SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-49162. July 28, 1987.]

JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem, ARLENE S.
SALGADO,Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V.
JAO, Respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision * of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51078-R,
dated 29 August 1978, which dismissed petitioners action for recognition and support
against private respondent, and from the respondent Courts resolution, dated 11 October
1978, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of said decision.
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother
and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against private respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter
denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) upon order of the trial court. The
result of the blood grouping test, held 21 January 1969, indicated that Janice could not have
been the possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado. 1
The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon plaintiffs
(herein petitioners) second motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, after
which, Janice was declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly support.
Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial courts failure to appreciate the
result of the blood grouping tests. As there was no showing whatsoever that there was any
irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of the tests
should have been conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.
The Court of Appeals upheld Jaos contentions and reversed the trial courts decision. In its
decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears undisputed that JAO was introduced
to ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bay Side Club, by Melvin Yabut. After this meeting, JAO
dated and courted ARLENE. Not long thereafter, they had their first sexual intercourse and
subsequently, they lived together as husband and wife . . .
It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO accompanied ARLENE to the Marian
General Hospital for medical checkup and her confinement was with JAOs consent. JAO paid
the rentals where they lived, the salaries of the maids, and other household expenses . . .
The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on August 16, 1968, after completing
36 weeks of pregnancy, which indicates that ARLENE must have conceived JANICE on or
about the first week of December, 1967. Thus, one issue to be resolved in this appeal is
whether on or about that time, JAO and ARLENE had sexual intercourse and were already
living with one another as husband and wife.
In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO sometime in the third or fourth
week of November, 1967 at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club; that after several dates,

she had carnal knowledge with him at her house at 30 Longbeach, Merville, Paraaque, Rizal
in the evening of November 30, 1967, and that he started to live with her at her dwelling
after December 16, 1967, the date they finished their cruise to Mindoro Island.
On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin,
Bayside Club, however, maintains that this was on December 14, 1967 because the day
following, he and his guests: ARLENE, Melvin Yabut, Didi Crescini and Charlie Litonjua went
to Mindoro by boat. He dated ARLENE four times in January, 1968. He remembered he had
carnal knowledge of her for the first time on January 18, 1968, because that was a week
after his birthday and it was only in May, 1968 that he started cohabiting with her at the
Excelsior Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.
These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in resolving the paternity of JANICE, the
role of the blood grouping tests conducted by the NBI and which resulted in the negative
finding that in a union with ARLENE, JAO could not be the father of JANICE.
We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is not in a position to
determine with mathematical precision the issue of parentage by blood grouping test,
considering the rulings of this Court . . . where the blood grouping tests of the NBI were
admitted; especially where, in the latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo Sunico who conducted the
test and it appears that in the present case, the same Dr. Sunico approved the findings and
report . . . In Co Tao v. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188, the Supreme Court had given weight
to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the
competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been recognized as early as the
1950s.
The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be stated as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother,
the child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the
father of the child. But group blood testing cannot show that a man is the father of a
particular child, but at least can show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states,
and courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of
the decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the
results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged
paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may scientifically,
be completely accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the
finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test.
"The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they
show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others with the same
blood type may have been the father of the child. But the Uniform Act recognizes that the
tests may have some probative value to establish paternity where the blood type and the
combination in the child is shown to be rare, in which case the judge is given discretion to
let it in" (I Jones on Evidence, 5th Ed., pp. 193-194).
"In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups, scientific opinion is now in accord in
accepting the fact that there is a causative relation between the trait of the progenitor and
the trait of the progeny. In other words, the blood composition of a child may be some
evidence as to the childs paternity. But thus far this trait (in the present state of scientific
discovery as generally accepted) can be used only negatively i.e. to evidence that a
particular man F is not the father of a particular child C." (I Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Ed.,
pp. 610-611).

In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and competency of the blood test, JANICE claims
that probative value was given to blood tests only in cases where they tended to establish
paternity; and that there has been no case where the blood test was invoked to establish
non-paternity, thereby implying that blood tests have probative value only when the result
is a possible affirmative and not when in the negative. This contention is fallacious and must
be rejected. To sustain her contention, in effect, would be recognizing only the possible
affirmative finding but not the blood grouping test itself for if the result were negative, the
test is regarded worthless. Indeed, this is illogical . . . As an admitted test, it is admissible in
subsequent similar proceedings whether the result be in the negative or in the affirmative . .
."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to petitioners contention that
JAOs actions before and after JANICE was born were tantamount to recognition. Said the
respondent appellate court:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not recognize her as his own. In fact, he
filed a petition that his name as father of JANICE in the latters certificate of live birth be
deleted, evidencing his repudiation, rather than recognition. The mere acts of JAO in
cohabiting with ARLENE, the attention given to her during her pregnancy and the financial
assistance extended to her cannot overcome the result of the blood grouping test. These
acts of JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing the unborn JANICE as his own as the
possession of such status cannot be founded on conjectures and presumptions, especially so
that, We have earlier said, JAO refused to acknowledge JANICE after the latters birth.
JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on paragraph 2 of Article 283 in relation
to Article 289 of the New Civil Code which provides: "When the child is in continuous
possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs 3 or 4 of said article which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father."cralaw virtua1aw library
As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could have been conceived from November
20, 1967 to December 4, 1967. Indeed, ARLENE claims that her first sexual intercourse with
JAO was on November 30, 1967 while the latter avers it was one week after January 18,
1968. However, to satisfy paragraph 3 as above-quoted, JANICE must have been conceived
when ARLENE and JAO started to cohabit with one another. Since ARLENE herself testified
that their cohabitation started only after December 16, 1967, then it cannot be gainsaid that
JANICE was not conceived during this cohabitation. Hence, no recognition will lie.
Necessarily, recognition cannot be had under paragraph 4 as JANICE has no other evidence
or proof of her alleged paternity.
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time of conception, ARLENE
had carnal knowledge with two other men: "Oying" Fernandez and Melvin Yabut, which was
not even rebutted; and considering that it was Melvin Yabut, who introduced ARLENE to JAO
at the Bayside Club. Moreover, the testimony of ARLENE is not wholly reliable. When the trial
court said that "the Court is further convinced of plaintiffs cause by ARLENEs manner of
testifying in a most straight-forward and candid manner," the fact that ARLENE was
admittedly a movie actress may have been overlooked so that not even the trial court could

detect, by her acts, whether she was lying or not.

"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and a new one entered
dismissing plaintiff-appellees complaint. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility and conclusiveness of
the result of blood grouping tests to prove non-paternity.
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to affirm paternity was
dealt with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals, 2 an action for declaration of filiation, support and
damages. In said case, the NBI experts report of the blood tests stated that "from their
blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From this
statement, the defendant contended that the child must have been the child of another
man. The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the
appellant was the father of the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a `possible
father. This possibility, coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out during
the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant Co Tao is the father of the child Manuel."
3
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove
paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three
decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an
important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity
that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and
alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the
blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that
of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged
father. 4
In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove nonpaternity has already been passed upon in several cases. In Gilpin v. Gilpin 5 the positive
results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a case in which it was shown that proper
safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, were recognized as final on the
question of paternity. In Cuneo v. Cuneo 6 evidence of non-paternity consisting of the result
of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the alleged father had cohabited
with the mother within the period of gestation. The Court said that the competent medical
testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such testimony would
be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact. Courts, it was stated, should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result
was to deny progress. 7 This ruling was also echoed in Clark v. Rysedorph, 8 a filiation
proceeding where an uncontradicted blood grouping test evidence, excluding paternity, was
held conclusive. 9 Legislation expressly recognizing the use of blood tests is also in force in
several states. 10 Tolentino, 11 affirms this rule on blood tests as proof of non-paternity,
thus
"Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be
transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two
persons does not indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of
different types will indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when
the supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be
father and child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today regard a blood test exclusion
as an unanswerable and indisputable proof of non-paternity." 12

Moreover,
"The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father cannot be a ground for
compulsory recognition if such cohabitation could not have produced the conception of the
child. This would be the case, for instance, if the cohabitation took place outside of the
period of conception of the child. Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests that the child
and the supposed father belong to different blood groups, the cohabitation by itself cannot
be a ground for recognition." 13
Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests in the instant
case by impugning the qualifications of the NBI personnel who performed the tests and the
conduct of the tests themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear to be without merit.
The NBIs forensic chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has had
extensive practice in this area for several years. The blood tests were conducted six (6)
times using two (2) scientifically recognized blood grouping systems, the MN Test and the
ABO System, 14 under witness and supervision. 15
Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a proper subject
for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first blood test, she,
represented by her mother, declined to undergo the same blood test to prove or disprove
their allegations, even as Jao was willing to undergo such a test again. 16
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that the result
of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible and conclusive on the
non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No evidence has been presented
showing any defect in the testing methods employed or failure to provide adequate
safeguards for the proper conduct of the tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted
therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific fact.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as heretofore quoted, which are
binding on this Court, we do not find it necessary to further pass upon the issue of
recognition raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle
University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the
Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute (UP-NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She
was a former professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where
she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her
testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the
test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.[4]
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against selfincrimination.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondents motion to conduct
DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Thus:
In view of the foregoing, the motion of the petitioner is GRANTED and the relevant
individuals, namely: the petitioner, the minor child, and respondent are directed to undergo
DNA paternity testing in a laboratory of their common choice within a period of thirty (30)
days from receipt of the Order, and to submit the results thereof within a period of ninety
(90) days from completion. The parties are further reminded of the hearing set on 24
February 2000 for the reception of other evidence in support of the petition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis in the original)
[G.R. No. 148220. June 15, 2005]
ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner, vs. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI
A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court,
Manila, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] to set aside the Decision[2] dated 29 November 2000 of the
Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. The appellate court affirmed two
Orders[3] issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (trial court) in SP No. 9888759. The Order dated 3 February 2000 directed Rosendo Herrera (petitioner) to submit to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing, while the Order dated 8 June 2000 denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his
mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support
and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with
counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also
denied physical contact with respondents mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that
under the present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is compelled to take would be
inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen,
unconstitutional.
In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[6]
On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He asserted that the trial court rendered the
Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June 2000 in excess of, or without jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner further
contended that there is no appeal nor any [other] plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Petitioner maintained his previous objections to the taking of DNA
paternity testing. He submitted the following grounds to support his objection:
1. Public respondent misread and misapplied the ruling in Lim vs. Court of Appeals (270
SCRA 2).
2. Public respondent ruled to accept DNA test without considering the limitations on, and
conditions precedent for the admissibility of DNA testing and ignoring the serious
constraints affecting the reliability of the test as admitted by private respondents expert
witness.
3. Subject Orders lack legal and factual support, with public respondent relying on scientific
findings and conclusions unfit for judicial notice and unsupported by experts in the field and
scientific treatises.

4. Under the present circumstances the DNA testing petitioner [is] compelled to take will be
inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen from the
petitioner, unconstitutional.[7]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and
affirming the questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner
merely desires to correct the trial courts evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available
remedy for an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his
right against self-incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion.
Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible adverse
result of the DNA paternity testing. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE,
and ordered dismissed, and the challenged orders of the Trial Court AFFIRMED, with costs to
Petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its Resolution
dated 23 May 2001.[9]
Issues
Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction
to determine filiation. Petitioner asks for the conditions under which DNA technology may be
integrated into our judicial system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test
results in a paternity suit.[10]
Petitioner further submits that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it
authorized the trial court to embark in [sic] a new procedure xxx to determine filiation
despite the absence of legislation to ensure its reliability and integrity, want of official
recognition as made clear in Lim vs. Court of Appeals and the presence of technical and
legal constraints in respect of [sic] its implementation.[11] Petitioner maintains that the
proposed DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.[12]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it appropriate to give an
overview of a paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the
requirements of the Family Code and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and
filiation.
An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a
legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,[13] support (as in the present
case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case,

affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the

putative father and child.[14]
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative
father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and
shift it to the putative father.[15]
There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative father may
show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either physical absence or
impotency.[16] The putative father may also show that the mother had sexual relations with
other men at the time of conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.[17] The
childs legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.[18]
Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part
of evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding.
However, although likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that
could quantify how much a child must or must not look like his biological father.[19] This
kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact.
In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba,
respondents mother, put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is
respondents biological father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial
court, she offered corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the
other hand, denied Armi Albas assertion. He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi
Alba and stated that respondent is Armi Albas child with another man. Armi Alba countered
petitioners denial by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show
how much they resemble each other.
Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests. We now look to the
law, rules, and governing jurisprudence to help us determine what evidence of incriminating
acts on paternity and filiation are allowed in this jurisdiction.
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130
provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member
of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family
books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
This Courts rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to
establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA,[20] a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue
of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant
incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New
Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of
filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of
the putative father.[21] A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted
by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence.[22] Letters to the mother
vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child
on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation.[23]
However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a fathers operation, or a
marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic
writing.[24] Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism[25] nor family pictures[26] are
sufficient to establish filiation.
So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of paternity and filiation
to incriminating acts alone. However, advances in science show that sources of evidence of
paternity and filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost
universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive on non-paternity,
although inconclusive on paternity.[27]
In Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,[28] the result of the blood grouping test showed that the
putative father was a possible father of the child. Paternity was imputed to the putative
father after the possibility of paternity was proven on presentation during trial of facts and
circumstances other than the results of the blood grouping test.
In Jao v. Court of Appeals,[29] the child, the mother, and the putative father agreed to
submit themselves to a blood grouping test. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted the test, which indicated that the child could not have been the possible offspring
of the mother and the putative father. We held that the result of the blood grouping test was
conclusive on the non-paternity of the putative father.
The present case asks us to go one step further. We are now asked whether DNA analysis
may be admitted as evidence to prove paternity.

DNA Analysis as Evidence

DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in
all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique.
Hence, a persons DNA profile can determine his identity.[30]
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from
an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for
the individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person,
except for identical twins.[31] We quote relevant portions of the trial courts 3 February 2000
Order with approval:
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is
exclusive to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a
single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every
cell in the human body, the DNA of an individuals blood is the very DNA in his or her skin
cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (adenine), G (guanine),
C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an individuals
DNA determines his or her physical makeup. And since DNA is a double-stranded molecule,
it is composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called
genes.
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular
sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework,
nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as polymorphic loci, which are the
areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA
fingerprinting/genetic tests or fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing simply means
determining the polymorphic loci.
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular
biologist may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct
DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism); reverse dot blot
or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by 37
courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; mtDNA process; VNTR (variable number tandem
repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction)
based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of by most
forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an
evidence sample a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the socalled DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate
places and can match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less than one
(1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, matches are determined. To illustrate, when
DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence
collected from the crime scene is compared with the known print. If a substantial amount of
the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But
then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have
come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of
these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called allele, one inherited from each
parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable

regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the
mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the childs DNA was inherited from
the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged
fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile,
which match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the
child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as
the father.[32] (Emphasis in the original)
Although the term DNA testing was mentioned in the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee, Jr.,
[33] it was only in the 2001 case of Tijing v. Court of Appeals[34] that more than a passing
mention was given to DNA analysis. In Tijing, we issued a writ of habeas corpus against
respondent who abducted petitioners youngest son. Testimonial and documentary evidence
and physical resemblance were used to establish parentage. However, we observed that:
Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA
test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to
conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. xxx For it was said, that
courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this
case to resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it would be useful to all concerned in the
prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
Admissibility of
DNA Analysis as Evidence
The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo[35] discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may be
considered a 180 degree turn from the Courts wary attitude towards DNA testing in the
1997 Pe Lim case,[36] where we stated that DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has
not yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the
vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched the accuseds DNA profile. We affirmed
the accuseds conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. We declared:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.[37]
Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there
was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court
moved from the issue of according official recognition to DNA analysis as evidence to the
issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.
In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact on jurisprudence on DNA
testing: People v. Yatar[38] and In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa.[39] In
Yatar, a match existed between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and the
DNA profile of the blood sample given by appellant in open court. The Court, following
Vallejos footsteps, affirmed the conviction of appellant because the physical evidence,
corroborated by circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of rape with homicide. In
De Villa, the convict-petitioner presented DNA test results to prove that he is not the father
of the child conceived at the time of commission of the rape. The Court ruled that a
difference between the DNA profile of the convict-petitioner and the DNA profile of the
victims child does not preclude the convict-petitioners commission of rape.

In the present case, the various pleadings filed by petitioner and respondent refer to two
United States cases to support their respective positions on the admissibility of DNA analysis
as evidence: Frye v. U.S.[40] and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.[41] In Frye v.
U.S., the trial court convicted Frye of murder. Frye appealed his conviction to the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia. During trial, Fryes counsel offered an expert witness to
testify on the result of a systolic blood pressure deception test[42] made on defendant. The
state Supreme Court affirmed Fryes conviction and ruled that the systolic blood pressure
deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among
physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert
testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made. The
Frye standard of general acceptance states as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
In 1989, State v. Schwartz[43] modified the Frye standard. Schwartz was charged with
stabbing and murder. Bloodstained articles and blood samples of the accused and the victim
were submitted for DNA testing to a government facility and a private facility. The
prosecution introduced the private testing facilitys results over Schwartzs objection. One of
the issues brought before the state Supreme Court included the admissibility of DNA test
results in a criminal proceeding. The state Supreme Court concluded that:
While we agree with the trial court that forensic DNA typing has gained general acceptance
in the scientific community, we hold that admissibility of specific test results in a particular
case hinges on the laboratorys compliance with appropriate standards and controls, and the
availability of their testing data and results.[44]
In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.[45] further modified the FryeSchwartz standard. Daubert was a product liability case where both the trial and appellate
courts denied the admissibility of an experts testimony because it failed to meet the Frye
standard of general acceptance. The United States Supreme Court ruled that in federal
trials, the Federal Rules of Evidence have superseded the Frye standard. Rule 401 defines
relevant evidence, while Rule 402 provides the foundation for admissibility of evidence.
Thus:
Rule 401. Relevant evidence is defined as that which has any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.

Daubert cautions that departure from the Frye standard of general acceptance does not
mean that the Federal Rules do not place limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Rather, the judge must ensure that the testimonys reasoning or method is scientifically valid
and is relevant to the issue. Admissibility would depend on factors such as (1) whether the
theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4)
the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the techniques operation; and (5)
whether the theory or technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.

In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an
individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and
child, it is possible to determine which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother.
The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged fathers
profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which
match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the child,
the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the
father.[52]

Another product liability case, Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael,[46] further modified the
Daubert standard. This led to the amendment of Rule 702 in 2000 and which now reads as
follows:

It is not enough to state that the childs DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A
complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative
father does not necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest
standard adopted in an American jurisdiction,[53] trial courts should require at least 99.9%
as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity (W) prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a
numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the
probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference
population database, such as the Philippine population database, is required to compute for
W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal to 100%.
However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the putative father, mother and child
are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those conducted between the putative father
and child alone.[54]

If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
We now determine the applicability in this jurisdiction of these American cases. Obviously,
neither the Frye-Schwartz standard nor the Daubert-Kumho standard is controlling in the
Philippines.[47] At best, American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive effect on our
decisions. Here, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not
otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court.[48] Evidence is relevant when it has
such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.[49]
Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as
follows:
The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or
training which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence.
This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence.
Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.[50]
Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions in Tijing,
Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as evidence. In our jurisdiction,
the restrictive tests for admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go
into the weight of the evidence.
Probative Value of
DNA Analysis as Evidence
Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in giving
credence to DNA analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.[51]
We also repeat the trial courts explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity cases:

DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of
non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be
considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is
refutable presumption of paternity.[55] This refutable presumption of paternity should be
subjected to the Vallejo standards.
Right Against
Self-Incrimination
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself. Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA
testing violates his right against self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier
pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence. Again, we
quote relevant portions of the trial courts 3 February 2000 Order with approval:
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a
paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right
against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is communicative in
essence taken under duress (People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has
ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an
exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a defendant
can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs.
Olvis, Supra); the substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as
evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145); morphine forced out of
the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order by the judge
for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil.
244); and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test
(Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on
testimonial compulsion.[56]

The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and
filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the
putative parent to claim his or her own defenses.[57] Where the evidence to aid this
investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such
evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the Orders dated 3
February 2000 and 8 June 2000 issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in
Civil Case No. SP-98-88759.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183652

February 25, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 21st DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, and MOISES ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA reversed and set aside the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated
February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and acquitted private respondents
Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime of rape for the
prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents Carampatana,
Oporto and Alquizola werecharged, together with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz,

Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping
AAA,3 to wit:
That on or about 10:30 oclock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alsons Palace,
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
HonorableCourt, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs
forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated,
brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging house, Maranding,
Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and once
inside said lodging house, accused RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took
turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA,
with lewd designs, kissed her against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of not
guilty to the offense charged.5
Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim, however,
remains at-large.
The factual antecedents follow:
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony.
Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte.
AAA then asked permission from her mother to go to the Maranding Stage Plaza because
she and her bandmates had to perform for an election campaign. She went home at around
4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she would be
attending a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and
Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding.
After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alsons Palace, which was merely a walking distance
away from Gemenos house. Outside the Alsons Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin
Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while, they went inside and
proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again saw Montesco with Harold
Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one
Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation,
to which the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks two (2) bottles of
Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree. Two (2)
glasses were being passed around: one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other
glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard
liquor before. During the session, they shared their problems with each other. When it was
AAAs turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was then that she took her first
shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of

Emperador Brandy. Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oportos lap.
Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered
her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just
laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they
still forced her to take another shot. They helped her stand up and make her drink. She even
heard Lim say, "Hubuga na, hubuga na," (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). She
likewise heard someone say, "You drink it, you drink it." She leaned on Oportos lap again,
then she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle to
drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she drank directly
from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then
she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at
the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been there before.
She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times that
she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body,
and having intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in
her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as
Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis
into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to
kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her body felt
heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower garments.
The upper half of her body was on top of the bed but her feet were on the floor. There were
also red stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a trisikad and went home. When
AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for her and was already furious. When she
told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting her. They brought her to the Lala
Police Station to make a report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her
medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of March
26, 2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 oclock position and hyperemia or
redness at the posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of
sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense
witnesses, in the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had
dinner at Gemenos house. Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party
hosted by Montesco at Alsons Palace, owned by the latters family. When they reached the
place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one Arcie
Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alsons Palace but could
not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently ended, but the group agreed to celebrate
further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2) bottles of
Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi. Several persons were in the room at that time:
AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also
present but did not join the drinking were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego,

Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a certain Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink
but the latter did not listen and instead told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking
session, AAA rested on Oportos lap. She even showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks.
And when her legs grazed Batoctoys crotch, she remarked, "What was that, penis?" Roda
then approached AAA to kiss her, and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the sameand
AAA also kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the Alquizola
Lodging House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped drinking at
around midnight. Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany her to Alsons Palace to see
her friends there. They proceeded to the second floor and there they saw AAA lying on
Oportos lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because her mother might get angry. AAA could not
look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, "I just stay here." Alquizola and Fiel then
went back to the lodging house. After thirty minutes, they went to Alsons Palace again,and
saw AAA and Oporto kissing each other. AAA was lying on his lap while holding his neck.
Subsequently, they went back to the lodging house to resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead instructed
them to take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big problem. AAA, Lim,
and Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house. When they arrived, AAA
approached Alquizola and told him, "Kuya, I want to sleep here for the meantime." Alquizola
then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana stayed. There were two
beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay down on the single bed and
looked at Carampatana. The latter approached her and they kissed. He then removed her
shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give way. Carampatana likewise removed her
brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the foot of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed
her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull her underwear
down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the lips. Carampatana, on the other hand,
placed himself in between AAAs legs and had intercourse with her. When he finished, he
put on his shorts and went back to Alsons Palace to get some sleep. When he left, Oporto
and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then entered the room. When AAA saw him, she said,
"Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a problem." Alquizola thus started kissing AAAs
breasts. Oporto stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio on
him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name. Afterwards,
Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had intercourse
with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alsons Palace to sleep. At around
6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the lodging house. They tried to wake
AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went home. Alquizola had gone outside
but he came back before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA was no longer there when he arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted Dela
Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime charged, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indivisible prison
term of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 for and by way of
civil indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years also of
prision mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages
and another amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
ACCOMPLICE in the commission of the crime charged, and the court hereby
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages
and another sum of P30,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold
Batoctoy and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt therefor beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the
Court acquits them of said charge; and e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto
and Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as attorneys
fees and expenses of litigations; and the costs of suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola shall be credited to them and deducted from their prison terms provided they
comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained
since then up to the present. Accused Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily on 26 March
2004 and detained since then up to this time, while accused Joefhel Oporto who likewise
surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 was ordered released to the custody of the
DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31 March 2004, and subsequently posted cash bond for his
provisional liberty on 17 September 2004 duly approved by this court, thus resulted to an
order of even date for his release from the custody of the DSWD.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the prosecution
to prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim as soon as he is apprehended.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA. On June 6,
2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial courts ruling
and, consequently, acquitted private respondents. The decretal portion of said decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are instead ACQUITTED
of the crime charged.

CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED. IV. THE
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES.11
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It assigns
the following errors:

SO ORDERED.8
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA
consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of what private
respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any physical resistance,
never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The appellate court
further relied on the medical report which showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration
on AAAs genitalia, giving the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a
man before. The CA also stressed that AAAs mothers unusual reaction of hitting her when
she discovered what happened to her daughter was more consistent with that of a parent
who found out that her child just had premarital sex rather than one who was sexually
assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari 9 under Rule
65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed private respondents conviction and
ardently contending that the same was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10
The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated
November 7, 2008 to assail the petition:
I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE PROSECUTION
CANNOT APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.
III.

I.
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF ACQUITTAL AS TO THE CIVIL
ASPECT OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN
EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. 12
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a
fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of
achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of
due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed. 13 Liberal
construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. The
relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their
operation, is warranted when compelling reasons exist or when the purpose of justice
requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not
on sheer technicalities.14
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment
rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of
acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing
lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated. 15 Section 21, Article III
of the Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only
with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be
assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the
lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment,
but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a

denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void. 16 If there is
grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioners prayer is not tantamount to putting private
respondents in double jeopardy.17
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in People v.
Santiago:18
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of
the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in
the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an
appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the
said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the
accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be
filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the
private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of
the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the
action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the]
name of said complainant.19 Private respondents argue that the action should have been
filed by the State through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or
the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting
on behalf of the State. This is because the authority to represent the State in appeals of
criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG. 20
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private
counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted
private respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in
her name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an immense interest in obtaining
justice in the case precisely because she is the subject of the violation. Further, as held in
Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the Court sustained the private offended partys right in a criminal
case to file a special civil action for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of
dismissal and ruled that the Solicitor Generals intervention was not necessary, the recourse
of the complainant to the Court is proper since it was brought in her own name and not in
that of the People of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioners cause in its
Comment,22 thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. 23
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of argument, that
AAA can file the special civil action for certiorari without violating their right against double
jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for petitioners failure to previously file a motion for

reconsideration. True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of
a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by reexamination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is not absolute and admits well-defined
exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case,
relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved.24
Here, petitioners case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same questions as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on the guilt of the
private respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for any further
delay would prejudice the interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise that of the
Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of
due process and for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is
considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the prosecutions
right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. The burden is on
the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the respondent court blatantly
abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very power to dispense justice. 25
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial
discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial courts findings of fact,
thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private respondents narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal
can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.26 There is grave abuse of discretion when the disputed act of the lower court goes
beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice. 27

The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the
respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private
respondents.

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise

unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by
the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that its
narration of the facts28 of the case was meticulously culled from the evidence of both
parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not altogether
parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of
Oporto,29 Carampatana,30and Alquizola,31 the accused-appellants in the case before it. The
appellate court merely echoed the private respondents testimonies, particularly those as to
the specific events that transpired during the crucial period - from the dinner at Gemenos
house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As a result, it presented the
private respondents account and allegations as though these were the established facts of
the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire
evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the same. 32 It simply cannot
acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot appreciate
one partys cause and brush the other aside. This rule becomes particularly significant in
this case because the parties tendered contradicting versions of the incident. The victim is
crying rape but the accused are saying it was a consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus, the
CAs blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of
the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation of petitioners right to
due process.33
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and made
its own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole ordeal. The
fact that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help, and never
fought against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter that the sexual acts
were indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is

demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation;
or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is
under twelve years of age.34 Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor
more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already
obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter
was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished
her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because
she did not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was
rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the
crime.35 The appellate court never provided any reason why AAAs testimony should deserve
scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape
cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a
judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that when a
woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean
that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused
can be convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the
sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the
complainants testimony itself.36 The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful to
her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial.
AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as she narrated
her harrowing experience.37
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She tried to
resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The RTC found
AAAs testimony simple and candid, indicating that she was telling the truth. The trial court
likewise observed that her answers to the lengthy and humiliating questions were simple
and straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. 38 Thus:
Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):
xxxx

Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when did
you regain your consciousness?

Q: After that, what happened, if any?

A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.

A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the bottle
of Emperador Brandy.
xxxx

Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining contained (sic)
of the bottle of Emperador Brandy?

Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?

A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.

A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was awakened by
the flash of light.

Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?

Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that (sic) flash
of light.

A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?
Q: Where?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
xxxx
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what happened?
Q: When did you regain your consciousness?
A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.
A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.
Q: So, you fell asleep again?
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying you?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Who?
Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.
A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.
Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry you?
Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?
A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:
A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.
xxxx

Q: He was on top of you?

A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.

A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)

Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?

Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on top of
you?

A: I could not remember, sir.

xxxx

A: I was starting to cry, sir.

Q: After that, what happened?
Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?
A: I went asleep again, sir.
A: I was saying dont because I feel pain my private organ (sic).
Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?
Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually abused
me.

A: When I feel (sic)pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw Raymund
Carampatana, sir.
Q: On top of you?

ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is
crying.
xxxx

A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.

Q: What was your reaction?

ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.

A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him dont.

COURT: Continue.

Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund
Carampatana?

ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who
else was there inside that room?

A: Only the three of them, sir.

A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.

Q: Including Moises Alquizola?

Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?

A: Yes, sir.

A: He was at my feet while looking at us.

Q: What was he doing?

Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?

A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.

A: Dressed up, sir.

Q: Where in particular?

Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?

A: In my face, sir.

Q: Then after that, what happened?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said that
you feel (sic) something in your private part when you saw Raymund
Carampatana?
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.
Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?
A: I woke up at about 7:00 oclock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir. 39
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense. It noted
that their account of the events was seemingly unusual and incredible. 40 Besides, the
defense of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to have been a last
ditch effort to avoid culpability. The accused never mentioned about the same at the pretrial stage. The trial court only came to know about it when it was their turn to take the
witness stand, catching the court by surprise.41 More importantly, it must be emphasized
that when the accused in a rape case claims that the sexual intercourse between him and
the complainant was consensual, as in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such
that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an
affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, it must be established with sufficient
evidence that the intercourse was indeed consensual.42 Generally, the burden of proof is
upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that it is the
accused who is responsible for its commission. This is because in criminal cases, conviction
must rest on a moral certainty of guilt.43 Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which
rests on a party at any particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his
favor or to overthrow one when created against him. A prima facie case arises when the
party having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and
adjudication for him of the issue in litigation.44However, when the accused alleges
consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as love notes, mementos, and
credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or sexual relationship between the offender and
his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the complainant, the burden
now shifts to the accused to prove his defense by substantial evidence. 45
Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but
unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana narrated that
upon reaching the room at the lodging house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked at him.
He then approached her and they kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere. Thereafter,

Oporto also removed AAAs lower garments and then went to kiss AAA. Carampatana then
placed himself in between AAAs legs and had intercourse with her.46 On the other hand,
Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. While
Carampatana was removing AAAs shirt and brassiere, Oporto was watching at the foot of
the bed. Then he removed her pants and underwear, and AAA even lifted her buttocks to
make it easier for him to pull the clothes down. When Carampatana left after having sexual
intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he then stood up, opened his pants, and took out
his penis so that AAA could perform fellatio on him. Then he proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the
carpet. After a few minutes, he woke up and went back to the room and again had
intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and after some time, he woke up to the sound
of AAA vomitting. Shortly thereafter, he made love with AAA for the third and last
time.47 Despite said shameless admission, however, the accused failed to sufficiently prove
that the lack of any physical resistance on AAAs part amounts to approval or permission.
They failed to show that AAA had sexual intercourse with them out of her own volition, and
not simply because she was seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore could not have
given a valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and exaggerated
when testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after her testimony, an
indication of a rehearsed witness.48 To be believed, the testimony must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the attending
circumstances.49
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to
observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a
better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence. 50Matters
of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the
appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of
witnesses who have personally appeared before him. 51 The appellate courts are far
detached from the details and drama during trial and have to rely solely on the records of
the case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the
Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court whose
findings must be given due deference.52 Since the CA and the private respondents failed to
show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial
court, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding. 53
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old hymenal
laceration on AAAs private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is expected
to be present when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary, could mean that AAA
actually consented to the fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when sex is consensual, the
vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion of the penis will not cause any laceration. It
presumed that complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent considering the presence of
old hymenal laceration that could have resulted from her previous sexual encounters. The

defense, however, failed to show that AAA was sexually promiscuous and known for
organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be noted that AAA was a minor, barely 17
years old at the time of the incident, having just graduated from high school on that same
day. In a similar case,54 the Court held: x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to
have sexual intercourse with two men or three, according to Antonio Gallardo in the
presence of each other, unless she were a prostitute or as morally debased as one.
Certainly, the record before Us contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, firstyear high school student, can be so characterized. On the contrary, her testimony in court
evinced the simplicity and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not even
suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the commission of the
crime charged.55
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her claim
were not true.56 And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a young age, the
same could still not prove that no rape was actually committed. Even a complainant who
was a woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape. Even a prostitute may be a
victim of rape. The victims moral character in rape is immaterial where, as in this case, it is
shown that the victim was deprived of reason or was rendered unconscious through
intoxication to enable the private respondents to have sex with her. Moreover, the essence
of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her consent.57 A freshly broken hymen is
not one of its essential elements. Even if the hymen of the victim was still intact, the
possibility of rape cannot be ruled out. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the
vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for
rape. To repeat, rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the womans genitalia is
not indispensable to a conviction for rape.58 Neither does AAAs mothers act of hitting her
after learning about the rape prove anything. It is a truism that "the workings of the human
mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people react
differently."59 Different people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no
standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or
frightful experience.60 At most, it merely indicates the frustration and dismay of a mother
upon learning that her daughter had been defiled after partying late the night before. It is a
settled rule that when there is no showing that private complainant was impelled by
improper motive in making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to
full faith and credence.61 So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she still need
to immediately tell her parents about it when she could have just kept it to herself? Why did
she ever have to shout rape? She was not caught in the act of making love with any of the
private respondents,62 nor was she shown to have been in a relationship with any of them of
which her family disapproved.63 She never became pregnant as a result of the deed. And if
AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why would she have to drag the private respondents
into the case and identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance indicating the
contrary, she brought the charge against the private respondents simply because she was,
in fact, violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the case, even after
the CA had already acquitted the private respondents, evinces the truth that she merely
seeks justice for her honor that has been debased. 64 Unfortunately, the CA chose to ignore
these telling pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the logic and effect of the facts as
presented by AAA in support of her complaint,65 contrary to common human experience,
and in utter disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on the crime of rape.

Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because his
participation in the crime was uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It found that his
participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape. 68 The
Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizolas liability is not of a
conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that
there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the
malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Conspiracy is
proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed
an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert. 69 Proof of conspiracy
need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective
conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a
common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. 70
In Lobrigo, the Court declared:
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and Dominador's
participation in the crime conflict on material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weapons during the
mauling and whether they participated in the mauling by more than just boxing the victim.
Noel stated that they did not, Domingo stated that they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not necessary.1wphi1 In
this case, the rule is not applicable because conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and
Dominador is not proven. Their exact participation in the crime is uncertain. 71 (Emphasis
Supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that there was
conspiracy:
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim based on the
testimony of the private complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis to her
private parts and that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled
her private parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the bestial acts of
Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three of them conspired and mutually helped one
another in raping the young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and spontaneous
participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the parked jeep, molesting her and
doing nothing to prevent the commission of the rape, made him a co-conspirator. As such,
he was properly adjudged as a principal in the commission of the crime. 73

Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizolas participation in the crime is not at
all uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the
rape could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room,
intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did not do
anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even admitted to kissing AAAs lips,
breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy among
Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one was
the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape.
While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice, when he appealed
from the decision of the trial court,74 he waived the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then
called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the accused-appellant.75
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it,
however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or
information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. 76 The rationale
behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the
necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for
his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might
confuse him in his defense.77 Non-compliance with this rule is a ground78 for quashing the
duplicitous complaint or information under Rule117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and
the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, 79 otherwise,
the defect is deemed waived.80 The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense
simply because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of the
Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to
question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are
merely different counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the
instant case, there is no duplicity to speak of.81 There is likewise no violation of the right of
the accused to be informed of the charges against them because the Information, in fact,
stated that they "took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA" on March
25, 2004.82 Further, allegations made and the evidence presented to support the same
reveal that AAA was indeed raped and defiled several times. Here, according to the accused
themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in between her legs and
had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted that he had sexual intercourse
with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as
many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for
each offense.83 Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held liable for more than
one crime of rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three
of them during the commission of each of the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus
be held liable for every act of rape committed by the other. But while Oporto himself
testified that he inserted his sexual organ into AAAs mouth, the Court cannot convict him of
rape through sexual assault therefor because the same was not included in the Information.
This is, however, without prejudice to the filing of a case of rape through sexual assault as
long as prescription has not yet set in.

Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of the
presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of an
aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon them,84 for each count. With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper imposable penalty upon him is
reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a
divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which
shall be within the range of prision mayor(the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion
temporal) and the maximum of which shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, there being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
and there being no aggravating circumstance. 85 With that, the Court shall impose the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for
each count of rape committed. 86 However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate
disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344,87which extends even to one who has exceeded
the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still
a child,88 and provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows: 89
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court,
be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision
should be taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord children in conflict with
the law, who have already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper treatment
envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and anotherP50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary damages
of P30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by way of an example and to deter others from
committing the same bestial acts.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Court hereby renders judgment:
a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case;
b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
four ( 4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the

indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day of

prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, in each case; and
c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
four ( 4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in each case.
The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and severally, the
amounts ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case is REMANDED to the
court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No.
9344. Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of
judgment.
SO ORDERED