The Equal Protection Clause

Definition:
Case:
Quinto vs Comelec (December
1, 2009) G. R. No. 189698
Nachura, J.
FACTS:
-Before the Court is a petition for
prohibition and certiorari, with
prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction,
assailing
Section
4(a)
of
Resolution No. 8678 of the
Commission
on
Elections
(COMELEC).
-An act authorizing the Comelec
to use an automated system in
the national and local elections
and making ipso facto resigned
elective officials who files their
COC. Almost a decade later, it
was amended by RA 9369 which
now provides that any person
holding a public appointive
office or position, including
active members of the armed
forces,
and
officers
and
employees in governmentowned
or
-controlled
corporations,
shall
be
considered ipso
facto resigned from his/her
office and must vacate the
same at the start of the day of
the filing of his/her certificate
of candidacy.
-They further assert that it is
discriminatory and violates the
equal protection clause in the
Constitution.
The
petitioners
contention, that the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election
Code
pertaining
to

elective officials gives undue

benefit to such officials as against
the appointive ones and violates
the equal protection clause of the
constitution
-Respondents aver that the case
is premature and they have no
legal standing because they have
not yet filed their CoC.
-The OSG, however, agrees with
petitioners that there is a conflict
in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 that
should be resolved. According to
the OSG, there seems to be no
basis to consider appointive
officials as ipso facto resigned and
to require them to vacate their
positions on the same day that
they file their CoCs, because they
are not yet considered as
candidates at that time. Further,
this deemed resigned provision
existed
in Batas
Pambansa
Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 881, and no
longer finds a place in our present
election laws with the innovations
brought about by the automated
system
ISSUE: WON RA 9369 is
constitutional?
HELD:
-The transcendental nature and
paramount importance of the
issues raised and the compelling
state interest involved in their
early resolution the period for the
filing of CoCs for the 2010
elections has already started and
hundreds
of
civil
servants
intending to run for elective
offices
are
to
lose
their
employment
-Here, petitioners interest in
running for public office, an
interest protected by Sections 4
and 8 of Article III of the

Constitution, is breached by the

proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369. It is now the opportune
time for the Court to strike down
the said proviso for being
violative of the equal protection
clause and for being overbroad
-In considering persons holding
appointive
positions
as ipso
facto resigned from their posts
upon the filing of their CoCs, but
not considering as resigned all
other civil servants, specifically
the elective ones, the law unduly
discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between
those
who
hold
appointive
positions and those occupying
elective posts, does not justify
such differential treatment.
-Applying the four requisites to
the instant case, the Court finds
that the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices
as opposed to those holding
elective ones is not germane to
the purposes of the law.
-The obvious reason for the
challenged provision is to prevent
the use of a governmental
position
to
promote
ones
candidacy, or even to wield a
dangerous or coercive influence
on the electorate. The measure is
further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline
of
the
public
service
by
eliminating the danger that the
discharge of official duty would be
motivated
by
political
considerations rather than the
welfare
of the
public. The
restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil
servants to the electoral arena,
while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they

would be attending to their

campaign rather than to their
office work.
-the provision pertains to all civil
servants holding appointive posts
without distinction as to whether
they occupy high positions in
government or not. Congress has
not shown a compelling state
interest
to
restrict
the
fundamental right involved on
such a sweeping scale.
Motion for Reconsideration
Held:
An election is the embodiment of
the popular will, perhaps the
purest
expression
of
the
sovereign power of the people. It
involves the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by
popular vote. Considering that
elected officials are put in office
by their constituents for a definite
term, it may justifiably be said
that they were excluded from the
ambit of the deemed resigned
provisions in utmost respect for
the mandate of the sovereign will.
In
other
words,
complete
deference is accorded to the will
of the electorate that they be
served by such officials until the
end of the term for which they
were elected. In contrast, there is
no such expectation insofar as
appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of
appointive and elective officials is
therefore
germane
to
the
purposes of the law. For the law
was made not merely to preserve
the integrity, efficiency, and
discipline of the public service;
the Legislature, whose wisdom is
outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to

balance this with the competing,

yet equally compelling, interest of
deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court
RESOLVES
to
GRANT
the
respondents and the intervenors
Motions
for
Reconsideration;
REVERSE and SET ASIDE this
Courts
December
1,
2009
Decision; DISMISS the Petition;
and
ISSUE
this
Resolution
declaring
as
not
UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678, (2) the second proviso in
the third paragraph of Section 13
of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3)
Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

Ichong vs Hernandez, G. R.
No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957)
Labrador, J.
FACTS:
-The Legislature passed R.A. 1180
(An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business). Citizens and juridical
entities of the United States were
exempted from this Act.
Its purpose was to prevent
persons who are not citizens of
the
Phil.
from
having
a
stranglehold upon the peoples
economic
life.

a prohibition against aliens

and against associations,
partnerships,
or
corporations the capital of
which are not wholly owned
by Filipinos, from engaging
directly or indirectly in the
retail trade
aliens actually engaged in
the retail business on May
15, 1954 are allowed to

continue their business,

unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with
law, until their death or
voluntary
retirement.
In
case of juridical persons,
ten years after the approval
of the Act or until the
expiration of term.
-Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and
behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships
affected by the Act, filed an action
to declare it unconstitutional as it,
among others, violate the equal
protection clause.
ISSUE: WON the act violates the
equal protection clause?
HELD:
-No. the mere fact of alienage is
the root and cause of the
distinction between the alien and
the national as a trader. The alien
resident owes allegiance to the
country of his birth or his adopted
country; his stay here is for
personal convenience; he is
naturally lacking in that spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasm for this
country where he temporarily
stays and makes his living, or of
that spirit of regard, sympathy
and consideration for his Filipino
customers as would prevent him
from taking advantage of their
weakness and exploiting them.
-The power of the legislature to
make
distinctions
and
classifications among persons is
not curtailed or denied by the
equal protection of the laws
clause. The legislative power
admits of a wide scope of
discretion, and a law can be
violative of the constitutional
limitation
only
when
the

classification
is
without
reasonable basis.
-The equal protection clause does
not demand absolute equality
among
residents.
It
merely
requires that all persons shall be
treated
alike,
under
like
circumstances
and
conditions
both as to privileges conferred
and
liabilities
enforced. The
classification is actual, real and
reasonable, and all persons of one
class are treated alike.

Victoriano vs Elizalde, G. R.
No. L-25246 (September 12,
1974)
Zaldivar, J.,
FACTS:
-Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter
referred to as Appellee), a
member of the religious sect
known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo",
had been in the employ of the
Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.
-He was a member of the Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union which has a
collective bargaining agreement
with the company which states
that Membership in the Union
shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent
employees workers.
-Later on, Republic Act No. 3350
was enacted, introducing an
amendment to paragraph (4)
subsection (a) of section 4 of
Republic
Act
No.
875,
as
follows: ... "but such agreement
shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any
such labor organization".
-Being a member of a religious
sect that prohibits the affiliation
of its members with any labor

organization, Appellee presented

his resignation to appellant Union
in 1962, then again in 1974.
-The Union wrote a formal letter to
the Company asking the latter to
separate
Appellee
from
the
service in view of the fact that he
was resigning from the Union as a
member. The management of the
Company in turn notified Appellee
and his counsel that unless the
Appellee
could
achieve
a
satisfactory arrangement with the
Union, the Company would be
constrained to dismiss him from
the service.
-Appellee then filed an injunction
to enjoining the company from
dismissing him. The RTC ruled in
favor of the appellee.
-The
union
challenges
the
constitutionality of RA 3350 as it
violates the right to form lawful
associations
(due
to
the
prohibitory character of the act).
Also, because it impairs the
obligations and contracts, and it
favors religious sects without
protection for the union, violates
non-establishment clause and
equal protection clause inasmuch
as by exempting from the
operation
of
closed
shop
agreement the members of the
"Iglesia ni Cristo".
ISSUE: WON RA 3350 violates the
equal protection clause?
HELD:
-The guaranty of equal protection
of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state.
The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to
things that are different.
-All that is required of a valid
classification
is
that
it
be

reasonable, which means that the

classification should be based on
substantial
distinctions
which
make for real differences; that it
must be germane to the purpose
of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class.
-We believe that Republic Act No.
3350 satisfies the aforementioned
requirements. There is such real
distinction in the beliefs, feelings
and sentiments of employees.
Employees do not believe in the
same religious faith and different
religions differ in their dogmas
and cannons. Religious beliefs are
not mere beliefs, mere ideas
existing only in the mind, for they
carry
with
them
practical
consequences
and
are
the
motives of certain rules. of human
conduct and the justification of
certain acts.
-The classification introduced by
said Act is also germane to its
purpose. The purpose of the law is
precisely to avoid those who
cannot, because of their religious
belief, join labor unions, from
being deprived of their right to
work and from being dismissed
from their work because of union
shop security agreements.
-Republic
Act
No.
3350,
furthermore, is not limited in its
application to conditions existing
at the time of its enactment. It is
intended to apply for all times as
long as the conditions to which
the law is applicable exist.
-Finally, the Act applies equally to
all members of said religious
sects; this is evident from its
provision. The Act only restores to
them their freedom of association
which closed shop agreements
have taken away, and puts them

in the same plane as the other

workers who are not prohibited by
their religion from joining labor
unions. The circumstance, that
the other employees, because
they are differently situated, are
not granted the same privilege,
does
not
render
the
law
unconstitutional,
for
every
classification allowed by the
Constitution by its nature involves
inequality

Biraogo vs. Truth Commission,

G.R. No. 192935 (December 7,
2010)
Mendoza, J.,
FACTS:
-The two petitions seek to declare
void E.O. No. 1, creating the Phil.
Truth Commission.
-Petitioner Louis Biraogo prays for
the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction and TRO to
declare
said
order
as
unconstitutional. Edcel Lagman,
et. Al, as members of the HR
prays the same.
-Biraogo claims that it usurped
the authority of Congress to
create
a
public
office
or
appropriate funds therefor. Also,
their arguments are as follows:
(b) The provision of Book III,
Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority
of the President to structurally
reorganize the Office of the

President to achieve economy,

simplicity and efficiency does not
include the power to create an
entirely new public office which
was hitherto inexistent like the
Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended
the Constitution and pertinent
statutes when it vested the Truth
Commission with quasi-judicial
powers
duplicating,
if
not
superseding, those of the Office of
the Ombudsman created under
the 1987 Constitution and the
Department of Justice created
under the Administrative Code of
1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause as it selectively
targets for investigation and
prosecution
officials
and
personnel
of
the
previous
administration as if corruption is
their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present,
who may be indictable.
(e) The creation of the Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010 violates
the
consistent
and
general
international practice of four
decades wherein States constitute
truth commissions to exclusively
investigate
human
rights
violations,
which
customary
practice forms part of the
generally accepted principles of
international
law
which
the
Philippines is mandated to adhere
to pursuant to the Declaration of
Principles
enshrined
in
the
Constitution.
(f) The creation of the Truth
Commission is an exercise in
futility, an adventure in partisan

hostility, a launching pad for

trial/conviction by publicity and a
mere populist propaganda to
mistakenly impress the people
that widespread poverty will
altogether vanish if corruption is
eliminated
without
even
addressing
the
other
major
causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous
commissions
were
not
constitutionally challenged is of
no moment because neither
laches nor estoppel can bar an
eventual
question
on
the
constitutionality and validity of an
executive issuance or even a
statute
ISSUE: WON the E.O 1 violates
the equal protection clause?
HELD:
-Yes. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of
graft
and
corruption
during
the previous administration only.
The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.
-In this regard, it must be borne in
mind
that
the
Arroyo
administration is but just a
member of a class, that is, a class
of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include
past
administrations
similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness
which the equal protection clause
cannot
sanction. Such
discriminating
differentiation
clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness
and
selective
retribution.
The
differences
enumerated were not substantial

enough
to
justify
such
discrimination.
-The PTC, to be true to its
mandate of searching for the
truth, must not exclude the other
past
administrations. The
PTC
must, at least, have the authority
to
investigate
all
past
administrations. While reasonabl
e prioritization is permitted, it
should not be arbitrary lest it be
struck
down
for
being
unconstitutional
-That the previous administration
was picked out was deliberate
and intentional as can be gleaned
from the fact that it was
underscored at least three times
in the assailed executive order. It
must be noted that Executive
Order No. 1 does not even
mention any particular act, event
or report to be focused on unlike
the investigative commissions
created in the past. The equal
protection clause is violated by
purposeful
and
intentional
discrimination
Justice Serenos Dissenting
Opinion
-The discussion of the majority
suffers from self-contradiction and
unreality of worldview
-In other words, within the class of
taxpayers obligated to pay taxes
in the period from the second half
of 1941 to the end of 1945 are
two subclasses those who did not
pay their taxes and those who
did. By the same kind of
reasoning, within the class of
political administrations, if past
administrations
have
already
been the subject of a fact-finding
commission, while one particular
administration has not been so,
that alone is a good basis for
making a distinction between

them and an administration that

has not yet been investigated.
-In order to be swift and
independent, truth commissions
operate
within
strict
time
constraints.
They
are
also
restricted in the subject matter
they can review. This is the real
world of truth commissions, not
that imagined by the majority.
-On the first test. Is the
classification reasonable, based
on substantial distinctions that
make for real difference? The
government has already given
several
reasons
why
the
distinction
between
the
administration of President Arroyo
is different from other past
administrations. The distinction
lies in reason administrative
constraints,
availability
of
evidence, immediate past acts,
non-prescription of causes of
actions all of which are not
whimsical, contrived, superficial
or irrelevant.
-On the second test. The
classification is germane to the
purpose of the law to get a
headstart
on
the
campaign
against graft and corruption. If the
investigation into the root of
corruption is to gain traction, it
must start somewhere, and the
best place to start is to examine
the
immediate
past
administration, not distant past
administrations.
-On the third test. Of course
this is not relevant in this case,
for the law being examined
in Victoriano was
one
that
granted prospective rights, and
not one that involves fact-finding
into past acts as with EO 1.
-On the last test. This asks
whether the law applies equally to
all members of the segregated

class. It must be emphasized that

in the Victoriano case, this last
test was applied not to all the
workers in the bargaining unit,
but it was applied to the subclass
of
workers
whose
religions
prohibit them from joining labor
unions. In application to this case,
the question should then have
been, not whether there is
equality of treatment between all
political administrations under EO
1, but whether within the subclass
of third level public officials of the
Arroyo administration that is, the
subject of EO 1 there is unequal
treatment. Obviously, the answer
is no.
-It must be emphasized that
the Victoriano case on which the
majority heavily relies states in
several parts that classification
must
necessarily
result
in
inequality of treatment and that
such inequality does not give rise
to a constitutional problem. It is
the lack of reason that gives rise
to a constitutional issue, not the
inequality per se
-In the instant case, the fact that
other administrations are not the
subject of the PTCs investigative
aim is not a case of selective
prosecution that violates equal
protection. The Executive is given
broad
discretion
to
initiate
criminal prosecution and enjoys
clear presumption of regularity
and good faith in the performance
thereof.
For
petitioners
to
overcome that presumption, they
must carry the burden of showing
that the PTC is a preliminary step
to selective prosecution, and that
it is laden with a discriminatory
effect
and
a
discriminatory
purpose. However, petitioner has
sorely failed in discharging that
burden.

Justice Coronas Concurring

Opinion
-Unlike the present embattled and
controversial Truth Commission,
however, the PCGG was created
by Pres. Corazon C. Aquino
pursuant to her legislative powers
under Executive Order No. 1,
which in turn, was sanctioned by
Proclamation No. 3.
-Considering that the President
was
exercising
a
delegated
power, his actions should have
conformed to the standards set by
the law, that is, that the
reorganization be in the interest
of "simplicity, economy and
efficiency." Were such objectives
met? They were not. The Truth
Commission clearly duplicates
and supplants the functions and
powers of the Office of the
Ombudsman
and/or
the
Department of Justice
-On its face, E.O. No. 1 clearly
singles
out
the
previous
administration
as
the
Truth
Commissions sole subject of
investigation. If the President
decides not to expand the
coverage of the investigation,
then the Truth Commissions sole
directive is the investigation of
officials and employees of the
Arroyo administration.
-(1) No Substantial Distinction
There is no substantial distinction
between the corruption which
occurred
during
the
past
administration and the corruption
of the administrations prior to it.
Allegations of graft and corruption
in
the
government
are
unfortunately
prevalent
regardless of who the President
happens to be. Respondents
claim of widespread systemic

corruption is not unique only to

the past administration.
-(2) Not Germane to the Purpose
of the Law
In the light of the unmistakable
purpose of E.O. No. 1, the
classification of the past regime
as separate from the past
administrations is not germane to
the purpose of the law. Corruption
did not occur only in the past
administration. To stamp out
corruption, we must go beyond
the faade of each administration
and investigate all public officials
and employees alleged to have
committed graft in any previous
administration
-(3) E.O. No. 1 does Not Apply to
Future Conditions
the classification does not even
refer to present conditions, much
more to future conditions vis-avis
the commission of graft and
corruption. It is limited to a
particular past administration and
not to all past administrations
-(4) E.O. No. 1 Does Not Apply to
the Same Class
It excludes from its purview the
graft
and
the
grafters
of
administrations prior to the last
one. Graft is not exclusive to the
previous presidency alone, hence
there is no justification to limit the
scope of the mandate only to the
previous administration.

Dumlao vs Comelec, 95 SCRA

392 (January 22, 1980)
Melencio-Herrera, J.,
FACTS:
-Petitioners
seek
to
enjoin
respondent
COMELEC
from
implementing certain provisions

of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52,

and 53 for being unconstitutional.
-Patricio Dumlao was the former
governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He
has already retired from his office
and he has been receiving
retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to
the same office.
Meanwhile,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was
enacted.
This
law
provides,
among others, that retirees from
public office like Dumlao are
disqualified to run for office.
Dumlao assailed the law averring
that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In
general,
Dumlao invoked equal protection
in the eye of the law.
-His petition was joined by Atty.
Romeo
Igot
and
Alfredo
Salapantan, Jr. These two however
have different issues. The suits of
Igot and Salapantan are more of a
taxpayers suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the
term of office of the elected
officials, the length of the
campaign, and the provision
which bars persons charged for
crimes from running for public
office as well as the provision that
provides that the mere filing of
complaints against them after
preliminary investigation would
already disqualify them from
office.
ISSUE: WON Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52 violated the equal
protection clause?
HELD:
-No. In fine, it bears reiteration
that the equal protection clause
does
not
forbid
all
legal
classification. What is proscribes
is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. That

constitutional guarantee is not

violated
by
a
reasonable
classification
based
upon
substantial distinctions, where the
classification is germane to the
purpose of the law and applies to
all belonging to the same class.
-If the groupings are based on
reasonable
and
real
differentiations, one class can be
treated and regulated differently
from another class. For purposes
of public service, employees 65
years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining
that
age
are
subject
to
compulsory
retirement,
while
those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
-It may neither be reasonable to
disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a
65 year old retiree could be a
good local official just like one,
aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old
elective local official, who has
retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason
to disqualify him from running for
the same office from which he
had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision. The need
for new blood assumes relevance.
-The purpose of the law is to allow
the emergence of younger blood
in
local
governments.
The
classification in question being
pursuant to that purpose, it
cannot be considered invalid
"even it at times, it may be
susceptible to the objection that it
is
marred
by
theoretical
inconsistencies"

Dissent of Justice Teehankee

-To specially and peculiarly ban a

65-year old previously retired
elective local official from running
for the sameelective office (of
governor, in this case) previously
held by him and from which he
has retired is arbitrary, oppressive
and
unreasonable.
Persons
similarly situated are not similarly
treated, e.g. a retired vicegovernor, mayor or councilor of
65 is entitled to run for governor
(because the disqualification is for
the retiree of 65 to run for the
same elective office from which
he retired) but petitioner is barred
from doing so (although he may
run for any other lesser office).
Both are 65 and are retirees, yet
one is barred from running for the
office of governor

Ceniza vs Comelec, 96 SCRA

763 (January 28, 1980)
Concepcion, Jr, J.,
FACTS:
-Pursuant to Batas Blg 51
(enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC
adopted Resolution No. 1421
which effectively bars voters in
chartered cities (unless otherwise
provided by their charter), highly
urbanized (those earning above
P40 M) cities, and component
cities (whose charters prohibit
them) from voting in provincial
elections. The City of Mandaue,
on
the
other
hand,
is
a
component city NOT a chartered
one or a highly urbanized one. So
when COMELEC added Mandaue
to the list of 20 cities that cannot
vote
in
provincial
elections,
Ceniza, in behalf of the other
members of DOERS (Democracy
or
Extinction:
Resolved
to

Succeed)
questioned
the
constitutionality of BB 51 and the
COMELEC resolution.
-They
said
that
the
regulation/restriction of voting
being imposed is a curtailment of
the right to suffrage. Further,
petitioners claim that political and
gerrymandering motives were
behind the passage of Batas Blg.
51 and Section 96 of the Charter
of Mandaue City. They contend
that the Province of Cebu is
politically and historically known
as an opposition bailiwick and of
the total 952,716 registered
voters in the province, close to
one-third (1/3) of the entire
province of Cebu would be barred
from voting for the provincial
officials of the province of Cebu.
Ceniza
also
said
that
the
constituents of Mandaue never
ratified their charter.
-Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of
BB 885 insofar as it classifies
cities including Cebu City as
highly urbanized as the only basis
for not allowing its electorate to
vote for the provincial officials is
inherently
and
palpably
unconstitutional in that such
classification is not based on
substantial distinctions germane
to the purpose of the law which in
effect provides for and regulates
the exercise of the right of
suffrage, and therefore such
unreasonable
classification
amounts to a denial of equal
protection.
ISSUE: WON there is a violation
of equal protection clause?
HELD:
-No. The thrust of the 1973
Constitution is towards the fullest
autonomy of local government

units. In the Declaration of

Principles and State Policies, it is
stated that The State shall
guarantee and promote the
autonomy of local government
units to ensure their fullest
development
as
self-reliant
communities.
-These cities are independent of
the province in the administration
of their affairs. Such being the
case, it is but just and proper to
limit the selection and election of
the provincial officials to the
voters of the province whose
interests are vitally affected and
exclude therefrom the voters of
highly urbanized cities.
-The classification of cities into
highly
urbanized
cities
and
component cities on the basis of
their regular annual income is
based
upon
substantial
distinction. The revenue of a city
would show whether or not it is
capable
of
existence
and
development as a relatively
independent social, economic,
and political unit. It would also
show whether the city has
sufficient economic or industrial
activity
as
to
warrant
its
independence from the province
where
it
is
geographically
situated. Cities with smaller
income
need
the
continued
support
of
the
provincial
government thus justifying the
continued participation of the
voters in the election of provincial
officials in some instances.
-The practice of allowing voters in
one component city to vote for
provincial officials and denying
the same privilege to voters in
another component city is a
matter of legislative discretion
which
violates
neither
the
Constitution nor the voter's right

of suffrage. Their right is limited

to the right to vote for elective
city officials in local elections
which the questioned statues
neither withdraw nor restrict.

Nunez vs Sandiganbayan, 111

SCRA 433 (January 30, 1982)
Fernando, C.J.,
FACTS:
-Petitioner in this certiorari and
prohibition proceeding assails the
validity of the Presidential Decree
creating the Sandiganbayan, He
was
accused
before
such
respondent
Court
of
estafa
through falsification of public and
commercial
documents
committed in connivance with his
other
co-accused,
all
public
officials, in several cases.
-Petitioner in his memorandum
invokes the guarantee of equal
protection in seeking to nullify
Presidential Decree No. 148.
The Sandiganbayan proceedings
violates petitioner's right to equal
protection, because - appeal as a
matter of right became minimized
into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and
limited only to questions of law,
excluding a review of the facts
and trial evidence; and - there is
only one chance to appeal
conviction, by certiorari to the
Supreme Court, instead of the
traditional two chances.
ISSUE: WON the PD creating the
Sandiganbayan is constitutional?
HELD:
-To assure that the general
welfare be promoted, which is the

end of law, a regulatory measure

may cut into the rights to liberty
and property. Those adversely
affected
may
under
such
circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can
show that the governmental act
assailed, far from being inspired
by the attainment of the common
weal was prompted by the spirit
of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination
that
finds
no
support in reason.
-The SC ruled against Nuez. The
1973 Constitution had provided
for the creation of a special court
that shall have original jurisdiction
over
cases
involving
public
officials charged with graft and
corruption.
The
constitution
specifically makes mention of the
creation of a special court, the
Sandiganbayan,
precisely
in
response to a problem, the
urgency of which cannot be
denied, namely, dishonesty in the
public service. It follows that
those who may thereafter be tried
by such court ought to have been
aware as far back as January 17,
1973,
when
the
present
Constitution came into force, that
a different procedure for the
accused
therein,
whether
a
private citizen as petitioner is or a
public official, is not necessarily
offensive to the equal protection
clause
of
the
Constitution.
Further, the classification therein
set forth met the standard
requiring that it must be based
on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the
law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of
the class. Further still, decisions
in the Sandiganbayan are reached

by a unanimous decision from 3

justices
a showing that
decisions
therein
are
more
conceivably
carefully
reached
than other trial courts.
-Classification is thus not ruled
out, it being sufficient to quote
from the Tuason decision anew
"that the laws operate equally
and uniformly on all persons
under similar circumstances or
that all persons must be treated
in
the
same
manner,
the
conditions not being different,
both in the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed.
Dissent of Justice Makasiar
-Some
provisions
in
the
Sandiganbayan violate not only
the constitutional guarantees of
due process as well as equal
protection of the law and against
the enactment of ex post facto
laws, but also the constitutional
provisions on the power of
supervision of the Supreme Court
over inferior courts as well as its
rule-making authority.
-Estafa and malversation of
private funds are on the same
category as graft and corruption
committed by public officers, who,
under the Decree creating the
Sandiganbayan. are only allowed
one appeal - to the Supreme
Court (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No.
1606).
The
fact
that
the
Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial
court does not generate any
substantial distinction to validate
this invidious discrimination Three
judges sitting on the same case
does not ensure a quality of
justice better than that meted out
by a trial court presided by one
judge. The ultimate decisive
factors
are
the
intellectual

competence,
industry
and
integrity of the trial judge. But a
review by two appellate tribunals
of the same case certainly
ensures better justice to the
accused and to the people.
-Limiting the power of review by
the Supreme Court of convictions
by the Sandiganbayan only to
issues of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion, likewise
violates
the
constitutional
presumption of innocence of the
accused, which presumption can
only be overcome by proof
beyond reasonable doubt
-Because the Supreme Court
under P.D. No. 1606 is precluded
from reviewing questions of fact
and the evidence submitted
before the Sandiganbayan, the
Supreme
Court
is
thereby
deprived of the constitutional
power to determine whether the
guilt of the accused has been
established by proof beyond
reasonable
doubt,
therefore
subverts
the
constitutional
presumption of innocence in his
favor which is enjoyed by all other
defendants in other criminal cases
-At present, there are only 6
members of the Sandiganbayan
or
two
divisions
actually
operating. Consequently, when a
member of the Division dissents,
two other members may be
designated by the Presiding
Justice to sit temporarily with the
Division to constitute a special
division of five members. The fact
that there are only 6 members
now
composing
the
Sandiganbayan limits the choice
of the Presiding Justice to only
three, instead of 6 members from
whom to select the two other
Justices to compose a special
division of five in case a member

of the division dissents. This

situation patently diminishes to
an
appreciable
degree
the
chances of an accused for an
acquittal.
Applied
to
the
petitioner, Section 5 of P.D. No.
1606 denies him the equal
protection of the law as against
those who will be prosecuted
when three more members of the
Sandiganbayan will be appointed
to complete its membership of
nine.
-Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 further
displays
such
arbitrary
classification; because it places
expressly the Sandiganbayan on
"the same level as the Court of
Appeals." As heretofore stated,
the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate
trial court and not an appellate
court; its jurisdiction is purely
limited to criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corruption as
well as violation of the prohibited
drug law committed by public
officers and employees of the
government

Pase vs Drilon, 163 SCRA 386

(June 30, 1988)
Sarmiento, J.,
FACTS:
-The
petitioner,
Philippine
Association of Service Exporters,
Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged
principally
in
the
recruitment of Filipino workers, for
overseas placement," challenges
the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of

1988, of the Department of Labor

and Employment, in the character
of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION
OF
DEPLOYMENT
OF
FILIPINO
DOMESTIC
AND
HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS.
-The measure is assailed, among
others, for "discrimination against
males or females;" 2 that it "does
not apply to all Filipino workers
but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills. Also, it
allegedly violates the right to
travel and exercise of lawmaking
power.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation
of equal protection clause?
HELD:
-No. As a general rule, official acts
enjoy a presumed vahdity. In the
absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, the
presumption logically stands.
-here
is
no
question
that
Department Order No. 1 applies
only
to
"female
contract
workers," but it does not thereby
make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is wellsettled that "equality before the
law" under the Constitution does
not import a perfect Identity of
rights among all men and women
-the Court is well aware of the
unhappy plight that has befallen
our female labor force abroad,
especially
domestic
servants,
amid
exploitative
working
conditions marked by, in not a
few cases, physical and personal
abuse. The sordid tales of
maltreatment suffered by migrant
Filipina workers, even rape and
various
forms
of
torture,
confirmed by testimonies of

returning workers, are compelling

motives for urgent Government
action. The same, however,
cannot be said of our male
workers. In the first place, there is
no evidence that, except perhaps
for isolated instances, our men
abroad have been afflicted with
an Identical predicament.
-There is likewise no doubt that
such a classification is germane to
the purpose behind the measure.
Unquestionably, it is the avowed
objective of Department Order
No. 1 to "enhance the protection
for
Filipino
female
overseas
workers" 17 this Court has no
quarrel that in the midst of the
terrible
mistreatment
Filipina
workers have suffered abroad, a
ban on deployment will be for
their own good and welfare.
-The Order does not narrowly
apply to existing conditions.
Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those
conditions exist. This is clear from
the Order itself ("Pending review
of the administrative and legal
measures, in the Philippines and
in the host countries)
-Had the ban been given universal
applicability, then it would have
been unreasonable and arbitrary.
For obvious reasons, not all of
them are similarly circumstanced.
What the Constitution prohibits is
the singling out of a select person
or group of persons within an
existing class, to the prejudice of
such a person or group or
resulting in an unfair advantage
to another person or group of
persons

International School Alliance

of Educators vs. Quisumbing,
333 SCRA 13 (June 1, 2000)
Kapunan, J.,
FACTS:
-International School (IS) pays its
teachers who are hired from
abroad, or foreign-hires, a higher
salary than its local-hires, whether
the latter are Filipino or not (most
are Filipino, but some are
American). It justifies this under
the dislocation factor that
foreigners must be given a higher
salary both to attract them to
teach here, and to compensate
them
for
the
significant
economic
disadvantages
involved in coming here. The
Teachers
Union
cries
discrimination.
-The School grants foreign-hires
certain benefits not accorded
local-hires. These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs,
taxes, and home leave travel
allowance. Foreign-hires are also
paid a salary rate twenty-five
percent (25%) more than localhires. The School justifies the
difference on two "significant
economic disadvantages" foreignhires have to endure, namely: (a)
the "dislocation factor" and (b)
limited tenure. The compensation
scheme is simply the School's
adaptive measure to remain
competitive on an international
level in terms of attracting
competent professionals in the
field of international education
ISSUE: WON there was a violation
of the equal protection clause?
HELD:

-Yes. The foregoing provisions

impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal
truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications,
skill, effort and responsibility,
under similar conditions, should
be paid similar salaries.
-In this case, we find the point-ofhire classification employed by
respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be
an invalid classification. There is
no reasonable distinction between
the services rendered by foreignhires and local-hires. The practice
of the School of according higher
salaries
to
foreign-hires
contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deserve the
sympathy of this Court.
-We agree, however, that foreignhires do not belong to the same
bargaining unit as the local-hires.
hese benefits, such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs,
taxes, and home leave travel
allowance, are reasonably related
to their status as foreign-hires,
and justify the exclusion of the
former from the latter. To include
foreign-hires in a bargaining unit
with local-hires would not assure
either group the exercise of their
respective collective bargaining
rights.

DECS vs San Diego, 180 SCRA

533 (December 21, 1989)
CRUZ, J.,
FACTS:
-Respondent San Diego has
flunked
the
NMAT
(National
Medical Admission Test) three

times. When he applied to take

again, petitioner rejected his
application based on the threeflunk-rule.
He then filed a
petition before the RTC on the
ground of due process and equal
protection and challenging the
constitutionality of the order. The
petition was granted by the RTC
therefore this petition.
-In his original petition for
mandamus, he first invoked his
constitutional rights to academic
freedom and quality education.
The additional grounds raised
were due process and equal
protection.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation
of the equal protection clause?
HELD:
-No. The contention that the
challenged rule violates the equal
protection clause is not welltaken. A law does not have to
operate with equal force on all
persons
or
things
to
be
conformable to Article III, Section
1 of the Constitution.
There can be no question that a
substantial
distinction
exists
between medical students and
other students who are not
subjected to the NMAT and the
three-flunk rule. The medical
profession directly affects the
very lives of the people, unlike
other careers which, for this
reason, do not require more
vigilant
regulation.
The
accountant, for example, while
belonging
to
an
equally
respectable profession, does not
hold
the
same
delicate
responsibility as that of the
physician and so need not be
similarly treated.

-There
would
be
unequal
protection if some applicants who
have passed the tests are
admitted and others who have
also
qualified
are
denied
entrance. In other words, what
the equal protection requires is
equality among equals.

Philippine
Judges
Associationn. v. Prado, 227
SCRA 703 (November 11,
1993)
Cruz, J.,
FACTS:
-Petitioners assailed the validity of
Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which
withdraw the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, the Regional
Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts,
and
the
Land
Registration
Commission and its Registers of
Deeds, along with certain other
government
offices.
The
petition
assails
the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354
on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject
and
does
not
express
its
purposes; (2) it did not pass the
required readings in both Houses
of Congress and printed copies of
the bill in its final form were not
distributed among the members
before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on
the independence of the Judiciary.
-It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is
discriminatory
because
while
withdrawing the franking privilege
from the Judiciary, it retains the
same for the President of the
Philippines, the Vice President of
the Philippines; Senators and

Members
of the House of
Representatives, the Commission
on Elections; former Presidents of
the Philippines; the National
Census and Statistics Office; and
the general public in the filing of
complaints against public offices
and officers.
-The respondents counter that
there is no discrimination because
the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with
the equal protection clause. In
fact, the franking privilege has
been withdrawn not only from the
Judiciary but also the Office of
Adult Education, the Institute of
National
Language;
the
Telecommunications Office; the
Philippine
Deposit
Insurance
Corporation;
the
National
Historical Commission; the Armed
Forces of the Philippines; the
Armed Forces of the Philippines
Ladies Steering Committee; the
City and Provincial Prosecutors;
the Tanodbayan (Office of Special
Prosecutor);
the
Kabataang
Barangay; the Commission on the
Filipino Language; the Provincial
and City Assessors; and the
National Council for the Welfare of
Disabled Persons.
ISSUES: WON RA No. 7354
violated the equal protection
clause?
HELD:
-Yes. In lumping the Judiciary with
the other offices from which the
franking
privilege
has
been
withdrawn, Section 35 has placed
the courts of justice in a category
to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the
President of the Philippines and
the members of Congress for the
franking privilege, there is no

reason
why
it
should
not
recognize a similar and in fact
greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege. While
we
may
appreciate
the
withdrawal
of
the
franking
privilege from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Ladies Steering
Committee, we fail to understand
why the Supreme Court should be
similarly
treated
as
that
Committee. And while we may
concede the need of the National
Census and Statistics Office for
the franking privilege, we are
intrigued that a similar if not
greater need is not recognized in
the courts of justice.
-the Philippine Postal Corporation,
as
a
government-controlled
corporation, was created and is
expected to operate for the
purpose of promoting the public
service. While it may have been
established primarily for private
gain, it cannot excuse itself from
performing certain functions for
the benefit of the public in
exchange
for
the
franchise
extended to it by the government
and the many advantages it
enjoys under its charter.
-On the contrary, we find its
repealing
clause
to
be
a
discriminatory
provision
that
denies the Judiciary the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed
for all persons or things similarly
situated. The distinction made by
the law is superficial. It is not
based on substantial distinctions
that
make
real
differences
between the Judiciary and the
grantees of the franking privilege.

Tatad vs Secretary of Energy,

G.R. No. 124360 (November 5,
1997)
Puno, J.,
FACTS:
-The petitions challenge the
constitutionality of RA No. 8180
entitled An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For
Other
Purposes.
The
deregulation process has two
phases: (a) the transition phase
(Aug. 12, 1996) and the (b) full
deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997
through EO No. 372).
Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180
constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power to the
President and the Sec. of Energy
because it does not provide a
determinate
or
determinable
standard to guide the Executive
Branch in determining when to
implement the full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry, and
the law does not provide any
specific standard to determine
when the prices of crude oil in the
world market are considered to be
declining nor when the exchange
rate of the peso to the US dollar is
considered stable.
-Petitioner contends that the
imposition of different tariff rates
on imported crude oil and
imported
refined
petroleum
products
violates
the
equal
protection clause. Moreover, the
3%-7% tariff differential unduly
favors the three existing oil
refineries
and
discriminates
against prospective investors in
the downstream oil industry who
do not have their own refineries
and will have to source refined
petroleum products from abroad.
-Petitioner avers that the tariff
differential
between
imported

crude oil and imported refined

petroleum products bars the entry
of other players in the oil industry
because it effectively protects the
interest of oil companies with
existing refineries.
ISSUE: WON the Oil Deregulation
Law violates the equal protection
clause?
HELD:
-In the cases at bar, it cannot be
denied that our downstream oil
industry
is
operated
and
controlled by an oligopoly, a
foreign oligopoly at that. Petron,
Shell and Caltex stand as the only
major league players in the oil
market. All other players belong
to the lilliputian league. As the
dominant players, Petron, Shell
and Caltex boast of existing
refineries of various capacities.
The tariff differential of 4%
therefore works to their immense
benefit. Yet, this is only one edge
of the tariff differential. The other
edge cuts and cuts deep in the
heart of their competitors. It
erects a high barrier to the entry
of new players. New players that
intend to equalize the market
power of Petron, Shell and Caltex
by building refineries of their own
will have to spend billions of
pesos. Those who will not build
refineries but compete with them
will suffer the huge disadvantage
of increasing their product cost by
4%. They will be competing on an
uneven field. The argument that
the 4% tariff differential is
desirable because it will induce
prospective players to invest in
refineries puts the cart before the
horse. The first need is to attract
new players and they cannot be
attracted by burdening them with

heavy disincentives. Without new

players belonging to the league of
Petron,
Shell
and
Caltex,
competition in our downstream oil
industry is an idle dream.
-These
provisions
on
tariff
differential,
inventory
and
predatory pricing inhibit fair
competition,
encourage
monopolistic power and interfere
with the free interaction of market
forces. R.A. No. 8180 needs
provisions to vouchsafe free and
fair competition
Germane to the Purpose of
the Law
People vs Cayat, G.R. No. L45987 (May 5, 1939)
Moran, J.,
FACTS:
-The accused, Cayat, a native of
Baguio,
Benguet,
Mountain
Province, was sentenced by the
justice of the peace court of
Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos
(P5)
or
suffer
subsidiary
imprisonment
in
case
of
insolvency.
-It was alleged that the accused
illegally receive, acquire, and
have in his possession and under
his control or custody, one bottle
of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating
liquor, other than the so-called
native wines and liquors which
the members of such tribes have
been accustomed themselves to
make prior to the passage of Act
No. 1639
-The act provides that [SEC. 2.] It
shall be unlawful for any native of
the Philippine Islands who is a
member of a non-Christian tribe
within the meaning of the Act

Numbered Thirteen hundred and

ninety-seven, to buy, receive,
have in his possession, or drink
any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine,
or intoxicating liquors of any kind,
other than the so-called native
wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have
been accustomed themselves to
make prior to the passage of this
Act, except as provided in section
one hereof;
-The accused challenges the
constitutionality of the act for the
following reasons:
(1) That it is discriminatory and
denies the equal protection of the
laws;
(2) That it is violative of the due
process
clause
of
the
Constitution: and.
(3) That it is improper exercise of
the police power of the state
ISSUE: WON the Act No. 1639
violates the equal protection
clause?
HELD:
-No. Act No. 1639 satisfies these
requirements. The classification
rests on real and substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical,
distinctions. It is not based upon
"accident of birth or parentage,"
as counsel to the appellant
asserts, but upon the degree of
civilization and culture.
-That it is germane to the
purposes of law cannot be
doubted.
The
prohibition
is
unquestionably designed to insure
peace and order in and among
the non-Christian tribes. It has
been the sad experience of the
past, as the observations of the
lower court disclose, that the free
use of highly intoxicating liquors
by the non-Christian tribes have

often resulted in lawlessness and

crimes, thereby hampering the
efforts of the government to raise
their
standard
of
life
and
civilization.
-The law is not limited in its
application to conditions existing
at the time of its enactment. It is
intended to apply for all times as
long as those conditions exist.
-Finally, that the Act applies
equally to all members of the
class is evident from a perusal
thereof. That it may be unfair in
its operation against a certain
number non-Christians by reason
of their degree of culture, is not
an argument against the equality
of its application.
- Act No. 1639, as above stated, is
designed to promote peace and
order in the non-Christian tribes
so as to remove all obstacles to
their
moral
and
intellectual
growth and, eventually, to hasten
their equalization and unification
with the rest of their Christian
brothers. Its ultimate purpose can
be no other than to unify the
Filipino people with a view to a
greater Philippines.
Dumlao vs Comelec
Held:
-The purpose of the law is to allow
the emergence of younger blood
in
local
governments.
The
classification in question being
pursuant to that purpose, it
cannot be considered invalid
"even it at times, it may be
susceptible to the objection that it
is
marred
by
theoretical
inconsistencies"
PASEI vs Drilon
Held:

-There is likewise no doubt that

such a classification is germane to
the purpose behind the measure.
Unquestionably, it is the avowed
objective of Department Order
No. 1 to "enhance the protection
for
Filipino
female
overseas
workers" this Court has no quarrel
that in the midst of the terrible
mistreatment
Filipina
workers
have suffered abroad, a ban on
deployment will be for their own
good and welfare.
Ichong vs Hernandez
Held:
-The law is clearly in the interest
of the public, nay of the national
security itself, and indisputably
falls within the scope of police
power, thru which and by which
the State insures its existence
and security and the supreme
welfare of its citizens. We,
therefore, find alien domination
and control to be a fact, a reality
proved by official statistics, and
felt by all the sections and groups
that
compose
the
Filipino
community.
They
owe
no
allegiance or loyalty to the State,
and the State cannot rely upon
them in times of crisis or
emergency. While the national
holds his life, his person and his
property subject to the needs of
his country, the alien may even
become the potential enemy of
the State.

Quinto vs Comelec
Held:
- The obvious reason for the
challenged provision is to prevent
the use of a governmental
position
to
promote
ones

candidacy, or even to wield a

dangerous or coercive influence
on the electorate. The measure is
further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline
of
the
public
service
by
eliminating the danger that the
discharge of official duty would be
motivated
by
political
considerations rather than the
welfare of the public. The
restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil
servants to the electoral arena,
while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they
would be attending to their
campaign rather than to their
office work.
-the provision pertains to all civil
servants holding appointive posts
without distinction as to whether
they occupy high positions in
government or not. Congress has
not shown a compelling state
interest
to
restrict
the
fundamental right involved on
such a sweeping scale.
Motion for Reconsideration
Held:
- The dichotomized treatment of
appointive and elective officials is
therefore
germane
to
the
purposes of the law. For the law
was made not merely to preserve
the integrity, efficiency, and
discipline of the public service;
the Legislature, whose wisdom is
outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to
balance this with the competing,
yet equally compelling, interest of
deferring to the sovereign will.

Duration

People vs Cayat
Held:
- The law is not limited in its
application to conditions existing
at the time of its enactment. It is
intended to apply for all times as
long as those conditions exist.
The Act was not predicated, as
counsel for appellant asserts,
upon the assumption that the
non-Christians are "impermeable
to any civilizing influence." On the
contrary,
the
Legislature
understood that the civilization of
a people is a slow process and
that hand in hand with it must go
measures
of protection and
security.
- But whether conditions have so
changed as to warrant a partial or
complete abrogation of the law, is
a matter which rests exclusively
within the prerogative of the
National Assembly to determine.
In the constitutional scheme of
our government, this court can go
no farther than to inquire whether
the Legislature had the power to
enact the law. If the power exists,
and we hold it does exist, the
wisdom of the policy adopted, and
the adequacy under existing
conditions
of
the
measures
enacted to forward it, are matters
which this court has no authority
to pass upon.

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.

vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City,
22 SCRA 603 (February 17,
1968)
Bengzon, J.P., J.,
FACTS:

- On January 29, 1964, the

Municipal Board of Ormoc City
passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of
1964, imposing "on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar
milled at
the
Ormoc
Sugar
Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a
municipal tax equivalent to one
per centum (1%) per export sale
to the United States of America
and other foreign countries."
-Payments for said tax were
made, under protest, by Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20,
1964 for P7,087.50 and on April
20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of
P12,087.50.
-Petitioner
alleges
that
the
ordinance is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal
protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art.
III, Constitution) and the rule of
uniformity
of
taxation
(Sec.
22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside
from
being
an
export
tax
forbidden under Section 2287 of
the Revised Administrative Code.
It further alleged that the tax is
neither a production nor a license
tax which Ormoc City under
Section 15-kk of its charter and
under Section 2 of Republic Act
2264, otherwise known as the
Local Autonomy Act, is authorized
to impose; and that the tax
amounts to a customs duty, fee or
charge in violation of paragraph 1
of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264
because the tax is on both the
sale and export of sugar.
-The defendants asserted that the
tax
ordinance
was
within
defendant city's power to enact
under the Local Autonomy Act
and that the same did not violate
the
afore-cited
constitutional
limitations.

ISSUE:
violated
clause?

WON
the
the equal

ordinance
protection

-Decision of CFI reversed. Not

entitled to interest.

HELD:
- We ruled that the equal
protection clause applies only to
persons or things identically
situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where
(1) it is based on substantial
distinctions which make real
differences;
(2)
these
are
germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) the classification applies
not only to present conditions but
also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of
the present; (4) the classification
applies only to those who belong
to the same class.
- A perusal of the requisites
instantly
shows
that
the
questioned ordinance does not
meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and
exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. At
the time of the taxing ordinance's
enactment,
Ormoc
Sugar
Company, Inc., it is true, was the
only sugar central in the city of
Ormoc. Still, the classification, to
be reasonable, should be in terms
applicable to future conditions as
well. The taxing ordinance should
not be singular and exclusive as
to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the
same class as plaintiff, for the
coverage of the tax. As it is now,
even if later a similar company is
set up, it cannot be subject to the
tax
because
the
ordinance
expressly points only to Ormoc
City Sugar Company, Inc. as the
entity to be levied upon.

Tatad vs Secretary of Energy

Held:
The
SC
declared
the
unconstitutionality of RA 8180
because it violated Sec 19 of Art
12 of the Constitution. It violated
that provision because it only
strengthens oligopoly which is
contrary to free competition. It
cannot be denied that our
downstream
oil
industry
is
operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at
that. Petron, Shell and Caltex
stand as the only major league
players in the oil market. All other
players belong to the lilliputian
league. As the dominant players,
Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of
existing refineries of various
capacities. The tariff differential of
4% therefore works to their
immense benefit. Yet, this is only
one edge of the tariff differential.
The other edge cuts and cuts
deep in the heart of their
competitors. It erects a high
barrier to the entry of new
players. New players that intend
to equalize the market power of
Petron, Shell and Caltex by
building refineries of their own will
have to spend billions of pesos.
Those who will not build refineries
but compete with them will suffer
the
huge
disadvantage
of
increasing their product cost by
4%. They will be competing on an
uneven field. The argument that
the 4% tariff differential is
desirable because it will induce
prospective players to invest in
refineries puts the cart before the
horse. The first need is to attract
new players and they cannot be
attracted by burdening them with

heavy disincentives. Without new

players belonging to the league of
Petron,
Shell
and
Caltex,
competition in our downstream oil
industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the
ground
inter
alia
that
it
discriminated against the new
players insofar as it placed them
at a competitive disadvantage
vis--vis
the
established
oil
companies by requiring them to
meet certain conditions already
being observed by the latter.
Applicability to All
Villegas vs Hiu Chiong
Held:
- Requiring a person before he can
be employed to get a permit from
the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is
tantamount to denying him the
basic right of the people in the

Philippines to engage in a means

of livelihood. While it is true that
the Philippines as a State is not
obliged to admit aliens within its
territory,
once
an
alien
is
admitted, he cannot be deprived
of life without due process of law.
This guarantee includes the
means of livelihood. The shelter
of protection under the due
process and equal protection
clause is given to all persons,
both aliens and citizens.

4.ForMoreInDepthAnalysisof
theEqualProtectionClause
Levels of Scrutiny in Equal
Protection Analysis
Nachura, dissenting:
-