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Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal

for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences
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Commentary by Howard Shevrin (Ann Arbor)

a

Howard Shevrin
a

2021 Vinewood, Ann Arbor, MI 48104, e-mail:

Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Howard Shevrin (2000) Commentary by Howard Shevrin (Ann Arbor), Neuropsychoanalysis: An
Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 2:2, 255-258, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2000.10773316
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Ongoing Discussion: Paul Whittle

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Jaak Panksepp
Department of Psychology
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OB 43403
e-mail: jpankse@bgsu.net

Commentary by Howard Shevrin (Ann Arbor)

Whittle has written an incisive and often witty exploration of the ways to answer the question posed in his
title. Essentially he tells us to "mind the gap," an
expression familiar to London Underground passenHoward Shevrin, Ph.D., is Professor of Psychology, Department of
Psychiatry, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

gers that warns them to avoid stepping into the space

between train and platform. But Whittle is doing more
than warning us about the "gap" between experimental psychology and psychoanalysis, he wants us to understand why there is a gap, and if it is worth closing,
or if the gap itself constitutes a potentially fruitful
divergence between the two fields.

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256

I found myself in complete sympathy with his

approach, having myself sometimes deliberately,
sometimes inadvertently, stepped into the gap with
danger to scientific life and limb. He is right in calling
our attention to what are essentially cultural differences between experimental psychology and psychoanalysis. The experimental psychologist and the
psychoanalyst live and breathe in totally different ambiences. In the daily work of psychoanalysis, the clinician is primarily concerned with singularity, with the
uniqueness of the person on the couch, the taste and
feel of another personal world. In the laboratory, the
experimental psychologist is concerned with generality, the functions and processes shared across people.
Yet, powerful as these differences are I believe that
closer inspection would reveal that there is more similarity between the consulting room and the experimental laboratory than initially meets the eye.
First and obviously, the psychoanalyst cannot do
without a theoretical frame of reference and guiding
principles of a general nature applicable across people
and, indeed, allow the psychoanalyst to appreciate
how patients differ one from the other. Although Whittle talks wisely about psychoanalytic theories, he
mainly stresses their highly speculative and baroque
character; but speculative or not, baroque or not, they
are theories and as such are in principle testable in a
generic context, by which I mean that the principles,
with significant variations but no contradiction, should
apply to all people.
It is also the case, as Whittle points out, that psychoanalysts have no trouble in engaging in flights of

Howard Shevrin
as a neuroscientist that one could account for more
of the findings and point in new directions, whereas
"peppercorn" empirical generalizations only account
for the finding immediately at hand. I believe that this
is more than a matter of style and culture, but goes to
the heart of how we view the scientific enterprise
itself.
Perhaps of greater import than the role and nature
of theory are recently developing convergences between the consulting room and the laboratory, which
are only gradually being acknowledged by experimental psychologists, and of which most psychoanalysts
are totally ignorant. Perhaps astonishingly, I refer to
the role of transference and countertransference in the
laboratory. As I have explored in a recent paper in the
context of my own research (Shevrin, 2000), which is
both clinical and experimental in nature, the experimental psychologist does not escape these realities in
the laboratory; rather, they are dealt with by attempting to eliminate them with consequences for the
generalizability of research findings.
It is common practice in experimental psychology to eliminate subjects who do not cooperate with
the procedures or fail to follow instructions. I would
submit that many of these subjects are experiencing
negative transferences toward the experimenter. This
reaction is especially likely to occur among the large
numbers of undergraduate psychology students who,
for course credit, must put in a certain number of usually tedious hours as subjects. These uncooperative
subjects are sent packing. In other words, most psychology experiments are performed with a sample of

theoretical fancy, while cognitive psychologists exer-

subjects biased toward positive transferences. No psy-

cise Spartan discipline when it comes to theorizing.

Whittle characterizes the way psychoanalysts theorize
as a kind of intellectual play. I find this characterization quite attractive. But isn't all theory a form of play
in the sense that it requires some suspension of belief,
captured by the central role played by the little word
if in theorizing-" if" this is the case, then this should
follow, "If molecules exist, then they should have this
and this character." Chemists were playing with the
idea of a molecule throughout most of the nineteenth
century before molecules were actually seen. Experimental psychologists need to do a little more playing,
and less moralizing about the pitfalls of speculation.
Interestingly, the neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp
(1999) has recently bemoaned the fact that neuroscientists, like their experimental psychologist colleagues,
develop only little "peppercorns" of theory rather
than comprehensive theories. He felt that Freud's
more sweeping theories held out the promise to him

choanalyst would cast out a patient because of negative transference and only treat those with positive
transferences. Ironically, the psychoanalyst might in
this respect have a better cross-section of people than
the experimental psychologist.
As for experimenter countertransference, it is
well established that unless steps are taken to preserve
the experimenter's ignorance of the experimental
stimuli, that an unwitting influence would bias the results in favor of the experimenter's hypothesis. Incidentally, these findings support the psychoanalytic
hypothesis that motivated unconscious influences play
a role in what happens between people, and that these
unconscious influences can change behavior. From a
psychoanalytic standpoint, these unconscious influences are due to unconscious countertransferences, that
is, the experimenter's desire to obtain confirmatory results and a subsequent publication and to influence the
subject to comply. These countertransferences are

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Ongoing Discussion: Paul Whittle

unconscious because ethical experimenters do not

wish to exercise a biasing influence, although they are
aware that this could happen despite their conscious
desire to collect unbiased data. The steps taken to
counteract this unconscious influence are highly unpsychoanalytic and of doubtful effectiveness. Mainly,
the experimental procedure is sanitized by having the
entire experimental procedure presented to the subject
on a computer screen with the experimenter removed
from the subject's presence. One doesn't have to be a
psychoanalyst to realize that an experimenter is still
lurking in the background to whom the subject ascribes various attitudes and expectations concerning
the subject's performance. These thoughts, really fantasies, must play some role in how the subject performs. Moreover, these fantasies will likely differ
from subject to subject, although there may in fact be
some common fantasies, one suspects, concerning the
importance of the experiment to the experimenter. In
any case, variance across subjects will be increased
and make it more difficult for experimental differences
to emerge; more importantly the influence of fantasy
on cognitive performance will be missed.
Recently, I was treated to an interesting presentation on the neuroimaging of obsessive--compulsive
disorders in children. A 10-year-old boy, suffering
from severe obsessional preoccupations with the number 4, was placed in a PET apparatus and exposed to
the number 4 with the result that the orbitofrontal cortex "lit up" much more than after exposure to other
numbers. Should one really believe, as the presenter
asserted, that the' 'stimulus" was solely the' 'number
4"? How about an adult deliberately exposing a child
to a number the adult knows will disturb him? What
is "lit up" by that "stimulus," or perhaps the orbitofrontal lighting up, already reflects these extra-number
4 effects. But we will not know until these factors are
taken into account.
Interestingly, there is some recent acknowledgment from a source well within the experimental psychological establishment of the importance of
individual differences and context. In a report called
"Basic Research in Psychological Science," sponsored by the American Psychological Society and the
National Science Foundation, Brewer and Luce
(1998) called attention to the important role of individual differences in cognitive experiments, and of equal
importance, the role of context. They pointed out, perhaps with tongue in cheek, that the second stimulus
in a series is not the same as the first because it is the
second! The number 4 presented by an adult to a child
obsessed with the number 4 as the child is placed in

a dark PET tunnel, is a context far different from the

mythic context of an isolated stimulus, the number 4,
presented to a disembodied brain conveniently suspended for measurement in a person-free environment.
In some of our own experimental work we have
amply demonstrated the importance of individual differences and context. We have shown in a series of
subliminal experiments that changing task strategy
(that is, changing the context) and inquiring from subjects which strategy they prefer (that is, taking into
account individual differences) makes all the difference in the world as to experimental outcome (Snodgrass, Shevrin, and Kopka, 1994). Had we not
introduced these factors, the experimental outcome
would have been nil; by including them we discovered
a new experimental finding in subliminal research-below chance performance present for one
particular combination of strategy and preference
which is highly suggestive of unconscious inhibition.
Now turning to the shoe on the other foot, psychoanalysts must become more tolerant and appreciative
of the contributions that experimental investigations
can make to psychoanalysis. One need only mention
the increasing body of research demonstrating the importance of unconscious perception, memory, and
judgment; our own research on unconscious conflict
(Shevrin, Bond, Brakel, Hertel, and Williams, 1996),
the neuropsychological research on dreams by Solms
(1995), the research on transference by Luborsky and
Crits-Christoph (1998), all of which provide foundational support for the theory that undergirds daily clinical practice. Psychoanalysts would do well to accept
these gifts rather than dismissing them because they
were delivered by what appear to be messengers from
an alien culture.
The challenge for both experimental psychologists and psychoanalysts is to look beyond the cultural
Jifferences so articulately identified by Whittle to the
ways in which the differences in method can be turned
into complementary strengths. By asking us to "mind
the gap," Whittle not only wishes to save us from
tripping, but also wants us to consider the gap as a
challenge and opportunity and not simply as a pitfall
to be avoided.

References
Brewer, M. B., & Luce, R. D. (1998), Basic research in
psychological science. American Psychological Society
Observer, Report 6:3-39.

Oliver Turnbull

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Luborsky, L., & Crits-Christoph, P. (1998), Understanding

Transference: The Core Conflictual Relationship Theme
Method. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Panksepp, J. (1999), Emotions as viewed by psychoanalysis
and neuroscience: An exercise in consilience. This Journal, 1(1): 15-38.
Shevrin, H. (2000), The experimental investigation of unconscious conflict, unconscious affect, and unconscious
signal anxiety. In: Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps, ed. M. Velmans.
London: John Benjamins.
- - Bond, J. A., Brakel, L. A., Hertel, R. K., & Williams, W. J. (1996), Conscious and Unconscious

Processes: Psychodynamic, Cognitive, and Neurophysiological Convergences. New York: Guilford Press.
Snodgrass, M., Shevrin, H., & Kopka, M. (1993), The mediation of intentional judgments by unconscious perceptions: The influences of task strategy, task preference,
word meaning, and motivation. Consciousness & Cognit., 2:169-193.
Solms, M. (1995), New findings on the neurological organization of dreaming: Implications for psychoanalysis.
Psychoanal. Quart., 64(1):43-67.
Howard Shevrin
2021 Vinewood
Ann Arbor, MI48104
e-mail: shevrin @ umich. edu

Personal Memories of Experimental Psychology and Psychoanalysis

Commentary by Oliver Turnbull (Bangor, Wales)

Paul Whittle's lecture was delivered to the Department

of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge
in 1994. Its publication evokes strong memories for
me because I had the privilege of attending the lecture
itself when I was about to complete my doctoral training in that department. The talk was part of an ongoing
weekly series of scientific lectures, called Zangwill
Club meetings, after the eminent Cambridge neuropsychologist (who was head of the Cambridge department
for many years). The talks were most commonly given
by invited speakers, typically prominent psychologists
and neuroscientists. Members of the department's own
academic staff (such as Paul) did deliver Zangwill
Club talks from time to time. However, the topics covered in the talks, whether delivered by internal or external speakers, were invariably of the' 'hard-nosed"
scientific sort, focusing preferably on small and tractable problems, and delivered with the usual barrage of
experimental data that are expected from a scientist.
Thus, data become the principal material of any talk,
and one's scientific credentials are (arguably) measured by the "quality" of the empirical material. At
times it has seemed that the ideal data for such an
environment would involve a rather mathematicallooking function, based on systematically manipulating an easily controlled variable, and plotted on a nice
tidy graph (a linear function would be best, but an
Oliver Turnbull is a Lecturer in Cognitive Neuroscience, School of
Psychology, University of Wales, Bangor.

exponential function would still be acceptable). Using

these criteria, the difficult scientific work is in devising
an experiment clever enough to produce such neat results. My recommendation for a successful talk (and
indeed a successful career) would be to have investigated psychological (if that is the correct term) phenomena as far away from the "mind"
as
possible-such as perceptual thresholds, or perhaps
time-to-collision investigations in visually guided action. In this sort of context, Paul is certainly correct
to suggest that the British are "notoriously distrustful
of theory. " In fact, if this empiricist attitude is typical
of British psychology departments in general, it is especially true of Cambridge. The department prides itself on having an especially rigorous scientific
outlook, and rejoices in its title of Experimental Psychology Department. It seemed to me then (as it seems
now) a rather inappropriate place to speak about psychoanalysis.
The Zangwill Club meetings were open to all,
and were invariably attended by the majority of academic staff and graduate students from the department. The talks were generally regarded as occurring
in a friendly scientific atmosphere-and usually several people took a trip to the pub afterwards for further
discussion with the speaker. However, it was also expected that the speaker would have to answer a number of tough questions from the floor at the end of
the talk, consistent with Cambridge's reputation as a
center of international scientific excellence. Thus, the