Nationalism and Its Explanation

Nationalism and Its Explanations
Author(s): Henk Dekker, Darina Malov, Sander Hoogendoorn

Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 2, Special Issue: National Identity in Europe (Jun.,
2003), pp. 345-376
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
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Political Psychology, Vol.24, No. 2, 2003
Nationalismand Its Explanations

Henk Dekker
Department of Political Science, Leiden University, Netherlands
Darina Malova
Department of Political Science, Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovak
Republic
Sander Hoogendoorn
Guest lecturer at Universidad de la Rioja, Logroio, Spain, during 1995-1996;
works now as a business consultant for governmental and non-governmental
organizations
Thispaper presents new termsfor analyzing individuals'national attitudesand their conceptualizationand operationalization,a universalpsychological structurein which these
concepts interconnect,and a nationalismexplanatorymodel. Threeempiricalstudies using
anonymousself-administeredsurveys served to test and improvenational attitudeassessment and its developmental theory. These empirical studies were conducted in a wellestablished state (the Netherlands), a recently established state (Slovakia), and a region
in which a considerableproportion of citizens are striving to develop a new independent
state (the Basque AutonomousCommunityof Spain).
KEYWORDS:nationalism,
nationalidentity,patriotism,
elites,massmedia,school,
socialization,
symbols,rituals,internationalism
The existing nationalismliteratureis a conceptuallabyrinthcharacterizedby

questionable instruments,a lack of valid empirical data, and poor explanatory
power (Dekker, 2001; Dekker & Malova, 1995). The concept "nationalism"has
differentmeanings relatingto various levels of analysis: nationalismas an ideology, a movement,the process of "nation"and "nation-state"building, and an individual's political orientation.Moreover,several differenttypes and intensities of
nationalismare distinguishedin disconnected ways. A prime example is that the
notion of nationalismis often confused with other national orientations,such as
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0162-895X ? 2003 InternationalSociety of Political Psychology
Publishedby Blackwell Publishing. Inc., 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 GarsingtonRoad, Oxford, OX4 2DQ
Dekker et al.
346
nationalpride. If 70% of the people are "nationalistic"because they are proudof

their country, the concept loses its significance. A stricter conceptualizationof
nationalism is needed to prevent a continuing "inflation"of nationalism's conceptual value.
We have found that most of the contributionsto the nationalism literature
include not one empirical paragraph.This lack implies that the notion of nationalism merely exists or grows within the literature,withoutadequateempiricaldata
to supportit. A possible explanationcould be that there simply are no adequate
tools for the measurementof nationalism.Hobsbawm (1990) echoed this sentiment: "The view from below, i.e. the nation as seen... by the ordinarypersons
... is exceedingly difficult to discover" (p. 11). The very few empirical studies
that do exist in the literaturealso suffer from conceptual confusion, resulting in
differing operationalizations(e.g., Kosterman& Feshbach, 1989; Loh, 1975).
A lack of theory, combined with unclear exploratory factor analyses, has
resulted in scales with low face validity. For example, in Kosterman and
Feshbach's 1989 study in the United States, a nationalist is characterizedas
someone who thinks that the first duty, among others, is to honor the national
history and heritage, that foreign aid programsshould benefit the United States
politically,and thatit is importantthatthe United States win in internationalsporting competitionssuch as the Olympics. This epistemological chaos has alertedus
to the urgent need for solidifying a clear conceptual understandingof "nationalism" throughsound empirical analysis.
In what follows, we attemptto presenta clear and consistent terminologyof
nationalism,as well as identify its main determinants,establishedthroughempirical data gatheredfrom reliable cross-nationalmeasurementsof nationalism.To
achieve this, we developed a new set of terms characterizingnational attitudes.
These characterizations,coupled with their conceptualizationand operationalization, help to create a structurein which these concepts are interconnected,as well
as a set of hypotheses explaining national attitudedevelopment.We understood
that any theory that aspires to universality must be tested in several culturally
diverse areas.Therefore,to test and improve our assessment and hypotheses concerning national attitudes, we conducted three preliminaryempirical studies in
three categorical states: a well-established state (the Netherlands), a recently
established state (Slovakia; see also Dekker, Malova, & Theulings, 1996;
Hagendoor, Csepeli, Dekker, & Faren, 2000), and a region in which a considerable proportionof citizens are striving to develop a new independentstate (the
Basque AutonomousCommunityof Spain).
Expectations About Nationalism
We consider nationalismas an individual's attitude.An attitudeis a particular amount of affection for a certain object, that is, "simply a person's general
feeling of favorableness or unfavorableness"(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, p. 54).
347
National attitudediffers in the type (positive or negative) and strength(moderate,

very, and extremely positive or negative) of affection. We derived six expectations from these simple implications:
1. One neutral and five positive national attitudes can be distinguished on
the basis of differencesin type and strengthof affection.The basic neutralnational
affection is the national feeling (feeling of belonging to one's own people and
country). The five positive national attitudes are national liking (liking one's
people and country),nationalpride [being proudof one's people and country(see
Rose, 1985)], national preference (preferring one's people and country over
others), national superiority (feeling that one's people and country are superior
to others), and finally, nationalism (feeling a sense of belonging to a particular
"nation"with a common origin, wanting to keep that "nation"as pure as possible, and desiring to establish and/ormaintaina separateand independentstate for
that particular"nation").We assumed that individuals' national attitudescan be
inferredfrom the responses of (complete) agreementor (complete) disagreement
to particularstatementsregardingone's country and people, and formulated26
statementsand survey items to cover the various nationalattitudes(AppendixA).
Nationalism is thus expected to be one of the five different positive attitudes
toward one's country and people. National preference and national superiority
include-contrary to nationalfeeling, liking, andpride-forms of intergroupcomparison and even discrimination(nationalism).It can then be inferredthat a positive nationalattitudegives an individuala (moderate,very, or extremely)positive
national identity, and it also serves to satisfy the need for a sense of positive
self-identity.
2. These individualnationalattitudesform a cumulativehierarchy.Each individual is expected to reach one of the following states of national attitudinal
development:nationalfeeling -> nationalliking - nationalpride-> nationalpreference -> national superiority-> nationalism.Each stage requiresthe fulfillment
of the previous one; it then incorporatesit and preparesthe individualfor the succeeding one(s). This expectationassumesthatvariousnationalattitudesarerelated
to one anotherin such a way that developing and maintainingone (e.g., national
pride) is more "difficult"than developing and maintaininganother(e.g., national
liking). The development of the next higher national attitude requires more
complex processes thanthe developmentof the lower one (see below). This statement is particularlyreflected in the decreasing numbers of agreed responses in
the higher states of the hierarchy(Figure 1).
3. If there is an absence of positive nationalattitudes,negative nationalattitudes can be found. They can be categorized as follows: national alienation (not
feeling comfortablebeing among one's people in general and not feeling at home
in one's country), national shame (being ashamedof one's people and country),
national disgust (being disgusted with one's people and country), and national
hate (hating one's people and country).As is the case for positive national attitude, a negative nationalattitudecan give one a negative nationalidentity and, as
Dekker et al.
348
Regional
nationalism \
Nationalism
National
/superiority
/
/
National
preference
/Regional-national
superiority
/
Regional-nationaloride
National feeling
Regional-national
preference
National pride
National
liking
Regional-national
liking
Regional-nationalfeeling
European
Unionalism
EuropeanUnion
superiority
EuropeanUnion
preference
EuropeanUnion oride
Internationalism
EuropeanUnion
liking
EuropeanUnion feeling
Internationalfeeling
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[
I II
Figure 1. Cumulativehierarchiesof national,regional-national,EuropeanUnion,

and internationalattitudes.
a result, a sense of negative self-identity.These negative attitudes,like the positives, also form a cumulativehierarchy,and these two hierarchiescombine to form
two separatescales (see Appendix A).
4. Besides nationalattitudes,several differentpositive or negative "regionalnational"attitudes can also be distinguished (see Melich, 1986; Rovati, 1992).
The hierarchies of the positive and negative regional-national attitudes are
expected to be the same as the national attitudes.
5. Internationalattitudesrelatingto particularregions of the globe, its people,
the world, andhumankindcan also be distinguished.Exampleswould be the European Union and its citizens (EUfeeling, EU liking, EU pride, EU preference,EU
superiority,and European Unionalism),Europe (varying from Europeanfeeling
to Europeanism), Slavic countries (from Slavic feeling to Slavism), and Arab
countries (from Arabfeeling to Arabism).The attitudestowardthe world, or the
"internationalcommunity,"and toward humankindcan be characterizedas an
internationalfeeling and internationalism,or cosmopolitanism (see Wittkopf,
1990).
6. Individualscombine moderatepositive attitudeson one level with positive attitudeson anotherlevel [moderatepositive regional-nationalattitudeswith
positive national attitudes,and moderatepositive national attitudeswith positive
internationalattitudes(Druckman,1994, p. 60)]. They do not combine very positive or extremely positive attitudes with positive attitudes on another level
because of the downward comparisons included therein. Very positive and
extremely positive attitudes are instead combined with negative attitudes on
another level [e.g., Basque regional nationalism with negative attitudes toward
349
Spain;Frenchand Danish nationalismwith negative attitudestowardthe EU (see

Hewstone, 1986)]. It is also unlikely that individuals with very positive or
extremely positive attitudes toward their own region, country, or international
region have an attitudeof internationalismor cosmopolitanism.Thus, in the attitudes hierarchy,the step from prideto preferenceis expected to be crucialin combining or not combining the various regional-national,national,and international
identities.
Hypotheses Explaining Nationalism
We distinguish three processes of national attitude development (building
on Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Dijker, 1987; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Mackie &
Hamilton, 1993). Each of these processes includes a particularset of variables
explaining a variance in national attitudes.The first developmentis the processing of one's affective observationsandexperiencesin one's countryandwith one's
people. The second process of attitudinaldevelopmentis the processing of affective messages from others about one's country and people (i.e., national socialization). And the third process analyzes the development in which attitude is
derived from the orientationsthat the individual earlier acquired and from the
individual's early behavior.The national attitudein this instance is the internal
inference derived from the individual's knowledge (national knowledge and
insights), beliefs (national auto-cliches and auto-stereotypes),thoughts (national
opinions), emotional experiences (nationalemotions), feelings (specific attitudes,
other than national attitudes), needs and desires (values), intentions (national
behavioral intentions), and previous actions (nationalbehaviors) with respect to
one's country and people. The most importantprocess is national socialization,
because the firstnationalemotions and rudimentarybeliefs thatone acquiresresult
from early socializationratherthan from early perceptions,inferences, and experiences. Four main determinantsestablish the development of one's national
attitude.
The first determinantis previously experiencednationalemotions. Finlayson
(1998) cautioned that "to study nationalism and ignore its affective, emotional
aspects would be folly" (p. 146). A national emotion is a strong feeling relating
to one's country and people, and is accompanied by physical reactions and a
change in readiness for action (Frijda, 1986; Ledoux, 1996). National emotions
differ in kind (positive or negative) and intensity (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993).
National emotions are expected to influence national attitudesnot only directly,
but also indirectlythroughtheir influence on nationalbeliefs. In general, national
emotions, coupled with rudimentarybeliefs, are often developed early in life
(Davies, 1968; Jahoda,1962a, 1962b;Lawson, 1963; Piaget & Weil, 1951). It can
be said that what is learned first influences what is learned later; the first step is
highly crucial. Informationthat comes later is attachedto, and filtered through,
these early-developed emotions. Emotions are acquired through experiencing
350
Dekker et al.
emotional events such as nationalrituals (partof nationalsocialization). Individuals who intensely experiencenationalritualsarethose who tend to connect strong
feelings to obvious and hidden nationalobjects. These objects have the potential
to become "self-objects" (Rothstein, 1994). Once an emotion is linked to an
object, it will be manifested in every instance when contact is made with that
object. This emotion can also be seen in occurrenceswhen one reads about that
particularobject, or even when that object appearsin one's mind (Bem, 1970).
Therefore,emotions form a potentially importantvariablein explaining attitudes
because they last a long time and are more resistantto change thanare cognitions.
The second determinantis salient nationalbeliefs (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980;
Bar-Tal, 1993). A national belief is a characteristicthat an individual links to a
country (cliche) and/or people (stereotype). Salient auto-cliches are related to
one's country's history, its actual political, economic, and social-culturalsituation, and that country's internationalpolitical position. An individual who holds
a higher numberof more positive auto-cliches and auto-stereotypestends to have
a more positive national attitude. National beliefs are acquired through direct
observationsand experiences, as well as throughselective mediatedobservations
from relevantothers such as parents,friends, teachers,journalists,political information officers, and politicians (nationalsocialization).
The third determinant is previously performed national behaviors. With
varying intensities, the examples consist of orally defending one's people and/or
country against criticisms from abroad,serving in the army on a compulsory or
voluntarybasis, and fighting in a war.A particularattitudemay be developed as
a result of perceivedjustificationof that behavior.Previously performednational
behaviors are expected to influence one's attitudedirectly and indirectlythrough
their influence on nationalemotions and beliefs.
The fourthdeterminantis specific attitudes(excludingthose underthis study).
These attitudes include those toward outgroups living within the country and
toward foreign countries and their people; worry about one's (family's) future;
and the individual's sense of positive self-identity.An individual who develops
more extremely negative attitudestowardforeign nationalor "ethnic"minorities
living within that country,and towardforeigners and foreign countries,will tend
to develop an attitudeof nationalism(Kleinpenning& Hagendoor, 1993). The
presence or absence of concernaboutone's political, economic, social, and/orcultural future is also expected to be a determinantof national attitudes.One who
worriesless aboutone's (family's) futurewill tend to have a more positive national
attitude (this only applies to national liking, pride, preference, and superiority).
We expect that an individual with more of such worries will turn towardnationalism. The individual's sense of positive self-identity serves as anotheraffective
determinant.A low sense of positive self-identity(such as may result from a clear
failure of one's "old"ideology) motivates individualsto develop a very positive
or extremely positive nationalattitude(see Blank, 1997; Bloom, 1990; Csepeli &
351
Orkeny,1993; Mummendey,Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999; Smith, 1991;

Tajfel & Turner,1986; Weinreich, 1991).
National emotions, national beliefs, national behaviors, attitudes toward
ethnic minorities, and attitudes toward foreign people and countries can be
explained as an importantpart of the individual's nationalpolitical socialization
(Breuilly, 1993; Csepeli, 1982; Desai, 1993; Frey, 1968; Gellner, 1993; Levine,
1965; Smith, 1992). The individual only acquires national emotions when the
emotions are evoked. And the individualonly acquiresbeliefs aboutone's country
and people, ethnic minorities, and foreign countries and their people when such
beliefs are offered. People participatein national activities only when they are
stimulatedor forced to do so. National socializationusually startsat an early age,
when it catches the child with experiences of positive emotions during national
rituals-in reality or via television. Positive emotions are then linked to national
symbols. And these positive emotions are reiteratedwhen individuals receive
informative messages regardingtheir country and their people in conversations
with their families (Seliktar, 1980) or via television programs.This socialization
continueswhen the school (Ram,2000), church(El-Wafi,1993), othermass media
(Deutsch, 1966), peers, people at the workplace, social networks, social movements, and politics serve as other sources of emotions and information(Dekker,
1991; Farnen, 1994, 2000; Wasburn,1994).
Socialization through these agencies (and through the socializers within
them) is in turn influenced by information,persuasion, or manipulationtoward
the goals and activities of political elites. The individualagencies and socializers
possess an autonomythat is relativeto the degree of freedomof expressionwithin
a given country.The level of autonomyis limited in autocraciesand in countries
with a high level of communicationcentralizationcomparedto democracieswith
truly free mass communications. Political elites can influence the individual's
national socialization directly or indirectly throughother socialization agencies.
In all political systems there is an intendedattemptto transferparticularnational
attitudes,emotions, values, beliefs, and behavioralintentionsand behavioralpatterns from the elites to the masses (Gumbert,1987). The elites in their speeches
emphasize positive aspects of their countryand people. This in turninitiates and
supportsother socializers that do the same (Billig, 1995).
Political leaders who are perceived as charismaticwill have strongerinfluence. Political leaders who act as nationalistic "entrepreneurs/dealers"are
expected to be the most importantnationalisticsocializers because of their ability
to directly socialize throughtheirwritings,statements,and speeches (Ram, 2000).
Nationalisticrhetoricis one of their tools, supportingand strengtheningthe belief
in the existence of "one nation"with a common origin, ancestry,consanguinity,
and the perspectiveof "one nation,one state."For example, such leadersmay say
that "our"communityis conditionedby the fact of a blood relationship,that "we"
have the same ancestors, "we" are the same family, "we" are all brothersand
352
Dekker et al.
sisters, that the same motherhas given birthto "us,"and that "we are partof the
nation, flesh of its flesh and blood of its blood" (Connor,1993). Othertools make
use of religious notions such as "chosen people" and "promisedland"; suggest
that a nationalconsensus exists on the country's goals and priorities;initiate and
strengthen rumor conspiracies; introduce carefully chosen national "traumas"
(Rothstein, 1994); and blame economic misfortunes,among others, on domestic
or foreign "enemies."Such leadersuse the issue of the "nation"to acquire,maintain, or extend theirpolitical power.Underthe influenceof charismaticand nationalistic political leaders, a considerable part of the population may have
strengthenedpositive nationalattitudesand thus may move upwardin the national
attitudinalhierarchy.
We expect that individuals first acquire a nationalfeeling through national
emotions developed through national rituals and initial motivation signals from
parents.Because individuals need to have a positive sense of identity, they will
be motivated to perceive predominantlyfavorable characteristicsabout their
country and fellow-nationals (because they have no realistic choices of country
and people, and also few realistic options to altertheircircumstances).This motivates them to develop positive beliefs about one's country and people, and also
to develop throughthese beliefs a nationalfeeling. When such people develop a
national liking, they will continueto strive for a sense of positive identitybecause
they will be motivated to continue participationin national rituals, and hence
strengthentheir own positive national emotions. They also will be motivated to
receive positive information about their country, people, history, and symbols
(e.g., reading literaturethat honors the deeds of a nationalhero). In school, they
may be educated in a single nationalhistory and culturethat contradictsthose of
outgroups.
These emotions and new beliefs may result in national pride. Because
individuals will continue to strive toward a positive self-identity, they will tend
to observe more similarities among fellow-nationals than with other nonnationals,and also to develop less positive or even negative attitudestowardother
nationalities.The positive attitudestowardtheir country and people may also be
supportedby highly positive informationabout them, and negative information
about other countries and peoples, that may be received from parents or other
relatives, teachers, or mass media personnel;by reading, hearing, and/or seeing
information directly from mass media; or from political leaders emphasizing
national successes in comparison to others. Once the negative attitudes toward
other nationalities living in the country and foreign countries and their people
have developed, individuals will tend to be less open to any contradictory
information about these groups and countries, and will also tend to ignore,
reject, distort, or forget this kind of information.People with a low sense of
positive self-identity are more motivated than others to develop such negative
emotions, beliefs, and attitudes toward minorities and foreign people and
countries.
353
Perceptions of competition and conflict with these minorities and foreign

countries and people-especially but not exclusively received from political
leaders, mass media, and military service trainers-may enhance the favoring of
one's countryand people. This may result in the developmentof national preference. The strongerthe preferencebecomes, the more negative the attitudetoward
others may become. National preference then leads to national superiority.
National superioritymay be acquiredindividually.However, it can also be conditioned by parentsor other relatives, participationin service organizationswith
nationallyoriented religious affiliations,national symbols such as the flag or the
head of state (such as throughenormous human reconstructionsof the national
flag at athleticevents and huge portraitsof nationalleaderson billboards),reading
newspapersthat express national superiority,listening to and/or singing national
songs frequently,and observing (directly or throughmass media) statementsof
political leaders emphasizing national superiority.
Finally, individuals may develop the attitudeof nationalism.Nationalism is
developed when the contents of national socialization include the mention of a
common origin, ancestry,or consanguinity,a wish to keep the "nation"as pure
as possible and to establish or maintaina separateindependentstate-if necessary, incorporatingwithin the bordersof that state all groups that are considered
to belong to that "nation."This action might force other nationalitiesor "nations"
and ethnicities inside the country to leave, leading to the end of all international
cooperation.These messages will be the most attractivefor people who have a
very low sense of positive identity or suffer from an identity crisis.
Systematic variables-relating to the political, economic, and social system,
and its history-are backgroundvariables in a model that aims to explain why
one individualis more nationalisticthananotherliving in the same system (Figure
2). The person's attitudecan be placed within the political, economic, and social
context as the individual emotionally experiences and perceives it. The individual's social-demographiccharacteristicsare also backgroundvariables.Variables
such as age and gender do not wholly tell us about national attitudeacquisition.
Importantelements that are linked to gender and age include experiences and
socialization (Figure 2).
In sum, we hypothesize that the individual'sdevelopmentof nationalismcan
be considerably explained by the following: intense positive national emotions
that were previously experienced; national behaviors with a high intensity that
were previously performed;extremely positive beliefs about one's country and
people; highly negative attitudes toward national or "ethnic"minorities living
within the country,and otherforeign countriesand people; a strongconcernabout
one's (family's) political, economic, social, and culturalfuture; and a very low
sense of positive self-identity.These orientationsare in turninfluencedby aspects
of the person's national socialization, including the frequency and intensity of
nationalritualsas well as national(or nationalistic)education,information,and/or
persuasion from various socializers, in particularfrom nationalistic charismatic
354
Dekker et al.
National emotions
National
socialization
by
National values
political elites:
directly
d y
and,
National beliefs
National
through
rituals,
~attitude
~~~~~~~~~rituals~,
school
National behaviors
\
education,
mass media,
~etc.,m
etc., also
also
~Outgroup
attitudes
indirectly
Concern about
future
Self-identity
Figure 2. National attitudeexplanatorymodel.
political leaders who have centralized national education and communication

systems at their disposal.
Study 1: The Netherlands
The aim of the 1994 Dutch study was to test our first two expectations (see
above) so that we could empirically distinguish the various positive national attitudes and confirm that these attitudes form a cumulative hierarchy. A quota sample
of secondary school students with Dutch nationalities from the third, fourth, and
fifth grades, ages 15 to 18, reacted to a selection of 14 of the 26 national attitude
items. They were contacted through their schools, and all school types and denominations were included. After excluding questionnaires that were filled out by students with foreign nationalities or were unusable for other reasons, a sample of
849 respondents remained. Quota controls were based on data from the Central
Statistics Bureau. Students from Catholic and Protestant Christian schools and
middle general-education schools were slightly overrepresented relative to
students from non-confessional public schools and pre-vocational, higher
355
general-education,and pre-universityeducationschools. Data collection, using an

anonymous self-administeredsurvey, took place during regular school hours of
50 minutes. History/Constitutionand Society classes were excluded so as to limit
the proportionof "socially desirable"or "politicallycorrect"responses.
We first checked whetherthe responses revealed a declining trendof support
as national attituderose in the hierarchy(i.e., as attitudestoward one's country
and people grew more positive). This was clearly the case (Table 1). Next, we
tested the statisticalreliability.Most of the subscales indicateda weak reliability
(Cronbach'sas varied from .56 to .83).
The next step was to compute the correlationcoefficients between the differentsubscales.Respondentswho had not answeredthreeor more of the 14 items
were excluded (resultingin N = 567) because the following analyses cannot treat
missing values. The missing values of others were replaced by a score of agreeing if a majorityagreed, and a score of disagreeingif a majoritydisagreed.A separatetreatmentof the subscales is justified if none of the correlationsexceeds the
borderof .80. The correlationsdid not violate the requirement;they were low to
modest (Pearson'sr varied from .11 to .50).
Table 1. NationalAttitudesAmong Dutch Youth in 1994 (N = 849)

Attitude
National feeling
1. Feeling Dutch
National liking (a = .83)
2. Liking the Netherlands
3. Liking to be Dutch
4. Liking the Dutch
5. Liking the Dutch language
National pride (a = .67)
6. Proudof the Netherlands
7. Proudto be Dutch
National preference (a = .56)
8. Preferringthe Netherlands
9. Preferringthe Dutch
National superiority (a = .70)
10. Feeling the Netherlandsis the best country
11. Liking Dutch people the most
Response (%)
++
Sum
66
26
92
26
41
19
29
41
36
48
37
67
77
67
66
12
7
13
14
4
3
2
5
16
1
1
1
1
13
16
14
15
26
36
33
51
59
18
16
6
6
1
1
23
18
22
11
36
21
58
33
23
36
8
19
2
2
10
10
9
8
15
12
24
20
36
39
20
27
3
3
17
12
Nationalism (a = .68)
12. Wishing Flanderspart of the Netherlands
7
6
13
35
34
3
16
13. Wishing all Dutch in the Netherlands
6
6
12
39
35
3
11
14. Rejecting internationalcooperation
2
4
6
41
16
33
4
Note. a, Cronbach's ac;++, strongly agreeing; +, agreeing; Sum, agreeing and strongly agreeing;
-, disagreeing;--, strongly disagreeing;?, don't know; 0, no opinion, no answer.
356
Dekker et al.
We conducted a Mokken scale analysis using the computer programMSP

(Molenaar,Debets, Sijtsma, & Hemker, 1994) to test the hypothesized cumulativity of nationalattitudes.We checked whetherthe correlationsbetween the different attitudesat the shortestdistance were higher than those between attitudes
at a largerdistance in the hypothesizedhierarchy("simplex model";J6reskog &
Sorbom, 1989, p. 182). With the exception of the liking-preferencecorrelation,
the correlationsbetween the differentattitudesat the shortestdistancewere higher
thanthose between attitudesat a largerdistancein the hypothesizedhierarchy.All
individualsubscales contributedto the overall scale, and MSP revealed a medium
scalability (H = .46; p = .77).
To validate the findings externally,we also measuredpolitical left/rightselfscaling and preferencefor an extreme right-wing party.As expected, it appeared
that the furtherthe respondentsplaced themselves to the right, the higher their
overall national attitudescale score appeared(r = .35). Among the respondents
with a party preference (66%), the extreme right-wing party scored high among
those with the highest overall nationalattitudescore, and low among those with
the lowest national attitudescore (23% and 2%, respectively; n = 413). We thus
conclude that the data did not reject our expectationthat we can empiricallydistinguish six differentnationalattitudesand that these attitudesform a cumulative
positive nationalattitudeshierarchy.Yet the reliabilityof most of these subscales
was too low.
Study 2: Slovakia
The 1995-1996 Slovak study also aimed to test the first two expectations
listed above-that we can empiricallydistinguishdifferentpositive nationalattitudes, and that these attitudesform a cumulativehierarchy-and the nationalism
explanationhypothesis.
The Slovak respondentsreacted to all national attitudeitems named above,
plus one additionalquestionregardingthe feeling of being or not being a Slovak.
Students from the Political Science Departmentof Comenius University interviewed 635 respondentsin theirhomes. The sample does not representthe Slovak
population(half of the respondentswere young people, ages 14 to 20, and more
women than men were interviewed). Originally we planned to carry out the
research among a quota sample of Slovak youth attending secondary school
classes. However, at the time of the data collection, our study became a political
issue and the Slovak Ministry of Educationhad forbiddenthe schools to participate in our research.
The responses to the 26 nationalattitudeitems indicateda declining trendof
supportas national attituderose in the hierarchy.Five of the six individual attitudinalsubscales were revealed to be statisticallyreliable;however, the nationalism subscale had a low Cronbach'sa of .62 (Table 2). The correlationsbetween
individualsubscales of positive attitudeswere modest to high, but none exceeded
357
Table 2. NationalAttitudesAmong Slovaks in 1995-1996 (N = 635)

Attitude
National feeling (a = .76)

1. Being Slovak
2. Feeling Slovak
3. Feeling Slovakia is my country
National liking (a = .81)
4. Liking to be Slovak
5. Liking the Slovaks
6. Liking Slovakia
7. Liking the Slovak language
National pride (a = .73)
8. Proud to be Slovak
9. Proudof Slovaks
10. Proud of Slovakia
National preference (a = .75)
11. Liking Slovaks more
12. PreferringSlovaks
13. PreferringSlovak citizenship
14. PreferringSlovakia
National superiority (a = .79)
15. Feeling Slovaks are better
16. Feeling Slovaks are the best
17. Feeling Slovakia is the best
18. Feeling Slovak nationalityis the best
Nationalism (a = .62)
19. Feeling a Slovak common origin
20. Feeling a memberof one Slovak family
21. Feeling of having Slovak blood
22. Wantingall Slovaks in Slovakia
23. WantingSlovaks not to mix
24. Wantingnon-Slovaks to leave
25. WantingSlovaks protected
Response (%)
++
Sum
63
44
33
27
33
46
89
77
78
2
5
3
19
21
34
39
34
48
45
43
53
68
79
82
9
10
4
24
24
10
4
9
9
19
+/-
2
1
1
6
13
15
1
4
3
7
2
2
2
1
0
1
2
29
25
17
11
9
5
2
3
33
33
15
22
14
27
7
5
12
22
39
41
16
10
5
8
32
15
26
11
41
24
45
38
14
23
13
21
4
8
3
21
19
31
28
9
23
14
10
2
2
4
9
5
6
4
12
7
8
8
22
35
35
35
24
26
16
22
13
21
31
27
26
11
11
9
16
4
4
22
3
4
2
13
1
4
8
29
8
6
3
18
0
8
11
51
11
10
5
30
1
47
39
12
34
35
36
22
24
24
21
4
22
32
45
6
67
16
21
15
29
15
11
28
3
6
8
18
4
8
3
14
5
Note. a, Cronbach'sa; ++, strongly agreeing; +, agreeing; Sum, agreeing and strongly agreeing; -,
disagreeing;--, strongly disagreeing;+/-, partly agreeing and partly disagreeing;?, don't know, no
opinion, no answer.
the border of .80, which justified a separatetreatmentof these scales (missing

values, "do not know," and "no opinion" were excluded). The correlations
between attitudesat the shortestdistancewere higherthanthose between attitudes
at a larger distance in the hypothesized hierarchy, with two exceptions
(feeling/preference and preference/nationalism).Respondents who gave no
answer or a "do not know" or "no opinion" response to six or more items were
358
Dekker et al.
excluded from the analysis, and the missing values of other items were replaced
by the neutralalternative.MSP indicated that the items do form one scale (H =
.39; p = .91).
To test our explanatory hypothesis, we asked the respondents to answer

questions regarding their national emotions, national beliefs (auto-cliches and
auto-stereotypes), previously performed national behaviors, negative attitude
towardoutgroups,concernregardingthe future,sense of positive self-identity,and
national socialization (see Appendix B). A stepwise multiple regressionanalysis,
including all independentvariables,revealed that national emotion had the most
effect on nationalattitude(, = .54). Close behind were nationalauto-stereotypes
(P = .18). Next came attitudetoward outgroups(P = -.14) and the socialization
variableof positive attitudetowardnationalisticleaders (, = .16). The percentof
explained variancewas 61%.
We conclude that the data did not reject our two expectationsin distinguishing empirically the different positive national attitudes, and that these attitudes
form a cumulative hierarchy.However, the explanatory hypothesis had to be
rejectedin part.An individual'snationalattitudecould be considerablyexplained
by his or her nationalemotions, auto-stereotypes,attitudetowardoutgroups,and
national socialization. Auto-cliches, previously performed national behaviors,
concern about the future,and sense of positive self-identity were, contraryto our
hypothesis, not "good"predictorsfor one's positive nationalattitude.
Study 3: Basque Autonomous Community
The 1996 Basque study aimed to test all six of our expectations and the
nationalismexplanatoryhypothesis.A quota sample of secondaryschool students
in the Basque AutonomousCommunity,ages 14 to 18, reactedto 37 positive and
8 negative Basque regional-nationalitems. After excluding questionnairesthat
were filled out by students with foreign nationalitiesor were unusable for other
reasons, a sample of 774 respondentsremained.The respondentswere contacted
through their schools, and the 25 schools were selected on the basis of school
type: privateor public school, linguistic model of the school, and geographiclocation. The data set is available for secondary analysis at the NIWI Steinmetz
archives in Amsterdam(numberP1494).
The responses to the Basque regional-nationalitems indicated a declining
trend of support in the higher stages of hierarchy.However, there were some
exceptions. Contraryto our expectations, more respondentshad the attitude of
regional-nationalliking thanregional-nationalfeeling. The relatively low support
for the item "I feel the Basque Countryis my country,"which is one of the two
regional-nationalfeeling items, is understandablewhen we rememberthat there
is in fact no independentBasque country.Three regional nationalismitems indicated a considerable increase ratherthan decrease of support(items on Basque
blood, common origin, and being partof one Basque family). All individualpos-
359
itive subscalesof regional-nationalattitudeswere statisticallyreliable(Cronbach's

as varied from .82 to .91; see Table 3).
Respondentswho gave no answeror the "no opinion"responseto six or more
items were excluded from the following analysis. The missing values of other
items were replaced by the neutral alternative.One of the items (non-Basques
should leave the country) had negative covariances with other items and had to
be excluded from the analysis. The remainingitems formed a scale with a high
scalability coefficient (H = .59). The correlationsbetween the individualattitude
subscales were high but not too high, with one exception (preference/superiority).
Even the attitudeof nationalismsignified a high correlationwith the neutralattitude of regional feeling (.59). Three nationalisticitems were responsiblefor this:
Basque blood, common origin, and being part of one Basque family. A new
Mokken scale analysis, leaving out these three items, produceda strong scale (33
items, H = .58, n = 623). None of the new correlationsbetween the subscales were
too high, and the attitudeof Basque nationalism no longer had extremely high
correlationswith the attitudes lower in the hierarchy.The correlationsbetween
attitudes at the shortest distance were higher than those between attitudes at a
largerdistance in the expected hierarchy,with the exception of the preferenceand
feeling/nationalismcorrelations.
To test our expectations with respect to possible combinations of regionalnational attitudeswith national attitudes,we also asked the respondentsto react
Table 3. Basque Regional-NationalAttitudesAmong Basque Youth in 1996
Attitude
Basque regional-national feeling (a = .82)

1. Feeling Basque
2. Feeling the Basque Countryis my country
Basque regional-national liking (a = .88)
3. Liking to be Basque
4. Liking the Basques in general
5. Liking the Basque Country
6. Liking the Euskeralanguage
Basque regional-national pride (a = .82)
7. Proud to be Basque
8. Proud of the Basques
9. Proud of the Basque Country
Basque regional-national preference (a = .91)
10. PreferringBasques to Spaniards
11. PreferringBasques to other peoples
12. PreferringBasque citizenship to Spanish
13. PreferringBasque citizenship
14. Preferringthe Basque Countryto Spain
15. Preferringthe Basque Country
Response (%)
++
Sum
44
41
40
32
84
72
5
10
3
4
8
14
749
746
47
43
46
42
41
46
45
34
89
90
92
76
3
2
2
8
1
1
1
7
9
7
5
9
752
752
752
754
46
26
26
37
31
31
84
57
57
4
16
16
1
3
4
11
24
24
750
745
745
23
17
30
24
34
24
22
24
25
23
29
23
45
41
54
47
62
48
24
26
16
20
15
23
9
9
9
9
7
9
22
23
21
24
16
21
741
744
743
741
744
745
--
Dekker et al.
360
Table 3. (cont.)
Attitude
Basque regional-national superiority (a = .91)

16. Liking Basques more than Spaniards
17. Liking Basques the most
18. Feeling Basques are betterthan Spaniards
19. Feeling Basques are better
20. Feeling Basques are the best
21. Feeling the Basque Countryis the best
Spanish region
22. Feeling the Basque Countryis the best part
of Europe
23. Feeling the Basque Countryis the best part
of the world
24. Feeling Basque nationalityis the best
Basque regional nationalism (a = .90)
25. Feeling a Basque common origin
26. Feeling a member of one Basque family
27. Feeling of having Basque blood
28. WantingBasques not to mix with Spaniards
29. WantingBasques not to mix with others
30. Wantingan independentBasque state
31. WantingIparraldato unite with the Basque
Country
32. WantingNavarrato unite with the Basque
Country
33. Wishing non-Basquesto leave the Basque
Country
34. WantingBasques in Spain protected
35. WantingBasques in Franceprotected
36. Rejecting cooperationwith Spain
Basque regional-national alienation (a = .83)
38. Feeling uncomfortableamong Basques
39. Feeling not at home in the Basque Country
Basque national shame (a = .68)
40. Ashamed to be Basque
41. Ashamed of the Basque Country
Basque regional-national disgust (a = .94)
42. Disgusted with the Basques
43. Disgusted with the Basque Country
Basque regional-national hate (a = .89)
44. Hating the Basques
45. Hating the Basque Country
Response (%)
++
Sum
28
19
14
11
17
23
24
25
15
14
24
31
51
44
29
25
41
54
21
24
36
38
26
21
8
9
12
12
10
7
19
23
24
27
22
19
746
746
745
743
738
740
16
18
34
31
26
739
14
15
28
35
11
26
742
20
17
37
27
10
26
736
23
25
31
6
3
22
22
37
39
39
7
5
17
20
60
64
69
13
8
39
42
11
11
11
46
49
19
16
4
4
5
25
28
18
12
26
21
15
16
16
25
30
735
738
742
744
738
741
744
21
21
42
17
12
29
739
43
38
13
739
9
9
4
2
23
26
9
6
32
35
13
8
24
22
33
36
11
10
18
19
34
33
35
38
731
739
741
739
2
2
5
4
7
6
24
25
63
64
6
6
753
754
1
1
2
6
2
8
24
24
68
58
6
10
754
752
0
1
1
1
1
2
25
25
68
68
6
5
751
753
0
0
2
1
2
1
27
26
65
67
7
6
749
753
Note. a, Cronbach'sa; ++, strongly agreeing; +, agreeing; Sum, agreeing and strongly agreeing;-,
disagreeing;--, strongly disagreeing;?, don't know and/orno opinion.
361
to 25 items regardingSpain (the countryto which the Basque Countrybelongs).

Generally,there was a declining trendof supportas the attitudesrose in the hierarchy.However, contraryto our expectations, more respondentshad the attitude
of nationalliking than nationalfeeling. Moreover,two nationalismitems (having
Spanishblood, wanting Spaniardsin Franceprotected)also indicatedan increase
ratherthan a decrease in support.All individual subscales of positive national
attitudes were statistically reliable (Cronbach'sas varied from .81 to .93; see
Table 4).
Respondents who gave no answer or the "no opinion" response to five or
more items were excluded from the following analysis. The missing values of
otheritems were replacedby the neutralalternative.MSP showed thattwo nationalism subscale items were weak indicatorsof the national attitudesscale (items
22 and 24); three other nationalismsubscale items had negative covarianceswith
other items and thus were excluded from this analysis (items 21, 23, and 25). To
fully explore the methodologicalproblemsof the nationalattitudesscale, we computedthe Pearson'scorrelationcoefficients (includingall 25 items, n = 572). Some
of these correlationswere too high (feeling/liking, feeling/pride,liking/pride,and
preference/superiority).Most importantfor our analysis was that the attitudeof
nationalismindicated high correlationswith the attitudeslower in the hierarchy
(feeling, .63; liking, .58; pride, .65). The high levels of supportfor three of the
nationalisticitems (Spanish blood, common origin, part of one Spanish family)
formed the underlyingreason for this result.
In a new analysis with all items, excluding the three nationalisticitems with
negative covariances, we let the Mokken scale analysis programsearch for possible scales (insteadof carryingout a test on all 22 items in one scale). This search
producedtwo scales. One scale includedall 17 nationalfeeling, liking, pride,preference, and superiority items (H = .66). The remaining nationalistic items
appearedto form a second scale with a low scale coefficient (H = .38). Two of
the five nationalisticitems could not be included in this second scale because of
low individual scale coefficients (wishing Portugal united with Spain, wanting
Spaniardsin Franceto be protected).We conclude that the data simply confirmed
our cumulative hierarchy expectations with respect to national feeling, liking,
pride, preference,and superiority;nationalismwas the exception. The very high
correlationsamong national feeling, liking, and pride hardlyjustified a separate
treatmentof these attitudes.The highest stage in the hierarchy-nationalismwas a separate phenomenon. A possible explanation for these methodological
problemscould be thatthe connotationsof these items standtoo far from the political and social reality of a large group of Basque youngstersbecause their identity is predominantlyBasque.
We expected that individuals would combine moderate positive Basque
regional-nationalattitudeswith positive Spanish national attitudes.The findings
confirmedthis expectation;large proportionsof respondentswith Basque liking
and pride also have the attitudesof Spanish liking and pride. We also expected
362
Dekker et al.
Table 4. Spanish National AttitudesAmong Basque Youth in 1996
Attitude
Spanish national feeling (a = .93)

1. Feeling Spanish
2. Feeling Spain is my country
Spanish national liking (a = .83)
3. Liking to be Spanish
4. Liking the Spaniardsin general
5. Liking Spain
6. Liking the Castilian language
Spanish national pride (a = .81)
7. Proud to be Spanish
8. Proud of the Spaniards
9. Proud of Spain
Spanish national preference (a = .83)
10. PreferringSpaniards
11. PreferringSpanish citizenship
12. PreferringSpain
Spanish national superiority (a = .85)
13. Liking Spaniardsmost
14. Feeling Spaniardsare better
15. Feeling Spaniardsare the best
16. Feeling Spain is the best
17. Feeling Spanish nationalityis the best
Spanish nationalism (a = .84)
18. Feeling Spanish common origin
19. Feeling a member of one Spanish family
20. Feeling of having Spanish blood
21. WantingSpaniardsnot to mix with others
22. Wishing Portugalunited with Spain
23. Wantingnon-Spaniardsto leave Spain
24. WantingSpaniardsin Franceprotected
Spanish national alienation (a = .71)
26. Feeling uncomfortableamong Spaniards
27. Feeling not at home in Spain
Spanish national shame (a = .68)
28. Ashamed to be Spanish
29. Ashamed of Spain
Spanish national disgust (a = .86)
30. Disgusted with the Spaniards
31. Disgusted with Spain
Spanish national hate (a = .87)
32. Hating the Spaniards
33. Hating Spain
Response (%)
-
++
Sum
10
10
30
31
40
41
21
20
25
25
14
14
760
759
9
10
10
13
29
46
39
56
38
57
49
70
19
15
17
11
25
11
17
8
18
17
17
11
761
759
757
762
9
5
5
25
20
25
34
25
30
20
26
24
24
23
17
23
27
30
759
754
759
5
5
5
28
16
23
33
21
28
30
33
32
16
22
22
22
24
18
759
758
757
3
2
2
2
2
20
10
18
13
6
23
11
21
16
7
37
40
36
41
42
20
27
22
25
27
20
21
21
19
24
757
752
754
756
756
2
3
4
1
1
1
3
1
22
18
24
6
9
2
22
5
23
21
28
8
9
3
25
6
28
29
24
42
31
36
24
34
16
26
27
31
20
45
13
20
33
24
21
19
40
17
38
40
743
750
754
753
758
755
755
754
4
9
13
20
17
29
36
30
34
30
13
11
764
760
5
5
12
19
17
24
30
30
34
29
20
17
745
762
5
6
10
14
15
20
34
29
37
37
15
14
774
762
6
8
10
13
15
20
36
31
34
34
14
15
762
764
Note. a, Cronbach'sa; ++, strongly agreeing; +, agreeing; Sum, agreeing and strongly agreeing;-,
disagreeing;--, strongly disagreeing;?, don't know and/orno opinion.
363
that very positive or extremely positive regional-nationalattitudesexclude such

positive nationalattitudes.This expectationwas not confirmedbecause large proportions of respondentswith Basque preference, superiority,or nationalismalso
had Spanish preferenceand superiority.
We also expected that very positive or extremely positive regional-national
attitudeswould be combined with negative nationalattitudes.To test this expectation,we firsthad to examine whethernegative nationalattitudesexist when positive attitudes are missing (such that positive and negative attitudes form two
separate scales). We asked the Basque respondents to react to eight negative
Spanish items (Table 4). A Mokken scale analysis, including both the Spanish
positive and negative items, revealed that they form two scales. All covariances
of the negative items had negative values with the positive items. The negative
items together formed one cumulative scale (H = .82). The expectation that
very positive or extremely positive regional-nationalattitudesare combined with
negative national attitudes was confirmed: The numbers of respondents with
negative Spanish attitudes tended to increase as their positive Basque attitudes
increased. Quite high proportions of Basque youth combine positive Basque
attitudes with negative attitudes toward Spain: About half of the respondents
with increased attitudes of Basque nationalism had negative attitudes toward
Spain.
These findingsbroughtus to the notion thatBasque youth could be classified
into five groups with distinct combinations of Basque and Spanish attitudes.
Group 1 combines a very positive Basque identity (preference, superiority,and
regional nationalism)with negative attitudestowardSpain (30%). Group2 has a
highly positive Basque identity but no negative Spanish attitudes(31%). Group
3 has a combinationof very positive Basque and Spanish identity (19%). Group
4 has an exclusively positive Spanish identity (8%). Group 5 has no very positive Basque or Spanish identity (12%; n = 561). A desire for an independent
Basque state was clearly differentbetween Group 1 and Group2 (92% and 66%,
respectively;n = 471). The two nationalistpolitical partiesalso received the most
support from Group 1 (64% would vote for the Eusko Alkartasunaor Herri
Batasuna). The terroristmovement ETA and its goals and activities were also
supportedmore by Group 1 (18% and 2%, respectively).
The Basque study also aimed to test our nationalismexplanatoryhypotheses.
Using the method of multiple regression, we tested the explanatorypower of
several different independent variables per attitude (regional-nationalfeeling,
liking, pride, preference,superiority,and nationalism).The independentvariables
were regional-nationalemotions, beliefs (auto-cliches, history belief, and autostereotypes), behavior, values, attitudes toward Spain, attitudes toward foreign
people, and Basque national socialization (see Appendix C). Regional-national
emotion explained 13% of Basque nationalism. Six Basque auto-cliches also
contributedto the variance explanationin the attitudeof Basque nationalism:a
foreign security threat, increased number of foreigners, growing difference
364
Dekker et al.
between rich and poor, increase in political liberties, economic deterioration,and

diminishing internationalinfluence. These Basque cliches (together with the
number of negative cliches) explained 20% of the variance in Basque regional
nationalism.The history belief explained 10% of the variance in the attitudeof
Basque nationalism, auto-stereotypesa low 6%, and regional-nationalbehavior
also a low 6%. The four specific values relatingto the Basque Countryexplained
32% of the variancein Basque nationalism.The neutralSpanish attitudeand two
of the five positive Spanish attitudes(feeling, liking, and nationalism)explained
55% of the variance in Basque nationalism.Three of the four negative Spanish
attitudes(alienation, shame, and hate) explained 52% of the variance in Basque
nationalism.Attitudestowardforeign countriesexplained more than one-thirdof
the variance in Basque nationalism(37%). Yet all variance came from the sympathy score and ranking of Spain. Attitudes toward foreign peoples and minorities also explained more than one-third of the variance in Basque nationalism
(38%).Again, almost all of the varianceis explained by the sympathyscores and
preferencerankingfor Spaniards.The explained effect of the linguistic model of
the school was 17%. Reading a Basque nationalisticnewspaperalso had a positive effect. The same applied to readingabout Basque politics in newspapersand
watching the Basque television channels ETB-1 and ETB-2. Reading Spanish
newspapers and watching Spanish channels, e.g. Television Espaiiola channel 1
(TVE1), had negative regression coefficients. The percentageof explanationby
these mass media variableswas a high 33%.A high 41% of the variancein Basque
nationalism can be explained when taking into consideration the nationalistic
leaders' charisma.Having heard or seen nationalisticstatementsexplained 26%.
The fatherappearedto be the strongestsocializer.Together,the nationalisticstatements and their socializers equatedin the regression-having often heardor read
the statementsthat"Lapurdi,Baja NavarraandZuberoa,the partsof Francewhere
people speak Euskera, should unite with the Basque Countryin a separateand
independent state, Euskadi"and "Basques should not mix with other nationalities," and having heardnationalisticstatementsfrom one's father,best friend(s),
brothers/sisters,and politicians on radio-explained 26% of the variance in
Basque nationalism.
The relative effects of all the explanatoryvariables on Basque nationalism
were tested using a backwardmultipleregressionanalysis.All variableswe found
in the separateregressionanalyses were entered,and one by one the variablesthat
added least to the total explained variancewere removed.AttitudestowardSpain
(national liking, national shame, and nationalism),the value of maintenanceof
Basque culture, the auto-cliche of increase in political liberties, and the socialization variablesof readingnewspapersand having heardnationalisticstatements
from best friends remained in the regression. Positive and negative attitudes
toward Spain best explained the variance in Basque nationalism. The total
explained variance in the attitude of Basque nationalism was a high 64%
(Table 5).
Table 5. Results of the BackwardMultiple Regression Analysis With Basque Nationalism and
Independentvariables
Removed from regression analysis:

Value: Generosity
Attitudetoward outgroups:Sympathy score: Spain
Socialization:Leader:Charisma:Jayme Mayor Oreja (PP)
Socialization:Leader:Charisma:Xabier Arzalluz (PNV)
Attitudetoward Spain: National hate
Socialization:Leader:Charisma:Javier Madrazo(IU)
Beliefs: Auto-cliches: Number of negative auto-clich6s
Beliefs: Auto-clich6s: Increasing difference rich and poor
Socialization:Reading news about Basque politics
Behavior: Basque nationalbehavior
Socialization:WatchingTVE 1
Socialization:WatchingETB-1
Beliefs: Auto-clich6s: Suffers from foreign threatof security
Beliefs: Auto-stereotypes:Number of positive auto-stereotypes
Socialization:Having heard/seen:"Basques should not mix. ."
Value:Willingness to fight for your country
Socialization:Having heard nationalistic statementsfrom father
Value: Knowledge of Spanish politics
Value: Knowledge of Basque politics
Beliefs: Auto-stereotypes:Efficient
Value: Good manners
Attitudetoward Spain: National feeling
Value:Good health
Value: Enjoyable work
Socialization: Having heard:"Lapurdi... should unite with..."
Beliefs: Auto-cliches: Increasing number of foreigners
Beliefs: Auto-stereotypes:Number of negative auto-stereotypes
Basque nation
B1
B2
-.003
.007
.009
-.010
.024
-.015
.017
.019
-.017
.020
-.017
.024
-.021
.038
-.026
-.026
.036
-.028
.039
.054
.037
-.060
.036
.039
.052
.045
.049
-.003
.008
.010
-.009
.025
-.016
.016
.011
-.016
.016
-.017
.022
-.025
.035
-.026
-.025
.032
-.031
.036
.035
.036
-.065
.036
.033
.039
.039
.043
Table 5. (cont.)
Independentvariables
Basque nation
BI
B2
Attitude:Sympathy score: Spaniards

Socialization: Having heard nationalisticstatementsfrom brothers/sisters
Value: Independence
Socialization: Leader: Charisma:Carlos Rodriguez (HB)
Value: Freedom
Attitude toward outgroups:Preferenceranking:Spaniards
Beliefs: Basque national history belief
Socialization: School linguistic model
Emotion: Basque emotion
Attitude toward outgroups:Preferenceranking:Spain
Attitude toward outgroups:Preferenceranking:France
Attitude toward Spain: National alienation
Socialization: Heard nationalistic statementsfrom politicians on radio
Socialization:WatchingTV channel most
-.083
.044
-.040
-.045
.060
.096
.035
-.060
.035
-.148
.043
.134
-.066
.069
-.072
.043
-.051
-.058
.052
.101
.052
-.066
.064
-.082
.058
.135
-.071
.095
Kept in regression analysis:

Beliefs: Auto-clich6s: Increase of political liberties
Socialization: Having heard nationalisticstatementsfrom best friend(s)
Socialization: Reading newspapermost
Value: Maintenanceof Basque culture
Attitude toward Spain: Nationalism
Attitude toward Spain: National shame
Attitude toward Spain: National liking
.054
.082
.073
.115
.228
.136
-.184
.093
.097
.150
.153
.210
.273
-.328
Note. The order in which the variables are displayed is the order in which they were removed from the regre
coefficient when all independentvariableswere included in the analysis; B2 is the regressioncoefficient one st
R2 is the variance, explained by the remainingvariables at each moment in the analysis.
367
Conclusion and Perspectives

In each of the precedingstudies we were able to improveaspects of our measurement instrument,such as the list of items measuringnational attitudes (face
validity, internalvalidity, externalvalidity). The expectationthat we could empirically distinguish one neutraland five positive national attitudeson the basis of
differences in kind and strengthof affection was confirmedby the data from the
Dutch and Slovak respondents,and also by the data from the Basque respondents
regarding Basque regional-national attitudes (but not their national attitudes
toward Spain). The Dutch and Slovak data also confirmed that the neutral and
positive national attitudesform a cumulative hierarchyof positive national attitudes. This expectation was also established in the case of the Basque attitudes
among Basque youth (but not in the case of their attitudestoward Spain). The
Basque data also revealed that the expectation of negative national attitudes
forminga separatecumulativescale and thatof positive and negative nationalattitudes forming two separatescales were correct.The Basque data also confirmed
that moderate positive regional-nationalattitudes are combined with positive
nationalattitudes.No confirmationwas found for the expectationthat very positive and extremelypositive regional-nationalattitudesare not combinedwith positive nationalattitudes,because considerableproportionsof respondentswith the
attitudesof Basque preference,superiority,and nationalismalso had Spanishpreference, superiority,and nationalism.On the other hand, the expectationthat very
positive and extremely positive regional-nationalattitudes are combined with
negative national attitudeswas confirmedby the Basque data.
Some of the explanatoryhypotheses could not be rejected.The Slovak data
analysis indicatedthatnationalemotion, nationalauto-stereotypes,attitudetoward
outgroups,and attitudetowardnationalisticpolitical leaders were the main determinants.The Basque data analysis confirmedthat the attitudetoward Spain best
explained the variance in Basque regional nationalism. One auto-cliche, one
regional-nationalvalue, and two nationalsocializationvariablesalso remainedin
the regression.In general, the cognitive explanatoryvariables-beliefs about the
country and people-had only highly limited explanatorypower. The conative
variable (Basque nationalbehavior) also was not highly successful in explaining
individual differences in Basque nationalism.It was a surprisethat emotion was
not a strong predictor,and the reason may be that we included only one singleitem emotion question in these studies.
Ourresearchhad severallimitationsand shortcomings.The studiesconcerned
no more than two countriesand one autonomouscommunityin Europe.Replication in more Europeancountriesand in countriesin other partsof the world is an
absolute necessity. The composition of these three samples was different.Future
researchshould use similar populationsand samples. All Dutch and Basque participants,and partof the Slovak sample, were young people. Futureresearchusing
adultrespondentsis needed to increaseexternalvalidity.The three measurements
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Dekker et al.
were different as well, and future research should use the same measurements.
The data did not allow for the testing of expected relationships between the
national attitudesand internationalattitudes.The explanatoryanalyses included
only possible direct effects of the independentvariables. Future studies should
include both direct and indirecteffects.
Few other related empirical studies were published since the start of our
project in 1992. Our research instrumentswere used in studies in Hungaryand
the United States (Kelemen, 1998; Saviano & Meinhold, 1999). In eight studies,
new methodologies and/or instruments were developed (Blank, Schnieder, &
Wittenberg,1999; Citrin, Haas, Muste, & Reingold, 1994; Davis, 1999; Herranz
de Rafael, 1998; Ka-Ying Wong & Tung-WenSun, 1998; Rossteutscher, 1997;
Seiler, Maes, & Schmitt, 1999; Smith & Jarkko, 1998). Three studies built on
Kostermanand Feshbach's 1989 study (Karasawa,1994; Poppe, 1998; Schatz &
Lavine, 1999; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999).
There are importantdifferencesand similaritiesbetween our researchand the
Schatz et al. (1999) study, which is the most recently published investigation.
Instead of three affections (constructivepatriotism,blind patriotism,and nationalism), we distinguish six national attitudes(nationalfeeling, liking, pride, preference, superiority,and nationalism).However, the various attachmentsappeared
to correspondwith some of our attitudes("constructivepatriotism"with national
feeling, liking, and pride; "blindpatriotism"with nationalpreference;"nationalism" with national superiorityand nationalism). Schatz et al. stressed orthogonality between constructive and blind patriotism and between constructive
patriotismand nationalismon the one hand, and causality between blind patriotism and nationalismon the other, whereas we hypothesized and found empirical
evidence for cumulativity.Finally, Schatz et al. wished to explain the origins of
the various attachmentsto one's country,whereas we took the first step towarda
theory explaining variances in national attitudes.There are, however, important
similaritiesbetween the two studies. Both studies aimed to develop reliable and
valid cross-national and cross-generationalmeasures of attachments to one's
country. Both also distinguished more national attitudes than the simple
dichotomy of nationalismversus non-nationalism(or nationalismversus patriotism). Both studies saw a clear boundaryline between national attitudeswithout
intergroupcomparisons, and attitudes that include these comparisons and even
intergroupdiscrimination.
In general, we see a growing congruence in research designs, despite the
many differences. A new, common, cross-national, and longitudinal empirical
researchproject aimed at measuringand explaining the notion of nationalismis
worth a try.
APPENDIX A: National Attitudes Measure in the Dutch Study
National feeling: "I feel I am Dutch," "I feel that the Netherlands is my
country."
369
National liking: "I enjoy being Dutch,""In general, I like the Dutch,""I like
the Netherlands,""I like the Dutch language."
National pride: "I am proud to be Dutch," "I am proud of what the Dutch
people have done," "The Netherlandscan be proudof what it represents."
National preference: "I preferbeing a Dutch citizen more than any other citizenship in the world,""Ingeneral,I preferto have Dutch people for my personal
contacts moreso than people from other countries," "In general, I like Dutch
people moreso than people from other countries,""I preferto live in the Netherlands moreso than in any other country."
National superiority:"The Dutch nationalityis the best nationalityto have,"
"In general, Dutch people are betterthan other nationalities,""In general, Dutch
people are the best people to have for my personal contacts,""The Netherlands
is the best country in which to live."
Nationalism: "I feel I share a common origin with other Dutch people," "I
feel I am a member of one Dutch family," "I feel I have Dutch blood," "All the
Dutch should live in the Netherlands,""The non-Dutchliving in the Netherlands
should leave the Netherlands,""The Dutch should not mix with other nationalities," "Flanders,thatpartof Belgium where people speakDutch, shouldunite with
the Netherlands,""The Dutch living in Belgium should have the Netherlands'
protection," "Internationalcooperation with other countries overburdens the
Netherlandsand, therefore,should be stopped."
National alienation: "In general, I do not feel comfortable being among
Dutch people," "I do not feel at home in the Netherlands."
National shame: "I am ashamed to be Dutch," "I am ashamed of what
the Dutch people have done," "The Netherlandsshould be ashamed of what it
represents."
National disgust:"Ingeneral,I am disgustedwith the Dutch,""Iam disgusted
with the Netherlands."
National hate: "In general, I hate the Dutch," "I hate the Netherlands."
APPENDIX B: Independent Variables in the Slovak Study

Slovak national emotionswere measuredby askingrespondentswhetherthey
felt very emotional with respect to Slovakia when they listen to the national
anthem, when they see the national flag, and/or when Slovaks are victorious in
sports events. Respondents were considered to have a strong positive national
emotion if they agreed with all three emotions.
National auto-cliches and auto-stereotypes were measured by asking respondents to indicate which of the displayed characteristicswere applicable to
Slovakia (and/orHungary,the Czech Republic, Russia, and Germany)and which
of the displayed attributeswere applicable to "most" Slovaks (and/or "most"
Hungarians,Czechs, Russians, Romanies, and Austrians). We included in the
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Dekker et al.
analysis an equal numberof positive and negative cliches and stereotypes:four

positive and five negative auto-cliches (democratization, increasing political
freedom, increasing comfort, and technologically highly developed; worsening
social security, less security on the street, increasing criminality,wants to rule
other countries, and is eager for war) and seven positive and six negative autostereotypes (tolerant, sense of humor, friendly, reliable, helpful, intelligent, and
honest;dominant,arrogant,aggressive,cruel, sly, and egoistic). Respondentswere
considered to have a positive set of cliches about Slovakia if they indicated at
least three positive cliches and not more than one negative cliche, and a positive
set of stereotypesabout Slovaks if they indicatedat least five positive stereotypes
and not more than one negative stereotype.The variable "nationalbelief' is the
sum of all positive and negative auto-cliches and auto-stereotypes.
National behaviors were measuredby asking respondentswhetherthey had
attendedceremonies in commemorationof the nationaldead, ceremonies in commemorationof national historic events, and rituals aroundthe national flag, and
whether they sing national songs. Respondents were considered to have a high
level of nationalbehavior if they answeredall four questions positively.
The negative attitudetowardoutgroupswas measuredby asking respondents
to react to five statements about Hungary,Hungarians,and Romanies: "I like
Hungary,""I like most of the Hungarianswho live in Slovakia," "I would have
no problems with Hungariansas my neighbors,""I like most of the Romanies,"
and "I would have no problems with Romanies as my neighbors."The responses
did not form a reliable scale (Cronbach'sa, .60). Respondentswere considered
to have a negative attitudetowardoutgroupsif they disagreedwith all five items.
A concern about one's future was measuredby agree/disagreeresponses to
six statementsaboutexpectationsregardingthe futureof the Slovak economy and
employment situation, the respondent's economic future, the respondent's
family's financial situation,and the respondent'spersonal safety and educational
opportunities.The responses did not form a reliable scale (Cronbach'sa, .64).
Respondentswere consideredto worry aboutthe futureif they agreedwith all six
statements.
Sense of positive self-identitywas measuredby reactions to five statements:
"I have knowledge about the importantthings in life," "People like me do not
have any say about what parentsdo," "I can help to bring about a change for the
better,""I have opinions about the main problemsin life," and "I can get further
ahead in life by virtue of my own efforts." The items formed a reliable scale
(Cronbach's a, .72). Rrespondents were considered to have a low sense of
positive identity if they disagreedwith the four positive items and agreedwith the
one negative item.
The following national socialization variables were used: frequency of
readingpolitical informationin newspapers,watchingpolitical news programson
television, talking aboutor discussing Slovakia/Slovakswith others,talkingabout
or discussing minoritiesand foreign countriesand peoples with others,frequency
371
of direct contact with minorities in Slovakia (talking with Hungariansand with

Romanies living in Slovakia), positive attitude toward nationalistic political
leaders, having often heard national(istic) statements, and having often heard
national(istic) statementsfrom political leaders. Positive attitudetoward nationalistic political leaders was measured by asking respondents to evaluate the
leadersof the Slovak NationalistParty,HZDS, and the Hungarianparties.Respondents were considered to have a positive attitudetoward nationalisticleaders if
they had a positive evaluation of the first two leaders and a negative evaluation
of the other two. The variable "having often heard nationalisticstatements"was
measuredby asking the frequency of having heard the statements"the Slovaks
form one nation,""the Slovaks are all brothersand sisters,""theSlovaks have the
same ancestors,""theminoritiesin Slovakia must leave Slovakia,"and "the same
'mother'gave birth to the Slovaks" (Cronbach'sa, .72). Respondentswere considered to have often heard nationalistic statementsif they answered "often"to
all five questions. They were also asked the sources of these statements;answers
were categorized into "family,""mass media," and "politicalleaders."
APPENDIX C: Independent Variables in the Basque Study

Basque regional-national emotion was measured by asking respondents
whetherthey get tears in their eyes while seeing the Basque flag being hoisted at
a sports ceremony.
Basque auto-cliches were measuredby asking respondentswhich of the six
positive and 15 negative displayed characteristicswere applicableto the Basque
Country (increase of political liberties, democratizing, increase of comfort,
increase of job opportunities,increase of opportunitiesto make money, and technologically highly developed; increase of criminality,minority groups threaten
the majority'sinterest,decrease of safety on the streets, domestic politics gets in
disorder, economic deterioration,eager for war, losing internationalprestige,
increasingnumberof foreigners,growing difference between rich and poor, suffering from a foreign threatof security,diminishinginternationalinfluence,worsening of social security,worsening of educationopportunities,wants to rule other
countries, and worsening of health care). Two other variables were added: the
numbersof markedpositive and negative characteristics.
The Basque history belief was measuredby asking respondentsto indicate
what they thought about the Basque Country'sperformancein the past on a 7point scale rangingfrom extremely positive to extremely negative.
Basque auto-stereotypeswere measuredby asking respondentswhich of the
12 positive and 12 negative characteristicsthat were presentedwere applicableto
Basques (industrious,sociable, sympathetic,sense of humor,intelligent, reliable,
honest, easy to interactwith, attentive,tolerant,efficient, and diligent; stubborn,
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Dekker et al.
skillful, aggressive, suspicious, dominant, arrogant,egoistic, susceptible, cruel,

sly, thinking hierarchically,and ambiguous). Again two other variables were
added:the numbersof markedpositive and negative stereotypes.
Regional-national behavior was measured by asking respondents whether
they had always, often, or never orally defended the Basque Countryor its people
against criticism from non-Basques.
To investigate specific values relating to the Basque Country,we asked the
respondentsto indicate the five most importantthings in life out of a list of 19
values and the five most importantthings that parentsshould teach their children
out of a list of 16 values. The lists included four Basque values: maintenanceof
Basque culture, Basque independence,knowledge of Basque politics, and willingness to fight for "your"country.
The attitudes towardforeign countries (all EU member states) were measured by asking respondentsto give a sympathy score ranging from 0 to 100 for
each of the countries, and to rank all the countries according to desirability of
living in them. The attitudes toward foreign peoples (the peoples of all EU
memberstates) andminoritiesin Spain (i.e., Catalans,Andalusians,and Galicians)
were measuredby a sympathyscore and a rankingin preferencefor having them
as neighbors.
The Basque regional-nationalsocialization variables included having experienced regional-national rituals (participation in the annual Aberri Eguna),
knowing and singing songs aboutthe Basque Country,speakingEuskeraat school,
reading a Basque nationalistic newspaper (Egin, Deia, or Egunkaria), reading
about Basque politics in newspaper, watching the Basque television channels
ETB-1 and ETB-2, watching television news about Basque politics, considering
leaders of nationalisticparties charismatic,talking frequently about the Basque
Countryand Basques (with grandparents,father,mother,brothers/sisters,teachers, best friend, and/or the priest), and having often heard or seen nationalistic
statements. Whether nationalistic political leaders were considered charismatic
was measuredby asking respondentswhetherthe leaders of the three nationalistic parties had a good characterand a vigor to convince. The variable "having
often heard nationalistic statements"was measured by asking the frequency of
having heard the statements "We, the Basques, should not mix with the rest of
the Spaniards,""We, the Basques, should not mix with other nationalities,"
"Navarrashould unite with the Basque Country in a separate and independent
state, Euskadi,""Lapurdi,Baja Navarraand Zuberoa,the parts of France where
people speak Euskera, should unite with the Basque Countryin a separateand
independentstate, Euskadi,""Cooperationwith other regions of Spain overburdens the Basque Country,and should thereforebe stopped," and "International
cooperation with other countries overburdensthe Basque Country,and should
thereforebe stopped."The respondentswere also asked the sources of these statements; they were allowed to mark as many socializers as they wanted. The list
included 17 socializers (e.g., grandparents,father, mother, television news,
373
newspaper, poster, magazine, teacher, textbook, best friend, and politician on

television).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Renze Portengen and Robert Straver for their assistance in collecting and analyzingthe datain the Netherlandsand Slovakia, respectively;Juan
Andres Munoz Arau (Universidadde la Rioja in Logroio) for his assistance in
data collection in the Basque Country;and Frits Meijerink (Leiden University)
for his assistancein the data analyses. For their comments on earlierdraftsof this
contribution,we thank Rudy Andeweg (Leiden University), Louk Hagendoor
(Utrecht University), Russell Farnen (University of Connecticut), Koen Koch
(Leiden University), Hans Oversloot (Leiden University), Joop van Holsteyn
(Leiden University), Cas Mudde (Leiden University), Gy6rgy Csepeli (E6tvos
Lorand University, Budapest), Sergey VladimirovitchTumanov (Moscow State
University), Dimitris Charalambis(National Centreof Social Research,Athens),
the editors, and two anonymous reviewers. Portions of this research were presented at the 1995, 1997, and 1999 annualconferencesof the InternationalSociety
of Political Psychology, in Washington,D.C., Krak6w,and Amsterdam,respectively. We thankHsuan Chou (Leiden University) for her general editing. Correspondence concerningthis article should be sent to Henk Dekker, Departmentof
Political Science, Leiden University, P.O. Box 9555, 2300 RB Leiden, Netherlands. E-mail: dekkerh@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
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Nationalism and Its Explanations

Author(s): Henk Dekker, Darina Malov, Sander Hoogendoorn

Political Psychology, Vol.24, No. 2, 2003