Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
What
China
Intentions
Will Want:
of a Rising
The
Future
Power
W Legro
Jeffrey
butwhat China will do with itsnewfoundcapabilitiesremainsan issueof contentious
China's nationalpower isgrowingrapidly,
At theheartof theproblem is thedifficulty
ofdiviningfutureintentions.
Two arguments
debateamong scholarsand policymakers.
The otherhighlights
China's growinginter
have dominated thedebate.One focuseson power and likelyChinese revisionism.
Both areproblematicin termsof logicand evidence.They offerlinearprojectionsthat
dependenceand likelyfuturesatisfaction.
of foreign
policy ideasand events.Relative
ignoretheway thatChina's futureislikelytobe contingent-especiallyon theinteraction
are importantbut theirimpact ismediated throughthedoctrinesleadersuse to justifyaction and
power and interdependence
establishauthority:thoseideasareprone to change in regular
ways-and with themChina's intentions.If thisargumentis right,
withChina need tobe
policyprescriptionsthatadvocatecontaining,engaging,or somemix of thetwo (i.e.,hedging) in relations
reconfigured.
"rising
China" problemisnot justaboutpower,
stressed
thatits
butpurpose.China has consistently
as amajor powerwill be peacefuland
development
non-obtrusive.
Yet in theUnited States thereis,as one
of anx
U.S. DeputySecretary
ofStateput it,a "cauldron
Expert testimony
beforethe
iety"overChina's future.1
U.S.-China Economic and SecurityReviewCommis
sion,a body thatmonitorsand reportstoCongresson
over
has focused
heavilyon uncertainty
bilateralrelations,
In February2007, Vice President
China's intentions.2
test
Cheney cautionedthatChina's recentanti-satellite
with
militarybuild-upwere "notconsistent
and general
of
rise."'3The stomachs
China'sstatedgoalof a 'peaceful
arechurning.
strategists
policyissueconnectssodirectly
It israre
when a pressing
literature.
Such is thecase
toa critical
gap in thescholarly
with the impactof theriseofChina on world politics.
Will growingpower lead Beijing to challenge inter
generat
nationalnorms,rules,and institutions-possibly
in
Asia if
East
amongmajorpowers
ingdangerousconflict
in
inter
the
not elsewhere?
Or mightChina's integration
increas
its
middle
class,
and
nationaleconomy, growing
ininternational
andexchanges
institutions
ingparticipation
The
lead toenduringsatisfaction
in theexistinginternational
order?
Today
China
appears
to be
a "status
quo"
power.4
Will itremainso?
Existinganswersto thisquestionlack theverything
ofcontingent
changein the
needed:a generalexplanation
intentions
ofChina.5The problemisnot simplyan issue
or repression
of freeexpression
sincethe
ofChina'ssecrecy
applies to democraciesas
problemof futureintentions
Even ifwe had accessto theinner
well as dictatorships.6
workingsof theChinesegovernment
today,it isunlikely
aims.Even if
thatinformation
would tellus about future
worldhegemony
or
China todayhas somesecretplan for
world harmony,thoseaimswill be subjectto changeby
China'sverygrowthand theprocessbywhich itunfolds.
Ironically
evenChina's top leaders,
despitetheirconcen
what
tratedpoliticalpower,cannotknowwith certainty
theircountry
willwant.
thedebate
Indeed,thatiswhat thetwoviewsdominating
inevitable
on China argue,althoughtheysee different
onChina'spowerand claimsthat
The first
futures.
focuses
China's desireforrevision
will growas China's relative
capabilitiesincrease
despitewhatBeijing thinkstoday.In
thisviewothercountries
mustdo all theycan tocontaina
rising
China becauseat somepointChina willwield its
new-found
powerto challengeglobalorder.The second
andargues
W LegroisProfessor
Woodrow
viewhighlights
China'sgrowinginterdependence
and Chair in the
Jejfrey
of the
thatsuchconflict
can be avoidedbycontinuingtoengage
ofPoliticsand Co-Director
WilsonDepartment
inChina that
at the
Miller
Governing
Americaina GlobalAgeProgram
China,whichwill builddomesticinterests
favorpoliticalliberalization
and accommodationto the
University
ofVirginia(legro@
CenterofPublicAJfairs,
rulesof theprevailing
international
system.
Both answers
RobertRoss,TangShip
virginia.edu).
Theauthorthanks
comments tap intodeep-seatedforcesshapingChina, but both are
ing,
Womack,andZhu Fengforhelpful
Brantly
assistance.
flaweddue to theirlinearprojectionof the futureof
research
andDaniel AaronWeirforexcellent
DOI:
10.1017/Si537592707071526
September
2007
Vol.
1
5/No.
515
Art'icles
Chinesepolicytowards
international
vis theirdomesticcritics.Likewise,
order-be itthecon
whenChina displays
or theharmo
flictual
revision
expectedbypowertheorists
consistentrevisionist
tendencies,such ideas should be
niousintegration
predicted
by interdependence
advocates.7 penalized-but onlywhen influential
oppositiongroups
China'sdiplomaticfuture,
are promoting
more attractive
alternativeideas.Other
however,is likelytobemore
contingent
thaneitherthepoweror interdependence
posi
wise,nomatterhow loathsome
anyparticular
approach,if
tionsallow.To highlight
thealternative
isevenlessdesirable,
contingency
requiresthatsome
dramaticpressurefor
thingbe saidaboutwhat thefuture
dependson-no small rapidchange isproblematic.
Therefore,itbehoovesthe
problemwith a countrylikeChina thatisauthoritarian international
community
tobe proactive(notjustreactive
onmany issues.
What policymakers tobehavior)bynurturing
and non-transparent
groupsand ideasinChina that
havefounddifficult
tostudy.8
most need,scholars
Clearly offermore benign replacementsto the less desirable
in thecaseofChina both itsrelative
powerand itseco
alternatives.
The issue
nomic interdependence
affectitsforeign
policy.
Naturallyin all theseareas,thepotentialforoutside
of courseishow thetwowill do so overtime.9
influence
on a country
ofChina's sizeand regimetypehas
I arguethattheirinfluence
dependson a third
limits.
meshing significant
Yetwe knowfromtheSovietexperience
gear-national ideasabouthow toachieveforeign
states,slowpatientefforts
to
policy thateven in authoritarian
goals. Such ideasperformthreecriticalfunctions:they supportreformers
can have an impact.'2The futureof
empowercertaindomesticinterests
groupsoverothers, Chinawill notbe decidedby theactionsofothers,
but the
is actionsofoutsidepartieshave influenced
theygenerateexpectations
againstwhich performance
China'sorienta
or impedethepossibil
tion in thepast (e.g.,Nixon and theopeningofChina)
assessed,and theyeitherfacilitate
to emerge.Specifically,
whenChi
ityfora new strategy
andmay do so again in thefuture.
in the
neseexpectations
I approachtheproblemof theriseofChina fromthe
about thebenefits
of integrating
extantinternational
with nega
orderaredefiedbyevents
of international
perspective
relations
not as an area
theory,
tiveconsequences,
anopportunity
existsfordomesticcrit
Thus I will emphasizehow developmentsin
specialist.
ics to challengethatorthodoxy.
Whether changeactually China relatetoa generalpatternseeninothergreatpow
on thedistribution
of replace
occursdepends,however,
ersin theirattempts
to revise,
join,or separatefrom
global
whethercriticscan coordinate
ment ideasthataffects
on a
order.
The goal is topointout theproblemsin thecurrent
worldview.
feasiblealternative
debate,offeran alternative
view,and exploreitscontem
some twists
on familiar
A good starting
This approachoffers
thinking. poraryrelevance.
what
point is todefine
viewofChina, themost
Contraryto thepower-centric
intentions"
meansand tooutlinethenature
exactly
"future
of current
Chinese intentions.
dangerousscenarioin thefutureisnot the"rise"ofChina,
The articlethenexplores
inChina'seconomicgrowth.
but ruptures
Opposed to the how power and interdependence
argumentsdeal with
economic interdependence
economic
intentions,
offers
an
explanationforchangeand continu
position,
engage
mentneednot leadtoharmony.
Countriesthatundertake ity,
and explorestheimplications
forthefuture
ofChina's
havegenerated
con
rapidintegration
intentions.
considerable
systemic
flict.'0China itselfhas displayedwide variationin its
or separateitself
approach,be itcooperate
with,challenge,
frominternational
societyover thepast twocenturies. China and Contemporary
The point isnot thatpoweror economicliberalization
is International Order
but ratherthatthosefactorsinteract
with
Intentions
refers
towhatChina plans todo. Here I focus
unimportant,
dominantideasinparticular
on plansfordealing
with theinternational
specifically
order.
ways toshapeenduring
pat
terns
In generalterms,statesdealwith international
of nationalbehavior.
order in
In termsof policy thismeans thatneithera contain
threeidealways: integration,
and separation.
The
revision,
mentnorengagement
policyisa reliable
consistent
choice. first,integration,
refers
to nationalstrategies
thataccept
Indeed, thedominantview todayamongpolicymakers thedominantprinciples,
rules,andnormsofwhatHedley
13Typicallysuchstates
a "hedging"strategy
acceptsthisadvicebyadvocating
that Bull called"international
society."
with theparticular areseenas "status
pursuesbothoptionssimultaneously
or "conservative"
quo," "satisfied,"
pow
ersbasedon theirdesiretoworkwithin theinternational
mix of strategy
vs. cooperative)
(conflictual
dependenton
A secondcategoryincludesthosestatesthatana
Chinesebehavior.'I
system.
The argument
hereoffers
a somewhat
andmore
toas "dissatisfied"
or "revisionist,"
different
but themean
lystsrefer
China
proactiveview: it suggeststhatmanaginga rising
ingisthesame:theyinvolve
efforts
tofundamentally
revise
will dependnot on behaviorper sebut on thenatureof
the international
breeds
system.Such revisiontypically
thedominantideas.
When China espousesideasandaction conflictsinceothercountriesare prone to defendthat
itmakes sensetodo as
thatfavorcooperativeintegration,
same order.14
A thirdapproach is seen in statesthat
much as possibleto ensurethattheirinternal
fromtheorbit
supporters attemptto removeor separatethemselves
gainpositivefeedback
and "I toldyou so" leverage
normsand practices,
much as
vis-ai of prevailinginternational
51 6
Perspectives on Politics
Figure 1
China's outlook on international order
Dominant Orthodoxy
Qing (1800-1860)
Separatist
Republican (1896-1939)
Integrationist
Revisionist
)
Integrationist
cen
TokugawaJapanattemptedtodo in thenineteenth
in
or
has
done
the
contemporary
period.
Myanmar
tury,
withaimsor
isa termthatisoftenassociated
Intentions
It is useful,however,to distinguish
goals or interests.
and theideasthatstatesadopt toattain
betweeninterests
showrelatively
Broad interests
littlevaria
theirinterests.
tionbothwithin and among states.Stateshave always
and especiallyin the
fromexternalthreats
soughtsecurity
has also emerged
economicprosperity
twentieth
century,
As JiangZemin
of government.'5
as a core responsibility
declaredin 1997,China seeks"thegoalof beingprosper
ous and strong"-anaim sharedbyChinese leaders(and
theages.China'sdesiretobe a
othernations)throughout
and to"enrichthepeople"dates
"richand strong
country"
back toat leastthelatenineteenth
TodayChina
century.16
national
on increasing
its"comprehensive
iscertainly
intent
power."
17
constantover
Ifsuchfundamental
goalsseemrelatively
those
about
how
to
achieve
of
ideas
longperiods time,
goals arenot.They have rangedfromtheviolentover
of international
orderto thedesireto remainaloof
throw
within it.As seen in fig
fromit,to an urge to integrate
ure 1,China's own historyover thepast twocenturies
showsvariationamongthesepositions.
aremostly
China'scurrentintentions
By thistypology,
China is joiningandworkingwithin the
integrationist.
The wellspringof thisstatus
rulesof theextantsystem.
quo approachisfoundinDeng Xiaoping'sascentto lead
ershipin 1978. Since thattime,China has not sought
norhas itaspiredtooverturn
separationfromthesystem
This
it.Insteadithas increasingly
opted forinvolvement.
in
increases
orientation
hasmanifesteditselfinsignificant
international
institutional
membershipas well as more
with theexisting
informal
behavior
cooperative
powers.'8
This integrative
was cautiousin theearly
orientation
yearshas pickedup
Deng period,but in thepast fifteen
considerable
momentum.There is room to debate the
whether it is shallowor
depthof Chinese integration
enmeshed-butthetrendisclear.'9China has leftbehind
of
"worldrevolution"
and "three
worlds theory"
rhetoric
revisionism
and giveslessemphasisto itsself-proclaimed
role as "leaderof theThirdWorld."20 InsteadChina
great
todayshowsmost of themarkersof a conservative
of theexistinginter
poweracceptingthebasicprinciples
nationalorder.21
China joined the
World TradeOrgani
zation,has cooperated
more fully
with theUnited States
inG-8
sincethe9/11 attacks,and regularly
participates
meetings.China's continuedpromotionof "theFive
Principles
of PeacefulCoexistence"or thecall fora "new
politicaland economicorder that is fairand rational"
seemvague.22China's commitmentto revisingthesys
temtobenefitdevelopingcountriesseemsmost relevant
when it involves
measuresrelatedtoChina'sown growth
of sovereignty
or toconcerns
relatedto itsownhistoryas
a target
of imperialism.23
To suggestthatChina acceptsthebasic principlesof
no
orderisnot to saythatitprefers
today'sinternational
changeinworld politics.CertainlyChina is dissatisfied
with someaspects.Three important
ones areU.S. domi
nance, the statusof Taiwan, and externalpressureto
democratize.
and "democratiza
China favors"multipolarization"
tion"in international
relations-i.e.,thatall states(orat
leastgreatpowers)haveamore equal sayand theUnited
States"hegemonism"
country)
(oranyotherpredominant
in terms
of theU.S. abilityto
lessinfluence-especially
in thedomes
use forcetoachieveitsgoalsor to intervene
That sentiment,
ticpoliticsofothercountries.24
however,
ishardlyunusualand is sharedbymostmajor powers,
America'sEuropeanallies.China has a special
including
in suchmattersdue to the linkbetweenits
sensitivity
colonialpast, subsequentindependence,
and the legiti
macyof theCommunistregime(whichbases itsauthority
inparton successfully
restoring
China'sautonomy).
The second,and related,issueisTaiwan.China favors
Taiwan
and rejects
anymove thatenhances
reunification
Since 1979 ithas advocatedpeaceful
ese independence.
mil
over"liberation"
reunification
(buthasalsodeveloped
China in
itarycapabilitiessuitedtoTaiwan as a target).
thisissue,aswithTibet or otherdisputedterritories,
por
Unification
with
asdefender
of theextantrules.
traysitself
Taiwan inChina'sview isa "domesticissue"overwhich a
statemustmake itsown internal
decisions.As
sovereign
in
to
States
Mao proclaimed theUnited
1970, "Youhave
occupiedourTaiwan Island,but I have neveroccupied
yourLong Island."25
of a desireforautonomyand reuni
The combination
what is also anomalous
with Taiwan is fueling
fication
forgreatpowers(withtheexception
of theUnitedStates)
in thecontemporary
system-a relatively
rapiddefense
to fathomexactnumbers
buildup.Althoughit isdifficult
and levelsof spendingdue toChina's secrecyon these
issues,ithas bumped itsmilitaryspendingsome 15 per
centa yearfrom1990-2005with a 17.8 percentincrease
September 2007
1Vol. 5/No. 3
517
Articles
aspiresto greaterdemocraticreforms,
the"mostimpor
tantand fundamental
principlefordevelopingsocialist
politicaldemocracy
inChina" istheleadership
of theCom
munistParty.30
In short,
israre,
politicalcompetition
pop
of thecountryis
ularpoliticalchoice forthe leadership
notpermitted,
thepressistightly
managed,theinternet
is
filtered
and blockedwith amazingsophistication,
religion
iscontrolled
by thegovernment,
andhumanrights
accords
areverbally
butnot fullyimplemented.31
acknowledged
Despite thisstanding,it isnotable thatChina isnot
advocatingthatstatesadoptsimilar
politicalsystems
to its
normsareillegitimate.32
own,or thathumanrights
Instead
Beijingemphasizesthatprinciples
suchas sovereignty,
sta
and territorial
shouldtrumpsuchconsid
bility,
integrity
initsfuture,
erations.33
China doesnot ruleoutdemocracy
itjustinsists
thatitwill followitsownpath,style
ofdemoc
racy,and timing.For the timebeing, the international
norm seemsto emphasizedemocratization
(i.e.,moving
in a liberaldirection)not theend stateof democracy(a
somewhat
undefined
goal).China'sstatements
andactions
fitthatprofile-asdiscussedlater,itisslowlyliberalizing
albeitat a slowpace andwith reversals.
Overall,despite
thetension
overhumanrights
anddemocratization,
China's
current
outlook ismostlyintegrationist.
Perspectives on Politics
IVol. 5/No. 3
519
ArticIes
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what states
and predict
implythat
we cannotunderstand
will dowithoutknowinghow theythinkaboutappropri
Yet theydo notaddressthekeyissueofwhen
ateaction.51
is likelytochange-or not.
such thinking
Interdependence
A different
responsetoChinesepowercomesfromthose
and social
who believethatChina'smaterialimprovement
with theworld give
evolutionthroughinterdependence
and
risetodomesticpoliticalforcesthatfavorintegration
This will occur througha
supporttheexistingsystem.
officialsthat
numberofmechanisms.First,government
over
diplomacy
andnegotiations
takepartininternational
inwaysmore consis
timecome todefinetheirinterests
tent
with thesystem.52
in theworld
participation
Second,China's increasing
economyis expectedto give riseto domesticeconomic
thatpressforevengreaterliberaliza
andpoliticalinterests
For example,asChinamodernizes,itsmiddleclass
tion.53
and its resources grow (see figure 3) 54-a
CINC -R
ussia
CINOC
China iseconomically
more that
and socially
Overall,the
withother
majorpowers(e.g.,theUnitedStates)
entwined
and themore it
themore itgainsfromtheoverallsystem
or engaginginmajor
has to lose inchangingthesystem
We mightalsoanticipatethatasChina partici
conflict.57
pates in thesystemitwill also changeit,inconsultation
more to itsliking.
withothercountries,
and agreement
cer
thatsupportengagement
These relatedarguments
on Beijing'sthink
tainlycapturean important
influence
by theeconomic
ingtoday.
China has becomecaptivated
growththathas accruedfromitsopennessto the inter
has generated
more
nationaleconomy.Such interaction
thatfavor
opening.
significant
domesticpoliticalinterests
While thegrowthof theChinesemiddle class is still
wealth
nascent,thereissomeevidencetosuggestincreasing
The People'sRepub
may affect
foreign
policyopinions.58
stateyetChinese
licofChina remainsan authoritarian
citizens
will also attestto thefactthattheirpoliticalsitu
ation today is vastlymore liberal and open than itwas in
more so.59
And finally
thepre-reform
periodandbecoming
China
tobecomemore engaged.60
rentsystem-withincentives
pointsus to thefactthat
world
usefully
This explanation
Finally as China opens, the increase in travel and edu
domesticpoliticsandwhathap
cationabroad (see figure
4),55 thespreadof freespeech politicsisenactedthrough
can affectthosepolitics,
relations
(seefigure
and ideason theinternet
5),56and experiments pens inChina's foreign
overtime.
changingthemdramatically
votingand choiceareexpectedto inspire potentially
withevenlimited
argumentsis
The problem
with theseinterdependence
a tasteforlibertythatfeedsdemocratizing
impulsesthat
liketheir
debatingopponents,are
power-centric
standards. thatthey,
willmorehappilyalignChinawith international
historically
been a forceforpoliticaldemocratization.
52!O
Perspectives on Politics
Figure 3
Disposable
Figure 4
Chinese students studying abroad
800
140000
700
120000
600/
100000
.
CD 500/
80000
2 400
0
U
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Figure 5
Chinese Internetusers
Figure 6
Chinese economic
10.00%
0.8
9.00%
0.7
8.00%
7.00%
I
V
6.00%
5.00%
0.6
0.5
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interdependence
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
...........................
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g8
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September 2007
8 8O
jVol. 5/No. 3
N C%JC'J
521
Articles
Nor doesglobalization-theshrinking
of theglobeand
economicpressures)
and tomake senseofhow they
might
increased
densityof contacts
within international
society conjointlycause outcomes-i.e., how powerand inter
due to technological
Chinese inte
advances-guarantee
with ideasthrough
dependenceinteract
mech
predictable
gration.The potentialinterdependence
ofChina in the anismsto causeoutcomes.The centralemphasisinwhat
system-interms
of thedecliningcostsof transportation followsison theroleof ideas(simply
becauseitistheleast
andcommunication
and therelative
opennessof the
world
understood)but the importance
of powerand transna
tradeorder-has been occurringfordecades.Whether
tionalpressures
will also be clear.
China tookadvantage
of thepotential
gainsof interdepen
dencewas at leastin part a Chinese policychoice that
ForeignPolicy Ideas and Intentions
needstobe explained.66
Forexample,as seeninfigure
6,67
broad concepts-almostopera
Chinese interdependence
has not beendrivensimplyby Statestendto formulate
tional
philosophies-that
orienttheirinternational
behav
themarch of technology,
but insteadbyChinese ideas
ior.
As
large
societies,
nations
require
ideas
that
signify
to
(and thoseof others)abouthowmuch China shouldbe
their
members
what
as
they
stand
for;
largeorganizations
engaged in theworld.Thus, Chinese interdependence
they
to
require
ideas
in
guide
them
their
in
interactions
theriseofMao's revisionism
declinedfollowing
andwhen
the
I
international
arena.
as
use
the
term
"Ideas,"
are
here,
China began to recalibrate
afterthedisastrous
Cultural
notmentalconstructs
of individuals,
but insteadthecol
Revolution,interdependence
after
begantorise-especially
lective
beliefs
of
societies
and
organizations
abouthow to
1978.
act.
Examples
of
beliefs
about
"good
policies"
fromthe
The historyof nationaleconomicmodernizationvia
foreign
policies
of
major
powers
include:
engagement
with the international
arena is filledwith
stories
of countries
undertaking
and thenlater
integration
* "non-entanglement"
in European politics (United
moving in theoppositedirection.
Here we might think
States,1776-1941)
ofWeimarGermany'sshiftunderHitler or Japan'sshift
* territorial
expansionon the continent(Germany
fromTaish6 democracyto theShowa era or even the
1890-1945)
retreat
of theUnited Statesin theinterwar
period.China
* isolationfromextensiveforeigninteraction
or pres
itselfreversed
directionsinmoving from
Qing China to
ence (Japan1640-1868)
NationalistChina and thenreversed
again in thetransi
* integration
as a normalpower(SovietUnion/Russia
tiontoCommunistChina.
1986-present)
In sum,both power and economic interdependence
inparticular
maypush strategy
directions
but suchmoves They areembeddednot only in somehumanbrains,but
havealsobeen reversed
evenwhen powerand interdepen most importantly
inthecollective
nationalsym
memories,
denceconditionsremainfairly
constant.Similarly,
some
bols,government
educations
procedures,
and rhet
systems,
timesstates
may stickto theirplansevenas conditionsof
oricof statecraft.69
altersignificantly.
powerand interdependence
Suchviewsmatterbecausetheyarea guide tonational
Why?
actionand can shapewhat stateswant to achieveover
time.
Naturallystateleadersstrategically
plan theiractions
The Meshing Gear: Collective Ideas
but theyoftendo so againsta backdropof certaindomi
Neitherpowernor interdependence
directly
shapedChi
nantnationalideasaboutwhat generalbehaviorisappro
nese grand strategy
because such systemicfactorsare priate.
These ideas
maybe contested
bysomegroups
within
enactedthrough
domesticpoliticsand decisionmaking. societies
butstillserveas a guideforthecollective
"nation."
There areof coursemany typesof domestictheories
of
Promotedby thosewho benefitand nurturedby habit,
politics.Here, however,I want to concentrate
on the theygrowroots.
As organizationtheorists
pointout,par
central(andmisunderstood)roleof enduringforeign
pol
when groupshave intangible
ticularly
goalssuchas "secu
icy ideas in domesticpoliticsand subsequentnational rity"or "wealth"stateswill focus theirefforts
around
behavior.
doctrinesof action ratherthanactualgoals.Put differ
There is a largeand veryinsightful
literature
on how
ently,ideasbecome intentions.70
In foreign
such
affairs,
collectiveideas (e.g.,beliefs,norms,discourses,culture, ideas arewhat ErnestMay has called "axiomatic"
etc.) "matter"in foreign
What isusually
missing formulations
policy.68
derivedfromhistorythatbecomeaccepted
in theseargumentsishow ideasmatterin their
own trans assumptions
of policy.71
The literature
formation.
isverygood on how collective
National ideasabout international
orderaredifficult
to
ideasmightkeep intentions
fixed,but lessclearon how
changefora numberof reasons.First,theyhaveconstit
theyaffect
change.To suggestthatideasplaya rolein their uenciesthatbenefitfromthemand thusareenergizedto
own transformation
is not to argue thatoutcomesare promoteand defendthem.Second,suchdominantideas
It isusefultodistinguish
caused
ideas.
theimpact becomeingrained
wholly
inpublicrhetoric
by
andbureaucratic
pro
of ideasfrom
otherfactors
(e.g.,strategic
circumstances
or
ceduresthat
make themresilient
likeall traditions
thatare
522
Perspectives on Politics
Figure 7
Collapse
Desirable Results
Ideas on
WorldOrder
Events Contradict
EventsConfirm-*
<1
UndesirableResults-*
Continuity
Continuity
Collapse
change
(potential
see Consolidation)
institutionally
entrenched.
Third, becauseof thiseffect triesthenuse thosebaselinesto assess-and supportor
When
they
becomenormalized
not justasmeans toachieveends, critique-existingpolicies,dependingon events.
eventscontradictcollectiveexpectations
and theconse
but also as a standardofwhat thenationshoulddo, or
evenwhat it is (i.e., identity).
quencesarestarkly
changeismore likely.
Such
undesirable,
situationsfacilitate
TokugawaJapancame to be definedby itspolicyof
changeby givingammunitionto the
opponentsof thecurrentorthodoxy,
allowingthemto
excludingforeigners
and itsleadersappealed to thattra
of thecurrent
theUnitedStates rallysupportto theirsidewhile supporters
ditiontosustaintheir
position.Similarly,
with the orthodoxy
areputon thedefensive.
For example,thesep
to"getentangled"
was distinguished
by itsrefusal
150 years aratistapproachof theQing Empirewas finally
disrupted
suspecttraditional
powersofEurope in thefirst
victoryin theSino-Japanese
War.
of itsexistence
and presidents
paid homageto thatnorm by the1895 Japanese
in
That
event
set
a
race
among
outsiders
to
control
China
off
pop
(e.g.,Harding in the1920s) ordertobolstertheir
China in thenineteenth
and encouragedforces
withinChina to challengetradi
centuryin thefaceof
ularity.72
incursions
tion,includingin foreign
attemptedtohew toa traditional
Qing
policy.74
foreign
Inmost othercircumstances,
continuityis likely.
For
Middle Kingdommentalitydespiteitswaningauthority.
thatcontinuity
isthenorm example,
canbe expected
whendeviations
from
It istherefore
not surprising
continuity
in foreign
ideasleadtoundesired
outcomes.
When the
policyideas.Thosewhowant tochallengetra
United
existing
in
hurdles.It isoftenhardforindivid Statesintervened
WorldWar I itviolateditslongstand
ditionfacesignificant
inEurope'spolitics.
uals toknow ifothersdesirechangeand iftheydo, how
ingtabooagainstentanglement
The
will riskactingon suchpreferences.
Lacking results
ofWorldWar I brought
widespreaddisillusion
much they
such information,
theycannotbe sureiftheirowndesire ment in theUnited Statesand theAmericansembraced
inEurope. In
forchange(shouldtheyexist)will have any anew theirtradition
of "no-entanglement"
and efforts
suchsituations,
defenders
of theold ideas(as theAmeri
effect.
Theymustmount a case for
why theold ideaswere
whichcan involve
considerable
andbecause can isolationists
did) will be able tomake politicalhay
effort,
defunct,
itthreatens
tradition,
invites
socialand politicalcriticism. by claiming"toldyou so,we shouldneverhave strayed
ofnew
fromour triedand truetradition."
in
Likewisetheformation
and institutionalization
Intervention
World
ori War I, theyargued,had been a disastrous
ideasbreedsstrife
and uncertainty
becauseparticular
mistake.
Likewisecontinuity
isevenlikely
whendominantideas
entationsofferdiffering
costsand benefitsto domestic
are ignored
occur.It ishard togather
overwhich, ifany,new direc
yetdesirableresults
groupsthatcan stalemate
is a potent momentumtochangecollectiveideaswhen outcomesare
tion ismore desirable.
Continuity,therefore,
policy agreeable.
force.
Yet asMay pointsout, entrenchedforeign
Consider,forexample,thedearthof investiga
tionsof largestock
vulnerableto transformation
"as
marketincreases
thatno one expected
conceptsarenonetheless
andcountries
"seethepastina new light."73 versusthespecialcommissionsthatalwaysseem to form
history
grows"
to examineunexpectedstockmarket crashes.
The interesting
When
questionsarewhen and how?
momen
outcomesaredesirable,it isdifficult
togenerate
Disintegrates
VWhen
Orthodoxy
tum to reorient
bureaucracies
and altertraditions.
The
of an extantorthodoxy
eventsthat
Implicitin theabovediscussionis thefactthatchangeis delegitimation
requires
not a singlephenomenonbut involvestwo stagesthat both contradictits logic and have undesiredconse
individuals
will bemore
must be explained:collapseof theold ideasand consoli
quences.In suchcircumstances,
dationof thenew.Both stages,I argue,are affected
by motivatedandmore likelytochallengethoseideas,believe
for
othersareof a likemind, and hence thepossibilities
ideas.
pre-existing
how lead
In thecollapsestage,pre-existing
ideasaffect
changearemore significant.
ersjustify
policyand seta baselineof socialexpectations
Figure7 depictsthebranchinglogicof collapseinvolv
ofwhat should result.Politicalopponentswithincoun
of ideasand consequences.
ingthisinteraction
September 2007
iVol. 5/No. 3
523
Articles
None orMany -*
One
Undesirable Feedback
-*
Desirable Feedback
* Consolidation
ConditionsofNew Orthodoxy
Evenwhen dominantideasare delegitimated,
however,
change is not automatic.Consolidation, like collapse,
faceshurdlesthatfeedinertia.Individuals
may agreethat
theold viewhas to go butmay not be able to agreeor
coordinateonwhat neworthodoxyshouldbe theguide.
Such a dynamichas been chartedin thestudyof revolu
tion,but it also existsin foreignpolicydisputesand
debates.75The consolidationof a new foreignpolicy
approachdependsnot only on thecollapseof theold
ideas,but also on thedistribution
of replacement
ideas,
especiallytheexistence
of a prominent
When
alternative.
thereare no developedalternatives
or when thereare
many equallystrongalternatives,
the resultcould be a
returnto theold thinking
due todefaultin thefirst
case
and deadlockamong factionsin thesecond.For exam
ple, inQing China in thenineteenth
century,
Sinocen
tricseparation
fromtheencroaching
international
society
was so dominantthatthere
were virtually
no groupsof
with developedreplacement
any import
ideas to guide
China's foreign
policy.76
The sustainability
of a neworthodoxy(whena promi
nent replacement
does exist)overa longerperiodoften
hingeson somedemonstration
of itsefficacy.
Ideas that
enduredo so because theyappear to generatedesirable
results.
When thosenotionsdo not,revanchists
oftenfind
fertile
groundtoarguefora returnto theold ideas.This
was thecase inWeimarGermany
when theresults
ofVer
saillesunderminedtheliberalinternational
policyof the
SocialDemocraticgovernment.
fledgling
Versaillesalso
spawnedthe
May Fourth
Movement inChina thathelped
discreditfledgling
liberaldemocracy
notions.77
Figure8 depictstheway thatthedistribution
of replace
ment ideasand their
demonstrated
efficacy
foster
or inhibit
change.
This argumentfeaturesideasas a meshinggear-one
thatinteracts
with otherfactors
and indoing so has its
own influence.
National strategies
therefore
area product
ofmulti-causalinfluence.
Prior ideasplay a rolebut of
coursedo not unilaterally
determineall aspectsof new
orthodoxies.
Consider,forexample,theroleof therelative
whichoftenshapesnegativeandpositive
powerof actors,
toprevailing
feedback
ideas.
Dominantconceptsthatignore
524
Perspectives on Politics
Continuity(ofoldideas)
Continuity
(change)
relative
powercan lead todisappointing
resultsthatcon
tributeto theirdelegitimation.
Consider thedeclineof
theQing-era tributesystemand sinocentrism
under the
weightof superiorEuropean and Japanesecapabilities
thatexposedtheirfragility
in thelatenineteenth
century.
Likewise,thenumberand natureof replacement
ideasso
centraltoconsolidationisshapedby thepoliticalactivity
and resources
of interest
groupsand individuals
thatpro
mote them.Economic interdependence
and thepromises
of growthinherentin itcan indeedstrengthen
thosein
favorof such ideas.78
Long-termefforts
thatencourage
international
exchangecan facilitatethe riseof replace
ment ideas in particularsocieties.79
Thus thesuccessof
ideascanalsobe shapedby thedegreea countryisinvolved
in theinternational
economy.
Overall,then,theaccountof foreign
policychange(and
continuity)
here iscontingent.
offered
Itdependson the
interaction
of thedominantforeign
policy ideasof states
with theresults
encountered,
aswell as thedistribution
of
replacement
ideasin a particularsocietyand theirinitial
success,ifany.To stress
isnot to forgoexpla
contingency
nation.80
We canposit thatfutureintentions
will depend
on thedegreetowhich theexpectations
ofparticular
dom
inantideasare defiedby events,negativeconsequences
result,
and somesociallyviablereplacement
ideaexists.
This generallogicseemstohavewide applicationin the
of greatpowers,and thoughtherearedifferences,
history
coversbothdemocratic
andauthoritarian
What
regimes.8'
followsis a briefillustration
of how someof thecentral
dynamicscapturedby the logicmight play out in the
ofChina's current"reform
future
and opening"viewon
international
orderdescribedabove.
and Expectations
justifications
and promotethe
Contemporary
Chinese leadersjustify
-in
andopening"
dominantintegration
idea-i.e., "reform
twodifferent
ways.
justification
of current
andmost important,
The first,
withintheexistinginternational
policyis thatintegration
orderprovidesthebestmeans fornationaleconomicdevel
China remains
a government
runbya commu
opment.82
Yet thelegitimacy
and popularsupportof the
nistparty.
but instead
doesnot reston socialistideology,
government
not "Work
"Well-off
Society"
on economicperformance.
mantra.President
Zemin's
Jiang
ersUnite" is thenational
2002 addressto the16thPartyCongressput thisclaim
starkly:
It isessentialforthePartytogive topprioritytodevelopmentin
governingand rejuvenatingthecountryand open up new pros
of the
pects forthemodernizationdrive . . . theprogressiveness
Partyisconcreteand historical,and itmust be judgedbywhether
thePartypromotesthedevelopmentof theadvancedproductive
forces.83
1Vol. 5/No. 3
525
Articles
risensteadilyin recentyears,increasing
from8,700 in
1993 to 87,000 in 2005.90 Involvementin theWorld
TradeOrganization(W1TO) is puttingsignificant
pres
sureson poor farmers
and peasants
who cannotcompete.
As longas theeconomyisbooming,someof thesepeople
can transfer
toothertypes
of jobsor thegovernment
can
providesomeformof subsidy.91
Yet ifgrowthfalters
ina
way that
makes thegovernment
seemcomplicit,thissys
temlooksbrittle.
Second,eventssupported
by theinternational
commu
nitythatChina seesas neo-colonialorwhichmove Tai
wan towardsindependencecould help to undermine
China's currentintegration
orthodoxy.
For example,the
1999 bombingof theChineseembassyinBelgradefueled
nationalismand strengthened
opponentsof opening.92
Much, of course,will dependon theparticularcircum
stancesandwhetherthey
makeBeijinggovernment
seem
Taiwaneseefforts
complicit.
to establishformalindepen
dencecausedeepconcerninChina-indeed thetypethat
can setthestagefor
China to takeaggressive
efforts
on an
issueseen as priorityevenby "reformist"
governments.
Taiwaneseindependence
efforts
in2004-2005 weremet
by a strong(and self-defeating)
reactionfrom
Hu Jintao
andNationalPeople'sCongresspassinganti-secession
leg
islation
which authorized
China touse forceagainstTai
wan ifitcontinuedtopush forindependence.93
Jiangalso identified
a secondgroup
withalternative
pref
erencesforChina'sforeign
policy.
He calledit"those
with
leftist
tendencies"
(distinctfromtheoldMarxistvariety)
who critiquereform-and international
involvement
as contributing
to social injusticeand inequality.
In the
current
context,this
mightincludefarmers,
ruralcitizens,
inlandcities,andpartsof the
militaryorCommunistparty
who havenot sharedequallyinChina'sdevelopment
and
couldrightly
blamereform
andopeningorparticipation
in
theglobalorder(think
WTO) as thecause.In foreign
pol
icysuchtendencies
translate
intosocialsupportforhalting
and reversing
China's integration
in thecurrent
order.If
thecommuniquefromtheFifth
Plenary
Sessionof the16th
PartyCongressinOctober2005 isan indicator,
thechal
lengefromtheLeft-and theinequality
ofgrowth-isof
particular
concernto theleadership
ofHu Jintao
who has
emphasizedthemoreegalitarian
goalof "harmonious
soci
ety"incontrasttoJiang's
mantraof "well-off
society."97
A third
position
would comefromthose
who arecritical
ofglobalization
andwesternvalues,butarenotnecessarily
isolationist
or anti-capitalist.
These peoplemight advo
catea nationalistrealpolitik
amore con
policythatfavors
frontational
with the
strategy
West, stability
and central
athome,whilepursuinga softlineand integra
authority
tioninAsia.Thinkof thisperhaps,as theplatform
forthe
resurgence
ofamodernday"MiddleKingdom"rolewhere
China would exerciseincreasing
withinAsia
hegemony
while perhapsdistancingitselffromoverallinternational
Replacementsfor "Reform
and Opening"
order.98
If reform
and openingdoes falter,
what then?
Presumably
Absentbetterinformation,
itwould appearthatthose
some sortof alternative
path.Anticipatingsuch a new who would emphasize
withdrawal-eitherthenew Left
approach,however,
dependson a keyfactorthatisespe
or realpolitikers-would
occupytherhetorical
highground
ciallyelusivein theChinese case: thenatureanddistribu shouldfutureeventsdefythe"opening"justifications
of
tionof replacement
ideasaboutinternational
within
theChinesegovernment
society
with cleardisappointing
results.
China.94The outlinesof threereplacements
arediscern Both offer
a greater
difference
withcurrent
dominantinte
able inan admittedly
opaque view.95
grationideas(Rightists
want evenmore integration)
and
The first
was identified
byJiangZemin as a challenge would likelybe in a betterpositiontodrawoffthelan
to his own "reform
and opening"emphasisin theyears guageof nationalismtomake theircase.99Chinese strat
followingthe 1989 Tiananmen Square fiasco.96Jiang egywill of course alwaysbe a mix of thesedifferent
labeledthisthethreatfromthe"Right."For thegovern approaches;theissueisthedirection
of shift
and thedegree
those
ment,thedangerfromtheRightinvolves
whowould
towhich one orientation
dominates.
attempttopursueeconomicand politicalliberalization
at
To theextentthata factional
accountofChinesepoli
an evenmore rapidpace at theexpenseof thePartyand
tics is overdrawn(e.g., because the decisionmaking
socialstability.
In recent
yearstheCPC hasbeenespecially dynamicis one of consensus,not groupsfighting
over
focusedon thischallengeand has gone togreateffort
to
control)thenanychange in foreign
will
policythinking
luresuccessful
businessmenintothepartyandwelcome demandespecially
and could takeconsid
negativeresults
thereturn
ofChinese fromabroadwho mightotherwise erabletime,justas itdid inQing China.'00 If thereis a
be a voice formore forceful
politicalchange.Think here continuedsharedview that"isolationis themajor factor
of those
who havebenefited
most fromrapidintegration explaining
China's decline"and "openingfueledChina's
butwho arenowchafing
underCPC constraints
or believe rise,"thenshifting
significantly
away fromreformand
Chinamust takereforms
to thenextlevel(e.g.ruleof law, openingwould not happenquickly.101
Althoughnot so
education)at a faster
pace-e.g., thenewprivatebusiness dominantas theseparatist
mentality
ofQing China, inte
men or state-owned
gration todayenjoysa privilegedstatusagainstwhich
enterprise
artists
or intel
executives,
replacement
or even
ideaproponents
lectuals,coastalcityregionsand theirofficials,
may havea hard timemak
partsof thebureaucracy
thathavean interest
in integration. ingheadway.
526
Perspectives on Politics
Influencing Intentions
1Vol. 5/No. 3
527
Articles
Of course,thelimits
of outsideinfluence
on a country
ofChina's sizeand complexity,
especially
giventhepopu
larChinesedesireforautonomy
andnon-interference
from
foreigners,
are significant.
Moreover,China's authoritar
iangovernment
and lackof transparency
limittheability
tocloselyfollowand shapeinternal
developments.
China's
futurein theworldwill be largely
of itsownmaking.Yet
as seeninhistory,
outsideinfluence
has sometimes
played
a role in the evolutionof China's approach to inter
nationalsociety-fromthe
OpiumWars tothe
May Fourth
Movement to theearlyCold War period to thecurrent
integration.
Centraltothishistory-andChina'sfuture
arenot just theperilsof poweror thepromisesof inter
dependence,but also how theyrelateto theway China
thinksabout theworld.
Notes
1 Zoellick2005.
2 See, for example the hearings held from the summer
of 2006 up to now. http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/
hearingarchive.php
3 Vice President sRemarks to theAustralian-American
Leadership Dialogue, Shangri-La Hotel Sydney,
Australia, February 27, 2007. http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/02/
20070223.html
4 Johnston 2003.
5 Friedberg 2005 offers a typology and contingent
analysis of future relations that lacks a general expla
nation to tell us whether eventswill move in one
or another.
direction
6 Copeland 2000a.
7 Friedberg 2005 documents that there is some varia
tion
in this
dichotomy?some
who
focus
on
power
pessimistic.
about
intentions
and
cooperative
or conflic
59 (April2007).
12 Thomas
528
http://www.fas.org/news/china/1997/970912-prc.
htm; Hao andWang 1978, 171.
17 Pillsbury 2000.
18 See Kent 2002; Johnston 2003, 2004a.
21 Ross 1997.
22 The five principles, which have been included in the
Chinese constitution, are 1) respect for sovereignty
2) non-aggression 3) non-interference 4) equal and
mutual benefit 5) peaceful co-existence.
23 Jiang Zemins Report to the 16thNational Congress
of theChinese Communist Party,November 8,
2002.
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/
49007.htm. Chinas recent "reassurance diplomacy"
in South East Asia suggests a mode of cooperative
not easily
equated with domination or
leadership
but
is nonetheless compatible
behavior,
balancing
with extant norms. See Medeiros and Fravel 2003;
Shambaugh 2005.
24 Wen, 2007. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/
2007-03/03/content_818952.htm
25 As quoted inWestad et al. 1998, 135.
26 Yardley and Lague 2007 and Office of the Secretary
of Defense, 2006.
27 Crane et al. 2005 and Annual Report toCongress: The
Military Power of thePeoples Republic ofChina 2006.
28 See Foot 2000; Barkin 1998; Payne and Samhat
2004.
29 Ramos 2004.
30
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/19/
content_3645750.htm. and Kahn 2007.
31 Foot 2000, 3.
32 Chinas respect for human rights saw a downturn in
2006 as China cracked down on dissent likely in
anticipation of the 2008 Olympics. See Human
RightsWatch, World Report 2007. http://hrw.org/
englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11 /chinai 4867.htm.
Small
14 See Morgenthau
15 Rosecrance 1986.
16 Jiang Zemins Report at the 15* National Congress
of
theCommunist Party ofChina, September 12, 1997.
1966, 38ff;Wolters
Perspectives on Politics
1962, 81-102.
advances
are also
sometimes
made.
For
exam
35 Mearsheimer
2001, 402.
36 Roy 1994, 149-168, 159-160.
37 Geyer 1981, 107.
38 Hong Kong Jing bao, No. 172 (5 November 1991),
6 November 1991, 28-30 as
84-86, in FBIS-CHI,
cited inWhiting 1995.
44 Pillsbury
2000;Qin 2001.
45
1995, 1-39.
2006.
50Walt 1987; Schweller
51 Lemke 2002. Ruggie
consider
purpose
as well
as
power.
52 Johnston 2001.
53 Frieden and Rogowski, 1996.
54 The index number of 100 for real disposable income
in 1978 was equal to 343.4 RMB. See http://
chinadataonline.org/member/yearbook/default.
asp?StartYear= 1984&EndYear=2006.
55 www.chinadataonline.org. For data prior to 1985,
see China Statistical Yearbook, 633.
56 Statistical Reports on theDevelopment ofChinese
Internet,
available
index/index.htm
57 Rosecrance
at
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/en/
PremierWen
) andZheng 2005.
20044/rs.pdf
as well.
U.S.
power was
policy
came
after Mao
to
of State
is "Create
a more
secure, demo
September 2007
1Vol. 5/No. 3
529
Articles
chinaembassy.org.il/eng/xwdt/tl78046.htm.
84 Communique of the 15th CPC Central Commit
tee Plenum, October 9-11, 2005. http://www.
china.org.cn/english/features/45280.htm.
85 Lampton 2001, 25Iff.; Zhao 2004. For an example
of this view of history see Chinas October 2005
white paper "Building Political Democracy in
China," especially Section I, "A Choice Suited to
Chinas Conditions."
86 Wu2001.
87 Riskin and Khan 2000; Lardy 2002; Eckholm
2002, 1;Kahn 2004a, 2004b.
88 Goldstein and Lardy 2004. Dollar 2005, 48-58.
89 Wang et al. 2007. www.l32.203.59.36:81/Group/
papers/papers/PMMA-2007-07.pdf.
90 Data based on figures released by Chinas
Security
Bureau,
20061115_l.htm.
91 Lin 2007.
www.zonaeuropa.com/
Public
137-156.
93 Cody 2005.
Press.
Perspectives on Politics
De
nia
cago
March
19.
2000. Managing uncertainty: Beliefs
David.
Edelstein,
about intentions and the rise of great powers. Security
18-25.
http://www.fas.org/news/china/1997/970912-prc.
htm.
-.
xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/19/content_
3645750.htm.
Jiang Zemins Report at the 14thNational Congress of the
Communist Party ofChina, 1992. Reprinted inChina
30 (2): 7-45.
english/docs/2005/01 /13/china9809.htm.
2007. World Report 2007. http://hrw.org/
englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11 /chinai 4867.htm.
Hunt, Michael.
Press.
Press.
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Mosher, Steven. 2001. Hegemon: Chinas Plan toDomi
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