The Weakness of Civil Society

in Post-Cominunist Europe

MARC MORJE HOWARD

ffiCNMBRIDGE
qtr uNrvERsrrY PREss

Contents

pdge vul

List of Figwres

ix
xi

List of Tables
I'reface

r
L
l
4
s
h
7

Introduction
An Experiential Approach to Societal Continuity and Change

Civil Society and Democ ratrzation

Post-Communist Civil Society in Comparative Perspective:
An Empirical Baseline
Explaining Organrzational Membership: An Evaluation of
Alternative Hypotheses
Why Post-Communist Citizens Do Not Join Organizations:
An Interpretive Analysis
Clonclusion

A
Appcndix B
A lrpcrrdix C

ppcndix

Appcndix

Coding of the Variables

Country Scores on the Main Variables

The Post-Communist Organizational Membership

r6
3r
57

9z
IZI

r46
t64
r67

Study (PCOMS) Survey

17O^

The In-Depth Interviews

175

ll('ercnrces

t89

Irttlcx

zor

Tables

Figures

3.r
i.,

The Arenas of Demo ctatizatton

The Groups of Political Soci ety, Economic Society, and Civil

page 33
36

Society
Average Number of Org anrzational Memberships per Person,
Prior Regime TYPe Averages

6z

4.2

Memb.6hip in Nine Types of

Typ. Averages

64

4.3

Average Number of Org antzational Memberships per Person,

4.r

5.9

MembershiP
Post-Communist Disappointment and Organrzational
MembershiP

The Implications of Prior Non-Democratic Regime Type for

the Tasks of Democratic Consolidation

4.2
4.j

Organtzational Membership, by Country

Changes in Levels of Membership, r99o-9r

4.4

Organtzattons, Prior Regime

by CountrY
5.r Income and organizational Membership
-5.2
Education and Organ tzatronal Membership
5.3 Ag. and Organ tzattonal Membership
i.4 Gender and Organ rzatronal Membership
Membership
i.S
-5.2 City Size and Organ rzatronal
Any Voluntary Organizations
Not
for
Reasons
Joining
-S
.7 Mistrust of Communist Organizations and Organ tzattonal
Membership TodaY
g persistence of Friendship Networks and Organ tzational
.

4.r

69

4.5
4.6

94
97

4-7
4.8

98

4-9

95

99
T03

4-r o

ro6

4.

ro8
,t.t

IIO
.+.r

\.

6t
65

to r99i-971

Country Rankings
Changes in Levels of Membership, r 995-97 to r999i
'Western

Germ any
Russia, Eastern Germany, and
Economic S7ell-Being and Organtzatronal Membership
Political Rights and Civil Liberties and Organ rzatronal

Membership
" Civili zatron" and Organ Lzatronal Membership
Prior Regime Type and Organ rzatronal Membership
Democratic Longevity and Organ rzattonal Membership
(Post-Authoritarian and Post-Communist Countries Only)
OLS Regression Analysis of Aggregate Membership in
Volun tary Organ izattons (All Countries )
OLS Regression Analysis of Aggregate Membership in
Volun tary Organ rzatrons (Post-Autho rrtaruan and
Post-Communist Countries Only)
OLS Regression Analysis of Aggre gate Membership in
\ft>lunt

page

7r
73

75

77
79
8o
8z
83

84

ary Organizations, with Controls for Individual

Characteristics (All Countries)

Ot.S Regression Analysis of Aggregate Membership in
Volu nta ry C)rganizations, with Controls for Individual
(,hanrctcristics (Post-Authoritanan and Post-Communist

88

(,ourttrics Orrly)
( )l ,S ltt'grt'ssiorr Arralysis of lndividual-[,eve[ Membership
irr Vollnlt:lry ( )r'g:urizrttiorts (ltussirt, lirtstcrn (]ermany, ancl

89

Wt'slt't'lt (,t'l-lll:llly.,

('(

llttllirlt'tl

too
t\

List of Tables

5.2

OLS Regression Analysis of Individual-Level Membership

in Voluntary Organrzatrons (Russia, Eastern GermdflY, and

'Western

5.3
6.r
B. r
C. r
D. r
D.z
D

Germ tfly, separatelY)

roz

OLS Regression Analysis of Individual-Level Membership

in Voluntary Organizattons (Russia and Eastern Germ"nY.combined and separately)
The Salience of Unemployment in Eastern Germany
Country Scores on the Main Variables
Distribution of PCOMS Survey Respondents
Comparison of In-Depth Interview and PCOMS Survey

r42

R.espondents

177

Preface
III

r67
17T

Comparison of In-Depth Interview Respondents to New

Democracies Barometer (NDB) and New Russia
Barometer (NRB) Results

178

In-Depth Interview Respondent Characteristics

r 8r

In April r9g8, five months before parliamentary elections, a new political

force seemed to be emergitrg in Germany. As the main politic al parties competed for the public's attention by placing posters all across the major cities,
a series of prominently positioned banners appe ared on beh alf of a "political
party" known simply by its acronym BKD. The banners included such
"slogans" as "Out with Diets!", "Freedoffi, Equalitg and Mealtime!", and
"It's Time for Change - BKD: The Genuine Alternative!", and they directed
viewers to the website of the party's campaigt headquarters.
Those industrious enough to check the site found out that the party's full
name was "Burger King fiir Deutschland" and that the campaign banners
were actually cleverly designed nationwide advertising initiative by the in^
giant Burger King in an attempt to gain ground on its
ternational fast-food
perpetual rival McDonald's. The ensuing media cov erage provided Burger
f(ing with a great deal of free publicitS and the humorous ad campaign was
widely viewed as a greatsuccess. Over the followittg weeks and months, "the
Whopper" emerged as the BKD's leading candidate, and Burger King continrrcd to play the BKD theme until the elections took place in Iate September.
Of Burger King's many clever posters and banners, one in particular was
rrrost striking, both in its location and its (perhaps unintentional) revealing
irrsight about East German society today. It was an enormous banner, aflirccl t<l the aboveground S-Bahn commuter train line, stretchittg across the
rrrrrirr street leading to Alexanderplatz in East Berlin - the site of the imlrosirrli tclevision tower built by the East German state as a symbol of its
;rllt.gccl supcriority to the S7est, and the place where more than one million
f ,,rrst (icnnans gathered for a demonstration on November 4, 1989, leading
to tlrt'r)pcrrirrg of the Berlin \il/all several days later. The Burger King banner
l)r'()c'l:rirrrcrl "cinc nr:r,rc: Ilurgcrllewegungr" an obvious play on the German
w()r'(l "lliir'11r'r'bcwr'14ung.," ()r citizcns'm()veffrent. All it took was one missnrl,, rrrnl:rul., rurtl tlrt't'rrtil't'nl('rurirrg of tlrc'phrasc was transformed, from a
t tllt('ns' ntr )v('nl('nl irtl o :t lt;uttlrttt'1it't' t'tl()v('lllt'tlt.

xii

Preface

Although I was not resourceful enough to take a picture of the striking

banner which I would later regret when trying to come up with this
book's cover - its image and message have remained with me throughout
this project. Aside from being part of an effective marketing campaigt,
the Alexan derplatz banner captured the condition of civil society in
contemporary Eastern Germ dny, and in post-communist Europe in general,
surprisingly well. However noble, well intentioned, and briefly powerful
the citizens' movements of r989-9r were throughout the Soviet bloc, they
were nonetheless ephemeral and fleeting. Indeed, the story I tell in this
book shows that post-communist societies have been far more successful in
developing a private "hamburger society" than they have been in creating
an actively engaged "civil society" in the public sphere.
This book was a long time in the making. It started as a vaguely conceived
dissertation proposal, took on substance after a year of intensive fieldwork
and multiple follow-up trips to Russia and Germany, and eventually developed into its current form after many drafts were written and revised, in
both Northern California and'Washington' D.C.
The research and writing of the book would not have been possible
without the help of many institutions, colleagues, friendso and family. The
MacArthur/Mellon Foundations provided funding at both the predissertation and dissertation stages of this proiect; the Social Science Research
Council allowed me to conduct my fieldwork Germany through its Berlin
Program for Advanced German and European Studies; the National
Security Education Program and the Berkeley Program in Soviet and PostSoviet Studies supported my fieldwork in Russia; and the National Science
Foundation provided the funding to commission my representative sur-

vey in Germany and Russia. Georgetown University's Center for German

and European Studies, where I was a post-doctoral Research Associate in
r999-zooo) generously offered a warm and supportive intellectual home
from which to begin revising my dissertation for publication. I am very
grateful to these institutions for having deemed this project worthy of their
financial and institutional support.
Since this project began as a doctoral dissertation, I would like to thank -y
former advisers for their helpful suggestions and supportive feedback. Ken
Jowitt, George Breslauer, Jack Citrin, Gerald Feldm an) and M. Steven Fish
were a constant source of inspiration, encouragement, and friendship over
the five years I spent at Berkeley. Juan Ltnzrmy former undergraduate adviser
at Yale,graciously accepted to join my dissertation committee from afar; his
ideas, conscientiousness, and unfailing work ethic have greatly irrflucncccl
me over the past decade. Even though these six scholitrs clo lt<lt rtlwrtys rlgrcc
with one another, their diversc rrppr()ilchcs,tttrl poilrts of vit'w lrrtv('c'trt'ic'ltt'tl

projcct trct't'tcttdotrsl y.
llrlsr) ()w('nr:lny tlr,url<s lo tlt,,rt'wlt,,ltr'l;tr',1 tttc itt ltttsrt,t .tlt,l ( 't'l'ltl,lllI
wlritt, I w:ts ('()ntlrr,, rirrli nr\1 lit'l.lrv,,tl*. lrr l(''.'.t,t, I u,,,ttl.l ,",It't l,tllt' lrl,.t'

th is

Preface

xlll

to thank Oleg Kharkhordin and his colleagues at the European University

of St. Petersburg; Viktor Voronkov' Elena Nikiforova, Oksana Karpenko,
and other researchers at the Center for Independent Social Research in
St. Petersburg; and Oksana Bocharova, Leonid Ionin, Alla Tchernyx, and
Natalia Zorkaya in Moscow. In Germany, I am particularly grateful to
Carola Hammerl, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Sigrid Meuschel, Eckhard
'Wielgohs for their help with
Priller, Torsten Schneider-Haase, and Jan
various aspects of this proiect.
The core of my field research would not have been possible without the
openness and generosity of my in-depth interview respondents. Even though
I was a total stranger to them - and I spoke German and Russian with
a peculiar Franco-American accent - they let me into their homes and into
thiir lives. They told me fascinating and inspiring stories, filled with struggle,
hope, and great emotion. I can only hope that some of their passion remains
in the pages of this book, and that readers will appreciate and learn from
them, as I have.
'!7hile
writing the book, many friends and colleagues were kind enough
to read chapters, and to provide me with helpful suggestions and feedback.
While apologizing to those I may inadvertently be omitting, I would especially like to thank Harley Balze4 Sam Barnes, Michael Bernhard, Valerie
Bunce, Keith Darden, Larry Diamond, Tomek Grabowski' Ken Greene, Steve
Hanson, David Isao Hoffman, Wade Jacoby, Jeff Kopstein, Mark Lichbach,
Jim McAdams, Laurence McFalls, Brian Pollins, John Sides, Jennifer Steen,
tUfalker, and
Jeremy Straughn, Vladimir Tismaneanu, Mike Urban, Ned
Lucan Way. Evan Lieberman read every chapter of the book - often more
than one draft of each - and provided detailed and insightful comments from
its eadiest stages to the final revisions and editing.
I would also like to thank Lewis Bateman, my editor at Cambridge
University Press, for his steadfast support and good humor throughout the
publication pfocess, as well as production editor Camilla Knapp for her
timely and helpful replies to my frequent queries, and copy editor Susan
( ireenberg for her thoughtful editing suggestrons.
Finally, I would like to thank my family for their help and support. My parcnts, Brigitte and Dick Howard, have shown me how to combine my love of
lrooks with human contact and interaction. And by raising me in a bilingual
lircrrch-American household, they have inspired me to seek out, understand,
,rntl irppreciate new languages and cultures. My wife, Lise Morj6 Howard,
Irrrs l'rccn rny companion throughout the entire journey of this project' Our
( ()lllllt()ll lovc of travel and adventure and our constant exChange Of ideas
Ir,rvt'r'rrriclrcd this book and my life. No language can express my sense of
1,,r:rtir rrtlc rtrttl rr1'rprccirrti<ln for our partnership. Finally, I would like to thank
rrrrl tf:rrrg,lrtcr"/ltc, who tlrrly recently entered this world and does not yet
\l)(':ll( in rrrry r'<,trtprcht'rtsiblc lrtttgttirgc, htrt who already gives me more joy
,rrrtl irrslrilitl iott t lt;ttt I lrrttl cvcl' irrr:tgirtt'tl w:ts possiblc.

I
Introduction

This book explores the general theme of how people adapt to a new democratic system, concentrating on the citizens of post-communist Europe, who
have lived through tremendous political and economic changes over the
past two decades. It traces their life experiences and trajectories, from living in communist political and economic systems to adapting to the rapid
and sweeping changes of post-communist democracy and market capitalism. In states where the Communist Party dominated for decades with its
omnipresent ideology and mechanisms of social control, ordinary people
developed strategies for getting by in an economy in which shortages were
rampant, and in a political system in which laws and institutions rarely
functioned as intended or promised. This book shows how, to what extent, and in what ways these adaptive strategies have persisted in the new
post-communlst era.
More specifically, this book focuses on civil society - conceived of as
e crucial part of the public space between the state and the family, and
crnb<ldied in voluntary organizations - and it seeks to explain why postc<rmmunist civil society is distinctively weak, characterized by low levels
of <trganizational membership and participation by ordinary citizens. The
rrsscrtion that civil society is weak throughout post-communist Europe denrrrrrds evidence and explanation. A major task of this book is therefore to
l)rcscnt a clear and detailed account of comparative levels of participation
in voluntary organizations across a wide set of countries. This "empirical
lr:rscf irrc," which introduces original and recent sources of data, provides an
t.rrrpiric:rl foundation to debates that are frequently marred by incomparable
tlirtir, with conclusions often reduced to hunches and wishful thinking. While
rlrc cstrrlrf ishnrent of a broad comparative baseline of organizational membcrslril'r is csscntial to this book, its most important and challenging task is
to ploviclr.rr cirus,rl cxplatttrtiotr to acc()unt f<lr the particularly low levels of
P(,sl ( ( )illtllu n lsl clvl(' l)ll rrlclpiltl()11.

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Europe

POST.COMMUNIST EUROPE

Although the topic, data, theorS and methods of this book are of wider
relevance for comparative politics, the specific project focuses on the region of post-communist Europe in order to explain a remarkable pattern
of low, perhaps even declining, rates of participation in the volunt ary organrzations of civil society. These consistently low levels of org anrzational
membership are especially surprising given the well-documented increases
in the numbers of existing orga ntzatrons in the region since the collapse of
communism.t
Throughout the book, I refer to "post-communist Europe" as a distinctive
and coherent region. The very use of this phrase necessitates a definition of
which types of countries are included and a discussion of how the region
has been viewed and treated by other scholars. My use of "post-communist
Europe" has both a geographic and a substantive component. GeographicallS it includes only those countries that arc located on the European continent, thereby leaving out non-European post-communist countries in the
Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as non-Soviet countries such as China,
North Korea, and Cuba. Although I believe that the similarities between
European and non-European post-communist countries are probably far
greater than most scholars reco gnLze, to include the non-European nations
in my analysis would go far beyond the scope of this book, as well as obfuscate its conceptual and thematic focus. Substantively, since I am primarily
concerned with the role of civil society in countries that are in the process
of dem ocratrzation - indeed, I argue that civil society requires at least the
minimum legal protection afforded it by democratic institutions - I am not
referring to countries that were blatantly non-democratic at the time I conducted my research. This distinction is import ant because, unlike studies
that focus on the entire universe of up to z8 post-communist countries in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union ,' rt narrows the realm of cases
by
half , leaving those countries tha t arc generally the most
"pproximately
successful in both political and economic terms. In short, my use of the category "the region of post-communist Europe" is meant to encompass those

Introduction
post-communist countries on the European continent that have achieved at
least a basic minimum of procedural demo cracy.3

Broadly speakitrg, scholars have looked at the countries of postcommunist Europe in two different ways, emphasizing either the new
opportunities of the post-communist present or the lasting effects of the
communist past. The first approach, which was especially domin ant in the
early- to mid -r99os, either assumes or argues explicitly that contemporary
political and economic attributes and policies are the most important factors for explaining and predicting cross-national varration. Scholars have
emphasized a range of variables, including the "mode of transition,"4 po-

litical "craftrng,"s institutional design,6 and economic policies and conditions ., By focusing on such generic factors, analysts have been able to include

post-communist countries in a broader comp aratle framework, thus treating them as another set of "cases" to which they can extend the theories
and arguments developed in studies of Latin American and South European
countrles.
The second approach, in contrast, accounts for current developments in
post-communist countries by emphasizing causal variables that arc particular
legacies of the communist experience. Many advocates of this approach have
crttrcized the "tabula rasa" element of the first, which they view as ignoring
rhe crucial historical and cultural context of communism. The specific factrrrs of the second approach that scholars choose to emphasize are quite
varied; they include the nature and consequences of political opposition and
crises,8 the simultaneity of post-communist political, economic, and (in some
crrses) even national transitions re the particular institutional design of comnrunist systems,'o and the attitudinal orientations and behavioral practices

"
'

for example, Lester M. Salamon et al., Global Ciuil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit
Sector (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999); Civicu s, The New
Ciuic Atlas: Profiles of Ciuil Society in 6o Countries ( \Tashington, DC: Civicus, tggZ); Grzegorz
See,

Ekiert and Jan Kubik, Rebellious Ciuil Society: Popwlar Protest and Democratic Consolidation in
Poland, r9|9-r99j (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

'

for example, Valerie Bunce, "The Political Economy of Postsocialism," in Slauic Reuieut,,
Vol. 58, No.4 Gggg), pp. 756-793; M. Steven Fish, "Postcommunist Sr-rbversiorr: Social
Science and Democrattzation in East Europe and Eurasia," rn Slauic Raieu:, Vrl. .5[], No. 4
(tggg), pp. 794-84; M. Steven Fish., "The Dcterminarrts of liconorrric llcfonrr irr tlrt'l)ostCommunist \W<>rlrl," in F',ast l;,urr\rcan I'tililics tutd Sor'ir'fir's, Vol. r z., No. r (r..1r1ll)., pgr. lr 78:
M. Stcvclt liislr., "l)crttocr':ttizrtliott's llt'tlrtisitt's:'l'lrt'l)oslt()nlnttnrisl l'.xP1'1-ir'nrr'," irr l't*l
,\ttttir,l Af f,tirs,Vttl. 14. No. 1 (l.t.t,rl), l)l). I r r= 1,17.
See,

I explain and discuss my critena for selecting countries in much greater detail in Chaptet 4.

't 'l-erry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America,
S<>uthern and Eastern Europe," rn International Social Science Journal, Vol. 43, No. z (r99r),
;tp.269-284.

'

(;iuseppe

Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitiozs (Berkeley:

IJniversity of California Press, r99o).
'Waisman,
eds. Institutional Design inNew Democracies: Eastern
A rcrrcl Lijphart and Carlos H.
'Westview
Press, 1996ll.
I;trru\te and Latin America (Boulder:
Atfarrr Przeworski, Democraq) and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern
li,ttroltc and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, rggr); Stephan Haggard
rrrrrf Itobcrt R. Kaufman,ThePoliticalEconomy of DemocraticTransitioas (Princeton: Princeton

[ | rr ivt'rsity l)rcss , 1 99 S)
l{ { irz,r.gorz. lil< icrt,'Tbe State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central
.

li,rtt'r

tltt (l)rirrccforr: Princeton University

Press.- T996).

'' ( ,l;r us ( )lf t.., "( l:lpitelisrn by Democratic Design?

I'

'

Democratic Theory Facing the Triple

irr lirrst ( lt'rrtnrl lirrropc," in Social Research, Vol. 58, No. + (tggr), pp. 865-892.
V.rlr.r rt. llun( ('r ,\ttltt,(rsit,(' Instilrtliorts:'l'he Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State
(( .rrrrlrrr,l1g,': (,;urrlrr itllit'tlnivt'r'sity l)r't'ss, t999); Stcvcn L. Solnick, StealingtheState:Control
tyttl ('rll,tlt.',' 1r,\r tt,tt'l lrt,sltlrtlrols ((,:urrlr itl11r', MA: I llrvrtrd Univcrsity Prcss, t 99tl).
I r ,r rrsitiorr

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

that developed under communism.-' But the historical emphasis and causal
logic are similar, and the common argument is that without an understandini of the communist past, it is difficult to make sense of the post-communist
prir.rr, and furure. peihaps paradoxicallg while one might expect the power
has
of leg"cie, to decrease on., ii-., the scholarly attention paid to legacies
providing
system'
socialist
state
of
the
increased since the collapse
just discussed.
".,,rlny
a much-needed correction to the ahistorical approach
hotly debated,"
been
have
approaches
Although these two contending
from both.'l
elements
incorporate
io
trying
,.hJl"rs are increasingly

-arry
Mo.eover, scholars from Loth approaches

whether they emphasize

contemporary economrc and politicai variables, or communist-era historical

there
factors I oft.r, share the aszumption, or reach the conclusion, that
This
Europe.'a
post-communist
of
iegion
the
are great dffirmces within
the
to
reaction
a
direct
is
often
Jiff.t.tt..
,r.*l-ph"si, on port-.ommunist
the
overemphasized
have
to
perceived
is
which
earlier field of sovietologS
scholars
even
words,
In
other
countries.rs
comilunist
similarities among
who focus on the power of the communist legacy tend to stress that individual communist countries had very different historical experiences, and they
g.rr.*lly seek to show how thoie- diverse experiences have contributed to
lasting differences in the present.'6

,,

Ken

Jowitt,

Neut World Disorder: The Leninist Extinctioz (Berkeley:

University of California

Press,rgqz);PiotrSztompka,..Civilizationallncompetence:TheTrapofP-ost-Comrnunist
Societies,"

inZehschriftftisoziologie,Yol.zz,No.z F9%),pp.85-95;PiotrSztompka,"The

in Comparatiue
Intangibies and Imponierables oi the Transition to Democracy," in Studies

,,

,l

Communisrt,Yol' 24, No. 3 (r99r)' pp' 295-3rr'

See

especially the pointed

.*.ttr"g. L.*".n

Valerie Bunce, on the one hand, and Philippe

Karl, "The
schmitter and Terry Karl, on the-othec Philippe c. schmitter and Terry Lynn
Should
East
the
to
Far
How
consolodologists:
and
Transitologists
of
conceptual Travels
Valerie
They Attempt to Go?" in Shuic Reuiew,Vol. 53, No' r (spring 1994]), PP'r73-r85;
..Should Transitologists Be Grounded?" in slauic Reuietu, Vol. 54, No. r (1995)'
Bunce,
..From Iron Curtain to a Papp.rrl_r27; Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter,
in Shuic Reuieut'
i., c,rrt"ir* Grounding Transitologists or Students of Postcommunism?"
Vol. 54, No. 4 (1995)' PP.965-978.
aspects from both approaches, see, for example,-Juan J' Linz
that
For recent books

"o-birre
Europe,
and Alfred Stepan, problems of betnoaatic Transition and Consolidation: Southem
Press,
Universify
Hopkins
(Baltimore:
Europe
Johns
Post-C,omnu.tnist
and
South Americal
Post-cornnnnist
in
Design
Institutiotal
Pretss,
K.
ryg6); Jon Elster, claus offe, and Ulrich
S.rlrii, Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David
Property in Fast
Stark and L6szl6 Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathuays: Transforming Politics and
CentT

al Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)'

for example, Jacqoes Rupnik, "The Postcommunist Divide''' in Journal of Democracy,

'4
Vol. ro, No. i (1999), pp. 57-64 Fish, "Democratization's Requisites'"
r5 See Ekiert, The Sate against Society, for an explicit articullttiort rrf thc distirtctiorl t<r
See,

Sovietology.
,6 See,forex-amplc,hikicrt,'l'brsltlrtl4ttittslSrllr,/vlllrtttrr',Srr/rtt't:rltrltrsltlttlittttsiV;rlcriclJtlrrtt''
..I{t'giorral l)iflt,rt.tru.s irr l)r'rrrorritliz;ttiolt:'l ltc li.tst vrtrttc tlrr S,ttllr''' n l\*l '\rt'td Alh't's'

Vtrl.t.t'Nrl.1(r..rr1tl)'1r1r'rl|,,.,1ri|ltttlrr',..'|'|rc|,.,|ttt..t||,r,tlr.tttt,lr|l'lr'.t..rrti.rIrlttt''

Introduction

This study builds on the perspective and findings from the legacies approach'
but it complements it in two crucial respects' and, overall, it suggests a theoretical reconsideration of the question of the relative similarities or differences between the countries of post-communist Europe. First, given the
difficulty in compiling comparable data across countries and regions, the
studies that stress the differences among post-communist countries often
lack a concrete comparative reference point with which to evaluate and
compare those differences to those between post-communist and non-postcommunistcountries.rT Yet, without wider comparisons, it is difficult to specify bout different a difference is. In contrast, this book incorporates new
and wide-ranging sources of data to compare the membership patterns of
post-communist citizens to those of people from other regions of the world'
While there are of course differences among post-communist countries that is, levels of organizational membership are certainly not identical across
the region - these differences are relatively minor when seen from a larger
comparative persPective.
Second, while the emphasis on the differences among post-communist
countries may be appropriate for studies that focus on elites or institutions,
the findings of this book point to important, but often overlooked, similarities on the "mass" or societal level. Although the sudden disappearance
of communist institutions allowed domestic elites and foreign advisers to
create rapidly new political and economic institutions that differed gteatly
from country to country, societal similarities have been much more resistant
to change. In this sense, this study builds upon some of the findings from
recent comparative survey research, which has found striking similarities
rrmong post-communist countries, particularly with regard to such themes
ls the importance of freedom from state control and a common mistrust of
the organizations of civil society.'8
In short, the focus on ordinary citizens, by means of widely comparative data, introduces a new perspective on the coherence of postcommunist Europe as a region, and it thus complements and enhances the
currently dominant emphasis on post-communist differences. This is not

"

's

Scvcral importantexceptionsincludeLinzandStepan,ProblemsofDernocraticTransitionand
(imstiidati6n;Bunce, 'Regional Differences in Democratization"; and B6la Greskovits, TDe
l\litical Econottty of Protzst and Patience: East European and Intin American Transfonnations
(itnpared (New York: Central European University Press, 1998).
Scc cspccially the many studies produced by Richard Rose and his colleagues, including
f{rth;rrcl fl<rsc, "|rcedom as a Fundamental Value," in lnterrational Social Science lourttal,
Nr r. r .15 ( r 995 ), pp. 454-47 | i William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Trust, Distrust and SkepI it isrr r; l\ lru l;r r l;.vrt ltrir t iorrs of (liv il a nd Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies,"
n ht,t,,h,l t,llt,/rti s, Vrl. 5e, No. r ( , y.tZ), pp. 4 r tl-45 r; and Richard Rose, William Mishler'

.t1tf (llrrrrti.rrr llit(.rt)lcr. lr,r,,t\nt(ttnkl ltsAltenutliut's:llndcrstandingPost-CommunistSocir'll'' (ll,rllrttrotc: l,rlttts I lolrlittts I llttvt'tsity Itrt'ss, r.1'18)'

'Weakness

of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

to deny the existence of many other differences among the countries and
societies of the region, but in terms of levels of membership in volunt ary
organizatrons, this variation is more acctxately viewed as "differences in degree"rather than as "differences in kind." In other words, not only do postcommunist citizens join organizations significantly less often than citizens
from other countries and regions of the world, but there is also less variation
among post-communist countries than there ts between them and non-post-

communist countries, whether "older democracies" or "post-authoritarian"

countries, from other regions and contlnents.
I do not mean to suggest that the "degree" versus "kind" distinction applies to all, or even to most, aspects of post-communist transformation. Issues
such as the extent, typ, and pace of political and economic reforms, the development of politic al party systeffis, or the expansion of NATO or the EU
are legitimate and important examples of " drfferences in kind, " where the
empiri cal realities are such that it makes sense to stress the important differ'
ences

within the region. In terms of the societal-level question of membership

in volu ntary organi zations, however - and especially when viewed in a wide,
cross-regional perspective - the findings and analysis of this book point to a
striking simil arrty throughout the region of post-communist Europe.

CASE STUDIES

One way in which I demonstrate this similar pattern of relatively low levels
of membership in voluntary organizatlons in post-communist Europe is by
focusing on two case studies, Russia and Eastern Germany. These two cases

Introduction

In addition to these three factors - contempor ary economic well-being,

political institutions, and civrhzation - which can be tested systematically
using available cross-national data, the dominant perspective on Russian
and East Germa n societies views them as being quite different from one another. Leaving aside national stereotypes, Russians are clearly living in a
more uncertain environment, where they have to struggle immensely to survive economically, where the political system is charactenzed by arbrtrary
decrees and theatrical politics, and where there is still a great fear of the
state and the police.'o East Germans, in contrast, have fewer such direct
fears, but they do have to contend with the very visible presence of the
'West,
which they perceive as looking down on them, judging them, and
even ridiculitrg them." Both societies see themselves and their problems as
'West,
since no other postbeing wnique: the East Germans because of the
communist country has the respective advantages and disadvantages that
come along with German unification, and the Russians because of a shared
sense of their historical destiny, fate, and culture ." Even though durittg the
communist period the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Soviet
LJnion were both cited as examples of hard-line communist regimes, most
scholars viewed the two societies as being vastly different, particularly given
the much higher standard of living in the GDR. A final difference between
them involves geographyr within the region of post-communist Europe,
lrastern Germany and Russia are located at either extreme. Therefore,
lry comparing these two distant cases, we can also control for geographic placernent, a factor that some scholars have identified as being

differ greatly on most contempor ary factors that would constitute alternative
explanations of variation in levels of participation in volunt ary organrzations: economic levels are very high in Eastern Germany but extremely low
in Russia; politic al and legal institutions are very well developed in Eastern
'West
German system, while
Germany, which inherited the well-developed
the Russian political and legal systems are still very weak and undeveloped;
and both societies belong to different cultural and religious "civtlizations."
The substantial variation between these two cases in these areas provides
maximal analytic leverage for explaining the causes of the similarly low
levels of civic participation across post-communist Europ e.'e

f<rr example. But the term here refers to the contemp orary post-communist period, where
it is beyond dispute that Russia and Eastern Germany differ widely on the most commonly
articulated alternative variables. On the method of agreement, see John Stuart Mill, A Syst.cm of Logic: Ratiocinatiue and Inductiue (New York: Harper, fi46), Book III, Chapter 8, " Of
the four methods of experimental inquiry"; on most different systems designs, see Adam

l)rzeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparatiue Social Inqulry (New York: John

Wiley & Sons, r97o), Chapter z) "Research Designs." For a balanced discussion of
thc strengths and weaknesses of Mill's methods, see Stanley Lieberson, "Small N's and
llig Clonclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on
rf Srnall Number of Cases," in Charles C Ragin and Howard S. Becker, eds.,What Is
tt (,asc? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University
f

"'
re In other words,

I am applying Mill's "method of. agreement," or what Przeworski and

Teune call the "most different systems" approach. This approach is the most appropriate f<tr
explaining the puzzle that is the focus of this project - where, within the univer:se of postcommunist cases, a similar outcome (weak civil society) is best explained by sinrilar factors
(certain common communist and post-communist expe rierrccs), clerspitc a wiclc ilrrily of cott
temporary varrables (economic, p<llitic:rl., civiliz,rrtion:rl) tlr:tt slrr)w llr'('itt tlif:lt't-('n('('s lrt:lwt't'rt
thetwocases. Onccorrlcl c<lrttcrtrl tlrltt Sovit't l(rrssiit;ut(l l'.;rst (,t'rrttrttty w('t('tt()l "tttosl tlillc'r
cnt"cils('srlrrrirrgtlrcr()nunlnrisl;lt'riorl Itct,tu\('oltlrctcl,tttv(-\tttttl,tttl!',,1tlr.'tr lt,tt'.1 ltttt'
r('gnrt('st wlrirlr w('r(' tttrr, lr nror(' l('\t',l.tttl l. r('lnutr tlr.ut r('[irlnr", rrr Ilutt[',,ttt' .tlt,l Itol,tttrl.

'r
'

tt

t'ss., 1r1.12).

lror' :ur cxccllent account of the economic problems in contemporary Russia, see David M.
W<r<rrlruff, Mtmqt tJnmade: Barter and the Fate of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, NY Cornell
llnivt'r'sity I)rcss, tL).)q).On the problems of developing an effective legal system in Russia,

\('(' lr.:rthryrr llcrrcllcy, "l.egal Development in Post-Soviet Russiar" in

Vol , l, N,,. t ( t9c)7), [,1r. z7t-256.

Pos/-Souiet Affairs,

lror nry owrr irrtt'r'1'rrctltion of thc liast-\West German division, see Marc Howard, "An East
(,r'rrrr,rrr l',tlrrrrt iry? t lrrtlcrst:rrrrlirrg tlrc Ncw [)ivision of Unified Germany," rnGermanPolitics
,trrrl ,\t,, lr'l1', Vol. t 1, Nt). ,l (t (/()S)., l'tlt. 49-7o.
\r'r' N.rrrr y l( rr',,, l{rrssl, trr litll..: ('ttlltrtt'iutrl (:(,ttt,(t'sttlitnt tltrritt14l'crcslroifta (lthact., NY: Cornell
i lt t t t'r'l ,.ll \, Itl t'rs. I .),) ')

.Weakness

of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

Introdaction

crucial to any understanding of political and economic developments in the

region.23

More specifically, the comparison is compelling in that it allows us to

focus on two societies with great theoretical and empirical significance. The
case study of Russia is central to any cross-national study of post-communist

Europe. It provides an opportunity to examine the origins and the core of the
state-socialist system, the country in which its effects were most pronounced,
and also in which contemporary post-communist problems are particularly
acute. Eastern Germany, in contrast, is the "critical case" to explain, because
it is so counterintuitive; having benefited from West German wealth and
institutions since unification, the expectation is that it should have a strong
and vibrant civil society today. In fact, however, increasinglS many of the
studies that compare Eastern and Western Germany have been concluding
'West are far greater than initially
that the differences between East and
expecred (and hoped). The most striking indicator of this persistent social
division is the intermarriage rate. In Berlin - which is, of course, the city with
the most interaction between West and East, where people from both sides
live and work in close proximity - the intermarriage rate between Easterners
and Westerners in 1995 was just 3.4y", a paltry figure when compared to
the rate of over zoTo between either group and foreigners.'a By 1998, rather
than increasing over time, the intermarriage rate in Berlin actually dropped
to under z.4o/o.zs In terms of participation in voluntary associations'
most studies show that the gap between West and East remains very large
as well.t6

,3

Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly "Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation
of the Postcommunist World," inVorldPolitics, Vol. 53, No. r (zooo), pp'r-7.
'a See Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichtenagentuq "Die Ost-West Ehe bleibt auch weiter die
Ausnahme," in Berliner Zeitung, August 9, 1996.
,5 See Peter Neumann und Ulrich Paul, "Zehn Jahre nach der Grenz<iffnung entsteht eine neue
Berlin-Identitdt," in Berliner Zeltrzzg, November 9, 1999.
,6 See Stephen Padgett, Orgnzizing Detnocracy in Easten Gematry: Interest Groups in Post'Wade
Communist Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, zooo);
Jacoby, Imiation and Politics: Redesigning Modem Gertnarry (Ithaca, Nt Cornell University Press, zooo);
Bernhard Wessels, "Biirger und Organisationen in Ost- und Westdeutschland: Vereint und
doch verschieden?" in Volker Eichener et al., eds.,Probbtne der Einheit: Organkierte Interessen
in Ostdeutschhnd (Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag, ry9zl; Dieter Rucht, Barbara Blattert, and
Dieter Rink, Soziale Bewegtngen auf dem Weg zur lrctiwtionalisierung. Zum Strukturunndel
"alterntiuer" Gruppm in beidenTeilen Deutschlands (Frankfurt/M: Campus, t9971;Eckhard
Priller, 'Verinderungen in der politischen und sozialen Beteiligung in Ostdeutschland," in
'Wolfgang Zafp and Roland Habich eds. Wohlfahrtsentwicklung im uereinten Deutschland.
,
.Wmtdel
und Lebensqwlitiit (Berlin: Edition Sigma, r 996); l lclnrtrt K.
Sozialstuktur, sozialer
Anheier et al., eds., Det Dritte Sektor in Deutschland: Organisatiorcn 4tuischcn St.dal urd Murkt
ingesellschaxlzhen Wandel (Berlin: Fldition Signra, r ygfl);.liirgcrr llitrrr; I lwc Koch, :t rttl Stcph:t rr
Telschow, Sptttucrcine im Itlx'rgut11' l)fu Vutinsl'unls'lt'll itt (lsltltrlv ltl'ttnl(A'rt ltt'rt: Mt'yt'r
See

tund

Mcycr, r.29y).

Despite the wide structural differences between Eastern Germany and Russia

today the findings of this book point to striking social similarities, and
this evidence provides strong support for arguments about the lasting impact of the communist experience. Both populations are undergoing similar societal processes in coping with the legacy of a long experience of
living under a rigid communist system, while bitterly acceptittg the reality of a new political and economic order that many citizens akeady feel
has let them down. And the fact that these two societies which most
people would assume are completely different todaS over a decade since
the collapse of communism - show such similarities gives strong support
for the claim that, at least in terms of membership in volunt ary organizations, the differences between post-communist countries are best character:zed as differences in degree, not differences in kind. Although more
detailed research and analysis still needs to be extended to other countries in
post-communist Europe, particularly to those located between Russia and
Eastern Germany - both geographically and in terms of competing political,
economic, and "civilizational" variables - I argue that the same causal processes apply, in varyitrg ways and to varyitg degrees, to the rest of the region
as well.
,t'HE

ORGANIZNTION OF THE BOOK

't'his book examines the theme of participation in volu ntary organizations

from a number of different perspectives. The sequence of the chapters
Iollows a specific organizatronal logic. I start by developing the theoretical
issues, concepts, and questions that are centralto this project. Then I present
rhe crucial empirical results that constitute the dependent variable, or the
rrurin puzzle to be explained. And finally I provide a causal explanation
r

lrrrt solves the puzzle, using two very different, but complement

dtY.-

cthodological approaches.
The following two chapters are primarily theoretical and conceptual. In
( ,lrarpter z) I present the theoretical framework that guides the rest of the
l,ook. After considering two alternative perspectives that emphasize the imlrrrrt:rnce of the state and the economy, I develop an "experiential" ^pptoach
Io societal continuity and change. This theoretical approach focuses on indivirlrrels as agents who make choices, and it emphasizes real-life experiences,
r';rtlrcr than general attitudes and orientations. I argue that for societal change
to r)ccr,rr rlr'!cl to last, a confluence of three factors must take place: first, new
rrrst it ut iorrs rrrtrst l-rc eruthoritative and binding; second, they should build
ul)()n t'ristirrg trrrditions llncl culture; and third, several decades and gener,r t iorrs ;u'(' rrt't'tlt'rl t o chrulllc 1-re oplc's hal-rits and acculturation so that the
,,o. rcl;tl r lt,utl'.(' is tlt'r'isivt' rtlttl t'lttltlrilrg.
rr r

'Weakness

ro

of Ciuil Society inPost-Communist Europe

The communist institutions, established after r9r7 in the Soviet Union

and after World'War II in Eastern Europe, managed to reconfigure and
homogenize a diverse population, although certainly not as originally intendeJ. The shortage economy and the Communist Party's ruthless control
of the public sphere caused citizens throughout communist Europe to develop adaptive mechanisms of behavior, centered on private networks, that
augmented the sharp distinction between the public and private spheres.'7 In
contrasr, posr-communist institutions, in addition to being still quite new and
unfamiliar, are based on neo-liberal ideas and institutions that are in many
ways antithetical to people's prior experiences and practices and that involve
the crucial concepts of individual initiative and self-motivation, which by definition are difficult to impose authoritatively. \7hile, of course, some societal
change has certainly taken place, it has not been nearly as overwhelming or
decisive as many analysts had expected given the dramatic and rapid change
in political and economic institutions after the collapse of communism.
In Chapter z, I also introduce the three main individuallevel causal factors
that guide much of the empirical analysis in subsequent chapters: (r) most
post-communist citizens still strongly mistrust and avoid organizations' even

,ro* th"t participation is voluntary; (z) many of the private and informal
networks ihat developed under communism

because of the

politicization

and state control of the public sphere, as well as the shortage economy - still
persist today in an altogether new institutional environment' and they serve
as a disincentive for many people to join formal organizations; and (3 ) many

post-communist citizens are extfemely dissatisfied with the new political

eco.romic system, which has not lived up to their hopes and ideals, and
this disappointment has caused them to withdraw even further from public
activities. I argue that these three factors, which all involve "experiential"
reinterpretations of people's past experiences in light of new institutions and
developments, have a strong and mutually reinforcing negative effect on
membership and participation in voluntary organizations'
Chapter 3 is primarily a conceptual analysis of civil societ5 covering its
meaning, the role it plays in the process of democratization,and how it can be
studied empirically. After alluding to the recent explosion of studies of civil
society which often apply unclear or inconsistent conceptualizations, I start
by placing civil society in the context of wider societal relations in a demo.i"ii. tyrt.-. Incorporating Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's five "arenas"
of democratization - civil sociery political sociery economic society, the
rule of law, and state bureaucracy - I illustrate and explain the distinctions
among them. I distinguish between the rule of law and state bureaucracy,
^and

'7

See the generrtl disctrssion

in lhrncc, Suln,t'rsitu'ltrslilttlitvts, (ihlrPtcrs r rrltd 1; lowitt, Nr'ra

Disrdrr, cspct.i;rlly pp. lt(r -ti7, r-lt7l Vlrrrlrrrrr Slrl;t1x'rtlrrlih, I'rtllh ,ttnl l'rir',tlc l.ilc
rl lltr,\tn,it l\t4ilt: (:lttu,lt,tl Vtilut.\ t,, l\*l .\l,iltrt llrr'rr,r (( )xlotrl: ( )rlortl I ltlivcrsily l'rcss,
World

r,rll,r),

Introdwction

rr

both of which are based on legal-rattonal institutions and organizing principles, and the three remainitrg arenas, which consist of organi zatrons and
groups of people. I contend that, whereas the groups of political society
consist mainly of political elites who are concerned with office-seeking
and individual power, and the organizations of economic society include
economic elites who are primarily interested in material profit, civil society
is the realm of ordinary citizens, who join and participate in organtzations
based on their own interests, needs, or desires, without directly seeking power
or profit - even though they sometimes strive for political influence and often
need financial support.

After explainitrg the main theoretical and analytic differences among

political, economic, and civil societ5 I show that, in reality, they often
overlap. For example, political parties include both political elites and mass
membership, and labor unions consist of both economic elites and workers.
However, despite much overlap, it is the specification of the general differences among civil, political, and economic society that helps us to understand
better what civil society is, and what it is not. I continue in Chapter 3 with a
discussion of the "virtues" of civil society, focusing on civil society's ability
to influence the state and to encourage people to broaden their circles of association, both of which create a more active, participatory, and responsive
democ racy. Finally, I argue that the most effective way to study civil society
cmpirically and especially comparatively across countries, is not to count the
rrumber of existing or nominally registered organi zatlons, but to focus on the
cxtent of orga nizatronal membership and participation by ordinary citizens,
which can be measured reasonably accurately by representative surveys.
In Chapter 4, I present the empirical findings that constitute the crucial
"baseline," a comparatle measure of participation in voluntaty organizat icrns across a wide set of countries. The countries are divided into three
groups, classified by prior regime tlPe, as either "older democraciesr" "postrrtrthorrtarranr" or "post-communist." The data come primarily from the
t t)95-97 World Values Survey (WVS). The question phrasings are all identi.':rl, asking whether or not respondents are members of each of a set of nine
v<rluntary organizations: (r) church or religious organizations, (z) sports
or recreational clubs, (l) educational, cultural, or artistic organizations,
(+ ) labor unions, (5 ) political parties or movements, (6) environmental
()r-flrlnizations, (Zl professional associations, (8) charity organizations, and
(.1) any other voluntary organizatron.
'l'hc rcsults show that, with the partial exception of labor unions, par'
tic'ipatiolr irr voluntary organizations is much lower in post-communist

in thc older democracies and the post-authoritarian counIrit's. (,r)nll):lrcd to thc two othcr gr()Lrps, the post-communist countries are
.r lrrrost ('xclusivt'ly gr'orrp-rccl rtt thc lowcst levcls of <lrganizational member-

('()rrrrtrics than

slril'r. Mr)t'('()v('r;;ur ;lrrltlysis ol'tlrt'r'ltllrtllcsi itt cornttry rllnkirrgs frtlnt I c) 9o-L)l

f rr | (r(rI t)-t \uliH('sls tlr:tl l('v('ls,rl rttt'rttlrt'r'slrill irt lx)st-cotlu-tlultist c()ttltft'it's

rz

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

have declined significantly especially when compared to those in the postauthoritarian countries. Finally, from t995-97 to 1999' the levels of participation dropped in Eastern Germany and Russia, showing not only that
organizational membership is very low in post-communist countries but also

that it may be declining even further.

Using a measure from the \(/VS data on organizational membership as a
dependent variable, I test several important hypotheses that emphasize economic, political-institutional, and civilizational factors, as well as a variable
for prior regime type, along with several individual-level variables that are
central to the literature on political participation and civil society. The results
show very clearly that prior regime type - and in particular prior communist
experience - is the most significant and powerful variable for explaining organizational membership. This finding indicates the need for more in-depth
consideration of the specific elements of that prior communist experience,
in order to explain uiry post-communist countries have relatively low levels of organizational membership in comparison to older democracies and
post-authoritarian countries.
lflhereas the purpose of Chapter 4 is to present, characterize, and explain
levels of participation in voluntary organizations in a wide cross-regional perspective, the objective of Chapters 5 and 5 is to provide a causal explanation
for the particularly low scores in the post-communist region. Chapter 5 incorporates an original representative survey, conducted in ry99 in'Western
Germany Eastern Germany, and Russia, and called the Post-Communist
Organizational Membership Study (PCOMS).'8 The chapter employs statistical analysis to test a series of different individual-level hypotheses, in two
distinct ways. The first test uses individual-level survey data from all three
societies, to estimate the significance of the socioeconomic status (SES) variables of income, education, age, and gender, as well as city size, along with
an individual-level variable for the prior communist experience. The results
show that, while the socioeconomic variables are sometimes statistically significant, prior communist experience is by far the most powerful variable,
thus suggesting that other - specifically post-communist - factors that are
missed by the standard SES model may be causally relevant.
The second statistical analysis in Chapter 5 examines the elements of
the prior communist experience in greater detail, incorporating the three
causal factors introduced in Chapter 2 to test their impact on organizational
membership in the East German and Russian samples. I operationalize the
concepts of mistrust of communist organizations, the persistence of friendship networks, and post-communist disappointment, and I test their causal
impact on organizational membership. The results show that all three factors
,S Several of the PCOMS questions wcrc rrlso itcklrcsst'tl lo it r(.1)r'(.scnlirlivt's;rrttPlt' ol Wcst
(
German respotrclcnts, tlrrrs :rllowirrg for sont.' b:tsit ttttttprtrisotts lx'lwu'lt ll;lsl it't lll;tlls rtttrl
\i(cst ( icrrrtit rts.

r3

Introduction
'$Thether

for a pooled sample of Russian and East

separately the inclusion of these
sample
German respondents or for each
improves upon the percentage
gre
ady
specifically post-communist variables
of variability explained by the socioeconomic factors alone. Overall, this
analysis provides strong empirical support for the experiential approach,
showing how people's past experiences, and their ongoing reinterpretations
of those experiences, can best explain their current behavior.
Chapter 6 seeks to complement the statistical analysis from Chapter 5, by
incorporating the findings from 6o in-depth interviews with ordinary East
Germans and Russians. In this interpretive analysis, I develop and apply
the three main post-communist factors in much greater detail than could be
captured by the closed-ended survey questions used in Chapter 5. I show
how each of the three factors relates to the life stories of my respondents, as
described in their own words. I incorporate many quotations and stories, in
order to illustrate the previously demonstrated causal connection between
the explan atory factors and my respondents' membership and participation in volu ntary organizations. In particular, I compare the responses of,
and stories told by, *y East German respondents with those of my Russian
respondents, pointing out the underlying similarities but also several significant differences. Again, the common theoretical element of the causal
factors is the way in which people interpret their prior experiences when
rnaking choices about their current behavior. Overall, Chapter 6 provides
rl much more complete and rich understanding of post-communist citizens
,rnd the range of experiences they have lived through, and it helps to explain
rfrore thoroughly the distinctively low levels of organizational membership
irr post-communist Europe today.
Finally, in Chapter T,Iconclude the book by discussing some of its wider
irnplications. I start by evaluating the impact of this book's findings on cont'c1-rtions of post-communist Europe as a distinctive and coherent region. I atHue that scholars have been too quick to emphasize the elite and institutional
tlif fcrences, while dismissing the similarities of the communist experience and
rrs lrrsting legacy - particularly on the societal level - among countries in the
r t.1iion. I suggest that the establishment of similarly low levels of participation
.r( r'oss the region, bolstered by the finding of similar causal factors in two oth(.r'wisc very different societies, should lead to a reconsideration of the relative
sirnilarities and differences among the countries of post-communist Europe.
I thcn cliscuss positive and negative interpretations of the effect that low
lt.vt.ls of par,ticipation in voluntary organi zations by post-communist citizens
rvill hrrvc orr post-comlnunist democracy. I argue that the weakness of civil
,.ot it.ty is rr distilrctivc rlrrcl potcntially precarious feature of post-communist
,1,'rn()crrlcy, but I srrggcst tlrrlt - parrtcloxically - this disengagement mn/ also
lf f f )1'1lt' t lrt' tlcvt'lopnrt'rrl t* tttrli:clcnr()e rlttic f<lrccs with widespread and orl,,.uuz('(l r'iriz,t'lr sul)porl,, ;ls ;t t'('rirrll of thc s:tlttt' lcgrlcy (tf lttistrtrst tlf all forms
()t'rittt'vivrrl of clt'tlt()ctrltcy
1',rrlrlrr ()rl'i,uu/.rliorr" Alrlr,,rrl',lr llrt'lrt'ltl<.l,lwrt

have explanatory power.

'l

r4

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Europe

may not be at stake, the quality of post-communist democracy suffers as a

result of the weakness of civil society, as post-communist citizens become increasingly alienated from the political process, while simultaneously lacking
the institutional leverage that organizations might provide.
I go on to consider the more speculative issue of how the findings of
this book might change over time. I focus on the potential effect that either generational change or institutional design could have on the current
pattern of non-participation in post-communist societies, and I predict that,
for the most part, little substantive change will occur in the near future.
Finally I conclude by addressing the daunting challenge of what can be
done to improve the current situation. IThile current patterns are hardly
encouraging, I emphasize the crucial role of the state as the cooperative
partner of civil society, and I stress the need to move beyond a neo-liberal
dogmatism about institutional "crafting" to a flexible and open-minded approach that is more sensitive and responsive to the history and personal
experiences of post-communist citizens.
RESEARCH

This book is based on several different types and sources of. data, and it employs multiple methods in an attempt to provide a causal explanation that is
theoretically and empirically convincing. In addition to analysis of existing
data and secondary literature, I incorporate the findings from my own empirical research, applying an inductive theoretical approach in conjunction
with both quantitative and qualitative methods. The combination of closedended survey data and open-ended interviews allows for an examination of
this study's central puzzle using two distinct, but complementary, methods of
gathering data, thus helping to corroborate and extend the book's findings.
The statistical analysis involves the testing and ruling out of a series of
alternative hypotheses, while demonstrating the explanatory power of the
three main theoretical factors that I hypothesize will affect organizational
membership. And the interpretive approach adds depth and flesh to the statistical findings; it contributes much more detailed, contextualized, and evocative descriptions of the argument's causal logic.
The use and combination of these two different methodological approaches provides a more rigorous application and test of the book's main
theoretical argument about the causal effect of people's prior experiences on
their current social behavior. Moreover, this methodological complementarity answers the recent calls from comparativists of all different theoretical
and methodological persuasions, who have been urging scholars t<l inc<lrporate multiple methods in their empirical rescarch.", Most inrportantly, tht'
"9 See,forcxantplt,(iirryKirrg, llolx'r't().Kcolt.rttc,.rrrtl Sl.llrcyVcrlr,r,l)rrnjlrlgl,xt,illrtrlttrt11t:

Sciuttilirlnli'rutrrinlltttlil,tlrt+'llrv,n,lt(l)rirrretorr:l'ultrr.totrllrrrvenrtyl'rr.rr,r,ru,1);l),rvrrl

Introdwction

r5

fact that these two different approaches point to the same results, showing
the same strong support for histori cal and experiential factors, gives even
more credence to the argument and findings than could be achieved if only
one method had been used.

Overall, this book seeks to provide a description and an appreciation of

the complicated lives of communist and now post-communist citizens. Only
by understanding how people lived under communism - how they adjusted

to the imposittg restrictions set by an intrusive state and a dysfunctional

economy, and how their relations with friends and acquaintances playe d a
central social role - as well as how people perceive and adapt to the new
challenges of post-communism, will scholars and policy makers alike be able
sense of societal-level developments in the region. This book shows
that post-communist citizens are certainly not avid joiners of organizations,
but nor are they atomrzed individuals, bereft of social relations. Rather, they
are thoughtful actors who are struggling with the challenges of an extremely
disorienting world. It is my hope that this book will help to bring about
a more complete and discerning understanding of the past experiences and
current behavior of the citizens of post-communist Europe.

to make

D. Laitin, "Disciplining Political Science," in AmericanPolitical Science Reuiew, Vol. 89, No.
z (tggS), pp. 454-456; and the chapters by Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman,
Margaret Levi, Marc Howard Ross, and Ira Katznelson in Lichbach and Zuckerman, eds.,
Comparatiue Politics: Ratiannlify, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, rg97).

Experiential Approach to Continuity and Change

z
An Experiential Apptoach to Societal Continuity
and Change

r7

role of the state in strengthenittg civil society.' In other words, rather than
view civil society and the state in opposition to one another, or as being
" zero-sum, " one should consider how - historically, across countries, and
often in unintended ways - the state can be a maior actor in creating and
supporting civil society. Phrased as a social-scientific hypothesis, this argument predicts that a strong, active, and supportive state will encour age the
development of civil society.

In the post-communist context, pafiicularly in Russia, it is clear that the

state has all too frequently not provided the necess ary resources and support
for the organi zations of civil society. Even worse, as a result of political battles

INTRODUCTION

This chapter develops the main theoretical argument of the book, an

inductively derived and historically based "experiential" approach to societal continuity and change. This dynamic approach treats individuals as
agents who make choices based on their prior experiences and their ongoing
reinterpretations of those experiences. It focuses on the creation and reinforcement of soci al patterns in the communist and post-communist periods.
Since the purpose of this chapter is not to conduct a literature review, I do
not supply extensive citations or references. Moreover, although I explain
the basic causal logic of the experiential approach in this chapter, I develop
it inductively throughout the rest of the book, within the specific context of
this project and its findings.
The starting point and core of this book is an empirical findittg on civil society in post-communist Europe. As I will develop and document more fully
in subsequent chapters, the essence of this finding is that post-communist
cittzens have extremely low levels of membership and participation in voluntary organi zatrons today. Moreover, when compared to that within other
regions in the world, the varratton among post-communist countries is relatively small. Within post-communist Europe, the similarity in levels of
organi zational membership is especially striking in light of the wide political, economic, and cultural differences among the countries today. In order
to understand the common weakness of post-communist civil societS we
need to consider the common elements of the communist experience and its
enduring legacy.

among elites and widespread corruption in almost all branches of government, the question of civil society has taken a back seat to the many other
ongoing elite-level, institutional, and ideological developments that dominate both the headlines and schola rly analyses of Russia. As other scholars
have shown, civil society rapidly disappeared from the Russian political and
scholarly agenda in the years followittg the period of mobrhzation around
the collapse of the communist regime.' Indeed, even though some scholars
have measured an increase in the number of organi zations, few people would
argue that civil society is vibr ant in Russia tod ay.r
Another important argument about the conditions, or even "prerequisites," for the development of civil society involves economics. This hypothesis predicts that a stable and functioning economic system, one that
enhances the material well-being of its cittzens, is necess ary for a country's
civil society to develop over the long run.4 The case of Russia once agarn
pr:ovides powerful support for this argument, as economic uncertainty and
chaos have persisted and even increased since the collapse of communism.
In other words, in such an unsettling economic climate, given that so many

'

'

See,

for example, Theda Skocpol, "How Americans Became Civic," in Theda Skocpol and

Morris P. Fiorina, eds., Ciuic Engagement in American Democracy ('Washington, DC: Brookings
f rr stitution Press and the Russell Sage Foundation, r9g9); Jonah D. LevS Tocqueuillel Reuenge:
,\tate, Society, and Economy in Contemporctry) France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
l)rcss, 1 99il; Padge tt, Organizing Democracy in Eastern Germany;Peter A. Hall, " Social Capital
irr []ritain," in British lournalof Political Science, Vol. 29, No. I ftggg), pp. 417-46r.
St.c, fr>r example, M. Steven Fish, Democracy from Scratch: apposition and Regime in the New
Iitrssian Reuolution (Prrnceton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Michael E. Urban,The
Iit,ltirth of Politics in Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, r991l. For a similar
rlisclssion about llastern Germany, see Charles S. Maier, Dissolution:TheCrisisof Communism
tttttl tltc I;,url tf l|ttst Ocrmany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, r9g7).
St.t.., {.or t'xlnr1'rlc., thc balanced and weil-informed account of the challenges facing Russian
'Weigle,

Russia's
rrrrtl its rclatiorrship with the Russian state, in Marcia A.
lleltttions in the Transition from Communism (University Park:
l'r'rrf rr),lv,rrri;r St:rtr' ( lrrivt'rsity l)rcss, zooo)., cspecially pp. 33j-379.
r t )f ( (lns('r ('(()rr()rrrit tlt'1rr iv:rti(vr ('tut lr',rrl t() ()r'll:lrriz,ccl :.tctiolt and revolt, but it is important
Itr tf r,,lurllrrrslr sPonl;nl('()r ts ltlltlt'sl h'()nr ()r'l,,:urizt'tl luttl sttstltirttd lnrticipatkm in a democratic

rvil

sor it.ty.,

I rl,rr,tl I'rojtt

THE IMPORTANCE OF TI{E STATE AND TIIIl II(]ONOMY

Before turning to the cxp('rit'ntirtl :ll)l)r'.r;tr'lt itst'll'., it is wortlr;rtrticip:tting,

tw<l irnprlrtlurt lrltt'r'rrrttivc l'rt'r'slx'r'tivt's" An I tlcvr'1,,;'t lrn=tlrrr nt (,lt;tptt't- |',
r,::, nt colrll'ilrrrtiorts to llt(' slu.lv ol t lvtl s, rt tr'lV lt.tv(' \ltcsr,',1 l lr,' tltlrPot'livr'

l: ,\lttlt,-,\trialy

.,r'llrrtp,, 1,,,r .lr ('\,.'ll,'nl ;t(( ottrrl rll plr)lt'.,1 .tt liotts itt posl c()tllttltttlisf l)<llltlttl., s('('Ill<icrt trlrtl
fr rrlrrl.. lt,'1,,'llt,trt.' ('tt'11 ,\tt, 1,'11'.

I8

'Weakness

of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Ewrope

people are struggling to make ends meet, to survive through the next winter,
to help their family members and close friends, how can one expect them to
be founding and joining voluntary associations?
From the Russian story, as well as from those of other weakly institutionali zed states with struggling economies, it would seem that economic
instability and a lack of state support fully explain the weakness of civil society. But the low levels of org antzatronal membership throughout the rest

of post-communist Europe, including in more "advanced" or "successful"

countries such as Hungary the Czech Republic, or Poland, suggest that these
structu ral factors, while probably necessary for the development of a more vibrant civil societg may not be sufficient for creating it in the post-communist
context.5 That East Germans, livittg for over a decade in a state often held
up as a model of support for civil society6 and having the highest standard of
living in post-communist Europe, have sirnilarly low levels of participation
indicates that other factors must be involved as well.
This is not to say that arguments about the importance of the state and
the economy arewrong or not relevant. Quite the contrary, they arc certainly
crucial factors for the development and strengthening of civil society. However, the fact that post-communist countries with widely different types of
states and economies have simil arly low levels of membership in voluntary
organi zatrons, distinguishing them from other regions of the world, shows
that factors specific to post-communist citizens and societies must also be
considered.
AN EXPERIENTIAL APPROACH TO SOCIETAL CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
Since the main outcome to be explained in this project is a collective pattern
of non-participation in volu ntary organi zatrons throughout post-communist
Europe, and since the total amount of participation in any country is de-

termined by the choices and actions of each and every individual in that
societg the most appropriate unit of analysis is the individual. Only by considering the motivations of individuals will we be able to understand and
explain their behavior. And only by considering individual behavior will we
be able to make sense of collective patterns within and across societies. Although such country-level variables as the economy and the roles of the state
and political institutions are important, a focus on individual-level factors
provides the most direct link to understanding and explaining organi zatronal
membership in a comparative perspectlve.
5 Padgett makes a similar point, as he writes that "Even in the 'leacling' post-ct)rrtmtutist c()r.nltries likethe CzechRepublic, Hungary and Polarrcl, whcrc rrurrkt't frrtnsifion rutd tlclnocrrttic
consolidation are most advarnced., cnre rgcrrt sot'io-t'cortorttic slt'ttc lrr cs ru (' ult( ()ttrltlr'iv(' l()
association:rl c<>llectivisltt." St'(' l):rrlpit'tt, ( )t,q,llti:,ttt,t4 I)t'tttrttttltY ttt li,,t\lt'tt, (,t't',,tttttlt., p. l(r(r.
r' Scc, frlrcxilr'r'rplt'., l,t'V/.,'lirtrlttt't,tllt", lit'r,t'il,t1t'r Pf r, !rt1 lr,t,.ttt,l lt.t.l;,1,'tl. ( )1.1', tttt':tt,.ql)t'tttt)t ttlr..]..'
itt lirtstt't'tt ( )rrtttrltty. PP, I 5 ., f,

r9

Experiential Approach to Continuity and Change

The core argument of this theoretical approach is that people's current

behavior is shaped by their prior experiences and how they interpret those
experiences. The logic of the experiential approach corresponds to what
Richard Rose calls a " lifetime learning model, " linking together soci ahzation and institutional performance theories, where "supportfor the regime is
initially shaped by early sociali zatron and then evolves continuously throughout adult life as initial beliefs are reinforced or challenged by later experiences."7 The basic causal mechanism is the same, but Rose examines the
relative influence of a set of factors from different times in people's lives on
their attitudes toward prior, current, and future regimes, whereas my argument emphasizes behavior rather than attitudes. By focusing on membership
and participation in volu ntary organi zatrons, I can consider the causal connection between people's prior practices, experiences, and social patterns,
and their current activities.
How do individual actors make the choices that determine their behavior ? In seeking to answer this question, the experiential approach emphasizes
real-life experiences over attitudes and values. Moreover, it maintains that
people's behavior can change over the course of their adult lives. Change,
however, is usually not unqualified or absolute. In other words, people cannot start anew altogether, since memories, habits, and person al relationships
arehard to forget, break, or end entirely. Instead, change is gene rally an adaptation from, or a reaction against, previous events, experiences, and patterns
in people's lives. Change does not have to be initiated by an " external shock";
it can also be inspired by new interpretation or by a reinterpretation of old
cxperlences.

Although change is more challenging to explain, continuity is the most

common outcome. People's patterns of behavior - including their work and

recreational habits and social and politic al participation - often remain relrrtively stable over their lives, adapted prim arrly to changes in the life-cycle
rrs they age. Moreover, the change may be only pafiral or temporaryr.Partral
change is often sparked by new circumstances, which lead people to reevalurr tc their prior experiences and change their behavior accordingly. But if the
ncw circumstances do not match people's expectations the change in their
lrclrarvior may not be long-lasting, and they revert to their earlier patterns.
t lltirnately, the process of interpretation and reevaluation is dynamic and
orrsoing, even if it does not necessarlly lead to lasting change.
Ilow clocs lasting societal change take place? \il/hen, ho*, and under
wlr,rt corrclitions cloes societal change become durable? My answer to these
ttrf ('stions irrvolvcs lroth institutional and cultural components, and I view
tlrt' pr'()('('ss rrs nrrrclr nrorc graclual ancl historically contingent than new ecorrorrrit irrstitrrliorrrrl tlrcorit's 1',r't'clict. My approarch to institutions follows the
lr.rtliliorr ol'lristoric'rrl irrstituti()n:llisttt" wlriclr clcfincs institutions "both as
l(,,,,r , r\lr,,lrl, r, ,lr(l I l,rr rlll t, ll,'ntrtr rrltI rultl ll,, ,\ll,'ttt,tlu,t'x, |.

r,\.

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

organ
differenti
of
action unier conditions
institutions can create confining condi

composing rules and as formal

for human inter-

ity"'8 Moreover'

range and types

act. Instituof possibilities within which people reasonably believe they can
and
directly,
tions do not, however, J.,.r-irr. people's actions and responses
"configuration"
this is where the contingen.y uttd *hut Ira Katznelson calls
come
-- in.9
to occur, three{actors should coincide: first, the
Eorturtitrg societal change
-authoritative
and binding, not weak and incohernew institutilns should be
tendencies,
ent; second, the new institutions should build upon the existing
need
,r"iiriorrr, or culture of a society; and third, the new institutions will
not
generations'
time to t"k. hold, time that is measured in decades and

months or years. More specifically' if

tative and binding' people are less like
to adapt to them' since they can easi
thermore, if theY do not build uPon P
institutions are more likely to be misun
alien, until enough
the new institutions will remain unfamiliar, perhaps even
they can influmet,
are
ii*. t passed so that, if the first two conditions
and solidifies
",
effects
that
peopljs social patterns in a way
.rr..

-odify

".rd
,o.i.tul ihurrg.. Althoug
long-lasting
thrJe factois take on lawli"ke properti
they do represent crucial factlrs in th
is likely to be only pattial and more easily reversible'

suggest that these

or societal change'
which any change

THE TRANSFORMATIVE IMPACT OF COMMUNIST INSTITUTIONS

Now I turn to
The discussion thus far has remained at a vety abstract level.
post-communist expea mofe specific consideration of the communist and
describe
.i.".., i" "rder to substantiate my general claims. In this section' I which,
I
the transformative impact of the-communist institutional system,
on
effect
;;il;;h;i a significant, decisive, and in.many ways homogenizing section' I
th! reconfigu."1io' of communist societies. Then' in the following
choices
tufn to the post-communist time period, focusing on individual-level
andbehavior,andshowhowthelegacyofthiscommunistexperiencehasan
important and lasting influence on post-communist developments'
s Ira Katznelson, "structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics," in Lichbach and
Zuckerman, Comparatiue Politics,

p' roz'

partially
9 Katznelson. ,.Structure .nd Conigrrrrtion in Comparative Politics." Katzncls.n,
llltilitl
ilinls
ttt;tcro;ttl'tlysis
contigttrittivc
"rr
that
quoting from Margaret Somers, writes
'll
(()11(('l)ls'l() r(c()llstrll(l ;ttttl
tt'ttt''trl
artl
spatial
dcpl,rys
ihat
'vt't
Lyiic"l"n"rratiuity
'lttll)lrl)li('
ltisl.tir'tl :l(t()rs' lll(
timC irncl spircc thc orrtologicrl ll:lllrlliv(s:lrttl rtlrtli.lrslliPs.l
,ilrtl.rrllrrltlnltft;tltv(stl,,,ti,rl,,,tttllrtitlrv|r.,ttt,l1l,,',,t,,t.tltltl'''""ltottrrllllrrrtt'lttlltt'ts
'FJrrttltrtl\'lrl
lrlllr\( lrltrrlll\''
\"rttrt"
lvitlrollrIr t,lt'v.tttl rtttttl l"tt''""\tr'1\lrrlirtrtl(
lrr\"'i'rl\'t'rr'tllr'lrttt''
\,trorr l{rllrrr'l'rrrt"lrrlilr"lr\\'"rlltrl'(ll"'llrrrrrrll'rrl
.11p,f \,',r.rl
\','l rr,Ir')rJ'1,plr
""1 '""

Experiential Approach to Continuity dnd Change

ZI

The communist experience in Eastern Europe and the Soviet trJnion provides an excellent example of the transformative potential of institutions.
Before the establishment of the communist system, after \forld tWar I in
Russia and in the early post-\World \War II period in Eastern Europe, the
region consisted of a very diverse group of countries. In addition to having different religious faiths, havitrg belonged to different historical empires,
and having fought on different sides in both world wars, they had vastly
different levels of industrial :u.,atron and economic development, ?S well as
different political traditions. By the r95os, however, the communist leadership - enforced by the ruthless policies of "Moscow Centre" - had succeeded
in imposing and enforcing "replica regimes" that were charactertzed by the
same institutional and ideological rnechanisms throughout the Soviet bloc.'o
Although the communists certainly incorporated and reinforced pre-existing
historical tendencies," over the next jo years the "party of a new type" also
succeeded in creating a "society of a new type."
Ken Jowitt , an astute and original scholar in the field of comparatlve communism, has argued convincingly that the distinguishing feature of what he
calls "I-eninist" regimes was the concept of "charismatic impersonalism."
In a 1978 essaS he wrote: "In both liberal and Leninist regimes (in contrast
to peasant-status societies), social action is primarl\y oriented to impersonal
norms. Sfhat is particular about Leninist regimes is that impersonality is not
expressed in procedural values and rules (i.e., due process), but rather in the
charism atrc impersonality of the pafty organi zatlon The novelty of Leninism
els an organi zailonis its substitution of charismatic impersonality for the procedural irnpersonality dominant in the \7est " " In other words, like the liberal
societies of the \fest, communist societies were based on impersonal institutions and norms, but their central and defining feature was the existence of
rfre Communist Party as the locus and core of all social organizatlon' whose
lrLrthority was transcendent, unquestioned, and charismatrc.r3 Although the
(.xtent of that authority did vary somewhat across the communist bloc, and it
rlirninished over the decades of communist rule, the institutional charism a of
thc Communist Party remained a defining feature that distinguished Soviettype regimes from other forms of non-dernocratic rule.14
In a recent book, Valerie Bunce has provided a useful synthesis of the variorrs elements of that communist experience, which she refers to as having

I f<rwiu", "Moscow Ocntre," in New'World Disorder, pp. r59-219.

I' lor rur int(,rcsting cliscrlssion of histor:ical continuities in Eastern Europe that date back to

''

(()rlnnunisl pcriod' scc Anclrcw C. Janos, "Continuity and Change in Eastern Europe:
ol l)ost (.ornnrunist l)olitics," in F,astF,urr$canPoliticsandSocieties, Vol. 8, No. r
(t',v',11),lrlt.I il.
' I(('lrrrrrtctl ,r., " I lrt' I r'rrrrrisl l'lrt'rr()nr('non.," in f owilt., Nr'ttr Wtryld Disrvder, yt. l.
' ; r\ 1,,,, ',t'r' \lt'1r111 11 | I l,rrr(,( )n. I tttt,',tntl lir'tutlrrlirttt: M,trtisttt tttttl ll.tt / )r'.sqqll ttf',\ttt'icl Ittslittltitttts
(( 1,,t1', I llrll, llrtt\( t"tl\ ,,1 N,rrllr ( .ttolttt,t l't("'1., ,,t't')
r l l .l, r r lrrgr tlr, ,lr,.tltr lton lrr lrvr r rr t otnrrrrrtrt',1 ,trt,l .rtrllrottl.ltt.ttt t('l',tttl(", ttl tttrt, lt
1',tr.tlt't
rlttrrl rrr ( lr,r1'g,1
tlrt'1111'

\lrrrtt'1',it's

':rr

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

"homo genrzing,"and her framing of the distinctive features of communism can serve to structure this discussion as well.'5 Bunce focuses on
four central factors: (r) "the ideological mission of the ruling elite," (t) "the
construction . . . of a conjoined economic and political monopoly that rested
in the hands of the Communist Party," 3) "the fusion of not just the polity
and the economy but also the party and the state," and (fi "the extraordinary institutional penetration of the state. "'6 All of these features existed in
communist systems across the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, with the
partial exceptions of the more pluralist Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent,
Poland and Hungary.
Bunce's first factor refers to the fact that communist regimes, unlike authoritarian ones, which strive for stability and generally work within a capitalist economic environmenr, we re "future-oriented, avowedly anticapitalist
and premised on a commitment to rapid transformation of the economy,
the society, and, following that, in theory at least, the polity as well."'7 In
practical terms, communist countries - most of which were late economic
developers relying on nineteenth-century models of production and growth embarked on major plans of moderntzatton, which included increasittg
indust rraltzation and urbani zatron at the expense of agriculture, modern
technology, and socioeconomic development. The unfortunate legacy of this
strident and defiant, and ultimately defective, ideology is that much of the
region of the post-communist landsc ape is cluttered with inefficient and outdated factories, which have proven to be both difficult to reforrn and difficult

to abolish.
The sccepcl factor that distinguishes communist regimes is the complete
political and economic monopoly of the Communist Party. Unlike systems
that allow for private ownership and market competition, the communist
sysrem placed all responsibility for political, economic, and ideological planning in the hands of the communist elite, acting in the name of the Party.
This led to what T. H. Rigby calls a "mono-organtzatronal" order, namely
the substitution of the Party for pluralism and competition in all fields, areas'
and sectors.'B As a result, the state-socialist system came to be charactetrzed
by the interdependence, or even "fusionr" of economics and politics - both
of which had a built-in need for increasing growth and power - under the
dominating influence of the Party.'q This fusion explains, for example, why
communist regimes insisted on ensuring full employment, which was a political prioriqi, even if such a policy eliminated the elasticity of labor markets

r5

Institutions.
Institutions, pp. z | -z5.
Instilttlittrrs.,,l). ' |
T. F-|. l{iglty., 'l'br (,lt,tttgrtt,g,\,r'lt'l ,\1"'1,'rtt: NT,tttrt (
Ortrlt,tt l.,q,1,', /tlr/t ut lttttrtIi (l\1.1,'trltol: | ,lrr',rr.l I l;l'rr-

Bunce, Swbu ersiu e

r6 Bunce, Subuersiue
r7 Bunce, Subuersiuc
rfl

l|,

||ttrrtt.'\lt/,t,l'l\lll,ltt,,ltltt|ll'|l.,,||

Experiential Approach to Continuity and Change

1','
2)

and created an excessive, a superfluous, and therefore often an inefficient

labor force.
Third, unlike in democratic or in other non-democratic systems, where the
institutional and administrative powers of the state are autonomous from,
and stand above, the representatives of the ruling politic aI party who filI its
positions, in communist systems the Party essentially was the state. All state
positions, from the highest leadership down to schools and neighborhood
associations, were filled by Party members. Career advancement and privilege was distributed based on Party patronage and loyalty, with very few
exceptions, especially in any realm that was remotely political. Leading state
officials were by definition leadin g Party members, and the state apparatus
was actually dependent on the Party for strategy- and decision-making.'o
As a result of the vast scope and role of the Communist Party, the fourth
factor that Bunce considers in her historical synthesis - and the one most
relevant for this book - is the Party-state's attempt at complete penetration,
surveillance, and control of all aspects of society. Although authoritarian
regimes gener ally allow for the existence of independent social activities that
are not directly threatening to the state, the Party prevented "the existence
of any associational life, politic al organizations, or social movements that
existed separate from the party-state institutional web. As a consequence,
mass publics were rendered dependent on the party-state for jobs, incorne,
consumer goods, education, housing, health care, and social and geographic

mobility.""
Even further, the Pa fty actually attempted to supplant the very need for
independent social activity with a dense institutional web of groups and organrzatrons in which membership and participation were generally mandatory
or coerced" Few people could avoid this Party-state control of the public
sphere, since almost every child had to join the youth organizatron, and
almost every working adult belonged to a trade union and other mass organrzations." Bunce provides an evocative description of the "remarkably
r-rniform set of experiences" of communist citizens:
Whethe r cttrzens engaged in political, economic, social, or cultural activities, they
wcre controlled in what they could do by the party. Thus, the party did not just
orchcstrate elite recruitment, voting, attendance at rallies, and the content of the
rn:rss rncclia. It arlso functioned in the economy as the only employetrthe only defender
ol'wor'l<crs' rights (through party-controlled unions), the only setter of production
n()r'n)s., rurcl tlrc <>nly allocator of vacation time (while being the only builder and

Ittstitttlio,/.{, l). r
'

l'tit r rsl, )u

t tt t t

ior

i.
(

Also scc Mar:ia Csanadi, Party States and Their Legacies

: liclward F.lgar,, ggZ).

( .lrt'l t t'n lrrr rrr., UK

nritss nrolriliz;ttiolt irr c<)nlnrunist

; '1'1'

r)

I ltr',',1,,r,' | | | t t.'.l1irrt. l'ttl111,,tl l',tt ltt llt,tltttrt rrr

I'r,'.,.,. t,,

,1). r .,1rrr

r.tllt {

11,11t1,

lltr'f /\,\/i

(ltr

irrtt'ton:

l)r

rt'13irncs., scc

irrrt'lolr Urrivt'r'sity

zA

Weakness of Ciuil Society inPost-Comrnwnist Ewrope

maintainer of vacation retreats). At the same time, the party allocated all goods and
was the
set all prices. FinallS it was the party (sometimes through enterprises) that
opportunities
and
transportation,
sole distributor of housing, education, health care,

for leisure-time activities.23

In short, the communist Party sought to monitor and control virtually every
aspect of economic, political, and even social life, and this feature distinguished communism from other non-democratic authoritarian regimes.
Another crucial element of the communist experience involves the peculiar social consequences of centralized economic planning. In an economic
system with chronic shortages,'4 only a few privileged people - usually elite
members of the Communis-t Party, who shopped at special stores that had
'western goods could avoid the long lines,. bland choices,
a full supply of
and frequently missing necessities, from salt to toilet paper, that marked the
situation and Communist Party constate ec;nomy. Together,
"tph.t. the economic
constricted and sometimes reshaped the range of
trol of the public
possibilities for thought and action. In other words, since the public sphere
i"", ,o politicized, cJntrolled, and monitored, and since valued goods and
servicesiere hard to acquire without connections or help, people developed
common patterns of adaptive behavior.
The central characteristic of these social and behavioral patterns was
the distinction between the public and private realms.'5 As Jowitt writes,
restating his own argument from almost 20 years earlier, -"The Leninist
experience irr F.astern Europe...reinforced the exclusive distinction and
dichotomic rrrrtrrgonism between the official and private realms.""6 Bunce
adds, " H<lr1logcnization also encouraged individuals within socialist systems
to {ivide their personalities into a public and conformist self, on the one hand,
and a privat. arrd -ore rebellious self, on the other - what was referred to
23 Bunce, Subuersiue Institutiors, p. 28.
,4 See the classic works on the state-socialist economy by Jlnos Kornai, including: Economics
system:
of shortage (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing companS t98o\; The Socialist
ih, potlfl*t n"onomy of Com*u.tnism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, r99z).

See,forexample,shlapentokh,PublicandPriuateLifeoftheSouietPeopb;OlegKharkhordin,
rhi cottectlui and. the lndiuidual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley: university of
California Press, r999).
,,The Leninist Legacy," in
,6
Jowitt, Neu.,'World Disorder, p. 287.ln his 1974 piece,
Jowitt,
regimes have stinrio*itt-*.ot., "Through their organization and ethos, then, [Leninist]
thrt lrc
,rlat"d u series of informal adaptive fesponses - behavioral and attitudinal thc
tratliof
basic
clcntcnts
certain
of
supportive
and
in many respects consrstent with
thc
tional political culture in these societies. These elements in tLtrrr rtrc rtrrtirhctic;tl to
(()rlr
()ll
I
strtr(ltrr(
rrn
cfhos:rrtd
with
society
of a regime and
"pp"urinaa
tlrc virtlrility ol irrr
''rttlitrttt'tl
pi"-anrnry relation.ship bt.twccrr tlrc prrblir ;rrrtl priv;tlt'tt'rtlltts.,ttt
ttt lllc tolr'rtl
IrIt,""'ttl
tlirllit:ltiltttistlt
orr
llrt'v:tltr,'ol
lriltl
r)orrrrs,
parr,rn"l rrrlcs ltntl
,.lli,.riu,.'rrrtitiprrrrt." Sr.r."l'olitir.rl (.rrltrrrc rrr I cttltttrl ltr';itrrtr",." rlr N,lr' \\i'rl,/ lllut'l't'

'j

pp. i,ir,

l.t

.'

Experiential Approach to Continwity and

Change

25

in the East German setting as a Nischengesellschaft, or niche society."27 \7ith

their public sphere entirely controlled by the Communist Pany and its corollary organi zattonal apparatus - including the secret police, trade unions, and
many mass membership organi zattons - most communist cttrzens developed
a cautrous relationship to public and formal activities.'S Private relations, in
contrast, became even more vibrant and meaningful because people could
speak openly only in front of others they knew and trusted and, also, because
personal connections played an important role in the shortage economy people relied on the rc family friends, and acquaintances to get things done
rather than go through official channels.'e
The transformation of communist societies provides powerful support for
arguments about the causal impact of institutions on social actors and about
the way in which the range of behavioral responses are restricted by the
structural conditions within which these actors live and operate. However,
the adaptive societal response was not determined by the institutions in any
direct, automattc, or intentional way. On the contrary, what was distinctive
about the communist experience was precisely that institutions did not work
as they were intended to, or as the authorities claimed that they did. This
led to an assortment of unintended consequences, most important of which
was the strict separation between public and private spheres. Moreover, the
societal response did not emerge immediately or rapidly; instead, it developed
graduallS over the course of the many decades of communist rule.
In short, the communist institutional system transformed societies across
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union because (t ) the institutions were
designed and enforced authoritativelS Q) the institutions built on and reinforced the pre-communist, non-democratic tradrttons that akeady existed
in many societies, and (l) the communist system lasted for several generations, from 40 years in Eastern Europe to over 70 years in t,h. Soviet Union.
ln contrast, the effect of post-communist institutions has been quite different.
As Richard Rose and his colleagues write, "Institutional theories of democracy err if they assume that the design of institutions determines popular
response; this is particularly so in post-Communist societies, where people
hrrve been socialized by institutions that do not work as they are supposed
(or claimed) to work."30 In terms of the third of the three elements necessary
I'or societal change, obviously not much time has elapsed since the new

'ri llt'rrr||

Vri,, l;rv Il:rvr'l's farn<)uscxrrrnplcof thegreengrocerwhopoststheslogan "Y/orkersof

tlrt' Wor'|,1, Urrilt'!" irr lris shol'r to slrow thrrt "l irnr ol-redicnt and therefore have the right to
lr.'lt'lt irr 1)(':r(('." St't'll:rvt'1 .'l'l,t'l',r(,r't'ttf'lbc l'otttcrk'ss., r'tl. f<llrlt I(crttte (ArnronkrNY: M.E.
\lr.u;'',', r ,rli\ ), .'sl)('( t;rllv 1'';t : ,' I,).
"t l\1,,,',,r'r' l,uun,'l(. \X/,',1,'1. ll,,'l'ut',tlr'l',,l,ttttl (Nt'w Yrlrli: l":trls otl l;ilt', 1,;li(r).
r" l(,,..r'. l\lr,,lrl,'r.,ulrl I l,rr'rPl,'t. It,'nttttttttYruttl lt, illl,'ttr,llu,t's. l). ()r.

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

z6

institutions were first established in r989-9r. More irnportantly, however,

the new post-communist institutions are generally predicated on neo-liberal
ideas and on ideals of self-motivation and self-help, which, by definition, cannot be enforced authoritatively, and which are in many ways completely anti-

thetical to communist practices and experiences. In the context of voluntary

organi zattons todaS if - unlike in communist organi zatrons - membership is
to be genuinely voluntary then people cannot be forcedto join, and they also
have the freedom to choose not to participate.3' Finally, as I will explain,
the desire to participate in volunt aty organizations, and thus to bridge the
wide gap between private and public spheres, is actually incompatible with
people's prior experiences with communist organi zattons, since they generally viewed then, and still view today, most organi zatrons with suspicion and
mtstrust.
APPLYING THE EXPERIENTIAL APPROACH TO POST-COMMUNISM

In this section, I introduce and develop the three main causal factors that
guide the empirical analysis in subsequent chapters of the book. I explain
why the mistrust of communist organi zatrons, the persistence of friendship
networks, and post-communist disappointment have a mutually reinforcing
negative effect on participation in volu ntary organi zatrons today. The common theoretical element of these three factors is experiential, in that they
connccr pcol-rlc's prirlr experiences, and their interpretation of those expericnccs, with tlrcir cu rrct'lt behavior.
Mistrust of Communist Organizations
One <tf the most striking features of state-socialist societies was the clear
distincrion between their formal institutions and the informal behavior
of people in everyday life. Every communist country had an intricately
organized,array of formal organizations having almost the same institutional form. These organizations included youth groups, the Communist
Party, trade unions, cultural federations, peasant and worker groups,
women's groups, and many others, ns well as less-politicized (but still
state-controlled) groups and organizations that ranged from sports clubs
to book lovers'clubs. Most people belonged to multiple organizatrons, but
their membership was often mandatory, coerced, or used for instrumental
purposes. Increasingly over the life of the communist regimes, as the Party
lost the legitimacy and popular enthusiasm that it had gcncnttccl irr its crtrlicr
stages, people joined organizatrons becausc thcy hrrrl to., lrt't'rtust'tlrc'y wct-('
7

Sec Isaialr llcl-lrtt,

"'lw, (,,lttt'Pls .l

[,lrrivt'r'sity l't't'ss., trl(rr;). 1r;r rlH | '*',

;ts ;t I tllttl;tltt('rrt.rl V,tltt,',' l'lt l\.1 | 'l

)rl,,trl. ( )rlortl
rrll, rt- l(n',(', I t,'t.,l,,ttt

I tl,,'tlt' ((
r

Experiential Approach to Continwity and Change

)-7

threatened with negative consequences if they did not join, or because they
improved their career chances by joining. Only in the case of less politicrzed
associations, like book lovers' clubs and sports clubs, did people join for
less coercive or instrumental reasons.

\il/hen they participated

in the quasi-mandatory organizations, most

people did little aside from pay their small annual dues (which were usually deducted automatically from their salaries), attend a few compulsory
meetings, and, occasionally make use of special benefits like vacation packages from their trade union. Their membership was based mainly on oblrgation, obedience, and external conformity rather than internal and volunt ary
lnrtlatlves.
One might think that the dis appearance of the communist system and its
mass organi zattons would lead to an outpouring of public participation in
new organizattons that are truly voluntary and autonomous. This is indeed
what many analysts expected, especially following the remarkable spontaneous mobilizatton that brought about communism's collapse in r g8g-gr.3'
But, as I show in Chapter 4, these new opportunities have not brought about
an increase in participation; rf anything, participation has actually decreased
ln recent years.
Today, as a direct legacy of the communist experience, most people in
post-communist societies still strongly mistrust and avoid joining any kind
of formal organizations, even in the newly free and democrattc setting.33
Instead of drawing a clear distinction between the volunt ary associations
of today and the mass organizations of the communist past, many of my
respondents view and evaluate orga ntzatrons with a certain continuity. The
distinction they make is that previously they were essentially forced to join,
while today they are free to choose not to join and not to participate.
The Persistence of Friendship Networks

The flip side of the public experience of communism

- where membership

in state-controlled organi zattons was more a form ahty, a matter of obligation and expediency rather than deeply felt - was that relationships in the
private sphere were extremely meaningful and genuine. Broadly speaking,
r''- Scc'

il

for cxrunple, Giuseppe Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico(,rrlturrrl Ohrrrrgc in llirstern E,urope," in WorldPolitics,Vol.44, No. 3 Gggt), pp. 49-8o;and
'/,bip,n it'w l{rrrr., ctl.,'f\tc llc.amcrgcnce
of Ciuil SocieQ in Eastern Europe and the Souiet Union
(lirrrltlt'r": Wt'stvit'w l)rcss., 1..19 r ).
lror lrrrllr('r ('rrrpiricrtlsul)l)()rt ol this lrrcl< <lf tr-ust, see Mishlerand Rose, "TrustrDistrustand
Sl,.t'Ptit isnr," 1)p. { rll 4srl:rrrrl l{i.lt:u'tl l{osr', "l)ostcor'nnrurrisrn ancl thc Protrlern of Trust,"
rrr | ,rrr\, l)i:rnr,,rr.l :rrrtl I\4;rtr l'. l'l,rttrrt'r; t'tls., 'l'ltt Oktlttl ll,r'srrrgt'rtcc tl'I)emrrrtlry,, zncl ccl.
(lt,r lrrnor(': f , rlrrr., I lr,;'tl,, ttr.. l lnr\ ('r.,rt\ ltr('s\1 t ()()()), lrlr. -rS t J(r i. Also st't' l'iott' Sztolttpl<:t.,
" f rrt',1 .rtr,l I nr('rlltrrli l)r'ln()r r.tt t' l("...orr,, lrortt l)rll;urtl," itt lttlt'ntttlituttll ,\tttitil,,,q1," Vol rr,
N,t t(t,trt(,), 1r1r t' (,!

'Weakness

28

of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

there were two main reasons for this. First, because the formal and public sphere was highly politicized, and also tightly controlled, people could
express themselves openly only within close circles of trusted friends and
family. Second, because of the shortage of goods to buy in communist
societies, connections played an essential role, whether the need was for

spare parts

to fix a

car

or for products that were rarely available in

stores.

two reasons why private nefworks were so important also correspond to two different, although sometimes overlapping, aPes of private networks that existed in communist societies. The first encompassed
how people socialized and with whom they spent their free time, and
the second involved a more instrumental use of connections to acquire
goods and services, and to get ahead in general.la The first type of network consisted primarily of a small number of close and trusted friends
and family membersl the second type included the many distant acquaintances or people with whom one interacted mainly for the purpose of receiving something. These two networks overlapped to the extent that close
friends and family also helped each other instrumentally, but only rarely
did instrumental acquaintances enter the small and trusted circle of close
These

friends.
Today, over a decade after the collapse of the system that had created
and sustained this vibrant private sphefe, networks of close friends and
family rcrnairr extremely prominent and important throughout the postcgtrrrnrrrrist rcgi<ur.15 The networks of instrumental connections, however,
hrrvt. charrgccl to varyirrg degrees across post-communist countries, since
thc rrrurl<ct cc()n()my can eliminate the need to acquire goods and services
through informal channels.35 In many'Western societies voluntary organizatiolls h:rve become central to the social and political culture, and people
join them to meet new people and to expand their horizons through public activities. In post-communist societies, however, many people are still
extremely invested in their own private circles and simply feel no need,
much less any desire, to join and participate in organizations, when they
feel that, socially they already have everything that they could need or
want.
34 For an excellent analysis of the use of connections in Soviet and contemporary Russia, see
Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia's Econotry of Fauours: Blat, NetworkinS, and Informal Exchange
(cambridge: cambridge University Press, rgg8). on Eastern Germany, see Beate Viilkcr

and Henk Flap, "Getting Ahead in the GDR: Social Capital and Statrrs Attaitrmcnt untler
Communism," in Acta Sociologica,Yol. 42, No. I (r999), pp. t7-34'
35 See also James L. Gibson, "sociarl Networks, (livil Socicty, rrrrtl tltt' l)rospt'tls lirr tlrt'(]rrt
soli<lating I{Lrssirr's l)crrrocrrrtic'li'rrrrsitiort," it Arrttrirrur futrnul,,l l\lilir,tl \tit'rttr', Vol. .1r'

No. r (zoot), l)l). 5r '{'tl.

r'' \r.t.. lrrrr.rrrr''lr., l1 .ttr'Vrrll.r'r .trr,l ll,rrl. ll.t1t,"( lr.rrr1i,'.rtt llt",'rr.rl Nr'lrr,rrl.,trtllrllotttttt

(if)f(."

rrr

N,'ll,'tl,trt,lrL)ttttt'tltl \,',rrl\,/r',,rr'r' Nrr '

(1'1'1tr)'

ltll l{' rr"

Experimtial Approach to Continuity and

Change

29

Post-Communist Disappointment
The third reason that helps to explain the particularly low levels of public
participation in post-communist Europe is the widespread disappointment,
and for some even disillusionment, with political and economic developments since the collapse of the state-socialist slstem.37 Although it is most
pronounced among those people who were personally involved in the movements leading to the creation of the new institutional order, this third factor
applies to the wider population as well. For most people throughout the former Soviet bloc, the years r989-9r represent a unique, momentous' and fascinating time in their lives, when their world was changing rapidly and dramatically. Although they had many fears and uncertainties about where the
changes would lead them, most people experienced at least a brief moment
of genuine excitement, hope, and idealism during those times of rapid transformation. Moreover, they shared the belief that the end of Communist Party
rule, the emergence of new democratic and market institutions, and at long
last the freedom and right to speak freely, to associate openly with others, and
to travel beyond the "iron curtain" would change their lives for the better.38
In the years since those dramatic times, however, many post-communist
citizens feel that they have been let down, even cheated, by the new system
that quickly replaced the old one. Even though a vast majority in every postcommunist country does not want to go back in time,3r the political and
economic systems that have since taken root seem to have disappointed most
people who had believed and hoped that a new political and economic system
would live up to their ideals. This disappointment has only increased people's
demobilization and withdrawal from public activities since the collapse of
communlsm.
In terms of societal change, the new post-communist institutions are still
perceived as being more incoherent than authoritative, more alien than
familiar, and still very new. As a result, the behavioral patterns in postcommunist societies can best be understood by considering the communist
institutions and their enduring legacy, rather than by focusing on contem-

porary institutional designs.

"the postcommunist letdown," similar to
what Jacques Rupnik calls "the post-totalitarian blues." See Geremek, "Civil Society Then
and Now," in Diamond and Plattner, The GlobalResurgmce of Democracy,pp. z4r-25o, and,
Ilrrprrik, "Tf.re Post-Totalitarian Blues," in Diamond and Plattner, The Global Resurgence of
I ) rn x tt-nt t1, pp. 36 5-37 7.
l3 St't' I{ost', "lircctkrm as a Fundamental Value."
!" Ir) sorru'srrrvcys, prrrticularly in Russia, a maiority of respondents has agreed that "life was
lrt.lt.r" irr llre r..17os, yct nr()st still rn:rintain that they do not want to "go back" to those
lirrrr.s. l(ost t't rrl. writt'thirt "n()stillgix nbout thc past clocs trot usually lead to a desire to
llo lr.r. li to it t r.rs tlrrur lr,rll llrost liivirrr', rr positivt'rilting t() tltc (irttttttttttist rcgintc wtltrlcl
.r,trr,rllt lrl., trrr<r'rr lr,rrl. "llrrr,,l\'lrslrlt'r,iur(l llr('r pltr, l)rttrottitr\tdntl llsAltrthtllt'r'r,pp.

17 Bronislaw Geremek refers to this phenomenon as

'Weakness

3o

of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

CONCLUSION

The experiential approach to societal continuity and change that I have

introduced and derreloped in this chapter is based on an understanding of
human beings as agents who make choices in the context of their prior experiences and iheir interpretations of these experiences. In other words, while
institutions do constrain and restrict the available options for social activity,
they do not shape or change people directly or automatically- Moreover,
although the period of late-childhood and early-adult socialization may
be the most formative time in many people's lives, people do not become

,.programmed,,, destined to remain the same their entire adult lives. only an
that is both dynamic and interactive, and that focuses on people's
"ip.o".h
actnal experiences,can lead to a more grounded and realistic understanding
of human behavior and societal change.
More specifically, in terms of the low levels of otganizational membership
in post-communist Europe todaS the main argument of this book - and one
that I document and tesi in Chapters 5 and 6, using both quantitative and
qualitative methods - emphasizes three main causal factors, and all three
involve people's ongoing reinterpretations of their prior and present experiences. these thtee factors consist of (r) the prior experiences that people
have with organizations, and particularly the legacy of mistrust of all formal
organizations caused by forced participation in communist organizations,
(z) the persistence of informal private networks, which function as a substitute f<>r, or altcrnative to, formal and public organizations, and (3) the
disappgirrtrlcrrt with the new democratic and capitalist systems of today,
whiclr has lcrl rnatry pcople to avoid the public sphere. As I demonstrate in
sulrscclucnt chrtptcrs, these three factors together present the most persuasivc accr>unt of the causal link between people's interpretations of their prior
and their current social behavior and activities.
experiences
'Before
turning to the empirical analysis, however, the following chapter
provides an account of civil society discussing how it should be conceptualized and measured and what role it plays in the context of democracy and
democratization.

Civil Society and Democratizatron

INTRODUCTION

Only twenty years ago "civil society" was an arcane concept in political
theory. Today it is a term that floods academic, journalistic, and even everyd^y discourse. The concept of civil society was revitalrzed in the r98os by
the Polish opposition movement and the subsequent wave of dem ocratrzation around the world.' Since then, civil society as an object of study has
experienced a veritable explosion, and today it is commonly applied to very
different contexts throughout the world.'Inthe new post-Cold \War era, in
which many countries have embarked on various forms of dem ocratrzation,
civil society has come to be seen as one of the main indicators of that process.
Moreover, almost every large international foundation or institute has established some kind of "civil society initiative " for the purpose of monitoring

'
'

See, for example, the excellent account by Michael H. Bernhard, The Origins of Democ.Workers,
Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics, 1976-198o (New York:
ratization in Poland:
Columbia University Press, r9%).
F-or just a few examples of recently published and wide-ranging applications of civil society,
see: Sheila Carapico, Ciuil Society In Yemen: The Political Economy of Actiuism in Modern Arabia
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Yossi Shain and Gary Sussman, "From
Occupation to State-Building: Palestinian Political Society Meets Palestinian Civil Societ5" in
()ouernment and Opposition,Yol.33, No. I ftgg8); Larry Diamond, A. H. M. Kirk-Greene,
rrrrd Oyeleye Oyediran, eds., Transition.Without End: Nigerian Politics and Ciuil Society under
lldlnngida (Bourlcler: Lynne Rienner Publishers, rygZ); Gordon White, Jude Howell, and
Slrrrrrg Xirroyuru-r, In Search of Ciuil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary
(',ltirr,t (()xforcl: ()xforcl [Iniversity Press, r996); Sunhyuk Kim, "Civil Society and Democr':rtizrrti<rrr irr South Korc:rI.," in IQvca lrrurnal., Vol. 38, No. z (rgg8); Jeffrey Haynes, Democtitt'\t ttrrtl (',it,il ,\ot it'l'yt irr tltr 'l'l.tirtl Wtild: I>rilitir.s and New Political Mouements (Cambridge:
f 'olity l'rt'ss, t 1)t)7); lolrrr A. lr,ootlt ;utrl l):ttricilt llltycr Itichard, "Civil Society, Political
(,,rlrtl,rl, ,ultl l)t'rrrot'r;tliz;tlion nr (.r'rrtrrrl Arrrt'r'ic':t," irr lortrttll ol l'tilitics.,, Vll. (ro' No. j
1

,1,1S

PUBLIC SPHERE

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

3z

and strengthening civil society in countries across the globe, and especially
in post-communist EuroPe
A vibrant civil society is often seen as the key ingredientin the success
of advanced democracies in the west, as well as a panacea for developing

(based on legal-rational

institutions and

organizing principles)

'sfithin political science

-

even though trust,

themes in
standard
have
been
ntization
political participation, and democ
way of
a
"new"
has
become
society
civil
;;;;";;". poii,i., for decades nonand
\Testern
the
throughout
applications
fram^ing ,o.h'r.r.ur.h, with
'Western world.
This chapter presents my conceptlon and application of civil society within
the field of comparative politics. It proceeds in three main parts: first, I
inrroduce a definition of civil society that includes both its theoretical origins
and its contemporary empirical manifestationsl second, I explain why civil
society is importanr and why it should be studied; and third, I describe
*hat i view as the most fruiiful way in which civil society can be studied
comparatively. The point of this chapter is not to make a contribution to
ayeady
the use of civil society in political theorS which many scholars have
society,
civil
of
concept
the
integrate
further
is
to
goal
my
done.a Rather,
theoretically and eripirically, into comparative politics, in order to develop
a common standard for meaningful and cumulative comparative research

countries elsewhere in the world.

across countries and regions.

(consisting of concrete
organizations and
groups of people)

WHAT IS CIVII, SO(;II:TY?

For arr urrclcrstrrrrditrg of the place and role of civil society, it is useful to
start with ir wide view of social relations in any given democratic or dernocratizing system. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. have provided a starting
point for it ir ftoua perspe6ive in their recent book, in which they disiinguish between fiu. int.i".ting and mutually reinforcing "arenas" of demJcratization:5 (r) civil society, (z) political societg (3) economic society'
(a) the rule of law, and (S) state buieauctacy' Figure 3'r represents my illustrated summary of these different arenas, and the interaction between
them.

3 For abalanced overview of some of these programs, see Thomas Carothets, AidingDemocracy
Peace,
Abroad: The Learning Curue ('Washingtona DC: Carnegie Endowment for International
1999).

MIT'Prcss', r 'lllz);
among others,Jean L. Cohen,ClassandCiuilsociety (Carnbriclgc, MA:
'l'btrnry (()rrrrrbritlgc., MA: Ml'l'
Prilitical
and
Socicty
Ciuit
Arato,
Andrew
and
Jean f. Cohen
press, r99z);Jr>hn Keanc., Dentrttrcttlt ttnil oitril Sotit'ly: ()rr tbt l'rrtli,ttttt(ttls ttf Iitrrttltt'tttt '\rt
(|otrlttllnt,ti ,\rrr i,tl rttttl l','lili,,tl l\tt('t't
cialism, the lrirrsltt,cls lit Dr,ltt)(.tit(\t, tttttl lltt, I'rtlilt'ttt rtf
("tt'tl \or rr'l\' (Nt'\\' \'ttrli: l'tcr' l'l't's\'
l'ltt'1,1,',r,,1
St'lilirrr;ul.'
(1.<rrrtl'rr: Vt,rso, ;r;i,ili); rrrr.l A,l;rrrr
See,

,,1r; .l

', I t1l ,l1,l \tr'lt,1t,

I't,,1,1,'ttl'. rtf l l,'ttt,tr l,lllt

lt,ttt"tlt'rtl

rltltl l'rtlt""lt'l'lltrttt

l'l{lVA'l'l,l Sl'l I l,lltli

I l(,lll(l'

{.l.

I lrt' Ar('n,t\

()l | )t'nto1 l,rlr/.tliort

.Weakness

j4

of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

To understand this figure, several key points need to be made explicit.

The first is that there is a broad distinction between the public and private spheres,5 indicated in Figure 3.r by the solid line separating family

and friendship networks, on the one hand, from civil society and the other
four arenas, on the other. This distinction refers to the important difference
between social activities that are within close and trusted circles and those
that go beyond them to involve interaction with other forms of organization in the society atlarge.In other words, there is a qualitative difference
between a gathering of family and friends - whether small or large, occasional or regular - and activities that involve a formally established group'
where diffeient kinds of people come together based on a common idea,
interest, talent, or cause.
Next, we should distinguish between the two arenas that are above, and
the three that are below, the dotted line in Figure 3 . r. The state bureaucracy
and the rule of law are based first and foremost on legal-rational institwtions
and organizing principles, which provide the essential core of any modern
democratic system. Political society, economic society, and civil society, in
contrast, .o.rritt of conqete organizntions and groups ofpeople that shape and
define the particular character of that democratic system. As indicated by
the thick arrow connecting these two categories of arenas, they interact in a
mutually reinforcing way. Indeed, the more the state bureaucracy and legal
systenl b...r,r. institutionalized along legal-rational principles, the greater
tire frccclorrrs arrcl <lpportunities for actors and organizations in economic'
politicrrl, rtrrcl civil society to associate. Similarly, the stronger and more inilrrcrrtirrl tlrcst'grou1'rs rlttd organizations become, the better the chances for
ltringing rrlrorrt r statc bureaucracy and rule of law based on legal-rational
principlcs.T
'

Thc rclationship among the three arenas located below the dotted line in
Figure 3 . r, consisting of concrete organizations and groups of people, is more
co-ple*. Simply put, political sociefy refers to elite politics, na,mely, political

leadirship and the competition for political power and office. Economic
society r.J.rt to the myriad of business organizations pursuing economic
profit in a capitalist system. Ciuil society refers to the realm of organizations'
g.oopr, and associations that are formally established, legally protected,
6 On the origins of the concept of the public sphere, see Jiirgen Habermas, The Sttuch.tral
Transformalion of the Pubtic Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Socie4r, translated
by Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
r9g9); and craig calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public sphere (cambridge' MA: MIT' Prcss,

r992]'.

7 The negative side of this mutual interaction is that witlxnil t lcg;rl rrrtiolrrrl slrtlt'bttrt'llttttrtcy
and rule of law, there can bc fcw opportrrrritit's for tht riglrts ()l ()tl',:ttli/:lli()tls:ttttl tilizt'tts to

benrgtcctt.tl.Artrl withorrt llrt.rlt.vt'lr,Prttcrttrrl Politit.tl,t'(rrlrrtllll(,.ttt.l

,ttl( l.\txl.ltlrtll\.lll(l

t)r('ssrrr(.s.llrt'r..w,rrrlrllrt.littlr.lilir.lilr,,,,,l,rl{urtlr,'t,r;,,trt.t,,tt,,ll,'1irlr'ttt,'rr.rl1,tttt,t1,l,tttl,l

Ciuil Society and

Democratization

35

autonomously run, and voluntarily joined by ordinary citizens. More explicitly, the conceptual and empiri cal feature that differentiates civil society
from political society and economic society is the important distinction berween the elite and the mass level. In civil society, individual members can
effect or prevent change by actirg through their organizatton In both economic society and political soci ety, however, individual elites still have the
power to control policies, even when they are not acting within, or on behalf
of, an organi zatron In other words, while political society and econgmic
society are composed primarily of elite actors and institutions in pursuit of
power or profit, civil society is the realm of ordinary cittzens, who join and
participate in groups and associations because of their everyday interests,
needs, and desires. Thus, unlike the organizations of political society and
economic society, the organizations of civil socie ty - although they often
seek political influence and are constantly in need of financial support
have neither power nor profit as their objective or rationale.B
Although I have just explained the crucial differences between these concepts, this does not mean that there are clear-cut conceptual or practical
lines separating them in the real world. On the contrary, there is a small
but signific ant ouerlap among the three arenas. As shown in Figure 3.2,
we can conceive of the three arenas as overlapping circles. The central
elements of political society consist of the leadership groups of political
parties, inter-party alliances, and professional politicians and elites. Economic society - which, with civil society, maintains a close connection to
the private sphere, since its origins stem from the very concept of private
property and personal and family entrepreneurship - includes, most importantly, businesses, financial institutions, entrepreneurs, and economic elites.
Finally, civil society encompasses a wide array of groupS, associations, and
organizattons, including community and local organizatrons; human rights,
peace, and environmental groups; educational or cultural activities; churches

or religious organizationsl sports or recreational clubs; and womerl'S,

veterars', youth, elderly disabled, animal rights, health, and self-help
groups.
Bur this is not the end of the story. Accordittg to the preceding definitions
of each arena) there must be groups and organizattons that belong to more
8 As Cehep and Arato write, "It is necessary and meaningful to distinguish civil society from
lrotlr rr political society of parties, political organtzattons, and political publics...and an
(,cof ropric sgcicty con-lposed of organrzations of production and distribution, usually firms,
c()opcr'rrtivt.s, 1'rrrr-trrcrships., arrcl so on.... [T]he actors of political and economic society are
tlir-r.rtly irrvolvctl witlr st:.rtc powcr rrnd ec<lnomic production, which they seek to control and
nr:urrrl',(.. 'l'lrt'politicrrl rolc oi civil socicty in turn is not directly related to the control
()r'(orrtlrrt.st ol powt'r'lrrrt to tlr('ll('rrt'r'rttiort of irrfltrcltcc thrtltrgh tlre life of denrocratic as\()( r,rtrorr\ .urtl rrrr(()n\tr;rrrrt'tl ,lis..rrssi,rrr irr tltc trrltru',tl ;lulllic sltltt'l-c. Strch tt political rtllc
,r ut(.\,rt,rl,lr, .lrllrr,.r' ,rtrtl rrrt'llit rr'nl " (,rlltt'lr :trltl At,tlo, (',it'il ,\orir'l\, tttttl l'rliti<,tl 'l'ltr'tY\'.
f

l)lt l\ \

Political Leaders and

Elites

o Leadership Groups

of

Political Parties
o Inter - party alliances
o

Media

o Elite-based

Political Parties

Community and local organtzations

o Human rights goups

o Peace initiatives

o Labor Unions
o Professional,

o Environmental or ecological

Employer,
and Producer
Associations
o Economic
Interest
Groups and
NGOs

movements
o Education or cultural activities
o Churches or religious organizations
o Sports and leisure clubs
o Women's groups
o Veterans' organizations
o Youth groups
o
o

o Businesses
o Financial Institutions
o Entrepreneurs and

Economic Elites

Elderly groups

. Disabled

groups

Animal rights groups

Health organtzations

o Self-help groups

FrcuRE 3.2. The Groups

Political/

Economic Interest GrouPs

and NGOs

(membership)
o Political Interest
Groups and NGOs

of Political Society Economic SocietS and Civil Society

'Weakness
J8

of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

than onetype of aren a atthe same time. For example, political interest groups

and large-scale non-governmental organizations (NGOs) usually have the

explicit goal of influencing and changing political power structures, yet they
also rely on participation and support from ordina ry citrzens for the legitimation of their cause. Thus on the overlapping section between civil society
and economic societS we could include labor unions; professional, employer'
and producer associations; and economic interest groups and NGOs. All of
these belong in economic society since they are concerned with influencing
economic outcomes; yet their membership basis is volu ntary, and they consist of larye or small numbers of people who come together to discuss and
act on their common interests.
On the overlap between political and economic soci ety, we could include
an array of elite-based political-economic interest groups and NGOs, which
are not dependent on citi zen participation or support. This would also include the corporatist or quasi-corporatist arrangements between firms and
unions that in certain sectors operate separately from the input of their members. Finally, cutting across all three arenas, we might place the media, which
plays an influential agenda-setting role within political and economic societyrwhile also serving as the fundamental means of communication to, and
among, ordinary citizens.
Having explained the gen eral distinctions and areas of overlap between
civil society, political society, and economic society, I want to turn briefly
to a few morc subtle issues that still need clarification and specification.
C)ne p<lirrt conccrrrs thc, relation between the state and civil society. Much of
thc litcrrrturc hrrs tcnclccl to make a sharp analytic dichotomy between the
strrrc urrcl civil socicty, with the two standing in a zero-sum relationship.e
ln tlrc cilsc of lrastcrn h,urope - where, importantly, much of the "renewal"
ef interesr in civil society originated - this relationship was actually viewed
as the two social forces in opposition, with civil society against the state.'o
This focus was approp rtate within the context of opposition to a communist
regime - especially since it was used more as a political statement than as
theoretical analysis - but it is less applicable to either established democracies or dem ocratrzing countries, where the state-civil society relationship is
much more interactive and reciprocal." As Michael WaIzer writes, "Only

Ciuil Society and

Democratization

39

a democratic state can create a democratic civil society; only a democratic

society can sustain a democratic state.""
Indeed, in recent contributions based on empirical investigation, some
scholars have introduced compelling evidence for counter-arguments to the
strict and oppositional dichotomy of state and civil society in a democratic
context. Theda Skocpol's extensive historical research shows that throughout American history, the u.S. government has been directly responsible
for the establishment and support of all types of voluntary organizatrons.'3
She concludes, "The story of American voluntarism has been clearly one
of symbiosis between state and society - not a story of society apart from,
or inst ead of, the state. "'4 Similarly, in a book that focuses on contemporary France, Jonah Levy argues that "the relationship between the state and
civil society is reciprocal and potentially symbiotic." He adds, "The state
is not necess arrly the enemy of civil society; nor is the absence of the state
enough to foster the good civil society. Rather, the state can - indeed, in many
instances, mwst - play an active role in forgitrg and sustainittg vibrant, effective societal and local institutions :) 15 The thrust of this argument provides

strong support for the depiction in Figure 3.r of the interaction between
the two arenas above the dotted line (state bureau cracy and rule of law)
and the three arenas below it (political society, economic society, and civil
society).

Another issue has to do with the

ch aracterrzatron of less structured types

of mass mobiltzatron. In my view, although they are certainly significant and

consequential, spontaneous demonstrations are excluded from civil society.

Civil society requires a degree of routrntzatton and institutionalizattonthat is
usually absent in such forms of mob thzatron. If, however, the demonstrations
lead to the formation of an organi zatron' with a name, an office, volunteers
or personnel, then the movement takes on the attributes of a civil society
organi zation In other words, civil society does not refer to simply any form
of mob thzatron, but to membership and participation in a formally orga nrzed
group, club, or association.
This leads to the necess ary differentiation between civil society and social movements, which often remains underspecified because scholars tend
to study one or the other.'6 Social movements generally consist of some
'Walzer, "The
Idea of Civil Society: A Path to Social Reconstruction," ir E. J. Dionne,
'Works:
The Reuiual of Ciuil Society in America (\Tashington, DC: Brookings
Irrstitution l)rcss, 1c2c28)., p. r 4o (originally published in Dlssent [spring r99r], pp. 293-04).
'l'lrcclrr Sl<oc1-rol, "Unrrrvcllirrg from Above," in The American Prospecl, No. z5
G996). Also
st'r' lrcr' lru'gc'r- sturly, "l lor,v Alrcricirns Became Civic."
Sftoc 1)r)1, " l low Arttcric:trts llt'crttttt' ( livic," p. 7o.

Michael

e For example, Ernest Gellner characterizes civil society as "the social residue left when the
srate is subtracted. " See Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Ciuil Society and Its Riuals (Ncw York:
Allen Lane/Penguin Press, 1994), p. ztzro See, for example, Andrew Arato, "Civil Society vs. the Statct: l)olrtlrtl 1..;flo-8t''" irt'li'/os,

No.4Z (r98r).

elso ntltli,r'tlris;'loinl,:ts tltt'y rul',tt('tlr;tt "\\/('\v,llll lo sltt'ss lltltl

.,ot tr'l\' ttl ol'rl)()'1,tltott lo lltt'
UnClCr li$Crlf l tlt,rl<tt-l-ltr.it.s, il Wptrltl Ilt. :r lrrrsl,rli,r. lo \('(' r tvtl
(
"'
(
tt'tl
,'\t.tl,.
Scr'
,,ltcn
,ut(l
'\,tt tt'l\',ttt,l I'r'ltlt,,tl I'lrt'rtt\',
('c()fr()nry ;rrttl sl;tlt, lry ,lt'lirriliorr
\.
l).

rr Note that Cohen arrcl Anrt<l

.f

r., ed

..,

Orsnanwnity

I t'vy, '1itt,111,'1,ill,"s l{r'lrr'l/,(r',1\. 7. lrot'sirrrillu'ttrgurncnts <tt't Oct'tt't:tny ancl Britain, respectively,

st't' f ',r.11,,,'ll, ( )l,rl, ttri:irt,4 I )t'tttttt t'ttt \r itt I",,tslt'rrt ( lrrtrt,lttyr :rrrrl I lrtll., "Sociltl (lrrltitrrl irt Ilritailt."
ltytlrl'('('l)t'(tlttiltt'ltl
l',,r ,t t('(('nl ()\'r'rvrt'rvol llrt'ltlcr;rlrrrt'()ns(,ti;tlnl()v('nr('nls,r{rltutltor-t'tl
.,r lrol,tr., ,rrr llr.' .,trlr;t't l, ,,r'r' l)out', l\lr r\,l,trrt, Sttlttct' l.ttt,r\\', :rrrtl (,lr:rrlcs'l'illy, "'low;llrl ,ttt

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

4o

In
combination of both spontaneous mobilization and loose organization.
they are formally organized, then they belong to civil societS
il;;;if
in Figure 3 .z
urrd in fact many of the examples of civil society organizations
,.f., ,o so-e for- of social rirovement. But what is distinctive about social
often resist their movement's institutional-ou.rn"rrr, is that their leaders
may be perceived as giving in or selling
formalization
such
izationbecause

Indeed,
out, resulting in the rapid demobilization of members and followers.
tend
witfiin the w]der .o.tr"", of civil society, social movement organizations
to come and go, or rise and fall, -o'L fttqotntly thanthe more."normal"
rr .".tya"y tip.t of voluntary organizations, thus resulting in what Sidney

Tarrow calls "cycles of contention."'7

memAnother complicated issue concerns those organizations for which

bership

or that may not actually be

-uy ,rot be completely voluntar5
a labor union in a highly corporatist

autonomous. For example, would

.oorrty, where all workers are automatically made members' and where
be classified as part of civil society?
the staie funds the organization,
'lrhat about the labor -unions in soviet-type communist regimes, which
The
were entirely organized, permeated, and controlled by the Party-state?
ambiguous,
more
is
first
second e"ample must 6; reiected outright; the
and this is where some discretion is left to the researcher who
however,
-U"r,
factors
t .ro*t a specific case. The answer would depend on such
make
to
has
it
capacity
as how the group is structured internally, what
interacfor
have
members
deciiions' and how much autonomy

its own
tion and organization, but the point is that there will always be room
in. in,.rpr.otion about the extent to which empirical rcality fits a socialfor these inscientific catcgory. The key, as I develop in the last section' is
and
arbitrary
than
tathet
terpretations io t. .orrrirtint und comparative,
isolated.

Afurtherproblemconcernsthoseorganizationsthatfitthegeneraldefassociate
inition of civil sociery where ordinary citizens come together and
interests
those
where
but
concerns,
and
based on their common interests
KIan
Klux
Ku
the
should
example,
For
are anti-liberal or anti-democratic.
Federation
Russian
the
of
Party
iffft, the Mafia, or the Communist
The answer necessitates
ifpnEi be considered civil society organizations?
belong, and which do
groups
which
of
q,rulifi."tion on the demarcation
";r-,.-E;r" though the internal structure and dynamics of some non-liberal
anizations' only
gr;rrpt ,rr"y ,.r!-ble those of more
other gr<lups' ilr
4
that
those groups or organizations
of civil socicty'
realm,
a mutJaily recogniied public
ilr I ir lrlt
Intcgr.fc(l I)crs'cclrvt'olt soci:rl M()V( llr('rll\ rttt.l ltt'volttliott,"
('t

rt

lt ;ttttl /'ttt

l<t t

ttrr I trrrrtt i u' l\

l"r/rtr' '"rr'l
hlttt\'tttrttl" 'rtr'l r t'ttlI'ttl'tt
'' sitlltr'v f lttt,rrv, l\tttt't ttt hlttt\'tttt'ttl: '\tttt'il
t 111;'r'r '' ltlt I lr rr"l
r'r''lil"
(.tttrlrtr'111
I'rr""
llrrr\'r''rl\
';"'r'rllt
((i,rrrrl,rr,11ir
r

ilil ir s.

tttrttt'
r'l

Ciuil Society and Democratization

4r

For this reason, I exclude extremist groups like the KKK, because they
are predicated on the denigration and destruction of other grouPS, whose
legitim acy they do not accept. I also exclude the Mafia, because it consists
of mainly for-profit criminal organi zatrons that place themselves beyond the
reach of the law. However, this is not to say that all org anrzations have to
be "good" or even benign to count as civil society organizatrons. The KPRR
for example, certainly has many distasteful attributes that may endanger
democratic stability in Russia, but it still accepts the rule of law and the right
of other pafiies and groups to exist.'B Although some may object that this
restriction adds a \Testern normative bias to the definition, it is important to
keep in mind that civil societS both as a theoretical construct and a practical
reahty, comes from the particular historical experience of the \7est. It is
therefore not at all a contradiction to specify that the groups belonging to
civil society must follow the general liberal democratic principles that have
long been associated with its development. re

A final and related point involves the distinction between "civil society"
and " social capitalr " two concepts that have become increasingly widesp read
in rece nt years, and that some scholars use indiscriminately or interchangeabIy. Social capital, as defined and applied most prominently by Robert
Putnam, refers to "connections among individuals - social networks and the
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. "'o The basic
18 For example, the KPRF proposed a motion in parliament rn 1996 that would have declared
the r99r dissolution of the Soviet Union illegal, but when the motion did not pass, the KPRF
-Weigle,
accepted its failure without seeking to go outside of the parliamentary system. See
Russia's Liberal Proiect, pp. 33o-33r .If , however, this situation were to change, and the KPRF
were to move in the direction that sorne analysts fear it might) one would have to reconsider
including it within the realm of civil society.

re For a similar argument andjustification for the exclusion of "fanatrcal organizations," see
M. Steven Fish, "Russia's Fourth Transitior," rnJournalof Democracy, Vol. 5, No. I Ggg+),
p.4t.Larcy Diamond also adds the following qualification: "To the extent that an organi-

fi

ffi;ii,::fi

1'j'il:::,r*:?T5: jii::,'i,?,illTJ;..,11:n,,i,"i#,lf lff ;

represenrs the only legitimate path,

it contradicts the pluralistic and market-oriented nature

of civil society." See Diamond, "Toward Democratic Consolidation," in Larcy Diamond

and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy, znd ed. (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. zz9-23o.
zo Rol-rert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Reuiual of American Community
(New Yorl<: Simon & Schuster, 2ooo), p. 19. Also see Robert D. Putnam, Making Democrd(y \Yrtrk: Ciuic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, r9%);
l{olrcrt l). l)utnrrrn, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Caprtalr" rn lournal of
l)trrtt)('tit(ry1 Vol. (,., No. r (r 995), pp. 6S-Z8; and Robert D. Putnam, "The Strange Disrrl)l)(,ru'rurc(' of (,ivic Anrcricrr.," in'l-hc American Prospecf, No. 24 (1996), pp. 34-48. The
oliliirtrrl l()t'nltrlrrti()n ol-tlrc tt'r'rrr "socirll crrpitlrl.," irr thc sernse that Putnam applies it, comes
Irorrr f ;rrrrt's (,olt'rrr;rrr. St't' f rtrrrt's S. (,olcrttlut., "Soci:tl Olrpitrrl itt thc (lrcati<ln of Htlman
(,,rprl,rl." rrr il utt'n(tut lt)nutrtl of ,\ttr trtlo,1,1,, V{rl. .t,f , Srr;t;tlt'tttt'trt (rt,l,gt{), ;11t. S.)S-Slzo; lllttl
\, ( olcrn.rrr, /'rtuutl,tltrttt', rr/,\r tt t,tl I'ltt'rtt'\, (( ,,rrrrll i.lt'.,'. N'lA: I lrrlv:rltl Ilrtivt'rsity l't't'ss'
f ,rrrrt',,
;,1';,')

'Weakness

4z

of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

difference between the two concepts is that social capital is a broader and
more general category than civil society, for it encompasses all types of relationships between people, not simply public activities in a democratic and legal setting. In other words, while membership and participation in voluntary
irganizations are included in definitions of both civil society and social capital, the networks and activities of the KKK, the Mafia, or other malevolent
and anti-democratic organizations, which are excluded from civil society, do
count as social capital." Moreover, private networks and relations between
close friends and family members, which are excluded from the public realm
of civil society, remain quite important in most applications of social capital.
FinallS civil society is generally viewed as a behavioral and institutional phenomenon, whereas social capital emphasizes the more amorphous "norm"
or "value" of inter-personal trust. These distinctions are not meant to imply
that there is antagonism or tension between these two related concepts' or
even between those who write on one or the other of them. Instead, they are
meant to elucidate the differences between civil society and social capital in
a way that might help diminish the conceptual confusion that often prevails

in contemporary discussions.
Overal! the conception and delineation of civil society articulated in this
section remain true to the theoretical and historical origins of the concept and
to contemporary discussions of democracy and democratization. My own
contribution shows how different types of groups and organizations from the
real worlcl :rctuirlly fit into an otherwise mainly theoretical conceptualization
9f civil socicty. lJrrving specified what civil society is, and how it fits into a
wiclcr s<lcictal pcrspcctive, I now turn to a consideration of its importance
within thc ficlcl of cor-nparative politics.

WHY SHOULD WE STUDY CIVIL SOCIETY?

A common understanding of most scholars who write about civil society however they may define or operationalize it - is the assumption that civil
society has a positive and beneficial influence. For most people, the term
immediately brings to mind a peaceful, moral, and idealistic image, which
is implicitly contrasted to its opposite, "uncivil society."" But what exactly
"

Aker the publication of Mahing Democracy Work, Putnam was criticized for not adequatcly
addressing what some scholars call the "KKK problem." To his credit, in Bowling Aknrc
he tackles the problem directly, including a short chapter called "The Darl< Sidc of Strcirtl

Capital," pp.35o1q.

",

Sometimes this contrrtst is nrirclc cxplicit; for cxrrtttplc, irr Itis ltr;tj,rr sPutlt olt ltrly 16, 1997,
(;('ll
entitlecl "Rclcwirrg thc $nitt'tl Nrrtiorrs: A l)tt,lltrtttttttt lot l(tlotrtt," IlN S((l('l:tly
crrrl l(tlfi Alttllttt rt'lt'rrttl t() lll( illlp()ltillrl 1',lolr;rl lttttl lt' "tt'tttlttt lltt'tttttttl3 rrl'trtrrivil
s.rit.lv' rritrrirr:rls, (l1rll l)1\ltr.t\ .1r(l lr'rorrrlr " l rr ,rr ( nll,tl',trrl', r',rltttttl tlt.tl ,l,r',1,';t,
k";u'tLr 'rrrtl
llll(l\'11 "1(l1l\" lll ltrr"l 'rttlltlllllll t l'rrt"1tt. 'rr'l'ttt
.t rl(\v l)(t\ll('(ll\r('rrll
lrrr"/'r'(l"rr'l'rrr
rttl\tttttttttttttttl
(.rrNfrr,l,l,.r,1,.lirr,r|rl\rtr,'lt'(ttttll,tltt'tt"l','ltlt'

Ciuil Society and

Democratization

4j

are the benefits of civil society? This section briefly summarizes the main
arguments about the "virtues" of civil society, in order to justify why it
should be considered an important object of study in comparative politics,
particularly in the subfield of democ raclr and democ ratrzation.
Larry Diamond presents a general account of the role of civil society,
listing many ways in which it can exert a positive influence on the process
of democratic consolidation. According to Diamond, in addition to "checking and limitittg the power of the state," civil society "stimulates political
participation, develops a democratic culture of tolerance and bargarning, creates additional channels for articulating and representing interests, generates
cross-cutting cleavages, recruits and trains new politic al leaders, improves
the functioning of democ ratrc institutions, widens and enriches the flow of
information to cittzens, and produces supporting coalitions on beh aIf of economic reform ," all of which help to strengthen and legitim ate a democratic
state.'3 \(/hile Diamond adds that a strong civil society in itself is no substitute for solid political and legal institutions, which are a sine qua non for a
democ ratrc system, h. concludes that once these basic institutions are set in
place, civil society can and indeed must develop in order to establish a more
deeply rooted, legitimate, and effective demo crac)r.
Diamond's account provides a useful summ aty of the potential virtues of
civil society in a democ ratrc system, but we still need to explore how civil
society actually causes or influences them. Skeptics may remain unconvinced
by wide-reaching gen erahzations about the beneficial effects of civil society even those that seem logical or obvious - in the absence of concrete evidence
about how the causal mechanism works empirically. In other words, could
other factors, such as economic well-being, the effectiveness of democ ratrc

political institutions, or long-standing cultural factors, b. more important

for explainirg the outcomes that Diamond attributes to civil society? The
question is impossible to answer systematic ally and definitivel5 but there is
certainly no shortage of skepticism.'4
Routledge) zooz). Also see Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein, "Bad Civil Society" in
PoliticalTheory, Vol. 29, No. 6 (zoot), pp. g7-865.
L3 See Diamond, "Toward Democratic Consolidation," pp. zz7-z4o (quotation from "Introduction," p. xxiii). Also see Larry Diamond, Deueloping Democracy: Toward Consolidation
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), especially Chapter 6.
'4 See,, for exarnple, Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the \Teimar Republic," in
WryldPolitics., Vol.49, No. I (rgg7),pp.4or-429; Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and Political

Irrstitution;rlizrttion," in American Behauioral Scientist, Yol. 40, No. 5 GggZ), pp. 562-514;

f(crrrrt'th Ncwtort., "S<lcirtl Oapital and DemocraCy," rn American Behauioral Scientist,VoI. 4o,
No. s (r,l 97), l')l). 575-5tt(',; Arrclrcw Greeley, "Colemern Revisited: Religious Structures
;rs rf Sortttt' ol Sot'irtl (,:rpit:r1.," irr Atttaric,trt 13chuuirtral Scicntist., Vol. 40, No. 5 ftggl),
l)l'). \fi z \().1; llolr l,tlw,rt'..ls;urtl Mirlr:rt'l W. l.'olt'y., "Soci:rl(,rrpit:rlantl tlrc Political F.crlrrorny
rrf ()ttr l)trtonlr'n1," irr ;\utr'ntrut llt'l,,tt'i,,titl ,\tit'ttlisl. Vol..1o, N<1. S (r.,r.)/), p;-1. 669-678
li,rl' | ..lrr,rr.l', ,rrrtl l\lrr lr,rr'l \\/, | .'lt'\', "( iv'rl Sot it't\, .rrr..l ,\,,t r.rl (,;rPitrrl !it'yorrtl l)rrlrrrnr,"' irl
\t tr'ttlt',1. \','l | '. Nr,, r (t,t,tli). IP tr | | l,; llrortt,t., l{ (,tls,lr k, " lltt'

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

44

'While perhaps not as clear-cut as Diamond's description of the benefits

of civil ,oii.ty, most of the recent empirical research (whether qualitative or
quantitative, contemporary or historical) on this topic has pointed to a strong
positive relationship between civil society and democracy.zs That said, the
skeptics are right to object to the hyperbole that some scholars express when
tr""iirrg civil society as if it were the only or the mostimportant factor, rather
than siLply one imporrant factor among others.'5 But in the end, while they
might dispute the relative emphasis placed on civil society when compared
-other
f-actors, few would actually deny its importance in establishing and
to
sustaining a vibrant and healthy democratic system. And fewer still, if any,
would .,-rgg.tt that a weaker civil society would actually be more beneficial

for a democracy.

Overall, the scholarship on the effects of civil society can be broken down
into two general approaches. The first, most closely associated.with Putnam's
work, emphasizes the positive effects that participation in civil society has on
individuai people, which in turn contributes to a more peaceful, harmonious,

and democratic society. The second approach is generally associated with the
work of historical institutionalists, such as Theda Skocpol' who argue that
the organizations of civil society provide a direct source of popular influence
on politic"l or economic developments, thus benefiting individuals and sociery Of course, these two types of arguments are not mutually exclusive,
ol'l)opullr Satisfaction with Government and Regime Performance in GermanS" in
llririshlinrrtt,rl rtl'l\litit:alScicnce,Vol.zg,No. +(rgggl,pp.64t-672;MargaretLevi,"Social
rrrrtl Urrsocirrl (iat;itirl: A llcview Essay of Robert Putnam's MakingDemocracy Work," in
l\'litits o *nitty, Vrl. 24, No. r (r996), pp. 45-55.

Shrrpirrg

,5 'l'his :rrgurrrcrrt ulso cxte nds to the economic realm. Whether this involves employer associatiorrs, l,rlt6r uniqrts, 9r local government, it is generally accepted that a well-developed civil
society will contribute to a better functioning and more socially representative economic
system. An alternative explanation, however, that emphasizes the impact of institutional
incentives rather than social capital, is articulated by Lane Kenworthy, "civic Engagement,
Social Capital, and Economic Cooperation," in Atnerican Behauioral Scimtist, Vol. 4o, No. 5

'n

Gggzl, pp. 645-656.

of the recent literature on civil society, Sheri Berman uses the
irr-on" of ih" ,h"rp.rt
".itiqoesto show how a strong civil society did not prevent the collapse
Germany
of
\Teimar
example
of a democratic system. She makes the important point that civil society alone is not enough;
equally or perhaps more significant are the political institutions that get set up in a democracy.
ih"t th. *llrpr" of Weimar democracy was a result of its weak political
Bermar,
".gr",
and the undeniable vibrancy of German civil society at the time did nothing to
institutionl
pr.u"rrt th"i collapse - if anything, civil society was actually mobilized and instrumentalizccl
Ly the Nazi move}ent. While her argument, which is supported persuasively by tlrc \fcinrar'
cottccl:t
case, is well taken, it may not iustify her overall condemnation of thc tlsc of thc
of civil society. Her critique of studies of civil society thirt igrtorc thc lrrrgcr Pictttrc rttttl
the greater p.rliti."l ancl econorlic c()ntcxt is cxtrctttcly vrrltltble. hrrt tllis Poittl sltorlltl ttol
bc rekcil l() its rxtr(.ilt('. lry t'lilirrriilg tlr;ll l).lrti(il);tli()ll itl vollltll.lly dll',.llli/;lliotrs
lill iIlt)orlrlttl t'lt.rrrt.lrl ol r.llt.clivr..lcrtr,,,r'.tli,
"(livilsotir'lv;tttrllltr'(]t'll,t1'rt't'ltlt''\Vltrr'rt

i\

r,r'l

l('sl)0llslv('ll('\\ 'ttt,l l,1ltttttt.t.\' St't llcttlt.tll,

trrrlll'lrtr"rl
l(r'l'rrl'lr'"'trttl"(tvtl\lrtr'lf

Ciuil Society dnd Democratization

45

and proponents of one often recogntze the importance of the other, but their
difference in emphasis - either on the value of participation or on the power
of institutional leverage - is analytically and substantively significant.

In his recent book, Putnam outlines a series of different ways in which

civil society, or more generally the broader rubric of " social capit dlr" can
have beneficial consequences. He writes, "Does social capital have salutary
effects on individuals, communities, or even entire nations ? Yes, an impressive and growing body of research suggests that civic connections help make

us healthy, wealthy and wise."'7 The book's chapters include "Education

and Children's \Telfar e ," "Safe and Productive Neighborhoodt," "Economic
Prosperrtyr" "Health and Happinessr" and "Democracy)" and in each, he
synthesizes rnuch of the past decade's scholarship on social caprtal, highlighting its positive effects. Putnam also presents original empirical evidence,
from a recently discovered archive of surveys from the past 2j years, which
he uses to demonstrate a strikitrg relationship across the 5o American states
between his social capftal index and an extremely wide range of issues and
data.tS

In terms of membership in volunt ary organizations - which is a criticaI element of his concept of social capital - Putnam incorporates Mark
Granovetter's classic argument about the paradoxical importance of distant or "weak" ties, as opposed to close or "strong" ties, when it comes
to finditrg employment or expanding one's horizon of life opportunities"'e
Close ties to family and friends are obviously still very much connected to
one's overall well-being; yet, in a larger economic and political sense, the
types of dist ant acquaintances that a person might make through organizatrons may actually be more valuable than family and close friends. As
Putnam describes, Granovetter's finding has been tested and confirmed in a
variety of contexts: "Dozens of studies from Albany to Singapore and from
Dresden to Detroit have found that at all levels in the social hierarchy and in
al| parts of the economy, soci al capttal is a powerful resource for achievittg
occupational advancement, social status, and economic rewards - perhaps
even more important than human caprtal (education and experience)."3o
More specifically, the basic logic of arguments made by Putnam and other
"social capitalists" is that civil society organizatrons serve as what Putnam)
paraphrasing Tocqueville, calls "schools for democracy""3r In other words,
L7 Pntnanr I*nuling Alone, p. z'87.
,
rtl lior cx:unprlc, hc fincls that "the more integrated we are with our communitg the less likely
w(,rrrc. lo cx1-lcrirrlrcc colcls, lrci,rrt lrttacl(s, strokes, cancer, depression, and premature death
of rtf l srtrts." l)ulttrtttt ., Iltttilirte Akttrt'., 1't. 326
;'r) St.t.M:rrl< (,r':urovt'tt('r', "'l'lrt'Slrt'rtgtlr ol: Wt'rtl<'['ics.," in Anteric.an
lournalof Sociolog,Vol.7B

(r,t7l), pp. tl()() rlllo.

r" f f rrlrt,tttt, /ltttt'lttt,tl t\lt,ttr'. 1',. l.'t,
fl
Itrrlrr.rrrr. /lttl'lnt.r, r\lttttt',1t. t tli, ( )lt tlrc tt'.1\' ttt rvlri.. ll t,,,ltttrl:u y :tssor i;tliotts ittcttlt ttlt' t ivit
v n l u(",,r r t, l'.l. r ll',,,t l',,,',,',. ;\ 1,' r, l', rlt' l i't,1rtt'r'tl l,' I

.Weakness

46

of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Europe

that autonomous organizations exist and flourish allows ordinary citizens

to interact with one another outside of their networks of family and close
friends and thereby develop greater trust, tolerance, and bargaining skills, all
of which are beneficial for democracy. Furthermore, their experience with
the organizations of civil society allows people to gain a greater sense of
their own roles and capacities in a participatory democratic system, thus
more proficient and engaged citizenry. The more people participate
in the voluntary organizations of civil society - eYen in those that are not
creating

explicitly political - the more they internalize the norms and behavior of a
participatory democratic citizenry,which can only strengthen the institutions
and performance of a country's democrattc government.
Unlike Putnam, who emphasizes the social-psychological benefits of consensus and cooperation that group participation will provide to its members and to society overall, historical institutionalists emphasize the role
of group conflict and struggle in shaping the development of modern
democracy.i' As Skocpol and Fiorina put it, "From an institutionalist
perspective, voluntary associations matter as sources of popular leverage,
not lust as facilitators of individual participation and generalized social
trust. " 33

In the contempofary context, the institutional approach emphasizes the

ability of the organizations of civil society to serve as a shield or a defense
mechanisnr that protects citizens against a potentially intrusive state. In other
w<rrcls, irr rr clcrnocratic system, the groups and otganizations of civil society
hrrvc thc caprrcity t() prevent the state from passing laws that oppose the
orgrurized irrtcrcsts of groups of citizens. In addition to this essentially defcrrsivc rolc, tlrc organizations of civil society can have a positive impact as
wcll, by iuflucncing those laws and regulations that do get passed. Voluntary organizations provide legislators with a greater breadth of information,
viewpoints, and pressure, all of which can contribute to more effective and

equitable policy-making.

:+

P. Mayer (Garden City, NY Doubleday, Anchor Books, ry69 ft835,

r84ol), especially pp. lSs-lSg; Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E' Brady,
voice and Equality: ciuic volunarism in American Politics (cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1995 ); and Harry Eckstein's classic study, Diuision and Cohesion in Democ-

Lawrence and edited byJ.

racy: A Study of Norway (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

3, For a clear articulation of this approach, see Skocpol, "How Americans Becarnc (livic,"
pp. z7-8o.In this tradition, also see Barrington Moore, Social Origins of l)ictakrsltip ,trul

(Boston: Beacon Press, r966); Thomas Ertmatr, Birth ttf tltc l,et'ittkrrr llttihlirty
Sates and Regimes in Medieual and Early Modarn li,ux4tc (('.lrtttbr itlgt': ( );t rr r h ritll',t' I lrr ivc rsit y
(
Press, r997); Dietrich Rueschcnrcycr, l.lvclyrrc I ltrlrt'l Stt'plrt'rts, rttttl lrrlrrr | ). Str'plrcrrs, irlrl

Ciuil Society and

rl

Sl(()(l)()l:tttrl lriotitt,t, ( ttl, I tt,r!tr!'tttr'ttl ttt '\ttt!'ttt'ttt l)r'f'l'rr"/'\" l' l\

ll 'l lrt, r'rrrplr,rrr., ,,lr tlr,. rlrrr.r I rrrrp,rr I rrl t'olttttl.tt \ rrtll,llll/,lllr'rr" ,'rl I't'lr' \ rrr'll'llll'. ll r\ lr'(l lt'
1rl",rt,1rt ltrr,ltrr1i'. .tl,,,rrl llr, tr'l tttrrttrlttl' ltr lrr" tl llr' .t tt' ttt'l ' trrl 'r' rr lt '\r 'ltr' ttr"'''l

47

The institutionalist emphasis on the direct political leverage of civil

A*y Gutmarr,
"Without access to an association that is willing and able to speak up
for our views and values, we have a very limited ability to be heard by
many other people or to influence the political process, unless we happen
to be rich or famous.D35 Moreover, in the words of Alexis de Tocqueville,
"An association unites the energies of divergent minds and vigorously
directs them toward a clearly indicated goal." 36 In short, membership
in organizations provides direct and tangible benefits to individuals
and to society by allowing people to influence the processes that affect
their lives and by achievitg collective goals that would not otherwise be
society can also be applied to individuals. As explained by

reached.

Despite the differences in emphasis between these two approaches, their

proponents share a common understanding of the beneficial effects of civil
society on democ rac)r. Skeptics may still contend that the link between
membership in voluntary organizations and responsive democratrc performance has not yet been demonstrated convincingly or system atrcally, but
my purpose here is not to resolve this dispute by testing the significance
of the relationship between civil society and democ rac)r. Rather, I accept
the general proposition that, to a relatively significant degree, membership and participation in volu ntary organizations ate important attributes
of, and factors in, democ ratrc performance and the quality of democracy.
The question that I am investigating is a different, and a prior, question,
but one that is equally important for students of comparative politics:
what factors explain why some countries have stronger and others have
weaker civil societies, and why some people join organizatrons and others
do not?
Given the unprecedented flurry of transitions to democ racy) since the
mid- r97os) during what Samuel Huntington has called the "third wave"
of dem ocratrzatronr37 and since many of these countries are still struggling
to keep their nascent democratic institutions afloat, civil society is a central
element of this endeavor. It is therefore not only entirely appropriate but also
essenti al for scholars to focus on the development of civil society in the wide
group of countries that are - with varying degrees of success - attempting to
dem ocratrze todav.
J

I)*to"ro.y

talistDruek4tmutandl)nrxx'rtt<-y((lhitrrlyr:tlrlivcrsityol (lrr'r1i'rl'tr""',t't't')
llrcd;tSl<6ctr6l ,rrrtl M,,r risl'. liiorillr,"M,rliirrliScrrscol llrr'(tvt, lttl'..t1',r'ttt,tttl)rlr.ttr',"ttt

Democratization

t\

crrrlicr irr this chapte r, the historical institutional approach has contributed a valuable understiutrlirrg of tltc wrry irr which the state and civil society interact in a symbiotic relationship,
r':ttltt'r' tltrut sirtrply dcfinirrg orlc ils the absence of the other.
Arttv ( iulnr:uln, "l;t't't'rl<)n'l ()l' Associlrtiorr: Arr Irrtrclcluctory Essayr" in A-y Gutmann, ed.,
f irt r;tt,'t rllt', / ),'tu()( tilt I ut,'\ttt,'tl(,1. l). | ()().
\r'r' 'r,rnrrrt I I' I lrrrrlrrrt',lorr. I'1,,' I'l,tt,/ \\,{lr u': I)t'tttt,( t'ttli.!,tlirttt irt tltt, Ltllt,'lirrttlit,llt
(N,,tnt.ur I lnt\'('t,,tl\' (,1 ( )[l,rlr,,nt,r l't(',,.,. 1,1,1t ).

(',r,ttlur1t

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

48

HOW CAN WE STUDY CIVIL SOCIETY?

civil
one major point of contention in contemporary discussions is whether
ideal
an
,*1.,y i, pri-"rily a normative and moral concept that serves as
participatory'
more
communicative,
more
become
to
societies
all
challenging

,-"rr.

"g-"rir"".ian,

and more democratic

- or whether it is a concept that can be

Representing
op.ruti'orr"lized'andmeasured empirically by social scientists.
naive view
"the
th. for*.. view, Beniamin Barber dismisses what he calls
isolation,"
that facts arrd values can be easily sorted out and kept in splendid
,,the interdependence of the ideal and the actual does not
and he adds that
.anything goes,' b-ut it does close the door on some simplistic
mean that
there are
notion that we ."., .urily arrive at an 'objective' definition, or that

'scientific'
--Wftif. answers to our political questions' "18
I sympathize witl this desire to avoid pseudo-scientific reductionto civil
ism and naivet6, I am not willing to reject the empirical approach
the
next
is
rcsearch
,r.i.,y per se. on the contrary, I believe that comparatiue
common
some
without
society. And
-ujo. challenge for the study of civil
which to
standards - whether qualitative, quantitative, or both - with
of
the.attributes
olti-utely, understand
.""f"",., compare' describe,

"rri,
.iuil ,o.i.ty i' difi.r.rrt .o.ri.*tr, research on civil

society

will not be able

to develop comparatively and cumulatively'

puts into
Arrorhcr inlpofrant obiection to the curfent uses of civil society
and
countries
across
measured
is
clucstiou thc ways in which civil society
maintains
volume,
edited
an
to
culturcs. (llrris tlrrrrtr, in his introduction
bias
that civil socicty hrrs a fundamental and historical western ethnocentric
summaHann
world.
the
of
parts
tern
that is 1.1<lorly
points: first, that "civil society debates
riz.es the crux
by modern western models
umscribed
hitherto have

Ciuil Society and

Democratization

49

Both of Hann's points present formidable challenges to scholars engaged

in empirical research on civil society in a comparative context. My approach
builds on an acceptance of his second point (on the need to incorporate
ethnographic research in non-\festern contexts) and a counter-argument to
his first (ott the need to expand the concept of civil society to incorporate
non-\Testern cultures). I agree with Hann's persuasive appeal to "shift the
debates about civil society away from formal structures and organisations
and towards an investigation of beliefs, values and everyday practices."4'
In other words, when studying civil society in non-\Testern countries, it is
important to examine what kinds of social practices exist in liew o/\Testernstyle participation in form atr, organrzattons. This is precisely what I attempt to
do in subsequent chapters. After showitrg in Chapter 4 that post-communist
citizens have very low levels of participation in formal volu ntary atganlzations, and testing a set of competing hypotheses statisti caIIy in Chapter 5, I
explore the reason s why post-communist citizens do not partici pate, and I
show what they do ins tead, by means of interpretive research and analysis
in Chapter 6.
However, while I also agtee with Hann's chara ctenzation of the unique
historical circumstances that led to the emergence of civil society as a new
form of social orga nrzatron in the \fest, I disagree that the concept or term
"civil society" should be expanded - in my view diluted - so that tt treats all
forms of soci aI organizatron and practices as being different manifestations
of the same general phenomenon, civil society.4'It is a valuable insight to
bring to the forefront of the discussion the point that civil society is an inherently Western concept that arose out of a distinct historical experience,
regardless of whether one views this experience and its potential transfer elsewhere positively or negatively. But - although I do understand the frustration
with seeing it applied, often mistakenly and clumsily to regions and countries that have completely different historical and cultural backgrounds I am not convinced that broadening our understanding of civil society to
include qualitatively different social patterns will help to reduce the alneadysignificant confusion surrounding the concept, and I am afratd that it would
do just the opposite.aj
4t Hann, "Pr>litical

in historical conditions that cannot

world todaY."4o
(Ncw
for (Js: Horu to Mak3 society ciuil and Dcmocracy 'Slrorrx
clircctccl rgaitrst I'tttrtrtttt'
argument'
similar
a
t:.2-t3.F<'sr
pp.
rgg8),
and'wang,
York: Hill
Talk"' in lt'c/fl fnnr ll* ltrstitttlc llt l'ltih's4ilt1'
see Jean L' Cohen, "n''tt'it"n'ciuil Soiicty
(r
r
li,
No'
eell)'
l\liry,Yol3
Publir
and
(llltis ll'rtlrr 'ttltl
r,, cllris ll:''r, "lrrtlotlr,,ti,,,,' l',,lili,,'l Sorir'll'rtrttl (iivil Arrtlrlt'|)okr;"v," irr
(
l\l"'/'/"
ll
(.tt,tl
\\'i'1&',//
lLllttt,\!ttli
.\,,,trl\':
r'rlr
l)rrrrrr,
,
lrlizrrlx.rlr
"tt'l"tt trt'l Ncrr' \r'lli;

38 Beniamin R. Barber, A Place

l(r 'rtt lt'rl1it', 1 rlrltr), 1r t

t, ILrrrn, "l,,,lrlrr,tl ',,rr tr t\ ,lt'l ( t\ tl ,\rrtllll|'r'1,';'\,

Society and Civil AnthropologS" p. ,4.

't)' FIar-rn writes: "'We nray, for some limited purposes, wish to apply a core definition of civil
socicty :utcl usc rhis for comparative analysis. But, instead of searching for the replication
of ottc pirrticulrrr wcstcrtt nrodel around the world, we should also be prepared to abanclort tltis rutivt'r's:tl yrrrdsticl<, urrcl to understand civil society to refer more loosely to the
nr()r'rrl conrr)uttity., to thc prolllcnrs of rrccountabilitS trust and cooperation that all groups
frtrt'. lrr tltis st'ns('., illl lrrrniln c()nr)runitics rrrc conccrncd with establishing their own versirrn ol ,r tivil sorit'ly, ot rit,ilis,tli()u." Ilrrrrrr., "l)olitic:rl Socicry rrrrcl Clivil Anthropcllclgy,,"

l)' : t ''
||llill];..'.I]i;,..,''..,,,'..,:::;;.,l]:,|'.1';',,'i;j;
l)l) t,,i I l,r\ 1.,tttrlll.tr r,l( ,'llt, t ,rrr,l J.ln(", \l,rlron, lt , "( ()n(('l)trr,rl'\trt'lt

lrrrrri'ltt'r'r,,rlr',1:

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

50

Moreover, as just mentioned, there rs an actual basis for the study of

in non-'Western countries,

civil society - as a specifically Sflestern concept given that'-"ny oi these have recently embarked on various forms of
ivesternization that include the development of democratic and capitalist
systems based on an ideal-typical'Western model. At least within countries
that are to some extent democratizing, civil society - measured by voluntary organizations and participation within them - is a legitimate and
approp.iale object of exploration and analysis. That said, and here Hann's
becomes very instructive, when the results of this type of analysis
"ijrrr*n,
shlw social patterns that are distinct from those of Western countries, it
is crucial foi scholars to take the next step and explain why this is the
case.

Having addressed these two important challenges to, and warnings about'
the eripirical study of civil roii.tS I now turn to a discussion of two
alternatiive empirical approaches' I focus on how they have been, and
can be, applied to port-.o-munist Europe' particularly within a wider
comparative perspective.
The most common approach used in empirical studies of civil society
focuses on the orgurriruiio.rs and associations themselves. Many studies
presenr extensive d"tu o.r the distribution of different types of organi,oti.rn, within a country's civil society, listing the numbers and percentages <lf voluntary associations that break down into different categories.44
Thcrc arc rwo main problems with this type of report: first, the categories
0f tyl.rcs ()f organizations are rarely standardized, and they vafy tremen.l,ruriy fr.rrr st'cly to study, thus ruling out meaningful comparison across
cour;ics; ,...r,,.1, the data are often collected haphazardly, based on unclcar ancl unsystematic sampling methods, resulting in a dubious claim of
representatlveness.

The most interesting and productive comparative work on voluntary orscholganizations has been clnd,tcied in Germany where several groups_ of
'Western
and
Eastern
in
society
of
civil
aspects
I., h"u. compared various
Germany. Despite using differint empirical methods, focusing on different
r.u.hing different interpretations and conclusions, these
types of groupr,
".rd
.!r.ur.hltt emphasize the iommon empirical finding that civil society is
weaker, and in some cases substantially weaker' in the East than in the

Ciuil Society and

Democratization

\7est.as This finding, which is very important

for understanding East and

only a starting point for understanding

the effect of the communist experience in its larger comparative context

S7est German differences, provides

across post-communist Europe.

In addition to focusing on the distribution of volu ntary organi zatrons in

a given country, some analysts report data on civil society organizattons by

showing the changes in the number of registered groups over time. This
allows for an analysis of trends, a vital topic in most discussions of civil
society, which attempt to measure or predict changes in the level of civil society over time. In post-communist countries, these trends often show large
increases in the number of org annations. For example, citing a report by
the Social Statistics Department of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office,
Ferenc Miszlivetz and Jody Jensen write, "The data. . . show an unprecedented growth in the number of civil, nonprofit organizations in the past
five years," and they specify that the number of groups more than tripled
from 1989 to 1992.46 Similarly, Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik report an
enormous increase in the number of organizattons in Poland from 1989 to
1996.47 And Lev Jakobson, Boris Rudnik, and Sergei Shishkin show that the
number of organizattons in Russia has almost doubled from 1995 to 1997,
and even the r99j totals are certainly much higher than they were in the
early r99os.48
\7hile a consideration of trends in the number of registered organrzations is certainly more helpful than a simple typology of different types of
organizatrons, nonetheless it has several problems. First, once agarn, the
data should be viewed with a certain skepticism, given inconsistent methods
for counting the number of org antzations across countries, especially when
based on a sub-sample of organrzatrons. These discrepancies make comparative analysis particularly difficult and tentative, and the findings have only
limited utility for researchers seeking to establish a comparative "baseline"
<ln civil society across countries and regions. Moreover, as Putnam correctly
points out, most studies that count organi zal.:rons merely tabulate the number

'rt

See , frrr example, Padgett, Organizing Democrdcy in Eastern Germarry; Jacoby Imitation
tlnd l'rilitics; \7essels, "Biirger und Organisationen in Ost- und \Testdeutschland: verein t u rr cl cloch ve rschiec{en ? " in Probleme der Einheit; Rucht, Blattert, and Rink, Soziale

Ilttt,t,gtutg(.tl ouf dcm'Mug zur Institutionalisierung; Priller, "Verdnderungen in der politischen

rrrrrf soz,irrlcrr llctciligung in Ostdeutschland"; Anheier et al., Der Dritte Sektor inDeutschland;

Rct/tizr"
Adapting categories in comparative Analysis," in AmericanPolitical scfuncc
(1993),
845-855.
No.4
PP'
aa

vrl

llT'

Forexample,or-rR,ls.i",r".F.M.Borodkin,"Tretii Sel<torv(iostrclrtrstvclilrtgotltrrstviy:r,"
lltrll'.rttt;t'
in Mir Rossii,No. z (r997), pp. 67-116. Also scc th('c()untry sttttlics ol Attstri:t'
(itty;ltt:1, ll:riti, llrrrrl',.11\'' I rtvir'
Canada. the (lzcch I{cprrblit, l)clrrttrtrli, li1,,yPt. l;rrtlr<t',
\( llr('rr irr( ]ivlr rt"'
Mcxico, Ntw /,t.,rl,tlrl. llrrssirr, Sl.vrrkirr, Sl,,ritt, srvitz, tl,ttr,l. Illr.rirrt,.rrr(l

'l'lu,Nttt,(.it,i,t\tl,t:.lrrtlrr'(ivi,rrr',,lrrrr.tlr,,l,tt.t.rr((rtrrl'rl((lrtr'.rlrlr(ll.llr(rllltlrllrrcrrt
rt,tts

llt tl .lll\

l lrllllr'lll''rrll

l{ 1,'t" (,lllllll{

\r l\

l( llll,ll'

l('

llrrrn., l(oclr.' rrrrcl 'l'clschow., Sprvtuereine im Ubergang. Also see the chapter "Germany," by
I lt'lrrrrrt l(. Arrlrcicr' irr ( livicus., '['loc Ncw Ciuic Atlas.
I't'r't'rrt Misz.livt'tz:urrl focly fcrtsctt., "An l'.n-rcrging Paradox: Civil Society from Above?"
lr l)it'tritlr ltrrt'stlrt'rrrt'yt'r; Mruilyrr l{rrt'scltcrncycr, ltncl I}yiirn Wittrock, eds., Participation
,tttrl I)t'urttt tttty li,l\l tuttl Wt'\l: (',tttttltrltisols tttttl Ittlt'rltrt'ldliolls (Arttrrlttl<., NY: M. E. Sharpe,
r ,,,)li ). I. |"i,1.

I I I.' tt'tl .rrt,l lt,rrlttlr, /i,'/,r'llt,ttt, ( tt'tl ,\,t, tt'l\'.

lri I t'r' t,rl,,,lr',un, l',,rr r', l(rr,lrrr[,.rr(l '',. rticr ltr.,lrl.ur] "l{rr',',r,r.'- trr (,tvt( u:,,'l'ltt'Nr'//'(',it,i,

t\tlrts.

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Cornntunist Europe

52

organizations that werc created in a given year. By considering only the

"birth rates" of organizations, scholars overlook their "death rates," or the
very real possibility that many may disappear.ae
In addition to the methodological difficulties in constructing a project
that would employ common methods for counting, sorting, and tracing
voluntary associations in different countries, there are theoretical and
substantive reasons why this approach is inadequate. As just argued, the
reason why theorists and scholars have considered civil society an important
feature of democracy is not so much because of the quantity and "form" of
the groups themselves but because of the meaning and "content" imparted

of

to them by the participation of ordinary citizens.5o Moreover, especially

in the post-communist context, where many organizations recently have
been created - primarily with financial support from the West - there is
a great incentive for these groups to exaggerate their size, activities' and
importance. Miszlivetz and Jensen refer to the "emerging paradox" of
a istatistically strong civil society," but one that is primarily organized
',from above," with only limited participation by ordinary citizens. Very
perceptivelS they point to the misleading and deceiving nature of analyses
of civil society that focus on the number of organizations:
These statistics show the formal institutional growth of the civil sector during the
transition period, An increased number of organizations in the civil sector, however,
does not necessarily mean that the real participation in civil society or its impact
on political decision making has increased in the same proportion or with the same
spcccl. Skcpticism is not only warranted because 49 percent of associations operate
in thc ticlcl ()f sp()rts and leisure activities. A larger problem is presented by the pseudo
cxistcnrc

tf many of the registered

NGOs.5'

w<>rds, although many organizations may exist on paper (or

even on the Internet), the "pseudo existence" of many of them does not

In other

4e putnam writes that "Nothing whatever can be inferred about the civic vitality of a community
from the birth rate of new organizations, unless at the same time we also examine the death
rate of older ones. The discovery that, say, half of all environmental organizations now tn
existence were founded in the last decade proves absolutely nothing about organizational
trends, unless we also know how many similar groups have disappeared over the same period.

... a list of organizations is not pruned regularly to

eliminate defunct organizations. " Putnam, Boutling Alone, p. 4t6.
Jo Even institutionalists recognize this important point. Skocpol, for example, writes that "because membership numbers and face-to-face meetings mattered in all the classic American
voluntary associations, those who were leaders, or who wanted to use officerships in thcsc
groups to symbolize or validate broader societal leadership, had to care aborrt trobilizirrg
and inspiring large numbers of fellow members. Members countecl. l,cadcrs hrttl lo rtrobilizc
and interact with others, or they were lt()t succcssful." Skocpol, "llow Atttcritrttts llctrttttt'
This issue is especially problematic if

Civic," pp. 67-6t1.

5'Miszlivctzitrr{.lcrrscrr,"Arrl,llrrcrgitrlll'rrr.rrkrx,"grp.!{.1 li5(r'tttplt,tsir.ttl,lttl).Alsostr'lirtrt,
Miszf ivt.tz, llltrsirttts,trnl lir,,ilttir't: l'lu'Mt'l,ntt,tlh r.rr o/ ( lrt'rl'\rr h'll ttt,t Nrtt'l trtttltr"ttt \lt,tr t'
(szotttlr,tlltclt,: S.tr.tti;t I ltttrct',tt\' I11",",

1';'1'1)

Ciuil Society and

Democratization

53

necessarily indicate corresponding levels of, and increases in, participation

by ordrnary citizens. 5'

In short, the core element of this approach to measuring civil society whether tabulating the proportions of different types of org anLzations, or

monitoring the changes in the number of org anrzations over time - is an

emphasis on the number of organizations rather than on the membership
and participation in them by ordinary cittzens. These research endeavors are
legitimate and can be useful in illuminating the characteristics or trends
within a particular countrS but since they collect data differently in each
project, and since the actual "existence" of many of the organizations they
list can be called into question, these studies provide only limited basis for
system attc comparison across countries and regions.

I believe that, while there is no perfect measure of civil society across

different countries, representative surveys provide a more valid and reliable
starting point for such research. By measuring the percentage of respondents
who are members of voluntary associations within a country, surveys not
only give a better approximation of the development of that country's civil
society than can come from a hollow list of total numbers or types of registered organi zations, but they also facilitate extensive comparisons among
the social strata of the country being studied, oS well as with other countries.
The use of survey research in post-communist Europe has exploded
since the collapse of communism, yielding somewhat mixed results thus far.
The earliest studies, which were published in the first half of the r99os
and were based on surveys conducted in the tumultuous years of r99o9L, attempted to evaluate whether or not post-communist - and particularly Russian - political culture was democratrc.S3 By applying questions
5r This somewhat disturbing observation - which is certainly not exclusive to the postcommunist region, although it is arguably more pronounced there - was confirmed in multiple off-the-record interviews with both activists within organrzations and local researchers
who studied andlor promoted them. In support of this point, Jefftey Hahn describes participation in the Russian city of Yaroslavl as follows: "The evidence presented here indicates that
rirtes of individual political participation in Yaroslavl remain fairly low, despite mechanisms
to prornote such participation. Political participation through groups also does not appear
lrrrrticr-rlarly effective. Most seem to be poorly organized, with membership lists that are limitcrl., if not cl<lwnright fictional." See Jeffrey Hahn, "The Development of Local Legislatures
irr l{trssirr: T'he Case of Yaroslavl," in Jeffrey Hahn, ed., Democratization in Rwssia: The Det,r'loltnterft rf Lcgislatiue [nstitutions (Armonk, NY M. E. Sharpe, 1996),p. r88. For a critique
ol' tlrc str-:rtcgics of Wcstcrn donors, which she views as being naive and open to abuse and
rf rrf'ripulrrtiorr., scc.f nrtirrc It. \Mcdcl, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid
Itt I')tslt'rrt l;,ttroltt' tySg-t998 (Ncw Yorl<: St. Martin's Press, rgg9).
\t Scr'.' lor ('\rlrrrplt'., .f t'l'frcy llrthrr., "(lor.ttinuity and Change in Russian Political Culture,"
llf llt tltslt ltttrrtt,rl ol l\ililit,tl ,\,'icrrr'r', Vol. l r ., No. 4 (t g9 r )., pr1-r. 3g3-4zz; James L. Gibson
,rrrrl l(;rynr.,rrtl lvl. l)rrtlt, "lintt'rgirrlq l)t'rttocr':ttie Vrtlucs irr Sovict Political (Julture,"
lrl Artlrrrr Il. l\lillt'r, Willr.rtrr l\1. ltt'istrr1,,t'r. ,nttl Vitlci l. Ilt'sli', c'tls.., l'ttlilit ()ltirritnt arrd
lit'.r!lntt' ('1,'t,t,t:(': //,,' N,'tt, l',,ltlt,, ttf I'u r/ \r,t,tt'l ,\rrt tr'ltt's (lirrrl,lt'r: \rVt'slvit'w l)t't'ss., t,).)l);
r\rrtlrr'r \ rr l\1,'lvrllt'. "/\rr I trrr'rlirrti ( rl'rt (.rrltrnt'/ lrlr',r1,,111,, I'rrlrlit Attrttttlt's, rttrtl l'olrtitrrl
f

54

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

on attitudes and values that are standard in American and West European
surveys, scholars attempted to place post-communist countries into a larger
comparative context. This good intention was marred, however, by the fact
that many of the questions were either incomprehensible or meaningless to
many post-communist citizens - particularly during the time surrounding
the collapse of the Soviet Union - thus yielding results that were often inconsequential and sometimes baffling.l+
The best application of survey techniques to post-communist Europe has
come from Richard Rose and his colleagues, who have conducted regular,
extensive, and perceptive Surveys across most countries in post-communist
Europe. Instead of using a standard battery of questions from a'Western context, Rose and his collaborators developed the New Democracies Barometer
(NDB), a large questionnaire that measures' among many others, such concepts as support for the communist and the current regimes, optimism about
the future, multiple economic portfolios, and social capital. Moreover, their
publications pay careful attention to the historical context of the communist
experience, the revolutionary upheaval of ry89-9r, and especially the process of post-communist transformation.55 In fact, many other surveys have
begun to incorporate NDB questions as "models" to replicate.
Vhile the NDB provides a wide comparative basis across much of postcommunist Europe, its findings are somewhat limited in their applicability to
this project. First of all, Eastern Germany and Russia - the two case studies
at the heart of this book - are both excluded from the large database, although for different reasons. Because of what Rose and Haerpfer call the
"ready-rnade state," Eastern Germany is viewed as being "uniquely privileged," arrd therefore it is kept separate from the other post-communist
countries.s(' Russia, on the other hand, is considered so important that it has
its own New Russia Barometer (NRB), which does repeat parts of the NDB
questions, but is rarely included in the comparative analysis.5T Furthermore,
Culture in the Early t99os," in Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli, Public Opinion and Regime
change; william M. Reisinger, Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli, and Kristen Hill Maher,
"Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and Implications for Democtacy," in British Joumal of Political Scienc'e,YoI' 24, No. z (1994)' pp. 183-224.
54 For example, Jeffrey Hahn reached the surprising conclusion that " On the whole, the picture
of Russian political culture that emerges from this study is one not strikingly different from
what is found in Western industrial democracies." Hahn, "Continuity and Change in Russian
Political Culture," p. 4zo.
55 See the impressive synthesis written by Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, Demttcraty and |ts
Abernatiues.
s6 SeeRichardRoseandChristianHaerpfer, "Thehnprrctof a Rcady-MirdcStrttc: li:tst (it'rrrr;trts

Ciuil Society and Democratization

55

since the NDB includes only post-communist countries, it does not allow for
comparisons with countries outside the region. Of more importance to this

study than their case selectior, however, is that the NDB and NRB do not
ask any questions about membership in organi zatrons of civil society. This
is unfortunate, especially since they do ask respondents about their trwst rn
various institutions of civil society and these results are striking, showing
great distrust and skepticism.58

Fortunately, there is a major survey project, the \7orld Values Survey

does ask about people's membership in voluntary organizations.
Although the \fVS is often maligned for the same reasons I mentioned earlier
with reference to the literature on Russian political culture - namely, that
it consists mainly of questions about attitudes and values that often do not
make sense to non-\Testern populations - it does includ e a battery of basic
behauiordl questions about whether or not the respondent is a member of
any of nine types of org anrzations, and if so, whether the respondent is an
active or inactive member. Because this question was asked in more than
50 countnes rn r99S-97, the results provide a remarkable, and still largely
untapped, resource with which to compare levels of participation across
countries and regions.
The question on membership in volu ntary organi zatrons in the \fVS questionnaire specifies nine different types of groups: (r ) church or religious organnations, (z) sports or recreational clubs, (l) educational, cultural, or
artistic organizations, (+) labor unions, (5 ) political parties or movements,
(6) environment al organizations, (Z) professional associations, (8 ) charitable org anuzations, and (g) any other volunt ary organi zatron \fhile this list
is by no means exhaustive (one could certainly argue that other types of
organizations, such as those devoted to womerr's, student, veterafls', and
rrnimal rights, issues, should have been included as well), it does capture
rr wide enough range of organi zatrons, both traditional and contem porary,
rlrat form the core of civil society to allow us to investigate the comparative levels of membership across countries. Moreover, the final category of
"()ther" organizatrons should capture, albeit less explicitly and directly, the
r-crnaining types of organrzatrons that were not included in the question list.
In slrort, given the significant limits in conducting valid and reliable coml)ru'rrtivc' research on the organizattonal level, a focus on civil society as
l)rlrticipation - measured by representative surveys that replicate the same
(lucstiorts in rnalty different countries - provides the best overall opportuf rity lor ct)nrpurativc rcscarrch on this important attribute of democracy and

(\fVS), that

It'r r l( )c rrl

ti't,;ttiolt.

in Comparative Perspective," in Otman lblltics, Vrl. (', No. r

57 DemocracyandltsAhannttit'rs,thcnr;rjorPublitrtliortbrtsctl

( r 997), pp. r oo-'t 2 r .

,tlttlte Nl)ll,txtltttltsltrrssi:l('ll

tirclyilthe lnllysis. lrrlrrstilyirrlltlrisnt;tjot otttirsiotr,tlrr'.trttltot'srvtilr',"1{ttssirtiscrrlrttlt',1

rolr.,trlltItrr..tlotrrlllrr'(.rrttttttttttt'.t\f\lr'lllilt\'.llll.ltt0tt,lt''.ttvtrlt,,,tl.,
lrt.tltttst.olit\ilili(llI
6l ilr rrwrr" (1r ,' r ) lrr 11, r,t( \1,, t1r,' rttr1,,,r l,rrrr r' ,,1 1(l',',t,t r', .rll tlr,' ttrrtr' t{.t',trtt tr, lll( ltt{l( ll

l)('r\pt'rltv(', r;lllrt'r'lltrrtr lo irrtply tlrrrl it lrrrs its ()wn c()rtrsc rrlrcl logic that
Itottt lltost'ol ttt'rlqlrl't,rr inli (()urtlrit's llrrtt rtls., sltru't'tl rr sirrrilru'('()r'nrrrrurist

56

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

CONCLUSION
'ril7hile

sufvey research does provide the best method for cross-national comparisons of civil society such a "comparative baseline" is only a starting point
lo, -or. complicated and specific analysis to account for divergent' anomalous, or surprising results.'S7hether by making individual-level comparisons
between respondents' answers to other closed-ended survey questions - thus

Post-Communist Civil Society in Comparutive

Perspective: An

E-pirical

Baseline

contrasting different groups and sub-groups of people within societies - or

by conduciing qualitative studies that enable the researcher to explore more
dleply the thonght pto..tses and behavioral pafferns than can be understood
fro* ,rrru.y questions, it is importantto analyze,test, and interpret the basic
empirical finiings. However, without actually achieving that "baseline,"
there is little posiibility for research on civil society that has any substantive
value for sch^olars trying to understand how common categories are actualized very differently across countries and contexts.
The iask of the next chapter is to provide that crucial baseline, relying

on the results from the ryiS-gZ'World Values Survey and my own replication of its basic question on organizational membership in surveys in
Russia and Eastern Germany in t999. The findings are quite striking, showing consistently low levels of organizational membership in post-communist
co".rnt.i.r, and they set the stage for more in-depth analysis
interpretive - which I conduct in the subsequent chapters'

statistical and

INTRODUCTION

Having defined and described the concept of civil society and justified the
need to measure it com paratlvely, I now present and analyze recent empirical evidence that includes a wide set of countries from around the world.
Although civil society is only one of many important challenges facing postcommunist societies and one should therefore be cautious in extenditrg
these results and findings to other issues - it does provide us with a baseline
from which to measure and compare types of democracy across societies.
Again, as emphasized in the previous chapter, while a vrbrant civil society in
itself is no guarantee of democratic survival, citi zen involvement and participation do represent an essential component of the quality of dem oqacy.
The main goal of this chapter is to present this empirical baseline - a consistent and comparative measure of membership in voluntary organizations
from a wide range of countries and regions - and to analyze the possible
causes of differing levels of organizational membership across countries.
Overall, the findings of this chapter point to consistently and system atrcelly low levels of membership thioughout the countries of post-communist
lrurope, when compared to the levels in many other countries from outside
t lrc region. After characterrztng and analyzitrg the particular weakness of
l)ost-communist civil society in this chapter, the followitrg two chapters apply individual-level analysis - using both a representative survey and in-depth
irrfr'r'vicws - in order to account for this strikirg finding.
I

lllr (;n'l'lr(;()ltY OIi l'RIOR

ITEGIME ryPE

llrt' lull l)()pul:ttiort of tlrc tL)L)5-97'World Values Survey (WVS) consists

ol t'('l)r'('s('nlrllivt'sl'ul'tlllcs ltrorrr ovcr 5o c()untrics. For the analysis in this
lr, rolt., lrotuv('v('r;

;J,'i,"']",::

l t'r.'ltrtl,' s,)nl(' of tltcr-rr., l<,r' Iwo n)rlirl

| ,'11,,1,""',,1';ll;ill l l;;:;l; illlili,ll'':;1i;,J":

rcrrsons. First, ITany

,:,'1,',ll',','l'i;li::::: ,ll'',

l'l;,:il;:,

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

58

the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Great Britain, Moldova, Poland, and

Taiwan from the analysis. Second, since I am focusing on civil society in
the context of democracy and democratization,I include only countries that
have passed a minimum threshold of procedural democracy, measured by an
average score of 3 .5 or better on the Freedom House country scores in both
r99s-96 and ry96-97 - the years when the WVS was conducted.' This distinction is necessary since membership in organizations in non-democratic
societies is rarely legal, autonomous, or voluntary. To include such nondemocratic countries would therefore distort the very essence of the concept
of civil society. This criterion excludes the following \(/VS countries from this

analysis: Azerbaijan,Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, China, Croatia, Georgia'

India, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan' Peru' Turkey' and Yugoslavia.
The omission of Poland is notable and regrettable since - as a result of the
non-collectivizationof agriculture, the influence of the Catholic church, and,
of course, the mass mobilization of the Solidarity movement - Poland has
generally been viewed as the "exception" within post-communist Europe,
with a more active civil society.' Howevet, it is worth pointing out that
a cross-national study of several post-communist countries conducted by
Samuel Barnes and his colleagues found that Poland actually had considerably lower levels of organizational membership (even in religious organizations) than every othef post-communist country in the study and Barnes
actually uses the term "Polish exceptionalism" to refer to Poland's unusually
weak civrl society.3 Moreover, in the two categories in which the ry95-97
\WVS question on membership in voluntary organizations was asked in
Poland - political parties and unions - the results confirmed Barnes's findings, showipg exceptionally low levels of membership. Unfortunately, due
to the missing data on the other seven types of organizations, this book will
not be able to answer any questions about Poland definitively, although certainly the preliminary evidence suggests that Poland may fit in with other
post-communist countries more than has been previously acknowledged.
Overall, the countries that form the core of this comparative baseline
consist of the following, divided into three distinct gfoups: (r) Australia,
Finland, Japan, Norwag Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, and
'Western
Germany, which I classify as the "older democracies"; (z) Argentina,
Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Spain,
Uruguay and Venezuela, which I call the "post-authoritarian" countries;
and (3) Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Eastern Germany' Estonia, Hungary'
See Freedom House, "Annuarl Survey of l"rccclortt Ilottsc (,<trnltt'y Sc'ort's |()7L-7
rg98-99"; elvitilablc: at <http://www.frt'cclt)ntlr()us('.()t'g/t'iltirrgs/r rttirtlis.ptlt:".
Scc, f<tr cxrln'tPlt', lil<it'l't :ltl(l l\rrlril< , Ilrltr'lli,,tts ('it'il,\,r /t'l\{

lrI

Sllll)'t'l ll. llrttttt's, "'l'lt,' [Vl.rlrilrz.tliptl 1l lt,tlttt,,tl ltlt'rrlrlt' lll Nt'rr' l)t'rtl()(l'lLl("'," lll
S;ltrttt.l l l ll,trrrt.,, ,rrrrl f .rrrr,., \111r,11, ,'.1., . ll,,' l'tt,.lrtttttttttttlt'.1 ( tlt"t'tt (ltrrrl.ll)t"'l: I t't'.lllll',
|,rtttrtl,tlturr. 1r1,1t'l). 1r t,'

St't'

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue Perspectiue

59

Latvra, Lithu ania, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and

Ukraine, which constitute the "post-communist" category.
Before turning to the actual data, it is important to explain and justify the
preceding grouping of countries into these three categories of prior regime
type. I separated the countries into these three groups for both theoretical and empiri caI reasons, and these divisions are also very important for
the cross-national statisti cal analysis at the end of this chapter. Overall, these
categories, based on prior regime typ e) are well supported by the literature
on democracy and democ ratrzation, in which older democracies - those fully
consolidated by the early post-\World \Var II period at the latest - are viewed
as having achieved a level of democratic stability that sets them apart from
others.4

While the uniqueness of the older democracies is fairly obvious, the distinction between the post-authoritartan and post-communrst categones requires further specification. For the most paft,I am followittg the pioneering
work of Juan Linz, although with several modifications for the purposes of
this project.s The post-authoritarian category generally refers to countries
that began to dem ocratrze either in or after the mid- r97os, countries in which
democ racy has generally been consolidated but not without struggle and
occasional setbacks. Linz defines the authoritarian regime type as follows:
"political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluraliSffi, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without
extensive nor lsic] intensive political mobilizatron, except at some polnts m
their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable
ones."6 My application of the authorrtarran regime type - or, when referring to the current period, the "prior regime type" of post-authoritarian
countrles - rs conslstent with Ltnz's definition, as well as with the country
studies in his book with Alfred Stepan, in which they present a chapter each
on Spain, Portugal, Greece, Urugudyr Braztl, Argentina, and Chile.z I have
a Note that \Testern Germany and Japan are included in this category, since both had pre.War
II democratic traditions and institutions that were rapidly reestablished in the
W<rrld
1-rost-war period, and which have remained stable and successful ever since (although in'West

(icrnrany morc so than in Japan).

rr | . |.in't,, Tbtalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, zooo ),

which
"Tbtalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein
:rntf Nt'lsorr W. l)olsby., cds.., I-land(took of Political Science (Reading, MA: Addison-\7esley,
197\), l"rlr. t7r-4r r. lior 1l sununrrry of the rnain argument, see Linz and StepanrProblemsof
I )t'r t tt x rit I it' I'r,t t rsi t it t I tt ttd ( )t nr st ilitla l it tn, pp. 3fl-l+.
"Art Atrtlroritrtt'irtrt llt'girrrc:'l'lrc (lrtsc of Sprtin.," in Flrik Allardt and Stein
f rr;rrr I lirtz,
l(rrl,.l,.;ur, ('(ls , Mrrss l',lilits:,\lttrlits itr l'tlitiul,\rrr'lr tlt4qy (Nt'w Yorl<: lrrcc Prcss, rL)7o)., p. z,55
(r rlt'tl rrr I tt/ .rrr.l Slt'11:rrr, l'l,,l,lt'ttts ttf l)t'tttot titlir 'l'r,tttsiliotr tuttl (,oz.srlitlttit)rr, l). lll).
Scc

.f rr rr

wr'rs origirrrrlly published as

"

Itorlrrli.rl,rrr,l (,r('('t('.u('t rrrtlotltttt.ttr'11', ttot ttr.'ltt.lt'.1 itr tltt'ttrosl r('(('ttl Wor-ltl V:rlrtt's Surv('y,
( ollnlil('\ ol Sottlltct rr l:trt()l)('.

.,,,,,1111 t lt,,'n rr'nt,un,, lo r('lrl1',,1'ttl lltr'1ro',1 .rutlroll,ur.ur

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Europe

6o

also included Bangladesh, the Philippines, South Korea, and South Africa,
which certainly belong to the post-authoritarian category even though they
are not located within the geographical areas in Linz and Stepan's study.8
In addition to democracy and authoritarianism, Linz defines and applies
two other regime types that are relevant here: totalitarianism and posttotalitarianism.e A totalit arian regime is one that "has eliminated almost
all pre-existing political, economic, and social pluralism, has a unified, articulated, guiding, utopian ideologg has intensive and extensive mobthzation,
and has a leadership that rules, often charismatically with undefined limits
and great unpredictability and vulnerability for elites and nonelites alike. "'o
\rhile the contrast between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes should
be clear, the post-to talrtarian regime type serves to capture those countries
that fit in between. Post-to tahtarian regimes, which emerge from within a
totalit arranregime after some period of thawing or loosening of control, and
which can range from "early" to "frozen" to "mature" post-totalttatianism,
tolerate more forms of pluralism than were permissible under the earlier totahtarian regime. That said, however, Linz insists that even post-totahtarian
regimes are significantly drfferent from author rtarranregimes in several ways,
most importantly in that they still permit much less social pluralism.

Linz's typology is useful for distinguishing between non-democratic

regime types and their legacies in the period of democratization. Table 4.r
spells out the differences between them, in terms of the five "arenas" of
democratrzation reviewed in Chapter 3. The table shows the major differ'
with author ttartan regimes generally scoring
rnuch higher: in all five arenas than the other two regime types. For civil society, the authoritar:ian countries range from "medium to highr" whereas the
totalitarian and post-totalrtarian regimes are "low" or "low to medium."
ences between the regime types,

8 One could object that South Africa's "transition to democracy" was different from those in
the other posr-authoritarian countries, both because of the highly politicized nature of the
resistance to apartheid and because the authoritarian rule actually included a democratic
regime for the white population, and these inherited democratic institutions facilitated the
incorporation of the black majority after the collapse of the apartheid system. But since
Bo"/o of the population had lived under an authoritarian regime, deprived of basic political
rights and civil liberties, it still makes sense to include South Africa in this category of regime
type. Moreover, the undeniable vibrancy of South African civil society today stands in sharp
contrast to the low levels of membership throughout post-communist Europe; it is worth
remembering that many analysts had expected and hoped that post-communist civil society
would be strong, active, and vibrant, much like what has actually happened in South Africrl.
9 Linzalso discusses the category of "sultanism," which refers to the extremely repressivc ltttcl
arbrtrary rule of a single leader and his family, with very little tolerzlnce of s<>cial pluntlisttr.
I have omitted this category from my discussion, becaruse <xrly Romanirt - which w:ts rtls<r
a communist regime, ancl is therefore placc:cl in thc colnr'nutlist crttt:gory - fits tlrt'tlcfirtitiolt
of sultanism, lnd norrer of tl"rc otlrcr ('x:un1'rlt's ol:sttltrrnistit' rt'giltrt's (llrriti, tlrt' l)olttittit';ttt
llcprrfiic., thc (lt,rrtrrrl Alrit:rrr ltt'prrlrlir,lrrurr rrrtl Nor llr ltott':t) l;rll witlrirr llrt'tt';tlrrr ol tlris

6r

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue Perspectiue

rABLE

4.r.. The Implications of Prior Non-Democratic Regime'typt for the Tasks of

D emo

cratic Cons olidation

Arena Characteristics

Authoritarian

Totalit arian

Post-Totalitarian

Civil society autonomy

Political society

Medium to high
Low to medium

Low
Low

Low to medium
Low

Constitutionalism and
rule of law

Low to high

Low

Medium

Professional norms and

Low to high

Low

Low to medium

Medium to high

Low

Low to

autonomy

autonomy of state
bureau cracy

Economic society with a

degree of market
autonomy and
plurality of ownership
forms

(communist)
or medium

low-medium

(fascist)

Note: The character of the arenas in the prior nondemocratic regime in the period relatively
to the start of the transition is of greatest importance for the tasks democratic leaders
will face. The less developed the arena, the greater the tasks democratrc leaders will have to
accomplish before the new regime can be a consolidated democracy.
Sowrce:Linz and Step an, t996, Table 4.r,p.56 (the table and note are reproduced exactlg except
that the additional category of "sultanism" has been omitted, for reasons explained earlier).
close

In this chapter, I inco rporate the k.y assumptions and definitions of Linz's

typologS but I orga nrze it slightly differently. I group the totalit arran and
post-to talitarian ideal types into one categorS which, for the sake of clarity
and simplicity I call "communist. " I believe that this combination is justified, particularly when communist regimes are distinguished from authoritarran regimes. Indeed, dS Ltnz and Stepan themselves write, "Empirically,
of course, most of the Soviet-type systems in the r98os were not totalitarian.
However, the 'soviet type' regimes, with the exception of Poland, could not
be understood in their distinctiveness by includitrg them in the catego ry of an

authoritarian regime."" Moreover, aside from the extreme totalttartanism

<rf Nazi Germ any, all of the examples of totalitarian and post-totahtarian
rcgimes come from the communist bloc.
Relatirrg my modified categorrzatron to the somewhat impressionistic
scorcs in Table 4.t, the rest of this chapter seeks to provide more specific
cnrl-riricarl sulrstantiation of the differences in levels of civil society between
l)ost-contnlrrrrist erlrd pclst-authoritarian regimes. Indeed, the results I present

tlo pr'oviclc strong support for [,inz's conceptual distinctions, showing that
llrir)r' r'('llirrrt'lypt' r-('nllrirrs ll cr'r,rcilrl c:irtcg<lry fr>r understar-rding current levels

ol t'ivil sot it'lv.

st rrtly.

l('| | 1rZ ;ttrtl Slr.;r.1tt, l', ttltlt'ttt,.,tl I)t'utttr lrlllt I't,ttt',llttttt ,ltttl ('t)tl',t,lt,l,tlt,,/,. l)

'1,,

|| | rtrz .ut(l \l('lt,tn. l't, tlrlt'ttt., ttl Ilt'tnttr tttltr 'l't,ttt.'tltrtu ,ttttl ('t,n\(,lt,l,tltt,r/i
l) .l |

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue Perspecttue

\X/ORLD VALUES SURVEY RESULTS: AN EMPIRICAL BASELINE

Li

In this section, I present the empirical findings from the \7orld Values
Survey questionnaire. My objective here is to charactertze my dependent
variable - membership in the nine different types of volunt ary organizations
listed in the previous chapter - as precisely and thoroughly as possible, show-

c(dN
OO\
tl t^
.9, o\
=o\
F
trq)

ing patterns and vanatrons across countries and regions. Overall, the results

FS
EE
o-

provide strong and clear empirical evidence that membership in volu ntary
organi zatrons is significantly lower in post-communist countries than in both
the older democracies and the post-authoritanan countries.
Before turning to each of the nine specific categories of org anrzations,
Figure 4.r presents a highly aggregated and broad view of the average overall
membership, comparing the three categories of prior regime type. " Although
one might expect that the post-authoritarran and post-communist countries
would be relatively similar, given their prior non-democratic regimes, we see
that the post-authoritarian mean on both scales is actu ally closer to the older
democracies than to the post-communrst average.
Figure 4.2 presents these findings in somewhat more detail, with the
prior regime type averages of all nine categories of org anrzations. The results show very clearly that, for all types of organizations except labor
unions, the post-communist mean is much lower than the means in the
other two groups, and the difference between the older democracies and
post-authoritarian averages is relatively small when compared to the large
gap between post-autho rttartan and post-communrst countnes.
\fhile Figure 4r.z presents only the prior regime type avetages for each of
the nine specific organrzatrons, Table 4.,,lists the country totals, along with
the group averages in parentheses, thus providitrg a gene ral reference point
for comparisons both within and between groups. Close inspection of the
scores on Table 4.2 points to the same general finding across eight of the
nine types of organrzatrons: the older democracies generally have the highest
scores, followed relatively closely by the post-authoritarran countries, and
the post-communist countries are grouped toward the very bottom. Few
post-communist countries score higher than the post-authoritarran mean for
rury of the nine organizations, a striking finding given the wide variety of

U)

(.)

bD

(s
$-{

a)

0.)

l-.

r>\
r-'r
G)

bD
q.)

(d^

o .:
trLr
c(d^
(6F

'='=a

oh

=f

A.

(s r,

69
O
o-

rJ.r

a
rt.

-{
a
,.L.'

0)

.'rl

Ei'b

c^
u)v
(l)

t,,

8o
()Lr

types of organrzatrons listed.

9R

(DF
E=

bz

E
ba)

bD
(g
l_r

q)

-.

-f

63

r'

The one major exception to this pattern is, of course, labor unions.
f{rrthcr thnrn being grouped at the lowest levels, the post-communist countrics rrctually show much higher rates of labor union membership than the
l)()st-:rtrtlroritrrrirur coLrntries, zrlthough still lower than the older democrat.it's. I lr)wcvcr., wc sltoulcl llc carcful not to overstate the importance of these

q_)

I
f)
lf)C!lf)r
Nr

uosJod rod sdlqsJaqtuottl luuolluz!tlu6lo lo

f,

r'
r--.i

l,rt

'' Wlrt'rr ,rrli.'.1 :rll ol tlrt' (lu('slions ()n llr'()lrl) nl('r)rllt'r'slti1'r., tlrt' r-('sl)()nilcrtts lrlrcl to choose
lrr'ltt't'r'tr llt,' l,,llorvitttl ()l)lt()tt\: ".tt ltvt' tlt('tttllt'r;" "l't,tssivt' ttl('tltltt't'," :ttttl "tt()l ll tlt('lllllt'r."
Itt r^tr'r\ r.r'.(' ('\( ('l)l r,'lrlqroui, ()r,i,lrrrz,tti()n.,. ltt,tvr'\'r'r. llrt' tttttttltt't ol rtt livt' nr('ntlrt't's is lo<l
'.rrr,rll 1,, tr',ltr,rrrt '.t'1r,rt.tlr'.rllt'trltnn"',o I lr.tr','lt,rlplrt'rl lp1'.r'llr6t tlrt'lir',1 l\\'() (,1)1t11',, l(',t\'11',
llr, l,.r',r, rlt',lrrr lr,n .r', r rilr lrr l\\'( ( n nrr'nrl,r'r', (.tr ltt r 'r l',r',',tt r ) ,trt,l n.rr nr('ilrlt, l',

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue Perspectiue

TABLE

65

4.2. Organizational Membershxp, by Country

(in Percent)

x()

Church

t-{

Religious

ct)

c)

.\u

sOto

,,JoL,llo,,

$-r

o\
I

r^t

s6ro olqelrreL.lc

o\
o\

\\

\)

q
;euorsse;ord

v)
(d

(.)

c.)

O.',

s6ro leluauuoltnuo

.h
r-r
a.)

bo
q.)

*.
$-r

seryed

;ecr1rlod

$-r

.rl
N

suorun roqel
bD
li

s6ro crlsrue ro

'lernllnc'leuorlecnpo

a
(.)

Ar

,X
C.)

z
sqnlc IeuorleoJcor
pue spods

C)

s6ro
snor6r;ar pue qcrnqe

E
a.)
F

/.,

"j

Artistic

or

Cultural,

5r

4r

38

5z

45

37
23

or

Labor
Union
z3
z3

Sweden

z9

Finland

8z

32

Norway

32
45

39

ZI
)')

r7
t6

49

3o

r7

48

r9
IZ

zo
r3

Switzerland

\7.

Germany

63

5r
47

(tz.rl

20
(+o.6)

(zl.o)

3r.t)

87

6o

4r

47

t6

.ra
))

5o

37

24
II

mean) (+l.r)

orit ari an countri e s

Po st -,Auth

South
South

52

IZ

Japan

(group

Africa
Korea

Chile

59

z9

35

z9

BraziI

6z

3r

z6

r8

Venezuela
Bangladesh
Spain

45

ZI

34

z4

29
z5

43

r7
r4

Uruguay
Argentina
Philippines
(group mean)

35

z3

r5
r3

(+6.8)

Qt.gl

34

r8
r8

))

20

r8
r6

r4

zz

r4
r9

IZ
II

r5

t6

IO

(zz.z)

(zt.g)
r4
r4

zo
z9

ommunist countries
r8
Macedonia
))
E. Germany

ZI

3r

Slovenia

3o

Romania
Slovakia

38

r5

r9
ro

z9

2Z

9
9
6

17

z4

20
r3

9
4

8
(

rz.8

Po st- C

Czech

Republic

Hungary
[-atvia
Ru ssia

d
v)
ti

Recreational

Educational,
Sports

ZI

0-)

bo

Active in
Church or
Religious

Older democracies
United States 78
Australia
47

q)

suorlercosse

or

['.st<lnia
I Ik ra inc

r4

L)

llu lgrr rirr

n)r'rt rt )

IO

t4

l)

IZ

l,ithrr:urirr
(1irou

r4

(tz.z)

z
4
I

(r.r)

z3

ZI
r9
r6
I2
r8

4o
r3
33

II

r3

r+.t

(8.a

(zo-+)

14

)
M

otooloc)ro(-)
TfCacnNrVt't
SJOqtt|OUI OJU Oqrn

iFl

sluopuodrol to']G

11.

(ctmtinued)

'Weakness

66

of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue Perspectiue

67

Sweden

r5

r3

t6

z3

35

relatively high levels of union membership. Labor unions in the communist

'West.
They did not
system were substantially different from those in the
interests and
collective
the
represented
voice
that
independent
serve as the
in
organizations
state-run
were
Rather,
they
workers.
rights
of
bargaining
were
they
people,
and
for
all
working
mandatory
was
which membership
an important element of the Party's intricate apparatus for controlling many
different segments of the population. Moreover, unions also served a crucial social function, as the provider of many social benefits, even vacation

Finland

IO

r5

ZI

packages, for their members.

Norway

r6

z6

z8

3r

Switzerland

r7

zo

z3

z3

IZ

r3
r5

))

I2
20

Although the communist state apparatuses disappeared during the

ry89-9r period, unions have remained, loosely otganized and retaining

Gt.t)

(zr.t)

Qs-tl
,,)

r8

3z

zo

rABLE

4.L (continued)
Political

Partv

Environmental

United States

50

z5

35

4r

3r

Australia

IO

r7

3o

3r

zz

Professional Charitable "Other"

Older dernocracies

Germany
9
7
Japan
(group mean) (fi.6)

\7.

Po st -'\uth o rit ari

an countri e s

(zr-zl

South Africa
South Korea

44

ZI

IZ

z5

r9
r4

Chile

t6
r4
r4

r8

r8

ZI

r9

r4

r7
t6

3r

r3

r5

r7

r5

r9

IO

r3

r7

T2

IO

IO
IO
IO

BraziI
Venezuela
Bangladesh

Spain
Uruguay

16

r3

Argentina

IO

r3

8
Philippines
(group mean) (fi.r)

ommuni st
Maccclon irt

Po st - C

L,.

co

(]cnrany

Sloven ia

Romania
Slovakia
Czech Republic

II

G+-t)

ftt.z)

(rz.r)

Gt.t)

r4

r4

r3

r5
zo

r4

4
6

IZ

IT

r3

)a
r3

untri e s

ZI

IZ
7
7

Hungary

IO

4
6

Latvia

Russia

Estonia
Ukraine

,,

,,

Lithuania
Bulgaria
(group mean)

(s.s

Source: r995-97 \7orld Values Survey.

(+.')

0.6)

z
)
')

z
z
(6.o)

r3

r8
9

4
I

z
I
I
I

0.,)

much of their membership rolls in some countries, despite their uncertain status and role in the post-communist period. Overall, however' union membership rates have been dropping consistently since the collapse of communism,
especially when compared to the old days of almost full membership.'r ltt
short, the rates of labor union membership across the three country group-

ings stand out as somewhat of an anomaly within the nine types of organizations asked about in the WVS questionnaire, in that levels of union
membership in post-communist countries are not at the absolute bottom.
However, this finding should not be that surprising in light of the central
role that unions played in communist societies and especially because the
levels of membership appear to be declining gradually in the post-communist
period.'a
Among the other eight types of organizations, post-communist countries
have particularly low levels of membership in those that are more political in nature, such as political parties and environmental groups. Similarly post-communist countries have consistently very low levels of church
membership, as well as very low membership levels in educational, cultural,
and artistic organizations. These levels stand in stark contrast to the much
higher levels and wider variation in religious and cultural membership in
the post-authoritarian countries and the older democracies. However, the
post-communist countries have a much wider variation in membership in
the type of organizations that involve leisure time and certain economic activities, namely, sports of recreational clubs and charitable organizations.
Several post-communist countries have relatively high levels of membership
in such organizations compared to that in many post-authoritarian countries.
ln the analysis that follows, I use an aggregate measure of organizational
rncrrrbcrship. The measure that forms the basis of the statistical analysis orr thc cor.lrtry lcvel in this chapter and the individual level in the following
rr ()rr tlrt, toltirrrrily

rl

rrnd tlr:trrgts o[ labor urrions in post-communist Europe, see Padgett,

( lru,ttri:ittg l)r,rrtrxt,tt1, in li,ttston ()cnrtttty, cspcci:tlly pp. 74-16 itnd 77-79.
()rr tltr.w,.;rlirr,.ss ol lrrlror irr Dost torrrnlrrrisl l'irrropt', st'c l);tvitl Ost lrrrd Stcphcn Or<lwlcy,
"Wr.rI l,rl,,,r .1r.1 lir,tlirlr. l)crrrotr;t(y," il Stcltlrcrr (.r'owlcy itt(l l)rrvi(1. ()sl, eds., Wtkars
,'l//,r \\i,r/.,'rr',\/,1/r''; l,ilnt ,ttnl l\lilk\ ttt l\*lrrtttttttttttt:l lirtslrttt litrtrtltt'(l rtlrlr:rrrr' Ml):
l(lttttt.ttt i\ | rttl,li,'1,1, r,,,,r)

rl

( )
(Jt

P
m

.
(Jr

l\)

N)
O)

1\)
O)
N)

Sweden

vxo
g)

zo.
do
j-i

N)

Finland

t\)

Xo
Fi 0)

+,
Yao
0a (o
^f
AN)

Norway

5
\l
l\)

Switzerland

i\J
N)

rl

pJ

W. Germany

t\)

Japan

F'

'lJ

t] o)
6
(t)

Chile

-t-.
o)

vll

Spain

ao

Uruguay

?,)

(o
J

(o

-r

-bo
oN)

Argentina

o
-a

b
(^)

Philippines
ct)

Macedonia

\-\

ilr
O
J

E. Germany

\o
\o

Slovenia

9t

J
I

.(J

-u)
oo
o-3
::t{f

@'
(=- .'+
CDf

Homania

A
-a
J

Slovakia

t\)
-a

b
\|

Czech Rep
Hungary

o
g)
(t)
(-f

Latvia

?l
oo
X<o

Russia

-t

(uJlsds dued

t\rtrrrrrlt ) '.)rr()l(J

rrr ...eruepr^A aqr le aruEIC V :uo,,rpuo3 f,rar3 srEJrJer[V,,,::(:r{-,

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lnttml uotuauty uI <.<suortElf,ossy d.relunlon ur drqsraqrual4l pue qJJeaseu da,rrn5,, <rellplxr
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qrlrrr aldoad ueql fto8aler auo urqlr.4A suoBeaue8ro
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Jo sle^al q8rq dpearle qrr.ra. aldoad teqr dleyt eroru grnru sr lr arurs .sarrtunoc Jo sdnor8 pue
salJlunoJ ueelt\leq seJuereJJIP IenlJE aqt atqsJapun ol selres dluo rraga Stl
'llarror dlarqua
sr anbFrn srql eJrqlfi .drqsraquraru auo se dluo palunoJ ste8 lr .adll relno4red E
Jo suog
,leql sr ,{e,tr srql ur sdrgsra<luraur
-ezr.ue8to oJoru Jo o,ur ol s8uoJaq luopuodsor E
Jr uala
leuortezrues.ro to reqrunu eqr surlunoc ot pasrer r^prl sreloq)s
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pusts Eruaaols puB l(ueurreg uJelssg (eruopaceyg 'dnor3 lsrunuuoJ-lsod

3ql uqlll\ i(leurg 'serrtunoJ lsrunturuoJ-tsod euros uerll ro^\ol dpqflqs arocs
serJlunof, IEraAes epq,l.'dnor3 dcercoruep Jsplo ogr ur asoql se qSlq se are
leqt seJof,s elpr{ Izerg pue ,epq3 ,earoy qlno5 .errr;y qtnos .drqsraguau
leuogeaueSJo IIEJaAO Ur uOrlErJeA eprm dre,r E eAEq serJlunoJ uprJlrJor{]nE
-rsod aq1 7,'26'0 s,uedef sr ueql 6t.z
1o ueeu dnor8 eqr ol Jesolr grnru
sr ztz sfl rnq 'elof,s tse.&,r,ol lxeu agl sErl .II r8.1lN plJo/N JOUB JrlErf,oruep

Venezuela

?; o
OP

,{

lLruuodtur raqlo lbarcos II^ll >leefi\

ro [?rn]lnr elgrssod ot uourppe uI zr

Brazil

Bangladesh

'-g)
FUf
CD=

! r.)i\\otl ;r I s r.)f su t:.tf JtJtf_t:)()t-uJp JO

;o

to
..e
((uos.rad
rad sdrqsreqruaur dnor8 6-9 's- 'z-r 'o ''B'al sar:o8a1e:r lallrrus orul s^rurp
llern se
-uodsar Surdnor8 Surpnpur 'drqsraquraur leuorlezrue8ro;o sarnsperu tuerqJrp
1r:rlls liursr.r
sll\ollot lBrF srsdluue aql pareedar 1 ,seserg due acnporlur lou prp Burpo:r srrll trrrl.l .trnsue oJ
Jr

S. Korea

=
+8

\o
\lO

tl
ttl

(r)
()l

Pue JeeJf, lsou eql sI leql alnseeu eql sr lr asnpf,aq uos;ad rad sdrqsraqurau yeuorlezrueS.ro
.egrrf,sap
Jo requnu Ietot aqr Jo xapur eql esn I
llrlra I teqt s8urpug aqt perroJurar Ipo suorl
-prJ esar{I 'uouezruuS-ro ue
sJaqureru
rlJE,, eJB or{1!^ sluapuodsa: asoql Burtq8ram se

S. Africa

\.,

(r.l

Australia

cDo
F.i=

'O

Jr)
(Jl

o United States

Yo.o

o
5

tn(,.ntlrt,'t sltllrs JX:1 lx:l ?i()ll

ll of orqflnizitliollitl

Estonia
Ukraine

Lithuania
Bulgaria

\o

IO)

(tl

o
b
s
9
O)
o

lEql df,EJJourep replo reqro eql'dueurrag uJelsal( .dnor8 leql ur

drlunoc raqro due ueqt drqsrequeru lguorlezrue?roto slalel ro,/'^ol rlrnru seq
qJIq^A 'uedvf sr dleruoue 3ul1u1s tsoru aql ,seroelooruop replo eqr Buoury
'ad& aulSar rorrd uo paseq
s8uldnor8 drlunoc oql ol pet?ler dyesole ere slelel dlqsraquaur leqt s^ oqs
ern8g srql 'S'o p aroJs e qlr^{ (uEBIng
Jo reqr ol u^{op e8uer serors eqt
lsuor1ezrue8rc 65.{.
Jo Jeqtueru e sr uosrad e?e:ew eql eJeql\,se1e15 parFn
.edf1
egr ul sr oroJs rsaq8rq aql (suorlezrue8ro euru runrurxeru p
Jo 1ng
eur8er rorrd lg reqreSot padnor8 serrlunof, aql qrr'\ ,uosrad rad sdrqsreg
-rueru Jo Jequnu a8ereule eql JoJ sarocs drtunoJ eql s,{,oqs

.}

arn8rg

er'slEnPIAIPuI
PUB serlerf,os ssoJcs drqsrequreu leuorlezrueSro lnoge suorsnlJuof, Surqoear
-reJ eroru pup Jepr^4. qJEeJ ol Jepro ur uorsrcard euros Burtgrrf,Es quo.{r\ sr
lr

'dlercos IArJ Jo suorldecuoc lsoru ol IEJtueJ aJE suortezruu8ro;o ieuo8alpc

,.a.r) praua8
oulu IIE Pu" '(uortezrue8ro fleDos
IATJJo addl relnrrged auo lou
ul dplros IrArf, sr >looq sqr Jo aueql egl eJurs 5, drlunoc ue,rr8 e ur uostad .tad
sdtqs,oquaut Tauotloxua&to Jo nqunu aBpnnp aqt or spuodserrof,
- reldeqc

aiong

gstunu,naoJ-tsod up &apog pq2

/o

ssau4oag1

89

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Past-Communist Ewrope

7o

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue Perspectrue

7r

4.j. Changes in Leuels of Membership, r99o-9r

out toward the top, with the former Soviet Republics and Bulgaria gener-

rABLE

ally groupe d at the bottom. Although there are certainly differences between
post-communist countries, that there is not a single post-communist equivalent to South Africa - not a single country that significantly exceeds the
average membership from another prior regime type group - indicates that,
when viewed from this larger comparative perspective, the differences within
the post-communist group appear to represent "dtfferences in degreer" not
"differences in kind."

Rankings

r99o-9r Country-Rank
Order

to r99

j-97: Country

r99S-97 Country-Rank
Order

\WEAKNESS OR DECLINE?

Before I turn to an analysis that justifies the prior regime type distinctions
more systematically, one underlying issue remains to be addressed. Having
demonstrated the low levels of post-communist organi zatronal membership,
both in absolute terms and relative to other countries and regions in the
world, can we also evaluate the extent to which there has been a decline in
participation in the years since the collapse of communism, as some scholars
have suggested?'B Xfithout time-series data by country it is impossible to
give a definitive answer, but I can offer several tentative suggestions. The
\World Values Survey was also conducted in r99o-9r, but unfortunately
the question on voluntary organizatrons was worded slighdy differently in
that questionnaire, which rules out the possibility of a direct comparison of
results.'e However, the countries can still be compared for their rankitrg and
how that might have changed from r99o-9r to 1995-97. Tablr- +.3 shows
the rankings of all of the countries that were included in both surveys, in
which all of the questions on org anrzational membership were asked.
One should be cautious in analyzittg these results, partrcularly since
the country rankings are relative to one another. A country's rise or decline in rank does not necess arrly indicate an increase or decrease in
membership - although that could be the case because other countries
might have had more clf an increase or decrease, which could hav e affected
the rankings without any change actually taking place within that first country"In short, there is little way of knowing exactly how levels of membership
within each country have changed from r99o-9r to r995-97 without replicating survey questions identically.
18 See, for example, Padgett, Organizing Democracy in Eastern Germany; Bill Lomax, "The
Strange Death of Civil Society in Post-Communist Hungary," rn Journal of Communist Studies and kansition Politics, Vol. 13, No. r (tggZ), pp. 4r-63; Aleksander Smolar, "Fronr
Opposition to Atomrzation," tn Journal of DemocrAqt, Vol. 7, No. t (1996), pp. z4-3t1.

re In r99o-9r, the question was as follows: "Please look carefully at the follr>wirrg list of
voluntary organizations and activities and say. . . (u) which, if arry, clo you bclorrg to?
(b) which, if afly, are you currently doing unpiricl volrnrtnry work for'?" ln rr)r)5-.27, tlrt'
question asked: "N<)w I rutt goirrg t() r('rrcl olf ;r lisl of'volrrrtlru'y ()r'li:utiz:ttiorts; lor t'rrrlr orrt',
cotrlcl y<ltr tcll rnc wlrctlrt'r'y()u ;lr'(':ln ;tt'livt'nt('lttlrt't.;ttt itr,tt tiv('nr('rttlrt'r, or rrol ;t nr('nrllr'r ,,1
tlr:tt tylx'ol or'11:utiz:tlion."'l'lrt'.rrrtlr()r\ ('rltl.rrrr llr.rt llrt'n('\\/ \'('t\run "lt'ntls lo r'lrt rl lrryilr,'r
It'vr'ls ol , l,rirtt.'.1 'nr('nrlt,'r,,lttg'',- lt, rllr
\ttttr'\ to111'lrrrrrll, gr
I

.tr

-ltt,' ,ttt,l tu,rr lr\ (' \r'r' llrr- r ,,,,\ tt '

\\1,

rrl,l

\/,r1rr,.,.

:,,.

RUssia.....,..

ilithuan:i:a

:,.SIoVenia,',

R6:man:ia
:::r::::::i.ir:::::::

:t: :

Poi$t':$6'ffiffiunibr

:i::::::::.:::::::r:j:j:.:i:: ::::j:r:.:f

,.iliji:iiJi

ii:ii:ii,

,..l.H.unga'fy
,::,i''Jt:,;atVia.,,
,.':,;,',..RU,sSia:,',,,

':,',.E,stbfiiA'i.l

tifhub:nii.a
,.Builga*.ie

Note: The avetage membership for t99o-9r was calculated based on eight types of organizations, the same as in the 1995-97 average except for charitable argantzations, which were
not included in the r99o-9r questionnaire. This table shows only those countries that were
included in both the r99o-9r and the 1995-97 WVS, and that were asked all portions of
the membership question in both surveys, thus leaving out Austraha, Bangladesh, the Czech
Republic, Macedonia, the Philippines, Slovakia, Switzerland, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
South Africa is also excluded from this table, since the auth orrtanan apartheid regime did not
collapse until well after the t99o-9r survey was conducted.
Source:

r99o-9r and r995-97 \forld

Values Survey.

However, the changes in rank indicated in Tablr- 43 can provide a rough

guideline to the changes within a group of countries, and indeed the table
shows in no uncertain terms that there are great differences between the
croLrntry groupings, with much smaller varration withineach group. The older
rf crrrr<rcracics l'rarrely changed in their rankings, remaining at or near the top
<rl- this rclativc scrrle in both | 990-9r and r995-97. The post-authoritarran
c( )u nfrics slrowccl lrrrgc irrcrcarscs across the board, as the rankings of all
livc l)()st -:rutlroritru'irur cor.rrrtrics rosc significantly. By cclntrast, with the ex('('l)t iorr ol Slovt'lr irr lurcl l(onlll nrlt.,t" ('vcl"y sirrglc p()st-c()tlttt-ltrtrist coLtntry
.lr',,f)pgtl irr tlrt' t':tttl<irrlis lt'oltt t()()r) 't) t ltl t ()() \*97- Wlrilt' it is irttpgssilllc
('rtli,lllurll ,1r,., u,,,,rntt r,l rr'lr.rr lr(' \'r('\\'', .r'r ('\( (",'.t\','lr' lrrl',lr .',. tttt't l,ll l(rrttt;ttti;t ott lltt'
.\\'\'rr.,,rr (r.tl'rr,|11.r,1, ,,ru, trurr.tl lru,,t .rrrrl I)rnrorr,rlr/,rltott ttt l'o',1 ( onttttltttt',1

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

-7)

to determine the extent to which, in absolute terms, the post-authoritanan

countries increased in membership while post-communist participation decreased, I suspect, for two main reasons, that most of the change occurred
in the post-communist societies.
First, it is likely that a significant amount of the claimed membership
from the r99o-9r survey was still a residue of the communist organizatlons
and therefore was not genuinely voluntary or autonomous. This is almost
certainly the case for Estonia, Latvia, Russia, and Lithuania, which were
still republics in the Soviet Union at the time of the survey, and where the
mass organi zations were still in existencel it is also likely that many respondents in Eastern GermanS Hungary and Bulgaria still stated membership
in organizations that were only recently defunct. The second reason why
organi zattonal membership in post-communist countries has probably declined from r99o-9r to 1995-97 rs that the r99o-9r survey was generally
conducted during a period of high mobilization and political activitS during
which many people did participate in various social and political movements,
but only for a relatively short period of time. \7hile these two factors cannot
be tested or proven, neither individually nor collectively, together they are
a likely explanation of why post-communist countries declined so precipitously in the rankings on Table 43 and, by extension, why the rankings of
authori tanan countries ro se dram attcally.
\7hile useful for comparisons, this decline in the country rankings from
r99o-9r to t99 j-97 does not allow us to reach a firm conclusion about
whether participation in voluntary organizattons has actually been decreasing in thc ycrrrs since the establishment of new democrattc regimes. However,
p o st-

thc |999 l)ost-(lornmunist Organtzatronal Membership Study

z.tz to z.oo memberships per

Societics," in (irrbricl llrrrlcscu,uttl

ll'ic M. lJsl;ln('r, t'rls,,\or i,tl ('.,t1tit,tl ,trttl lltt''l'titrtsiltt)tt l()

I)cntrx'rd1ry (Nt'w Yor'l<: l(orrIlt'tl1',r,', l,rl ||tt orrrirr1i)
li<lr' :r (()nrpt'llirrli tli,;t rrs:;iorr ol llr,' t onlunrntll .lrt ittrr' ttl Fit.ttlr ttt('tttlt,'t',ltrlt rtt | .tilt'ttt

(,t'r lll.lll\',

,r('(' l'.r.11',r'll. ( lt.r:,tttt'nt!,

I li'lttrtr

4.4. Changes in Leuels of Membership, r99

Germany, and Western Germarry

rABLE

Russia

r995-

Average

j-97 to 1999: Russia,

Germany

Eastern

Western Germany

r995-

r995-

97

rg99 Change 97

o.65

o.45 -o.zo r.44 o.78 -o.66

number of

Eastern

1999 Change

97

rg99

z.Tz

z.oo -o,r2

Change

organrzational
memberships
per person
Source: r99S-97 World Values Survey and 1999 PCOMS

organi zatronal membership throughout the region, or if Eastern Germany

and Russia are anomalous. Given the evidence shown in Tabll- +.4, PdtticuIarly when added to the stark changes in rankings shown in Tab\r 4.3rlcan
tentatively suggest that membership in volunt ary organizations has been

declining in the post-communist period.

Having described the range of variation in levels of membership, I now

rurn to an analysis of the factors that explain it. The next section incorporates descriptive and statistical analysis of the potential causes of crossnational variation in orga ntzattonal membership, using the average number
of org antzational memberships per person as the dependent variable.
COUNTRY.LEVEL CRO S S-NATIONAL ANALYSI

In examining organizatronal membership cross-nationallyr l consider a series

<rf competing hypotheses, all of which involve explanatory variables that are
cenrral to debates about civil society and democ ratrzation. After discussitg
crrch individually I turn to multiple regression analysis, which allows us
ro examine the causal impact of each factor, while controlling for the oth('rs. The results confirm the importance of the regime type distinctions discrrssed earlier and suggest the need for a more extensive investigation of the
irrclividual-level reasons why the communist experience has such a negative
t'lrfcct or1 org antzatronal membership in post-communist societies.

person.

It would be worthwhile to replicate this question in other post-commuttist

countries in the future, to see if indeed there are consiste nt dcclirtcs irr

73

(PCOMS)

thc 1995-97 \(rVS question in Russia, Eastern Germany,

(iermany,
thus enabling at least some consideration of the relirnd Wcstcrn
membership in these three cases.
decline
of
organrzatronal
ative
Table 4.4 presents the overall results of those changes, in terms of the
average number of organi zattonal memberships per person. The results show
decline in all three cases. In Russia, the decline is relatively slight, frorn an
already very low level of o.65 organizattonatr memberships per person in
1995-97 to o.45 in 1999. In Eastern Germdny, average membership appears
to have dropped quite sharply in that short time span, as the average East
Germancitrzen belonged to r .44 organizalons in r995-97rbutto only o.78
in 1999." Finally, in \Testern Germany there appears to have been a small
sllrvcy dicl rc1-rlicatc

decline, from

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue Perspectiue

ltlr l' ttl I ,t'.(r'tlt (,i'ltlt,llll',

r '.1'r', r.tllt

lll)

li ' ,,\

rcortonr ic Wcll-Rcing

'l'lrt. logic lrclrirrd thc first hypothesis is clear, since it is commonly believed
rlr:rt rlrt' stt'r'rrgtlr ol'civil socicty is u procluct of increasittg levels of economic
tr,,,ll ltr,itt,q irr lr s()('it'ly. lrrtlt't'rl, ()n(' oft tltt' c('tlf rrtl tcttets tlf mrtclernization
llr..,,r'y t\ tlr,rt rlrt' lrililtcl' rt r'()ultll'y's strltttl:tl'tl ol livilrg., tltt' lll()l'c villrltltf
rvrll lr,' rl., ,1,'rn()( r'.1( \'r ,rrrrl llrc nr()r'(' ils r itiz('tts will l);tl'lit iPtllt' ilt t'ivil

.Weakness

74

of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Europe

society organizattons.'u In other words, it takes a certain level of economic

well-being for people to be able to devote time and energy to orga nrzattonal
activities, and countries with greater economic means should have higher
levels of organrzational membership.
Table 4.5 presents the descriptive results, measuring economic well-being
by using GDP per caprta rates from 1997, the same year in which most of
the nfVS was conducted.'3 The table divides the 3r cases into three groups,
corresponding to high-income, middle-income, and low-income countries.
'Within
each group, the countries are ordered accorditrg to decreasing levels
of GDP per capita, and the column on the right provides the organi zatronal
membership scores for each country. At the bottom of each group, the group
means for both GDP per capita and organizatlonal membership are provided.
The results show that there is inde ed a clear and strong relationship between
GDP per capita and organi zatronal membership, and this correlation remains
significant when the countries in the highest group are excluded.
There are several important exceptions, however. Japan stands out as an
anomaly among the high-income countries, with the third-highest GDP per
caprta but a veryr low organizatronal membership score. Eastern Germany
and Spain also have lower levels of membership than their high-income status
would seem to predict. Among the middle-income countries, South Korea,
Chile, and Venezu ela are far above the group mean, while Hungary the Czech
Republic, Argentina, and Slovak La are located far below it. FinallS within the
low-income country group, South Africa and Braztlexceed the group average
sigrrificantly, and Bangladesh and Macedonia - the two poorest countries
in tlrc cntirc clatrrset - have much higher levels of membership than other
c()r.rrrtrics lrpproxirnating their GDP per caprta levels, while Estonia, Russia,
[,rttvirt, l.ithtraurirr, Bu[garia, and IJkraine all have very low organizattonal
lulcnrbcrship cornpared to the other countries in this group.
In short, although there are many exceptions to the general pattern of
increasittg GDP per caprta corresponding to greater levels of membership in
zz

See, for example, Seyrnour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracyi Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy," rn American Political Science Reuiew, Vol. 53, No. z
GgSg), pp. 69-ro5; Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, "The
Impact of Economic Development on Democracg " rn Journal of Economic PerspectiuesrYol. 7 ,
No. 3 ftggZ), pp. 7t-86; and Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy
Reconsidered," in Gary Marks andLarry Diamond, eds., ReexaminingDemocracy (Newbury
Park: Sage, r99z), pp. 93-ry9.
23 To make the East German and Vest German GDP per capita rates reflect the endtrring
(although diminishing) economic differences between the two groups, I adjusted slightly tlrc
German GDP per capita score, by adding to"/o to \Testern Gerrrrany and sulrtr:rctirrg to",4,
for Eastern Germany. Since the r 997 all-Gerrnan GDP per capita wrls listccl :rs $zo,lloo' lirr'
the statistical analysis I used a rate of $zz,flBo for \flcstcnr (icrnrrury rurd $'8,72o lor lirrslt'r'rr
Germany. This rnirrgin col'rcsponrls [o rttost t'stirttrttcs of llrt' irrcorrrt' tlillt'r'('nct's lrt'tw('('rr l',;rsl
ancl Wcst (it'rtttru)s. St't'., lir t'x:unplt', Mit'lrrrcl ( ilirrrrlirrli ,rrrrl (,1:rus Srlnl;11r,'1., "Arrlilt'it lrrrrrlg
<lsttft'ttlse ltt'r' liirtltonnn('n ;ul w('sttlt'ulst ltt' Nil,r',rrts: lrttrr' li'll,urtl,,,rrrlrr,tlrrrr,'." in ///, lt't,utls,

Vol. rs, No. 1(r,r,1t). grlr \-'

(r(r.

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue Perspectrue

rABLE

75

4.5. Economic Well-Being and Organizational Membership

Average Number of

Capita
(rggZ in U.S.$)

per Person

30)ZOO

27 r4oo

2.47

Japan

z4r5oo

o.9z

Switzerland
\7. Germany
Australia
Finland

z3 r8oo
zz188o

2.rz

zrr4oo

2.68

2OTOOO

2.48

Sweden

1917oo

z.6z

E. Germary

18 17zo

r.44

Spain

t6r4oo

r.39

(group mean)

(zz,5oo)

(r.tgl

South Korea

13

r7oo

z-44

Chile

tt16oo

2-32

Czech Republic

r or 8oo

Slovenia

r orooo

r.o7
r.30

GDP per
Income

Level

Highest group

Middle group

Country
United States
Norway

Argentina
Uruguay
Slovakia

Lowest group

9r7oo
8,9oo
8,6oo

Organizational Memberships
.59

', t)

I.I

r.39
I.TZ

Venezuela

8,3oo

r.84

Hungary
(group mean)

o.8z

'4oo
(g,88g)

('.+g)

Estonia

6,450

Brazll

63oo

o-64
z.13

South Africa

6rzoo

3.o7

Romania

Russia

Latvta
Lithuania
Bulgaria
Philippines
Ukraine
Bangladesh

Macedonia
(group mean)

r3oo

-r4

4r7oo
4rz6o
4rz3o

o.6

4rroo
)ZOO

o.35
T.o3

zr5oo

o.6o

r r33o

r-53

96o

(4;28)

o.70
o.46

r.50

(t.r

s)

No/r,: (;t)l) pcr ca1-rita is Ineasured in U.S. dollars, adjusted to purchasing power parity. GDP
l)(.r'(rrpitrr is corrclrrtcrl wirlr orgilnizational membership atr - .62 (p < .oor).
\o/rrr r'; (,lA Wor'ltl li;tc'tlrool< (r ygti); tgL)\-L)7 W<lrld Values Survey.

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

76

civil society organizations, there is certainly a strong, positive relationship

between economic well-being and or ganizational membership.

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue

rABLE

Perspectiue

77

4.6. Political Rights and Ciuil Liberties and Organizational Membership

Average Number of

Level of Political
Freedom

Rights and Civil

House

Organizatronal

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Liberties

Country

Scores

Memberships per Person

The second hypothesis relates to the strength of a country's political institutions and their ability to ensure the political rigbts and ciuil liberties of its citizens. Political institutional arguments are also common explanations for the
strengths and weaknesses ofcivil society, since it is generally agreed that the
more repressive a regime (even if it is still viewed as democratic overall),

Highest group

United States
Australia

I
I
I
I
I
I

3.59
2.68

(')

(2.68\

r.5
r.5
r.5
r.5
r.5
r.5
r.5
r.5
r.5

3-o7

the more difficult it is for citizens to participate in autonomous voluntary

organizations.'a If, instead, a country's political institutions are open and
encourage participation, more people should join voluntary organizations.
In other words, the expectation of this hypothesis is that the more extensive a
country's political rights and civil liberties, the stronger will be its civil society.
TabIe 4.6 describes the country differences, incorporating the widely
cited Freedom House scores on political rights and civil liberties, which
range from r to 7. Like Table 4.5, Table 4.6 divides the countries into three
groups, "highestr" "middler" and "lowest"l these correspond to the extent of
political rights and civil liberties in each country. The six countries that fit into
the highest group are all among the older democracies, and their scores on
organizational membership are among the highest in the entire sample. Only
onc country (South Africa) from either of the other fwo groups even exceeds
thc mcan from the highest group. At this point, it appears that the Freedom
Fforrsc scorcs are excellent predictors of organizational membership. But
a closcr look at the middle and lowest groups shows very little difference:
although the middle group has a slightly higher mean (r.36) than the lowest
group (r.26), the difference is slight, and there is wide variation within each
group. Although the overall correlation between political rights and civil liberties and organizational membership is still quite strong, it is much weaker
when the countries in the highest group are excluded. In other words, while
still a fairly good predictor overall, it does not appear that the distinctions
between the Freedom House scores of the middle and lowest country groups
helps as much as GDP per capita to explain organizational membership.

The next variable measures what Samuel Huntington calls ciuilization.

Huntington writes that "it is far more meaningful now to group counrrics
L4 See Freedom House's annLral rcport., Frccdrnrt in tbt'rMtyld:'l'lte Attttrt(tl
Sut't,t\t ()f l'tliti
cal Rights and Oiuil Lilrcrties (Wtsltiltgtort., l)(.: l;r't'r'tlortt l lorrst', vru'i()us y(';u s); Atlri;rrr
I(:trrttttycl<y., Alt'r;ltl(l('t' f . M()tyl, ;lt)(l ( llr:tr'lr's (,r;rylrorv' r'rls., Nrl/rr )n\ ut'l'r,trtst!,1r;,7,\.. (',tt,tl
,\ttr it'11t, l)t'tttrtt tiltlt,ttttrl Mitt'kt'ls nt li.,tsl ('t'ttlt,tl I'ttttrltr',ttttl lltt'Nr'l/'lY ltt,lt'lt1'11,1t'ttl ,\'l,tlt',, (Nt.rv

Nf:

Finland

Norway
Switzerland
(group mean)

Middle group

South Africa
Germany
E. Germany

.W.

Spain
Slovenia
Czech Republic
Japan

Hungary

Lithuania
Uruguay
Estonia
South Korea

[,owest group

I r,ut.,,t(

|t(ln Itrtltlr,,lr('r,,.

I,1,1,))

r.7
r.7

z.6z
2.48
2.47
) t)

z.rz
r-44

r39
r3C-

r.o7
o.9z
o.8z

o.46
5
5

,,

r39
o-64
z-44

Chile

Latvta

z.3z
o.70

Bulgaria
(group mean)

2.25

o.35

G.z)

ft.t61

Argentina

2.5

I.IO

Venezuela
Slovakia

2.7

t-84

2.7

I.IZ

Philippines

2.7

Brazll

z.T3

Romania

)t
)a

Bangladesh

3.25

r-53

Macedonia

3-5
3.5
3-5

o.65

3.')

ft.26)

Russia

Ukraine
(group mean)

"Civilization"

llt'rrrs\\/rr li,

Sweden

-o3

I.T4
r.50
o.6o

Np/r,.- lirecclorn l-lerrsc scores range from r (the highest score) to 7 (the lowest). The scores
l)r(.s(.rrlt.tl rrrt. tlrc irvcrilgcs of thc 1c1c15-c16 and r .)96-97 scores. Political rights and civil liberties
(rvirlr rr flippctl scrrlt') rrrr: corrclrrtccl with orgnnizational membership atr : .46 (P < .or).
,\o//l'r,': lrr-t't'rlottt I loust' ( r 9,2.;); l ()95-97 Wtlrltl Valtlcs Srlrvcy.

'Weakness

78

of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Ewrope

not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their

level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and
civilization.""s Although he distinguishes berween eight different civilizations, Huntington argues that the differences can be reduced to one
primary cleavage, which he calls "the 'West versus the Rest.""6 The distinctive features of \Testern civilization result from a unique combination of
factors, including Catholic and Protestant traditions, rule of law, separation
of church and state, social pluralism, and individualism.'7 In the context of
this book, the logic of Huntington's expectation is that countries in the West
will have stronger civil societies than those in "the Rest."
Table 4.7 presents the 3r countries, divided into fwo groups, "'S(/estern"

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue Perspectiue

TABLE

4.7. " Ciuilization" dnd Organizational Membership

Average Number

of Organizational

"Civilization"

Country

Memberships per Person

"Western"

United States
Australia

3-59
2.68

Sweden

z.6z

Finland

"Non-Western"

Prior llcgimc Type

'6

r-44

Spain
Slovenia

r39

Slovakia
Czech Republic
Hungary

T.TZ

o.8z

Latvra

o-70

Estonia

o.64

Lithuania

o"46

(group mean)

G.zo)

South Africa
South Korea

Chile
Brazrl

3-o7
z-44
z-32
z.13

Venezuela
Bangladesh

r.53

r.30

in particular his classification and mapping of countries on pp. zz-27 oI Tbe Clash of
Nrr/c:

r-o7

t-84
r.50

r89
I.T4
I.IO
r.o3
o.9z
o.6

Ukraine
Bulgaria
(group mean)

Ciuilizatiotr.s.

"7 Huntington, The Chsh of Ciuilizations, pp. 69-72.

'8 Although Huntington is not entirely explicit about which countries fit in which category, I
have classified them according to his logic. All of the "older democracies" except for.faprrrr
are "Western," as is Spain, as well as eight post-communist countrics, inclLrtlirrg thc (lzcch
Republic, Eastern Germany, Estonia, Hungery, [,atvia, l,ithuirnir, Slovrrl<i:r.;rrd Skrvcrri;r, rrll
of which Huntington irrcludcs irr tlrc Vt'st. llortr;rni;r rrrrtl Ulirrrirrr.rut.tlivirlt.rl, lrrrt pn.rrorrl
nantly "non-Wcstt'rrt." I;irrltlly, tlrc Sllvir ()rthotkrx rourrtlics ol lhrl1i.ri,r. N{.rrt.tlorri.r,.urtl
l{ttssirl itr('rtll "nott Westcrt," rrs;ut tlrr'l.rtirr t\rrrnrr.rrr (orntrr'\.rrrrl ll.rrrt:l.rrlr.slr. Srrrrtlr
AIritir, Sorrtlr horr',r. .trrrl tlrc l'lrrlrpprrre,,.

z.Iz

E. Germany

Japan
Russia

Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 \r9%t,
pp. 22-49; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Ciuilizations and the Remaking of World Order
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
See

\7. Germany

Macedonia
Uruguay
Romania
Argentina
Philippines

also irrc<>rporate the category of prior regime type, as elaborated earlier in this chapter, into this analysis. To reiterate, in the current time
period, the expectation of the prior regime type hypothesis is that the
older democracies will have the highest levels of organizational activitg
followed relatively closely by the post-authoritarian countries, and the
'5

Switzerland

2.48
z-47
2.22

Norway

and "non-'Western."'8 The overall finding shows that, while the relationship
between civilization and organizational membership is positive, it is generally
very weak. The "'Western" countries average r.7o memberships per person,
while the "non-I7estern" countries have a mean of r.47. Moreover, there is
wide variation within each group of countries, with the "'W'estern" countries
ranging from a high of 3.59 inthe United States to a low of .46 in Lithuania,
and the "non-rD(/estern" countries ranging from 3.o7 in South Africa to .35
in Bulgaria. Among the "'Western" countries, what is most noticeable is that

the seven lowest scores - and eight out of the lowest nine - consist of postcommunist countries. Similarly, among the "non-'Western" countries, the
three lowest scores come from post-communist countries. In short, it appears
unlikely that civilization has any systematic relationship with membership
in civil s<lciety organizations.

79

o.6o
o-35

ft.+z)

"(,ivilization" is correlated with organrzational membership at r -- .r4

(not signif.).

,\trnt1'r': I lurrtirrl4torr (tc..t16), pp.

z7-z\;

r99 j-97

\7orld Values Survey.

-conun unisf c()t.nrtrics will lag behind the other two groups considerably.
clrrtrt clcpictccl vistrally in Figu re 4.3. The correlation
Irt'lw('(-n prir)r' r'('Hin'r(' tyl)(' rlrt(l ()rglutiz,rtri<lrrltl nl('rttl'rc'rshill is vcry high., ilncJ

l)( )st

'f

irlrlt' 4.tl prcs('ntsi thc

tlrt' l't'l:rliorrslrip | ('nlltitts ('\L('ptiolrlrlly

st

t'()nll wltt'lt f ltt' olrlt't' clt'tll()ct'rtcit's

8o
TABLE

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

4.8. Prior Regime'type and Organizational Membership

Average Number

One of the distinguishing features of the older democracies is that their

of Org anizational

citizens have had much more time to experience and live in a free and democratic society and have thus developed a famrliarity with volunt ary organ:u.,a'Western
tions. Of the eight older democracies, only a few elderly citizens of
Germany and Japan have actually experienced as adults anything other than
a democratic system .'e Inthis sense, democ ratic longevity is central to the distinction between democratic and non-democratic regimes. It seems logical,

Country

Memberships per Person

Older democracv

United States
Australia

3.59
2.68

Sweden

z.6z

Finland

z-48

Norway

2.47

Switzerland
'W.
Germany

2.ZZ

Japan

o.92

(group mean)

(z-tg)

South Africa
South Korea

3-o7
2.44

Chile

2-32
2-13

Braztl

Post-Communist

r.84

Uruguay
Argentina
Philippines
(group mean)

r.39

r.53

all. In fact, among the post-authoritarian

r49
r -o3

(r.82)

r.50
r-44
r

Romania
Slovakia

r"r4

-3C-

Multiple Regression Results

I.IZ
r -o7

While each of these variables does have the overall predicted effect on organizartional membership across countries, the relationship is hardly monotonic.

o.8z

o.70

Moreover, the most conspicuous and interesting country anomalies usually

Russia

o-6

Estonia
Ukraine

o.64

Note: Prior regime type is correlated

.74 (p < .oor).
Source: r99 5-97'World Values Survey.

o.6o
o.46

Bulgaria
(group mean)

with

o.35

(o.gt

organrzational membership

at r

are excluded. In thc nrultiplc rcgrcssiorr:ulrrlysis tlr:rt l;ollr)ws1 prior' l'('lllnl('

type is ()pcrltfi()r'rlllizctl rts two rlununy vrtrirtlrlt's., ltt'irtt' rutlltttt'il,tt'itttt t',\'lt1'y1
('n(('iuttl ltrit)t' ('()uuttttttisl r',\'/rr't'it'ut t',llrus lt';tvirr1l ,,ltlcr ,lr'nr()( r',tt it's ;ts t lr t'
1'.

only the correlation is

Hungary
Latvra

Lithuania

t'x,. ltttlt',1 t';tlr'11't

cases

actually negdtiue, given that Chile, South Korea, and South Africa are the
three post-authoritarran countries with the shortest experience with democracy) but the highest levels of organrzatronal membership. Thus, while democratic longevity is a crucial element of the difference between democratic and
non-democratic prior regime types, it proves to be a much less important factor when comparing post-authoritaian and post-communist countries.

I.IO

Slovenia

Czech R.epublic

therefore, when comparing post-authoritanan and post-communist countries, that the length of time a country has been democratic would have a
strong and positive influence on participation in civil socie ty, regardless of
prior regime type. The expectation of this hypothesis is that more years of
experience with democ racy will lead ta a more vibrant civil society.
Table 4.9 presents the post-authoritarian and post-communist countries
according to their "years of continuous democracy."3o The table shows
that although post-authoritarian countries do generally have both a longer
experience with democ racy and higher rates of participation, democratic
longevity and organi zatronal membership are only weakly correlated over-

z.rz

Venezuela
Bangladesh
Spain

Macedonia
E. Germ any

8r

Democratic Longevity

Prior Regime Type

Post-Authoritarian

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue Perspectiue

() -l'his

more distant non-democratic legacy may have a persisting effect in these two countries
toclay (although much less so for \Testern Germany), since they have the two lowest scores
()n organizational membership of the older democracies.
i() 'l'his variable is adapted from Ronald Inglehart's measure of "years of continuous democracy
s i rr cc 1 c.-Lo." See Ronald Inglehar t, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cwltural, Economic,
trrd Prilitical Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), especially
l)l'), .].s 7-35t1. I have extended his scores to reflect the number of years a country has been
torrtirrrrously dcmocratic until 1997 and added a few countries that he did not include
(lf:rrrglrrrlcsh., Mirccclonia,, the Philippines, Ukraine, Urugtay, and Venezuela). I have also
:rrliustt'tl :l l'cw scorcs thlt wcre slighdy inaccurate, namelS Argentina (which has been
,1,'rrr,rtrrttic'sirrc't' r.)fl], rtot r985)., Ilrrtzil (sir-rce r985, not 1986), and Chile (since r99o,
rrot 1r,p,1l). M()r'('()v('r; I lt:tvt'slrutrlttrdizt'rl tlrc post-conrnrunist c-lern<lcracies, which Inglehart
r,,t1,'rl s,,rrrcwltrtl lr:rlrllrrz:urlly. so tlr:rt tlrt' rrort Sovit'l lirtst Iirrrol-rclu't coulttrics have tcl9c..rr llrt'rr \t.utrr1 (l:rlt',;trrtl tlrr'lortrrt't'Sovir'l l{t'prrlrli,.s ltrtvt' ;t)r)r. l;ol':rll <lf lltt'st'cils('s.,
l,,llr'\\,ntfi lrrlglt'll.nl'.. Irott'tlttt,', nt tounllrlq tlr('\'('iur. ol tortlttttt()u\ (1,'ltt,)rl;l( ), I sl:tl't witlt
tlr, lrr'.1 \r',u tf l,'t tlrr' tt,ur',tltnn \\'.r', r nrirltlr'lr'rl
,

'Weakness

8z

of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

rABLE 4.9. Democratic Longeuity and Organizational Membership

(Po st-Auth oritarian and Po st- Communist Countr ie s O
)

TABLE 4.ro. OtS Regression Analysis

Aggregate Membership in Volwntary

"l,y

Prior Regime

83

of

Organizations ( All Countries)

of
Continuous
Democracy

Average Number
of Org anizational

3o

r.84

Years

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue Perspectiue

Memberships per Person

Variable

Coefficients

GDP per capita

.o3
(.oa

Political rights and civil liberties

.or

Cllhzation

.13

Type

Country

Post-Authoritarian

Venezuela
Spain

zo

Argentina

r4

I.IO

Braztl

r3

2-r3

Uruguay

IZ
II
II

r.39

7
6

z-32
2.44

Prior communist experience

3.o7

Constant

r.55

Bangladesh

Philippines
Chile
South Korea
South Africa
(group mean)

Post-Communist

Prior authori tanan experience

r -o3

-.97*
(.sa

r.r4

SEE

.5o
.59

3r

I.I2
r -o7

Note: Table entries are unstandardrzed regression coeffiwith standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the average number of organrzatronal memberships per person in each country.
* p..o5 (one-tailed)
'World
Sowrce: 1995-97 \7orld Values Surveg CIA
Factbook (rgg8), Freedom House (tggg), and Huntington

o.8z
o.35

Slovenia

r.50
r.30

Latvia

o.70

Russia

o-65

E stonia
Ukraine

6
6

o.64
o.6o
o.46

(6.9)

(o.gr

(t.+zl

cients,

('gg6)-

Note: Democratic longevity refers to the years of continuous, uninterrupted democracy in r 997

r -.14 (not signif.). Among the post-authoritarian countries onlS the correla@ot signif.), and among the post-communist countries, it is.zr (not signif.).
Source: r99S-97 \forld Values Survey and Inglehart (tggZ).
membership at

-.q

involve post-communist cases, which tend to have much lower levels of organrzattonal membership than would be predicted by the general relationship
between the vartables. To weigh the relative effect of prior regime type against
the other factors, we can turn to multiple regression analysis.
Table 4.ro presents the regression results with all 3 r countrics incluclccl. r'
The results show that GDP per capitat., p<llitical rights rutcl civil libcrtics, rutrl
lr Notc tlrirt tlrt'viu'iirlllt'lir rlt'nr()('r';rtit'lorrlit'viry

-.o3

(.+8)

With the older democracies excluded, democratic longevity is correlated with organizational
tion is

Adjusted R'

(group mean)

(.t8

r-53

Bulgaria
Macedonia

Lithuania

(.rt )
('Western)

(r.82)
r.44

Hungary

(r2"8)

E. Germany
Romania
Slovakia
Czech Republic

r39

is rrrt inr.'lrrtlt'r.1 irt tlrt'r'('1,,r'('\\iorr witlr,rll Ir

c()rlntrit's lrt't':trrst'it is itst'll tlrt' rtr.rirr l);rsir ol tltt' rt'liitttt' ly;rt'tlrrltttt ltott ltt'l\\,t't'tt tlt'nr(,( r,rlr(
rutrl rtorr tlcntorr,rlrt tr'1,1itttt's, l'lr,' v,ttt.tlrlt' lot (,1)lr grrr (,tt)rl,t t', ..,,t1,'tl rr llt,,tts,tttrls ,,1

cllhzation have positive coefficients that are not statistically signific ant.3z
The dummy variables for prior authoritarian experience and prior communist experience both have the predicted negative effect, but only prior communist experience is statistically significant. Ceteris paribus, prior communist
experience is associated with a .97 decrease in the predicted organi zatronal
membership. Considering that the range on the dependent variable extends
only up to a maximum of 3.Sg organizattonal memberships per person, a
decline of . 97 rs substantively very large. The effect of GDP per caprta, the
tJ.S. d<lllars, and the Freedom House scale is flipped, so that a higher score corresponds to
grcrrtcr political rights and civil liberties. A full description of how the variables were coded
is proviclccl irr Appendix A.
l'r Altlrorrglt wltcrr rrll jr countrics are included there is some multicollinearity (e.g., GDP per
t';tlritit :rtttl tlrt' l;rct'dotn I lotrsc scores alre correlatcd at r .75, and the Freedom House
s('()r'('s ruttl civiliz:rtiort rtt | .,.7o)., it rlocs r)()t sullsr:rrrtirrlly affcct the results here. \ffhen
()n('()r
(()tttlrirr:tlion
('x('lrrtlt'rl
.uty
ol lltt'sc tlu't't'v:u'i:tlrlcs is
f-r'orrr tht'rrrrrrlysis., thcy rrrt.still
ttol :.l,ttt\lr.,rllt'rrlirrili.,tttl,:utcl tlrc tot'lficit'rrls lor ;trior :rtrllrrilru'irut t'r;lt'l'it'lrr'('ilrrtl ;ll'ior'
('\l)r't tr'rrtc lr,trtlly r lr,lnl:c'rt ;rll.
( rflilnllIlt\l

'Weakness

84
rABLE
Vo

4.n

luntary

of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

OLS Regression Analysis of Aggregate Membership in

d Po st- C ommunist

O r ganization s (Po st- Auth or itar ian an

Cowntries Only)

Variable

Model r

Model z

GDP per capita

.o5

.o3

(.ot
Political rights and civil liberties

(.oz)

-.oo5
(-r+)

Clrhzation

(-Western)

-.26
(.+o)

Prior communist

-.gz**

experlence

-.8

Democratic longevrty

7***

(.zz)

G6)

-.o4
(.oz)

ft.+t\

r.57***
(.26)

Adjusted R'

.47

.45

SEE

.50
z3

.5r

r.9 4

Constant

23

Note: Table entries are unstandardi zed rcgression coefficients, with standard
errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average number of organizational memberships per person in each country.
*p
..o5; ** p < .or; *** p < .oor (all one-tailed)
Source : I c)L) j-L)7 \W<rrld Values Surveg CIA \forld Factbook (tgg8 ), Freedom
Hcrusc (t999)., I lrrntington (tgg6), and Inglehart (tggZ).

r-rcxt strongcst coefficient, is much smaller, as an increase

of one thousand

dollars in GDP per caprta is associated with only a .% increase in the predicted organi zatronal membership.
Table 4.n presents the same analysis, but this time with the eight older
democracies excluded, thus allowing us to focus on the important distinction between the legacies of authoritarian and comrnunist regimes. Model r
shows all of the relevant independent variables,lr including the varrable for
the length of time a country has been democ rattc, and agaln prior communist
experience is the only varrable that is statistically signific ant.34

Most striking about the results of Model

are the surprisi.g negatiue

effects of political rights and civil liberties, civrhzation, and democratic

longevity. These counterintuitive findings do not imply that greatcr political
33 The

prior authoritariern expericncc vllrirrblc is orttittcrl., rts it is rtow tlrt't'rrltrrlt'rl r:tlt'11or.y ol

pnor ref{rmc typt'.

it is 1'r't'st'rrl, rtrullr t.lllirr.';trrl1, .lot's rtol tli.'rr, llt,'',.' t,'',ttllt. I vrrr llt,ttrt',lt
(,(,i,ltt(l llr,'ltt't'rlrtttt
(;l)l) pt'l t:t1ril;r,rrrtl tltr'l'tt't'tlotn llotrr.(".((Dt('\,tlc tot t('l,ttt'rl ,rt I

74 Aglrirr., rtltlr<luglr
l lprr\(.

.,r(f t(',r ,tttrl r lt,rltl.llt(rlt

'.rtl'',l.trrlr.rllt

.lt,ttr1i,

tlr,

,ll ,

tr tlt,lttlttll',

(,1, llt,'
r r)r llt, t, trt',

,)tltl'.'.lrtlt

ol otlr' (tt lllnl('

\.tlr.rltlt'

,lrtt",

ltol

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue Perspectiue

85

rights and civil liberties will actually lead to lower levels of organi zatronal
membership, that "\(/estern" clrhzations are less compatible with civil
society, or that more years of experience with democ racy will decrease levels of organizatLonal membership. Rather, they should be interpreted in the
context of the differences between prior regime types. Many countries with a
prior communist experience score well on the Freedom House scores and are
classified as "\7este rnr" yet still have relatively low levels of org anizational
membership. Even though post-communist countries have fewer years of
experience with democracy than many post-authoritarran countries, some
of the highest-scoring post-authoritarian countries are those with the fewest
years of democratic experience, thus helping to account for that variable's
surprising negative coefficient.
Model z on Table 4.rr trims out the variables for political rights and
civil liberties, civil tzatron, and democ ratrc longevity, and it shows that prior
communist experience agarn has a very significant negative effect on organtzatronal membership, while GDP per caprta is still not statistically significant. In this model, with the older democracies excluded, prior communist
experience is associated with a .8 7 decrease in the predicted number of organrzatronal memberships per person in each country, a very large effect given
the narrow range of membership in these countries.
Tables 4.ro and 4.rr show that the only variable that is consistently significant, both statistically and substantively, is prior communist experience, and
it explains most of the variatton in both models. \7hile GDP per captta and
the Freedom House scores are both positively correlated with levels of organrzatronal membership, when controlling for other factors in a multlartate
model, they emerge as statistically insignificant. The implications of these
cross-national findings suggest that, although economic growth and stable
political institutions may be associated with higher levels of membership in
voluntary organizatrons, they have more limited explanatory power when
controlling for prior regime type. Moreover, while "clrltzation" may be
trseful for predicting - or perhaps creatitrg - strategic military alliances between types of countries, it appears to have little utility for explaining levcls of membership in civil society organizations. Democratic longevity is
rur essential element of the prior regime type typology that distinguishes
bctween older democracies and other countries that recently experienced
nor'r-detnocratic rule, but it does not help to explain cross-national differ('nccs elnrong pclst-authoritarian and post-communist countries. Rather, it
:rl)pcrrrs thart thc lasting legacy of different types of non-democratic regimes,
,uttl tltc wrtys in lvhich these regimes ruled and exercised control over their
f)()l)ulrrtions., rs nrorc irnportant than simply the number of years since the
I r :trrsit iort lo rlcnt()cr'1'tcy.
sltorl., tlt('('nrlrn'irr1i l('grrcy ()f':r courrtr"y's pr-ior rr'13irrrc typer - particularly
()lntlt'it's
lor
witlr :t llrtot' t r)ninrunist r'\f-rt'l'it'lrrt' s('('nls f<l 1ll:f y ll t-n()rC
rf rf)orl.ull t,rl,'llt.ut lltt'st'olltct ('(()n,rnrit. irrstituti()n;t1.,.'ivilitttliorr,rl.,:urtl
f

rr
(

It-ttt;'',t1,11 f ,l,

l,,t', ttt tlr,' ;)t()t (",', (rl ,lt'r,,'1,t1)tttll t lVll ',,,,

tr'l\,.

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Ewrope

86

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue

Perspectiue

87

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS

likely than men to be affihated with any organi zation, political or non-

The analysis until now has remained on the country level, focusing exclusively on the contemporary institutional variables and the prior regime type
typology. This section extends the analysis to include individual-level data
from the \[VS, and thus to surmount the problem of cross-level inferen ce,3s

politic aI." 3e

by using a constructe d dataset that mixes the \fVS data on individuals with
the two main aggregate variables developed in the previous section.l6 This
allows us not only to control for demographic variables but also to test some
of the most prominent individual-level variables in debates about partici pation and civil society on a very large sample from a wide array of democratic
countnes.

The literature on individual attributes and participation in civil society is

akeady very established, as scholars have developed and tested a series of
hypotheses about what types of people are more or less likely to participate.
The classic predictors of individual participation are derived from the
concept of socioeconomic status (SES;.az Many studies have shown that
people with greater economic resources and those who have higher levels
of edwcation are more likely to participate in voluntary organizatrons.38
A third element of SES is ag, and the general expectation is that, since
participation in organizations is a habit and a skill that develops over
the course of an individual's life, older people will participate more than
younger people. A fourth hypothesis consid ers gender, and the differences
bctween men and women. Although there is no consistent agreement across
strrcf ics els t<l whether men or women participate more, Verba, Schlozman,
rrrrcl llracly found that, "contr ary to stereotype, women are slightly less
rt (,lrristophcr

and \W. Phillips ShivelS Cross-Leuel Inference (Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 1995).Also see the discussion in J. Eric Oliver, "City Size and Civic
Involvement in Metropolitan America," in AmericanPolitical Science Reuiew, Vol. 94, No. z
(zooo), pp. 36r-n.
36 For greater clarrty, although they were included in the analysis, I have omitted the variables
for political rights and civil liberties, civrhzation, and democratic longevity from this section.
The results showed that, as with the country-level analysis discussed earlier, their coefficients
were negative and had little explanatory power.
37 See, for example, Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Joe-on Kim, Participation and Political Equality: A Seuen-Nation Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, tgZB);
Lester \7. Milbraith and M. L. Goel, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get
Inuolued in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally,, 1977); Raymond E. \folfinger and Steven J.
I-1. Acl-ren

Rosenstone, Who Votes? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 198o). Also see the discussiort

in Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality. By means of an excepti<>nally clctailctl
questionnaire and extensive follow-up interviews, Verba, Schlozman, rtncl Rrady w('rc rtblt'
to go "beyond SES" to include other factors such as "civic skills" in tlrcir (livic: Volurtlrtrisnt
Model. However, it should be pointecl out thrtt wlrilc tlrcy crilicizc tltt'SliS Irtotlr'l tor lrt'irrg
"weaker theoretic:rlly," tlrcry clo rt()t (ltrt'sliott its rr'lt'v:ur((':lrrrl illtl)()t'l:ttt(('; iltslt';ttl, lltt'y sr'r'li
t<litchi(:vc"ttriclrt'l'rlrrtlcrst:uttlinll()l lrrlwsori.)('(()ttottti,, portlt,,tt l.',t,1'. lopolitr.;tlrttlivily"
(P. r')).
1lt l,,tlrrr ltlion t\
1,,('tr,'r.rllt' \'rr'\\'t'tl ,r., tlr,' rnrr',1 tttt|rotl.tttl r'lltttrttl
('\,rrrt1rl1'. \\/,,llrrr;,i,'r ,ur,l l(, )'.('n'.t,rtr'. \\'/,,, \i,/,".:

In addition to these important socioeconom rc factors, there are several

other variables that have become central to the literature on political participation and civil society. Eric Oliver has shown that city size has a stron g effect
on seve ral different types of panicipation and that people who reside in larger
cities are less likely to participate than those who live in smaller places.4o
Many scholars have also pointed to interpersonal trwst as a strong predictor
of org anuzational membership and activity, such that people who are more
trusting of others will be more likely to join organizafions.4' Another factor, teleuision watching, has been developed by Robert Putnam, who argues
that television is largely responsible for the decline in "social caprtal" in the
United States .4' The final varrable that I consider here is Ronald Inglehart's
concept of postmaterialism, which refers to the development of values such
as "self-expression and the quality of life" as opposed to the materialist values of "economic and physical security.u+3 Inglehart argues that people with
postmatertalist values will be more likely to join organizattons than those
with materialist values.
Table 4.rz presents the full regression with both country-level and
individual-level variables.44 Among the individual-level variables, there are
few surprises. Income, education, age , gender, trust, and postm aterralism all
have the predicted positive effect on organi zatronal membership, and city
size and television watchirg have negative effects, 2s expected. All eight
variables are highly statisti cally signific ant. At the country level, GDP per
3e Verba, Schlozman, and Brady Voice and Equality, p. 256.
40 Oliver, "City Size and Civic Involvement in Metropolitan America";
J.Eric Oliver, "The
Effects of Metropolitan Economic Segregation on Local Civic Involvement," rn American
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. t (tggg), pp. r96-ztz.
'Work;
4 | See, among many examples, Putna m,
Making Democraqt
Francis Fukuyam a, Trwst: The
Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1995); Adam B. Seligman,
The Proble.m of Trust (Prrnceton: Princeton University Press, t99z);Mark 'Warren, ed., Democracy andTru.s/ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Eric M. Uslaner, The Moral
Foundations of Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, zooz).
rr Putnam, "Bowling Alone," pp. 6S-18. Putnam puts considerably less emphasis on televisittrr wertching in the book Bowling Alone, although it remains an important part of his
cx prla nirtion.
rl lnglclrl rt, Modernization and Postmodernization, p. 4j also see Ronald Inglehart, The Silent
Ilcuilutitm: Ohanging Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton: Princeton
I Inivcrsity Prcss., I L)77); Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase et al., Political Action: Mass Parlit ilt,tliorr itr I)it,c Wt'slcnt I)cntrrcrAcics (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, r979).
rl St't' Appt'rrrlix A lirr rlctrrils rrbout thc coding of the variables. Unfortunately, a numItt'l ol (()lnttt'it's :u(' orrrittt'tl lrorn tlris 1-rru't of tlrc rrrrrrlysis due to missing data for all
t('sl)otttlr'ttls otl ()tl('()l tttolt'ol tlrt'irrtlivirlrrrtl lcvt'l irrtlr'llcnrlcnt vltriablcs. Argcntirrat., the
(,zt'r lr l(t'Pultltt, ,trr,l tlrt' l'lriliPl'tirrt's lr:rv(' rrrissirrlg v:rlrrt's lor tily sizt'; llrrlgru'i:r, Ilurrgru'y'
l\1.t, r'.lrtttt,l,,ur,l \l()\'('ttt,t lt.t\'('nrisrrrryg v,rlut's l()r' ur( onr('; f ;rp,rrr is rrrissinll ('(lur:rtiorr :rrrtl t ity
',t/r'i \ottllr ,\ln(,t t', iln',,,ntli('(lrt,,ttton.ttrtl ,rl',r'; \otrtlt Kot(..t t,. nu,,.,nll',t tlf .,t/(.,trrrll..l..vi.,totl
\\,tlr lrrrrli

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

8tJ

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue

4.rL. OLS Regression Analysis of A1gregate Membership in Voluntary

Organizations, with Controls for Indiuidual Characteristics (All Countries)

rABLE

Unstan dardized

Coefficients

Variable
C

owntry -L

et, e I

Vari ab

(.oot

Prior authori tarran experience

I-Jnstan dardized

.r7***

C ountry -L

(.o6)

Prior communist experience

In diui du aI - L eu el Vari ab

.og***

.o6***

Education

(.ot )
. r6***

(.oo6)
.o03***
(.oor )

Gender (male)

rr***

***

City

size

-.o7***

(.ot
Trust in others
"I'clcvision watching

.05**
(.oz )

-.o4**
(.ot

I)ostrttrt tcri

rt

Ii

srn

Education

Ag.

(.ooz)
.oor

size

Trust in others

.oz**

r -70

zr

Note: For the unstand ardized coefficients, standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the average number of organ rzattonal memberships per person.
* p ..o5; **
*** < .oor (all one-tailed)
P
P < .or'
Source: r9g5-97'World Values Survey and CIA \7orld Factbook (r998).

caprta has a very strong positive effect, as predicted, and the prior regime
type variables both have the expected negative effect, although prior comrnunist experience is considerably stronger than prior authoritarian experience.
Overall, when comparing the relative impact of cnrch varriablc by cxrlnrirrirrg,
the beta weights, we see that prior conlnuttist cxp('r'icrtcc lrrts tlrc stt'ortgt'st
coefficicnt (- "L9), followccl by crlucirtiort (.rll) ruttl t il)l'pt'r'cirpitrr (.rZ). ( )l
thc otltt'r' irrtlivitlurtl lcvt'l viu'i;tlrlt's, ittr ont(' rttttl c'ity sizt' lt:tvt' lrctrt wt'iglrls
ol' .o(, ;uttl .t ).f r r'('\l'rt't lrvt'l\,.. rvltr't'(',t\ llrt' t('nt,ttttilrli lil,t' r'.lnl'.(' lrottt .o:

.or
.o5***

-.03

***

-.o3

-.or

-.o3*

Postmaterialism

.og***

(-oz)

-.or

.04***

(-or)

.o3***

1768

***

Television watching

Constant

.49***

SEE

.05

(.ot

-.oz**

Adjusted R'

rg***

r 8***

(.or

-.04***

,.::,

(.ol

City

(.or)
(-l<>rrstant

.oo7

(.ot )
.r4***

Gender (male)

.og***

Ie s

.or

.o3***

-.?-8***

(.oor

(.oz)

r o***

Income

r 8***

.03

-.98***
(.ol

-.zg***

Income

Ag.

.04***

(.oot

In diui du al -L eu el Vari ab le s

Standardized
Coefficients (Beta)

arcI Vari ab Ie s

-.o3*

-r.r5***

Coefficients

GDP per capita

-. rr*
(.os

Prior communist experience

4.r3. OLS Regression Analysis of Aggregate Membership in Voluntctry

Organizations, with Controls for Indiuidwal Characteristics (Post-Awthoritarian
and Post-Communist Countries Only)
Variable

.04***

89

rABLE

Standardized
Coefficients (Beta)

le s

GDP per capita

Perspectiue

.64***
(.o8

Adjusted R'

.rz

.SEE

r.59

r 5 ,o36

Note: For the unstandardrzed coefficients, standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent
virriable is the average number of organrzatronal memberships per person.
' l, ..o5; **P < .or' *** p < .oor (all one-tailed)
,\ourcc: r995-97 \forld Values Survey and CIA 'World Factbook (r998).

I t r .o 1 . I".vcn though their coefficients are relatively weake r, allof the hypothes('s frortt tlrc litcrrlture on individual participation are supported by these
finrlirrgs.
As ilr t ltt' l)r'('vious sccrion., ir is worth rcpcrlting thc same analysis
w il lr t'('lil)( ltttlt'l'tt s l't't lrtt lltt' r lltlcr tlt'tt)( )r'r'rrr'ics ('xclrrclcd., irr orclcr to

Ior'tts ()n tlrt'ilttpol'l;lttl tlistittt.lion l)('lwt't'n f)()sl ;tulltol'ittu'ilut luttl post

onttnutttrl t tl ir('n\. 'l ,r ltlt' .l . r I Prt'sr'nl\ tlrt' r('\u lls. rvlrit'lr slr, rw lt'w rrrrr jor'

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

9o

changes.45 Among the citizens of formerly non-democratic countries, several

of the individual-level coefficients are weaker and less signific ant than they
were when cittzens from all the countries were included, but they generally
have the same sign as predicted (with the exception of trust, which now has
an unexpected but very slight negative effect). Education, however, has an
even larger coefficient in the restricted sample, showittg that its strong effect
on org anrzatronal membership does not apply only to the older democracies.
Prior communist experience remains the most powerful explanato ry varuable
in the regression, and GDP per caprta is somewhat weaker than in Tablt- 4.rL,
although still quite robust.
Overall, a person's prior communist experience is associated with a decrease of .g8 in her or his predicted organi zatronal membership , an extremely
large amount given the range of the scale of orga nrzattonal membership, and
especially since this takes into account the effect of other variables widely
considered to have a strong influence on participation.
CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have introduced recent and wide-ranging aggregate and

individual-level data on membership in voluntary organizatrons in order to
describe and compare basic differences in levels of organi zattonal membership across societies and individuals. The descriptive results show striking
differences between countries, made especially clear when the countries
are organizccl by prior regime type. \7hile the older democracies and the
p<rst-rrrrtlroritrrrirrn countries generally have high rates of organizattonal
n-rcn-t['rcrshi;r, tlrc clata show that there are extremely lornr, and perhaps even

clcclining, lcve ls of membership throughout post-communist Europe. Moreover, while there is a great deal of variation within the older democracies and
post-authoritartan prior regime type categories, the varratton among postcommunist countries appears to be differences that are "in degree , " and not
"in kind." This conclusion is confirmed by multivariate regression analysis,

which shows that when controlling for other country-level economic,

political, "clrhzationalr" and temporal factors, 2S well as for a host of
individual-level variables a country's prior communist experience has a
very strong negative impact on the organi zatronal membership of its citizens
today.

Although very important within the cross-national perspective of this

chapter, the establishment of a strong statistical effect of the pr:ior communist
experience still does not tell us very much about uthy this is the case. \7hrtt wtts
it about the communist experience that makes citizens <lf posf-c<)nlnttnist
countries much less likely to j<>in orgilttizitti<llts tltrt tt citizctrs ol- couttt t'it's
45 As wirlr 'lirblt'4.r r.,'lirlll,' .l.r t ,'ru ltttl,'r llr.' 1'ttt,'r ,ttttlr,rttl,ttt.tll ('\l)('lt('tt( (' \/,ttl;tltlt', ',tlt((' tl
is tlrc t'rt lrrtlt'tl r;llr'11o1\' ol 1t",,' l('lr,ltllt' l\'p('

Ciuil Society in Comparatiue Perspectiue

9r

from comparable economic backgrounds, living in democ ratrc systems with

comparable political rights and civil liberties, and even for a comparable
number of years ? This question is central to the individual-level theoretical
perspective of this book, and I address it in the followitrg chapters.
In short, the finding of low post-communist organizattonal membership,
as described and charactertzed in considerable detail in this chapter,
presents a puzzle that needs to be explained. It is all the more surprising
since, as mentioned in Chapter j, many analysts claim that the actual
number of volunt ary organizations has been increasing considerably in
the past decade. The next two chapters seek to provide a caus aI argument
that accounts for the particularly low levels of org antzatronal membership

in post-communist Europe, by using two distinct, yet complement aty,

methodological approaches. Chapter 5 applies quantitative analysis of a
specially designed representative survey conducted in Germany and Russia,
while Chapter 6 incorporates qualitative and interpretive methodological
techniques based on in-depth interviews with ordinary Russians and East
Germans. Both chapters develop and apply the "experiential" theoretical
factors introduced in Chapter z, showitrg how post-communist citrzens link
their current behavior to their prior experiences.

Explaining O r ganizational Memb

Explaining Orga nizational Membershipr An Evaluation

of Alternative Hypotheses

ersh

ip

93

are with post-communist developments, the less likely they are to participate. By taking into account these three specifically post-communist factors,
this analysis considerably improves our understanding of the reasons for low
post-communist membership in the organi zatrons of civil society.
SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS IN \WESTERN GERMANY,
EASTERN GERMANY, AND RUSSIA

This section incorporates the results from the 1999 PCOMS survey of

INTRODUCTION

Having described and analyzed the range of variation in levels of organrzational membership across 3r countries in Chapter 4rlnow turn to an analysis of the factors that explain the distinctively low levels of post-communist
membership. This chapter presents an analysis of the Post-Communist Organizational Membership Study (PCOMS) surveS which was conducted in
'Western
1999 with representative samples in Russia, Eastern Germany, and
Germany, using the same measure of average number of organi zatronal memberships per person as the previous chapter.
In this chapter, I start by briefly revisiting the main socioeconomic factors
deve f opcd in Ohapter 4,butthis time while focusing on the three populations
'West
fr<rm the I)(IOMS survey. The
German sample adds a comp aratle perspcctivc to the East German and Russian samples, and it also enables me to
include the varrable for "prior communist experience" in the analysis. The
results of the PCOMS survey show that, while several of the socioeconomic
variables are statistically signific ant, prior communist experience remains
the most powerful explanato ry factor.
Although - just as in Chapter 4 - the variable "prior communist expe-

rience" is an extremely powerful predictor, substantively, the relationship

remains underspecified. This leads to an obvious question: what elements
of the communist experience can explain why participation in civil society
is so low throughout post-communist Europe today? The final section of
this chapter explores this question in greater detail, examining in particular
people's mistrust of communist organrzations, the persistence of their frienclship networks, and their disappointment with post-communism. The rcsults
show that citrzens with higher levels of mistrust in comrnLnrist orgirrrizatiorrs
tend to be less active in voluntary org;rniz.atiorrs torluy' tlrrrt ltcoplt'whost'
friendship netw<lrks hnrvc pcrsistt'cl irr tlrt'l)()st conunurtist pt'r'iotl ru't'lt'ss
lil<c:ly t<t j<lirr ()r'flrtttizltliorts totl:ty., :lntl tlr:tt lltt' nl()t'(' riis.rl)l)oirtlt'tl pt',,;rl,'

Western Germ dny, Eastern Germ dny, and Russia and tests a set of applicable
individual-level hypotheses.' The goal is to estimate the relative significance
of several independent variables, within each society separately as well as
in the pooled dataset. In this section, I focus on socioeconomic status (SES),
which in numerous studies has been identified as a strong predictor of participation.' Figures 5. r to 5.5 show the levels of organrzattonal membership for
each of the three samples on the four main SES factors - incoffie, education,
age, gender - as well as on city size.
Figure 5. r divides each of the three samples into quintiles based on total
household income, showing the average number of organizatronal memberships per person in each quintile. The results indicate that in all three
societies people with higher levels of income tend to have higher levels of
organi zattonal membership.
Figure 5.2 presents the different education levels within the three samples,
with the country-specific education vartables recoded to fit a continuum that
includes values for lo*, medium, high, and very high.l The figure shows that,
with one minor exception, increasing levels of education are indeed associated with higher levels of organizatronal membership, in all three samples.
The vartable for age is especially approp iate to test in the post-communist

context, where the question of generational change is central to most

'
'

For a full description of the PCOMS survey, see Appendix C.

See the discussion and references in Chapter 4. Note that one feature of the SES model that
I have not incorporated here is job status. Due to the vast changes in the labor market in
post-communist countries, with many people changing their jobs, working in the informal
sector, or not receiving their wages, this category loses its traditional meaning and relevance
irr the post-communist context. Moreover, since many people who worked for decades in a
ccrtain career path still consider themselves as part of that profession, even if they no longer
work in it, I would expect problems of validity and reliability in the measurement.
l;or tlrc l{ussian sample, the scores correspond to the following categories: low is "primary"l
rrrt'rliunr a1'rplics to "non-complete secondarS" "secondary withoutr" "technical schoolr"
"s('corrclrrry witlr," "sc:conclary technicalr" and "special"; high is "non-complete higher";
,rrrtl v('r'y lrigh is "rl lr.iglrcr ccluclrtiort," "two higher educatioflsr" and "post-graduate

strrtlir.s." l,'or tlrt'(it'r'rrr:trr s:rrrrplt'., low is "ohrtc I--lrrupt/V<rlksschulabschluss"; medium is

"l l:rrrpt/Voll<sst lrrrl;rlrsclrlrrss," "llt',rlsc'lrulrrbsclrlrrss (rrrittlt'rc llcifc).," arrd "Abschluss der
l'olytt't lnusr lrt'rr ()lrcrstlrrrlr'(ti./r,,. Klrtssr')"; Itililr is "li;rrlrlrorlrsclrull't'il'("'rltltl "rtllgclttcilrc
,,tlcr Lr, lr1',t'ltrrrrrl.'rrr' | 1,,, lrr., lrrrlrcrlr'/Al''itrrt"; ,urrl v,'r'y lrryilr rs "1":rt lr/l lttt'ltstltrrl;tlls,'lrlltss."

l-

o
n
Lr.r

o1

o.
L

CL

o.

-c
o

1I-

r.c

o
ll

tr

o
E

G
?
o

-
N

c ntr
4l \,/.\.'
o
L

Lowest 1/5

Fourth 1/5

Third 1/5

Top 1/5

Second 1/5

Income Group
@

FiGURE

Russia

Eastern Germany tr Western Germany

-i.r. Income and Organizattonal Membership. Source: PCOMS (tggg).

o zc
L

,-\

l-

oL

o-

a,

o-L

=o
L

:
F

15

=G

c1

.9
F

G
.N

o5
F
o)
l-

o
High

Medium

Education Level
El

FIGURE

Russia

Eastern Germany tr Western Germany

5.2. Education and Organizatronal Membership. Sowrce: PCOMS (t 999).

Very High

.Weakness

96

of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Europe

societal-level studies.a Figure 53 presents the results for each of the three
samples, dividing the respondents into six age groups: under 25, 25-34,
35-44,45-54, 55-64, and 65 and over.s The \7est German sample shows

t-

o
o

that organiza:.:'onal membership is at its highest for people aged 45-54, with
slight drop for those aged 55-64, followed by a much sharper drop for those
65 and over. The East German sample follows the same basic trend, but the
differences among the age groups are much smaller. Finally, the Russian sample is interesting in two respects. First, the life-cycle decline in membership
starts much sooner, as the most active age group is 35-44, and subsequent
age groups show steady declines thereafter. Second, the under 25 age group a sub-sample that is unfortunately missing from the \7est German and East
German surveys - which had very little direct contact with communist organrzatrons, actually has relatively high levels of organizatronal membership.
Although still too early to determine with any certainty, it does appear that,
at least in terms of membership in civil society org anrzations, generational
change is taking place in Russia, with younger people participating more

Ec
(d

LO

(o

$
(o
I

LO
LO

slr)

than their elders.

Turning to gender, Figure 5.4 shows that men belong to org anrzations at
higher rates than women in all three samples. A closer look at the figure, however, shows that the difference rn rates of membership is somewhat smaller
in Rr-rssia - where women's participation rate is 8 8% that of men - than it is
irr cithcr l..astern Germany or \Testern Germany - where women ioin orgaIrizrrtiorrs:rt:r rrrte of 75% and 78"h, respectively, compared to men in each
s()cit'ty. 'l ht'sc rcsults are difficult to interpret, however, since the average
ltt,t'/ ol P:rr-tieiPrrtion for women in \Western Germany is more than double
rlrr'lt'vt'l irr I::rstcnr (icrmany and over three times higher than in Russia.6
liirr:rlly, lii{rLrrc 5.5 presents the results for the three samples in terms of
city sizc.'l'he city size variable has four basic categories: cities with under

rO

CL

(,
L

ct)

s$
I

lO

e
(,

\\
\)
q

orooo residents, those with r o,ooo to 5o,ooo, those with 5orooo to 5oorooo,
and finally cities with over 5oo,ooo. The pattern for \Testern Germany shows
that there is a steady decrease in levels of orga nrzattonal membership as the
size of the city increases. For Eastern Germany and especially for Russia,
however, the trend is actually the opposite: organrzatronal membership tends
to be higher in larger cities. Once agaln, it does appeat that the communist experience - with its large projects for urbantzatton, industrtaltzation,
and the collect wrzatron of agriculture - was responsible for reshaping tw<r
otherwise verv different societies in a simil ar way.

v)
Li

(.)

scf)
I

LO

\3

z
N
bo

rO

N
t-

oc

for example, Richard Rose and Ellen Carnaghan, "Generatiorral lrftccts ()n Attittttlt's lo
Communist Regimes: A Comparative AnalysiS," in l'os/-,\'ot,ir'l Af'ftirs.Yttl. rr, No. r (r.7';5),

See,

(-)

bo

pp.z8-t6.
l w6trltl lili.t' lo llr;rrrl, \lr, lr.rt I lit rr'l,,rr,l l,,r l),rrrtrrrr ,rrt llrr trr r rl l,, ,lt ,ltttt',rrr',lr
ttltl'1, '.
:rrrtl l,'r, l', ,rl ;,.ttlt( tl,tlt,,,t r,, lt( tr ( { }tlli) tltttt' llr, ll,t,,

v)

cf)

Note that since thc F,ast (icl-rrr:yl ilptl Wt'st (,t'r1t:1) s;tntl'tl,'s; ,li.l rtol itt. lrrtlt rrr\' r(',1)()tttlt ttl',
undcr 25., this grrlrrp is lurlotlunirl('lv .'r..lrr.l.'tl ll.ttt lltt ," ,lt',t',

o\
o\
o\

lO
(\l

C\l

lO
,

uos ri)d rorl sdrrls roqruol

t-

lf)
c)

l lrlr.rorlrtzrrrrtbr6

I!

g
Ll-r

o
Lrr

o1

ot-

o-

CL

-c
o

1-

r.c

ll

=1
(E

,9
+.

(E

.N

E
o)

o5

L.

o
Male

Female

Gender
El
FTGLRE

Russia

Eastern Germany tr Western Germany

,t.4. Gender and Organizatronal Membership. Source: PCOMS (t 999).

-/

a.-

a\

.:

N
F

-\

under 1 0,000

50,000-499,999

0.000-49.999

City Size
El
FTGURE

Russia

Eastern Germany

El

Western Germany

(.999).
5.5. City Size and Organizattonal Membership. Sowrce: PCOMS

over 500,000

roo

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Ewrope

5.r. OtS Regression Analysis of Indiuidual-Leuel Membership in Voluntary

Organizations (Russia, Eastern Germany, and'Western Germany, combined)

rABLE

Variable

Model A

Income

Education

(.oz)
.o6*

r4***

(.oa

Ag.

.oo6***
(.ooz)

Gender (male)

.25

***

(.os

City

srze

-.o7***

(.oz)

Prior communist

Model B

Model C

.rz***

(-oz)

(.oz)

.rz***
(.ol )

r3 ***

(.ot

(.oor

(.o+

(.o+

-.o8***
(.or)

-.ooo6

AJ

**

(.oz)

- r. 26***
)

- r. 6r***
(.os

SIrl-'.

-.05

(.os

Adjusted R'

.zr***

r .44***

(.o+

Russian dummy

Constant

.ooz#
(.oor )
.zz***

experlence
East German dummy

r o***

(.t)

r.44***

r -49***

(.tr

(.rr)

.o4

-34

.35

.98
2644

-97

-7n

r.r8
2644

2644

No/r': 'lirlllc crttrics arc unstandardized regression coefficients, with standard errors in parenthe-

'l'he dependent vari:rble is the average number of

organrzational memberships per person.
.oor ; # p < .ro (all one-tailed)
Source: Data come from PCOMS (rggg).
scrs.
*

l, ..o5;** P < .or;*** p <

Now we can turn to regression analysis to measure the effect of these five
basic variables on organi zational membership, while also controlling for
individual-level prior communist experience. I operationalize the prior communist experience within the pooled sample in two ways. First, I substitute
a dummy variable for prior communist experience, with Russians and East
Germans coded r, and West Germans coded o. Second, I include a dummy
vartable for East Germans and a dummy variable for Russians, in order to
compare the direction and strength of the coefficients in both countries and
to ensure that the same causal mechanism is taking place in each. When I
analyze the countries separately, however, I cannot include theser vilrirrlrlcs,
since they are constant for all respondents in each coLrntry.
Tables 5.r and S.z present nrultivuriirtc rcgrcssion r('sr,rlts. lrr 'lirblt. 5.r.,
which inclttdes thc 1-ro<llc,cl rcspotttlcrtts l.l"orrr :rll lllrt'r' c'()untry slunplt.s.,
Moclcl A tcsts tlrt'SliS:utrl c'ily si'r,t'vru'i;tlrlt's tolit'tlrt'r', slrotuvinlg tlr:rt.,:rs frr'1.
tf ictt'tl., iltc't)ttl('., t'tllr(:lliort., :uttl ;ll1(' lt,tv,' l)()\ilit,t' r'llt't ls (ln ()r!,,.vn/.rltorr,tl

Explaining

O r ganizational

Memb er sh ip

IOI

membership, men participate more than women, and city size has a negative
effect. Of these five variables, income, age,7 gender,and city size are all highly
statistically significant, while education has somewhat less significance. Despite these significant coefficients - which should not be surprising, given the
very large sample size - Model A explains only 4"/" of the variability in this

pooled sample.
Model B adds the individual-level variable for prior communist experience. In this model, with the exception of age, all of the variables are statistically significant, most highly so.'When looking at the coefficients, however, it
becomes clear that most of the explanatory power comes from the prior communist experience variable, which is associated with a very large decrease
of r.44 in the predicted, organizational membership. Moreover, Model B explains 34To of the variability in the sample, a major improvement over the
Russian
4"/o explained by Model A. Model C substitutes East German and
j"--y variables for prior communist experience, and the results show that
the two variables have similarly strong negative effects, both highly statistically significant and with similarly low standard errors. The effect of being
East German is associated with a decrease of r.z6 in the predicted otganizational membership, while being Russian is associated with a slightly larger
decrease of r.6r. That these coefficients are so similar suggests a strong
commonality between East Germans and Russians, at least in terms of their
organizational membership.
f"Ut. 5.2 presents a multivariate analysis of the three country samples,
showing the most fully specified model for each country separately. The
results show that income and education have positive and statistically significant effects in all three countries. Age is significant only in Russia, showing
a negative effect on participation, which is surprising given that the effect
is positive in both Eastern Germany and Western Germany. The ef"f
"ge gender is positive in all three countries, showing that men participate
fect of
more than do women, and it is statistically significant in Eastern Germany
and in'Western Germany, but not in Russia. Finall5 city size is statistically
significant only in the West German sample, where it has a strong negative
ef-fect, unlike the slightly positive, but not statistically significant, effects of
city size in the Russian and East German samples.
overall, the fully specified model of the SES variables and city size combine to explain 3o/" of the variability in the Russian sample, 5% in the
'West
German sample. Given that
l.last German sample, and xooh in the
experience is by far
communist
prior
Table
in the pooled sample from
5.r,
this suggests that
variables,
independent
other
nrorc powerful than any ofthe
missed by the
are
factors
that
post-communist
r ht'r'c nrrry bc othcr specifically
prior
commuthe
of
itsclf,
the
cstablishment
itr
intpor-taltt
Sl,lS rtrotlcl. Whilc
<lrganizations
irr
thc
prrrticipntion
orr
lrr.girtivc
cfti'ct
str()ltll
rrist crpt'r'ir.nc(.'s

'Weakness

IOL

of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Europe

al
cl
ol

rABLE S.z. OLS Regression Analysis of Indiuidual-Leuel Membership in Voluntary

Organizations (Russia, Eastern Germany, and Western Germany, separately)

Variable

Russia

Eastern Germany

'Western

Income

.o5**

.o9***

(.oz)
Education

.o6*

(.ot )
- -**
.r)

.r5***
(.ot )

(.ot)

(.o5

Ag.

-.oo3

Gender (male)

(.ooz)
.o4

size

Constant

(.oz)

.ooz

.ooo7

(.oot

(.ooa

.r8**
(.oz)

.44***

.oz

.oo4

(.or)

(.o+

-.r5***

.24*

.o07

(.os

City

(.os

(.o+)

Cg

Germanv

.zr**

cOl

'-N
a
a

c3
oa

(Uu)
EC
L-l-o

fr
I
L\-

'F
tE

'-N
E
o i

9E
o-=
/l\

t-

oq.,.=F9
.*t
+,
i=OOoc
OCCCiE

Es

(D c=

F='--

CS

>
L

r-,

@8trtrtr

4..

6.oo

o
c

FEg
R(o
-L_

9q
60x
olFlUi
Eqb
_c!F
bo6
>\>c
Fb6

CS

91

=
o
c
a
o
o
E
a

ab
L(Dtrl

.a

tr

oo(u
-o=_
E.>:

gHb A
; T-E- Ro\
6-*:o

r.24***

(.tz)

(.zo)

(-26)

Adjusted R'

.o3

.o5

.ro

SEE

.72

I.ZI

roo9

.96
842

793

Note: Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with standard errors in parenof organrzational memberships per person
in each country.
* p ..o.t; **
lt < .or;*** P < .oor (all one-tailed)
Sr>urcc: l)atrr corne from PCOMS (tggg).
theses. The dependent variable is the average number

-??5^-

c
.0,

EJ

.9 '6
a F'= o
-.=
o-c-

o,
o
c

Lo=

Ha3 ;
-te='=
6r
o^

lA E"e a
E9PP \./
gEEE
sU 8e.,EF
6r:F ,2.!S
E E=iF
nb--b ,;
E"b E
3
u) E
q
q@

S..gg S
e,6 E ? ';
FEA $
_e; g_b
U

of civil socicty does not tell us very much about why this is the case. \7e
still ncccl to unclerstand much more about the nature of that communist
cxpcrience, arrd why its legacy seems to have such a discouraging effect on
participation in the organizattons of civil society today.
Altern ativ e Explan ation

$-r-

=
FEVEO

F bgEs E
ob EBEs
E
TEEP =
T s552

ur

Before turning to an analysis of specifically post-communist factors in the

survey, Figure 5.6 presents a stacked chart showing the aggregate results to
a different question from the PCOMS survey, in which those people who
are not members of any organizattonwere asked about their reasons for not
joining. Since this question was also asked of West German respondents,
we can identify some common elements of the post-communist responses.
This allows us to investi gate some possible alternative explanations based

on contemporury factors, before turning to the more historical variablcs

connected to the prior communist experience, in order t<l alccount frlr rhc
differences between Russians, East Germans, ancl \rVcst ( lcrrrrllns.
The most important ancl re vealing firrclirrg irr liigrrrr' 5.6 is tht' r'('sl)()ns('

to the option "l ant just rtot irttcrt'slcrl; I just tlort't

w:urt lo lrt'l,lrr1', lo;uty

orgtrttizltfiolts." l)r'slrilr' :l ;llt'tltrlt":t ol trllr't'n,tlivt's.

5(,'.1,,

ol l',:tsl (;('t'nt.uts

gEFE

E.

F;b5'

eP

_6'E= S

3EE3
q, > X I .=
s

E:5= E

grt! 7
-E EPsf
Ea5
E

E
g:ds *
q EsiE
?

u
# HH:o
g
sEea &

FE'E:

gE PE

II
l!

ro4

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

agreed with this option slightly more than the So"h of

Russians who agreed and significantly more than the 36% of \West Germans.
The next option on Figure 5.6 was meant to capture those respondents who
are not simply averse to organizations in a personal sense, but who also
display a wider sense of hostility or antipathy toward them, by agreeing
with the option "I find these organizattons to be completely useless." The
results show that relatively few East Germans or \7est Germans agree with

in this sample

this sentiment, whereas almost t8"/o of Russians do agree with it. \fhen
these first two options ate combined, however, one sees that a total of
68% of Russians and 6o"/o of East Germans have very negative views to'West
German
ward volunt ary organi zattons, compared to only 42"/" of the
sample.

Since this question was posed only to respondents who are not members of any organi zattons, the contrast between the three societies is even
starker in the context of the overall survey where 8 f/" of \fest Germans are
members of at least one organi zatton, ds opposed to 52"/" of East Germans
and 35% of Russians. In other words, within the full population (i.e., not
just non-members), the relative percentages of people who simply do not

want to join any organizations or who find organizations to be useless

is very high in Russia and Eastern Germany, and much lower in \Testern
Germany.
The responses to the third option , "I am interested in these activities, but I
don't have the time to participater" provide an interesting perspective on the
clistinctions lrctween these three societies. Since\fest Germans live in a highly

it is perhaps not surprisittg that over 3o"A of

Wcst (icrrrrruls view the lack of free time as an obstacle to their participation
in orgrrnizertior-ls. In Russia, in contrast, where the new economy is replete
witlr inefficiencies and lack of productivity, under 6% of the respondents
claimed that lack of time was a reason for not participating. East Germans,
with r9"/" responding in the affirmative, seem to fit in between Russians and
\West Germans in this regard.
Another possible explanation for the avoidance of orga nrzatrons involves
the inaccessibility and ineffectiveness of existin g organtzattons, which is certainly more of a reality for Russians than for either East Germans or \7est
Germans. The next two options capture respondents who agreed with the
followitrg statements: "Nobody has invited loffered me to join any organizatronsr" or "f do not really know of the activities of any of these organizations; if I knew more, maybe I would consider participating." A total
of n"/o of \West Germans, rz"/" of East Germans, and ztoh <lf Russians ilt
this sample responded affirmatively to one of these two opti()ns, showing
rrclvrrrrcccl rrrirrl<et economy,

that voluntary organizatrons are indeec-l lcss publicly visiblc irr l{ussi:t t lrrtrt
in Germany, and clnly slightly nr()rc so itt li:rsl('r'n ( it'r'nlrlny lltrut ilr Wt'slt't'n
Gcrrnat'ly. llilrlrlly., tlrt' l:tst olrtiort irr t'('sl)()ns(' lo tltt' sut'v('y (lu('sliott w:ls
"otll('l- t-('ils()nS.'" :rlrtl lltt't','sulls slttlw llt,tl l',;tlt ( ,r't.tlt,tns,u (',r11.rilt ilt lrt'lw('('tl

Explaining

O r ganizational

Memb ersh ip

ro5

\flest Germans and Russians, but this time they are closer to the Russians, as
many more'West Germans claim to have their own reasons for not joining
organizations.
Overall, the results depicted in Figure 5 .6 show very clearly that many East
Germans and Russians, for whatever reasons, do not want to ioin voluntary
organizations. But the obvious question remains: why not?
POST-COMMUNIST FACTORS IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN GERMANY

This section focuses on Russia and Eastern Germany, in order to achieve a

better understanding of the prior communist experience and to specify why
so powerful. I start by
its negative effect on organiz
ntroduced in Chapter 2'
presenting hypotheses for the
oled sample of Russian
and then I turn to the regres
and East German respondents, as well as for each society separately. Overall,
the analysis shows that the mistrust of communist organizations, the persistence of friendship networks, and post-communist disappointment all have
both substantive and statistical significance for explaining post-communist
citizens' current behavior and organizational membership.

Mistrust of Communist Organizations

The first factor connects people's mistrust of organizations in communist
times to their current participation in organizations. The assumption of the
argument is that the collapse of communism did not create a tabula rasa by
erasing people's prior experiencesl rather, those very experiences influence
people's current behavior. This is not to suggest that the communist orga.rir"tion. were analytically equivalent to civil society organizations. On the
contrary, they were neither voluntary nor autonomous, and participation in
them was often forced, coerced, or undertaken for instrumental and careerist
purposes. Whether people participated willingly or not - which, of course,
depinded on the type of organization, as well as on each person's individual
situation and choices - they did have extensive experience with these orgaruizations, which were omnipresent in communist societies. This hypothesis
suggests that the more people mistrusted communist organizations, and the

rngre they avoided them during the communist period, the less likely they
will be to participate in voluntary organizations today. The logic of this arltsmcnt goes against a common view, articulated optimistically by many in
thc carly post-communist period' that those people who had avoided or opposcd corrntunist organizations would be eager to participate now that the
t orrrrrrrrrrist systcln tto lottgcr cxists, and that people who were active during
rlrt' corrrrrrtrrrist pcriod wortld ltc lrt<trc rcsigttccl lrrrcl passive today.
'lir rrrr.:tsrrrt.tlris lrypothcsis, rlrc l)(l()MS srtrvcy iltcltrclctl tlrtcstions abottt
tltc s;rtrtc ttittt't;ttt'1iot'lt's ol ot1',rtttiz;tliotts irl. ltrtlt'tl irl tht'Worltl Vlrlrrcs

Exp laining O r ganizati onal Memb er sh ip

-lo\
o\
o\

.9''

r07

Survey, only this time referring to membership in state-run communist

organizations. Figure 5.7 presents the level of mistrust of communist organrzations by both Russians and East Germans - measured by the extent
to which they avoided joining organizatrons in the communist period - as
well as their mean organi zatronal membership today.s The results show great
similarities between the countries: increasing mistrust of organizations duritrg the communist period seems to be closely associated with decreasing
levels of orga nrzatronal membership today.

o-

(,

The Persistence of Friendship Networks

\\)

The second argument that I incorporate into this analysis involves the Priuate networAs that developed in the communist system. These networks arose
because the shortage economy created a climate in which people needed connections and help to acquire many goods and services, and because the public domain was so controlled and politic tzed that people formed trusting ties
with their close friends and family. This hypothesis predicts that those people who have maintained their vibrant friendship circles will feel less need or
desire to participate in voluntary organizatlons. To operationalize friendship
networks and to measure change in networks over time, the PCOMS survey
included questions (at different points in the questionnaire) referring both
to the communist period and to the contemporary period, asking how often
people used to rely on, or currently rely or, friends for help in fixing their
house or car) or assisting someone in their family, or in coping with difficult
situations in gen eral. I then constructed two indices of reliance on friends,
one for the communist period and one for the contemporary period. Finally,
to measure the persistence of or change in these networks, I subtracted the
current index from the communist index, yielding three basic categories: less
reliance, more reliance, and no change. Since the important cleavage is between respondents whose use of personal networks ha s decreased and those
for whom it has persisted., I group together respondents whose reliance on
friends is either "the same or more." Figure 5.8 thus differentiates between
respondents with either "low" or "high" levels of persistence of friendship
networks.
The results show interesting differences between Russians and East
Germans. For Russians, levels of participation in voluntary organizatrons are
virtually identical, whether or not their friendship networks have persisted
(i.e., whether or not they currently rely on friends as much as they used to).
lior llrrst (icrrnans,, however, those people whose personal networks have
rr<rt 1-rcrsistccl sr)cln to 1'rrrrticiprrtc in voluntary organizatrons at higher levels

o
L
o

.9

E
E

ri

q
>.

E,

+,

-t

ct)

c
L
J

!t

U)
a.)

c
c(E
fN
Pc

.9

-P

9(u
t

ct)
L

o
+,
.9

q)

tsl

e
ri'(

bD

=
E
E

(t

r{-

o
o

J
L
+t

.9,
rts
=
o

o
o

N
bo
l-{

J
ts

(,
P
(t)
r-t

l-r
P

U)

z
r'
aa

nc\l

Y-oqqnclo
rOOOO

uosrad .red sdlqsraqwouu lBuollBzluBoJo

r4

u
tt

ll 'lll(.(,tlt.1,.rlr\,()l "l111v" lpislrrrsl ltlllllit's lo lltost'rvlt,l \v('t('ltt('ttlllt'r's olt 4-r1 c()lllllltlllist <lr"rtt,.,1111" 1lt5lt1,rl lo lltr)!,(' wlr,r lrr'l,,tr;',.'tl t,, I r()tlttltttltisl r)l'[l;lltiz:tlirltts, :ttttl
1,,.11/,tlt()1.,,
-'lrrlilt' 11.,1t1.,1 l(f 11t,,.,.'rvlr,, \v('t('nt('ntlt,-ts ol ,rttl\',) .'(ottlllllllll\l
ot1l.llll/,tlt(rtts.

0.8

E
o

07

o.
L

to

o6

CL

05

c)

-o
tr

04

(tr

03

.!

02

low

high

Level of Persistence of Friendship Networks in the Post-Communist Period

@

FIGURE

Russia

Eastern Germany

5.8. Persistence of Friendship Networks and Organizational Membership. Source: PCOMS (tgggl.

FJ
>r

R-

*E.alit*flrgilE aI E lE[t[iiiFg-E'li
-s
'::;;leii i+$il$ il$FruFE$ilF tiiFF$E'aEI t5aF
=1=:iai

T'ii?iiig
!,ite
l+ [$

*F F{i

llFg HFiF*
Fx gFigi li'EFi

rBF+$an+Fr iE*'
B
E '$lIFi
EFEE llEE

Ilai aEII lag[Eg;Fi gig

iiiiB?
flbi+gxEinF+ari flllgfglieiiif
;?
:*
'_liie+l
gsFtIig
Iil?H*f F+33!iilltEFFi
t*el'i arsis*$r* +iF:

h
od
\'

N
(\.

s.

s'

g;

ag.+i

? E-*

zieFg$l

$i-+i'*$rFEsg

\o

0.9

o
o
L
o

0.8

0.7

o.

o
o.
o 0.6

.+
?
o
L
o

0.5

.o
e
F

0.4

=6

03

(-

o
?

0.2

01

CD
L

high

medium

Level of Disappointment with Post-Communism

El

Russia

Eastern Germany

FrcuRE 5.9. Post-Communist Disappointment and Organizational Membership. Source: PCOMS (tSSg).

r.r.BLE

-i.-i. OLS Regre,r-sion Anah'sis oi Indiuidual-Leuel Membership in Volunnry Organizations

R:rs-.i.i

.lrd Etsten Germany, combined and separately)

R+EGr

\ anable

R+EGz R+EGt

I:c t ;ne
E.iucarion

Rr

Ge

n'Jer imale)

.og***
(.oa

.o6*

.r5***

slze

-\Lsrrust of communist
*f

Pe

a -r***
.)/

(.ot

FSdIltZatlOnS

:sistence of friendship

-.05

:ie rw-orks

(.o+

sappointment

-.r

4***

(.oz)

r.5r***

(.ol

(.ooz)

.or

5EE

.86
r 85r

.8r
r934

r 8o6

.\

(.o6)

(.o+
(.oa

.o5
(.os

(.ot

.o3
(.o5

-.r3*
(.oz)

(.tz)

)
-. r o**
(-ot)
r.r8***
(.tt )

(.zo)

.03

.II

.rz

.o5

.II

.r3

.72

.7o

.69

.92

r oo5

r oo5

.96
842

.92

Too9

929

8or

(.oz)

.r3

(.tr

.oo4

(.oz)

r 3***

.o3

.o7

(-ot)

(.o+)

\dlusted R'

stant

r 8***

.oz

-.o7*

-.

-.oo3*

EGa

.ooz
(.oor

-.36***

r.36***
(.r+ )
.r5
.8r

Con

(.os

(.os

L.n-

EGz

EGr

R3

(.oz)
(.ot
_\qe

Rz

**
.o5

.2,4*

-.o5
(

.o4)

r.or***
(

.r7)

.oe)

(.zs

Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of organizational
memberships per person in each country.

\otej
-

p < .o5; **p

. .ot; ***p < .oorl #p < .ro

Source: Data come from PCOMS (1999).

(all one-tailed)

IIZ

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

For each of the three sets of regressions, the first model shows the four
variables from the SES model and city size, the second model shows my three
posr-communist variables, and the third model shows all eight variables
combined. The results show clearly that the addition of the post-communist
variables significantly improves our understanding of organi zattonal membership. In all three samples, the adjusted R-squared scores for the postcommunist variables are much higher than for the SES factors alone, and
they rise slightly when all eight vartables are included together.
Of the SES factors, income remains the most statistically signific ant.
Education is also statistically significant in the SES models, but loses its significance when included in the fully specified models. Ag. has a significant
negative effect in the fully specified model in Russia, but less so in Eastern
Germany. As akeady noted, men participate more than women, particularly
in Eastern Germany, where gender is statistically significant in the complete
model. Finally, city size has little to no statistical significance in most of the
models.

Looking more closely at the effects of the post-communist varrables, we

see that the mistrust of communist organi zatrons is by far the most powerful
explan atory factor. In the fully specified model of the pooled sample , dn
increase in one unit on the three-unit scale of mistrust is associated with a
predicated decrease in organizattonal membership of .36, a very large figure
considering that the mean of organizatronal membership is only .45 in Russia

and .78 in E,astern Germany.

Ocnerally speaking, there are two ways of interpreting the strong effect
of pcopler's rnistrust of communist organizations. First, focusing on those
pcople who r-rsed to participate at high levels in the communist organuzations, many of thern did so because they wanted to. \7hile almost all citizens
of cornmunist countries had little choice about being members of the trade
union and perhaps one other organizatron, it is very likely that those people
who participated in four or more org antzattons did so by choice - whether
for instrumental reasons or simply because they enjoyed participating in the
various activities. In other words, the active participants in the communist
organi zatrons probably developed positive associations with organizations,
and had positive experiences while participating in them, which have translated into higher levels of participation in volunt ary organizations today.
In contrast, the people who did not join any communist organizations,
or who were perhaps members of one or two, but no more, most likely
had unpleasant experiences and developed negative opinions about organtzattons. Tod^y, even though the circumstances surrounding parrticipatiolt
have changed entirely, since people are now free to fornr rtncl ioilt ()rgrlntzattons that are not state-controllecl, thc bchrtviorrtl prtttct'tts of lttrltly of'
these formerly inactivc pa rtic:ipiurts ()r' n()rr-llrt rticip:t tt ts tlo ltot :l l)l)c'rt l' lo
have chatngccl vcry ltruclr. 'l'lrt'ir rlisintt't't'sl irr., rllttl pt'l'llitl)s ('v('tt ;ttlliprrtlly
towlrrrl., lrll l<irrtls ol ()r'[',llrrizrrli<,tts tlr;tt .lt'vr.'lo1lt'tl ,ltrlrrrli llrr'it'('\;rt'l'l('tl(('

Explaining Organizational

Membership

nj

with communist organi zattons seems to have carried over into the current
period.e

As described earlier, friendship networks have lost their salience more

in Eastern Germany than in Russia. Moreover, those East Germans whose
friendship networks have persisted or even intensified are less likely to join
volunt ary organi zatrons, whereas those who have experienced more disruption in their own networks are more likely to participate. In the fully specified
model for the East German sample, the persistence of friendship networks
has a statistically significant negative effect on current organ Lzatronal mem-

bership. These results show that, at least in Eastern Germdny, there is often
a trade-off between the vibrant social networks that developed during the
communist period and the propensity to participate in volunt ary organva'

tions today.

Finally, the disappointment variable is highly statistically signific ant in

the pooled sample, where an increase in one unit on the three-unit scale of
disappointment is associated with a predicted .o8 decrease in organrzattonal
membership. Disappointment is also significant for the East German sample, but not in the fully specified model for the Russian sample - a finding
that can parttally be attributed to its negative correlation with the income
varrable, which thus masks some of its statisti cal effect. \ilhile not as powerfully as for the other variables, these results show that disappointment with
post-communism is an inhibiting factor to participation in voluntary organrzattons. In short, as expected, the more people are disappointed, the less
they will participate.
CONCLUSION

Overall, these findings show that the three post-communist factors I have
presented here help considerably to explain the reasons for the particularly
low levels of organrzattonal participation in post-communist countries. The
specification of these three main elements of the communist experience elucidates the finding - both on the country level, with the cross-national study
'West
Germans added to
,.tf 3t countries, and on the individual level, with
the East German and Russian samples - that the dummy variable "prior
communist experience" is by far the most significant when tested against a
h<lst clf alternative explanations.
The common theoretical element of these three causal factors is that, in
sr:cl<irrg to survive in a complex and fast-changing world, people use their
llri<)r cxl)cricnce's as rl rcfcrcnce p<lint for their current choices and actions.
Wirlrout corrsiclcring tlrosc cxp(:ricttccs - how they shaped people, and how
1rt'oplt' r'r'flt'ct ul)()n ltttrl irrtcrpt'r't tltt'rn

focllty wc will have only a very

'' lrr tlrt' lollon,urll ( lr,rlttt'r, I r'rPlorr llrr",r' r.r,ru('.r ur nrrrr lr lirt',rl<'l tlt't;ril, lll irrgirrlg ilr tlrt'st<ll'it's
Irr lrn ilt.ilr\' (f l tttt' llt rlr'1ttlr rlll('l \'l('\\' I(",|liltttlt.ttl',

rr4

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

Explaining Or ganizational Memb

ersh

ip

II5

limited understanding of post-communist citizens and early post-communist

socletles.

Having shown the relative similarity among the countries in postcommunist Europe in Chapter 4, and having specified several important
causal factors that can account for the low levels of post-communist
participation in this chapter, the next chapter seeks to contribute a more
comprehensive and discerning account of the ways in which post-communist
citizens understand their prior experiences and explain their current choices

and activities. By analyzing 6o in-depth interviews, with a stratified random sample of 3o ordinary East Germans and a quota sample of 3o ordinary Russians, I incorporate an interpretive methodological approach that
complements and bolsters the findings presented in this chapter.

r.

Official May

demonstration in the GDR, with unsubtle Stasi observe r facrng

camera (photo by A. James McAdams, rgSS).

l. ( ,l';t s\
[Vlor 1r' I

l',1'(

)WS

l,,w,u,l,,

in rul t'rttpty fit'ltl llr,rt lr\t'tl to lrt'tlt,'llt'r'lirr Well (photo by Marc

t

,).t

.:

).

Why Post-Communist Citizens Do Not Join

Orga nizations: An Interpretive Analysis

\o
o\
o\

INTRODUCTION

4 charactertzed, illust rated, and demonstrated the particular weakof civil society in post-communist Europe, and Chapter 5 employed
statistical analysis to identify and test the explan atory power of a set of
individual-level causal factors that could account for levels of partici pation, both across and within countries. This chapter adopts a very different
Chapt er

rG)
Lr

()

ness

Llr

methodological approach, based on qualitative and interpretive techniques,

incorporating the findings from in-depth interviews with 3o East Germans
and 3o Russians, conducted in the spring and summer of 1998.' The goal
here is to reach an understanding of the lives, experiences, motivations, and
behavior of post-communist ctttzens that is far more discernitrg and complete
than can be provided by answers to closed-ended survey questions. This interpretive approach allows for an in-depth consideration of the complex and
fascinating life stories of my respondents, thus complementirg the statistical
approach frorn the previous chapter.
The objective of this chapter is to provide a detailed discussion of the
cognitive and experiential reasons why people do or do not participate in voluntary organizatrons. Since the distinctive characteristic of post-communist
civil society is the low level of participation by ordLnary citizens, I devote
tlre bulk of this chapter to the respondents who do not participate in any
v<>luntary organizatrons. I build upon the three main causal factors that were
irrtroclucccl theoretically in Chapter z and analyzed statistically in Chapter 5,
btrt hcrc I spcll ther-n out and elaborate them more fully. By weaving in the
stor-it's rrrrd worcls of nry respondents, I show the relevance and importance

,.n

o l' t lrt's(' t lu'cc

\3

e
('i

$-r

.T(
Q

a
Ci
Cd

a-)

()
CC

(.)

(,
l--r

f:ltctors.

|) l''r,,r t.l,'t,r tlt'l:ttlt'tlrlist ussiorr ol nr1, r('s(',r r..'lr rrrt'tlrocls lor- tht' in-clcpth interviews,
It,,rt | ',t l, t lr tl trt\ r(.ll'lott,lt nl',, llort nr\' ',,rrrr1'rl('s ( ()nrl):u t' lo llrt' l,rrgc N srtrrrplcs
( )Nl(r'.ut\( \. trrtl lrorr | .,,tr,ltr. l,,l tlr, trrlcr \ r( \\,.,, .r,r rr,,'ll .rs llrt' ;rt lrr;rl irrlt'r vit'w
, r, lt ttrlr t\ t( \t

rzz

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Cornmwnist Europe

wHY POST-COMMUNIST CITIZENS DO NOT JOIN ORGANIZATIONS

A careful analysis of my interviews reveals a host of factors that explain why
so many post-communist citizens do not ioin voluntary otganizations. Some
of these factors, such as old age or poor health, lack of time, or insufficient
exposure to organizations, are typical for respondents in Western societies
as well, and in this sense an East German or Russian respondent could quite
easily resemble someone from'Western Germany or the United States. As
demonstrated statistically in the previous chapter, however, the traditional
socioeconomic explanatory factors can account for very little of the variation
in participation within post-communist societies. As a result - just as Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady were able to apply an extensive survey database that
incorporates more precise and contextualized factors that go beyond the
basic SES model - this chapter uses qualitative and interpretive methods to
identify and clarify the specifically post-communist factors.'
As developed in Chapter z and applied in Chapter 5, these three factors
include: (r) the mistrust of communist organizations; (z) the persistence of
friendship netwofks; and $) the disappointment with post-communism. The
first two are a direct legacy of the communist past, while the third has to do
with more recent post-communist developments and their failure to live up
to rhe particular expectations that many people had in r989-9r. These three
broad factors, whiie analytically distinct, are mutually reinforcing in their
effect on public participation, and to varying degrees all three apply to the
full sct of othcrwise diverse and distinct countries in post-communist Europe.
Morcovcr, thcy can be understood only in the contexts of the communist
cx1'rcricrrcc and <lf how people today reflect upon, interpret' and evaluate
thrrt cxpcricncc.
'fo better understand these factors, I address each of them individually.
This does not mean, however, that they occur in isolation from one another.
on the contrary, they arc inter-related, and many people are clearly influenced by more than one factof, and sometimes even by all three. My objective
is not to specify the exact proportions of the influence, because these vary in
idiosyncratic ways that cannot be measured or fully understood. Rather, the
main goal here is to specify the different types of motivations expressed by
and to show why
-y respondents in order to explain their non-participation,
expefience.
communist
of
the
nature
particular
the
to
consider
it is necessary
to underin
order
developments,
post-communist
recent
that
of
as well as
Europc.
post-communist
throughout
participation
levels
of
low
stand the

Mistrust of Communist Organizations

The explanatory factor for l<lw lcvcls of P()sI c()lllllltlttist ()r1',:tttiz;tti()tt:tl

membership thrrt Icorrsirlcr lirst lt'rs lo tlo witlr lrt'oplt"s tttislt'ttsl ol
' Vt'rl,.t,

Sr

lrl,,zlrt.ttt,.trr,l l"r.r,lt, \'t't,, ,ttt,l I 'lt,rltll

Why Post-Communist Citizens Do No/ Join Organizations

r23

communist organizations. Having recognrzed this general finding in the

larger population in Chapter 5, I now turn to the more detailed picture
provided by my own in-depth interviews, which specify how people's prior
experiences with organi zatrons help to explain their levels of participation
today. I start by presenting the East German responses, before contrasting
them to the answers given me by -y Russian respondents.
The explanation given by 46-year-old East German male journalist who
^
provides a starting point for this discuswrites for a major German weekly
sion: "I think it's the same for many GDR citizens; they believed in somethittg
once, and they don't want to anymore. " In other words, having been engaged
and active in organi zatLofis for much of their lives, many post-communist
cittzens are reluctant to try joining agarn) even though they now live in free
and non-coercive conditions.

\fhat is interesting and surprising is that post-communist citrzens rarely

distinguish between the obligatory organizations of the communist system and the volunt ary organizations of a free society. For example, an
East German 64-year-old retired male electrician claims: "'Well, I would say
that I'm just not interested in that anymore. I spent many, many years doing
group work, and I thought it would change things, but basically nothing has
changed. " In other words, his frustration with the ineffectiveness of his past
organi zatronal experiences is an essential element that explains his inactivity
today. A a6-year-old East German female secr etary describes her reasons for
not participating as follows:
\7ell, I have a really hard time explaining it. If I say I have no time, then it sounds
like abanal excuse. I have to say that in GDR times, we were forced to join many of
these kinds of organtzattons. And after the Wender3 I said to myself, I'm not joining
anything ever again. I'm somehow frightened about joining, or I simply have no more
desire for it. At least that's what's happened to ffie, and also in my familg I have to
say, it's been confirmed, and many others feel that way too. Very simply people sort
of, well, probably, because there was a certarn pressure there back then, and they had

to do a lot of things that they didn't want to do, and now it's swung in the opposite
direction, and they say, no, not again.

Most striking in this quotation is her insistence on never joining anything

ag'ain, which shows that she views her life, despite the momentous changes

continuit5 where her current

sitturtion crlnnot be understood without reference to her past experiences.
'l.frcir rclr-rctance t<l join voluntary organizatrons today does not necessar-

rrrrd upheaval of the'Wende, as havitrg a certain

ily

nr(:lu.r

t lr;t

t tht'y

tlrat prcople are uninterested in the goals of these organLzatrons or

( )pp()sc) tlrcir cxistcnce. For many people, their non-participation
sirrrlrly rt'flt'c'ts tlrcir pcrsonel choicc n<lt to be members. This point is well
I I lrt' ( ,r'rnr.ut lctnr \\''r'llr/r' rtrt',rn', lttcr.rllv' "turn ()r ".lt,utll('1" l'tut irr llris ,-()rlt('xt, it rr'ft'rs
ll,,','r,'111'.,,1 1,1Ii,; .trr,l llt, r.tlrlll untltr.tltott lrto( (".'.

t<t

rz4

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Europe

stated by one respondent,

a 56-year-old male East German

lawyer, who is

now employed by the German state and thus lives very comfortably: "Many
people from the former GDR feel that way, that they say, 'we were members
long enough, and now we don't have to be members in order to be engaged in
somethirg, or to support something.' " Similarly, a z9-year-old East German
male mechanic explains his aversion to group membership:

I don't want to commit myself to anything, not to some group. I would rather be
independent, free. . . . If I say, "Now I want to do something for the protection of
animals," then I go and give a contribution, or ask if I can do something. But only
once. I don't want to be depend ent again and then have to go regularly or something. I
don't want that. . . . F GDR times] it was more or less an obligation, and they forced
you in or told you that you must do this or that. But it's just that dependency, where

they tell you "yo., must go to this meeting" or whatever, and it was an obligation,
that'swhat I don't want. And therefore I don't do that now, be dependent somewhere.
I'd rather think for myself.

Why Post-Communist Citizens Do No/ Join Organizations

rz5

join Greenpeace or something, I don't want at all to be an active member. I also don't
want to just sit here and and think about which action I have to do next or something.
For me that time is, I'll say it now, over. I now prefer to play the supportive role, that
says, "oka5 it's a good thing what you're doing. \fhere I can help you, I will." But
I don't want to be one of these "organrzation people" anymore.

epitomizes the k.y points of aIl the

others in this section so fan In discussitrg why she does not participate in
volunt ary organizations today, the respondent clearly refers to her past
experiences with membership in communist organizations, even calling
herself "organtzatronally damaged." Moreover, she does not really view
today's " free" organizations as being somethitrg fundamentally different,
and finally, she claims that her unwillingness to join does not mean that she
is not interested in the causes of organrzations.

In a sense, this single quotation

of rcvolutionury upheaval, and their current circumstances, for some peo-

Turning to my Russian respondents, we see that Russians also tend to refer

to their communist past when explaining their current non-participation,
but not as strongly as the East German respondents I have just described,
and somewhat differently.
A 41-year-old man who works for a company that publishes cultural
materials about the city of St. Petersburg shows a similar hostility tow ard
volunt ary organi zatrons. Although he is autom atrcally a member of a cultural
organi zatton through his work, he nev er attends its meetings and does not
pay any dues. \fhen explainitrg why he does not participate in this or any
other organi zatrons, he gives the following answer:

plc thcir c()nur'lunist cxperience evokes extreme and even hostile reactions.

\7ell, reallS

This quotation makes clear how strong the aversion is to membership, which
to many post-communist citizens implies an obligatory participation. It does
not necess arrly represent a rejection of the causes themselves, however. This
respondent seems to think that today's organ tzatrons will make him feel the
way he did before, zS coerced into continued membership or as somehow

"dependent" on the organtzation.

Whilc for rrany people interpretation of their past involves a balance of
positivc rrncl ncflrrtive considerations about the communist period, the years
'l'hc: following rcsponse from a zg-yea?old East German female elementary
sclrool teacher is a striking example of this hostility and of how tt affects her

view of volu ntary organi zattons today:

I think that I'm simply org antzattonally damaged, because of the FD J,+ and also the
Pioneers, and it all gets on my nerves. I just don't want that. For the groups that
are on this list, my view is that, for example, religious organrzatrons, I don't have to
belong to the church to believe. For me that's crystal clear....I also play sports. I go
regularly twice a week to the "sport center" and do something there. But I would
never come to the idea . . . [trails off]. Because just this membership, that's enough! I've
had enough! That's just too much commitment agarn' monthly dues, a membership
card, that's just all too much again. I just want to do it from the inside out, YeS.
Third world groups and human rights organrzations, of course I'tn concertred, :rncl I
do what's in my power. But for that I don't have to let myself bec<tme "tlttiftlrr)tccl.,"
that's not my thing. With animal rights groups it's the same thing., with pcrlcc ltr'()uPs'
it's very clear. If I can do something, gather clothes., sencl packrrg('s ()f c'ourst'., l'll
do it. But I don't need to go to sonre ()rgirrriz,:rtion. Ancl | ,rlso rlort't w:utl lo rtl ,tll.,
a'l'lrt.

lll)J, ()l' lilt.it, l)r.rrtstltt. frrr',..rr.1. \\,,t.. tlr. l,r,.l (,rlttttn

h.onrs()ntt,l. Ilt.',,)nrtnlrttt',1 |otrllt rit( tttlt.'

((ltttt,,tl,ttl

,,1 tlr, l(rr'.',l,rrr

I don't have time, and I'm not interested. But the most important is
that, well, the Soviet systen, it instilled an antipathy or aversion, because any experience with organrzations was unpleas ant. That is, [to many people] an organtzauon
is that which imposes an obligation. And obligations under socialism were so rigid
that now I just don't want to participate. Maybe they [organizations] are completely
different, but I just don't want to.

This response is very similar to those given by several East Germans. This
Russian man's opinion of communist organi zatrons was entirely negative,
viewing membership and participation as an obligation rather than a free
choice, and this experience has left him dissatisfied and unwilling to participate ln any contemporary organlzatlons.
Another example comes from a Sz-year-old Russian woman who works as
slrlcsclcrl< in rr snrall clothing store. She explains, "Maybe it's left over from
t lrc (,ornnrurrists., l'rut I l<ccp ar vcry cautious attitude towards these groups."
1l

Slrt'll()('s orr to tcll rr l()ns story ubout I'rcr crpcricnce while living in Yerevan,
Ar-rnt'rrirr., tlur-rrrr,, tlrt' r.lt'vrtslrttirrti crtt-llrtlu;ll<r' irt 1.2llll. Shc retnembers that
nr;ur\' ( ()nnnurrist or'1!.utiz,tliotts w('r(' pl,'..lr',irrti sul)1'rorl :utrl pr()n'risirrg rricl
lrut tlr.rt lrttlt' ol rt :rt tu.rllt r('.r( lrt',1 tlr,' ;tt',,plt' nr n('('(1. Sin('(' llrcrt.' slt(' :trltls.,
,,1f,'lr,r', r('nr.urrr'.1 \'('rV rlr',lru',llul ,l .rnV l.,t',1 ,rl ollr.'r.rl ()rt',,tt/:tliort- llr

r26

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

other words, like that of many of the East German respondents, this Russian
woman's view of contemporary organizations is tainted by her prior experiences with communist organizations, leaving her feeling detached and
dissatisfied.

The example of an active, mobile, albeit currently unemployed, z4-yearold Russian woman echoes a point made by several of the East Germans.
Although she does not specifically refer to her communist experience in this
,.rporr*, her explanation for not participating shows that the unwillingness to join organizations does not necessarily mean lack of interest:
I'm continuing to be busy with my own things. I'm interested in societal/group activities. I can iook at them, but I'm not ready to participate in them. I don't know,
maybe when I continue my studies, maybe something will change in my life, but for
now, I don't participate in any organizations and I don't want to. It's not interesting to me. If there's something that has to be done, the only thing I know is that
if iomething has to be done, changes in the country or something, then yes, I'll do
it, but for now especially I just don't see any. . ..I like art, theater, and also social
interaction at [evening] parties. I don't miss much. I watch the news, television, for
now things are calm, and I'm calm too. If it's necessar5 I'll do it. If it's necessary
to go ooi to demonstrations, I'll go out to demonstrations, and even, maybe, go
on a hunger strike, if it's necessary. But for now everything is calm, good, and I'm
calm roo. I'm living in the present, now, and I don't want to change anything in this
life.

\While she docs not manifest the same direct hostility toward voluntary organizati<lns that others do, her comments show that she attributes her current
unwillingncss to parrticipate to factors beyond her control, saying that her
aftitude nright change if the situation in the country changes, necessitating
action. Importantly, her apparent passivity is accompanied by a great deal
of interest in and potential commitment to action.

Similarly a successful 37-year-old Russian man who is the director of

an international language institute explains why he is not a member of any
organizations by stressing that he is very active in his own social activities
and beliefs and simply does not want to join any groups:
see any kind of activity where I need a group. I'm active in sports, but I do it
by myself, I don't need to be a member of the group "Dynamo" or "Spartak'" I go to
chur.h, but I,m not about to become a member of a religious group and to fight for
something. It's my conviction, and I'm not about to join something. Political parties,
I meet with them often and I have ties, but I'm not a member of a party. Thcrcforc thc
only thing that could happen is that I could become a member of sottrc clrrb, wht'rt'
I could spend time with my acquaintances and friencls. That's ell'

I don't

This response reveals thilt pc()plc crrrr bc irrvolvt'tl irr :rct ivitit's tlrrtt itr'('trslr
ally ass<lcintccl with s()tn('s()rt ()t v()lunlilry ott',:tttizrtliorts, wltt'lltt'r'r't'li1',i,,rls,
lrthlctir., or polilir;rl, willrr)lrl w;lnlirrli or rt,,'.lirtti to iorrr lll( ()ll',,llll7:lllorl
l

lt:tt t'oortlitt:tlt s l ltost .l( l l\'ll l('\.

Wby Post-Communist Citizens Do No/ Join Organizations

r27

Having addressed the similarities between the East German and Russian
distrust of organizations, based primarily on past experiences with communist organizations, I should also note several differences. The East
German respondents tend to show more anger and resentment toward the
old communist organi zatrons, whereas the Russians display a more general
view of organizations as unnecessary, useless, and sometimes distasteful.
This observation also applies to the responses to the survey question depicted in Figure 5 .6, which showed that, whereas few East German or \fest
German respondents claimed that they find organizatrons "to be completely
uselessr" r8o/o of the Russian non-members did. Nevertheless, what is
especially striking is that in the precedittg quotations the Russian and East
German respondents tended to raise the same issues, show similar thought
processes by evaluating present organizations based on past experiences,
and reach the same conclusion in choosing not to participate. That citizens
in two completely different societies, with entirely different institutions and
cultures, could give such similar explanations constitutes strong evidence for
the explanatory power of people's mistrust of communist organizatrons as
a caus al factor that accounts for the low levels of membership in voluntary
associations today.

Until novv, I have focused on the gre at majority of people who have negatiue
reactions to communist organizations and to their experiences with them,
and who explain their current aversion to volu ntary organi zatrons with rcference to their forced participation in organizatrons in the communist past.
The other element of this argument, however, involves those people who had
positiue experiences with, and therefore low mistrust of, communist organizatrons. According to the logic of this argument, as was demonstrated statistically in the previous chapter, these people should be more acttve partlcrpants
today.
The results of my in-depth interviews also provide strong support for this
aspect of the argument. Of the rr Russian and rz East German respondents
who are currently members of one or more voluntary orgaruzatrons, most
were also members of several communist organizatlons in the past. Moreover, by focusing on those respondents who are most active today, the logic
of the argument becomes even more clear. Of the two R.ussian and three
East German respondents who are currently members of two or more organizations, ail five developed extensive org anrzational experience, skills, and
spririt cluring the cornmunist period.
'l'frc nrost rlctive such respondent is a
3;-year-old East German protestant
l)rrst()r. Obviously vcry rrctivc in u rcligi()us organizatron, h. also participates
in clrru'ity., y()utll.' ,rncl nlusicrrl ()r-llrrrriz:tfions. IIis crr-rciarl experience with
()r't',:rrriz:rliorrs ()('r'rrr-r-t'tl irt tlrt' l:tlt' 1 t,;,tios., r,lurirrR tltt' r('voltrti()ttltry pcri()cl.,
vt,lrcn', .r., .r \'()unt,, slutlt'ltl ol llrt'r,1.,1,,\,., lrr'' lt,',..lnl(' l,',t,lt'r' ol :l sttltlt'rtl ('()tlt
f f uf lrr' rl I r'r;ttt!,,. I lt' ortr',,un tt',,l ,ur,l l,'.1 ,lr'., u',',r()n l',r'()ul)\ ,ttttl tlt'lr,llt's, ,lltrl

rz8

'Weakness

of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

well-known "Monday demonstrations," which ultimately put the most direct pressure on the regime.
Although he was unsure of his career path during his studies, he states that
the excitement of his activities and experiences convinced him to become a
pastor and that he feels a responsibility to help and support his fellow GDR
cittzens in coping with their difficulties after unification.
The next example comes from a very poor 47-year-old Russian woman
who now runs a struggling educational tourism business for children. Today
she belongs to and supports both cultural and women's org anrzatrons. She
also acquired organi zattonal experience in the communist period, both in
her participation in several state-run organizations, such as the Red Cross
and a book lovers' club, and especially in her non-state activities in the
r9}os. Since her (now ex-) husband was a poet, their friends were typically
literary and cultural figures, many of whom were dissidents under suspicion by the regime. She describes her involvement in helpittg to publish underground Samizdat materials, recording Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's banned
Gwlag Archipelago onto a poor quality audiocassette and then distributing
it, and supporting the anti-communist opposition movements in the eatly
r99os) when she spent full days demonstrating on the Palace Square in
Lening rad. The recent revolutionary period was the most invigorating and
fulfilling time of her life, and she claims that she will never stop being active,
no fflarttcr how bad the situation in Russia becomes"
-l'lrc of hcr lLussian respondent belongittg to two organizations is a
5c.l-/crrr-olcl rnrrle actor and theater director active in artistic and charity
()r-prrrrizrrtions. t.lc also developed his interests, skills, and habits during the
c()n.urrurrist pcriod. Although his membership in communist organizatrorrs
wers purely a formality, he was active in literary and artistic circles, which
rnet regularly to read and discuss books and themes that were either banned
or discouraged by the regime. Most importantly, however, he developed
his own artistic talents, both as an actor and a director during that time,
and he has continued his organi zattonal activities in the post-communist
he was an early and active participant in the

Why Post-Communist Citizens Do No/ ]oin Organizations

TL9

Compared to those respondents who have negative associations with the

communist organizations, and who avoid volunt ary organizations today

because they feel that they were forced to join and participate in them in
the past, this woman shows, in her response, that her positive experiences
with organi zatrons during communism have contributed to her willingness
to participate today.
Another East German woman, this one a 56-year-old lawyer, clearly developed her organizattonal skills during the communist period. She was a
willing and an active participant in the Communist Party and especially in
the trade union, in which she organi zed and directed many committees and
working groups. By late t989, she was a public figure, and she spoke on
behalf of the trade union at many of the large demonstrations, in support
'West
Germany. In
of the goal of reforming the GDR without unifying with
the years since unification, she no longer takes part in union activities, but
she remains very active overall. In addition to belonging to a professional
association, she has joined the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and she attends
meetings regularly, giving speeches and making statements that attempt to
contribute an East German perspective to the FDR a party that has made
few inroads into the East German elector ate. It is clear that her enthusiasm for org antzations continues from the communist period, where she had
extensive opportunities to develop organizatronal skills and spirit.
In short, whether one focuses on the small number of their cLtrzens who
are currently active participants in volu ntary organizations or on the vast
majority who have withdrawn entirely from public activities, the common
finding in both Eastern Germ any and Russia is that people's prior experiences
with organi zatrons, and how they interpret and evaluate those experiences,
help to explain why they do or do not partici pate today. Comp ared to the
typical socioeconomic indicators, which are of only limited utility in ex-

plaining post-communist participation, the individual-level focus on prior

organizatronal experiences offers a more rich, contextsaltzed, and accurate
perspectrve.

period.
tWhereas the first three examples involved people who were especially
active in non-state groups and activities, the following two respondents, both
East Germa n, participated in official communist organi zatrons, and they now

A 37-year-old female homemal<er,

member of an animal protectiolr
is
a
optician,
an
as
work
used
to
who
response shows, shc spcrtl<s
following
As
the
club.
a
sports
organizatronand
very positively about her experience with communist orgarti'r,;'ttiorrs:

participate in voluntary organizations.

I was also in smaller clubs., lil<c sp()rts <)l'll:lltiz,:tliolts.

was great. Tlrcn with tlrt' ,l:ltl('(' tit'()tlp.' lltrtl w:ls .rls.,

The Persistence of Friendship Networks

Whereas the mistrust of communist organi zatrons is an easily identifiable factor that !-nany respondents referred to explicitly when explaining why they do
n<rt participate in any voluntary organizattons todag the next two specifically
1'rost-c<)n-ltnunist ferctors must be inferred from other responses given durittg
t lrc in[c'rvicws. Norrcthclcss) ars demonstrated statistically in Chapter 5, these
l:rc't()r-s:ll-t'still v('ry irrrportrtrtI frlr unc]erstanding post-communist patterns
ol n()n l);lrtir'ip:rtiorr irr volurtlru-y ()rsrlrtizrttiorrs. Moreover, they both follow
tlrt'\.ult('llrt'ol't'tir';rl 1,,1',it'., n:ulrt'1y., llr;rl l)('()plt"s il'ttt'l'1-lt'ctlttitllrs tlf past ex'llris st'ctiolt iltt't)t-l')(tt-llt('s
l)('rr('n( ('\ lr.'lgr to ('\l)l.rirr llr,'r t lrtI't'rtl lrt'lr.tt,iot'.
.utollr.'r tlr,'lnt'r rl lrrt' trtlt't vt('\\'',, rvlrr, lt r', 1( )',lt,,rr,' llt.tl ttt,ttty lrrlsl ( ()lllllltllrisl

rjo

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

citizens feel no need to participate in voluntary organizations because they

are yery involved in, and satisfied with, their own private networks of friends
and family.
The survey data in the previous chapter showed that East Germans have
had more changes in their personal networks than have Russians. Moreover,
a regression analysis found that the persistence of personal networks had a
statistically significant negative effect on participation in Eastern Germany,
but no relationship in Russia. The evidence from my interviews adds depth'
context, and perspective to these findings. First of all, while alatge number
of both East Germans and Russians claim that their personal networks have
not changed grealy since the collapse of communism, there have been more
changes in Eastern Germany.5 This should not be surprising, given the much
more radical rupture caused by German unification, along with the complete

restructuring of the labor force and workplace environment. More subtly

and importantlS however, my research shows that there are still strong
similarities between East Germans and Russians. The fact that many East
Germans tell life stories similar to those of Russians further supports my
claim that these two cases may be near opposite extremes on a contrnuum
of post-communist social networks, but with the differences between them
being differences "in degree," and not "in kind." In other words, the
variation between the two cases is much smaller than the variation between
a post-communist society and a non-post-communist society.

The most basic difference in the types of answers given by my respondents

concerns the extent to which relationships between people have changed
since the collapse of communism, and whether any changes have been for
the better or for the wofse. Many of my respondents made sharp distinctions between their assessments of society in general, and their own personal
lives. Regarding society in general, most people claimed that relations had
changed, and mainly for the worse. More specifically, they raised several
key themes, including: (r ) that people now focus on themselues and their own
indiuidual liues muchmore than they did in communist times; (z) that monq'
now plays a central role in relations between people; (3) that new social inequalities have arisen, with sharp delineations between rich and poor; and
(4) that, especially for East Germans, a major cause for these new developments has been the changes in the workplace.
In characterizing interpersonal relations in their respective s<tcietics,
many East German and Russian respondents explained that, in thcir vicw,
people have retreated into their own individual lives nr<>rc. Ijor cxrttttplc, rt
5 Forfurthereviclcnccof thcchrrrrgt'silr l'hst (iertt;utsori,tltttlwttrlis,str'litrtlt V,,llit'r, \/,,1r/,/
auld At'tlu,tirrlttnL In, fryqtil l" l lu' ltt,liltrttrttt: rl ( rurtttrrrrri\ttt, tl't' Iiittt,tltt'tt lt' | ,tl'tt'tlt'ttt

tttdl\,rs,trr,ilNr,/lrt,l/.': llu,(,t','rll.tsl(,t'utt,tn\'(Artr',1,'t,l,tttr, llr,-'r', 1'rrltlr''lr,r". r't'rt)l

Vi,llir.r rrrr.ll,l.rl'."( lr.rrr1it..rrrl',.r.,,,rr,rlNrtr!rrrl.rrrrlr, lilrrrr|r (,1)l(.'l'l' li' rr,,

rrt,l

Why Post-Communist Citizens Do No/ ]oin Organizations

r3r

3z-year-old East German plumber claims that "old friends are now more
focused on themselves. They are not interested anymore in what others
are doing." And a 41-year-old Russian audio technician states that "people
have become more withdrawn into themselves. \fell, maybe this doesn't apply to everyone, and some people still get together with friends, and all is
still good, but for me it's somehow happened that we've drifted apatt."
Another Russian, a 3z-year-old female bookkeeper, expresses her disenchantment with interpersonal relations in even more despondent terms:
Before, friendshlp relations were somehow closer and better. That is, before there was

more of a genuine friendship. Today it's somehow being lost. \7hy? I don't know,
life has become such that everyone is fighting for his piece of bread. Before, the
government gave it to him, and he didn't really think about it. He had time to get
together with friends every d^y, to go here or there, but now, well, it's every person
for himself. Every person for himself, yes.

Echoing the view that relations have deteriorated signific antIy, but this time
from an East German perspective, a 3z-year-old male gardener explains:
It's become colder. . . . In the GDR there was this warmth between people. Maybe they
couldn't stand each other, but they needed each other somehoq because of those
connections. But that's entirely gone now. Everyone does his thing, and everyone
thinks, or maybe tries to convince himself , that "I don't need him, that ass! No, I
don't need him at aIIr I can br'ty anything, go away!" So it's become more aggressive,
and it's colder.

This response brings to light a cruci aI difference between the two case studies, namely, that today the need to use connections to acquire goods and
services is essentially absent in Eastern Germany but largely continues in
Russia. Moreover, as I explain later in greater detail, Russians have to cope
with the realities of economic adversity in a way that East Gerrnans cannot even imagine. As a 34-year-old Russian sanitary-technical worker puts
it, "Everyone has simply withdrawn into themselves, because of their lack
of means. They've withdrawn into themselves, because they have to make
money and feed their families. "
Many respondents in both countries talked about the new importance
of money in their societies. Concerning the effect of money on relations
between people, the Russian language institute director quoted earlier offers
a prototypical response:
Wcll., they Ifriendship relations] have become more monetarily based, I would say,
l'rccirusc vcry mLrch now depends on money, because many friends have become depcncf crrt orr nriltcriarl statu s. That is what has changed. Relations depend on material

,rrrtl linrurcirrl frrctors. llcforc, this als<l cxistcd, but not to the extent that we find
'{:r'r' :r ttcl tttur-lt st r-oltgcr.
f r rtf rr y. Now,r,l,r ys il's nrtt('lt ln

A ) , \,('.u ,,1,1 l',:rst ( it'r'nl:ur \ /()nr:ln., wllo w:ls l'tlt-lll('t-ly l't c()()l( :ltlcl is c:ttrr('ntlv un('rrr;,1()\,('(l,,r.ltls tlr:rt tlrc n('w t,,lt',,1 ttl()tt('y lr,ts irrstill,'.1 ,r s('tts('ol'

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

r3z

enuy)which she believes did not exist in GDR times, and which she views
being destructive of human relationshlps:
Before

it was a community. Families would go away [on vacation]

as

together, and

people did many things together. There was no envy. These days, only money matters.
Today many families are fighting over financial affairs, over inheritance, mainly things
that used to be completely banal. In my family it's no different, and I can give many
examples. It's mainly because some people haven't done well after the.Wende - [two
are] unemployed, for example. . . . Others live up by the Ostsee. They inherited land
from their mother, started a business there, and are now millionaires. Yes, they're
both in the same family. Of course, they both don't speak a single word to each other
anymore, because the [unemployed] ones say, "They took it away from me." And
because of that, it's very, very complicated, yes. This thing, that I was saying, the
Wende, and especially these financial things, have destroyed much, so much. This is
because all of a sudden envy plays a role where it didn't exist before.

Perhaps her charactertzation of relations in GDR times is excessively rosy;

nevertheless, the crucial point is that she perceives that currently, people's
relationships have become corrupted by the new influence of money, greed,
and envy.

This description of the effects of recent wealth and poverty within one
family points to a general view of society that many people hold, namely,
rhat social inequalities have increased dramatically since the collapse of communism. The followirg two quotations show similar interpretations of the
new social inequalities in both countries, while also demonstrating some of
the clear differences between life in Russia and in Eastern Germany. The first
comes from

a fi-year-old

Russian female homemaker:

\7ell, somehow relations between people have changed, it seems to me . . . The stratification of society is very deep. In Soviet days, we were all more or less at the same
level. \7e didn't really know what was there on top. But it seems to me that even
the Communist Party was still somehow more modest. Because [to d^y] when they
show these three-story brick mansions, well, they're worth such a colossal amount of
money. But the common masses are everywhere and destitute. And because of that,
.We
all used to be more or less even, and we
relations between people have changed.
had cars, like "Zhrgulis." But now you see all over Moscow these incredibly expensive cars. . . . There's a big difference between, how can I put it, the rich elite and the
completely poor people. An extremely large stratification. And especially between
people, there are certainly many fights and skirmishes.

The next response comes from a 46-year-old female East German secretirry:
The financial situation has become very different. In the GDR' cvcrybocly wrls brrsically at one level, with few variations. Of coLrrse rl b<lss rttrtclr' r'n()r-(' llrrtn :r s('('r-t'l:rry.
But the differences were not very t'rig. T<rclrry it's r-t',rlly :r f irtrurt i,tl prolrlt'ttt, :utrl tlris
prestige-thinking has bcc<lrrrc rrruclr rn()r-('l)r'()rrrirtt'rtl, I tlrirrlt. ll s()nr('()nt'lruys:l
bigger car., thcrr s()n'r('()n(' ('lst' loolis .rl lrirrr slt.urtit'l\,,, {r1 rl \()nr('()n(' Ittul,l" ,t lt.,u'r('.
| 1t,",.' l,.trrtl', ol tlttlt1", r tt'.tlt
l-lrrt sr)n't(.()n(. (.1s,. ,,trlv liv.'., nr .t lt'rrlt'tl .tlr,trltttt-rtl

Why Post-Communist Citizens Do No/ Join Organizations

ry3

friction. I mean, ther e are certainly people who don't care. But there are also people who suffer under these conditions and who say, "I won't go see them anymore;

they've become too conceited for me, " or something like that. . . . In that respect,
I think, that camaraderie, which used to exist, isn't there anymore. . . . There are
certainly good friendships that stick together through thick and thin, and that live
through everything, but some also fall apart, I think.

two quotations are similar in several ways. In relating the current

situation to the communist past, both women empha srze that almost all
people were at "the same level," or "one level." And they both express
regret over the increasing inequalities that have grown in post-communism,
resulting in vast differences between rich and poor that damage friendships
and relations. They also both use curs as an example, something that several
other respondents did as well, to illustrate the changes from the simple and

These

strictly functional use of automobiles in the communist era to the prestigious

and wealth-flauntimg aspects of car ownership today. In short, the quotations reveal a fundamental similarity between East German and Russian
societies - one probably shared in different ways and to varyitg degrees by
all post-communist societies - which is that many post-communist citizens
perceive and regret that the new importance of money has created new inequalities and a new social hierarchS thus destroying the non-hierarchical
friendships and broader social ties of the communist period.
\7hile these two quotations share this underlying similarity, they also
reveal some differences between the two countries. Most importantly, the
inequalities that have arisen in both societies - even though they are interpreted in relatively similar fashions, with reference to the "egalitarran" past
of communism - are of a drfferent order altogether. \fhile the East German
respondent refers to relative improvements in material possessions, acquiring a " bigge r car" or buying a house inste ad of renting an apartment, the
Russian respondent says quite directly that "the common masses are everywhere and destitute." In other words, subsistence and survival are central
elements of life in Russia, whereas in Eastern Germany material concerns
are more about luxuries than about necesslttes.
Another difference that emerges from these quotations involves the fact
rhat many Russians experience the new inequalities between rich and poor
from ar distance. Since most Russians are still quite poor, their only contact
with cxtrenre wealth is either watching it displayed on television, or in the
str-ccts whcn thcy scc strrrnflcrs in opulent clothing and driving luxury cars, or
strrrrcling irr front of storc wirrclows:rncl gazing at expensive foreign products.
( )rl)r'r'wisc'., r'rr<lst l)(x)r l{ rrssi:'urs r-;r rr'ly ('ncounter the small minority who
t'(' v('t-y I ir'lr. liul llr li,;rslt't'rt ( ,t't'nlrl nV wlt('t-(' llcttttille poverty is almost
lr()nt'rislt'rrl ,ur.l wlr.'r'('r (,lr;t', livt'l!,., ,'( ()rtorttir iltt'tltrlrlitics ilrc llttt ncatrly as
,,l,u l*. .r., l(ussi:r's nr,ur\' lrt'';rlr' lt.tr'.' lr.r,l tlilt't | ('\l)('t'i('tlt'(' witlr tlrc tlcw
lt('(lu.rltlti',,,r'tllrcr rvlllult ll,,'n o\\''lrl.utrllt,",(fl rvttlrilr llr,'ir',. ltrlt'sol llit'lttls.

:t

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

ry4

Why Post-Communist Citizens Do No/ Join Organizations

135

therefore, that personal networks among East

Germans have been more disrupted than those in Russia.
Yet another compelling albeit paftral reason for the differences between
East German and Russian social networks in the post-communist period involves the changes in the workplace that have occurred in Eastern Germ dny,
but much less so in Russia. Although many Russians must work much more
and rnuch harder these days to get by - and certainly many have also lost
their jobs, or they have to work second or third jobs because they are not
paid regularly by their " offici al" job - most East Germans have experienced
a complete transformation of their workplace environment" For example,
consider the following comment frorn a 31-year-old East German salesclerk:

This means that they have to build something entirely new. And you have to reahze
that the majority of GDR citizens only rarely changed their workplace - they often
stayed in the same company for zo) 3c.) 40 years, and these companies were made
bankrupt. To find a new friendship circle zo years later is almost impossible.

Before, at work there was a dtfferent "togethernessr" now, there isn't. People were
in a "collective." People were in a community, [and] they worked together for many
years"...[No*,] one person stops workinE, a new person comes in, and you don't
haue that contact anymore.Before, with our co-workers, for example, on international
women's day we had a party, and for Christmas, and for this and that too. . . . Now
it's only work.'Work and maybe just ro minutes in between to talk, and that's it.

respondents.
To sum marrze' the four themes raised in many interviews

It should not be surprisirg,

In further support of this view, a 47-year-old female bookbinder complains

that \West German control of the new companies has contributed to a decline
in collegiality among East Germans at the workplace:
Nobody wants interaction anymore. And pardy because, according to our experience,
in nrrury corlrl'rrrrrics a so-called "\(/essi"6 is the boss, and they fthe \West German
lrosscsl clolr't wr'u)t that. They don't want co-workers to get together in private
Arrrl thcy w:lnt us to say "Sie" to each other, something we never did back in GDR
tirrrcs. Wc usccl to huve a circle of co-workers, where we only said "Du" to each
<rthcr., rrncl thet wirs sclmehow rnore frtendly.z But today that is unfortunately no
longer the case.

Finally, in a thoughtful and balanced response, a 49-year-old male freelance

consultant for disabled people explains that friendship circles, which had
been nurtured by long careers in the same company and with the same coworkers, were broken by the post-communist employment changes, leavitg
many people unprepared to build new sets of friends:
\7hen people say that friendliness has decreased... it's mainly justified by saying.,
"well, we don't need those connections anymore, that one-hand-washes-the-othcr
isn't really necessary anymore. " I don't think that's exactly correct. Ycrur harvc to rc:t lizc:
thatmost acquaintances and friendships came out of the workplace, ,rttcl thet l'or flo'2,
of formerGDRcitizens,theoldworkplacehasdisappearecl,()rllltttost 8o"/,,.'l'lr:tl :tlso
includes, basic allyrthe personal connections to co-worl<crs., fo f ricrt,ls ,r rttl c'<,llt',tllu('s.
(' "\(/cssi" is rr (rrstr:rlly) tlt'ror1;tt.ty

:trt l,:tst ( 't'l lll;lll

/ ((\t("'

t.,

tlt,'l()tilt,tl t', r',t()n \\',tt r'l

A common element in many responses is that, for most people, their experiences under communism serve as a reference point for their contemporary evaluations. I believe that this observation fits all post-communist
societies - albeit in different ways, dependittg on the extent of pov erty, of
people's personal contact with social inequalities, and of the changes in
people's workplaces - and that many citizens of other countries would thus
respond within the range of answers given by my East German and Russian

- the increased
focus on personal life, the newly prominent and destructive role of money,

the far greater social inequality, and the transformation of the work
environment - have been major causes for change in interpersonal relations.
The picture that emerges from these responses is one of interpersonal relations that have changed dramatically in both East German and Russian
societies, albeit with certain differences reflecting the two populations. Indeed, one might conclude that the old private networks that were so well
developed under communism - either the friendships of deep trust or the
relationships of instrumental necessity - are coming undone tod ar/, perhaps
opening people to the possibility of joining voluntary organizatror-Is for social interaction. However, when focusing on their own personal lives, rnany
respondents present a quit e dtfferent picture, reportittg fewer changes in their
interpersonal relations. This is an indication that people do not necess arrly
apply the dominant discourse - that "money" and "greed" have destroyed
the valuable social fabric that was the best part of socialism - to their own
lives. Of course, it is difficult to determine exactly where the boundary is
between "society overall" and one's "own personal life," since some people
rnight count only close family members in the latter category, while others
rnight include anybody that they know even remotely. \fhat is clear from my
irrterview results is that many people make that distinction intheir ownminds.
Mrrrcover, nrost of my respondents, in both Russia and Eastern Germ"ny,
sc'r'rcrrrlly vicw their own condition as being better, or certainly "less worse,"
tlrrrrr thut ol' othcrs in tl-reir society.
'l'lris is rrr>t to suggcst thart it is inaccurate or misleading to observe

hrrvc' chrtrtgccl. Nor is it a contradiction for

;r,'o1rlt' to .'l,rirrr tlr:rl r-t'l:tliotts ltrtvt' w()t-s('rrt'tl ()vcr,rll lltrt have stayed the

tlr;rt rr'l:rtiorrs irr socicty

\.un(' ur tlr,'ir ()\vn ,.il'. lt's. ()rr tlr,'(()!rlr'.ll'y., t',ivt'lt tlt:rt pcttlllc l'lrtsc thcir
('\.tlu.rltotr ol .,ot tr'l\ ()n 1,,('n,'l,tl llrlt't.tt ll()n\ rvltlt slt':lttll('t's ()tt llrt'sll't't'l ttlri,rllr tll,,l.lltl .trrlll.urrl,ur((",, rl ',lr,,rrl,l ltol n('((".',.tlll\ l,,ll,,rry tlr.rl l)('()1llt"s

r36

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

interactions with close friends and family have also become more cold and
unpleasant - although in some cases they certainly have. The important
point here is that for some people social networks, which were such a vital
and distinctive feature of communist societies, have partially changed, as
was revealed by many of the responses quoted earlier. But for others) close
social networks have remained essentially the same, even though there is
still a strong sentiment that broader social relations have deterio rated.
This point was made explicitly by respondents in both countries, of all ages
and occupations. They attested to the stability of their social networks with
such phrases as: "Actu ally they've stayed the same as they always were. Nothing has changed";8 "V/ell, in my circles, there haven't been any changes";e
"Nothirg has changed. It's stayed the same. Nothing that I know of has
changedat all";'o "I haven't experienced any changes, what I used to have is
still there";" "In my circles things haven't changed at all";" "Friends don't
depend on anything, they're friends. That's what they were, and that's stayed
the same. They can'tchange. Friendship doesn't change";'3 "\fell, today it's
more about money and wealtho and money plays a more important role than
it did in GDR times. But as for my family and the people and friends who've
always been close to me, nothing has changed at all, actually."'+
In sho fi, for the many people who have experienced little change in their
social networks, and who continue to have the close ties they developed under communism, the satisfaction with their own networks helps to explain
their non-participation. Moreover, given that the common communist experience serves as an explicit reference point for respondents in both Eastern
Germany and Russia, we can suggest that this factor applies, in varying
ways and to varying degrees, to the many post-communist countries that lie

in between these two case studies.

Po

st-Communist f)is appointrnent

As with the mistrust of communist organizations and the persistence of

friendship networks, I addressed the phenomenon of post-communist disappointment in Chapter 5 o showirg a statistically significant negative effect
on organi zatronal membership. In this section, I incorporate my in-depth
interview results to develop the argument more extensively, showing how
my respondents experience this disappointment and how it affects tlreir
participation in voluntary organizations.
8

IO

II
l2-

64-year-old East German male pensioner, formerly an elcctricirrr.

6r-year-old Russian female pension er.
3z-year-old East German malc, who w<lt-l<s for-rt tt'rnl)()r'rtry lririnr', rr!lt'nr
47-year-olcl Russi:rn fctttrt lt' typist/st'r'r't'l :t ry.
z9-ycltr-olrl llrrst (,t'tttt:ul lll:tlt' rrtt'. lt,tttit
ii y('ru oltl l(tt:.si,rtt lt'rtr.tl,',,lli, ( nr.ur,u',(
(,i \'(',lt ,,ltl | .r',1 (,r I ttt ttt l, ttt,tl, lt,t,tl' | , , 1t,
"

rl
r.l

1,-

Why Post-Communist Citizens Do No/ Join Organizations

ry7

Disappointment is a relative concept, and its emergence depends partly on

the type and intensity of people's expectations. During the heady and exciting
period when communism was collapsing and a new era emerging, many of

my respondents had extremely high, and probably unrealistic, hopes. For

example, a z6-year-old Russian male office manager explains:
I had many hopes: that the iron curtain would faIl, the whole world would be open,
your happiness would be in your own hands, a sea of possibilities, to do whatever
you want, be a big shot, make lots of money. . . . You could say it was intoxicating,
the intoxication of freedom. Before you couldn't travel abroad, nothing! The shelves
were empty. But within half a year, or a year) you could do everything. You could
b.ry everythirg, travel wherever you want, say what you want. Everything became
possible! It was like an intoxication.

A aT-year-old

East German man, who runs a transport business, characte:-izes people's expectations in similar, albeit less evocative, terms:

In my

circles . . . people

really wanted more freedom

of opinion, travel, and

consumption. . . . These goals were, you can say, somewhat primitive. I don't think
there were any bigger ones. For the most part it was travel, yes, and that blinded
people.

two quotations show that people's hopes and expectations were in

many ways driven by their incredible frustration with what they could not
do in a communist system, namelyr (r ) travel outside of the communist bloc,
(t) speak their minds openly, and (l) have the opportunity to b.ty a wide
vartety of material goods.
At the same time, however, people had very little reahzation of the extent
of the difficulties that were to come. The high hopes of many respondents
quickly soured, as a 41-year-old Russian man working for a cultural map
company explains:

These

I felt that it was very good, that it was marvelous, remarkable . . . The feeling of freedom was, well, it was truly excellent. At first it was euphoric, but shortly afterwards,
it became disappointing.. ..It seemed that in this joy, you could say everything, you
c<luld say the truth to one another, not just somewhere in some kitchen, but openl5
,rrrcl that the newspapers would actually write the same thing that you think. But
vcry little has actually changed in real life. That is, words don't immediately have an
cffcct on thir-rgs., and reality moves much more slowly. There was a euphoria about
srrrr-tirrg to spcrlk., rrnd we thought that everything would change at once. But it turns
orrt tlrrlt's rtot crlrctly riuht.

Arrtl tlrt'slurr(' ,l 7-yc1v--olcl-lrrrst (icnlrrur rnan quoted earlier adds that "those
wlrorrr I l<rr1)Wr llrt'y iu'('v('r'y' v('r'y rlisrrl)l)()irrtccl. Because many didn't want
tlris 'l lr,'y \,V:rrrtt'tl s()rrrt'tlrirrri r ()nrl)lt'tt'ly' tlillt'r't'nt. I thirtl< thc biggest part of
tlr,' l)()l)rll.tliolt tlitllr't \\z,lllt wlt;tl \\/(' ll()w lt:tr','. No w:ty. Nolltltly."
I ooInti,, 1,.t, 1,.. .,()nr(' r('.,1)()n(lcttl', t(-ln.ttk,',1 ;tltrltlt ltow tt:ltv(' tlrt'y w('l-('
rr 11,.",' , n1,,.l.rlron', .urtl lt,,rl r'.t',tlV tlrct \\'('t(' tttl',1,'.1 lrt' tlr,' l)t()tllls('\

ryB

of politicians. A

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Europe

1,g-year-old Russian educational sociologist puts

it

as

follows:
\7e had great hopes. And, in principle, the population of the Soviet Union was a
.We
believed the printed word. And when the new big
trusting people, very trusting.
politics arrived, the people weren't politicized,weren't ready for it. And participation
in all of these games was like the participation of children in some game of adults.
And then looking back now, how ridiculous we were! To believe those people who
were playing! \We were just participants in their "high" games.

In a similar statement, although without reference to any "child's play"

63-year-old East German female bookkeeper claims:

A big portion [of people] have become frustrated. . . . Many people hoped for too
much frona these changes, or too spontaneously. Many people had illusions that
were far too big. And they were then very disappointed. . . . Not everything has gone
well. And because of that, many people who went with excitement and good will
to the demonstrations are disappointed today, because they're unemployed, or have
other problems.

The k.y point in these two descriptions is that during the time of optimism slrrrounding the collapse of communism, many people were exceedingly trusting of what they heard, unaware of the difficulties they were soon
face, and unprepared for the adjustments they would have to make.
The main object of people's blame and disdain is undoubtedly politicians.
Although the desire to "throw the rascals out" is centralto awell-functioni^g
democ rattc system, the dislike of almost all politicians and political parties
is particularly strong in the fledgling post-communist democracies - as evidenced by public opinion surveys, as well as by the large number of electoral
reversals throughout the region in recent years. This disappointment with
contemporary politics obviously takes on a different form in each country,
depending on the particular constellation of political forces and personalities.
In this respect, the Russian and East German cases are as different as one can
imagine within the spectrum of post-comrnunist Europe. German unification
was an utterly unique event, giving East Germans a "ready-made state" that
has made them "uniquely privileged."15 But the fact that almost every elite
.West
Germans'6 has given East Germans a very
position is controlled by
visible target for blame: not only politicians, but West German politicians,
personified by former Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In contrast, the loarthing of
politicians in Russia is more typical of other East European countrics - whe rc
no "internal other" (i.e., 'West German) group crln bc blarrrccl rrlthttrrglt
"foreign" and "\(/estern" governments ancl le aclcrs il rc ccrt:r irr ly hr'ltl p:r r-tly
responsible for domestic problcrls.

to

It

Sct' ll()s('irnrl I lrr('rl)lr'r, " I lrt' lnrJr,lr I ol .r l(t',t.lr i\l r,lr \t,tlt' "
I(r St't' Willr,'lrtr lirrrlilrrr. I lrllr, l(,'ltr n',lot l. r'l rl , / ltlt'tt ttr lt,'trl',, l,l,ttt,l
.t1t',tltt,lr (l cr,','t l'. tt',('tt: | ,",1 ,' i. lirr,lr r, lr, t ',') ')

Why Post-Communist Citizens Do No/ Join Organizations

ry9

\Tithin this common theme of disappointment, the differences between

the two populations are made clear in the following responses, starting with
Russian examples, and then moving on to East Germans. A 37-year-old
Russian security guard, who himsel f partrcipated several times in demonstrations in r99r, describes his disappointment as follows:
I was hoping for a better life, mainly. But now, with the passing of time, I see that
actually very little has changed. It hasn't gotten better" I personally think that the
situation has become more high-strung, and everyone is now expecting some kind of
social explosion. There's major stress in this society you can feel it.

Moreover, the z6-year-old Russian office manager quoted earlier on his high
hopes and the "intoxication of freedom," claims that "I am disappointed in
e\ierythirg, everything in our politics. Right now our entire highest power
is 9 9% corrupt." Finally, a 47-year-old Russian male cornputer technician
gives more specific reasons for his disappointment with his country's political
leadership:

am very, uery disappointed. The distribution of property took place, in my

very unjustly. And I think that 8o"h of the population thinks so too. It's
the main question that upsets me and many other peopleo I think The distribution of property was simply a fraud, they cheated the people, and everybody
knows this. Consequently, how can I believe my government, when it deceives

viernr,

me? First, they deceived the people, and second, they robbed them. \7hy? \7hen
I worked, I didn't steal, I earne d a certain amount of money. I worked evenings,
nights, and counted in my head and with the computer that I'd earned a certain amount of money. I counted on it. But then it turned out that it was gone!
Everything! Nothing left. And now, I'm supposed to trust this government? No, of
course not.

These quotations show the utter and complete disgust with contemporaqr
politics in Russia, which is probably more extreme than just about anywhere
in the world. For many years while he was president, the twice-elected Boris
Yeltsin's approval rating wavered between f/" and z"/", a percentage that is
almost unheard of, especially so consistently over time.
But the aversion to politics and politicians in Russia is only part of the
reason why people are so disappointed. Another major component, akeady
discussed in previous sections, has to do with the realities of economic hardship aurcl thc strr-rggle for survival that many people face today. As explained
by a c1u itc succcf ssfu I zll-year-old Russian female lawyer,
Wlrt'rr Yt'ltsirr wrrs t'lt'ctt'tl f,r- tlrt' fir-st tirnc., it wzts absolutely grandiose.... And I
lrt'lit'vt'tl tlr;rt \v('w('r'('orr tl)r'l.r;ltlr tlr:rt w()rrlrl [rrirrg rrs cl()scr tcl a good life. Changes
lr,rr'.' l;rl<t'rr 1rl:rtt', w,rlllottl ;r tlottlrl I ilt' lt,tt ,lt,tlt1',t'tl too",/,, I tt-lctlll in terms of
)rrr.,rl,rlrllt,, 1,,,1,).r()rttt^llunt,, or .rt lrr,'r,".,'ll r,'.rlrr,tli()n. (lr'lirrirt'ly. ltvt'lt ilt lt ttllrr()w
f
,,( n,,('. ll,.t(,t('\\'urrl,,rr', ()r otr',lotr ',1r,'1r.", llrrt tlrr olltt't tlrirrti is tlt:tl tlris llils l'('vt',tlt'tl
nr.ur\ ,,lr,,rlt onuni,,',, rr lrt,, lr ',tr',rrrlt. .rirtlt \\,t',r tt tlr, t( ',ttll l lr,rt t'.. ttt.ltt\' ;'t,',,1r1,'

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Ewrope

r4q^

have been sacrificed for the sake of this. Sixty percent of our population lives on the
edge

of pove rty today.

The discouraging effect that these economic difficulties have on participation

in volu ntary organi zatrons is well char actertzed by the following statement
made by 41-year-old woman who currently works in real estate, after many
"
years of teaching
Russian language and literature:

I'm disappointed, disappointed, not satisfied with anything. I know that abroad, of
course, many people join these types of organizattons. But I think they have different
problems. \fhen, in gen eral,there is only one problem here now; and that's to survive,

to survive so that you don't feel humiliated. \7hen you go to some store and see
expensive products and food, and you can't afford it yourself. I don't knornz, I never
experienced this until now. . . . I know that I need to live, and I need to work. I go
to the theater, listen to music. For that I don't need any organization. I have many
friends, some of whom work in the the ater, and I spend time with them. That's it.
Vell, agarn,I don't need any official organ:Zations for that.

This response also serves as a good example of the way in which the factors
I have outlined can overlap and be mutually reinforcing. In this excerpt,
the respondent states clearly that her struggle to get by precludes any participation in volu ntary organizations, but she also adds that she has many
friends and is very socially actle and states that she does not feel any need
for "official" organizations.
In summary, the disappointment felt by many ordrnary Russians has at
its root the widesp read economic devastation that has taken place in their
country since the collapse of communism. The target for blame is generally

the politicians surrounding Boris Yeltsin, who are seen to have " stolen "
much of Russia's property and wealth, and even its dignity.
The East German case is different in several ways, as the following examples show. Overall, the k.y features of this East German disappointment can
be characterrzed by two interrelated themes that distinguish it from Russia:

(t ) feelings of havittg been misled by 'West German promises, and (r) the
psychologically devastating effects of unemployment. \fhile these factors
are certainly not as severe as the struggles for subsistence and survival that
many Russians face, they have given many East Germans a feeling of generarl
malaise and dissatisfaction with the new political and economic clrder, lcaclittg them to be even more reluctant to participate in voluntary organiz;rtiorrs.
Indicative of the first theme having been misled by Wcst ( icrnrlr n
elites - a 37-year-old East German homemal<cr cxprcsscs hcr cliscrrclrrrrrt
ment with Helmut Kohl, and his Christian l)crrrocrrrtic IJrrion ((.1)tl) ()v('r'
the eight years when he wi'rs he r clrrurc('ll<,r:
Sfe all votc'tl l:or- tlrt' (,l)tl. Arr,l Kolrl, lr,' ,.,trrl,l .rlrr,.rr',
pr()tttist's. Alrtl !v(' \{,('r(' , lr'rtlurt', lo llr.'rrr ,r lrttli', lrrrl
tl()w n,,lrr,,l\, \,\,o1rl.l volt' lor K,,lrl .rrr\'nrorr ( ru,rr,rrrlr

It

Why Post-Communist Citizens Do No/ Ioin Organizations

r4a

\fhile this view is probably somewhat standard for many East Germans'

:z7-year-old unemployed woman, who was also quoted earlier on the topic

of money and greed, explains her disgust with the way in which Kohl initiated the unification process, and how this has alienated her from the new
system:

In the head of many GDR citizens was this unification,

because we are German.

And I noticed quickly that it was coming when we received roo Marks as "greetings
money" lBegrilpungsgeld]. Yes, "greetings mon ey." . . . And then these political things,
what actually happened, these people all sat together, and they just listened to Helmut
Kohl and voted for the CDU. My reaction was, these people didn't think, they were
just emotional! After that,I'd had enough. So it all happened pretty quickly. . . . I was
thinking, this is too euphoric, what's going on. So for me it's certain that I won't
grow old in this state. It's not my country! It has nothing to do with me being a GDR
citrzen, but rather on the basis of the politics of this state.

A majority of the East German responses probably fit in between these two
views, particularly with regard to the national level of the CDIJ and Helmut
Kohl personally. Indeed, less than half a year after my interviews were conducted, Kohl was resoundingly defeated, ending his unprecedented r 8 -year
rule, and the East German electorate was primarily responsible for the transfer of power to a new coalition government led by the Social Democratrc
Party (SPD).Itr the years since this new government came to power in 1998,
the East German elector ate has repeatedly expressed dramatic fluctuations
in its preferences, generally voting resoundin gly against each recently elected
government in local and state elections" In this sense, East Germans resemble
crtrzens of other post-communist countries more than they do \7est Germans,
whose voting patterns are much more stable and predictable.
The people who feel most resentful tow ard \fest Germans are usually the
East German activists who were so centralin bringing about the revolutionary changes in the first place, and who feel that the process and terms of
German unification represented a betrayal of the goals that they took sigpificant risks to pursue. For example, a 33-year-old social worker, who had
lrcen very active in the late r98os, explains why he has withdrawn from most
()

r-s:r

t'ti,e d, a ctivities

Whcn I rc:rlizccl that the takeover by \Mest Germany was going to happen, that we'd
rrctrrrrlly lost rhc rcvolLrtion, simply because we didn't make use of the chance to create
s()nrt.tlrin.il nc'wr f hcn I l-rccan-rc' vcry frustrated, and it was all over for me.

l,:rtt.r' irr r lrt' intt'r-vit'w' wlrt'rt ,lt'scribirrg lris current jtb in a major West
( ,t'r'nrilrr .'lrru'ily ()r'tl:utiz,:tliort., ltt' sl:llt's lh;rt thcrc ilre very few East German
nt(,lrrl',.,rs irr t lrt'()t-l,,:rniz.rf i()n1 .rrrtl llr,,rr.' rvlto ltt-(' tll('lllllcrs lrre gelrerally much
l,'r, :rt livt.. I lrt' r('.rs()n., ,r( ( (,r,lur1i to lrirrr, is tlr:rt "t'ttlltly ltltvc withcJrarwn

()t .1(' ryltlr.ll.t\\,ntl,, lloltt rrtti.tlll/.tltrt;1',. l',t'r,lll'-(' llrt'1' lt't'l :l lil'(':ll tlt':tl tlf
|

)(

)\\',' r la",'-| r('',',

r42
TABLE

Weakness of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

6t.

The Salience of [Jnemployment in Eastern Germany

Russia

Eastern Germanv

Number of Times

Number of Respondents

Unemployment Mentioned

(Percent of Total)

Number of Respondents
(Percent of Total)

o
I
z

z6(86.7%)
2(6.7%)
2(6.7%)

.,

o
o

4t
Valid ld

3o

6(zo.o"/")
s (16.7%)

z2ts%)
6(zo.o"/")
6(zo.o"/o)
3o

Note: Measurements for this table were conducted by using word searches through all of the
interview transcripts for any mention of unemployment (as noun, verb, or adjective), counting
each sentence where the word was mentioned at least once (i.e., if it was mentioned several
times in the same sentence, it still counted as one).
Source: Author's interviews ( 1998).

Why Post-Communist Citizens Do No/ Join Organizations

r43

current system. Now we can turn to a more in-depth consideration of how

and why this is the case.
The reality of unemployment in Eastern Germany is especially painful for
two main reasons: first, despite the fact that today it may seem to be an
"inevitable" part of the restructuring of an inefficient and decayed communist economic systeffi, at the time of the revolutionary changes, few people
had any notion that such high numbers of people would lose their jobs,
without much hope fclr finding a lasting new job; second, unemployment
is particularly excruciating for post-communist crtrzens, who lived most of
their lives in a system where everybody had a job (even if the factory or
enterprise was losing money) and where the workplace was the cornerstone of social activity. In other words, given that unemployment came
so unexpectedly and that holding a job is so deeply valued by most people, the fact that over zo"h of the East German population is currently
unemployed, and a majority has experienced unemployment for some period of time since unification, has had a very damagittg effect on many
people.

As support for this point about the depth of this value of work, and

\fest German politics and politilevel, the second main aspect of East
German disappointment is much more specific. Simply put, unemployment
has emerged as the central and domin ant complaint in East German society today. It was the main issue in the 1998 elections - held shortly after I
conducted my interviews - and it remains an overwhelming topic of conversation, concern, and distress throughout the population.
'While the theme of dissatisfaction with

cians remains at

a fairly general

Table 6. r provides evidence of the extent to which the issue of unemployment dominates the East German discourse, particularly when compared to
Russia. In my in-depth interviews, I did not ask any open-ended questions
that addressed the issue of unemployment directly but the table shows the
number of times that respondents brought up the issue of unemployment,
contrasting my two case studies. The difference is clear and overwhelming.
\X/here as 26 out of my
3o Russian respondents did not mention unemployment ataIl, only six East Germans left it out.'7 Most East Germans brought
it up several times throughout the intervieq and one woman - a 4r -year-old
cook who was unemployed for several years and whose husband is currently

brought it up ra different trmes.

The results of Table 6.r provide a valuable starting point for thc rcrrli'r,,.rtion
that for most East Germans, unlike for Russians' the topic of trrrcnrployrrrc'rrt
is usually mentioned immediately when discussins thcir cvrllurrtiorr ol' I lrt'
unemployed

t7 \(/hile it is
1'r<lssiblt'rhrrt tlrt'st'lirrtlinlis \^/orrltl lr:rv('lrt't'rr tlillt rr rrt lr,r.l I ( ('n(lrrt tr.l rnr rrrtt'r
vicws:tftt'r tlrr' llttssirtrr linrurt i,tl .. risis ol t\rtr',tt',1 r,),,$, I ,l,rrrlrt tlr.rt un('rrrl'l,,1nr( nt rrr l(rr.,,,r,r
It:ts ltt'.()nl(' :t\ l)t()lntttrnl ,t l,t,,lrl,'nr ,t', rl t', trr t ,r',lr In ( ,r Inr,ur\. |.rr Irr rrl.rr lt ,,rr( (' l( rr,,,,r,trr
,l,,tltt'slit prt ,,,1u( lt\ tl\ t, trr rllt ltt tr.r,,r rl l,,ll,,rr trrr, llr, ( 1,,t,.

the pain caused by unemployment, consider the example of the 4r-year-old

woman who mentioned unemployment t4 times during her intervie% who

currently works as a cook at a rnedical center. In describittg her main values
and ideals, she states, "For us it is very important, first, that we have work,
and second, that we are he althy." She then goes on to tell about her own
experiences and views:
And when I look at things today, I think that in GDR tirnes, everyone had not only
the duty but also the right to work, which is no longer the case today. And I should
add that . . . although we didn't go to any demonstrations, we did hear:, on television
and in the media, what Chancellor Kohl prornised. But wbat has he kept of all of
that? I Did anyone actually tell any GDR citizens what was actually going to happen
to us in the end? . .
.

The national government, as it spread itself around here, destroyed everything that
we had, and didn't even try to rebuild something responsibly even olrr products, that
we made in GDR times, and they weren't all bad! . . .
'T'his Lrnenrploynrent. I know that from my own experience, I was unemployed myself

frrr- | ,/, ycrrrs irr 1c)c) t_..)2. My husband is currently unemployed. These \Testern
c()n'rplurics cr)nlc lrcrc rrncl brrilcl, [-rut they bring their own people. Or a bunch of
Iort'igrrcrs' wlrt'f hcr l)ort ugu('s(' ()r s<lnrcthing else. I don't know how much they
rrr:rl<t'.' lrut tlrt'st'l'orciqrrt'r's ru'('trrl<irrg thc jol-rs from our own people.

l'lris r'('sl)orrrlt'rrl ("xl)r-('ss('s:r nunrlrcr'ol irnl-r<lrtltnt 1-lclints in her remarks.

l;irst. ,rrr,l n'r()st irnl)()r'lrurllr' lor llrt' l)ln post's ol tlris clisctrssiolt, she clearly
('\,itlu,rlt':.' llrt' l)t('\('nl silrr,rlr()n l''t' nrt'.ur\ ol lr,'r' l)t'('vious c'xp('ricltlccs and
('\l)('tl,tlrorr.. lrrrlrrtlllrt', rrt.rurlt' llrr'(onununr'.,1 tiltrt'1tt't'iotl., llrlt ttls<l
tlr,' \\,'ll,/,'lrt'llorl

\('rolttl.,',1t,".1t,,\\",

rr',tlt t',t('.ll ('lll()ll()ll

lt.,tt,:ll',()lrizilrli

r44

'Weakness

of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

unemployment has been for her family. Third, she blames Chancellor Kohl
and his government for what she views as false promises and anti-Eastern
policies. And finally, she raises the very sensitive issue of the responsibility
of foreigners for East German unemployment. Although this last point goes
beyond the themes of this chapter, her apparent willingness to take out her
frustration on foreign workers is indicative of the potentially dangerous consequences that this East German frustration and disappointment could have
in the near future.
It should be clear that this widesp read East German disappointment is
hardly encouraging for participation in volunt ary organizations, and this
effect was demonstrated statistically in Chapter 5. Although, as I have explained, the situation is somewhat different from that in Russia given
the unique role of N7estern Germany and the widespread unemployment
in Eastern Germany, as well as the severity of the economic collapse in
Russia - the effect on public participation is actu ally quite similar. The following response - from a n-year-old East German woman who , after several
years of being unemployed herself, has just started a construction supplies
business sums up what I view as the basic element of post-communist
disappointment:
-fhings

have definitely changed. \7e continue to discuss politics, but nobody would
go into the streets again. Because everyone has some worry or another, really. And
they're all different, for some people bigger, for others smaller. And they keep you
preoccupied. I mean, for example, we have friends, both of whom are unemployed.
They're just busy trying to get by, find a job. They have nothing left that would let
them become politically engaged agarn.

Leaving aside the specific example of her unemployed friends, the main
point is that many people - whether in Eastern Germany Russia, or in the
many countries in between are extremely preoccupied with their own
worries, problems, and struggles in adaptrng to a new system that they see
as bein g far from perfect.
Just as I tried to do in the two previous sections - on the mistrust of communist organizations and the persistence of friendship networks - in this
section I have attempted to show how the third factor of disappointmenr
applies to the two case studies. In so doing, I have emphasized both similarities and drfferences, for the purpose of drawing wider conclusions tlrat
may apply to other post-communist countries as well. Despitc tlrc ntorc obvious differences, which vary based on the p<lliticrrl forccs rrrrcl ('c()rrorrric
situation in each countrS the underlyirrg rutd irrrrclrun('ntrrl sirrril:u'ity irr tlrt'
responses just discussed is thltt pcoplc ('vlllulrlt' llrt' l)r'('s('nt lr,rst'tl ()n t lrt'ir'
experiences in, rtntl cxp('ctrrfi()ns l'r'orn., lllt'l)rtsl. Arrr.l ,r\,r lt'srrll ,rf itlt';rlislit
expectlttiotts f<ll'lltt'n('w l)()sI t'onunlnu\l r't,t llt,rt lr,tr','\() l.rr l',()n('1.u.1i,.11,
ttltftlllillt'tl., lttltny posl (()ttuntntisl t rlrl('ni lcr'l ,lr',.r1)lrorrlrrrr'nl ,rrrtl .r nr.rl.ust.

Why Post-Communist Citizens Do No/ ]oin Organizations

145

that further discourages them from participation in public social life and the
organi zatrons of civil society.
CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided an in-depth interpretiv e analysis that accounts for
the low levels of participation in volunt ary organi zattons in two very different post-communist societies. By providing many of the original quotations
from my interview respondents, while contextuahztng and analyzing their
responses in comparative perspective, the methodology of this chapter complements the statistical approach from the previous chapter. The advant age
of this interpretive approach is that it allows for rich and vivid representations of people's experiences and thoughts in their own words.
In this analysis, I found three main factors that apply, in varying ways
and to varyirg degrees, to both of my case studies. Simply put, a great number of citrzens in Russia and Eastern Germany feel a strong and lingering
sense of distrust of any kind of public org anrzatron, a general satisfaction
with their own personal networks (accompanied by n sense of deteriorating
relations within society overall), and disappointment in the developments of
post-communism. Although it needs to be established by further empirical
research

- whether qualitative, quantitative, or both - I believe

that these

three factors also apply to the many post-communist countries that lie in
between Russia and Eastern Germ any, both geographically and in terms of
their levels of participation today.
The common theoretical element of all three of these factors involves
the way in which people refer to, interpret, and sometimes react to their
prior experiences. As argued in Chapter z) post-communist citizens were
not shaped by an immutable set of cultural values and predispositions, nor
do they respond autom attcally to the incentive structures of contem porary
institutions. Rather, they are perceptive social actors who have experienced
a tremendous amount of turmoil in the past several decades, including living through a dramatic and unexpected revolutionary uphe aval that took
them from one type of political and economic system to another one that is
radtcally different. Put in this context, and supported by the many fascinatirrg st<rries afteady recounted, this chapter shows how these people interpret
thcir prior and current experiences, and how this leads them to act accordingly. ()vcrall, in addition to providing a more complete understanding of
rlrc clistirrct cxpcricnccs that post-communist citizens have lived through, this
l)(,f's1'rcctivt' hclprs fo cx1'rlrtitt wlry lc'vcls of participation in voluntary organi'r.ttli()ns lll-(' so rrruclr lowt'r' in l)()sl .r'onlnltutist llurope than in other regions
t lrt' w,,r'1.1.

'l

Conclwsion

Conclusion

r47

original communist institutions that shaped most living adults today. But at
the same time, this process of generational change is not certain or automatic,
given how many other factors act together to influence a person's sociahza-

tion and the development of that person's public or private relations and
habits. Another mechanism for change can be facilitated by more active
"
role of the state in supporting and working with volunt ary organizations,
and by relating them to people's personal life histories such that organizations become viewed as less alienatirg and imposing. Overall, however,
barring unforeseen improvements in the way new institutions and policies
are implemented, we are unlikely to see dramatic changes in the pattern of
non-participation throughout post-communist Europe.
THE REGION OF POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE

In previous chapters, while providing relevant theoretical and empirical context, I have kept the discussion focused on the specific topic at the heart of this
book: participation in the organizations of civil society in post-communist
Errrope. This concluding chapter, in contrast, has a broader and more speculative purpose. I consider three important themes that are central to *id..
debates about the future of the region. First, I explain how the arguments
and findings of this book should change overall conceptions of the region
of post-communist Europe, particularly with regard to the lasting impact of
the societal legacies of the communist experience. I argue that analysis have
tended to focus too much on elites and institutions rather than on society
and ordinary citizens, and that they have therefore been too quick in overlooking or dismissing the relative societal similarities
port-communist
"*ong
countries in the region.
second, I discuss and interpret the relevance of my empirical findings for
the prospects for democracy and democratic stability in the region, addressing both positive and negative interpretations. I argue that, while the weakness of civil society does not necessarily mean that post-communist democracy is in danger of collapse or breakdown, it does prevent the development
of the "civic skills" that are so important for supporting and consolidating
a democratic system, and it also ensures that many post-communist citizens
lack the institutional representation and leverage that could otherwise be
provided them by active voluntary organizations.
Finally, I speculate about the extent to which the empirical findings arrcl
trends I have presented might change in the future. Although I argue thar
change is unlikely to occur rapidly or decisively, given the powcrfrrl arrrl
lasting legacy of the communist experience, as well as thc rclativc frrilrrrc. .f
neo-liberal institutional "crafting,," I clo suggcst tw<l 1'lossiblc rrrcch:rrrisprs
for change, and how these rright ()ccrlr ()r bc cncorrrrrgt,rl to rlcvclol'r. ( it,1t'
rational chrrngc prcscnts rr vory grlrtlrr:rl rrrt.irrrs lirr lt'plrrt.inli,ltlr.r P.r,plt.
irr socicty witlr tlrt'ir tlt.st'r'rrtlrrrtls. wlro will lr,rvr. ltrrtl lt.ss r.rlrosrlr.r.to tlrr.
l.l(t

Until r989-9r, it was common to

refer to communist citizens collectively,

of the communist bloc. Aside from Communist Party rhetoric
about being "comrades" and fellow members of the "socialist brotherhood
of peoples, " it was generally accepted by social scientists that communist
citizens lived under relatively similar political and economic conditions and
that it made sense to stress their common characterrstics. Today, however,
as residents

most scholars view post-communist Europe as a set of independent countries

facing a host of different challenges, including the performance of economic
and political institutions, timetables for NATO and Eu expansion, and IMF
and \forld Bank targets. \Thereas before the collapse of communism, the
emphasis was on similarity, today it is on difference.
The findings of this book add anothe r layer to this perspective, based on
concrete and system anc comparative evidence. Despite the wide institutional
and "civtltzatiofral" differences between the countries in the region, the data
and analysis presented in this book sugges t that in the context of ordinary citizens and their social behavior, the re are still very striking similarities among
the citizens and societies of post-communist Europe. At least for levels of
participation in voluntary organizatrons - an object of study that is central
to debates about democracy and democratrzation - this project shows that
post-communist citizens have significantly and consistently lower levels of
rnembership and participation than citizens of most other democratrc countries, petrticularly when compared to citizens of post-authoritarian countrics that hrrve simrlar levels of economic development and political rights
rurcl civil libcrtics. The evidence that I have presented in this book suggcsts thrrt tlrc vrrriution thut clocs exist among post-communist societies is
lrcst clrirrrlctcrizccl lrs "difft'r('nccs in clcgrce.," as opposed to "differences in

l<itttl."
Mrlt'('()v('t; lry I'or'usiltll ()n ll:tsl('r'n (,t'l'nl:uly lutcl ltttssilt, tw<l cases that
tlill,'r'l:r'r';rlly lronl ()n(';urrltlrt'r'in lt'r'rtrs of tltt'nr()st conlnl()n llltcntrttivc ex;rl:ul,rliolrs llr,tl ,rr-t'lr,t\('(l ,rtt 1r)nlt'trt|rot',n'v ct()n()rttir'r'()ntliri()tts ruttl llolitic'lrl

| 4tl

Wcukrtdss

( ,iuil

,\ot'icty in Post-Commwnist Europe

Conclusion

institutions, I have been able to identify and dcrnonstrate the causal power
of three experiential factors that apply to both countries, albeit with cirtain
variations. Although more research is needed on other post-communist countries in the region, I am suggesting that, since the core of the argument is
an understanding

of the common elements of the communist

post-communist democ racy. Accordirg to this view, does democ racy still
mean "rule by the people" if the people choose not to participate in ruling?
More forebodingly one could argue that such a hollow democ racy will
remain unstable, since civic organi zatrons lack the active support of the population, leaving demo cracy at risk of being toppled by hostile forces, whether
based on non-democratic historical traditions or a nevv, anti-democratic
ideolo gy.'
On the other hand, a more positive and optimistic interpretation would
suggest that the absence of a vibrant civil society poses no obstacle to democracy and democ ratic stability. Indeed, political participation and trust in
government are supposedly in decline throughout much of the world, as
people withdraw from public activities in increasingly large numbers. Perhaps the post-communist present, havitrg skipped or bypassed the " stage " of
an actrve participatory democ racy) actually resembles the democ ratrc future
in the rest of the world.' Moreover, in terms of democratrc stability some
argue that a strong and vibrant civil society can actually contribute to the
breakdown of democ racy, and in this sense - paradoxically - democracy in
post-communist Europe may be enhanced or even saved by the absence of
citizen p articip ati o n in vo lu ntaty organi zations .J
My own view of post-communist democ racy differs from both the positive
and negative scenarios. Even rf participation in voluntary organizations is
declining in the older democracies,+ this does not mean that levels of organizatronal membership around the world are converging. Quite the contrary.
As shown in Chapter 4, the older democracies and the post-authoritartan
countries are generally closely paired, but the post-communist countries have
much less participation, and the available evidence over time suggests that
there may even be a further decline in the aheady low levels of organrzafional
membership among the post-communlst countnes. In short, potential trends
toward convergence should not be overstated.5

elxperience

and its effect on individuals and societies in the Soviet bloc, the same basic factors will apply elsewhere as well. In other words, citizens throughout post-communist Europe will, in varying ways and to varying degrees:
(r) maintain strong feelings of mistrust of voluntary organizations that result from their prior experience with communist organizations; (z) continue
to make use of private friendship networks that have persisted in the current
time period, and which serve as a disincentive to joining voluntary organizations; and (3) feel extremely disappointed with the new political and economic system, thus discouraging them even more from participating in public
activities.
These findings provide a new perspective to the study of politics and society in post-communist Europe. They support much of the recent scholarship
that stresses the importance of communist legacies in shaping contemporary
developments, not only in terms of elites or institutioni, bnt .rp..Llly in
terms of societies and ordinary citizens. Based on an application of multiple methodological approaches, anchored by recent comparative data and
evidence - both on the aggregate level across a wide group of countries, as
well as on the individual level within several case studies - this book,s societal perspective both complements and challenges the findings from studies
that focus primarily on elites or institutional design.
, Although I have in some places reached firm conclusions, my general
findings and arguments represent only the beginning of .*pior"iion into
questions about the relative distinctiveness of the co,lttt.i.r of postcommunist Europe in a larger comparative perspective. vThether invoiving
cross-national surveys, focused comparisons, or in-depth case studies, more
systematic research is needed that compares the countries of post-communist
Europe to non-post-communist countries from other regions of the world.
rfe still have much to learn about the singularity of the communist experience, its potentially changing legacy, and its impact on civil society and

'

See,

for example, Ken Jowitt's discussion of "movements of rager" in New Woild Disorder,

especially pp. 27 5-277.

'
I

democracy.

This argument is put forward, albeit only tentatively in Padgett, Organizing Democracy in
Eastern Germany.

See, for exan-rple, Berman, " Civil Society and the Collapse of the \Teimar Republic,"
pp. 40 t-4zL)\ Stephen E. Hanson and Jeffrey S. Kopstein, "The Weimar/Russia Comparison," in /'ost-Souit:t Affairs, Vrl. r3, No. I GggZ), pp. z5z-283.
+ 'l'his cllirrr., rnrlrlc f:ur()us by llobcrt Putnam's research on the United States, may not acturrlly ryrply to otlrt'r-rtdv:urct'tl irrrlustrirrliz.ccl countries. See, for example, Hallr "Social Capital
in llritrrin," rlnrl llo l(otlrstt'in, "Soti:rl (,:rpit:rl irr tlre Social Democratic Stater" papers prest'tttt'tl :tl tlrt' 1r;r,rll Arrlrrr;rl Mt't'lirrlq r,l tlrt'Arnt'r-ic:ut I)olitical Science Association, Boston,

DEMOCRACY IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE

The finding of low levels of participation in the organ izariorrs .f ci vi l s'ciuy

throughout post-communist Europe can lcacl to ir h.st ,f cliflc.rcrrt arrd
-

often emotionally charged - interpretittiorrs rrborrl tlrt. pr'ospt.cls lirr. tlcrrr6c

racy in the region. ()n thc olrc hrrnrl, rr lrt1,,rrtivt. :trrrl Plssirrrislir. vr.r.srorr
emphasizcs th:rt thc low lt.vr.l ol t.ng:rp,,t'rrrt.nt :ut(l l),l.tt(t[,ltiorr lry ol.rlilrrrry
citizcrts is irrtlir':rtivr.ol llrt. lrollow, Dr',rtr'.lrrr.rl,,rrrrl lornr.rlr:,trt tlr:rr;ltlt.r.rrl

r49

,l

St';ltt'tttlr.'t 1, (', 1r1r1l{.

\ l'ttltt,utr ltttnrt'll ,tt lurorvl,',l1it's tlrr rvtrlt'rlrllt'r('n( (':r ,un()n,l ('orutlrit's.,

:ts wcll as the still relalcvt'ls,rl otli.rtttz.tlron.rl rrr.'trrlrt't,,lrr1) nr llr,'tlrrrlt'rl St;rlt's. lior'('xrnrplt', ltt'writcs.,
" lotl.t\'. .t'. r 'r r \'('.u',.11io, l\rn('n(.ut',,tl('nto11' lrl,,'lf lo lrr' ulv(,lvt'.1 ilr volrlrrl,lty:tss()(i;rtions
tlr,trr ,lrl r rltrt lr',,,1 nr(r',1 olltrt n.llrrrn'. (',r'r' l'ttln.trrt- ll,,tt'lnt.t: ,'ll,tttr', 1', ,1 lt
lrvr'11' lrrlilr

r50

Wcukn(,ss

Oiuil Stx:icty in Post-Commwnist Ewrope

More importandy, in terms of the breakdown or survival of democracy,I

do not view post-communist democ racy as being cloomed to collapse or fall,
nor do I believe that the weakness of civil society is a good sign for a healthy
democtacy.In contrast, my basic, and less contentious, interpretation stresses
the charactertzation of the weakness of civil society as a distinctive element of
post-communist democ racy, a pattern that may well persist throughout the
region for at least several decades. The finding that posr-communist civil society is distinctively weak does not necessarily indicate that post-communist
democracy is less stable or more precarious, but it does point to a qualitatively different relationship betwee n citrzens and the state, one based on
very little engagement by ordinary people in volu ntary organi zatons in the
public sphere.
Does this mean that democ racy cannot collapse, that the region is safe
from authorrtarran rule? Certainly not. As has abeady happened in Belarus,
and could happen in Russia or elsewhere in the next decade, anti-democr atrc
leaders and forces may well succeed in connecting with voters' frustrations particularly in the countries that experienced 70 years of Soviet rule, and
where economic difficulties are most extreme today - and usher in a new authoritarian regime, even by democratic means. Such a development would
depend largely on the individual leaders, their personalities and ideologies,
and their political strategies.6 \fhile the behavior of leaders is impossible
to predict, the findings of this book suggest that any potential followers will
be difficult to activate and engage. Indeed, the reluctance of so many postcommunist citizens to partici pate in volu ntary organi zatrons today means
that anti-democratic org anrzations and movements, just like their democ ratrc
counterparts, will also have problems org anrzing and mobili zrng) and their
efforts will be hindered by the same legacy of mistrust of org anrzations.T
In other words, while demo cracy may remain relatively hollow or stagnant,
with a disconnect between rulers and ruled, the overthrow of existing democratrc regimes by movements with broad-based and active popular support
seems very unlikely.

Although the weakness of civil society may not be a harbinger of democracy's demise in post-communist Europe,

it should certainly not be viewed

6 Ott the role of political elites in the breakdown of demo cracy) see, for
example, Juan

.f

Linz, The Break-down of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, And Reequilibration (Ba ltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Pres s, 1978 ); Nancy Bermeo, "Dem ocracy in Europe, " ilr Dae dalus,
Vol. r23, No. t (rgg+), pp. t59-r78; Thomas Ertrnan, "Democracy rrrrcl l)ictatorship in

Interwar \Testern Europe Revisited," in WorldPolitics, Vll. .5o, No. 3 (r99ll),, ;rp. 47s-5o5.
7 In this sense, I agree with Hanson and Kopstcin's point thrrt "whilc tlrt'lt.gircy ol totrrlitrrrianism indeed poses significant obstaclcs to tht'fr)nnrltion of rr postc'onrnurrist 'r'ivil socit.ty.,'
social atomization rlrlty als<l sinrrtlt:rttcously l)()s('olrsl;rt'lt's lo tlrr'(r(',rlron ol ;r wt,rl<rrlrlr.rru
thoritarialtisttt." Sc(' Ilrutson ruttl Ko;rslcin., "'llrt' Wcirrr;rr'/l(ussr;r (,ornp,rrr\o1.," p. :.',,7. (\1
baltrltct'., lt()w('v('t; lvir'w lltr'wr';tlirtt'ss ol porl ronunrrrrrrl trvrl \o( r('t\'.r,r,r l-r, tor llr.tl t5 1t()l('
Ir oulrlirrli Ilrrut ir is lrr'.u't('nnr11.

Conclwsion

I5I

in positive terms either. Even with the historical precedent of 'Weimar

Germany - where high levels of org antzational membership may have supported and facthtated the emergence of an anti-democratic Na zr reglme - it

would be unreasonable to argue that the low levels of public participation

are actually beneficial for democracy in post-communist Europe.
There are two impo rtant reasons why the weakness of civil society impinges on the quality of post-communist democ racy) and these come from
the very heart of the debates, discussed in Chapter 3, about the importance
of civil society and its effect on democ racy. The first reason is derived from
the arguments of Robert Putnam and other " social capitalists, " who demonstrate the ways in which voluntary organizations "instill in their members
habits of cooperation and public-spiritedness, as well as the practical skills
necessary to partake in public life."8 By choosing not to join or participate
in voluntary organizattons, post-communist cittzens have forsaken the opportunity to develop those democratrc habits and skills" Although, as the
evidence in this book demonstrates, this decision is completely understandable in the context of the communist and post-communist experiences, the
larger consequence is that the new democ ratrc institutions are not rooted in,
or actively supported by, the larger population.e
Most scholars would agree that citrzen involvement is a fundamental aspect of any democ ratrc system. In that sense, the post-communist situation
stands in sharp contrast to post-authoritarian countries, where groups and
organi zattons - which often had abeady existed under authoritarian rule have been able to play a leading role in dem ocratrzation. In post-communist
countries, however - where people's orga ntzattonal experiences originated
predominantly in the forced mobili zatron of the communist regime - the negative memory of mandatory participation leads most people to eschew organrzattonal activity today. \7hile political institutions and elite commitments
may be most crucial for sustaining the continued existence of democ racy, the
passivity of post-communist citizens, and their alienation and removal from
the democratic process, can only be a troubling sign for post-communist
democ racy.
The second reason why civil society is impo rtant for democracy has to do
with the direct influence of volu ntary organi zattons to serve as what Theda

Skocpol calls " a source of considerable popular leverage" to influence the

political process.'o According to this historical institutional argument, the
organizations of civil society which represent the aggregate opinions, interests, ancl prcferences of their meffrbers, can protect cittzens from potentially
8 f tuln;urr,

/lr ut,litt,g AIottt', 1t. I ttt.

') l'ot';ur ('vor';tlivt'tlt'sr''r'igrtiorr ol tlris lrrolrlt'nrr \('('l(it'lr;u'tl

l{{)sr'.' "ltussirl as an H<ltrr-Glass

Srrttt'ly: A t,r)n\lrltrtrorr wrllrotrl (,tltzc'rrs," nt l;ttsl Iitttrtltt'tut ( ttttstitttliotml ll.,t,it,tt,, V<ll. 4.,
No, 1 ( t ,t,r1), ;rp. l.l .l .',
r" \hor lrol, "l l,rrv Attr,,il(,iltl llt't,ilil('( t\,t.," lt ,rI

t52-

Wcakrl('ss

ofCiuil Society in Post-Communist Europe

unjust laws and policies, as well as exert a positive influence on legislation

that concerns them. In the post-communrst context, the low levels of organizatronal membership considerably reduce the political leve rage and influence
of voluntary organizatrons. As a result, not only are post-communist citizens
bereft of the opportunities for developing greater "civic skills" through participation in organizatrons, but their voices and views arehardly represented
in the political decision-making process.
As discussed in Chapter 3, other scholars have found that the number

of existing civil society organlzatlons m post-communist Europe has been

steadily increasing throughout the region since the collapse of communism.

Is it not possible, therefore, that these organizations could serve to influence
the policy-making process, even if their membership levels remain extremely

low and perhaps even ate declining? \7hile plausible, such a scenario is
highly unlikely, for three main reasons. First, the statistics on the number
of org anrzations are misleading, as many of the organi zatrons counted either have disappeared as quickly as they appeared or have been leadin g a
"pseudo-existence" that corresponds little with their putative goals and activities." Second, since so many organrzatrons are completely dependent on
'Western grants for
their funds and support, they are often more beholden
to the requirements of 'Western donor agencies than to the larger public
whose interests they are supposed to serve. " This further contributes to
the prevalence of an elitist form of democracy throughout much of postcommunist Europe. Third, and perhaps most important, without the energy,
sense of purpose, and legitim acy that an active membership provides, many
organizatrons can have only a limited influence on the policy-making process. As Skocpol argues based on the American context, "Because membership numbers and face-to-face meetings mattered in all the classic American
volunt ary associations, those who were leaders, or who wanted to use officerships in these groups to symbohze or validate broader societal leadership, had to care about mobilizing and inspiring large numbers of fellow
members. Members counted. Leaders had to mobrhze and interact with others, or they were not successful. " t3 In post-communist Europe, there are
few members to be counted, and as a result, the organizations are rarely
successful.

rr

rz

See Ferenc Miszlletz andJodyJensen, "An Emerging Paradox: Civil Society from Above?"
in Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Marilyn Rueschemeyer, and Bjorn \Wittrock, eds., Particiltation
and Democraq) East and'West: Comparisons and Interpretatiozs (Armonk, NY: M. 11. Sharpe,

r53

Conclusion

"Civil Privatism"

as Functional Equivalent

to Civil Society?

Although I have characterrzed post-communist civil society as being distinctively weak, and post-communist citizens as organi zatronally passive and
detached, it would be a mistake to conclude that post-communist citizens
are atomized individuals, torn from meaningful ties and relations with other
people. Quite the contrarS since, as the findings of this book show; many
post-communist citizens still value and make use of the vibrant private networks that they developed under communism. Furthermore, I have suggested
in Chapters 5 and 6 that these active private networks are to some extent
an alternative to, or a substitute for, the social ties that many people in nonpost-communist societies typically acquire through voluntary organizations.
This leads to a critical question: do these private networks also serve as
the fwnctional eqwiualent of membership in volu ntary organi zattons ? In other
words, could one argue that a high level of priv ate participation compensates
for the low level of public participation, and that post-communist democracy is healthy and vibrant after all? In this sense, these private networks
might be characterized as what Jrirgen Habermas calls "civil privatisffi," referring to a form of passive citizenship and self-orientation that is crucial for
legitimating a democratic regime.'4 This seems plausible given that private
friendship networks also play a signific ant role in Putnam's conception of
"social capitdlr" as he includes measures of time spent visiting with friends,
hosting dinner parties, and informally socializing, along with various public
activities and a general measure of social trust in other people.
\7hile it is a tempting way to find a reason for optimism in the otherwise
bleak situation in post-communist Europe, I think it would be wrong on
several counts to conclude that private networks serve the same purpose
as public organuzations. First, as Habermas makes clear, not only does civil
privatism not supplant public activity, it is itself "secured informally through
the structures of the public realm."r5 Moreover, to view civil privatism as a
sufficient alternative to the public realm of civil society is to accept what Jean
Cohen and Andrew Arato call "realist, elite models of democracyr" which
"leave politics to the professionals in political society and advocate 'civil
privatism' for the members of society. "'6 In short, private networks serve an
important purpose in democratic societies, alongside and in addition /o public
participation, but they do not replace it.
One reason why Putnam views private networks and public participation
bcrth as being important elements of social caprtal is that they are mutually

1998), p. 8+; Putnam, Bowling Alone, p. 416.

Abroad; Marina C)tt<)way arrcl 'l'lrcrcsrr ( ,hurrg., " l)cbuting Democracy Assistance; Toward ir Ncw l):trltrligrtt.," in lttrrttd ol' I)t,tttt)('nr(ry, Vol. I o.,
No. 4 ftggg) pp. 99-t r j; $fcclcl.,Otllisirtttttnd (lllrtsitur; Vrtlt'r'it'Spt'r'lirr1i, ( )r,g,uti:,irtgWt)ttt(u
in Contemltrrary Itrssirl; I;,tt,gt'rtth'rirt,t1 'l'rtttsiliott ((,;nrrlrritllic: (,.rrrrlrrrrlpit' llrrrvr.t'stty l't'r.ss,
See Carothers, Aiding Democraqt

, gss).

Skor'1rrll,

"llow

Arrrt'r'it;trrs llt't ilntc

(.tvtt," ;rp, 6, ,

(r11-

.f

iirgt'rr I l:rlrt'rnrrrs., l,c,gitinttttitnt ( lrisis., frrurslrttccl by Thclmas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon

f'r't'ss, t.)7

S).,

t's;lt't'rlrlly

pgr.

6tl*75.

I f rtlrt'r'tf r.ts., Ir'gtlitttttltott (,r'l.srs.l p.

7 L.

rt.n .ut(l Ar.rlo., ( ',tt,tl ,\,tr tt'l1t tu,rl l\iltltr,tl 'l'lrt't,t'),r l), I(,5. Alsr) scc tlrc clrtssic criticltte of
r'lrlrst (rflr(('Plrnn\ ol tlcnt()(l;tt1,, l)clcr lt,rr lu,tr lr ,ul(l ff4,rtl()n llin':llz., "'l'ltt''lwo l;:tct's <lf
trr\\'r't," lll ,\tttr'llt,ltt ltt,ltltr,tl ,\t tr'llr r'l(r'l'lr'tl'. Vrtl 1fr (ltlfrJ ), lll). ,).17 ()\l
f
(

,rrf

I t.{

\Vr',l/.//('.s.\

)f ( ',turl ,\ot'lr,/1, itt I'rxt-Communist Europe

sLlpportivc. In othcr wol-cls' it is gcrtcrally uttclc:rstoocl that people's active private networks can ernc1 oftcn clo trarnslate irrto public activities. For example,
scholars who study sclcial rttovements have founcl thet private friendship networks provide excellent oppclrtunities to "recrLr it" pcople into movements.'7
According to this logic, the existence of vibrant private networks should help
to enable, rather than to prevent, the development <>f a more participatory
public sphere, since the existing networks could serve as a source of recruitment and mobili zatron.
In post-communist societies, however, the distinction between public and
private - a defining feature of communist regimes, as described in Chapt er z remains very strong today.'8 There is still much less overlap and interaction
between priv ate and public activities than in other types of societies, since
people's close family and friendship networks are viewed as a realm that is
by definition separate from, and antagonistic to, the larger domain of public,
state-controlled activities. In the language of network theorS these private

networks remain "strong ties" that do not develop into the kind of crosscutting "weak ties" that, paradoxically would open the door to a wider set
of acquaintances, contacts, and opportunities.'e Moreover, post-communist
private networks today do not contain the implicit support of the public
sphere that the concept of "civil privatism" presupposes in order to legiti-

r55

Conclwsion

As a result, there is still very little representation of ordinary crtrzens in the

public domain by organi zatrons, and most post-communist citizens still have
(and want to have) very little exposure to the org anrzatlons through which

they could acquire the kind of public "civic skills" that would benefit their
society and democracy.
On the whole, negative and positive interpretations of the empirical findings of this book and their impact on democ racy in post-communist Europe
are both overstated. Post-communist democ racy is neither thrivittg nor on the
verge of collapse. Instead, it is likely to continue to "muddle through," with
elites and institutions that vary widely in their style and performance, but a
citrzenry thatremains disengaged from the public sphere. The distinguishing
element of post-communist democ racy is - and probably will be for several
more decades and generations - the troublitg, but not fataI, characteristic

of its weak civil society.

PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE OVER

TIME

In short, unlike private networks in older democracies or in post-

Having specified the implications for democracy and democ ratrc stability of
this book's empirical findings, in this section I address the question of how
the weakness of post-communist civil society might change over time. In so
doing, I reiter ate part of the theoretical argument from Chapt er z) but in a
more speculative manner and in the context of post-communist institutional
change. Although I argue that the current situation is unlikely to change in
the near future, I discuss the two ways in which a gradual increase in orga-

authoritarian societies, post-communist private networks remain resistant

to public mobtlization, since their very identity was created historically by

ntzatronal membership is possible, namely, generational change and a more

active and supportive cooperation between the state and the organizations

conditions that imposed a strict division between public and private spheres.
Their vibrancy is difficult to transfer into public groups or orga nrzatrons, because private networks are predicated on a long-standing resistance to group
activity" In and of themselves, they are certainly not bad for democracy, but
these private networks do not substitute for the public realm of civil society.

of civil society.
As I argued in Chapter zrthe new institutional designs in post-communist
Europe have not yet brought about lasting societal change. Not only has
little time elapsed since the new institutions were established, but these
institutions' theoretical and logical underpinnings are based on neo-liberal
notions of self-reliance and self-motivation, which are completely inconsistent with people's prior experiences under communism. Moreover, the very
nature of these neo-liberal ideals makes them difficult to spread, since people
crurrrot be "forced" to ioin and participate in voluntary organizations. By
clcfinition, the desire and motivation must come from within. As a result,
tlrc 1-rost-c<)nrlunist institutional changeS, which have been extensive and
wirl('sl)rcrrcl, lr:rvc rrof yct brulught about a concomitant change in the socit't:rl lrt'lrrrvi<)r- ()f i,,irrirrli voluntrtry organir,ations.If anything, these changes
lr:r vt' r't'irr lor-r't'tl ltrir)/' soci:t l prtttt'r'ns., rtt lcrtst witlr regard to the distinction
'l'lr(' ('v irlt'rrcc frtlnt the region of postlrt'r u,,('('n t lr,' Pu l',lit' ,r rrtl priv:t tt' sPlrt't't's.
()nnnurusl
(
l,ur<)l)(' l',oirrls lo lltt' linrils r,l itrslitrrti()tl:ll '"crtrftittll" ,tncJ trl the
l).rrlr.rl f ,ulrtrr ol llrt'.ut lntt'r ls,rl l)()\l t unululltl\l ttt'o lil)('t':tl ilrstitrrt.iolts t<t
trl rrt'', tlr.it tr',,ul,l t(",()lt.tlr' rvrllr llri' tvl,l,'l l)()l)tll,tlitllt.

mate the democratic system. As much research has shown, post-communist

Europe has extremely low levels of trust, whether trust in strangers or trust

in public institutions.'o

17 See, for example, Tarrow, Power

in Mouement, pp. 47-50.
r8 Richard Rose addresses this issue in his description
of the post-communist "hour-glass"
society: "In an hour-glass society there is a rich social life at the base, consisting of srrong
informal networks relying on trust between friends, relatives, and other face-to-face grosps.
Networks can extend to friends of friends, too. At the top of the hour-glzrss, rhe rc is :r r-ich
political and social life, as elites compete for power, wealth, and prestigc.... Such rr secit'ry
resembles a civil society insofar as a number of informal and even fonrrrrl irrstitrrti()1s :y'(.
tolerated and now legally recognized by the state. Yet thc rcsr,rlt is rrot :r civir c()nyrryrrirv
butan hour-glass societg because the links betwecn t()p lrncl b<)tt()nr:u'(.v('r'y lirrritt't1." l(6st.,
"Russia as an Hour-Glass Society," lr. Js.
19 See Granovetter, "Thc Strcrrgth of
Wt,:rl< 'l'i(.s1" l)l). r ',()()
Lo See, f<lr cxllnrplc', Mislrlt'r' :trrcl l(ost., " l'r
rrrl, l)r.-tru.,t .rrr,l
Szt<lttt;-ll<:t, "'l't'lrsl rrlrtl l'.ln('rt',irr1i l )('nr,r r.tt \. l,l, I (,',
I

I",tlSlt't

tt ( )t'l lltrlul,.

('.,1)r't

r,rllf 1r1t

t ( ,(

t, ,

'

56

WzArrr,s-s

rl

Oiuil Stx.icly itt l\rt-Communist Europe

\flhat should we expect to find irr r o years' tirnc? will levels of membership
and participation gradually increase, at least in somc countries? Any attempt
to answer these questions is purely speculative, a risky venture for a social
scientist, but especially for one within the field of "p.st-sovietologg" given
the extended debates in sovietology about the problems, and failures, of
prediction.'- Nonetheless, the findings of this book warrant some cautious
speculation about the conditions for, and the likelihood of, change in the
patterns of non-participation in the organizations of civil society.
For the countries with the lowest levels of participation - such as Bulgaria,
Lithuania, Russia, and ukraine - which generally have weak and unsupportive states and unstable economies, it is unlikely that citizen participation
in voluntary organizations will increase significantly. In this sinse, barring
any miraculous turnarounds, the structural impediments of the state and
the economy will serve to keep organizational membership very low, and
the specifically post-communist factors that I have identified will not change
substantially either.
However, for those countries on the higher end of the post-communist
spectrum of participation in voluntary organizations - such as Hungary the
Czech Republic, Eastern Germang Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania it is
quite possible, and in some cases even quite likely that the state and economy
will become stronger over the next decade. The question remains: will this
lead to an increase in organizational membership and participation? If so,
will participation increase to the extent that these countries will eventually
start to resemble countries in the post-authoritarian and older democracies
country groupings, rather than remaining close to other post-communist
countries? In my view, although perhaps it could happen in one or two
individual countries, such a development is unlikely to occur, unless there
are drastic improvements in the way in which domestic states and foreign
funders approach post-communist citizens and their prior experiences living
in communist regimes.
The phenomenon of non-participation that has emerged in the postcommunist period is not accidental or temporary. Rather, it represents the
continuation of a pattern of social relations and behavior that developed
over several decades, under the very distinct conditions of the communist
system. Ironically, now in a very different institutional environment, this
pattern seems in many ways to have been reinforced in the post-communist
time period. Moreover, a dynamic analysis of changes over time, as shown in

r57

Conclusion

;1
i

Chapter 4, suggests that levels of participation have actually decreased, and

may still be decreasing today. In short, while the pattern of non-participation
could certainly change over time, leading to a resurgence in participation and
a lasting change in societal social patterns, it is doubtful that this change will
be rapid, or that it will happen in the near future'
Despite this bleak assessment about the persisting weakness of postcommunist civil society, it is worth considering how, if at all, an increase
in organizational membership and participation could come about in the future, and in particular how states and international organizations might be
able to contribute to it. Although there are certainly no miraculous formulas
or quick solutions, there are, broadly speaking, two ways in which such a
trend could develop.
The first and most obvious potential mechanism of change is through
generational change, as new generations of post-communist citizens, less
influenced by the experience of life in a communist system, come of age.
As originally articulated by Karl Mannheim, the logic of the generational
argument is that a coherent group of people, roughly aged between 17 and
zS) car\ be shaped not only by their common age or geography but also by
"significant social events" such as war or economic depression.t" In the postcommunist context, the expectation of generational change presupposes'
as Piotr Sztompka argues, that "as long as the majority of the population
consists of the people whose young, formative years, and therefore crucial
socializing experiences fall under the rule of the communist regime - one can
expect the continuing vitality of the bloc culture." However, he adds that
this will change over time, as "new demographic cohorts replace the older
generations at the centfal positions in a society."'3 In terms of membership in
organizations, the expectation therefore is that those people who dislike and
avoid voluntary organizations will eventually die off, replaced by a younger
generation that might be more sympathetic to such activities.
On the one hand, the expectation that generational change will bring
about a steady increase in organizational membership is certainly plausible although not particulady encouraging, since even in the best conditions,

"

Karl Mannheim, "TheProblemof Generations," inEssaysintheSociologyofKnouledge(New

Ygrk: Oxford University Press, r95z [rgz8]). Also see, among others, M. KentJennings and
Ilichard O. Nicrli, Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Aduhs and Their Parc115 (Prirrceton: I)rinceton University Press, r98r); Inglehart, The Silent Reuolution. Many
rlcrrrogrrrplrcrs lrnvc usctl thc analogy of war or depression to characterize the devastating
tlt.rrrogrrphic t.ffi'cts of thc collapse of communism and the difficulties of post-communist
(r:f lrsili()r). Sct' Nitlrolus lr,bcrstrrclt, "l)cn.rographic l)isaster: The Soviet Legacy," inNational
l1lr,rrr/, No. tr' (rvu.l), l)l). st-57i Nichol;ts li,lx rstrrtlt, "l)crlographic Shocks after Comrrrrrrrirnr: lr.lst( rrt ( ict tttrtrty, r9lJ,) 91," in l\4ttrl,ttirtr,ttnl l)nu'k4tntent Rcuicw,Y<>l- zo' No. r
(r,r,r.1 ), 1t1t

r!'r\.'.

\rtorrr1,t..r, "l,,,,1.rrr1,, ll.r,li: llrr'\t'.u r,rli,r.r'.,r

( ttuutuuu..l ,rrt,l l\',,t I tiltutuutt',t,tr,,,1,,'.. V,,l -',r, N,'

'r I'rltr

( rrllrrt.tl.trrtl (liviliz;rtitrrritl llrc;rk," irr

' (t,t,rt'), Ip t-'(, tl,'

sfl

Wutrrr,s-s

tl

Oit,il ,\otiaty in l\xt-Commwnist Europe

it will

take many dec:rclcs firr such generati<lrrrrl replacement to run its

course - and it fits with dre argument of this book about the importance
of the communist experience in explaining the low levels of post-communist
organizational membership. on the other hand, however, such a development may be more painstaking than it is automatic, and it is difficult io
predict whether or not generational change will contribute to an increase in
participation in civil society, even in the long run. After all, a major element
of socialization comes not only from the current institutional settine but also
from one's parents, teachers, and peers, all of whom can contribite to reproducing a continuation of the same patterns of orientations and behavior,
even if the original institutional environment is long gone.24
If the process of societal change may take generations, not years, a logical
object of study would be today's youth, or the youngesr adult generation,
which had the least exposure to communism and should therefore be less
marked by its experience than older generations. Indeed, as discussed in
chapter 5, the results of the PCoMS survey in Russia show that there is a
noticeable generational difference, as Russians aged under zs ate members
of an average of slightly more organizations than the rest of ihe sample.
At the same time, however, one should be careful not to place too much importance on this youth generation, for three main reasons. First, since young
people in all societies tend to be unsettled and changing, the establisirmeni
of certain patterns today does not necessarily mean that differences between
them and other generations will last as the youth grow older. second, young
people are notoriously uninterested in politics, and it is generally in a perioJ
of "late youth" that political interest, preferences, and patterns of behavior
become more fully developed.'s rhird, and perhaps moit importantly in the
context of this book, although the youngest adult generation today did not
experience the communist system as adults, they did have a great deal of
exposure to it through the communist youth organizations, which began recruitment when children first entered elementary school. Since these.hild..r,
were still actively socialized in a communist system, it would be inaccurate
to say that they constitute a genuinely post-communist generation - a label that would apply only to those who were too young to join the youth
organizations at the time of the collapse of communism.
. It is still far too early to make firm predictions about changes in aggregate
levels of participation based on this youth generation. To measure and
'4

see, for example, Richard G. Braungart and Margaret M. Braungart, "[.ifc-(]6ursc arrl
GenerationalPolitics," inAnnualReuianof sociology,vol. rz (r9g6), pp. zo5-z j,r; Sr.rrlcy
A. Renshon, ed. Handbook of Political Socialization: Theory and Rcscttrch (Nt.w ygr1: lrrct.
Press, 1977);

Orit Ichilov, Political Socializatiln,

Oit izanship

liluctt

ir

trr,

ttt(l I )flt rt x,i 1,1, ( Nt.w

York: Teachers College Press, r 99o).

2J Here, of course,
thc higher lcvt.l ol l{rrssirrrr yorrtlr rrrr rrrlrr.rlll jly irr volrrrrl:u }, r,r,,,.1r/.rtr.r\
stands otlt ls alt itttP0tl;tttt txrt;rtiorr lo llrrr |.rilr'r rr, lrrrt rt riltrll t,r0 t..rrlt to r..t( lr ll ll
cttttclttsiorrs or prcrlit liorr,, lr.rrr.,l ul,,rrr t 1,,.,, r, rrrlt,

r59

Conclwsion

test generational change, many more studies should be conducted across

different countries over the next decades, particularly as the first genuinely
post-communist generation reaches adulthood. Until then, we are likely to
iee a continuation of existing post-communist patterns in the low levels
of organizational membership, as well as in the common reasons and
causes that best explain it. Over the long run, however, generational change
remains one of the main prospects for gradually achieving lasting societal
change in the region.

The second mechanism by which post-communist citizens could conceivably become more active participants in civil society is more difficult, but
also more heartening, because it allows for the possibility of new policies
influencing current and future developments in a positive way. The most
fundamental requirement for post-communist citizens to change their participatory habits involves their acquiring familiarity, comfort, and a new
positive association with voluntary organizations. But this cannot occur
easily or automatically, even with the passing of time, given the daunting
obstacles to participation described in Chapters 5 and 6. Many of the existing organizations, which have been steadily increasing in numbers since the
collapse of communism, have been created by Western organizations and
are to varying degrees dependent upon'Western funds and conditions. As a
result, much of the organizational initiative comes from "above," namely,
from outside or foreign sources with little understanding of communism and
post-communism. It should come as no surprise' therefore, that in trying to
convince people to join, many appeals come across as empty or unfamiliar
at best, or foolish and misguided at worst. Moreover, the realities of fundraising in conditions of economic uncertainty are such that the local leaders
and activists in organizations are often more beholden to their funders than
to the people they are trying to engage and inspire.'5
Perhaps even more importantly many of the new organizations that are
supported by'Western sources contain an underlying anti-communist theme,
one that implies that the way people lived under communism was wrong, unethical, or unsuitable for a democratic and capitalist society. Such a message
might seem to be justified by the finding that the persistence of communist-era
private networks serves as a disincentive for joining public organizations irr other words, since they are an impediment, perhaps they should simply
lrc wipccl rtw:ry. Howcver, while the denunciation of the communist systern
rrrrry bc ncccsslrry for convincing people to start anew, and to change their
orrtkrol<s rtnrl socirrl pllttcrns, thc explicit or implicit condemnation of peoplc's lili'stylt.s rurtl pt.rsorrrrl historics has thc opp<lsite effect, leading to even
nr()r'(.nrisun(lt.rst:rrrtlirrli. rt'signrtiort. ruttl rlist'rtg,rgcrrtcltt. UnfortunatelS the
'r' \r r'(

.il

llr('r',.

\t,lttt,r' l)t'tttrtt

\\ r r/, lt lt ttl I r tttlr'tttltl

11,r/

t,t,

l' li !t" Irl

t6o

'Weakness

of Ciuil Society in Post-Commwnist Ewrope

message of many organizations does not make the distinction between eval-

uating the communist system and criticizing people's own lives. Until that
distinction becomes clear, and until the leaders of organizations learn to value
and appreciate what so many post-communist citizens view as the positive
aspects of life in a communist system, as well as their personal resourcefulness and ingenuit)! most attempts to mobilize people to participate in
voluntary organizations will continue to backfire, or at least to fall on dead
or skeptical ears.

CONCLUSION

This discussion - and, indeed, this entire book - begs the crucial, yet frustrating, question of what can be done to help encourage more post-communist
citizens to take part in public organizational activities. While this represents a daunting task that is unlikely to produce rapid changes, there are
some steps that can be taken. One obvious precondition that I have repeated
throughout this book is the importance of improving economic conditions,
particularly in those countries in which many citizens have been facing nearcatastrophic economic obstacles. This applies not simply to the development
of a wealthy business elite or to an aggregate measure of national productivity or growth, but especially to improving the actual standards of living
of most ordinary people, so that they might have the economic means to
devote time and energy to voluntary organizations and possibly to contribute a donation or membership fee that could pay off for them in the
longer run.
In addition to broad improvements in the overall economy, a second
step for strengthening post-communist civil society involves a reappraisal
of the role of the state and its relation to the organizations of civil society.
As discussed in earlier chapters, contrary to the simplistic views of many
conservative commentators or politicians,Lz a convincing body of research
that incorporates a larger historical and comparative perspective has demonstrated that the state has played a crucial role in enabling, facilitating, and
encouraging the existence and flourishing of voluntary organizations.r8 Although obviously it cannot force its citizens to join organizations, the state
can, among other actions, pass legislation that protects the rights of organizations, as well as provide tax or other institutional incentives that encourage
organizations to recruit more members.
27 For examples of the conservative
approach in the American dchrrtt., st't. Willirrrrr A. St h:rrrrhrrr,
"All Community Is Local: The Key to Arrrcricrt's (livic l{cnt.wrrl," :rntl l);rn ( lr;rts rntl I{itli
Santorum, "Civil Socicty arr<l tht: IlutDblc lLrlc,,l (iovcrrrrt rrt," lxrtlr irr |)irrrrrrr.. (',1,ilililil,ilt\,
Works.
'8 Scc, firr t xrtntplt', slirx pol, "l lorv Arrrt'r i( .ut.. lt(.(.trrrr ( .rvrr "; l r \ t, lin,1rr, ttll,':, li, tTrt.tt ;
ft;rtf13'tt, ()r,\'tttt trr,r:llr'ttti,t,r,\'utl;tt\lt'ttr(,tttil,ut\'.,rrr,l ll.rll, "f,,,,rrl (.||,rt,rl rrr lirrt.rrrr

r6r

Conclusion

By no means, therefore, would I suggest that since many attempts at

strengthening civil society have not worked, these efforts should be stopped'
and the funds should be cut. On the contrary, both domestic governments and
international donors should intensify their efforts to strengthen local groups
and organizations, but they need to refocus their energies in a way that
would encourage and reward groups for expanding their activities, membership, and constituencies, rather than simply providing a well-written mission statement and a nicely designed Internet site. Such a strategy would
certainly require more complicated (and costly) techniques for evaluating
organizations and how they make use of their funds, but the payoff in terms
of stronger connections with local populations - both improving peoplet
relationships with organizations and representing their interests socially or

politically

would be well worth the investment.

In this sense, the example of West Germany after World War II is instructive. Although one should not equate the post-Stalin communist systems of
Eastern Europe with the murderous Nazi regime on a moral level, there are
significant parallels - especially for Eastern Germang most obviously, but
also for the rest of post-communist Europe - in terms of institutional and
societal change in the aftermath of a period of non-democratic rule. Few
observers would deny that post-war'West Germans, who were commonly
viewed after the war as the prototype of "the authoritarian personalityr"'e
have successfully internalized the liberal-democratic norms and habits of a
democratic society. Even Daniel Goldhagen, one of the harshest critics of
German culture and its inability to change, has praised "the character and
the democratic promise of contemporary Germany."3o
In addition to the revitalization of preexisting democratic traditions from
the Weimar period, the main factor that contributed to the striking tlansformation of West German society was the successful transplanting of lTestern
political and economic institutions by the Allied forces in the early post-war
period.l' This leads to two crucial questions: if West German society could
change so rapidly and dramatically after \(orld War II, could the same process take place in post-unification Eastern Germany or in post-communist
Europe in general? How were the new institutions and policies transplanted
to post-war'West Germang and what might this tell us about contemporary
Theodor W. Adorno et al., Tbe Autboritarian Personality (New York: Harper, r95o).
ro l)arricl .fonah (ioldhagen,"Mod.ellBundesrepublik:National History, Democracy and Interrrirtigrraf izirfigrr irt (iertnany," in Robcrt R. Shandley, ed.,UnwillingGenruns?TheGoldhagen

'e

I )r/r,rtr, ( M

irrlt';t polis:

I lrr

ivcrsity of M

itt

ttt'sotrr Prcss, I 997), p. 285; Daniel Jonah Goldhagen,

Ititlcrs Willitrll l;,ttrntirynrs: ()rdintrv ()tnntns aru! tbc Holocaust (New York: Knopf,

1,19{,).

1' frttrlry, lttttl,tlfitt,,ttnl l\litns;,llstt st'r'Mitlr.rt'l;r l{itltlcr, "liroltl Statc (ltrlture to Citizen
( rrlrrrrc: ll,lrtr..rl l'.rrtrr.r.rrr,l tlrr'l'o,.trv.rr lr.rrrllun.rlr(rtt (tl l)olititrrl (lrrltrlrc itr (icrttrltly,"
rrr frrlrrr \ ftr.r,lt., ll, r,r'rlt,( r.rrrl,,rrl.,rrr,l \.rr.rlr I ltr,'Wrlr.rrt1.r'rlt , ll,rl\Nttrtt liittrslrt'tttltirttt
,l(,rtttt,trrt, lr\rrrr l\rl,or, llntttt'.tlt,'l Nlr,lrrli.lr l'r( . r'r','))

r6z

'Weakness

of Ciuil Society in Post-Communist Ewrope

Eastern Germ any and post-communist Europe ? In a recent study based on

systematic comparison of these two case studies, \Wade Jacoby has argued
that "effective transfer depends upon policymakers' finding org antzedgroups
in civil society who are willing to sponsor or pull in the foreign design :) 3z
According to Jacoby, in post-war \fest German5 the new institutions and
policies were implemented in conjunction with local groups and organ:zations that were able to connect them to the larger society. In post-unification

Eastern Germany and in post-communist Europe, in contrast, the new institutions have been imposed with little consultation, agreement, or alliance
with volunt ary organi zattons - in part because there were fewer available
organizations but primarily because of the unwillingness of \West German
policy makers to allow for a more flexible interpretation and adaptation of

their own institutions.33

The comparison to post-war \Testern Germ any is instructive for two reasons: first, it helps to explain why institutional transfer has not had nearly
the same transformative effect in post-communist societies; second, and more
importantlS the main factor that explains this relative failure also suggests
possible means for correcting it in the future. In other words, given the
\West German example, the crucial objective for states, policy
makers, and
even foreign advisers should be to propose and attempt to implement new
policies in coordination with civil society organi zations that have a genuine
constituency and membership base. Such a practice - all too rare in the first
post-communist decade, in which institutions were changed andpolicy directives were issued with little consideration of the views or interests of ordi nary
citizens and volunt ary organi zatrons - would help to legitimate institutional
changes, by making them more recognrzable, familiar, and comfortable to
ordina ry crtrzens, and thus making it more likely for lasting societal change
to develop.
For this type of change to take place, it is critical for analysts and policy
makers alike to reco gnrze that it cannot happen without the active support of
the state. The state is neither the opponent nor the antithesis of civil society,
but its cooperative partner. In the current political climate in post-communist
Europe, however, a neo-lib eral dogmatism continues to predominate, in

which the dominant assumption is that the "craftrng" of new institutions

based on foreign models will suffice to change long-lasting societal patterns.
Even in Eastern Germany where East Germans live as crtrzens of one of the
most supportive states and vibrant economies in Europe and the world, the
t'
tl

Jacoby, Imitation and Politics, p. zo.

Jacoby refers to the successful post-war Allied strategy in V[/cst (icnrrrury rrs "tlrt' lurrc'tiorr:rl
equivalent approachr" in which policy mal<ers focrrs on thc gc'rrcr:rl "lrnrrtiorrs" ()r'"(irsl(s"
of an institution., allowing for flcxibility t<l rttlll)t to tlrt'sorit'ty. lrr rorrtr:rst, tlr.'slr:rtt.11y irr
post-unificati<llr [.,rrstcnt (,t'r'ltt:uty, wlrirlr lrrrs llct'rr ;r rt'lrrtivt' l;rilurt', lr.rs l)('('n ()lt(.ol "t'\,lt I
trrtltsfc'l;" wltir'lr is(()nuttillt'tl lo "tlrr'l:ritlrlul r,'gllr.,,rlron ol ur.,lrtrrlr,rrr,rl,.tnr( lurr',. " 1,,.,,1,1,.

Itrtil,tlir,il tuttl l',lttt, s, pP.

|(, t l

Conclusion

ii
i

r63

approach to institutional change has been one of imposition by outside (i"e.,

\7est German) "experts" on East German society, without the intermediary
of local organ rzatrons who could have helped to influence those changes by
making them come across as less alien and distasteful for most citizens.
Until there is more consideration of the specific personal and societal
experiences of post-communist ctttzens, and of how these experiences have
shaped citizens' approach to society and politics today, institutional and
policy changes will have only marginal effects on people's social patterns,

and they may actually reinforce previous attitudes and habits developed
during the communist era. For these reasons, although change is certainly
possible, the pattern of aweak post-communist civil society is likely to persist
long into the future.

Coding of the

Variables

165

APPENDIX A

the r- 7 scale flipped, So that a higher score corresponds to greater political

rights and civil liberties.

Coding of the Yariables

Ciuikzation. This variable, which derives from Samuel P. Huntington's

The Clash of Ciuilizations, is coded

r-

\7estern,

non-\7estern.

Prior regime t1pe. This concept, which derives from Juan Linz's Totalitarian
and Authoritarian Regimes, is coded as two dummy varlables: prior awthoritarian experience (r - yes, o - no) and prior communist experience (r - YeS,
e - no).
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

r-ro scale within each country, in response to the following question: "Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in
what group your household is, counting all wageS, salaries, pensions and
other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household
falls into, before taxes and other deductions."

Income. Coded on a

The followittg describes the coding for each of the variables used in the
statistical analysis in Chapter 4.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Organizational membership. "Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizatrons; for each one, could you tell me whether you are an active
member, an inactive member, or not a member of that type of organrzatton? "
The question referred to the followitrg types of org anizations: (t ) church
or religious organizatrons, (t) sports or recreational clubs, (3) educational,
cultural, or arttstic organizations, (+) labor unions, (5 ) political parties or
movements, (6) environmental organizattons, (7) professional associations,
(8) charitable organizatrons, and (g) any other voluntary organizatron The
dependent variable is an index of the total number of claimed memberships (active or inactive), with a minimum score of o and a maximum
score of 9. In the country-level analysis, the dependent variable refers to

Edwcation. Coded on a r-9 scale with country-specific codes in response to

the following question: "S7hat is the highest educational level that you have
attained ? "

Agt. Coded in years.

Gend.er

r-

male, o

female.

City size. Coded accordirg to the followitg eight categories: r - under

z)ooo; 2 - 2)OOO-5'OOO; 3 : 5'OOO-IOTOOO; 4 - IOTOOO-2O|OOO; 5 :
zorooo-jorooo; 6 - 5orooo-roorooo; 7 - roorooo-5oorooo; 8 5oorooo
or more.

the auerage numbe r of organi zatronal memberships per person for the entire

country.

Tiust in others. In response to the followitg question: " Generally speaking,

would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too
careful ' in dealing with people?" Recoded so that r - people can be trusted,

COUNTRY-LEVEL INDEPENDENT VARIAB LES

o - can't bc

GDP Per capita. The figures come from the r 998 CIA

'World

Factbook,

arrcl

they are coded in thousands of US dollars.

tclcl careful.

Tblwiskm watcbing. lrr rcsp()nsc to the followitg question: "Do you ever

],i::ll :,i:lll:,'i. li::,:;]',:'l'l :,:li :'l'I"",1';l'ii]]l;i::f

Political rights and ciuil liberties. The sc()rcs c()nr(' l'r'orrr tlrt' lir'('('tl.,rrr I loust'
"Annual Survey of Frcccl()ln I lousc (lrurttry Scr)r'('s 1 .()',/ ) 7 \ lo 1,;.;l{ .),)."
The figures ttsccl irr tltt' :ur:tlysis l't'1lrt'st'nl llr,' .rv('r.r1,,r' r,l tlr.' 1r,,lilit,rl rililrts
sc()rcs ruttl tltc civil lilrt'r'lrt's sr()t'('s lor lrotlr r()r,\ {f(r.rrrrl prlt,p(, t)'.i, wrtlr
| {t.I

:r('('('ssto'l'V', )
i lr, I t's l)('t' ( l.t y"
)r

| ) ltrltlt'sl)('t',l,ty.'

#:T::TfJilT

r- ; lrr)rrrs pcr clap 4 -

more than

r66

Appendix A

from the work of Ronald

art, Modernization and Post-

Postmatqialism. This variable comes directly

Ingleh art. See, for example, Ronald Ingleh
modernization, p. l8g, in which he wntes,

This index is based on the respondent's first and second choices in the original fouritem Materialist/Postmaterialist values battery. If both Materialist items are given
high prioritg the score is cc r''; if both Postmaterialist items are given high prioritg
the score is c( 3D; if one Materialist item and one Postmaterialist item are given high
priority the score is " 2." If the respondent makes only one or no choices, the result
is missing data.

The actual question reads as follows: "If you had to choose, which one of the
things on this cardwould you say is most important?...And which would
be the next most important?" The respondent is then offered the followitg choices: "Maintaining order in the nation))' ccGiving people more say in
important government decisions"; "Fighting rising prices"; "Protecting freedom of speech. " The first and third options are considered to be materialist,
while the second and fourth are deemed postmaterialist.

APPENDIX B

Country Scores on the Main Variables

TABLE

B.r. Cowntrv Scores on the Main

Variables

Average Number of

GDP per

Political Rights
and Civil
Liberties"

.59

3o^.2

r.o
r.5

Australia

3.o7
2.68

6.2

zr.4

Sweden

z.6z

19.7

Finland

z-48
2.47

27.4

South Korea
Chile
Switzerland

2.45

ry.7

z.o
z.o

Brazrl

z.r2
2.rz

6.3

3.5

22.9

r.5

Venezuela

r.85

8.3

2.5

E. Germany

r.44

18.7

Spain

r49

t6.4

Uruguay
Romania
Slovakia
Argentina
Czech Republic
Philippines

r.39
T.r4

8.9

r.5
r.5
r.5

5.3

2.O

T.T2

8.6

3.o

I.IO

9.7

2.5

r.o7

r o.8

r.5

H unga ry

o. [Jz

3.2
7.4

2.5

[,atvia

4,3

r.5
r.5

ussiit

o.70
o.66

4.7

3.5

listort in

o,6 4

ft.5

I.5

Organizational
Country

Memberships
per Person'

United States

South Africa

Norway

'$7.

Germany

2.32

z.z2

I .O4

Capitab
(in $ r,ooos)

zo.o

u.6
4.8

r.o
r.o
r.o
r.o

r.o

(umtinued)

thJ

r68
TABLE B.

Appendix B

r (continued)

Average Number of

Organizational of

Average Number of

Organizational
Country
Ukraine

Memberships
per Person'

Political Rights
GDP per Caprtab and Civil
(in $ r,ooos)
Liberties'
2.5

Lithuania

o-59
o-45

4.2

r.5

Bulgaria

o36

4.7

2.5

Older democracies mean

Post-Authorit arran mean
Post-Communist mean

z.6o

4.6

r.86

9.4

I.I
2.3

o.8z

7.o

2.4

3.5

United States
Australia

3.59
3.o7
2.68

Sweden

z.6z

Finland

2.48

South Africa

Prior Regime
Civilizationd
'Western

non-\Testern
'Western
'Western
'Western
'Western

Norway

2.47

South Korea

2.45

Chile
Switzerland

z.3z

', )',

'Western

Brazll

z.rz
z.rz

non-'Western

'S7.

Germany

Venezuela

r.85

E. Germany

r.44
r.39
r.39
r-T4

Spain

Uruguay
Romania
Slovakia
Argentina
Czech Republic
Philippines

Hungary
Latvra

I.IZ
I.IO

'Western

non-'Western
'Western
'Western

non-Western

non-\Testern

'Western

non-\Testern

r.o7

'Western

r.o4

non-\Testern
\Testern

Ukraine

o.8z
o-70
o.66
o.64
o-59

Lithuania

o.45

Bulgaria

og6

Russia
Estonia

non-\Testern
non-'Western

'Western

non-'Western
'Western

non-'Western

'Western

non-'Western

Typ.
democratic

authoritarian
democr atlc

democratic
democratic
democr atic

authoritarian
author ttartan
democratic
author ttartan
democr attc
author ttartan
communrst

authoritarian
authoritarian
communlst
communrst

authoritarian
communrst

authoritarian
communrst
communrst
communlst
communrst
communrst
communist
con'r nr trn

Older democracies mean

Post-Authoritarian mean

Memberships
per Person

Prior Regime
Civilizationd

Typ.

z.6o

'Western

democr atic

t.86

mainly

authoritarian

o.8z

non-'Western
'Western
and
non-'Western

communtst

a r995-g7 \7orld Values Survey.

b CtA I7orld Factbook (1998).
t Freedom House, "Annual Survey of Freedom Country Scores" (tgg8), scaled from
free) to 7 (least free).
d Huntington (rggl).

Organizational
Memberships
per Person

Country

Post-Communist mean

Average Number of

Country

r6g

Country Scores on tbe Main Variables

ist

(most

17r

Post-Communist Organizational Memb ership Study Swruqt

rABLE

APPENDIX C

The Po st-C ommuni st Orga nizational Memb ership

Study (PCOMS) Survey

c.r. Distribution of PCOMS Suruqt Respondents

Russia

Eastern Germany

(%)

(%l

Western GermanY
(%)

Gender
Female

8.s

57.9

56.3

Male

4r.5

42.r

$.8

Ag.

The Post-Communist Organrzatronal Membership Study (PCOMS) survey

was conducted in Russia and Germany in early 1999. It was financed by
^
grant from the National Science Foundation (grant #SBR- 98roj84).
In Russia, the survey was carried out by the All-Russian Center for the
Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), between January ro and February 8,
1999, xs part of its bimonthly "omnibus." The universe was the population
of the European part of the Russian Federation (includitrg the Urals region)
aged 16 years and over, and the sample was representative by gender, dge,
educational level, region, and urban and rural residence. Overall, the sample
consisted of r roog interviews taken in approximately 8o urban settlements
and rural regions of the European pafi of Russia. Given the low levels of
phone penetration in Russia, all of the interviews were face-to-face, as is

rg.5

4c'-49

23.o
16.o

)) )
)) )

zo.z

50-5 9

6o-69
Over 7o
Education

ry.5

zo.z

16-S

tt.6

ry-9

anarray ofdemographic information. Russian

'

rrrrcl l',rrsr ( icn'nrur rcsporrcle nts

tht' tlisrttssiort irt Str';lltcrt Wltttr', ltrt lr.rrrl l((,\('i ,rrrtl l.rrr MrAllisrcr,
/trrsslil Vrlr'.s ((ilr;rllr;utr, Nl; (,lr;rtlr;rrrr ll()u\er t,r,r,), ltlt, l ,r ] ',),

See, f<lr cxlutt;rlt'.,

l7(

llrt11,

6.9

17.8

Low
Medium
High

6.4

r.9

r.7

52.4

74-5

7z.r

zo.o
ZI.I

ro-7
rz.9

16.8

Very high

r)oo9

rroo3

r roo8

Valid N
Sowrce: PCOMS

9.4

(rggg).

were asked all

rz questions, and'West German respondents were

asked only

questions 6-8.

Qr. During the Soviet/GDR period,

there were all sorts of organizations

in which many people participated. I am going to read off a list

of different types of org anrzations; for each one, could you tell me
an inactive member' or not a

*trH#lrITr.""i:U#:T*:

(lr.

The PCOMS surveys asked the followittg qLrestior.rs, irr aclclitiorr to rcclucstirrg

3-7

z8.o

ZI.I

3c,-39

common for Russian survey research.t

In Germany, the survey was conducted by the Institute for Social Research
and Analysis (FORSA), from January zS to February rr, r 999. The universe
was the population of both S7estern and Eastern Germany aged z8 years or
older, and both samples were representative by gender, age ,educational level,
region, and urban and rural residence. The sample consisted of r ,oo3 interviews in Eastern Germany, and rroo8 in \Testern Germany. The interviews
were all conducted by telephone, using computer-assisted techniques.
Table C. r presents the overall distribution of the three samples, in terms
of gender, age , and education.
Survey Questionnaire

2.4

2r-3

Under 3o

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

Church or religious org antzatlon

Sport or recreation organizatron
Art, music, or education al organrzatron
Labor union
Politic al party

Environmental organLzatron
Professional association

Charitable organizatron
Any other vcllunt ary organi zatron
[n thc Soviet/GDR time period, how often did you rely on friends for
lrclpr with thc followirrg:

:I

.l

ll1['.l,,,,,(s
rlt t't'ly

llcv('l'

T7z

Appendix C

Post-Communist O r ganizational Memb

a.
b.
c.

d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

actrvrtres
3

4
5

I had heard of them, but I never participated myself

I participated, but only from time to time
I was a fatly active participant
I was very active, and even helped to organLze and lead
meetings myself

try to remember how you felt in the late r98os, when all of
Q+.
these changes in the GDR/USSR were going on. 'V7hat were your
expectations regardittg your own life ?
Please

t .'n.ctedthat myriT: would get:

z
3
4
5

somewhat better
stay the same
somewhat worse
much worse
Q5.Looking back novv, compared to what you expected, how would
you describe the changes in your life over the past decade ?

s"'fen:

T'" 3ff$tr1T:::"s
3
4
5

stay the sarne

somewhat worse
much worse

Q6. Generally speaking, these days, how often do you rely on friends for

herpf"n*H]:ns:
j
4

173

Labor union
Politic al party

Environmental organizatton
Professional association
Charitable organization
Atty other voluntary organizatron

IF RESPONDENT IS A MEMBER OF NO ORGANIZATIONS:

Q8'

X*'*::il;J:'/:n'rr#m,,0.'jj,exprains

whv vou are not

j
4

organizations

I find these organi zatrons to be completely

5
6

useless

other reasons

Q9. In your opinion, how have relations between people become in the
ye

rs in Rwssian/East German society ouerall?

Relations between people

in Russian/East

German society have

become:

r
z

much better
somewhat better

:HJ*iliT:,,.
'5
much worse

Qro. \fhat about for you personally, how have interpersonal relations in
your own life become?

rarely

never
a. working (assembling, installing, fixing) on house, car, etc.
b. caring for someone in you r family (brrby, elderly pcrson., ctc.)
c. in difficult situations (sirrrply for srrpport)
QZ. I am going to rcilcl off rr list of voltttttrtt"y orllirrrizrrfiorrs; ft)r crrclr r)ncr
ccttllcl yott tcll nl(' wltt'f ltc'r y()u ;u'r' r'urrt'rtlly iut :lclivr' nlr.nrllt.r; rul

Nobody has invited loffercd me to join any organizations

I don't really know of the activities of any of these organrzations; if I knew more, maybe I would consider
participating
I am interested in these activities, but I don't have the time
to participate
I am just not interested; I just don't want to belong to any

r
z

last r o
MY

ip Study Suru qt

inactive member, or not a member of that type of organrzation?

a. Church or religious organtzatron
b. Sport or recreation organizafion
c. Art, music, or education al otganization

working (assembling, installing, fixing) on house, car, etc.

caring for someone in your family (baby, elderly person, etc.)
in difficult situations (simply for supporr)
Q3.Beginnitg in the mid-r9Sos, many small and informal groups and
organizations, organized outside of the Party, began to emerge in
the GDRruSSR. At the time, how did you relate to these kinds of
activitttt t
, had not even heard of these organizations and their
z

ersh

Itclutions between peoplc in my close circles have become:

I
L
l
4
s

rtruch bcttcr
sorllcwhltt lrcttt'r
st lt

y t llt'

s,l

tllt'

s()tltt'wltitl w()t's('
nlttr'h w()t'sc

r74

Appendix C

Qtt. How satisfied are you with how democracy is

developing in

EG/Russia?

Qtt.

r
z
3
4

very satisfied

fairly satisfied
not very satrsfied
not at alI satisfied

How often do you trust the national government to do what

r all the tirne
z most of the trme
3 some of the time

4
5

APPENDIX D

The In-Depth Interviews

is right?

almost never
hard to say

SAMPLING METHODS

In selecting my interview respondents from Russia and Eastern Germany I

attempted to reach a wide variety of people in both societies, spanning many
different ages, occupations, levels of education, and economic situations. To
make the selection process more manageable, I picked two cities in each
counrry as sampling points Moscow and St. Petersburg in Russia, and
Berlin and Leipzig in Eastern Germ any - and I conducted r i interviews in
each city. The choice of these particular cities allows complement arrty.- since
Moscow and (East) Berlin are comparable in their unique significance, both
in the past and in the present, as the caprtal and most important city of their
respective countries, and since St. Petersburg and Leipzig are comparable
in their cultural and political significance, both historically and as the heart
of dissident activity during the r98os, as well as in their relative economic
success today.

Although ide ally one does not mix sampling methods across cases, the
practic al realities of my project were such that I had to follow two quite different sampling procedures. In Eastern Germ dny, the official survey institute
FORSA, which also conducted the large-N survey, provided me with a list
of people in Lerpzig and Eastern Berlin who had agreed to be contacted by
an American researcher interested in askittg about their "life experiences."
Although the institute did not tally a response rate when gatherittg the names
of and contact information for these respondents, only one person contacted
by me declined to be interviewed. In Russia, however, the procedure for finditrg respondents was more complicated. Since telephone penetration in Russia
is quite low, and, more importantly, since it is notoriously difficult to find
Russians willing to participate irt surveys,' I had to follow a quota sampling
, A1 entployce;rl ;r rrrrrjnr'l(rrssiiut sut'vey irrrtitutc toltl tttc off-tltc-rccorcl that this is also how
1r(f!t splvcy\;1'c ((,n(lrrtterl rn l{urrl;r1 lrlng;t wttle wclr ol I'cs('rlrchcrs ilr tltc fie'ld t<l firtcl
7\

li

l
I

I
I

Appendix D

176

method. This required my asking my Russian friends and acquaintances to

help me find and contact respondents, whom I had not met before the interviews, and who fit certain categories based on gender, age, and education
level. Although less systematrc than the stratified random sampling method
that I was able to use in Eastern Germany, this quota sampling still allowed
me to find and interview Russian respondents who were comparable in their
diversity to my East German respondents.

TABLE

D.r. Comparison of In-Depth Interuiew and PCOMS Suruq

respondents through their acquaintances. This pcrsort t'stirrr;rlt'tl tlrrrt lry

11oirr1,,

tl,,.r'lo

tloor',

aresearcherwouldhavetol<nockon()vcr jootloor-slot,,t'l r()l)('o1rlt'r(f ;rtlrt't't()l)irrti.iP.rtt'

in the survey.
2

Notethatin'l'llllc l).1,ltoll,rpst'tl tlr."'lrililr .ur.l "t.'tr lrrrilr",'.ln(,rtron

i;l:l: )::l:,i::l'll: ';ii:,;',lll':',ll;:

;;.,)1,':';,;';, ll,l',,',',',;::,',',',"::::; ,,,,1'

(.rlr'1,,,ut',, lrorrr tlrr'

",

"r' ""

"

'r'

In-Depth Interview

Large-N Survey

Respondents

Respondents

Germany Russia Eastern Germany

Russia

Eastern

Female

So"h (tS)
So"h (tS)

So"h (tS)
5o"A (tS)

4r.

rc"/" 3l

zt.ro/o

Ag.

When conducting an in-depth study it is impossible to achieve the representativeness of large-N surveys, since many different types of people cannot
be captured by the small number of respondents. Furthermore, it is difficult
to determine how "typtcal" or "unusual" the views and experiences of any
respondent may be compared to those of people outside of the sample with
similar basic demographic characteristics. Nonetheless, it is still advisable,
if one seeks to reach conclusions that apply to the overall population, to
select respondents who resemble that population as closely as possible, for
doing so can only increase the plausibility and the explan atory power of the
arguments derived from a small-N sample.
Table D. r presents basic distributions of my 6o respondents, which I
contrast with the simiiar groupings from the representative large-N survey
discussed in Appendix C. The table shows that my respondents were roughly
similar to the survey respondents in gender and age distributions. In terms of
educationr' however, my sample overrepresents highly educated Russians;
overrepresentation is a common problem in small-^/ research, particularly
when one relies on a quota sampling method. That said, I believe that this
overrepresentation does not distort the analysis, since the in-depth interview
respondents resemble the large-N sarnple in most other respects, and since
the effect of education is somewhat limited anyway, as shown in Chapter 5.
Thble D.r also shows the percentage of former members of the Communist
Party in both countries, revealing that my East German sample slightly overrepresents former Party members, although two of the eight had actually left
the Party by the mid-r98os.
In terms of participation in voluntary organizations today, Table D.r
shows the number of my respondents who are members of o, r , L) 3, or
4 such organizations. As we would expect, the rates of menrlrership :.rre

Respondents

Gender

Male
THE IN-DEPTH SAMPLE IN A \X/IDER COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

177

The In-Depth Interuiews

Under 3o
30-39

40-49
50-5 9

Over 6o
Education

Low
Medium
High

ry%

$l

$)
$)
zo"h (6)
rc"/" G)

z7%
z7%

o
$)
n% Qt)
z7%

p%
p%

(g)
(g)

rc"/" 3)
zo"/" (6)

z%Q)

6o"/" (t8)

n% ('o)

S8.S%

5"/"

T9.5"/"
z3.oo/"

57 .9"
42.r"/"

2.4"4
zr .3"/"
zz.zoh

6.o"h zz.zo/o
2o.4"/" 3r.8"h
6.+%

r.9"/"

52.4"/"

74.5'/"

4rt"h

4.6"h

Former Communist Party members

Members
ry% (+) z7% $)
Not members SZ% Q6) n% Qr)

8"h fi.2"1"
8z.7oh 8l.l%

17

Number of organrzational memberships (today)

r8
r9
o
I

.,

o
o

I
I
I

-43

.6o

3o

3o

)
4

Average number of

-45

.78

organrzational
memberships per

person (today)

Valid N

Too9

roo3

Source: Author's interviews (1998); PCOMS (tggg).

slightly higher in Eastern GermanS where the average number of organizatronal mernberships per person is.6o (.78 in the large-NsurveY), than in
Russia, where the score is .43 QS in the large-Nsurvey). In both countries,
the intcrvicw rcsponcicnts have slightly lower levels of membership than resp()nclcrrts irr tlrc lrrrgcr siunplc, but thc' levels are still in the same general
rll I I ll('.

'lirlrlt. l).2 pr-t'scrrts tltt'tlistrilruliort ol. llrr'rcsp()ndents from another

(-()ntl);u;rlrvt' l)('r'slrt't livt'; tlris tirrtt' tlrt' lot us is ()tl scvcrltl cl<lsed-ended
;rltitrrtlrlr.rl (llt('.,ti,,n\ ltottt tlr,'Nt'rv l(ur'.1.t lt,,u.otttt'lt'l'(Nl{ll) :tlltl flrc Ncw
l)r"ln,t r,r( r(.,, ll.u()rrrt'lrr (Nl)ll), wlu, lr I r,';tlt,.rlt'tl .tl tlt,','rrtl ol Irry ilt tlt'1lllr

Appendix D

178

D.z. Comparison <sf ln-Depth Interuiew Ilcsltondcnts to New Democranes

Barometer (NDB/ and lrJew Russia Barometer /N/{ Il) Ilaswhs

TABLE

Russia

NRB Mean

E,astcrn

Cermanv

NDB Mean

Average trust in institutions

Distrust
So"h
Skepticism 45%
Trust
6%

46"h
4z"h
to%"

32"/"

3r"A

6o"h
8%

y%

37"h
o"/"

4s%
_^ o/
)5 /o

9"/"

n%

r6"/"

Positive evaluation of political regimes

Communist 6l%
Current
Soo/o
In five years 8o"/"

5r"/"

36%
49"h
Positive evaluation of economic regimes

Communist
Current
In five years
Valid N

74%
fi%
4"/"
30

7
7

6t"/"

3aoh

6+%

r4oh

n"h

320h

44"/"

860/"

6S%"

3o

g087

3535

Source: Russian and East German data come from author's interviervs (t998); New Russia
Barometer results come from White, Rose, and McAllister (rggZ); New Democracies Barometer
data come from Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (tgg8).

The In-Depth Interuiews

179

the responses above zero are coded "positive." In terms of political regimes,
Table D.z shows that my Russian respondents were more positive than the

NRB mean in evaluating the communist, current, and, especiallS future

regimes. The main pattern of the NRB still applies to my respondents,
however, since more people feel positively about the old communist regime
than about the current one. The East German respondents, in contrast,
are less positive about the prior communist regime than the NDB mean
.W'hen
evaluating the future,
and more positive about the current regime.
very high percentages of all four samples are positive, although these
results should be interpreted with caution, since many of my respondents
prefaced their responses with comments such as "I hope" or "with God's
help!"
In terms of economic regimes, the Russian pattern remains the same many of my respondents evaluate the previous economic system more
positively than they do the current one, showing results that resemble the
NRB mean. The East German pattern stands out from the NDB mean,
however, since many more of my respondents are positive about the current
economic system tlran about the communist one. Again, respondents in all
four samples are optimistic about the future, but especially so in Eastern
Germany.

interviews. The first question involves trust in institutions, and it asks respondents to rank, on a seven-point scale, their trust in n dtfferent institutions
(government, parliament, the President/Chancellor, civil servants, courts,
politic al parties, the army, police, me dra, church , trade unions, and private
enterprise). Richard Rose and his colleagues divide the responses into three
categories: distrust (scores of r or z), skepticism (scores of 31 4, ot 5), and
trust (scores of 6 or 7). The first rows in Table D.z show the percentage of
distrustful, skeptical, and trustful respondents in my two samples, compared
to the average scores from the NRB and the nine Central and East European
countries in the NDB.I The results show that the Russian respondents
are very close to the NRB mean and that the East German respondents
resemble the NDB mean. Relative to each other, of course, the Russian
respondents are much more distrustful than the East Germans, which is not
surprisitg given the many problems and the high levels of disappointment in

My purpose here is to

Russia today.

All of the interviews took place in r 998, it March-April and Jnly in Russia
and in May-June in Eastern Germany. I conducted the interviews myself,
in either German or Russian, usually at the respondents' home, although

The next two questions in Table D.z replicate the main clepencle nt
variable in R.ose's studies, namely, people's eualuation of ltrirv, r urrcnt, and
futwre political and economic regimes. The respondents rrrc lrsl<r'cl [o cvrrlurrtr:
each regime separately on a "heaven-hcll" scalc ir<lrn -l roo to too' rurrl
3 See Richarcl Il<lst', Willi:rrrr Misltlcrl .ur.l t lu r',tr,rrr I Lrt rl,lcr. I),'rrt,tt t,tt \, ,ttt,l ll', ,'\lt,'ut,tlu,r't
'Ihc Nl)li c()urtllit's irr, lrr.l.' ltrrlli.u r,r, tlr, ( z,, lr ltr l'1rl,lr. , \l,,r,rl, r,r, l lunr: u \. l'ol.rrr,l.
l(orrr:uri:r. Slovt'rri.r, lir'l.u u,., ,ur(l I ll.r.rrrr,'

characterrze my interview respondents by putting

them in a larger comparative perspective. Tables D.t and D.z show that my
in-depth interview respondents are indeed comparable to large-N samples,
includitrg both the large-N surv ey at the center of Chapter 5 and the multicountry surveys from the NRB and NDB. My interview respondents are
diverse in their gend er, age, education, occupation, and former Communist
Party membership, and they have average scores for organi zatronal member-

ship and on attitudinal questions that fit the national and regional expe ctations. Moreover, the convergence with the findings from the large-N analysis

suggest tentatively, at least that the results of this in-depth

small--|,I
analysis can be gen erahzed and applied to the wider population as well.
DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVIEWS

occasionally at their places of work or at the apartment where I was staying,

if that wils nrore conve'nicnt frlr thern. The interviews were very informal;
s<lnl('tirrrcs f<l<ltl rrrrtl clrirrks wcrc s('rvccl. tlsually, nobody else was present,
llut ()n st'vt'r':rl ()ccilsiolrs lt t-('sl)orttlt'ttt l)t'('it't'rccl t<l have a spouse or friend
olrst'r'v('., wlut lr | ;lt'r'rrrittcrl, \int,' it s('('rrrt'.1 to rn:tkt' thc rcsp()t'tclent more

tr)ttrf,rlt,rlrlr'. l'lrt'.rv('r.tl'.(',lul.tlron ol :ut lttlt'rvicw wrls:tllttrlst itlc'trtic'ltl ilr

r8o

Appendix D

both countries: r hour and 24 mrnutes in Russia, and r hour and z5 minutes
in Eastern Germany. The longest interview in Russia lasted z hours and
5o minutes, and the shortest was only 4o minutes; in Eastern Germany the
longest was two hours and zo minutes, and the shortest was 5j mlnutes.
During each interview; I guided the respondent through a discussion of his
or her life history, focusing on themes such as social patterns, membership
in organizations, private networks, and levels of trust, as well as on general values and ideals. I tape-recorded all of the interviews, which were then
transcribed into text documents, enabling computer-assisted analysis of the
responses. Although I broached all of the themes in every intervieq usually
bringing them up in the order presented in the guidelines, the time and attention I gave to a particular theme would vary accordirg to what was most
relevant and tangible for the respondent. The interview transcripts have provided me with rich datathat can be compared and that enables an interpretive
analysis of the causes of non-participatron m post-communist societies.
Table D.3 summarizes the main characteristics for each respondent, show-

ing the broad diversity of the sample.

INTERVIEW GUIDELINE

The interviews consisted of two very different parts: (t ) open-ended questions about a series of themes, and (z) selected closed-ended questions
(mainly from the New Democracies Barometer, New Russia Barometer, and
'World
Values Survey), to ascertain basic and standard demographic information that could be used to com pare the responses and characteristics of my respondents with results from larger studies - as shown in Thbles D.r and D.z.
My top priority for each interview was to make the respondent comfortable and willing to talk freely and openly about the themes and questions thar
I brought up. Another priority was to keep the interviews as standardized as
possible, so that their results could be systematic ally compared. \fhile these
may be somewhat conflicting imperatives, I tried to balance them as much
as possible.
The major themes that I addressed in my interviews and examples of the

types of questions that

I asked follow. Please note that I used this as an

intervi ew gwideline, not a rigid questionnaire. In other words, I asked many

of these questions conversation ally, rather than read them in full as they
appear here. Also, to make these guidelines easier to follow I have numbered
the questions here, but during the interviews I did not follow an ovcrly rigicl
order (i.e., if respondents started to speak of an issue on thcir owrr that was
to come up later in the questionnaire - which haprpcrrccl rpritc frcclr.r('ntly I let them continue, and I organized thc'strbscryu('nt rlucsti()ns:rccortlirrgly).
Finally, I did not ask cvc:ry c'lucsti()n ol t'vr'r'y r'('sl)()rrrlt'rrt. Sr)nr(' tlrc'nl('s r.lic'irt.tl
more of a respottst' fl-t)nl s()nt(' l'('sf)orttlcrtls., lrrrl lt'ss l'r'orrr ollr,'r's. lrr 1',t'rrt.l',r1., I
triecl t<l fr)cus olt llr,'tlt.'rttt's llt:rt s('('rttt'.1 rnrl)orl.trrl rrr tlr('r('s;ron.lr,lrls'livt.s.

r8r

The In-Depth Interuiews

TABLE

D.J. ln-Depth Interuiew Resltctndent Characteristics

Current
Organizational

ID

City

EGor Berlin

Gender
M

Ag. Education Occupation

runs a transport
high
47

Membership
none

business

EGoz Berlin

33

medium construction

sports

entrepreneur

EGo3 Berlin

4z

mediurn

EGo4 Berlin

37

medium

cook at hospital none

clinic
homemaker animal rights,
sports,

EGo5 Berlin
EGo6 Berlin

M
F

46
29

high
high

journalist
elementaty

EGoT Berlin

4e

high

advisor

educational
none
none

school teacher

EGo8 Berlin
EGog Berlin

EGro

Berlin

EGrr

Berlin

6z
3e
42

high
high
medium

27

medium

for

professional

disabled people
technical scientist
secretary
truck driver and
mechanic
unemployed (was

professional
none
none
none

cook)

EGrz
EGr3

Berlin
Berlin

29
69

medium

mechanic

low

pensioner (was

EGr4

Berlin

32

medium

temporary hiring

none
none

salesclerk)
none

agency

EGr 5 Berlin

56

high

lawyer

political party and

EGr6

Leipzig

4r

medium

cook in medical

professional
trade union

EGIT
EGr 8
EGrg

Leipzig

40
32
47

medium
medium
medium

tax advisor

Q
Q

medium

46
56

rrtccliu m

higlr

secretary
strrtc-ertnployed

l5

rtrt'tliurtr

s,t lt'st.lt'r-l<

center

Lerpzig M
Lerpzig F

EGzo Leipzig

[,ei pzig

F'

lr

lr(Jzi

Lcipzig
l,t'ipzig

r.1

| t'r1)/ rll

E,Gz

low

plumber

bookbinder at
library
bookkeeper
pensioner (was
salesclerk

l;.()zz

l:l
lr,( '

none
none
none
none
muslc

none
none

wlt'f
grrrclcning
(r t

ttrlirtrrrtl)

Appendix D

18z
TABLE

D.3 ftontinued)
Current

EGz5 Leipzig

Ag. Education Occupation

64 medium pensioner (was

EGz6 Leipzig

M
M

jj
58

ID

City

EGzT Leipzig

Gender

medium
high

ID

Rzr Moscow M

charitable

high school

none

68

medium

pensioner (was
metal worker)

none

EGzg Leipzig

M
M

3L
js

medium
high

gardener

englneer

trade union
religious,
music, youth,
charitable
trade union

pensioner (was

cultural

M
M

6o
5e

high
high

j7

high

director of

Membership
none

language
rnstrtute

Rzz

Moscow

Rr3

Moscow

47

high

computer
technician

none

Sz

high

unemployed

none

doctor

St. Petersburg
St. Petersburg

City

charitable

electrician)
social worker

pastor

Gender Age Education Occupatron

Organizational

EGz8 Leipzig
EG3o Leipzig

Current
Organizational

Membership

teacher

Ror
Roz

r83

Tbe In-Depth Interuiews

engineer)

Ro3
Ro4

St. Petersburg M
St. Petersburg F

27
48

medium
medium

manual worker
unemployed

none

Ro5
Ro6
Ro7
Ro8
Ro9

St. Petersburg
St. Petersburg

55
38
24
z8
45

medium
high
medium
high
high

former nurse

none

medical doctor
unemployed
lawyer
real estate

trade union

religious/

P.t4
Rr5

Moscow

Moscow

P.z6

Moscow
Moscow

Moscow

Rz9
R3o

P.r7
Rz8

52
44

high
medium

z6
3j
j4

high
high
medium

Moscow

5e

high

actor and theater

director

artrstrc,

Moscow

48

high

economrst

none

salesclerk

low-level
technician
office manager
office manager
sanitary-technical

none
none
musrc
none
none

worker
charitable

spiritual
F

St. Petersburg F
St. Petersburg F
St. Petersburg F

none

o
Rrr
Rrz
Rt3

St. Petersburg M
St. Petersburg M
St. Petersburg F

L5
3r
47
6r

St. Petersburg

high
high
high

high

lawyer
physicist
education
tourlsm
company
pensioner (and

Z. WARM-UP/gIOGRAPHY

none

I'd like to start by asking you some general questions about yourself. 'S7here
were you born, where did you grow up, how long have you been living in
[city], how long in this apartment, where are your parents from. . . ?

none

trade union
women's,

cultural,
youth

St. Petersburg

none

St. Petersburg

Rt

jL

high

none
bookkeeper for
investment firm

45

hish

cultural

high
medium

publishing
company
paleontologist
typist/secre tary

Rr6
Rr7
Rr 8

Moscow
Moscow
Moscow

F
F

Rr9
Rzo

Moscow

M<lscow

t;

7r
47
je
17
sl

high
nrccliuttt
lr

iglr

edtrcationa I
socio logist
s('cu rit y g,rr:t rtl
Ir,rttt'rttltJtt't'

3. ACTIVITIES

AND SOCIAL RELATIONS DURING THE COMMUNIST

TIME PERIOD

cleaner)

Rt4

INTRODUCTION

professional

business

Rr

I.

cultural

Now I would like to ask you a few questions on your life in the Soviet
Union/GDR. Rather than tell me what you would do today if the Soviet
Union/GDR were still around, I would like you to try as much as possible
to put yourself back into that time period and to tell me how you thought
and what you did back then.

..

none
sc lf-hc

n()nc
ll()ll('
ll()ll('

lp

3.r'Were you in the Pioneers? Were you a member of the Komsomol/

FDJ? Please tell me about it. \7hat did it mean do you? How
'Were
you enthusiastic
irrrportirnt wals it in yolrr life at the time?
:rbout it., ()r wrls it nr()rc of lr formality, and a formal membership
orr ly

r84

Appendix D

3.2

The In-Depth Interuiews

'Were

strangers, and that which they said within close circles of family
and friends. In other words, that people feared that they could be
reported on or that they could have problems or get into trouble for
expressing their true opinions
.Was
it really so? How so? Could you give me some examples?

you a member of the Communist Party? \fhat about the trade

unions? Please tell me about this experience . . . when you joined, how
long were you a member, what did you do, and how did you feel . . . ?

3.3 Societal life in the GDR/Soviet Union was apparcntly highly organized. There were all sorts of different orga nrzattons and groups, such
as [several examples], and many people took part in their activities.

Did you participate in any such

organizations? \7hich ones?

\7hen? For how long?

'What

did your membership mean to you at the time.

'Were
you a formal member (paying dues, etc.)?

..

l;1"'::r;;:;"*m:',^T'[i,:;;:;;;:::;:';i;:,;i:l;#:]:i;-:,
were given by the collective/group] at your place of work? (If yes)

'Were
you asked to do this? (Please explain...)
'Were
there any alternative or informal organi zatlons or clubs that
'S7hat
you

you knew about?

part in their activities

did you think of them? Did

ever take

3.4 How did you usually spend your free time? (family, friends, coworkers, etc. )

4.2 Did you (or any close friends or relatives) ever find yourself in diffifor no'c being

l[,xi :il:f:rnilH::tr ;H'"lr31Tj;il1"

4.3 And how have things changed today in this regard? Do you feel
more free to express yourself? What, rf anything, are you careful
about talking about in public? Are there still subjects that you feel
you have to avoid in certain public situations ?

5. CIVIC PARTICIPATION
j. r The last years and months of the GDR/Soviet Union saw the emergence of many types of social movements, public demonstrations,
and meetings. How well do you remember these times? \7hat was
your reaction to the events takitrg place ? Did you yourself participate
in any of these events ?
If respondent did participate: Have your (political) activities continued until today, or was this only a passittg phase in your life?

3.5 Some have described the GDR/Soviet Union as a society where people
were excluded from political life, and therefore they placed more
emphasis on their private lives, spending their time within circles of
'What do you
famlly and friends, with their hobbies, in their niches.
cterrzation? Does it fit the way you lived? \fhat

\fhy?
If responden t did not participate: Did you have any friends or close
acquaintances who were politic ally active at that time ? [If so] Have
their activities changed since then? How so?
[Spontaneous follow-up questions . . .]

l}*r."t"*;*"
3.6 It is often said that the state tried to control people's private lives. Did
you ever feel that the state was in any way controlling or invading

f ::ff:ffi ;rnlJ:T.'m*JJTil::1X':mf ::J;,1s'me'ne

3

.7 Did you, or any of your close friends or familS ever have

problems/encounters with the state security organs ?

any personal

S.z Xfhat about the first free elections? Did you participate atthattime?
Do you remember how you felt and thought about it then? And has
that changed over time? (If yes) How so?
5

3.8 People say that connections were more important than money in
the Soviet Union/GDR because there wasn't much to buy with your
money, but with good friends and connections you could basically
get what you wanted. Do you think this description of Soviet/lrast
German society is accurate? How did you experiencc it in y()r,rr own
life? Could you give me some examplcs?

4.

puR r,rc,/ rrlt I vA'l'1,.

|)|

s't't N( ;'t't ( ) N s;

t)|

ss I M t, l,A t'l ( ) N

4.1 lt is oltt'rr s:u(l tlr,rt irr Sovrt'r/(;l)l( lnnt's Pr',rplt' lr.t,l lo tlrllt'tcttlt,tlt'
Irctrv('('rr rvlt.tl l lr,'\' ...u(l ortl l, rtr,l rtt Irttltlr.. - .rl w,,r 1,.. ( )r ur ltottl ol

r85

.3 Today in [city] there are allsorts of orga nizatrons that people can join,
for example: [snow GARD: Church or religious org anrzatron; sport or
recreation organizationsl art, music, or educational organizations;
labor unions; political parties or movements; environmental organizations; professional associations; charitable organizations, and
many others.l Are you a member of any of these organrzatrons? How
alrotrt any clther kinds of groups or organizations?
lf ycs: Which one (s)? \Would you say that you are an active memlrt'r'()l'iltr irr:rctivt'r'n('rrrbcr? l'-low malny meetings do you attend a
wt't'lt

ll V('\: lSpolrl;ut('olt\ lr,llow ul) (lu('stiolts;tlltlut c()tltrilltltiotts

(lrrr.rnr t.tl ,rt Volrrlrt.u \' \votlr ), l,..t,lt't'slrrlt lolt',. Vltt't()tts ('\l)('l-it'lt('('s

Appendix D

186

at

meetings, and potential friendships

first made at

institutions that are at either extreme, and asked them (a) why and
(b) to talk about some of their experiences with this institution or

group

meetings . . .]

If no: \7hy not? [Spontaneous follow-up questions

group, etc.]

. . .]

6. PRIVATE LIFE

6.r

8. GENERATIONS

Please tell me about the people in

your life whom you feel the closest

8.

to. \7ho are they?

63

Approximately what

age

group do you consider as belongittg to your

8.2 \7hat differentiates your generation from others? Do you think that
older or younger people look at the world differently than you do ?

whom do you usually spend your free time?

How

6.4 How wide is your understanding of "family"?'S7hom do you consider as family? \fhere do your relatives live? How close arc you to
those who live far away? How important is family to you?

8.4 Can you remember one (or more) important moment(s) in the world
that you feel shaped your political beliefs? Please explain what it was,
and how it influenced you.

step above?

6.6 Do you sociahze with your neighbors? If so, how close is your relationship? Do you ever visit your neighbors just to talk? If your
neighbor asked to borrow money would you loan it?

\fhat about with your colleagues at work?

so?

8.3 Do you think you understand people who are closer to your age
better than you understand other people? How so? How strongly do
you feel a sense of solidarity with people of you r age in comparison
to people of other ages ?

6.5 How important is friendship to you? Do you consider some of your

friends as close as family, or even closer? Or does family remarn a

6.7

generation?

6.2 How did you get to know your closest friends (or spouse)?
.S7ith

r87

The In-Deltth lnteruiews

9- GENERAL VALUES AND IDEALS

9.r

6.8 How and how much have interpersonal relations changed in the years
since the collapse of the USSR/GDR? And what about in your close
circle of familv and friends ?

Generally speaking, do you consider yourself an optimist, pessimist,

or somewhere in between? \fhy?

9.2 In your opinion, what values do you see making up today's society? How have they changed in comparison to Soviet/GDR times? In
other words, what was important to people back then, and what is
important to them today?

7- TRUST

Generally speakitrg, would you say that most people can be trusted
or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people ?

9.3 In an ideal world, what are the values that you would most like to

7.2 I am going to name a number of organizatrons and institutions. For

each one, could you tell me how much trust you have in it? [sHow
ceno] \7hat value on this scale from r to 7 best fits your opinion,
where r means absolutely no trust, and 7 means a great deal of
trust? [The legal system; the press; labor unions; the police; your
national governmentl political parties; parliament; thc Clhanccllor
[President]; your regional government; yorrr loc:al g,)vcnlntcnt; thc
civil service; the school system; privrrtc brrsin('ss('s; nlil jor c<)nll)rlnics;

9.4 Many people, when speaking of GDR/Soviet times, express a kind

of nos talgra about those times, mainly because there were different
values and ideals. In your opinior, what was good about GDR/Soviet

7.r

the green/ecology m()vemcnt; thc w()nl('n's nr( )v('nl('rrt; t ll(' l)('oplt' y()rl

work with; y()rrr rrciglrb<trs; y()lrr frit'rrtls; y()rn't'l()s('l;rrrrily;

e

xtcn tlt'tl

f':r lr r i I y

y()ur-

see make up a society?

times

7.\ l()Ptiort:rl sl)()nl.lrrct)lis ()pt'n ('ntlt'.1 lrtll,,n rrlr 1lu('\ttons: l)t.Pcrttlrril',

()f l l('\l)ott.f,'lll..'.1!t..w('ls lrr tlr,'1tt('\'trl1;'. (1il(",ltott, I l,r,rl., ..()lll('()f tlrc

these?

TO. T'OI,ITTCS (NNNSONAL AND GENERAL)

I

o. I I le rc is ir scalc frlr ranking how our system of government works.

'l'lrt'top' plrrs roo., is thc l'rest; the bottom, minus roo, the worst.
I

\fhy

)w (:nru rl
Wlr(.r'(' orr llris st .rlt' woultl y,,u prrl tlrr' ft<)rtll('r c()tllttttrtrist regime?
r)'( s( svst"' or 1i'lrv( r'rir':11
Y,f i;';; :::',:l]:l ),,11, ;:i':ll,i;,",]]',';,:ll'l

sr tt

''

Appendix D

r88

\fhere on this scale would you put our system of governing five
years in the future

ro.z Does any political party represent your point of view?

If yes: \7hich party is it?
If yes: How close do you feel to this party?
If yes: Are you a member of this party?

References

ro.3 Do you vote? Do you think free elections matter?

ro.4 [Specific questions on voting in previous elections

..

.]

rr. ECONOMTC STTUATTON (PEnSONAL AND GENERAL)

rr.r 'Sfhat is your current employment situation?
rr.z Have you or anyone in your family

T.:. *
"

been unemployed at some time

(:',"#ffi *'o:;it"'i.ff 11 ff ; -

oer

)H

nv

ee

ks

rr.3 In the past year, have you or another member of you family at some
time been on short time or not paid for a full week's work by your
employer? (If yes for self or family member) How many weeks did it
last

rr.4 Here is a scale for ranking how the economy works: the top, plus
roo, is the best; the bottom, minus roo, the worst. [sHow cano]
'sfhere
on this scale would you put the socialist economy before
r989/r99r?
Where on this scale would you put the present economic system?
\il/here on this scale would you put our economic system in five
years time?
r

ri

u.6

3H'ff#H;',r::rtr',1f#,T#t**:H;:5

ust get bv' spend

People sometimes describe themselves as belongitrg to the working

.Would
you declass, the middle class, or the upper or lower class.
scribe yourself as belongittg to the [upper class, upper-middle class,
lower-middle class, working class, lower class]?

rr.7 Here is a scale of incomes. I would like to know in what group

your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensirtrts., ilncl othcr
incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the grr)up yorrr houscholcl
falls into, before taxes and othcr dcductions. I
I

l-2. oTr{I,.R DliM()(;ltn l,lll(:s

Achen, Christopher H., and $7. Phillips Shivelg Cross-Leuel Inference (Chicago: lJniversity of Chicago Press, 1995).
Adorno, Theodor \il/., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, R. Nevitt Sanford'
Betty Aron, Maria Hertz Levinson, and William Morrow, The Awthoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, r95o).
Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichtenagentur, "Die Ost-.West Ehe bleibt auch weiter die
Ausnahffier" in Berliner Zeitwng, August 9, 1996.
Anheier, Helmut K., "Germ lny," in The New Ciuic Atlas: Profiles of Ciuil Society in 6o
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