entered the disputed property and
harvested the palay planted therein.[3] Plaintiffs
15. 15. 15 were prompted to move for defendants to be declared in contempt of court because of
their open defiance and willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the court, which were
abetted by the acts of Atty. Egmedio Castillon who is an officer of the court.[4] On 25
January 1991, the trial court declared Atty. Castillon and his co-defendants guilty of indirect
contempt of court, with the penalty of one month imprisonment and fine.[5] Subsequently, on
26 July 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, with the
modification that instead of imprisonment, defendants were ordered to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 each.[6] In his Answer to Complaint dated 02 March 1998, respondent denied
complainants allegations and claimed that said complaint was a form of harassment.[7]
Hearings were thereafter scheduled but were cancelled and reset due to the unavailability of
the complainant. Finally, on 09 December 1998, a hearing for the reception of complainants
evidence was conducted.[8] While notices were subsequently sent to respondent setting the
case for reception of his evidence, no such hearing pushed through due to respondents
failure to inform the IBP of his new office address. Thus, respondent was deemed to have
waived his right to present evidence.[9] In the Report and Recommendation (Report) dated
17 March 2004, the investigating commissioner, Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos, found that
complainant failed to prove that respondents actions, with respect to his unsuccessful
defense of the case were not within the bounds of the law. Moreover, that respondent lost his
case in the trial court does not necessarily support the charge of willingly promoting or ruing
any groundless, false or unlawful suit or giving aid, or consenting to the same, [10] he
added. Thus, according to the IBP, the only remaining issue to be resolved is respondents
liability, if any, for his contumacious acts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
[11] Recognizing that the findings of the trial court and the appellate court with respect to
respondents contumacious acts as final and conclusive, it was found that respondent
committed an act which constitutes a breach of his sworn promise to obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities. Furthermore, the Report noted
respondents attempts to thwart the instant disbarment proceedings, to wit: i) attempt to
mislead the Commission on Bar Discipline by representing that the proceedings relative to
the contempt charges against him are still pending when in fact they had already been
terminated; ii) placing too much emphasis on the alleged lack of personality of the
complainant to file the disbarment complaint; and iii) failure to notify the Commission of his
change of address.[12] Finding however, that the penalty of disbarment would be reasonable
under the circumstances, the Commission recommended instead the penalty of suspension
for one month.[13] As explained in the Report: A close examination of the facts of this case
reveals that the basis of the act for which the court found to be contumacious is a claim of
ownership over the subject property, and thus arose from an emotional attachment to the
property which they had possessed prior to their dispossession as a consequence of the
decision in Civil Case No. 1345. Respondents subsequent acts, however, including those
which were found to be contumacious, as well as his actuations in the instant case, merit
disciplinary sanctions, for which is recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1)
month.[14] On 30 July 2004, the IBP passed a resolution adopting the Report and

Recommendation, to wit: RESOLUTION NO, XVI-2004-376 CBD Case No. 510 Epifania Q.
Bantolo vs.
16. 16. 16 Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A;
and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent has been found by both the Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals guilty of indirect contempt for disobeying the writ of execution
and for attempting to mislead the Commission into believing that the contempt charge is still
pending by submitting an Order of the trial court which pertains to a second contempt
charge, Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) month. The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken. Lawyers are
particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well.[15] Such is the situation in the
instant case. We need not delve into the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals on the contempt case against respondents. Suffice it to say that respondent lawyers
commission of the contumacious acts have been shown and proven, and eventually
punished by the lower courts. A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus,
while he owes his entire devotion to the interest and causes of his client he must ensure that
he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an
instrument of truth and justice. More importantly, as an officer of the court and its
indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice, graver responsibility is
imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts[16] and to show
respect to its processes. Thus, any act on his part which tends visibly to obstruct, pervert or
impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes professional misconduct calling
for the exercise of disciplinary action against him.[17] Respondents defiance of the writ of
execution is a brazen display of disrespect of the very system which he has sworn to support.
Likewise, his various attempts to delay and address issues inconsequential to the disbarment
proceedings had necessarily caused delay, and even threatened to obstruct the investigation
being conducted by the IBP. Nevertheless, the supreme penalty of disbarment is not proper
in the instant case. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While
the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring lawyer from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers when the evidence calls for it, it will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will
suffice to accomplish the desired end.[18] In the case of respondent, the Court finds that a
months suspension from the practice of law will provide him with enough time to purge
himself of his misconduct and will give him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the
virtuous path of the legal profession. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon is
found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) month with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely. Respondents suspension is effective upon notice of this decision. Let notice
of this decision be spread in respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of

the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned. SO ORDERED.
17. 17. 17 EN BANC 5.) [B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003] DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE,
complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent. D E C I S I O N CARPIO, J.: The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance
than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the
morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations. The Facts Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who
passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass
oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law,
grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed
respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22
May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against
him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the
Roll of Attorneys up to now. Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of
law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that
respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to
the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In
this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
18. 18. 18 On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate.
As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body. On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan
(Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice
mayoralty candidate. On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to
take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared
of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to
comment on the complaint against him. In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan
sought his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that
he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of
certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading. On his employment as
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on

11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the
Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor
Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated
considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys. On 22 June 2001, complainant
filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his
appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant
alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for
Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his
oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government. Respondent filed a Reply
(Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative
case is motivated mainly by political vendetta. On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case
to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. OBCs
Report and Recommendation The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the
MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC
likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the
lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a
serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of
law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine
Bar. On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent
allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government
employee.
19. 19. 19 Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise,
respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC. The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that
respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the
lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed
as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent
stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he
had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and
similar bodies. On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the
MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal
counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the

MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty
Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying
for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate. All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar. In
Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that: The practice of lawis
not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the
Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use
of legal knowledge or skill. Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to
do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent
called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held
himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has
shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
20. 20. 20 The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations.
The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5] The
regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate
passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He
was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under
Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7] True, respondent here passed the
2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the
bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an

attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9] On the charge of violation of law, complainant
contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any
court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the
acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May
2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] ViceMayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the
evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while
serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan. On the charge of grave misconduct and
misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent
him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law. WHEREFORE,
respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar. SO ORDERED. EN
BANC AGUIRRE DIGEST Aguirre v Rana Facts: Rana passed the 2000 bar examinations.
The following year, one day before the oath taking, Aguirre filed a petition for denial of
admission to the bar against Rana, charging Rama with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law and grave misrepresentation. Rama was alleged to have
appeared as counsel for a certain Bunan in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of canvassers in Masbate, and filed a pleading as counsel. His clients were running for
Mayor and Vice-Mayor. He was still allowed to take his oath as a member of the bar but
ruled that he could not sign the roll of attorneys pending the resolution of the charge.
21. 21. 21 Incidentally he is also a government employee (Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Mandaon Masbate): By law, he is not allowed to act as counsel in any court/admin body
because of his government position Issue: W/n he is allowed by law to act as counsel for a
client in any court or administrative body? Held: Respondent is guilty of unauthorized
practice of law. Rana had been appearing in proceedings even before he took his oath. This
misconduct casts serious doubt on his moral fitness as a member of the bar. Practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces preparation of
pleadings and papers incident to actions and other proceedings, the management of such
actions on behalf of clients before judges and courts. Giving advice to clients and all actions
taken for them in matters connected with the law. Basically activity in and out of court which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience.
Although he passed the bar examinations it is the signing in the roll of attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. In fine, he engaged in the practice of law by filing
pleadings and signing as counsel and giving advice to his clients thereby creating a attyclient relationship even before signing the roll of attorneys. He shouldve waited a little longer.
(Rule 9 violated; Unauthorized practice of law) He is DENIED ADMISSION to the Bar 6.)
[A.C. No. 6486. September 22, 2004] EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISPIN
G. DANTES, respondent. D E C I S I O N PER CURIAM: Despite variations in the specific

standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the
practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has good moral
character, and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the
standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent[1] to
the practice of law, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when
a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.[2] In
an Affidavit-Complaint[3] dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on
the ground of immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law. The
case was docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851. Complainant alleged that respondent is a
philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one
after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time respondents illicit
affairs started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and their children, thus forcing
complainant to work abroad to provide for their childrens needs. Complainant pointed out
that these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his lawyers oath and his moral and
legal obligation to be a role model to the community.
22. 22. 22 On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order[4] requiring
respondent to submit his answer to the Affidavit-Complaint. Respondent submitted his
Answer[5] on November 19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of marriage with the
complainant and the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually
agreed to separate eighteen (18) years before after complainant had abandoned him in their
Balintawak residence and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when
complainant returned after eighteen years, she insisted that she be accommodated in the
place where he and their children were residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented
apartment. Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could
afford and provided for their needs. He even bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons,
Dandelo and Dante, and gave complainant adequate financial support even after she had
abandoned him in 1983. Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to
force him to remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her. Subsequently, the IBP
conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint. Complainant presented her
evidence, both oral and documentary,[6] to support the allegations in herAffidavit-Complaint.
From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19,
1979, complainant and respondent were married[7] and lived with the latters mother in
Balintawak. At that time, respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends meet,
complainant engaged in the buy and sell business and relied on dole-outs from the
respondents mother. Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and
Daisy, who were born on February 20, 1980,[8] October 14, 1981[9] and August 11, 1983,
[10] respectively. Complainant narrated that their relationship was marred by frequent
quarrels because of respondents extra- marital affairs.[11] Sometime in 1983, she brought
their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent had
failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a
domestic helper. Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to
live separately, complainant asseverated that she was just compelled to work abroad to

support their children. When she returned to the Philippines, she learned that respondent
was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he did not want to live
with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses. Complainant presented documentary
evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave,[12]
all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour[13] to prove the fact
that respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different
women. Letters of complainants legitimate children likewise support the allegation that
respondent is a womanizer.[14] In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to
have waived his right to cross- examine complainant, after he failed to appear during the
scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to
the Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude the Evidence from the
Records of the Proceedings[15] onAugust 1, 2002. Subsequently, on May 29, 2003,
respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism.
Respondents motion was denied because it was filed after the complainant had already
presented her evidence.[16] Respondent was given a final chance to present his evidence on
July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise denied for being a prohibited pleading under the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent submitted his Position
Paper on August 4, 2003.
23. 23. 23 In respondents Position Paper,[17] he reiterated the allegations in his Answer except
that this time, he argued that in view of the resolution of the complaint for support with
alimony pendente lite[18] filed against him by the complainant before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City,[19] the instant administrative case should be dismissed for lack of
merit. On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant its
Report[20] and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD Case No. 01-851.[21] The IBP
recommended that the respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. Except
for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken. The Code of Professional
Responsibility provides: Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03- A
lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as
that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion
of good and respectable members of the community.[22] To be the basis of disciplinary
action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must
be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree[23] or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the common sense of decency.[24] In Barrientos vs. Daarol,[25] we ruled that as officers of
the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to
be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards
of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only

required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain
its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but
should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning. It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character
has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image
of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant
lawyers from themselves.[26] Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not
only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain
their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.[27] They may be suspended from
the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities,
as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
[28] Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different
women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral
conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in
conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondents
commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the high
and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.[29]
24. 24. 24 In Toledo vs. Toledo,[30] we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and
cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,
[31] we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall
within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. We
reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,[32] that moral delinquency which affects the
fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which
makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. The power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.
[33] Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should never be decreed.[34] However, in the present case, the
seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be
the most appropriate penalty. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes
is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar,
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED. 7.)
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 2361 February 9,
1989 LEONILA J. LICUANAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL L. MELO, respondent. R E S
O L U T I O N PER CURIAM: An affidavit-complaint, dated November 11, 1981, was filed by

Leonila J. Licuanan with the Office of the Court Administrator on 5 February 1982 against
respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, for breach of professional ethics, alleging that respondent,
who was her counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant, failed to remit to her the
rentals collected by respondent on different dates over a twelve-month period, much less did
he report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only after approximately a year from
actual receipt that respondent turned over his collections to complainant after the latter,
through another counsel, acquired knowledge of the payment and had demanded the same.
25. 25. 25 In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted having received the payment
of rentals from complainant's tenant, Aida Pineda, as alleged in the complaint, but explained
that he kept this matter from the complainant for the purpose of surprising her with his
success in collecting the rentals. We forwarded the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General, for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were conducted and the
parties presented their respective evidence. After investigation, the Solicitor General
submitted the following Findings and Recommendation: Findings: The issue to be resolved is
whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of the respondent in accounting for the
funds collected by him for his former client, the complainant herein, for which unprofessional
conduct respondent should be disciplined. A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to
delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to
his clients. Under paragraph 11 of the Canons of Legal Ethics, he is obligated to report
promptly the money of client that has come to his possession and should not commingle it
with his private property or use it for his personal purpose without his client's consent viz:
Money of the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be
reported promptly, and except with the client's know and consent should not be commingled
with his private or be used by him. And paragraph 32 of the Canons of Legal Ethics further
requires a lawyer to maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust: ... But
above all, a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private
trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen. In the instant
case, respondent failed to observe his oath of office. It is undisputed that the relation of
attorney and client existed between Licuanan and Melo at the time the incident in question
took place. The records disclose that on August 8, 1979, respondent, as Licuanan's attorney,
obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor against Aida Pineda whereby the latter was directed
by the City Court of Manila to pay Licuanan all her monthly rentals from October, 1978 and
succeeding months thereafter. When several months had elapsed without them hearing a
word from Pineda, respondent decided to send her a letter on February 4, 1980, demanding
that she pay the monthly rental of her apartment otherwise he will be constrained to take the
necessary legal action against her to protect the interest of his client (Exhibit "A", p. 8,
record). On February 11, 1980, Pineda yielded to the demand of Melo. She went to
respondent's office and paid him P3,060.00 for which respondent gave her a receipt for the
said amount representing her rental payments for October, 1978 to February, 1980 at the
rate of P180.00 per month (Exh. "B", p. 9, Ibid.) At the end of March 31,1980, Pineda again
went back to respondent and paid the rentals of her apartment for the months of March and
April, 1980 in the sum of P360.00 (Exh. "C" p. 10, Ibid.). Not only that, respondent again

received from Pineda on June 30, 1980 rental payments covering the months of May, June
and July, 1980 in the total sum of
26. 26. 26 P540.00 (Exh. "D" p. 11, Ibid.). And, on September 29, 1980, he received and issued
Pineda a receipt for P540.00 covering rental payments for the months of August, September
and October, 1980. (Exh. "E", Ibid.). After four months had elapsed, or on January 23, 1981,
he collected again from Pineda the total sum of P720.00 covering the months of October,
November, December, 1980 and January 1981 (Exh. "F", p. 12, Ibid.). During the entire
twelve-month period that respondent had been receiving the said rental payments of Pineda,
he did not bother to inform or report to complainant about the said payments and instead
unnecessarily retained the money. He allowed the money to accumulate for a year and kept
complainant in the dark as to the progress of the case. He did not even attempt to tell her
about the money that had come into his possession notwithstanding the fact that complainant
used to call him and inquire regarding the case (pp. 14-15, tsn., Sept. 10, 1985). It was only
when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new counsel retained by complainant, wrote respondent
a letter on May 4, 1981, advising him to surrender the money to complainant that he
accounted for it (Exh. "H", p. 15, Ibid.). But this was rather late because as early as April 27,
1981, complainant, not knowing that respondent had been receiving the rental payments of
Pineda, instituted an administrative case against her (Aida Pineda) before the Chief of the
Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing her of "moral turpitude" arising from her alleged
failure to pay the rent of her apartment as ordered by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case
No. 037276 and claiming that she has ignored and refused to pay her just obligation (Exh.
"G", p. 14, Ibid.). This led therefore Pineda to bring an action against her (Licuanan) for
damages before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, for she allegedly suffered mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation arising from the
unfounded administrative case Licuanan filed against her (Aida Pineda), since as borne out
by the records, she had been paying her obligation religiously to the lawyer of Licuanan,
herein respondent (pp. 48-52, record). Clearly, this unfortunate incident would not have
happened had respondent been only true to his oath as a lawyer, i.e., to be honest and
candid towards his client. Thus, we find it hard to believe respondent's defense that he kept
the money of complainant for a year merely because he wanted to surprise her with his
success in collecting the rental payments from Pineda. On the contrary, it is very much
discernible that he did not surrender immediately the money to complainant because he was
using it for his own benefit. Common sense dictates that by unnecessarily withholding the
money of complainant for such length of time, respondent deprived her of the use of the
same. It is therefore too credulous to believe his explanation, which is flimsy and incredible
Respondent's actuation casts doubt on his honesty and integrity. He must know that the
"highly fiduciary" and "confidential relation" of attorney and client requires that the attorney
should promptly account for all funds and property received or held by him for the client's
benefit, and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct, as succinctly held by the
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Fermina Legaspi Daroy, et al., vs. Atty. Ramon
Chaves Legaspi, Adm. Case No. 936, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 304, to wit: A lawyer, under
his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his

clients that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private
property or use it for his personal purposes without his client's
27. 27. 27 consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust (Pars.
11 and 32, Canons of Legal Ethics). Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment
in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be immediately turned over to them (Aya vs.
Bigonia, 57 Phil. 8, 11). xxx xxx xxx A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in his office as attorney or for any violation of the lawyer's oath (Ibid,
sec. 27). The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and
of a very delicate, exacting and confidential in character, requiring a high degree of fidelity
and good faith (7 Am. Jur. 2d 105). In view of that special relationship, 'lawyers are bound to
promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure
to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on
money in his hands collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty of promptly
accounting for the funds received. (Emphasis supplied). In fine, we are convinced that
respondent is guilty of breach of trust reposed in him by his client. Not only has he degraded
himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable
profession (In re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25; In re David, 84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm.
Case No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 131). By his deceitful conduct, he placed his
client in jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit; thus, instead of being a help to
his client, he became the cause of her misery. He, therefore, deserves a severe punishment
for it. (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8, 11; In re Bamberger, April 17, 1924, 49 Phil. 962; Daroy,
et al., vs. Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi, supra.) Clearly, respondent is guilty of professional
misconduct in the discharge of his duty as a lawyer. RECOMMENDATION WHEREFORE,
we respectfully recommend that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of not less than one (1) year, and that he be strongly admonished to strictly and
faithfully observe his duties to his clients. (pp. 78-85, Rollo) We find the foregoing findings
well considered and adopt the same but differ with the recommendation. The actuations of
respondent in retaining for his personal benefit over a one-year period, the amount of
P5,220.00 received by him on behalf of his client, the complainant herein, depriving her of its
use, and withholding information on the same despite inquiries made by her, is glaringly a
breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore observance, and an evident transgression of
the Canons of Professional Ethics particularly: 11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY The
lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or
takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
28. 28. 28 Money of the client or collected for the client of other trust property coming into the
possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not
under any circumstance be commingled with his own or be used by him. * Indeed, by his
professional misconduct, respondent has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. He
has shown himself unfit for the confidence and trust which should characterize an attorneyclient relationship and the practice of law. By reason thereof complainant was compelled to
file a groundless suit against her tenant for non-payment of rentals thereby exposing her to
jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit filed by said tenant against her By force
of circumstances, complainant was further compelled to engage the services of another

counsel in order to recover the amount rightfully due her but which respondent had
unjustifiedly withheld from her. Respondent's unprofessional actuations considered, we are
constrained to find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has
displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to delay
any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has
proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He
deserves the severest punishment. WHEREFORE, consistent with the crying need to
maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal profession and to preserve
undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent,
Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys. Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all Courts of the country and
spread on the personal record of respondent Atty. Manuel L. Melo. SO ORDERED. LEONILA
LICUANAN vs V ATTY MANUEL MELO pe t February 9, 1989 A.M. No.2361 FACTS: Melo
was hired as counsel by Licuanan in an ejectment case filed against her tenant, Aida Pineda.
Melo, as Licuanan's attorney, obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor against Pineda and was
directed by the City Court of Manila to pay Licuanan all her monthly rentals from October
1978 and succeeding months thereafter. When several months had elapsed without them
hearing a word from Pineda, Licuanan decided to send her a letter demanding that she pay
the monthly rental of her apartment otherwise he will be constrained to take the necessary
legal action against her to protect the interest of his client. Pineda yielded to the demand of
Melo. She went to respondent's office and paid him rental payments and continued paying
her obligations religiously to Melo. During the entire twelve-month period that respondent had
been receiving the said rental payments of Pineda, he did not bother to inform or report to
complainant about the said payments and instead unnecessarily retained the money
Licuanan not knowing that Melo had been receiving the rental payments of Pineda, instituted
an administrative case against her Pineda before the Chief of the Philippine Tuberculosis
Society accusing her of "moral turpitude" arising from her alleged failure to pay the rent of
her apartment as ordered by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 037276 and claiming
that she has ignored and refused to pay her just obligation Pineda brought an action against
Licuanan for damages before the then CFI of Manila, for she allegedly suffered mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation arising from the
unfounded administrative case filed against her since as borne out by the records, she had
been paying her obligation religiously to the lawyer of Licuanan It wasonly when Atty.
Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new counsel retained by Licaunan, wrote Melo a letter advising him
to surrender the money to Licaunan, that he accounted for it. Melo admitted having received
the payment of rentals from Licaunan's tenant, but explained that he kept this matter from the
29. 29. 29 Licaunan for the purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting the rentals
ISSUE: Is Melo guilty of violating paragraph 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and
breaching the Lawyers Oath HELD: The court held in the affirmative. The actuations of
Melo in retaining for his personal benefit over a one-year period, the amount received by him
on behalf of his client, depriving her of its use, and withholding information on the same
despite inquiries made by her, is glaringly a breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore
observance, and an evident transgression of theCanons of Professional Ethics particularly

Canon 11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY. By his professional misconduct,

respondent has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. He has shown himself unfit
for the confidence and trust which should characterize an ACR and the practice of law. By
reason thereof Licaunan was compelled to file a groundless suit against her tenant for nonpayment of rentals thereby exposing her to jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage
suit filed by said tenant against her by force of circumstances, complainant was further
compelled to engage the services of another counsel in order to recover the amount rightfully
due her but which respondent withheld from her. - The court is constrained to find him guilty
of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of honesty and
good moral character. He has violated his oath not to delay any man for money or malice,
besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proven himself unworthy of the
trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the severest punishment.
Consistent with the crying need to maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal
profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved
to DISBAR respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of law. His name is
herebyordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys 8.) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME
COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981 MAGDALENA T.
ARCIGA complainant, vs. SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent. AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of
lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly
immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit
relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City.
Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while
Segundino was a

PRACTICE OF LAW
PRACTICE OF LAW
Rule 138, Section 1. Who may practice law - Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Concept of the Practice of Law

Generally, to engage in the practice is to do any of those acts which are characteristic of the legal
profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 46). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience (PLA vs. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173).

Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

***Practice of Law means any activity in or out of court which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which devise or service requires the use, in any degree, of legal knowledge or skill.

People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111

***Strictly speaking, the word practice of law implies the customary or habitual holding of oneself to the
public as a lawyer and demanding compensation for his services.

***Private practice in more than an isolated appearance for it consist of frequent customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. An isolated appearance may, however, amount to practice in relation
to the rule prohibiting some persons from engaging in the exercise of the legal profession.

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic Inc. 223 SCRA 378 (1993)

***In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney-at-law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activities:
1.

legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations

2.

preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman; and

3.

appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of
life, liberty and property according to law, in order to assist in the proper interpretation and enforcement of
law.

***Essential criteria enumerated by the C.A. as determinative of engaging in the practice of

law:

1)Habituality
2)Compensation
3)Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure
4)Attorney-Client relationship

Non-Lawyers authorized to appear in court:

1.

In cases before the MTC, a party may conduct his case or litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose (Sec. 34, Rule 138, RRC).

2.

Before any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally (Ibid)

3.
In a criminal case before the MTC in a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is not
available, the judge may appoint a non-lawyer who is
a.

resident of the province, and

b.
RRC)

of good repute for probity and ability to aid the accused in his defense (Rule 116, Sec. 7,

4.
A senior law student, who is enrolled in a recognized law schools clinical education program
approved by the Supreme Court may appear before any court without compensation, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the Legal Clinic of the law school. The student shall be under the direct
supervision and control of an IBP member duly accredited by the law school.
5.
Under the Labor Code, non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter, if (1) they
represent themselves, or if (2) they represent their organization or members thereof (Art. 222, PO442, as
amended).
6.
Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can represent a claimant before the Cadastral Court (Act
No. 2259, Sec. 9).
7.
Any person appointed to appear for the government of the Phil. in accordance with law (Sec. 33
Rule 138).
Limitations of Appearance of non-lawyers
1.

He should confine his work to non-adversary contentions.

2.
He should not undertake purely legal work, such as the examination or cross-examination of
witnesses, or the presentation of evidence.
3.

Services should not be habitually rendered.

4.
Should not charge or collect attorneys fees (PAFLU vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co. 42
SCRA 302
Q.

A and B who are law students entered their appearances before the Municipal Court as
private prosecutors in a criminal case. This was disallowed by the trial judge. Is this correct?

A.

NO. A non-lawyer may appear as a friend of the party before the Municipal Courts under
Section 34, Rule 138 Rules of Court; he may make such appearances either as defense
counsel or private prosecutor under the control and supervision of the fiscal. The permission
of the fiscal is not necessary for the appearance of a private prosecutor, although if he so
wishes, the fiscal may disallow participation in the trial by handling the case
personally. (Catimbuhan, et al. vs. Hon. Cruz, G.R. No. 51813-14, Nov.29,
1983)

Public Officials who cannot engage in the private practice of law in the Philippines:

1. Judges and other officials as employees of the Superior Court (Rule 148, Sec. 35, RRC).

1.

Officials and employees of the OSG (Ibid).

2.

Government prosecutors (Peo v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109).

- if permitted by their department head should only be in isolated cases
involving relatives or close family friends

3.
President, Vice-President, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants, (Art. VIII Sec.
15, 1987 Constitution).
4.

Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions (Art. IX-A, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution).

5.

Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. IX, Sec. 8 (2nd par.), 1987 Constitution).

6.

All governors, city and municipal mayors (R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 90).

7.

Those who, by special law, are prohibited from engaging in the practice of their legal profession

Q.

Can a civil service employee engage in the private practice of law?

A.

A civil service officer or employee whose duty or responsibility does not require his entire
time to be at the disposal of the government may not engage in private practice of law
without the written permit from the head of the department concerned. However, government
officials who by express mandate of the law are prohibited from practicing law may not, even
with the consent of the department head, engage in the practice of law. If so authorized by
the department head, he may, in an isolated case, act as counsel for a relative or close
family friend.
A government official forbidden to practice law may be held criminally liable for doing
so. An officer or employee of the civil service who, as a lawyer, engages in the private
practice of law without a written permit from the department head concerned may be held
administratively liable therefor.

Q.

The City of Manila hired the services of Atty. Bautista of the ABC Law Offices to represent it
in case pending before the RTC. Can Atty. Bautista validly represent it?

A.

NO. A local government unit could not hire a private attorney to represent. The provisions of
Sec. 1683 complemented by Sec. 3 of the Local Autonomy Law, is clear in providing that
only the provincial prosecutor and the municipal attorney can represent a province or
municipality. The provision is mandatory. The municipalitys authority to employ a private
lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial prosecutor is disqualified to
represent it, as when he represents that province against a municipality.

Public Officials with Restrictions in the Practice of Law:

1.

Senators and members of the House of Representatives

2.

Members of the Sanggunian

3.

Retired Justice or judge

4.
Civil service officers or employees without permit from their respective department
heads (Noriega vs. Sison 125 SCRA 293)
Restrictions in the Practice of Law of Members of the Legislature

No senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before
any courts of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administration bodies
xxx(Art. VI, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution).

 A lawyer-member of the legislature is only prohibited from appearing as counsel before any court of
justice, electoral tribunals or quasi-judicial and administrative bodies

The word appearance includes not only arguing a case before any such body but also filing a
pleading in behalf of a client as by simply filing a formal motion, plea or answer. (Ramos vs. Manalac,
89 PHIL. 270)

Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as part of firm name under the
signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent amounts to signing of a nonqualified senator or congressman, the office of an attorney being originally an agency, and because he
will, by such act, be appearing in court or quasi-judicial or administrative body in violation of the
constitutional restriction. He cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly. (In re: David 93
PHIL. 461)

Restrictions in the practice of law of members of the Sanngunian

Under the Local Government Code (R.A. 7180, Sec. 90), Sanggunian members may practice
their professions provided that if they are members of the Bar, they shall not:
a.
appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or
any unit, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
b.
appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or
local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
c.
collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
d.
use property and personnel of the Government except when the Sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the government.
Restrictions in the practice of law of members of the Judiciary

Under RA 910, Sec. 1, as amended, a retired justice or judge receiving a pension from the
government, cannot act as counsel in any civil case in which the Government, or any of its subdivision or
agencies in the adverse party or in criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense in relation to his office.
Remedies Against Unauthorized Practice
1.

Petition for Injunction

2.

Declaratory Relief

3.

Contempt of Court

4.

Disqualification and complaints for disbarment

5.

Criminal complaint for estafa who falsely represented to be an attorney to the damage party

Alawi vs. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997

Q
.

Are persons who pass the Sharia Bar members of the Philippine Bar?

A
.

Persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence
may only practice before the Sharia courts. They are also not entitled to use the title
attorney as such is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the
study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing

Q
.

Does scrivening constitute practice of law?

A
.

NO. Scrivening or the filling of blanks in a standard or stereotyped forms which involves pure
clerical work without need for any legal interpretation. This is not practice of law.

In re: Joaquin, 241 SCRA 405

Appearance in propia persona is appearance in court by a non-lawyer for himself without the
assistance of a member of the Bar. This is sometimes referred to as pro se practice

While pro se practice is allowed, it is not advisable to do so. Court proceedings are full of technical
pitfalls that may entrap a person unschooled in substantive and procedural law.

IN RE: LUIS B. TAGORDA 53

PHIL 37 3/23/29- Malpractice
Legal Ethics
inShare1

FACTS: The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits
that in the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which in
translation, read as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE FOR BOARD MEMBER,
Province of Isabela. (NOTE.- as notaty public, he can execute for a deed of sale for the purchase
of land as required by the cadastral office, can renew lost documents of your animals; can make
your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit.
As a lawyer he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint
for or against you. Come or write to him in his town Echague, Isabela. He offers free
consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio
in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter reads as follow:
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the
belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Iligan and that I would then be
disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I
would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my
residence here in Echague, I would request your kind favor to transmit this information to your
barrio people in any of your meeting or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my
desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in
your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the
registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge
only three pesos for every registration.

HELD: Application is give to se. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act NO.
2828, providing The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokets, constitutes malpractice, and to Canon 27 and 28 of the Code
of Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippines Bar
Association in 1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer. The law is a profession and not a
business. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or
suspension.
1. Respondent Tagorda is suspended from the practice of law for 1 month.
2. For advertising his services in the Sunday Tribune respondent attorney is
reprimanded.

IN RE: LUIS B. TAGORDA 53

PHIL 37 3/23/29
A.C. No. 3523 January 17, 2005
RASMUS G. ANDERSON, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. REYNALDO A. CARDEO, respondent.
Administrative case against Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeo for malpractice and neglect of duty,
stemming from his alleged neglect or deliberate mishandling of a case.
Held: SUSPENDED (6) months and WARNED that any similar infraction in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
Thus, respondents defenses that the complainant was "uncooperative" as a client, that the
voluminous records turned over to him were in disarray, and that the complainant did not
disclose to him certain particulars of the case, are all unavailing. Thus, in view of the fact that he
remained counsel of record for the complainant, it was highly irregular for him to entrust the
filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to other people who did not lawfully appear interested
in the subject litigation.
As a lawyer representing the cause of his client, he should have taken more control over the
handling of the case.
Respondent should know that as a lawyer, he owes fidelity to the cause of his client. When a
lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite
academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. The lawyer has the duty to exert his best
judgment in the prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable
and ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of the case.

[A.M. No. 5925. March 11, 2003]

RUBY MAE BARNACHEA, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDWIN T. QUIOCHO, respondent.
Complainant engaged the legal services of respondent for the latter to cause the transfer under
her name of the title over a property previously owned by her sister. Complainant was able to
pay respondent for legal fees.
Respondent failed. Complainant demanded that respondent refund to her the legal fees and
return the documents which she earlier entrusted to him. However, respondent failed to comply
with said demands.
Held: SUSPENDED for 1 year; repetition of violation will be dealt severely. PAY the
complainant.
Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it
that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in the profession but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional
duties, making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the
law confer upon him.

A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his
possession. The conversion by a lawyer funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation
of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and is of a very delicate, exacting
and confidential character. A lawyer is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
his dealings and transactions with his clients. The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney
an absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly,
with the interest of his client. In this case, respondent miserably failed to measure up to the
exacting standard expected of him.

[A.C. No. 4349. December 22, 1997]

LOURDES R. BUSIOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT, respondent.

Complainant charged respondent with having committed the crime of estafa by

misappropriating the sum of P32,000.00. Of this amount, P30,000.00 was entrusted to
respondent for deposit in the bank account of complainants husband, while P2,000.00
represented the amount respondent demanded from complainant supposedly for a bond in a
Civil Case when no such bond was required. Respondent did not appear in the administrative
proceedings to clear his name. Respondent was able to pay the amount, complainant withdrew
the estafa case but proceeded with the administrative case.
Held: DISBARRED. There is no doubt that respondent is guilty of having used the money of his
clients without their consent. Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of
his clients is held in trust and must be immediately turned over to them
Respondent, by converting the money of his clients to his own personal use without their
consent , and by deceiving the complainant into giving him the amount of P2,000.00
purportedly to be used as a bond which was not required, is, undoubtedly, guilty of deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct. By so doing, he betrays the confidence reposed in him by his
clients. Not only has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair
name of an honorable profession.
When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded
he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.

[A. C. No. 5485. March 16, 2005]

ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent.
Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. He claims
having prepared the position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the same, the Labor
Arbiter had already issued the order dismissing the case. Atty. Ortiz admits though that the
period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure to
timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor because he was too
busy. Eventually, he withdrew from his other cases and his free legal services. Complainant
filed this complaint but later on withdrew .
Held: SUSPENDED: (1) month, with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligence will be
dealt with more severely.
Still, the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective until a notice of discharge by
the client or a manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal,
and a copy thereof served upon the adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be
counsel in the case.
Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do
so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who
withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property
to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of
the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action on the case was that
he was informed that Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming that were
true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.
There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the
client in the midst of litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause of
desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might be perceived as a
higher calling, election to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction of professional duty.
Suspension from the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason to deviate from the
norm in this case.

[A.C. No. 5817. May 27, 2004]

EMMA V. DE JUAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. OSCAR R. BARIA III, respondent.
Petitioner was terminated without notice or explanation so she filed a complaint before the
NLRC against the company for illegal dismissal. In search of a lawyer, she asked the assistance
of BBC which assigned respondent to handle her labor case. On December 29, 1999, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of complainant. The Company appealed to the NLRC. In a
decision promulgated on September 24, 2001, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and
declared there was no illegal dismissal.
Complainant blamed respondent for the reversal. She said that she came to know of the reversal
of the Labor Arbiters decision when she called respondent in October 2001. When she asked the
respondent what they should do, respondent answered, Paano iyan ihaehhindi ako
marunong gumawa ng Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: The core issue is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would
warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainant a motion for reconsideration

from the decision of the NLRC.

Held: FINED with WARNING that a repetition of the same will be dealt with severely.
No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but once
he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Further, among the fundamental rules of
ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it
to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to
abandon his client and withdraw his services without reasonable cause and only upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances. Any dereliction of duty by a counsel, affects the client. This
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
The records reveal that indeed the respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration of the
NLRC such that the said decision eventually had become final and executory. Respondent does
not refute this. His excuse that he did not know how to file a motion for reconsideration is lame
and unacceptable. After complainant had expressed an interest to file a motion for
reconsideration, it was incumbent upon counsel to diligently return to his books and refamiliarize himself with the procedural rules for a motion for reconsideration. Filing a motion
for reconsideration is not a complicated legal task.
We are however, not unaware that respondent had been forthright and candid with his client
when he warned her of his lack of experience as a new lawyer. We are also not unaware that he
had advised complainant to get a new lawyer. However, his candor cannot absolve him. Without
a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, respondent remains counsel of
record and whether or not he has a valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot just do so
and leave his client out in the cold. An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written
consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event
the attorney should see to it that the name of the new attorney is recorded in the case.
Respondent did not comply with these obligations.
Negligence of lawyers in connection with legal matters entrusted to them for handling shall
render them liable.

A.C. No. 5162 March 20, 2003

EMILIANO COURT TOWNHOUSES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, complainant,
vs.

ATTY. MICHAEL DIONEDA, respondent.

ECTHA and respondent entered into a Retainers Agreement wherein respondent lawyer agreed
to handle the case of the complainant for P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and P1,000.00 as
appearance fee per hearing. It was further agreed that respondent lawyer would update the
complaint and work on the development of the case.
Respondent failed to do such. Demands to give back the money were made but to no avail, thus
this administrative charge. Despite due notice, respondent never attended the IBP
administrative hearings.
Held: SUSPENDED for six (6) months, with WARNING that repetition of the same will merit
more severe penalty, and is ORDERED to RETURN to complainant their money with interest.
A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY to the cause of his client mindful always of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. An attorney-at-law must serve his client with competence and
diligence at all times, and never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, for it is his sworn duty
to delay no man for money or malice and to conduct himself in a proper manner not just to his
client, but also to the court, the legal profession and society at large.
Respondents lamentable attitude towards his clients case is clearly evident from his apparent
disinterest in his own case for disbarment. Dioneda never bothered to present evidence in his
defense. He disregarded all notices sent to him by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, which
were personally served at his office address. He never appeared before the Commission despite
several opportunities to do so and explain his side.
The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and
discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the
legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer's oath has proven them unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.

[A.C. No. 1526. January 31, 2005]

NAZARIA S. HERNANDEZ (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY LUCIANO S. HERNANDEZ, JR.,
complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE C. GO, respondent.
Complainant engaged respondents services, she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed
him to sell her lots, believing that the proceeds thereof would be used to pay her creditors.
Respondent abused her trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others but to
himself and spent his own money to pay her obligations. Obviously, had he sold the lots to other
buyers, complainant could have earned more. Records show that she did not receive any amount
from respondent.
Held: DISBARRED. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Such conduct on the part of respondent degrades not only himself but also the name and honor
of the legal profession. He violated this Courts mandate that lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. When it appears that an attorney is no longer
worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but
also the duty of this Court to withdraw the privilege. Respondent, by his conduct, blemished not
only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also the legal profession.
Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his best efforts and ability to protect the
interests of his clients. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only
protects his clients cause; he also serves the ends of justice and does honor to the bar and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.

G.R. No. L-961 September 21, 1949

BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB
ASSAD, respondents.
Petitioner alleged that she and the counsel for the defendant had an attorney-client relationship
with her when, before the trial of the case, she went to defendants counsel, gave him the papers
of the case and other information relevant thereto, although she was not able to pay him legal
fees. That respondents law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on
the merits of her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted at
his office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney
Francisco's professional services. Atty. Francisco appeared as counsel for defendant and
plaintiff did not object to it until (4) months after. Then, plaintiff moved to dismiss the case
between her and defendant.
Issue: Was there an attorney-client relationship between plaintiff and Atty. Francisco?
Held: YES. In order to constitute the relation a professional one and not merely one of principal
and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a legal point, to prosecute
or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as
deeds, bills, contracts and the like.
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed
the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should

have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did
not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect
to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional
capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must
be regarded as established.
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor-when he is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating his
client's cause in open court. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney
from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the latter.
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney Agrava and that,
this being so, no secret communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would not vary
the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's statement that other papers, personal and
private in character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that
the mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the
opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received by
him from his first client.
An attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client
in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no
knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse
employment
"A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his
future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for
being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the
other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express
understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services
contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for
the services which he has retained him to perform."

[A.C. No. 5804. July 1, 2003]

BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainants, vs. ATTY.
ERNESTO S. SALUNAT, respondent.
An SEC Case was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of Directors. Respondent admits that
the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA.
Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent Board of Directors in the said case.
Complainants contend that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest because he was engaged
by the PPSTA, of which complainants were members, and was being paid out of its corporate
funds where complainants have contributed. Despite being told by PPSTA members of the said
conflict of interest, respondent refused to withdraw his appearance in the said cases.

Held: GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher

degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a lawyer represents both the
corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest. The interest
of the corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any interest of the
individual corporate officials. The rulings in these cases have persuasive effect upon us. After
due deliberation on the wisdom of this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer
engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the same corporations board
of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to
representing conflicting interests, which is prohibited by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995

RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.
Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the MTC which ordered respondents client to
vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case. respondent as counsel, appealed the decision.
CA dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with the proper
procedures. Respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the
execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client.
Held: SUSPENDED for (1) year. Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising
from the same cause. Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution
of a judgment or misuse court processes.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his
client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his
client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun
for hire.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of
dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating
and delaying the execution of a judgment.
A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud.
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same
judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping exists when, by reason
of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable
resolution of his case.

[A.C. No. 5085. February 6, 2003]

PABLITO SANTOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALVARO BERNABE LAZARO, respondent.
Respondent failed to win the cause of his client. Failed to follow proper procedure in submitting
memorandums for client with feeble excuses. Demanded unconscionable amount of legal fees
considering the grinding poverty his client.
Held: GUILTY of negligence in protecting the interest of his client. SUSPENDED for (6) months.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that negligence of
lawyers in connection with legal matters entrusted to them for handling shall render them
liable. It is a basic postulate in legal ethics that when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he
covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes such lawyer
unworthy of the trust reposed upon him by his client and makes him answerable to him, to the
courts and to society.
By neglecting to file the memorandum/brief, respondent set off a chain of events which
eventually ended in the demolition of complainants home.
Respondents failure to exercise due diligence in attending to the interest of complainant caused
the latter material prejudice. As a lawyer, respondent was wanting in the exercise of reasonable
care demanded of every member of the Bar; his measure of diligence is several notches below
the standard required of his office.

[A.C. No. 4219. December 8, 2003]

LOTHAR SCHULZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELO G. FLORES, respondent.
Atty. Flores knew too little of the provisions and application of PD No. 1508 which mandates
that all disputes, except those specifically cited (the dispute between Lothar Schulz and Wilson
Ong not included), between and among residents of the same city or municipality should be
brought first under the system of barangay conciliation before recourse to the court can be
allowed. Because of respondents transgressions, his client was haled to court as part-defendant.
Respondent also refused to return petitioners money in spite of his meager service.
Held: GUILTY of negligence and incompetence. SUSPENDED for (6) months. RETURN the
money of complainant with interest. STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or

similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The breach of respondents sworn duty as a lawyer and of the ethical standards he was strictly to
honor and observe has been sufficiently established. Respondent has fallen short of the
competence and diligence required of every member of the Bar.
CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Respondent erred in not returning complainants money despite demands after his failure to file
the case and his devious act of compelling complainant to sign a document stating that he has no
financial obligation to complainant in exchange of the return of complainants papers. This
conduct violated the following Canon:
CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND LOYALTY IN ALL
HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of client when due or upon demand.
The failure of an attorney to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the
trust reposed in him by the client. It is not only a gross violation of the general morality as well
as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment. In short, it is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to his
client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a
manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith and fairness.

Regala vs. Sandiganbayan

PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo Coujuanco for the anomalies in the COCO
LEVY FUNDS. PCGG wants petitioners divulge that Cojuangco indeed was a client of their firm,
as well as other information regarding Cojuangco.
Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its clients name?
Held: NO.
As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The general is
that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his
client.
1) the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.
2) the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established.
The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule,
know his adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. He cannot
be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.
Except:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing
the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged.
That client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the
disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for
which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.
1. 1. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS Homework Help https://www.homeworkping.com/
Research Paper help https://www.homeworkping.com/ Online Tutoring
https://www.homeworkping.com/ click here for freelancing tutoring sites Adm. Case No. 4749
January 20, 2000. 322 SCRA 529 SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant Vs. ATTY.
FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent Misrepresentation and Non-payment of Bar

Membership Dues FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar
membership dues filed againstrespondentAtty.FranciscoR.Llamas. Ina letter-complaint to this
Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the
bar, alleged that Atty. Llamas, who for a numberof years now, has not indicated the proper
PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated IBP Rizal 259060
but he has been using this for at least 3 years already. On the
otherhand,respondent,whoisnowof age,averred that he is only engaged in a limited practice
of law and under RA 7432, as a senior citizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes
and included in this exemption, is the payment of membership dues. CANON 7: A lawyer
shall atall times uphold theintegrity and dignity of the legal profession,and support the
activities of the integrated bar. CANON 10: A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court.
2. 2. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS ISSUES: Whetheror not the
respondenthasmisledthe courtabouthisstandinginthe IBP by usingthe same IBP O.R. number
in his pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions. Whetheror notthe
respondentisexemptfrompayinghismembershipduesowingtolimitedpractice of law and for
being a senior citizen. HELD: Guilty. Respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year,or until he has paidhisIBP dues,whicheverislater.
Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and
default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membershipandif
nonpaymentcovers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent
s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only
engagedinlimitedpractice of law. Moreover, the exemption invoked by respondent does not
include exemption from payment of membership or association dues. In addition, by
indicating in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he
had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility that provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitfulconduct.Hisactis alsoa violationof Rule 10.01
whichprovidesthat: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. A.C. No. 4585 November12,
2004 MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainant Vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ,
respondent Petitionfor Disbarmentfor having beenConvictedin a Crime involvingMoral
Turpitude FACTS: Thisis a verifiedpetition for disbarment filed against Atty. Francisco
Martinez for having been convictedbyfinal judgmentin Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime
involving moral turpitude by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City.
Respondent has been found guilty and convicted by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 for issuing a worthless check in the amount of P8, 000. He is imposed a penalty of one
(1) year imprisonment and fine double the amount of the check which is EIGHT THOUSAND
(8,000.00) PESOS, plus payment of the tax pursuant to Section 205 of the Internal Revenue
Code and costs against the accused. RULES: Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rulesof Court,a
memberof the Barmay be disbarred or suspended from his officeas attorney by
theSupremeCourtforany deceit, malpractice,or other grossmisconductin such office,grossly

immoralconduct,orby reason of his conviction of a crime involving moralturpitude, or for any

violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
3. 3. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS disobedienceof any lawfulorderof a
superiorcourt,or forcorruptly or willfully appearing asan attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. Sec. 12, Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent,orhas been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty. Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."It involves"an act of
baseness,vileness,ordepravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between
man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." HELD:
Atty.FranciscoP. Martinez,respondent,is disbarred and his name is ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys. The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the
same constitutessuchwillful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public
confidence in law and lawyers. And while "the general rule is that a lawyer may not be
suspended or disbarred, and the court may notordinarilyassume jurisdictiontodiscipline him
for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity, where, however, the misconduct
outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licensesandthe lawconferonhim,the
court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney." A.C. No.
716 January 30, 1969 EDUARDO J. BERENGUER, complainant Vs. PEDRO B.
CARRANZA, respondent Confusion and Prolongation of the Cadastral Suit FACTS: A
complaint against respondent Pedro B. Carranza was filed on July 15, 1966, for deception
practiced on the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, in that aware of the falsity of an Affidavit
of AdjudicationandTransferexecutedbythe motherof hisclienttothe effectthatherownmother left
no legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other heirs except herself, when, as a matter
of fact, the deceasedwassurvivedbyfour other daughters and one son, father of the
complainant, he introduced the same in evidence. Respondent was charged with "violation of
his oath of office, having caused confusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit for
presenting evidence containing a false statement inconsistent with facts he definitely knows
by reason of the family litigations between his client and complainant,whichare rootedin
successionrightsandthat respondent'sfailure to discharge his duties as a lawyer consistent
with his oath of office. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Carranza violated his oath for
prolongation of the cadastral suit.
4. 4. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS HELD: Pedro B. Carranza, respondent, is
reprimanded and warned that a repetition of an offense of this character would be much
more severely dealt with. Everymemberof the bar must be on hisguard,lestthrough oversight
or inadvertence, the way he conducts his case or the evidence he presents could
conceivably result in a failure of justice. Time and time again, lawyers have been
admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and that while they owe their

clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict
accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned. Even if there be
no intent to deceive, a lawyer whose conduct betrays inattention or carelessnessshouldnotbe
allowedtofree himself fromacharge institutedagainsthimbythe mere plea that his conduct was
not willful and that he has not consented to the doing of the falsity. G.R. No. 100113
September3, 1991 RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner Vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON.
JOVITO R. SALONGA,Commissionon Appointmentand HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE,Secretary of Budgetand Management, respondents FACTS:
RespondentChristianMonsodwasnominatedbyPresidentCorazonC.Aquinotothe position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
AppointmentsonApril 25,1991. Petitioneropposedthe nominationbecause
allegedlyMonsoddoesnot possessthe required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he
took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challengingthe validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination,petitionerasa citizenandtaxpayer,filedthe instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty.ChristianMonsodisa memberof the Philippine Bar,havingpassedthe barexaminationsof
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippinessince itsinceptionin1972-73. He has alsobeenpayinghisprofessionallicense
feesaslawyer for more than ten years.
5. 5. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has the 10
years of practice of law requirement for him to assume such office. HELD: The
petitionisDISMISSED.The Commissiononthe basisof evidencesubmitteddolingthe public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualificationsasrequiredbylaw. Interpretedinthe lightof the variousdefinitions of the term
Practice of Law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. A.C. 1928 December19, 1980 (In the
Matter ofthe IBP MembershipDuesDelinquency) Atty.MARCIAL A. EDILLION, petitioner
Reinstatementofa Disbarred Memberofthe Bar FACTS: RespondentMarcial
A.Edillonwasdisbarredon August3, 1978, the vote being unanimous with the late. On
November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
Governors,unanimouslyadopted ResolutionNo.75-65 in Administrativecase No. MDD-1 (In
the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to
the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn
refusal to pay his membershipdues'tothe IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding
due notice. From the time the decisionwasrendered, there were

variouspleadingsfiledbyrespondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for

reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. RULE: Effectof non-paymentof dues:Subjectto
theprovisionsof Section 12 of this Rule, defaultin thepayment of annualduesforsix
monthsshallwarrantsuspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,and default in such
paymentforoneyear shall bea ground fortheremovalof the nameof the delinquentmember
fromthe Roll of Attorneys.
6. 6. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS ISSUE: Whetherornot the court may compel
Atty.Edilliontopayhismembershipfeetothe IBP. HELD: The Court restores to membership to
the bar Marcial A. Edillon. On the petition of Mr. Marcial Edillon for reinstatement to the Roll
of Attorneys, appearing that he had fully paid his delinquent membershipfeesdue the
IntegratedBarof the Philippinesandsubmitted tothe IBPBoard of Governors a verified
application for reinstatement together with an undertaking to abide by all By-laws and
resolutionsbysaidBoardinthe eventof reinstatement,the Court Resolved to grant the petition of
Mr. Marcial A.Edillon tobe reinstatedasamemberof the Philippine Bar. He was allowed to take
anew the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys after payment of the required fees. A.
M. No. 139 March 28, 1983 ATTY. PROCOPIOS. BELTRAN, JR., Presidentof the Philippine
Trial Lawyers Association,Inc., complainant Vs. ELMO S. ABAD, respondent FACTS: Mr.
ElmoS. Abadwas chargedby Atty.Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial
LawyersAssociation,Inc.,of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the
Philippine Bar. Respondent Abads circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute
his admission to the Philippine Barandthe rightto practice law.He shouldfulfill the twoessential
requisites for becoming a lawyernamely:hislawyer'soathtobe administeredby Courtand his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys. ISSUES: Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of
law. Whether or not Atty. Jacobe liable in his collaboration with the respondent. HELD:
7. 7. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS Mr. Elmo S. Abad is fined Five Hundred
(P500.00) pesos payable to the Court within ten (10) days from notice, failing which he shall
serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment. The proven charge against respondent Abad
constitutes contempt of court. G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970 ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO Vs. VIRGINIAY. YAPTINCHAY Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title FACTS: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what
he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against hisclientbythisSupreme Court."He
indictsthe Court,inhisown phrase,as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our
pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and
commitculpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who
was deeplyaggrievedbythisCourt's"unjustjudgment,"hasbecome "one of the
sacrificialvictimsbefore the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the
classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf
and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the
people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that
"whatevermistakes,wrongsandinjusticesthat were committedmustneverbe repeated." There is

no use continuinghislawpractice,Almacensaidinthispetition, "whereourSupreme Court is

composed
8. 8. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice,
who ignore without reason their own applicable decisionsand commit culpableviolationsof the
Constitution with impunity. He expressed the hope that by divestinghimself of
histitlebywhichhe earnshisliving,the present members of the Supreme Court "will
becomeresponsiveto all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge
itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. Atty.
Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title,"alreadyadvertedto a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end
with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks against the
Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is
unprofessional. HELD: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen was suspended from the practice of law
until further orders; the suspension was to take effect immediately. The misconduct
committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity which cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a
lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be
futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacenwill realize thatabrasive
language neverfailsto do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor
there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it was viewed that the suspension will
suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by
neithermanifestingrepentance norofferingapologytherefore leftthe courtnoway of
determininghow longthat suspensionshouldlastand,accordingly,the courtare impelledtodecree
thatthe same should be indefinite.For,atanytime afterthe suspensionbecomeseffectivehe
mayprove to the Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law. B.M. No. 712
March 19, 1997 RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH FACTS:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court
however deferredhisoath-takingdue tohispreviousconvictionforReckless Imprudence
Resulting In Homicide. The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction arose from
the death of a neophyte during fraternityinitiationrites sometime in September 1991.
Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially enteredpleasof notguiltytohomicide charges.
The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded
guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The Court through then Senior Associate
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to
submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complyingwiththe
requirementof goodmoral characterimposeduponthose seeking admission to the bar.
Petitionersubmittednoless than fifteen (15) certifications/ letters executed by among others
two(2) senators,five (5) trial courtjudges,and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner
likewise submittedevidence thatascholarshipfoundationhadbeen establishedinhonor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazingvictim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8)
accused in the criminal case. HELD:
9. 9. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino was allowed to
take the lawyer's oath on a date set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter,

to practice the legal profession. In allowing Mr. Argosinototake the lawyer'soath,the

CourtrecognizesthatMr. Argosinoisnotinherentlyof badmoral fiber.The
variouscertificationsshowthathe isa devoutCatholicwithagenuine concern for civic duties and
public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for
the deathof Raul Camaligan.Theyare preparedtogive himthe benefitof the doubt,takingjudicial
noticeof the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. JULIETA
B. NARAG,complainant vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG,respondent Administrative
Complaintfor Disbarment FACTS: On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an
administrative complaint for disbarment againstherhusband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag,
whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for
Lawyers. Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in
order to live with Gina Espita. On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the
complainant was able to establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with
another woman. Absent any evidence showing that these witnesseshadanill motive
totestifyfalselyagainstthe respondent,theirtestimoniesare deemed worthy of belief. RULES:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
10. 10. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS CANON 7: A lawyershall atall timesupholdthe
integrityanddignity of the legal profession,andsupport the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule
7.03: A lawyershall not engage inconductthatadversely reflectsonhis fitness to practice law,
nor shouldhe,whetherinpublicor private life,behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession. HELD: Dominador M. Narag is disbarred and his name is ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. The respondentwasdisbarredafterthe
complainantprovedthathe hadabandonedherandmaintained an adulterous relationship with a
married woman. The Court declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of
morality expected and required of a member of the bar. SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION
BOARD and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners Vs. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL,
as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and MAC-ARTHUR INTERNATIONAL
MINERALS CO., respondents FACTS: Original action for certiorari and prohibition, with
preliminary injunction, to restrain the Honorable Gaudencio Cloribel, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, from continuing with the hearingof Civil Case No. 67400 of said
Court, and from enforcing a restraining order issued therein on November 16, 1966, as well
as to annul an order of respondent Judge, in the same case, dated December 9, 1966. From
the records of said Case No. 67400, that the Company had no cause of action against
petitionersandthat,accordingly,respondentJudge committed a grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excessof jurisdiction,inissuingitsrestrainingorderof November16,1966, and
itsorderof December 9, 1966, refusing, in effect, to set aside said order of November 16,
1966. First ContemptCase. The Supreme CourtrenderedadecisionagainstMacArthur
International Minerals Corp and in their third Motion for Reconsideration, Attys. Santiago and
Castro wanted for the two
11. 11. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS justices to inhibit themselves in the MR. The
Court demanded for Santiago and Sotto to "show cause" whytheyshouldn'tbe
citedincontemptforthe said statements. Santiago insisted that the statements he made were
inadvertently included in the copy sent to the Court, and was just intended to be in the MR's

rough draft. Second Contempt Case. Counsel for MacArthur drafted a fourth motion for
reconsideration, this time with Atty. Juanito M. Caling as counsel, and again contained
language which the Court found disrespectful.The MRassailedthe decision
pennedbyCJConcepcionsince he wasoutof townwhenthe decision was written and included
seeming threats of elevating the issue to the World Court and allegations of rise of graft and
corruption in the judiciary. The Court demanded Caling to also "show cause" and he said that
it the motion was already prepared by Santiago when he took the case as was verified by
Morton Meads, an employee from MacArthur. ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyers should be
cited in contempt? HELD: Writ granted.Ordersof respondentJudge datedNovember16,and
December9, 1966, are annulledand the writ of preliminary injunction issued in the present
case made permanent, with costs against respondent, Mac-Arthur International Minerals
Company. Adm. Case No.2131 May 10, 1985 ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIEand JUANG. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA,JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA,JOSE R. SANDEJAS,
LUCASM. NUNAG,J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A.
CURAMMENG,JR., respondents FACTS: LawyerAdrianoE. Dacanay,admittedtothe bar
in1954, inhis1980 verifiedcomplaint,sought to enjoinJuanG.Collas,Jr.and nine
otherlawyersfrompracticinglaw underthe name of Baker& McKenzie,alawfirmorganizedin
Illinois.Baker&McKenzie,beinganalienlaw firm, cannotpractice law inthe
Philippines(Sec.1,Rule 138, Rulesof Court). As pointed out by the Solicitor General,
respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutesarepresentationthatbeingassociatedwiththe firmtheycould"render legal services of
the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade
and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo).
12. 12. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should
enjoin from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie. HELD: YES. Baker &
McKenzie,beinganalienlaw firm, cannotpractice law inthe Philippines(Sec.1,Rule 138, Rules
of Court). Who may practice law. - Anypersonheretofore dulyadmittedasa memberof the
bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is
in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. Respondents'use of the firmname
Baker& McKenzie constitutesarepresentationthatbeingassociated with the firm they could
"render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others
engaged in foreign trade and investment" which the Court finds unethical because Baker &
McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. WHEREFORE, the respondentsare
enjoinedfrompractisinglaw underthe firmname Baker& McKenzie. A.M. No. 3360 January 30,
1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent
FACTS: In a Motionto Lift Orderof Suspensiondated12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda,
a member of the PhilippineBar,asksthisCourt to liftthe suspensionfromthe practice of law
imposedupon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R.
CR No. 05093. Consequently,four(4) informationswere filedagainstrespondentwith the
Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358;
and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos.
85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No.

05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent
Tuanda from the practice of law. On 16 December1988, respondentfiledaNotice of Appeal
withthe Courtof Appeals.The Court of Appeals,inaResolutiondated9January 1989,
notedrespondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her
13. 13. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS "to address her Notice of Appeal to the
Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this
Court a Notice of Appeal. Revised Rules of Court: Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended
by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admissiontopractice,orfora wilful disobedience of anylawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied) Sec. 28. Suspension of
attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appealsora
Courtof First Instancemay suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in
the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied) HELD:
The Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall
remain suspendedfromthe practice of lawuntil furtherorders from this Court. Respondent was
thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude. A.C. No. 5141. September29, 1999 PRISCILA L. TOLEDO,
complainant vs. ATTY. ERLINDA ABALOS, respondent FACTS: On July 9, 1981, Atty. Erlinda
Abalos obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from Priscila Toledo, payable within six months from
date, plus interest of 5% per month. To guarantee the payment of said obligation, respondent
executed a Promissory Note (Exhibit B). After the lapse of six months, and despite
repeateddemands,respondentfailedtopayherobligation. Afraidthatshe will not recover her
money, Ms.Toledo sought the help of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which
referred the matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline. On February 1, 1995, the
Commission issued an order directing Atty. Abalos to file her Answer to the letter-complaint
of Ms. Toledo. Despite receipt of said order, respondent did not answer the complaint.
14. 14. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS According to the Supreme Court, the general
rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred,andthe court maynot ordinarily
assume jurisdiction to discipline him, for misconduct in his non-professional orprivate
capacity.Itwas,however,still necessaryforrespondenttoacknowledge the orders of the
Commission in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her wanton
disregard of its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction. Thus, her suspension from
the practice of law is warranted. ISSUE: Whether or not IBP has jurisdiction to suspend Atty.
Abalos. HELD: Respondent Atty. Erlinda Abalos is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of ONE MONTH from the date of the finality of this Resolution. January 9, 1973 IN
THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: On
December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated

November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the said Report
and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 5262 of the Court, and "consistently
with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as
well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the
adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule." The petition in Adm. Case No. 526
formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing,
giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar
associations. The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all
the arguments adducedinAdm.Case No.526 and the authoritative materialsandthe massof
factual data contained in the exhaustive Reportof the CommissiononBarIntegration,thatthe
integrationof the Philippine Bar is
15. 15. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS "perfectlyconstitutional
andlegallyunobjectionable,"withinthe contextof contemporary conditions in the
Philippines,hasbecome animperative meanstoraise the standardsof the legal
profession,improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively. HELD: The Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by
Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, ordains the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
A.C. No. 4758. April 30, 1999 VICTOR NUNGA, complainant vs. ATTY. VENANCIOVIRAY,
respondent FACTS: VictorD. Nunga,presidentof the Masantol Rural
Bankfiledacomplaintfordisbarmentagainst Atty.VenancioM.Virayon the groundof grossand
seriousmisconductfornotarizingdocumentswhen he was not commissionedtodosoat the time
the saiddocumentswere executed. It was concurredwiththe findingof the
InvestigatingCommissionerthatrespondentAtty.Venancio Viray did not have a commission as
notary public in 1987 and 1991 when he notarized the assailed documents.
Respondentknew thathe couldnotexercise the powers or perform the duties of a notary public
unless he was duly appointed as such pursuant to the Notarial Law (Chapter 11, Title IV,
Book I, RevisedAdministrative Code). He triedtoimpressuponthe
investigatingcommissionerthatsince 1965
16. 16. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS to date he has always been commissioned as a
notary public. Yet, he was unable to rebut complainants evidence that he was not so
commissioned for the years in question. Where the notarizationof a documentisdone bya
member of the Philippine Barata time whenhe has no authorizationorcommissiontodoso,the
offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one,performinganotarial
withoutsuchcommissionisaviolationof the lawyersoath to obey the laws, more specifically,the
Notarial Law. Then,too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not,he
is, forall legal intentsandpurposes,indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath
similarlyproscribes. These violationsfall squarelywithin the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. HELD: The Court adopted the
findingsandconclusionsof InvestigatingCommissionerLydia A. Navarro, which the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but MODIFIES the

penalty recommended by the said Board of Governors. As modified, respondent ATTY.

VENANCIO VIRAY is BARRED from being commissioned as notary public for THREE (3)
years and his present commission, if any, is revoked, and SUSPENDED from the practice of
law also for THREE (3) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of the Resolution. A.C. No.
4369. November 28, 1997 PIKE P. ARRIETA, complainant vs. ATTY. JOEL A. LLOSA,
respondent FACTS: Complainant Pike P. Arrieta prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Joel A.
Llosa for certifying under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale. Complainant averred that
respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 24, 1993 makingitappear
thatsome of the vendors in said Deed namely, Edelina T. Bonilla, Jesus T. Bonilla and
Leonardo P. Toledano were parties and signatories thereto when in truth and in fact, all three
were
17. 17. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS alreadydead prior to the execution of the said
Deed of Absolute Sale. Jesus T. Bonilla died on August 22, 1992 while
LeonardoP.Toledanodiedon November 1, 1992. Edelina T. Bonilla allegedly died on or about
June 11, 1992. By affixinghisnotarial sealonthe instrument,he convertedthe Deedof Absolute
Sale, from being a private documentintoapublicdocument. Bycertifyingthe
Deed,respondent,ineffect,proclaimedto the world(1) that all the
partiesthereinpersonallyappearedbeforehim;(2) that they are all personally knownto him;(3)
that theywere the same personswhoexecutedthe instruments; (4) that he inquired intothe
voluntarinessof executionof the instrument;and(5) theyacknowledgedpersonallybefore him
that they voluntarily and freely executed the same. Respondents act of certifying under oath
a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendorswere
alreadydead,theybeinghisformerclients,constitutesmisconduct. Butthisbeinghis first
administrative offense, such should not warrant the supreme penalty of disbarment. HELD:
The Court found respondent Atty. Joel A. Llosa guilty of misconduct. Consequently, he was
orderedSUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a
warning that another infraction would be dealt with more severely. ADM. CASE No. 6973,
February 13, 2006 ROBERT FRANCIS F. MARONILLA and ROMMEL F. MARONILLA
(Complainants) RepresentedbyATTY. RAMON M. MARONILLA vs. QUISUMBING
J.CARPIO, CARPIO-MORALES,and IDA MAY J. LAO and TINGA, JJ.(Respondents)
RepresentedbyATTYS. EFREN N.JORDA FACTS: On 28 January 2002 at about 4:45 in the
afternoon, Ferdinand Ocampo, a student of the UP and a member of one of the fraternities
was assaulted by members of the rival fraternity. Ocampo hesitated in the identification of
Robert Francis and Rommel Maronilla (Maronilla brothers) for
18. 18. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS the reason that they are twins,
therebymakingpositive identificationdifficult.Atty.Jorda thereafter prepared an Extended
Manifestation praying that the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the SDT decision be
considered as an appeal and the modification of the SDT decision holding that the Maronilla
brothers be equally held liable as the rest of respondents in the SDT case. The Extended
Manifestation was noted by herein respondent Atty. Ida May J. Lao (Lao), the chief legal
officer of the UP Diliman Legal Office. ISSUE: Whether respondents, members of the U.P.
Diliman Legal Office, stepped out of bounds when they appealed to the University president
to reconsider the exoneration by the Student Disciplinary Tribunal of the sons of the

complainant. HELD: The Court approves the recommendations of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines in Resolution dated22 October 2005.
Accordingly,Atty.EfrenN.Jordaisreprimandedforgrossignorance of the lawand forviolatingRule
12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complaint against Atty. Ida May J. Lao
is dismissed for lack of merit. The Court recognized that Jorda breached a procedural rule no
higher than the Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Fraternities, Sororities and Other
Student Organizations of UP. It must be remembered that Jorda as a functionary of a state
university is obliged to adhere to the due process clause of the Constitution, the UP being an
instrumentality of the State. He is bound to respect those enactments that afford benefit or
relief to those under pain of sanction. As an officer of the law, he is expected to be
circumspect in acting within the boundaries of his duties and responsibilities. G.R. No.
120654. September11, 1996 MARIA LOURDES PAREDES-GARCIA(petitioner) vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and HON. ESCOLASTICO M. CRUZ,JR. (respondents) FACTS: A
petitionforreview on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the decision of
19 June 1995[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.37081 dismissing the petitioners
special civil actionforcertiorari to annul the orderof respondentJudge Escolastico M. Cruz, Jr.,
which cited the petitioner for contempt and ordered her to pay a fine of P100.00. ISSUE:
19. 19. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS Whetherthe respondentJudge
hasactedwithoutorinexcessof jurisdictionorwithgrave abuse of discretion in issuing the
challenged orders. HELD: The instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of 19
June 1995 of the Court of AppealsinCA-G.R.SPNo.37081 and the challengedordersof
respondentJudge Escolastico M. Cruz, Jr., of 12 April 1995 and 20 April 1995 in Criminal
Cases Nos. 93-7434 to 39 are SET ASIDE. The Departmentof Justice andthe Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal are requested to recall the designation of the petitioner to
Branch 58 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City and to detail her to other courts if these
have not been done yet. Adm. Case No.6290 July 14, 2004 ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA
(complainant) DAVIDE, JR., C.J.(complainant) vs PANGANIBAN,SANTIAGO,CARPIO,and
AZCUNA,JJ. (respondents) ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO FACT: In a verified
complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a
20. 20. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B.
Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office. On deceit, the complainant alleged that the
respondent has been falselyrepresentingherself tobe married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.,
who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another woman. However,through
spuriousmeans,the respondentandFelicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false
marriage contract,[1] which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in Manila. As
to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the
dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina
Alora Jacome. On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged
that the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a
member of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her clientsmoneytoher own use and benefit,
which led to the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and

her family on 24 January 2000 with the statement Isang bala ka lang to deter them from
divulging respondents illegal activities and transactions. ISSUE: Whether, on the basis of the
facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
duly proven. HELD: For culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondentAtty.AnaLuzB. Cristal-Tenoriois suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) monthseffectiveimmediately, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. A.C. No.
5908. October25, 2004 ANTONIO B. RAMOS and MA. REGINA PAZ R. DE DIOS
(complainants) vs. ATTY. ALEJANDRO JOSE C. PALLUGNA(respondent) FACTS: The
instant disbarment case arose when Antonio B. Ramos and Ma. Regina Paz R. De Dios
charged Atty. Alejandro Jose C. Pallugna with gross misconduct and violation of his oath as
a lawyer relative toCivil Case No.2002-264[1] ina verifiedComplaint datedNovember 26,
2002. The respondent was the counsel of the plaintiffinthe said case then pending with the
Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de
21. 21. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS Oro City,Branch 24. The mainissue raisedin the
complaint was the ownership and control of Vineyard Piano Bar and Restaurant. Indeed, the
respondents actuations render him administratively liable for failing to observe the candor,
fairness and honesty required of him as a member of the bar. It was his duty to inform the
appellate court, as well as his client, of the factual developments in the case, and otherwise
to bring the case to an end if the court thereafter determines that the issues had thereby
beenrenderedmootandacademic. The appellatecourtcouldthenhave devoteditseffortsto the
study and adjudication of meritoriouscontroversiespending decision. The respondents bad
faith is evident, as he appliedfora restrainingorderinthe Court of Appeals when he very well
knew that the orders of the trial court which were sought be enjoined had already been
implemented. The respondents insistence that he was merely assisting in the
implementation of the Order of the Higher Court deserves scant consideration. ISSUE: The
main issue raisedin the complaintwasthe ownershipandcontrol of VineyardPianoBarand
Restaurant. HELD: RespondentAtty.AlejandroJose C.Pallugnais foundGUILTYof
violatingCanon10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is suspended
from the practice of law for a period of Three (3) Months. He is sternly warned that future
similar transgressions shall be dealt with more severity. G.R. Nos.79690-707 October 7,
1988 ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR (petitioner) vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYANand
HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claimingto be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
underthe 1987 Constitution(respondents) G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988 ENRIQUE A.
ZALDIVAR (petitioner) vs. HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claimingto be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsmanombudsman under the 1987 Constitution(respondent)
22. 22. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS FACTS: A Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to
Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special
Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring
respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt
and/orsubjectedtoadministrative sanctionsformakingcertainpublicstatements.Petitioner
Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177

(for violation of the Anti-GraftandCorruptPracticesAct) pending before the Sandiganbayan.

The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it
is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was
carried out. Respondent Gonzalez disclaims intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The
subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or
misconduct is concerned. RespondentGonzalezalsodefends himself contending that no
injury to the judiciary has been shown, and pointstothe fact that thisCourt
deniedhisMotionforReconsiderationof its percuriam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated
and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. Respondent Gonzalez lastly
suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case and suggests
that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. ISSUE: Whetheror
notthe misconductwithwhichthe respondentischargedalsoconstitutescontempt of
court.Whetheror not the statementsmade byrespondentGonzalezmay reasonably be
regarded by this Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary
authority of this Court over members of the Bar. HELD: The Court concludes that respondent
Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an
officer of the court and member of the Bar. The Court resolvedtoSUSPENDAtty.Raul M.
Gonzalezfromthe practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. A.C. No. 5738 February19, 2008 WILFREDO M.
CATU (complainant) vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA (Respondent) FACTS:
ComplainantWilfredoM.Catuis a co-ownerof a lotand the buildingerectedthereonlocated at
959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio
Catu, contestedthe possessionof ElizabethC.Diaz-CatuandAntonioPastorof one of the
unitsinthe building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a
complaint was initiated against
23. 23. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where the parties reside. Respondent, as punong
barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. Whenthe
partiesfailedtoarrive atan amicable settlement,respondentissued a certification for the filing of
the appropriate action in court. Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment
againstElizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent
entered hisappearance as counsel forthe defendantsinthatcase.Because of
this,complainantfiled the instant administrativecomplaint, claimingthatrespondentcommitted
an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a publicofficerwhenhe stoodascounsel forthe
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay. CANON: CANON 1.A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land, promote respect for law and legal processes. CANON7. A lawyerat
all timesupholdthe integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
integrated bar. ISSUE: Whetherornot the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of
respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were
proper. HELD: Respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is found guilty of professional
misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of six

months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly warned that any repetition of
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Metropolitan bank and Trust Co. vs. CA
FACTS: A certainCeledonioJavierboughtseven(7) parcelsof
landownedbyEustaquioAlejandro, et al., witha total area of aboutten(10) hectares.These
propertieswere thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner to secure a loan obligation
of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation.Duringthe pendencyof
these suitsthatthese parcelsof landwere sold by petitioner to its sistercorporation,Service
LeasingCorporationandonthe same day, the properties were resold by the latter to Herby
Commercial and Construction Corporation. Three months later, mortgaged the same
properties with Banco de Oro wherein the lower court found that private respondent, did not
have knowledge of thesetransfersand transactions. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for
substitution of partyas a consequence of the transferof said parcels of land to Service
Leasing Corporation. Private respondent, on its part, filed a verified motion to enter in the
records of the aforesaid civil cases its
24. 24. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS charginglien,pursuanttoSection37, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and current market
values of the litigated properties as its attorney's fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed to
appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted the same and
ordered the, Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of
title of the parcels of land. Private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based
on quantum meruit, which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between the
parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private respondent; the
latter, in turn, countered that the amount of P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be
considered as full payment but merely a cash advance, including the amount of P14,000.00
paid to it on December 15, 1980. It further appears that private respondent attempted to
arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, offering a compromise amount of
P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful. ISSUES: 1. Whetheror not private
respondentisentitledtothe enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorney's fee. 2.
Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien. 3.
Whetheror not private respondentis entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current
market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis. HELD: 1. NO. On the
matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides: He shall also have a lien to the
same extentuponall judgmentsforthe paymentof money,andexecutions issued in pursuance
of such judgments,whichhe hassecuredinalitigationof hisclient,fromandafterthe time when he
shall have causeda statementof hisclaimof such lientobe entered upon the records of the
court rendering such judgment,orissuingsuchexecution,andshall have causedwrittennotice
thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same
right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his
lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. Consequent to such
provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the paymentof
attorney'sfees,requiresasaconditionsine quanona judgment formoney andexecutionin
pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client.
A lawyer may enforce hisrightto fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the

main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the
action from which the fee is to be paid. The civil cases below were dismissed upon the
initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill satisfaction of their claims." 2. NOT
NECESSARY.At thisjuncture anenforceable charginglien,dulyrecorded,iswithinthe jurisdiction
of the court tryingthe maincase andthis jurisdictionsubsistsuntil the lien is settled. Court
trying main case will determine attorneys fees. 3. The Court refused to resolve issue but
gave the elements to be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services
rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit. These are: (1) the importance of the
subject matter in controvers (2) the extent of the services rendered, and
25. 25. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS (3) the professional standing of the lawyer order
of the trial court is hereby Ramos vs. Manalac FACTS: The facts involved in this case are: On
August 31, 1933, Victoriano, Leonardo, Vicenta, Isabina, Gregoria,Ceferina, Jose and
Geronimo, all surnamed Ramos, executed a power of attorney in favor of their brother Eladio
Ramos giving the latter authority to encumber, mortgage and transfer in favor of any person a
parcel of land situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan. On August 9, 1934, by virtue of the
power of attorney abovementioned, Eladio Ramos executed in favor of one Romualdo Rivera
a mortgage on therefore saidproperty. Together with another parcel of land, to guarantee the
payment of loanof 300, withinterestthereonat the rate of 12%
perannum.WhenEladioRamosfailed topay the obligation on its date of maturity, Romualdo
Rivera, the mortgage, filed an action to foreclosure the mortgage, making as partiesdefendants the herein petitioners, brothers and sisters of Eladio Ramos (civil case No.7668).
The summonswasservedonlyuponEladioRamos,whoacknowledgethe servicein
26. 26. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS hisownbehalf and in that services of Attorney
Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his appearance for all the defendants,andsubmittedan answer
in their behalf. After trial, at which both parties presented their evidence,the
courtrendereddecisionorderingEladioRamostopayto the plaintiff hisobligation of 300,
withinterest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, from August 9, 1934, until its full
payment, plus the sum of 100 as attorney's fees, and ordering the foreclosure of the
mortgage upon failure of EladioRamosto pay the judgmentwithinninety(90) daysfrom the date
the decisionbecomesfinal.The decision was rendered on August 24, 1939. As Eladio Ramos
failed to pay the judgment within the periodthereinspecified, on motion of the plaintiff, the
court ordered the sale at public auction of the mortgagedproperties,which were sold to the
plaintiff as the highest bidder and the provincial sheriff issuedthe corresponding deed of the
sale in his favor. The sale was confirmed by the court on April 1, 1941. On August21, 1947,
RomualdoRiverasoldthe propertiestoFelipaLopez,wholaterfiledamotion praying that she be
placed in possession thereof. This motion was granted on September 22, 1947. As the
petitionersdidnotheedthe order,theyweresummonedbythe courtto explainwhytheyshouldno be
punished for contempt for their refusal to comply with the writ of possession, to which they
answeredcontending that said writ partakes of the nature of an action and as it was issued
after more than five years, the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and that the sale
conducted by the sheriff was illegal because petitionerswere
notproperlyservedwithsummonsasdefendantsinthe foreclosure suit.The explanation
givenbypetitioners having been found to be unsatisfactory, the court insisted in its order and

threatened to punish the petitioners as for contempt of court if they failed to obey the order.
ISSUES: Whether or not the order of the court dated September 22, 1947, directing the
issuance of a writ of possession to place respondent Felipa Lopez in possession of the
properties purchased by he r from the mortgage. Whether or not the decision rendered by
the lower court on August 24, 1939 in civil case No. 7668, ordering the foreclosure of the
mortgage excluded by Eladio Ramos on the properties in question is valid. HELD: The
second issue raised by the petitioner is not also taken, for the simple reason that the
issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of judgment
within Section6, Rule 39 of the Rulesof Court, butis merelyaministerial
andcomplementarydutyof the Court can undertake evenafterthe lapsesof five (5)
years,providedthe statute of limitations andthe rightsof the third persons have not intervened
in the meantime (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil. 201). This is the correct interpretationof
section6,Rule 39, in relationtosection 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This is a case where
the judgment involved is already final executed, and the properties mortgaged sold by
orderof the court, and the propertiesmortgaged sold by order of the court, and purchaser
thereof has transferred them to a third person, who desires to be placed in their possession.
The Court is of the opinionthatthe claimof the petitionerscannotbe sustainedfor the reason
that it is inthe nature of a collateral attach to a judgment which on its face is valid and regular
and has become final longago.It isa well-knownrule thatajudgment,which on its face is valid
and regular, can only be attacked in a separate action brought principally for the purpose
(Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717)
27. 27. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS Quirante vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
FACTS: On June 18, 1983, herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the
confirmationof his attorney's fees.Accordingtohim, there wasanoral
agreementbetweenhimandthe late Dr. Casasolawithregardto
hisattorney'sfees,whichagreementwasallegedlyconfirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion
Vda. de Casasola, and the two daughters of the deceased, namely Mely C. Garcia and
Virginia C. Nazareno. Petitioner avers that pursuant to said agreement, the attorney's fees
would be computed as follows: a. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the
attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00.
28. 28. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS b. In case the Honorable Court awards damages
in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of I.
Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz. ISSUE: Whether or not Quirante
could claim attorneys fees. HELD: NO.An attorney'sfee cannotbe determineduntil afterthe
main litigation has been decided and the subjectof recoveryisat the dispositionof the court.
The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been recovered from which
the fee is to be paid. Since the main case from which the
petitioner'sclaimsfortheirfeesmayarise hasnotyetbecome final,the determination of the
propriety of saidfeesandthe amountthereof shouldbe heldinabeyance. This procedure gains
added validity in the lightof the rule thatthe remedyfor recoveringattorney'sfeesasanincidentof
the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. WHEREFORE,
with the foregoing observation, the decision of the respondent court subject of the present
recourse is hereby AFFIRMED. Quingwa vs. Puno FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified

complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and
misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a
number of years. The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing
the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual
intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for
sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby
boy supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate andtoshow how intimate the
relationship between the respondent and the complainantwas,the lattertestified that she gave
money to the respondent whenever he asked from her.
29. 29. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS The respondent denied all the material
allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do
not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former
Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended. HELD:
YES. One of the requirementsforall applicantsforadmissiontothe Bar is that the applicant
must produce before the Supreme Courtsatisfactoryevidence of goodmoral
character(Section2, Rule 138 of the Rulesof Court).It isessential duringthe continuance of the
practice andthe exercise of the privilege to maintaingoodmoral character.When
hisintegrityischallengedbyevidence,it is not enough that he deniesthe chargesagainsthim;he
mustmeetthe issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the chargesof
the complainantthatthe allegationsinthe complaintdonotfall underanyof the grounds for
disbarmentor suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of
the (old) Rulesof Court,it isalreadya settledrule thatthe statutory enumeration of the grounds
for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts
to suspend or disbar a lawyer.The inherentpowersof the court over its officers cannot be
restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Courtheldthatan attorneywill be
removednotonlyformalpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privilegeswhichhislicense and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
court states that: Nunga vs. Viray FACTS: VictorD. Nunga, president of the Masantol Rural
Bank filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.VenancioM.Virayon the groundof gross
and serious misconduct for notarizing documents when he was not commissioned to do so at
the time the said documents were executed. . After issues were joined, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines conducted an investigation. The report showed that respondent Viray
notarized a deed of absolute sale when he was not duly commissioned as notary public as of
that date. Respondent alleged that from 1965 to date he was always commissioned as notary
public. . According to respondent, there was no year in his practice of law that he was not
commissionedasnotarypublic.He furtherexplainedthatinthe allegeddocuments, he had PTR
for that purpose and therefore, he would not have obtained a commission without the PTR.
The Undersigned

30. 30. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS notedaftergoingoverthe recordsof the case that
althoughboth parties were required to submit their respective memorand[a], only complainant
complied with the order. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents act is a valid ground for
disbarment. HELD: YES. Notarization is invested with public interest because it converts a
private document into a public one, making such documents admissible in evidence without
further proof of the authenticity thereof.Notarizingwithoutcommissionisaviolationof the
lawyersoathtoobeythe laws (the Notarial Law) and by making it appear that he is so
authorized is a deliberate falsehood which violates the lawyersoathandof Rule 1.01 of Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,whichprovides: A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. WHEREFORE, the Court herebyadopts
the findings andconclusionsof InvestigatingCommissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but MODIFIES
the penalty recommended by the said Board of Governors. As modified, respondent ATTY.
VENANCIO VIRAY is hereby BARRED from being commissioned as notary public for
THREE (3) yearsandhis presentcommission,if any,isrevoked,andSUSPENDEDfrom the
practice of law also for THREE (3) years. In Re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
FACTS: The Commission onBar IntegrationsubmitteditsReportwiththe earnest
recommendation that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as
soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule." The
petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Courtto order the integrationof the
Philippine Bar,afterdue hearing,givingrecognitionas far as possible andpracticable
toexistingprovincial andotherlocal Bar associations. Arguments in favor of as well
asinopposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. The Court has cl osely
observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the
Bar.
31. 31. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Court have the
power to integrate the Philippine Bar. (2) Whether or not the integration of the Bar be
constitution. (3) Whether or not the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time. HELD:
(1) YES. The Court may integrate the PhilippineBarinthe exercise of
itspower,underArticleVIII,Sec.13 of the Constitution,"topromulgate
rulesconcerningpleading,practice,andprocedure in all courts, and the admissionto the
practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional
authorityoverthe Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to
effectthe integrationof the Philippine Bar,"RepublicAct6397 neitherconfersanew
powernorrestricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the
integration of the Bar will promote publicinterestor,more specifically, will "raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,andenable the Barto discharge
its public responsibility more effectively. (2) YES. The Court quotesdiscussionmade bythe
CommissiononBarIntegration. Tocompel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate). For
the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not meanthat the Court leviesa
tax. A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose
of atax isrevenue.A lawyerisfree,as he has always been, to voice his views on any

subjectinanymannerhe wishes,eventhough suchviewsbe opposedto positions taken by the

Unified Bar. Bar integrationisnotunfairtolawyersalreadypractisingbecause although the
requirement to pay annual duesisa new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new
system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive
benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed,anddischarge theirpublicresponsibilitiesinamore
effectivemannerthantheyhave beenable to do in the past. (3) YES. Inthe eventof integration,
Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be
weakened;cliquismwillbe the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar
will become animpersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs. The national poll
conducted by the Commissioninthe matterof the integration of the Philippine Bar shows that
96.45% voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 2.51% against it. The Court is fully
convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious studyof all the argumentsadducedinAdm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data containedin the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integrationof the Philippine
Baris"perfectlyconstitutional andlegallyunobjectionable,"within the contextof contemporary
conditions inthe Philippines,hasbecome animperativemeanstoraise the standardsof the legal
profession,improve the administrationof justice,andenable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively. ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in
it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of
the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16,
1973.
32. 32. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS Vitug vs. Rongcal FACTS: Catherine Joie P.
Vitug sought the service of respondent Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal who was introduced to her
by her former classmate. Complainant asked Atty. Rongcal to represent her in the support
case she was going to file against her former lover, Arnulfo Aquino. Soon after, herein
complainant and respondent started having sexual relationship with each other. According to
Vitug, respondent also gave her sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial
security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support
against Aquino.
33. 33. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly
convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer which the latter signed without
reading the said affidavit. On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant
that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to
answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her,
respondent handed her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to
give her the balance of P58,000.00 soonthereafter.However,sometime in April or May 2001,
respondent informed her that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for
his political campaign as he was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member of
the 2nd District of Pampanga Complainant argues that respondent's acts constitute a
violation of his oath as a lawyer. She filed an administrativecase against Rongcal which was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. It was thenrecommended thatrespondentbe
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to
complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The same was approved by the

IBP Board of Governors. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motionto
Set Case forClarificatoryQuestioningwiththe IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for
Clarificatory Questioning with the Supreme Court. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not respondent
be disbarred for immorality (2) Whether or not respondents act of preparing and notarizing
the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. HELD: (1)
NO.One of the conditions priortoadmissiontothe baris that an applicantmustpossess good
moral character. Saidrequirementpersistsasa continuingconditionforthe enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice,otherwise,the lossthereof isagroundforthe revocation of such
privilege. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. On sexual relation and on
respondentssubsequentmarriage,byhisownadmission,respondent is obviously guilty of
immorality inviolationof Rule 1.01 of the Code whichstatesthat a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitfulconduct.The Courtfindcredence in respondent's
assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage,
complainants allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence
required in disbarment cases. (2) NO.It wasnot unlawful forrespondenttoassisthisclient in
entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law
encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which
might otherwise be filed in court. Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that: A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a
controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently
agreedto a settlementwithAquino,she cannotlaterblame hercounsel whenshe experiences a
change of heart.Suspicion,nomatterhowstrong,isnotenoughin the absence of contrary
evidence, what will prevail isthe presumptionthatthe respondenthasregularly performed his
duty in accordance with his oath.
34. 34. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS WHEREFORE,
premisesconsidered,thisCourtfindsAtty.DiosdadoM.Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and
impose onhima FINE of P15,000.00 witha sternwarningthata repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. The charge of misappropriationof fundsof
the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report and recommendation
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision. In Re Clemente Soriano FACTS: On
October 10, 1969, Clemente M. Soriano, a member of the Philippine Bar entered his
appearance inthe presentcase (L-24114, PHHC and U.P. vs.Mencias,Tiburcio,etal.) as "chief
counsel of record"for the respondentsMarcelinoTiburcio,etal.Thisact initself wouldhave
beeninnocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one year and eight months after the
decision in this case became final. Atty. Soriano asked the Court to exhume the case from
the archives. Atty. Soriano's subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to dissuade this
Court from requiring him to show cause why
35. 35. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS disciplinary action should not be taken against
him for entering an appearance at such a late date. He allegedthatsometimeduringthe
firstweekof October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own behalf and as

attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him to engage his professional services in
two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-24114) and the Varsity Hills case (L-30546). Atty.
Sorianoallegedlyrelieduponthe assurance of a mutual acquaintance and representation of
Marcelino Tiburciothat the twocases were pendinginthe Court.He
thenagreedtorenderprofessional servicesin the two cases in consideration of a contingent fee
of 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Soriano is guilty of negligence. HELD: YES. Before taking over a
case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformityof the counsel
whomhe wouldsubstitute. And if this cannot be had, then he should, at the veryleast,give
notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. His entry of appearance in the case
without the consent of the first lawyer amounts to an improper encroachment upon the
professionalemploymentof the original counsel. Atty. Soriano violates Rule 8.02, Canon 8 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
encroach upon the professional employment of anotherlawyer; however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel. We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross
negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This
inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law
profession, were it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake
and the apology he made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be
as he is hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future
similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction. Atty.Sorianoisherebyordered,inthe
present case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief counsel of
record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. Alcantara vs. Pefianco FACTS: Thisis a
complaintagainstAtty.MarianoPefiancoforconduct unbecoming a member of the bar for
usingimproperandoffensivelanguage andthreatening and attempting to assault complainant.
The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District Public Attorney of the
Public Attorneys OfficeinSanJose,Antique.He allegedthatwhile Atty.Ramon Salvani III was
conferring with a client in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San
Jose, Antique, a woman
approachedthem.ComplainantsuggestedAtty.Salvanitotalkwithherwhenrespondent Atty.
Mariano
36. 36. LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS
Pefianco,whowassittingnearby,stoodupandshoutedatAtty.Salvani
andhisclient.AttyPefiancowas asked to calm down but he did not refrain from his outburst.
This caused a commotion in the office
whereinrespondenttriedtoattackcomplainantandevenshoutedathim, "Youre
stupid!"Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III, Felizardo Del
Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo to
corroborate his allegations. In hisCommentandCounter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said
that the sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved him and
prompted him to take up her defense. He also averred that it was Alcantara who punched
him and called him stupid. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents act violate the Code of

Professional Responsibility. HELD: YES. Pefiancoviolated Canon 8 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility: CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH
COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES,
AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL. Lawyers are
duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and
candidlytowardeachotherand otherwise conductthemselveswithoutreproachatall times. In this
case,respondentsmeddlinginamatterinwhichhe hadno rightto do so causedthe
untowardincident. Thoughhe thoughtthatthisis righteous,hispublicbehaviorcanonlybring down
the legal profession in the eyes of the public and erode respect for it. An injustice cannot be
righted by another injustice. WHEREFORE, Atty.Mariano PefiancoisfoundGUILTY of
violationof Canon8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering this to be his
first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a
warning that similar action in the future will be sanctioned more severely.

Duties of members of the Bar

Legal Ethics
inShare

DUTIES
a.) Rule 11.05 Code of Professional Responsibility

A lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the

proper authorities.

An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still

available.

A letter complaint was filed with the Office of the Chief Justice charging a member of the CA
with having transacted in favor of the respondents in a labor case, issued a TRO without
conducting a hearing, and without requiring the posting of a bond. The complainants did not file
a motion for reconsideration of the resolution issuing the TRO. (Rondain, et al. vs. Associate

Justice Eloy R. Bello, etc., A.M. No. CA-05-43, July 8, 2005, citing De Guzman vs. Pamintuan,
405 SCRA 22 [2003]).

The judgment or order of a collegiate court, like the CA, whose members reached a collective
judgment, cannot be the subject of a charge of misconduct or unethical behavior against a
single member of the CA. (Rondain vs. Bello, supra). It cannot prosper if proferred against a
solitary member.

b.) Duty as officer of the Court

An officer of the court has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to
promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. (In Re: Letter dated February 21, 2005
of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No. 05-03-04-SC, July 22, 2005). The lawyers first duty is not to
his client, but to the administration of justice to which his clients case is wholly subordinate. His
conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.

Mercado vs. Security Bank Corp.

G.R. No. 160445, February 16, 2005

A lawyer was punished for contempt and fined in the amount of P50, 00.00 considering the
gravity of his offense. While feigning to be searching for truth on whether Chief Justice Davide
indeed exerted tremendous pressure to the ponente of a case, he repeatedly hum, hated him
and the judiciary in the most loutish and insolent manner. He accused him of doing an
unthinkable, ungodly and malicious act of depriving his family of their basic fundamental
rights in the protection of their property. He further said, There is no justice in our courts, the
Supreme Court particularly. (See also: In Re: Laurela, 148 SCRA 382).

Dalisay vs. Mauricio, Jr.

479 SCRA 307 [2006]

c.) Change of Theory

A party should decide early what version he is going to advance a change of theory in the
latter stage of the proceedings is objectionable, because it is contrary to the rules of fair play,

justice and due process. If anything has been achieved by the lawyers inconsistencies, it is his
dishonesty.

Balaoing vs. Calderon

A.M. No. RTJ-90-530; Balaoing vs. Maliwanag, A.M. RTJ-676
April 27, 1993

A lawyer was disbarred because of penchant for filing administrative charges against judges in
whose sala he had pending cases whenever the latter rendered decisions or issued orders
adverse to his client.

d.)

Delay in the administration of justice

Republic vs. Vicente G. Lim

G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005

The State acquired and used a parcel of land in Cebu, to become the Lahug Airport more
than 50 years ago. It has not paid the owner. Yet, the rule is that the title to the property
expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. The State was the one that resorted to a series of remedies to delay the
payment. Consequently, it was ruled that if the government fails to pay the just
compensation within 5 years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners have the right to recover possession of their property.

Equatorial Realty, Inc. vs. Mayfair Theaters, Inc.

G.R. No. 106063, November 21, 1996

A person, not a party to a contract may not file an action for annulment because of lack of
privity. The appropriate remedy is rescission. (See also: Paraaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. vs.
CA, G.R. No. 111538, February 26, 1997).

PCGG vs. SB & LUCIO TAN, ET AL.

G.R. NOS. 151809-12, APRIL 12, 2005

In 1976, General Banking Corp. encountered financial difficulties, that despite various
loans or financial support extended to it, it incurred daily over-drawings of its current account
with the CB. It failed to recover from its financial woes despite emergency loans extended by the
CB, hence, it was declared insolvent by the CB, and ordered its liquidation. A public bidding was
conducted and Lucio Tan submitted the highest bid. Subsequently, former Solicitor General
Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI (RTC) of Manila praying for assistance and
supervision of the court in the banks liquidation.

In 1986, with the EDSA I that toppled the Marcos government, the PCGG was created.
In 1987, the PCGG filed with the SB a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages against Lucio Tan, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. 0005. In
connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by defendants by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with
Marcos.

Tan, et al. filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court
to nullify the writs issued by the PCGG. The cases were referred to the SB and docketed as
Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. The parties were represented by former Solicitor General Mendoza
who then resumed his private practice. In 1991, PCGG filed motions to disqualify Mendoza as
counsel in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and 0096-0099. The ground relied upon was that he actively
intervened in the liquidation of Genbank which was subsequently acquired by Lucio Tan and
became Allied Bank. His intervention consisted of advising the CB on the procedure to bring
about the Banks liquidation and appeared as counsel for the CB in connection with the petition.
The motions were based on Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting
former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he intervened while in said service.

On April 22, 1991, the SB issued an order denying the motion to disqualify Mendoza in
Civil Case No. 0005 ruling that PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between
his former function as Solgen and his employment as counsel of Lucio Tan. It ruled that
Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the CB when he was Solgen
and that his appearance was beyond the one-year prohibited period under RA 6713, Sec. 7(b)
prohibiting former public officials from practicing their profession in connection with any matter

before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or
separation from public office.

In connection with Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099, the SB denied the motions citing the
same reasons in Civil Case No. 005, hence, a petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by
the PCGG alleging that the SB acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in denying the motions to disqualify Mendoza. The core of the issue is whether the
intervention of Mendoza was substantial or innocuous. Decide.

Held:
The intervention of Mendoza was not substantial or significant but only innocuous
because it merely consisted of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. The reasons relied upon
are the following:

1) The petition in the special proceedings (CC No. 005) was a mere initiatory pleading;
hence, he signed it as then Solgen.

2) The record is arid as to the actual participation of Mendoza as it was in slumberville for a
long time. The petition merely sought to ask for the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of Genbank. The principal role of the court is to assist the CB in determining
the claims of creditors. The participation of the Solgen was not that of the usual court
litigator protecting the interest of the government. (PCGG vs. SB & Lucio Tan, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005).

Q Does this case represent adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03? Explain.

Answer: No, because Solgen Mendoza had no adverse interest problem when he acted as
Solgen in SP. Proc. 107812 and later as counsel of Mr. Tan in Civil Case No. 0005 and Case
Nos. 0096-0099 before the SB.

The Congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03.

Q What does the term matter mean in Rule 6.03? Explain.

Answer: It is any discreet, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a
particular transaction and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations, laws or briefing abstract principles
of law. (PCGG vs. SB, et al., supra.).

Q PCGG insisted that Mr. Mendoza is disqualified to handle the case because he
intervened in the closure of Genbank by advising the CB on how to proceed with said
banks liquidation and even filed the petition for its liquidation. CB officers conferred with
him and furnished him documents to aid him in filing the petition. Are these acts
included within the concept of matter under Rule 6.03? Explain.

Answer: No, because the procedure is given in black and white in RA 265, Section 29.

The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is entirely different from the matter
involved in the sequestration of the stocks owned by Lucio Tan in Allied Bank. The case does
not involve the liquidation of the bank. Whether the shares of stocks of Allied Bank are ill-gotten
is far removed from the issue of the liquidation of the Bank. In short, the legality of the
liquidation of Genbank is not an issue in the sequestration case; hence, Rule 6.03 cannot apply
to Mendoza. (PCGG vs. SB, et al., supra.).

Q What does the term intervention mean? Explain.

Answer: There are two meanings of the term. Under the first interpretation, intervene includes
participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little
influence. Under the second interpretation, intervene only includes an act of a person who has
the power to influence the subject proceedings. The second meaning is more appropriate to
give to the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light
of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do no exist where the government
lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as xxx drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles.

In short, the intervention cannot be insignificant and unsubstantial. The intervention of

Mendoza was insignificant and innocuous. He is not therefore, disqualified. (PCGG vs. SB, et
al., supra.).

Q Are there any disadvantages if Rule 6.03 would be interpreted strictly so as to

disqualify former government lawyers from handling cases where they intervened while
in government irrespective of the extent of the intervention? Explain.

Answer: Yes, even if it is admitted that the rule is an attempt to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in
government. There are however considerations to take into, like:

1) The rule was not interpreted to cause chilling effect on government recruitment of able
legal talent. At present, it is difficult for government to match compensation offered by
the private sector and it is unlikely that it will be able to do so or to reverse the situation.
The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to
recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and
contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. Rightly,
Judge Kaufman said that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too great
for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice
of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with
which they become associated to be disqualified. Indeed, to make government service
more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter.

2) To interpret Rule 6.03 strictly would allow other party litigants as a litigation tactic to
harass opposing counsel and deprive a client of the right to choose a competent legal
representation. It may be used to bludgeon an opposing counsel.

3) A strict interpretation of the rule would affect the independence of lawyers in

government. An individual who has the security of knowing that he/she can find a job
upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously and challenge official conduct.
An employee who lacks this assurance does not enjoy such freedom. The position of a
Solgen should be endowed with a great degree of independence. Any distinction of the
independence of the Solgen will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.

The disqualification may deprive him of the right to exercise his profession. It may
extend to the members of his law firm. Such former government lawyers may stand in
danger of becoming lepers in the legal profession. (PCGG vs. SB, et al., supra.).

Q Should the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility be subjected to prescriptive period or be made retroactive? Explain.

Answer: It should not be retroactive. Note that the Rule has not yet been adopted by the IBP
when Mendoza was the Solgen, hence, it should not be given retroactive effect.

It should have proscriptive period otherwise, it would be used to bludgeon a lawyer,

harass him and results in deprivation of a client of a lawyer of his choice. It may result in having
a former government lawyer a leper in the legal profession. (PCGG vs. SB, et al., supra.).

Q State the basic rule in resolving a motion to disqualify a lawyer. Explain.

Answer: In evaluating a motion to disqualify a lawyer, courts are not bound by stringent rules.
There is room for consideration of the combined effect of a partys right to counsel of his own
choice, an attorneys interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client of
replacing disqualified counsel, and any tactical abuse underlying a disqualification proceeding.
(PCGG vs. SB, et al., supra.).

Q What is the nature of an order denying a motion to disqualify a lawyer? Explain.

Answer: An order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is final and, therefore, appealable. The
issue of whether or not a lawyer should be disqualified from representing a client is separable
from, independent of and collateral to the main issues in a case. In short, it is separable from
the merits. Clearly, a petition for certiorari is dismissible. (PCGG vs. SB, et al., supra.).

Q If it is final, then, will res judicata lie to bar similar motions to disqualify a lawyer?
Explain.

Answer: Yes. To rule otherwise is to encourage the risk of inconsistent judicial rulings on the
basis of the same set of facts, and this should not be countenanced. Public policy, judicial
orderliness, economy of judicial time and the interest of litigants, as well as the peace and order
of society, all require that stability should be accorded judicial rulings and that controversies
once decided shall remain in repose, and that there be an end to litigation. (PCGG vs. SB, et al.,
supra.).

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo.

Q It was suggested that the prohibition under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is not perpetual but merely lasts for 5 years based on the Civil Code and
that the practice of law is a property right protected by the Constitution. Is the contention
correct? Explain.

Answer: No, otherwise, it would mean that after five years from the termination of the attorneyclient relationship, all lawyers would be able to represent an interest in conflict with that of the
former client and that they would no longer be bound by the rule on privileged communication.

It bears to emphasize that the law is not trade nor a craft but a profession, a noble
profession at that.

The practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of

which is entrusted only to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character. If the respect of the people in the honor and integrity of the legal profession is
to be retained, both lawyers and laymen must recognize and realize that the legal
profession is a profession and not a trade, and that the basic ideal of that profession is to
render public service and secure justice for those who seek its aid. It is not a business,
using bargain counter methods to reap large profits for those who conduct it. From the
profession standpoint, it is expressive of three ideals organization, learning and public
service. The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration.
The professional spirit the spirit of public service constantly curbs the urge of that
instinct.

The law as a profession proceeds from the basic premise that membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions and carries with it the responsibility to live up
to its exacting standards and honored traditions. A person enrolled in its ranks is called
upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the state the
administration of justice. That the practice of law is a profession explains why lawyers
repute and of eminence welcome their designation as counsel deoficio, as an
opportunity to manifest to the concept that law is a profession.

The law must be thought of as ignoring commercial standards of success. The

lawyers conduct is to be measured not by the standards of trade and counting house
but by those of his profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the
ethical rule against advertising or solicitation of professional employment, rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a noble profession. (PCGG vs. SB, et
al., supra.).