OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

PESCA vs. PESCA

G. R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001
Facts:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot
four children. She contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
psychological incapacity to perform his marital obligations starting 1988. His
true color of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband
became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying
with friends daily from 4:00 oclock in the afternoon until 1:00 oclock in the
morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking,
respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner
with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the
children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her
sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months
later, she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay,
things did not so turn out as expected. On the morning of 22 March 1994,
respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the
children. She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for
slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court
declared their marriage to be null and void ab initio on the basis of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals,
which in turn reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of
respondent and petitioner still subsists.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial
court.
b) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals
and Molina should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.
Ruling:
The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was absolutely
no evidence showed and proved by petitioner the psychological incapacity on
the part of respondent. Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as laid down in
the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further explained in Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and

fidelity and render help and support.

Relation

Persons and Family

268

The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction
placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the
law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of
that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of
this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have
relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit. The petition was denied.

1. NATIONAL CHILDREN; ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF; FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED

IN DETERMINING THE STATUS OF THE CHILD. Where, as in the recent case,
the child had established that she had been in continuous possession of the
status of natural child of the deceased, the latters act in disavowing his
paternity to the child cannot be made the criterion in determining whether
the child was his or not, for human frailty and parental arrogance sometimes
may draw a person to adopt unnatural or harsh measures against an erring
child or one who displeases him just so the weight of his authority could be
felt. In the consideration of a claim that one is a natural child, the attitude or
direct acts of the person against them whom such motion is directed or that
of his family before the controversy arose or during his lifetime if he
predeceases the claimant, and not at a single opportunity or on isolated
occasions but as a whole, must be taken into account. The possession of such
status is one of the cases that gives rise to the right in favor of the child of
compulsory recognition. (Art. 2833, Civil Code).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF COURTS DECLARATION THAT THE CHILD HAS
ACQUIRED STATUS OF NATURAL CHILD. In cases of compulsory recognition,
as in the case at bar, it would be sufficient that a competent court, after
taking into account all the evidence on record, would declare that under any
of the circumstances specified by Article 283 of the Civil ode, a child has
acquired the status of a natural child of the presumptive parent and as such
is entitled to all the rights granted to it by law, for such declaration is by itself
already a judicial recognition of the paternity of the parent concerned which
the heirs of the latter against whom the action is directed, are bound to
respect.
3. INFORMAL CIVIL PARTNERSHIP; REQUISITE BEFORE A PARTY MAY BE

ENTITLED TO SHARE IN THE PROPERTIES ACQUIRED DURING THE

COHABITATION; CASE AT BAR. Before Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code of
the Philippines) went into operation on August 30, 1950, this court had
already that where a man and a woman, not suffering from any impediment
to contract marriage, live together as husband and wife, an informal civil
partnership exists, and each of them has an equal interest in the properties
acquired during said union and is entitled to participate therein if said
properties were the product of their JOINT effort (Marata v. Diono G.R. No.
24449, December 31, 1925; Lecasa v. Felix Vda. de Lesaca, 91 Phil., 135;
Flores v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 94 Phil., 451, 50 Off. Gaz. 1029).
In the case at bar, aside from the observation of the trial court that appellee
was an illiterate woman, there appears no evidence to prove appellees
contribution or participation in the acquisition of the properties involved;
therefore, following the aforecited ruling of this Court, appellees claim for 1/2
of the properties cannot be granted. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that this case falls under the provisions of Article 144 of
the Civil Code which recognizes the parties as co-owners of the
properties acquires during the union, the law would be applicable
only as far as properties acquired after the Act are concerned and to
no other, for such law cannot be given retroactive effect to govern
those already possessed before August 30, 1950.
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California,
where he resided and consequently was considered a California citizen. In
1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his
death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he
had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on
March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of
Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared
acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California
law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back
to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately
applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the
success ional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other
hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear
that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must
apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the
matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and
consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in
absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to
anything and his will remain undisturbed.