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Articles
Doing
Politics
Courts
Justice?
in Latin
Studying
Judicial
America
01 7/S105375927080813899
Americanjudiciaries,
on courtsin theregion
most research
beganwell afterthe "thirdwave" had passed through
most LatinAmericancountries.5Indeed,until the first
majorpost-authoritarian
volumeon courtsinLatinAmer
icandemocracies
was publishedin 1993,6most compar
on politicalinstitutions
in
ativepoliticalscienceresearch
the regionremainedfocusedon presidents,
partiesand
assemblies.
A first
setofworkson LatinAmericancourtsfocuses
primarily
on thejudicialreform
efforts
of thelate1980s
and 1990s,and on issuesof transitional
This lit
justice.
erature
has emphasizedthechallenges
of reform
(inpar
ticular,of simultaneously
addressingtheproblemsof
judicialindependence,
and accountabil
access,efficiency
ity),7as well as thedegreetowhich reformled to the
inways that
improvement
of courts'performance
might
A secondstrainin the
contributeto economicgrowth.8
literature
examinestheways inwhich the region's
new
to
authoritar
democraciesattempted addressremaining
ianenclavesand providetransitional
justice.9
The focusof theliterature
haswidenedmore recently
toencompasstwobroaderthemes:
courts'contribution
to
social justiceand judicialpolitics.Researchon thefirst
on theroleof courtsinadmittedly
themefocuses
unequal
LatinAmericansocietiesand, especially,
how theycan
contributeto bridginggaps in theapplicationof law,
includingthebreachbetweenformallegality
and actual
on thesecondthemeexaminesthe
practice.10
Scholarship
of courtsaspoliticalinstitutions,
performance
atboth the
level(deciding
who getswhat,when,and
micro-political
on disputesbetween
macro level(ruling
how),aswell as the
branches
of government,
and actingas a checkand a bal
anceon both theexecutive
and legislative
branches).
The focusof thisartide is thisfourthresearch
theme:
judicialpoliticsinthecontemporary
of
period.This strain
theliterature
and foremost
analyzescourtsfirst
fromthe
Decmber
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2008
1Vol.
6/No.
741
Articles
in politics:itexamines
perspective
of theirinvolvement
theinstitutional
structures
thatunderpinand shapethat
involvement;
explores
how judgestakedecisionson polit
ical issues;and examineshow courtsdistribute
political
powerand affectpolicyoutcomes.The fieldcomprises
varioussub-themes,
suchas thejudicialization
ofpolitics,
judicial independence,
and judicialpower,and scholars
utilizemyriadapproachesto examineand explainvaria
tioninthesephenomena,ranging
fromlegalscholars'
focus
on factorssuch as the legalprocess,doctrine,and juris
prudencetomore typically
politicalscienceemphasessuch
as the impactof judicialinstitutional
structure
and cul
turalnorms,and thestrategic
motivations
and attitudinal
forjudges'decision-making.
Scholarsalsouse a variety
of
qualitative,
and game theoretic
quantitative,
methods to
and tocarry
outvarious
analyzedataand drawinferences,
typesof comparativeinquiry.
Perhapsdue to thisdiversity,
theresearch
programana
lyzingjudicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica remainslargely
uncoordinated.
Insofaras thequestionsbeingaskedvary
among scholars,thislackof coordinationisunfortunate
but understandable.
Yet a suboptimalamountof cross
occursamong scholarsaskingsimilarques
fertilization
tionsbut studying
different
or usingdifferent
countries,
approachesor analytic
methods.Further,littlecompara
tive
work isconducted-eithercross-nationally,
orwithin
countrycases (acrossprovinces,time,areasof law,policy
arenas,or levelsof thejudiciary,
forexample).
This articleexaminesthe richbreadthof research
on
judicialpoliticsinLatinAmericawith thegoalofcontrib
uting to thecoherentand progressive
accumulationof
knowledgein thisfield.
The remainder
of thearticlepro
ceeds in fivesections,inwhichwe reviewthemain ques
tionsscholarshaveposed regarding
courtsand politicsin
LatinAmerica; thenexaminethe literature's
main find
We nexthighlight
ingsand theoretical
debates.
keycon
ceptualdebates,analyzetheresearch
methodsscholars
have
somedirectionsin
employed,andwe closeby suggesting
which thestudyof judicialpoliticsinLatinAmericamight
proceed.
in the
Figure 1
Type of publication
Articles
45% _
Chapters
32%
Unpublished
dissertations
11%
742
12%
and
judicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica involvesdifficult
controversial
decisions.Undoubtedlywe have failedto
will considergermaneto
includesomeworks thatothers
we
With thesecaveatsinmind, however,
judicialpolitics.
are reasonably
confidentthatthe90 pieces considered
hereare representative
stateof the
of thecontemporary
debateon judicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica.
We beginour inquiryby offering
a fewparameters.
in terms
of thisliterature
Figures1-3 showthedistribution
of type
ofpublication,
scope,and countries
underanalysis.
These figures
containsome signalsthatthestudyof
amaturingfield.
judicialpoliticsinLatinAmericaremains
First,thebulkof thework comprisesshortpieces (book
books.The
chaptersand articles)ratherthanfull-length
fewbooks thatfocusexclusively
on thetopicaremore or
lessequallydividedbetweencompilations
of disparately
themedsinglecountrychapters,
andmore in-depthcase
studies(often
springing
from
doctoraldissertations).13
Fur
demonstrate
thatscholars
of judicialpol
ther,thefigures
iticsinLatinAmericatendtofocuson one countryrather
thanengagingin explicitly
cross-national
inquiry.
With
respecttocountries
studied,
muchof theresearch
analyzes
fourof the21 countriesin theregion(Argentina,
Brazil,
Books
literature on
Perspectives on Politics
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More thanone
country
31%
Figure 3
Countries studied
Mexico
18%
Braid
_1 6 to~~~~~~6
Argentina
31%
J_
Uruguay
1%
s
_
Bolivia_
1%
11
i l lrChile
15%
Colombia
Guatemala
2%
El Salvador
2%
/
Peru
2%
Costa Rica
4%
1
5%
Venezuela
3%
Chile, andMexico);mostLatinAmericanjudiciaries
have
been examinedinonlyone or twochapter-length
studies
or havenot been studiedat all. Finally,althoughit isnot
shownin thesefigures,
themajorityof theworkon judi
cial politicsinLatinAmerica focusespredominantly
on
highcourts(supreme
courtsor constitutional
courts);full
nationalor federal
come ina distantsecond
courtsystems
place,onlyscantattentionispaid to statecourtsystems,
and practically
nowork examinesintra-judicial
relations
or dynamics.
Key Lines of Inquiry in theSurveyedLiterature
We place the literature
surveyedin thisarticlein three
one thatfocuses
on judiciaries'
categories:
interactions
with
otherbranches
ofgovernment;
a secondthatexaminesthe
affect
degreetowhich judiciaries
publicpolicyoutcomes;
one thatprovides
anda final
ormainlydescrip
classificatory
tiveanalysesof courtsand legalinstitutions.
The third
andmost-researched
questionregards
whether
andwhen courtschecktheelectedbranches.
While some
work in thisveinanalyzesjudicialassertiveness
inauthor
itarian
settings,
most research
examinesthequestionunder
democraticrule.16
The bulk of thisliterature
is steeped
in a normativesuppositionthatcheckson theelected
branches-and especially on the region'spowerful
executives-area positiveoccurrence.
While someof this
researchis largelydescriptive,seeking to understand
whetherand how courtsactuallyact tocheckexecutives,
most studiesadopt an explanatoryframework.'7
Some
scholarsquery thepoliticalconditionsunderwhich jus
ticesor courtsruleagainstthegovernment.'8
Othersques
tion theextenttowhich publicor societalsupporthas
permitted
courtsto challengeexecutives
and implement
or thedegreetowhich soci
judicialpolicypreferences,'9
etaldemandscan activatecourtsand influence
thedirec
tionof judicialdecision-making.20
Others investigate
the
importance
of institutional
factors:
Domingo, forexam
ple, askswhetherinstitutional
changesincreasetheabil
ityof courts to act independently
of the executive;21
Brinksexaminesthedegreetowhich judicialreform
affects
and decisionalindependence;22
judges'preferences
and
severalothersexplorehow institutional
and constitu
tionaldesignaffectjudicialindependence
and thescope
of judicialdecisions.23
Most of theseinquiriesconcerncountries-such as
ArgentinaandMexico-featuringhyper-presidential
sys
temsand a tradition
of judicialdependence.In suchset
tings,theexpectationis thatcourts
will be neither
willing
norable tochallengetheelectedbranches,
and theintrigu
ingquestionbecomestheparticular
of con
configuration
ditionsunderwhich theywill dare to do so.A smaller
groupof scholars-almostentirely
students
of theChil
ean judiciary-reverses
thequery,questioning
why seem
courtsfail to enforcecheckson the
inglyindependent
executive
and instead
deferto thegovernment.24
Finally,a
smallsubsetofwork addresses
bothquestions.Huneeus,
forexample,seekstoexplaintheevolution
ofChile's judi
intoa (selectively)
ciaryfroma deferential
lessquiescent
power,and Staton askswhyMexican courtsauthorita
at somepoints,but seemto
tively
resolve
politicalconflict
avoidcontroversial
issuesat others.25
Courtsaspolicy-makers.
The secondmain lineof inquiry
on publicpolicy.A recentInter
analyzescourts'effects
Interaction
between
and elected
thejudicial
branches.Three American
Bankpublication
summarizes
four
Development
questionsunderliemuch of the researchon the inter key rolesLatinAmericanjudiciaries
play in thepolicy
actionbetweenthejudicialand electedbranchesinLatin makingprocess(vetoplayer,policyplayer,impartialref
America.First,
whydo executives
delegatepowertocourts, eree,and societalrepresentative)
and positsthatlevelsof
andwhat sortof formalpower isdelegated?"4
A second judicialindependence
areamajor determinant
of courts'
of thejudicialization ability"to improvethestability,
question,usuallycouched in terms
or
public-regardingness,
of politics,iswhethercourtsarebeingincreasingly
drawn adaptability
ofpolicychoices."26
While thisreport
glosses
intopoliticaldebates,and ifso, inwhat patternsthispro
over thepotentialroleof courtsas reluctant
vetopoints
cessoccurs.15
activated
byotherpoliticalactors,and puts lessemphasis
December
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2008
1Vol. 6/No. 4
743
Articles
features
andtheir
effects.38
744
relatively
efficient
highcourtthatcanonlybe directly
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through
hugely
momentous
legaljudgments.54
As they
attemptto "grow"theirinstitutional
power,judgesmay
seekoutmerelysymbolic
victoriesincaseswith little
prac
ticalrepercussion.55
While mostwould agreethatjudicialpowerand judi
cial independence
are inextricably
linked,thereis signif
icantdebatewith regardto thenatureof therelationship.
In Brazil forexample,thegradualconstruction
of judi
cial independencein an uncertainand extremely
chal
lenginginstitutional
environment
has been carriedout
piece-mealthroughelaboratekabuki-style
shadowbox
ingbetweentheexecutive
branchand thejudiciary.
The
highcourtinparticular
has used itspower to securefor
an "institutional
environment
itself
where itcan remain
freefromexternal
politicalinterference,"
via "tokendeci
sionsand declarations
by theCourt and itsjustices...
[which]functionas a formof pressurebargainingto
56Ithas been suggested,
preserve
incontrast,
autonomy."
thattheChilean judiciary
had to engagein self-restraint
(i.e.,limititsownpower)inorderto retainindependence:
the refusalof courts to actuallyexercisetheirpowersof judicial
controlof theconstitution. .. represented
thecontinuationof a
longheld strategicstanceaimed atmaintaining theveryauton
omy and political independencethathas historicallyallowed
themtoplay a crucialrolein thepromotionandmaintenanceof
the legalitythathas characterizedthecountry.57
raisesthe
Finally,increasing
judicialpower inevitably
issueof judicialaccountability,
or theage-oldquestionof
who guardstheguardians.
Given thecounter-majoritarian
of judicialreview,
character
powerful
courts
may at some
point issuedecisionsthatangera significant
portionof
theelectorate.In theColombian case, scholars
wonder
about thepotentialforbacklashagainstthesurprisingly
ConstitutionalCourt.58Similarquestions
progressive
regarding
judicialaccountability
are addressedinGlop
pen et al.:59How unaccountablearecourts,and atwhat
pointdoes theirlackofaccountability
becomea concern
or well before
onlywhen theybecome independent,60
then?61
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2008
IVol. 6/No. 4
745
Articles
A verydifferent
factorhas been used in theMexican
countriesthathavebeen thefocusof somestudycan be
divided intodiscretegroupsaccordingto thefrequency case toexplaincourts'
willingness
and abilitytochallenge
theactionsand policiesof theelectedbranches:theexis
and degreetowhich theircomponentcourtsassertpower
tenceof "basicsocialsupportstructures."70
in thepoliticalrealm.In the firstgroup,composedof
The general
Mexico,
Brazil,Colombia,Costa Rica, and increasingly,
argument,
which has also been raisedin theArgentine
power,thoughtheyplaysignif case,71is thatcourtsmay feelempoweredto challenge
courtsassertconsiderable
In a
rolesinnationalpolicydeliberations.
icantly
different
electedleadersinhigh-stakes
cases(even
when facing
oppo
ArgentinaandChile, courts sitionfroma hostileexecutive
branch)ifsufficient
societal
secondgroup,
which includes
formal
power,but fordiffer supportexistsfora challenging
decision.Statonalsohigh
theoretically
havesignificant
or unabletoassertitconsistently. lightstheimportance
of societalsupportin theMexican
ent reasonsarereluctant
exer
case,and itsrelevanceto judgesseekingtobuild institu
nationsinwhichcourtsrarely
A third
groupincludes
tionallegitimacy.72
He suggeststhatpublicsupportisan
inpoliticsisspas
cisepowerandwhere theirinvolvement
important
factor
in
justices'strategic
calculationsabout
of
import
and
generally
less
recurrent
modic,unpredictable,
on
will
topolicy(ifnot political)outcomes,suchasGuatemala, thecases which they challengetheelectedbranches
(greater
potentialsupportfora challengingdecision is
Peru,andVenezuela.
equatedwith a decreasedlikelihood
of subsequentattack
The main factorsused to explain thewillingnessof
poweraretheoverallpolit
by theelectedbranches).
courtstochallenge
government
withincourts.
Furtherexamination
of thesehypotheses
and thecon
and institutional
factors
icalenvironment,
of theArgentine ditionsunderwhichcourtsexercise
severalscholars
With regardto thefirst,
powerseemsmerited.
as a
In so doing, itmightbe salutarytomove towardtesting
highcourtview theuncertainpoliticalenvironment
Some scholars
causeof strategic
behavior
argue hypothesesthathave been advanced to explainjudicial
by judges.63
are lesslikelyto behaviorinotherpartsof theworld.For instance,
eachof
thatjudgesactingundersuchuncertainty
controlof
as thepresident's
the three
vote againstthegovernment
main approachesto thisquestion in theU.S.
literature-the
attitudinal
model, strategic
accounts,and
Congress increases.'Helmke points toboth theuncer
tainpoliticalenvironment
new institutional
approaches-hasexplanatory
potential
and institutional
weaknesssug
in theregion.
approachtheendof
While theattitudinal
model has caughton
executives
gestingthatas incumbent
ofLatinAmericancourts,thereare
secu
slowlyamongscholars
highcourtjudges"wholackinstitutional
theirterms,
in thatdirection:
to increasetheirantigovern some efforts
Helmke and Sanders,for
ritybeginfacingincentives
haveexaminedthe"goals"of judges,developing
ment rulingsto distancethemselves
froma weakening instance,
the
case, a game-theoretic
model thatlinksjudicialbehavior(includ
Argentine
Chavez,alsoaddressing
government."65
of
con
the
ing
challenging
electedleaders)to thosegoals,and iden
the
historical
political
emphasizes importance
of judges:loyalists,
four"idealtypes"
may
policyseekers,
configurations
text,notinghow similarinstitutional
tifying
Sincewe cannotassume
institutionalists,
and careerists.73
of different
levelsof checksand
lead to theemergence
arenot
on thedispersalof powerand com
thatLatinAmericanjudgesand justices'ideologies
balances"depending
importantto theirdecisionmaking, further
analysisof
petitivepolitics."66
on dem
where thereis
Incontrast
to the
Argentine
case,most research
judicialattitudes,especiallyin countries
seemswarranted.
stability,
ocraticChile assignslesscausalweight to thepolitical greaterinstitutional
accountsthatana
domi
Moreover,as notedabove,strategic
environment,
perhapsbecause thepost-transition
coalitionhasmeant
Concertacidn
lyzetheongoinggame among thebranchesof govern
nanceof thecenter-left
new and few,but showpromise,as in
The keypuzzle formost ment are relatively
littlevariationon thatvariable.
independent Iaryczower's
depictionof "strategiccompliance"and
studying
Chile iswhy relatively
researchers
of "strategic
defection"inArgenti
Most scholarsoffer Helmke'sdescription
courtsexercisepower so selectively.
ratherthanstrate na.74 In fact,many politicalsettingsin LatinAmerica
and culturalexplanations,
institutional
thatis thoughtto lead tostrategic
Hilbink, forexample, exhibittheuncertainty
gic accounts,of judicialpolitics.67
in"constitut judicialbehavior,
roleof judicialidentity
forinstance,
thatthisapproach
suggesting
positstheimportant
to judicialdecision-making
and theexertionof judicial
[ing]thegoals thatjudgeshave,ratherthansimplycon
goals," and
powermight have significant
power in the
strainingthe achievementof pre-existing
explanatory
isconstantly
due to
region.
reinforced
explainshow thatidentity
veinof theU.S. literature
rulesand
theChilean judiciary's
Finally,thenew institutional
particularinstitutional
takesintoaccounttheeffect
ofvariablesinter
increasingly
This new institutional
structure.68
approachhas counter
nal to judicialinstitutions,
has empha
rangingfromlegalcultureto
parts inMexico and Brazil,where research
viewofcourts
The new institutional
affect caseload
of judicial institutions
management.
sized how characteristics
to judiciariesinLatinAmerica,
constrain
pertinent
choicesituations,
standard
politicaland judicial seemsextremely
and limit(orempower)politicalactors' where factorssuch as a lifetimejudicialcareerand the
actors'strategies,
against
ability
tobring
challenges
government.69
746
formalism
of thelegalsystem
notonlyconstrain
judges'
Perspectives on Politics
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of theirnormative
optionsbutmay also be constitutive
public policy.Miller, for
in cases regarding
preferences
of
example,suggeststhattheway inwhich a "sociology
developsand evolvesina politycan affect
judicialreview"
courts'abilitytoconstraintheexecutive.75
Of course,we are not suggestingthattheU.S. and
LatinAmericancontextsare so similarthattheoriesthat
would naturally
haveproventohavemerit in theformer
thatthelitera
are
we
suggesting
in
the
latter.
Nor
apply
of new
source
is
the
only
possible
tureon U.S. courts
on
the
region's
making
decision
totestregarding
hypotheses
courts.Our main point is thatthefieldof comparative
with one footplantedinpublic lawand
judicialpolitics,
mightwell benefitfrom
politics,
theotherincomparative
cross-regional
fertilization.
greater
2008
1Vol. 6/No. 4
747
Articles
amoreheateddebate-is thefactthatthelinks
generated
(2) judicialpower,and
between(1) judicialindependence,
are
while a backdroptomany inquiries,
(3) democracy,
rarely
an explicitfocusof research.In LatinAmericaas
and
we urgently
need to clearlyconceptualize
elsewhere,
operationalizethese threeconcepts,develop testable
among them,and
hypotheses
regarding
therelationships
empirically
explorethosepropositions.91
In sum,research
on judicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica
Yet theoreti
findings.
has produceda rangeof intriguing
We suggestfourfactors
cal debate remainsembryonic.
ofdebate.First,
that
may havehamperedthedevelopment
scholarsof judicialpolitics in the regionoften fail to
work, especially
when that
acknowledge
and cite related
nations in the region.Second,
work concernsdifferent
usedby those
scholarsarehesitanttoemployframeworks
who studyotherregionsin theworld,despitethewealth
of hypothesesand insightsthebroaderjudicialpolitics
While thefactthatLatinAmerica
literature
has to offer.
means
followsthecivilratherthancommonlawtradition
thattheories
developedtoexplainjudicialphenomenain
mightneedtobemodifiedinordertoaccount
otherregions
foroutcomesin theLatinAmericancontext,thisshould
not preventus fromadopting,adapting,and exploring
of thoseexplanations.
Third,thedearthofexplic
theutility
ofLatinAmerica(be
research
by scholars
itlycomparative
or subnational
comparisonacrossspace,
itcross-national,
time,issueareas,or judiciallevelstoname justa fewpos
sibilities)diminishesthebasis fordebate and compro
mises our abilityto adjudicateamong thecompeting
explanationsforkey phenomenaof judicialpolitics.A
debate
finalreasonforthelackofmorevibranttheoretical
may be thefactthatwe haveyet to completeimportant
forsuchdebate,achievingcleardefinitions
pre-requisites
forthecon
workableoperationalizations
and developing
The
blocks
of
our
theories.
the
that
form building
cepts
nextsectionexaminesthisissue.
Conceptual Debates
and Challenges
alsobriefly
mentionthreeadditionalconcepts:theruleof
law,politicization
(ofthejudiciary),
and judicialaccount
ability.
While spacedoesnot allowus todevelopa discus
sionof thissecondgroupof conceptshere,we pointout a
fewof thechallengestheypose forthe fieldof judicial
politics,both inLatinAmericaand beyond.Our aims in
thissectionare to showhow theconceptualization
chal
lenges
mentionedaboveare reflected
in thestudyof judi
cial politicsinLatinAmerica,and to offera foundation
thatcan be used tobegintobuild towardgreater
concep
tualawareness.
CentralConceptualDebates
Judicialization.Of thetermsreviewed
here,judicializa
tion is perhapstheone on which thereis thegreatest
degreeof conceptualconsensus.
Most of theauthorsin
thesurveyed
literature
who definethetermstartfromthe
essential
definition
offered
byVallinder.
Vallindersuggests
thatjudicializationinvolvesthe infusion
of courtsinto
politicalarenas,and theadoptionof court-like
or legalis
ticdecision-making
processesin non-judicialsettings.92
Nonetheless,most scholarsof judicialpolitics in Latin
America,whose essentialinterest
is incourts,definejudi
ofVallinder'stwodimensions.
cializationas justthefirst
A
Some scholars,
however,
departfromthatconsensus.
fewadopt narrower
definitions,
equatingjudicialization
oroperationalizing
with judicialpower,93
thetermas some
thingakin to judicialactivism.94
Others adopt broader
definitions.
Domingo, forexample,understands
judicial
izationas:
first,theprocessbywhich thereis an increasein the impactof
judicial decisions upon political and social processes. Sec
ond.... theprocessbywhich political conflictis increasingly
resolvedat the levelof the courts.Third .... [it] reflectsthe
constructed
degree towhich regimelegitimacyis increasingly
upon thepublic perceptionof thestate'scapacityand credibility
in terms
on ruleof law,and rights
ofdelivering
protection.Finally,
it refersto thegrowingtrend ... to use law and legalmecha
nisms tomobilize around specificpolicies, social and economic
interests
and demands.95
We
debates
remain
incomplete
insomecases.
thatthose
748
someLatinAmerican
scholars
question
thisview.Perez
Perspectives on Politics
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Perdomo,forinstance,
wonderswhetherjudicialization
is
theresult
of courts'voluntary
assumption
of amore active
role,or whether in factpoliticalactors invitejudicial
interventions.98
neither(1) identified
with,nor (2) unilaterally
influ
in theoutcomeof
encedbyanyonewith an interest
thedispute.In otherwords,judges
must have inde
pendencefromthepartiesto a suiton twodimen
sions:theirpreferences
and theirdecisions.109
3. Independence
of lowercourtjudgesfromtheirsupe
riorsin the judicialhierarchy-thatis, "internal
0 This dimensionof judicialinde
independence.""
pendenceobviouslyhasconsiderable
bearingon the
and uniformity
of a courtsystem's
efficiency
influ
ence on policyoutcomes.Other thingsequal, a
courtsystem
suchasChile's,with lowinternal
inde
pendence,can be expectedto perform
more uni
and efficiently
thana courtsystem
withhigh
formly
internalindependence,
suchas Brazil's.
2008
IVol. 6/No. 4
749
Articles
a certainruling,onemight tryto
themedia); following
actsof retribution
(includingthenominationof
identify
or budget
new judges,changesincourts'administrative
aryconditions,or attacksin themedia) and otheracts
rebuketo thecourts(anover
thatconstitute
a significant
forexample).'17Inaddi
amendment,
ruling
constitutional
and retaliation
thatare
resistance
tionto the"extra-legal"
commonplacein someLatinAmericancontexts,anyof
legaland
theseactions(manyofwhich can be perfectly
repercussions
forjudi
couldhavesignificant
constitutional)
cial independence.
they
must issuerulingson conflictsintowhich theyare
unwillingly
pulledbypoliticalactorstakingadvantageof
judicial "veto points"122 or "legal opportunitystruc
tures.123Itwould thusseem thatjudges'discretionis
limitedfrommany directions.Yet in Latin America's
weakly institutionalized
contexts,room for innovation
oftenexists.For instance,
while judgesmay not be able
to createnew law out of whole doth, theycan often
exploitambiguitiesin the legal-institutional
contextto
with the elected
defensively
manage theirrelationship
branches.124
And asKapiszewski(2007) documents,
both
theArgentineand BrazilianSupremeCourts take full
advantageof thefactthattheyhave solecontroloverthe
timing
of theirdecisionsto"choosethepolitical
moment"
atwhich to hand down controversial
rulings.In short,
courts facing feweror ambiguouslydefined legal
institutional
and politicalconstraints
havemore discre
tion,and thus,greater
potentialpower.
is at theheartof activejudicial
Judicialassertiveness
power.An assertive
courtisone thatchallenges
powerful
Herewe againemphasizea keypointmade ear
actors.'25
lier:
whilemany studiesof judicialpoliticsinLatinAmer
icahave interpreted
judicialchallengestopowerful
actors
(in particular,the executivebranch)as an indicator
of
we proposethatit ismore accurate
judicialindependence,
toconsidersuchchallenges
of judicialassert
an indicator
iveness.
Understoodas such,judicialassertiveness
and the
ofpower(which
factors
thatguidecourts'selective
assertion
may varyacrosscountries,
courts,time,and types
of case,
among otheraxes), has been a major objectiveof the
research
on judicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica.
The finaldimensionof judicialpower,authoritative
ness,refers
to theextenttowhich a court'sdecisionsare
regarded
as legally
bindingand, inpractice,to theideaof
with judicialdecisionsby losingparties.
Draw
compliance
ingon the
Mexican case,Statonhas takena substantively
admirablefirst
andmethodologically
stepin theexamina
tionof compliance;
he arguesthatcourtssometimes
engage
in "strategic
public relations"-thatis,make public their
oppositiontogovernment
policies in a (not alwayssuc
of government
cessful)attemptto increasethelikelihood
compliancewith a judicialdecisionagainstthosepoli
cies.126
Gloppen et al. (2004) approachtheissuefromthe
ofaccountability,
perspective
askinghowwell courtsensure
and
transparency,
obligeanswerability
bypublicofficials
enforce
on governments
their
controllability
overstepping
bounds.We thinkfurther
studyof complianceshouldbe
on judicialpolitics
a keyobjectiveas theresearch
program
inLatinAmericamoves forward.
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Yet as
editedvolumeson theruleof law in theregion.130
theeditorsofoneof thesevolumesnotes,"the
meaningof
isaboutasmuddled as conceptsget in the
'accountability'
socialsciences.
"131This confusionisdue inpart to the
factthat"accountability"
has variouspotentialobjectives
(e.g.,probity,
andmay involve
policy,performance)
myr
iad
potential
actors
(e.g.,
elected
leaders,
prosecutors,
media,
Ruleof law. Among themany conceptsdiscussedin the
agencies,publics).
surveyed
literature,
one of themostwidelyusedand least judges,oversight
For
instance,
scholars
use the termin discussingthe
welldefinedandoperationalized
isthe"ruleof law."Rather
to
degree
which
courts
(and
oversight
agencies)engagein
thanenteringtheconceptualfray,
we will simplyexpress
routinized
control
elected
officials'
of
actionssuch that
twoconcerns.
First,efforts
todefinethetermboth in the
are
they
"answerable"
for
Yet thetermis
their
behavior.132
surveyedliterature
and in thebroaderfieldhave found
used
to
refer
to
also
or (as noted
judicial
accountability,
littlecommonground-existingdefinitions
of thecon
the
earlier)
old
dilemma
of
who
shall
guard theguard
Our secondconcerncenters
on
ceptvaryconsiderably.127
Conceptualized
as
ians.133
such,
of account
discussions
operationalization:
inone sense,theruleof lawrepresents
ability
with
of judicial
immediately
intersect
analyses
an important
conceptualshorthandforadherenceto the
independence:
does
judicial
independence
account
require
lawas amatterof socialpractice.
Yet as soon as thecon
to
some
it
ability
greater
to
an
authority
(be
oversight
ceptualrubberhits theempiricalroad, the ruleof law
body such as a judicialcouncilor to some amorphous
definedas suchbecomesinherently
immeasurable,
subjec
jurisprudential
ormight
tradition),
tive,and subjecttocategorical
rejection-thatis-we are notionsuchas received
in
such
fact
accountability
ultimately
compromise
judi
immediately
"dataproblem."
paralyzedby a significant
cial
The
central
dilemma
that
scholars
independence?
must
Neitherof thesechallenges
theconcept
justifies
discarding
account
in fact,
we hope bothwill serveasmotivation address,then,ishow todelimitaccountability:
altogether;
which
towhat
of
to
or
ability
actors
and
whom,
ideals,
towork toward
forresearchers
moremutuallyinformed
end?
conceptualization.
This necessarily
partialreviewof thecentralconcepts
and conceptualdebatesin theliterature
on judicialpoli
Politicization
of thejudiciary.Anothertermthatisoften ticsinLatinAmericasendsa critical
atten
message:greater
is
usedbut seldomclearlyconceptualizedin theliterature
tionmust be paid to thedefinition
and useofkey terms.
the"politicization"
of thejudiciary.
The termisgenerally We do not presumethatthediscussionsabovewill con
employedonlywhen authorsare arguingthatthephe
stitutethefinal
word on anyof theconcepts
mentioned.
nomenon inevitably
precedesor followsthejudicializa We do, however,
of theconceptual
hope thatrecognition
tionof politics,but scholarsrarelydefineor discuss limitations
and contributions
ofpastworkwill enablethe
as theyanalyzejudicializa
politicizationas thoroughly
fieldtobegintodevelopa dialogueabout terms
and con
Two possiblemeanings are the importance
of
tion.128
ceptsthattakesintoaccountexisting
thuspro
definitions,
politicalpartiesor partisanideologyto judicialappoint
vidinga commonstarting
point fortheory-building
and
ments or promotions,
and thedegreetowhich individ empiricaltesting.
To be clear,
we arenot endorsing
com
ual judges'decisionsalignwith theirpoliticalpartyor
If scholarsprefer
more
plete conceptualhomogeneity.
trackshiftsin partisandominancein government
(i.e., nuancedor inclusive
definitions
of fundamental
concepts
arenon-law-driven).
Others use thetermto referto the thanthoseused in related
work,we simplysuggestthat
focuson judicialdecisionsin debates in the theyindicatehow theirdefinitionsrelateto thosepro
increasing
broaderbodypolitic.One way or theother,theconcept's posed byotherscholars,
and offer
compellingreasonsfor
connotationis negativeinmuch of thework surveyed theirdeviationfromthosedefinitions.
We believesuch
Given thatcourtsappeartobe assumingamore
here.129
careful
useofconcepts
will facilitate
dialogueamongschol
activerole in politics in a numberof LatinAmerican ars,and help thejudicialpoliticsresearch
move
program
how politicsaffects
countries,
understanding
courtsand
as a coherent
forward
whole.
theirdecisions-and thusunderstanding
whatwe mean
by and how we measure the "politicization"of the
judiciary-willlikelybe increasingly
important.
Research Methods
do not have space toadequatelyaddresstheseimportant
conceptsin all theircomplexity,
we brieflylayout some
centralconcernsinhopes thatfuture
judicialpoliticsstud
of theseimpor
ieswillwork toclarify
conceptualizations
tantphenomena.
IVol. 6/No. 4
751
Articles
Data Colection
The types
of data and evidencepresentedin theworkwe
andquantitative.
surveyed
aredividedbetweenqualitative
On thequalitativefront,thewrittendecisionsof courts
are,perhaps,themost-often
used typeof data.Comple
mentaryqualitativesourcesincludemedia accounts;134
inter
primary
documentsavailableinnationalarchives;135
non-participant
viewdata;136and data gatheredthrough
observation.137
With regardto quantitative
data, the rangeincludes
surveys of judges,138 legal experts,
39 and broader
pub
out large-n
research
(which
tends
tOlenditself
toquan
752
titative
analyticstrategies),
or small-nor case study
work
(towhich theywould be more likelyapplyqualitative
analytictechniques).147
In theexplanatory
realm,schol
arsmight approach theiranalytictaskdeductivelyor
inductively.
trum,
therichvariety
ofmethods
applying
mentioned
Perspectives on Politics
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heretounderstanding
thecausesand consequences
ofcru
cialjudicialprocesses.
Moving inthatdirection
couldeven
tuallyleadus tobroadertheoretical
conclusions
that
would
be testable
beyondtheLatinAmericancountriesinwhich
theywere generated,includingin contextsoutside the
and theverydifferent
formsthatjudicial
judicialsystems,
politicstakes,LatinAmericaseemsto represent
an ideal
laboratory
foranalysesthatprivilege
breadthoverdepth.
Moreover,
with twonotableexceptions,16"
fewauthorsgo
beyondLatinAmericatodrawcomparative
lessons,
despite
region.
thefactthatexistingresearch
on Spain,Portugal,
Korea,
India,SouthAfrica,and a numberofothercasesoffers
the
potentialforhighlyrevealing
cross-regional
comparative
Methods ofComparison
analysis.
In short,the abundanceof existingsingle-country
an important
Our surveysuggests
imbalancein theLatin
American judicialpolitics researchprogram:while an
studies-themajorityofwhich arecareful
anddetailed
incredibly
richbodyof case studieshas been produced, offers
a richopportunity
formeta-synthesis
and compar
in
been
ison
that
thefieldhas
lesseffective undertaking
couldlikely
yieldimportant
forthebroader
compara
returns
withinor acrosscountries.
fieldof judicialpolitics.Extending
tiveinquiry
Martin Shapiro'splea
thesurveyed
lit
thatscholarsstudyany lawbut constitutional
Regarding
comparison,
within-country
law,any
eraturedoes includea numberof piecesof exemplary courtbut theSupremeCourt, and anycountrybut the
withinthesamenation.155 UnitedStates,
research
acrossvariousperiods
we encouragefurther
comparative
examina
However,as noted earlier,fewstudiescomparedifferent tionacrosstypesof law,courts,and countries.'62
of particular
subnationalregions
countries-forinstance,
ofdifferent
thedecision-making
statesupreme
contrasting
fewstudies
courts.
Further,
comparejudicialpractices,
judi Conclusion
cial rulingsor,more generally,
how courtsfunctionat Over itsbarelytwodecadesof development,
thefieldof
different
levelsof thejudiciaryina particular
country,156 judicialpoliticsinLatinAmericahasgrownquicklyintoa
despitethe factthatfederalsystemssuch asArgentina, eclecticand excitingareaof inquiry.
Our surveyof the
Brazil,andMexico would lendthemselves
to suchanaly
literature
revealedthree
major linesof studyaround
which
most important
sis.
While somescholarshavebegun tocomparejudicial the
theoretical
debatesrevolve.
First,schol
acrossvarying
arenasofpublic life(refer arshave exploredtherelations
betweenthejudicialand
decision-making
toour discussionof theexercise
of judicialpowerindif
electedbranches
ofgovernment,
and inparticular
thecon
ferent
work has comparedjudicialdecision
ditionsunderwhichLatinAmericancourtsaremore apt
areas),little
makingacrossdifferent
policyareasina certainpolity,157 to check(ormore likelytodeferto) electedleaders.In a
or acrossdifferent
areasof law(publicand privatelaw,for region
thisisobviously
pronetohyper-presidentialism,
an
A secondlineof inquiryrelatesto the
base
with such a strongdescriptive
concern.
example).In short,
important
courtshaveon thepolicyprocessand policyout
laid,thereisenormouspotentialforsubnational
compar
effects
ativework.
comes.Given thecrucialimportance
ascribedtothewaves
in theregionover
toearlierthatattempt of economicand socialpolicyreforms
Further,
beyondstudiesreferred
incourts'involve
to categorizejudiciaries
institutional
fea
thepastquartercentury,
scholars'
alongdifferent
interest
alsoseemsquiteappropriate.
tures,thereis littlerigorouscross-national
inquiry,for ment inpolicymaking
Finally,
of different
example,of thepolicyeffects
judicialframe a thirdlineof studyincludesclassificatory
and descriptive
or cultures.
While severalunpublished analyses
ofcourtsand legalinstitutions.
The thickdescrip
works,histories,
158and a handfulof articles159offer
dissertations
explicitly tion theseworks generateformsthebedrockof our
evenbook
cross-national
analyses,
theyareinthe
minority;
knowledge.
of nationalcase studies-a format
Our survey
also revealed
a greatdeal about thetheoret
lengthcompilations
icalorientation
thatshouldfacilitate
comparative
inquiry-donotneces
of the field.Scholarsof LatinAmerica
drawout thecross-national
forbeingquitegood at produc
sarily
comparisons
implicitin haveearneda reputation
theanalysesthatconstitutethem.To some degree,the ing local levelknowledge,aswell as carrying
out strong
lackofcross-national
analysisisunderstandable
(andinher "mid-level,
theoretically
informed
empiricalstudyof one
163
To what extentis thattrueof the
Engagingincross-national
comparison ormore countries."
entlydefensible).
can involveserious
methodologicalchallenges:collecting studyof judicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica?In a sense,this
mannerinmore thanone coun
is thewrongplace toanswerthatquestion,sinceour sur
gooddata ina consistent
trycan be quite difficult,
as can drawinganything
more
veyof the literature-bydesign-excludeswork that is
thantentative
lessonsfrompairedcaseswith fewer
obser
But it is fairly
evidentthatwhilework
solelytheoretical.
vationsthanexplanatory
on judicialpoliticsinLatinAmericahas addressedsome
Yet on thewhole,
variables.160
we believethatour collectivefailuretoproducerigorous importanttheoretical
debates-such as thoseregarding
cross-national
analysisrepresents
a missed opportunity. theactivation
of judicialactors,thedelegationand con
Given thebroadsimilarities
thatcharacterize
theregion's struction
of judicialpowerand itsexercisein thepolitical
December
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2008
IVol. 6/No. 4
753
Articles
betweenjudicialinde
realm,aswell as therelationship
tobe thefocusof sustainedinquiry.In theremainder
of
dynam
thisconclusion,
we highlight
someprimecandidatesfor
pendenceandpoweron theonehand,and regime
on judicialpoliticsinLatin
icson theother-the literature
future
examination.
We first
mentionsomeof theactors,
thatwe might bring into
America is not at the leadingedge of theory-building. courts,and legal institutions
That privilegebelongsto scholarsofU.S. andEuropean
future
study.
We thenadvocatean expandedfocuson the
of judicialrulings.
Finally,
we endorse
morework
judicialpolitics.
Why might thisbe thecase?
aftermath
identifying
and analyzingtheconnections
betweencourts
One obviousansweris time:thefieldofLatinAmeri
can judicialpoliticshas existedforlessthantwodecades. and regime
dynamics.
haveinhib
othercharacteristics
Yetwe believeat leastthree
toconceptualiza
progress:
our inattention
itedthefield's
tion,our lackof methodologicalrigor,and our weak Actors,Courts,and Legal Institutions
inquiry.
With regardto thefirst, There has been littleanalysis(inEnglish)ofLatinAmer
emphasison comparative
scholars
ican judicialelites.165
holdof
For themost part,we know little
our review
of thevariousunderstandings
or preferences
conceptsin thefieldsuggests about thebackgrounds,
ideologies,
of the
severalof thefundamental
region'sjudgesand justices,and have barelybegun to
of judicialpoliticsinLatinAmericahavenot
thatstudents
or the
on developing
andemploy
explorethepoliticization
of theregion's
judiciaries
placednearlyenoughemphasis
definitions
forkey terms, implications
of thatdynamicforthose
who populateLatin
ingclearand operationalizable
or on takingintoaccountexistingconceptualcontribu Americancourts.166
Although thecareerpathsof some
We suggestthat LatinAmericanjudgescan be longer,
more bureaucratic,
toacceptor rejectthem).
tions(whether
more insulatedthanthoseof their
workwhen defining
keycon
and toa certaindegree
scholarsdrawon previous
NorthAmericancolleagues,thisis not alwaysthecase,
reinventing
thewheel.More
ceptsratherthanconstantly
culture,and atti
would doubdessaid thefield and evenwhere it is,justices'ideology,
"self-aware"
conceptualization
exert
in
some
on
more
broadly
applicable
tudes
must
effect
their
decision-making.
of judicialpolitics generating
Additionalstudyof thesepowerfulindividuals
mightgo a
contributions.
theoretical
our analysesof judicialpolitics.
longway in informing
Second,perhapsbecausescholarshavebeen racingto
of judicialpoliticsin theregion Scholars
find
cataloguetheemergence
wishingto takethisapproachcouldcertainly
in thejudicialpoliticslit
most analystshavecarriedout
foundations
strongtheoretical
and analyzeitsdynamics,
withoutusing rigorous
methods to select eraturefromoutsidetheregion.
theirinquiries
or drawinferences.
Yet we also proposea sharperfocuson the involve
Without greater
cases,gatherevidence,
methodologicalcare the fieldwill have enormousdiffi ment in and importanceto judicialpoliticsof actors
as a scholarly
enterprise.
beyondjudges.Here we may be jumpingon a moving
movingforward
culty
A finalissue thatmay have hinderedfurther
theory traingivenrecent
publicationsin thisspirit.For instance,
and sub
Perez Perdomohas authoreda book examiningLatin
buildingis theabsenceof deepercross-national
Also, an editedvolumebyHalliday
With regardto theformer, American lawyers.
nationalcomparative
inquiry.
while thefieldhas produceda hostofwonderfulcountry et al.,which includesthreechapterson LatinAmerica,
on politicalliberalism
ofwhat they
case studies,and evena handfulof cross-national
studies, examinestheeffects
themand drawout their referto as the"legalcomplex"(thebench, thebar,and
little
has beendone to integrate
"allotherlegally-trained
who under
lessons.LatinAmerica is a regionof
broadertheoretical
personnelina society
char
takelegalwork");while theoutcomeof interest
isdiffer
with historicaland linguistic
countries
similarities,
and
thatfacilitate
cross-national
acteristics
examination,
ent,thefocuson thisbroadersetof actorsis instructive.167
we echoEpsteininurgingscholarsto "graspthecompar Garro has takena lookat theroleof thepublicministry
inArgentina,and theroleof Brazil'squasi-independent
ativeadvantage."'64
Moreover,as thediscussionsabove
has sparkeda burgeoningliterature.168
Com
subnational
prosecutors
analysiscan take
myr
comparative
suggested,
withotherprosecutorial
bodiesin theregion
parison
might
iad forms,
and engagingin thatsortof studyallowsana
without provideeffective
which
insightsinto choices regarding
of comparativeinquiry
lyststo reapthebenefits
crimestoprosecuteandwhich policysubjectstopriori
facingthemethodologicalchallengesinherentin cross
ofprosecution,
and theoveralleffect
We firmly
ofLatin
nationalanalysis.
believethatifscholars
tize,theeffectiveness
in
on
more
of
these
American judicialpoliticsengage
comparative
dynamics judicialpolitics.Futureworkmight
of theoffice
of theombudsmen
will likelyproducenew find
exploretheinvolvement
of eithersort,they
inquiry
and inform (oftenreferred
to as theDefensor
delPueblo),of auditors,
with thepotentialto influence
ingsand insights
of councilsof state,and of judicialcouncilsin judicial
of theworld.
debatesaboutcourtsinotherregions
Related to the issueof theory-building-and
despite politics.169
Finally,inparticularinLatinAmericawhere
law professors
often litigate,litigators
often teach,and
advancesthefieldhasmade and thefasci
theintellectual
academicscan be a sourceof authoritative
ithasgenerated-webelievethata num
doctrine,it
natingfindings
tOconsider
theimpacts
thatlegal
haveyet couldbe informative
politics'
mostinteresting
dynamics
berofjudicial
754
Perspectives on Politics
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2008
1Vol. 6/No. 4
755
Articles
or rolesthatcourtsplay in thecountries
of the
functions
region.
To offerjustone example,
while scholars
ofLatin
Americancourtshavebegun to addressthecrucialtopic
of social rightsadjudication,176
theextraordinary
policy
consequences-andeconomicramifications-that
courts'
rulingsin thisareacanhaveareseldomfully
addressedin
thosestudies.
To understandjudicialimpact,
we need to
knowhow judicialdecisions-such as thosemandating
free
medicineor electoralrecounts
or pensionincreases
ripplethrough
politicalsystems,
provideammunitionin
politicalbattles,and affect
politicaland policyoutcomes.
By tracingthe resultsand broaderaftermath
of judicial
what function
decisions,we will be able to determine
courtsareactually
playingin thepolitiesunderstudy,
be
itas an effective
defender
of socialrights,
guardianof the
or any of
democraticprocess,economicpolicy-maker,
myriadrolescourtshave thepotentialtoplay.177
Courtsand RegimeDynamis
Democracyis theelephantin thecorner.It loomsoverall
of judicialpolitics,as both a motivatingforcebehind
in
research,
and as an oftensilentbut centralconspirator
of research
While thereissome
theformulation
questions.
thingof a consensusinmuch of thecomparative
politics
courtsareimportant
thatstrong
forstable,high
literature
qualitydemocraciesand thatweak courtscan imperil
them,178 as suggested above, no such consensus exists in
on judicialpoliticsin theregion.
theliterature
For instance,severalscholars
wonderabout theeffects
courtson executive
of strong
policyautonomyanddemoc
with powerfuljudiciaries,
racy.In countries
marginalized
of specificinterests
groupsor representatives
may be intro
with signif
duced intothepolicygamevia thecourts,'79
formajorities.To what degree
icantpolicyrepercussions
enhancethe"consensual
nature"
does theirintroduction
of somepoliticalsystems,'80
and how farcan thisprocess
go without testingthe limitsof majorities'patience?
What, in otherwords, are theconsequencesof judicial
181
anddemocratic
powerfor"policystability
governance"?
Towhat extentdo expandingjudicialpowerand lowjudi
an "explosiveformulafor
cial accountabilityrepresent
182
democracy'?
Somewhatparadoxically
weak
(giventhatcourtsremain
inmuch of theregion),scholars
have lesstosayabout the
A few
of judicialweaknessfordemocracy.
implications
connectionin
authorshave examinedthecourts-regime
out bothhistoricalstudies
theVenezuelancase,carrying
of theperformance
of courtsduringpast authoritarian
of therecentreversal
of the
interludes
and examinations
democraticorderand dilutionof judicialpower.'83
And
at leastone scholarhaswonderedwhethercertainpolitical
are inherently
dynamics(i.e.,dientelism184)
incompati
ble with strongcourts.Yet a seriesof other important
questions
remains
unasked.
Does judicial
weakness
inex
756
orablyencouragethetrampling
of institutional
limitsby
Are certaininstitutional
electedleaders?
frameworks
more
toexecutive
susceptible
abuse?How doescorruption
influ
ence judicialdynamics
and judicialpolitics?
Can legalcul
turesemerge-both in thecourtsand in society
more
broadly-thatprovideeffective
protections
againstexecu
tivetampering
and corruption?.85
A relatedconcernregardstheeffect
of democracyand
democraticbeliefson judicialbehavioritself.
We natu
rallyassumethatjudgesactdifferently
underauthoritar
ian and democraticconditions,yet few studiesfocus
explicidyon thiscontrast,
preventing
us fromperceiving
what difference
regimetypemakes to judicialdynamics
and judicialpolitics.'86
Moreover,theway inwhich judges
understand
democracy
may have an important
effect
on
theirbehavior.
Decisions aboutwhethertoenforcesocial
rights,
adjudicateso-calledpoliticalquestions,or givepri
orityto individualrightsover broadereconomiccon
cernsmay all revolvearound judges'understandings
of
democracyand theirbeliefsabout thebestwaysof pre
or expandingit.
While judgesarecertainlyinflu
serving
enced bymany other factors,
normsand beliefsabout
democracymay be more relevantthan the attention
devotedto themwould suggest.187
An equally importantissue is courts'involvement
in
fundamental
politicaldynamicsthatdo notnecessarily
butcertainly
can-have regimerepercussions.
LatinAmer
icandemocracies
periodically
experience
"critical
political
suchaswar or shiftsin thedominantnational
junctures"
politicalcoalition.
Moreover,likedevelopingdemocracies
theworld over,theyhavebeenparticularly
susceptibleto
repeated
political,economic,and institutional
crises.Such
events
ofconflicts
thatpoliticaland social
producean array
actorsare increasingly
turningto the region'scourtsto
resolve.
How do LatinAmericancourtsrespondwhen
theyaredrawn intosuchprocessesof dramaticchange,
andwhat lessons
do theseepisodessuggest
aboutthenature
of judicialpoliticsand the relationship
betweencourts,
law,and democratic
politics?
In sum,therelationship
betweenjudicialpoweron the
one hand, and politicaldynamicsand thequalityand
ofdemocracy
on theotherremains
stability
quiteunclear.
As suggestedearlier,
we believethatthislackof clarity
at leastinpartfromthefactthatfewscholarsfocus
results
on theempiricallinksbetweenjudicialdynam
specifically
icsand regime
This isnot tosuggestthatstudy
dynamics.
ingjudicialpoliticsforitsown sake isnot important-it
obviouslyis.But giventheconsensusthatcourtshave the
insub
democratic
potentialtoaffect
qualityand stability
stantial
ways-and that thequalityof democracy
may
influence
courtbehavior-focusedinquiry
on thecourts
regimeconnectionshouldbe of paramountimportance.
It isno longerreasonabletoarguethatLatinAmerican
courts
areunderstudied.
Theyarelessstudied
than
arethe
Perspectives on Politics
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1974.
5 Huntington 1991.
6 Stotzky 1993.
7 E.g., Hammergren 1998; Prillaman 2000; Ungar
2002.
8 E.g., Buscaglia et al. 1997; Buscaglia and Ulen
1997; Castelar Pinheiro 2000.
9 E.g., MacAdams
1997; Barahona De Brito,
11 Most
that
references
literature,
we
recognize
that
the
not
always
accurately
reflect
local
debates.
We
encourage
such
1 Epstein 1999.
2 E.g., Chavez 2004b.
3 Widner2001.
4 Trubek and Galanter
collaboration.
does
not
reference
courts'
effects
on
socio
claim,
made
later
in the article,
that
the
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2008
1Vol.
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757
Articles
addressing Brazil.
41 E.g., Fiss 1993, examining Argentina and Chile.
42 E.g., L?pez-Ayll?n and Fix-Fierro 2003 addressing
Mexico.
44 Wilson 2005.
1974.
48 Taylor2006b, 2008.
58
59
60
61
758
regime instability.
64 E.g., Iaryczower, Spiller, andTommasi
Scribner 2004.
2002, 713;
2002;
75 Miller 1997.
76 Magaloni 2003.
77 Domingo 2004,
78 Couso2002.
123.
84 Santiso2004;Wilson 2005.
85 Fiss 1993.
86 P?rez Perdomo 2005,
154.
Perspectives on Politics
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Wed, 21 Oct 2015 04:56:07 UTC
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1995, 2.
and
Sieder, Schjolden,
Angel? 2005, 11.
P?rez Perdomo 2005.
Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002, 699.
See, for example, Finkel 2003, 779; Verner 1984,
99
100
463.
101Miller 2000.
budgetary
autonomy,
the rules
re
may
incorporate
her
taken
by
the government.
guarantees
concern.
those
allies. We
thank
an
anonymous
re
operationalizing,
measuring,
and
explain
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2008
1Vol. 6/No. 4
759
Articles
and 2003).
2005.
Kapiszewski 2007.
159 E.g., Brinks 2005; Rios-Figueroa and Taylor 2006.
160 We thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding us
of these challenges.
161 Gloppen, Gargarella, and Skaar 2004; Gargarella,
Domingo, and Roux 2006.
162 Stated, for example, in Shapiro 2005, 278.
Perspectives on Politics
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et al. 2008, 7.
-.
Paulo: EDUC.
-.
2007.
170 Uprimny 2004, 66.
171 E.g., Beer 2006.
2003, 2005.
184 P?rez Perdomo 2003, 2005.
185 Although it lies outside the temporal scope of this
essay and examines areas in addition to Latin
America, a robust discussion (rooted in compara
tive law) of the effectsof judicial review on democ
racy can be found in Schor 2008.
important
exceptions.
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