FOR ARIE KACOWICZ

International
Relations of the
Middle East
Evaluating the Effectiveness of
Sanctions
Case Study: Iraq

Jeremy Rees

Sanctions regimes since the mid-1990s have become an increasingly

common instrument among policy-makers as a means of affecting the
behaviour of other states1. However, the effectiveness of previous
sanctions attempts at achieving their stated or desired goals is highly
debatable. This questionable effectiveness is highly pertinent given the
current sanctions regime imposed on Iran by the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), as well as the additional measures imposed by the US and
the EU. This essay will review the sanctions debate, using the sanctions
regime employed against Iraq from 1990-2003 as a case study. I will then
attempt to find lessons learned which can be applied to future cases such
as the ongoing case of Iran, and suggest under what circumstances these
sanctions are likely to achieve the stated goals of the sender countries2.
This essay will be set out in 6 phases: (1) theory behind sanctions
imposition; (2) review of the data currently available on sanctions
1 In 1950 only 5 countries were subject to economic pressure, by the mid-1990s
that number had risen to 47. Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions
Destabilize Country Leaders?, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No.
3, July 2005, p. 564. The number imposed by the UNSC and thus binding for the
international community as a whole was even less, with only 2 cases where
sanctions were imposed (Southern Rhodesia in 1966, and South Africa in 1977).
From 1990-2000 however, the UNSC imposed sanctions 16 times; Arne Tostensen
& Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, World Politics, Vol. 54, April 2002,
p. 373. For a comprehensive list of all UNSC-imposed sanctions see Chantal de
Jonge Oudraat, Economic Sanctions and International Peace and Security,
Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, eds. Chester
A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aall, 2 nd ed., (Washington, DC: United
States Institute of Peace, 2008), p. 336-337. UNSC sanctions are legally binding
under the UN Charter, Chapter, VII, Article 42
(http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml). The UNSC may
impose sanctions if it determines the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression (Article 39). However, over time this
has been interpreted to include massive human rights violations, breaches of
international law, [and] transgressions of democratic rule. Arne Tostensen &
Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, p. 375.
Jeremy Rees

effectiveness, and potential problems or inaccuracies that have been

voiced by critics of the data; (3) a brief history of the sanctions regime in
Iraq from 1990-2003; (4) analysis of the sanctions regime in Iraq in regard
to its successes and failures; (5) lessons from the Iraqi case for future
sanctions regimes; (6) conclusion on the overall value of the use of
sanctions.
Theoretical Considerations
I define sanctions as non-military instrument used by one or more states
against another state intended to coerce the latter to change its general
behaviour, or a specific action, or to punish it for this behaviour or action 3.
The relatively frequent use of sanctions can be explained by the high
demand of political leaders to interfere in other countries affairs
intersecting with the available supply, especially for such entities as the
US or EU which have large economies and generous aid budgets4.
2 Throughout this essay the term target will refer to countries which are the subject of
sanctions by others. The term sender will be used to refer to a state or states that are
imposing sanctions on another state. In this I follow the system used by Daniel W.
Drezner, Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is Cooperation
Counterproductive?, International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 1, Winter 2000, p. 73.

3 This definition goes beyond that used in some studies, which focus purely on
government-inspired restrictions on customary trade or aid relations. Gary
Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffery J. Schott, & Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions
Reconsidered, 2nd ed., (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics,
1990), vol. 1, p. 2; also used by Nikolay Marinov, cf. Do Economic Sanctions
Destabilize Country Leaders?, p. 566. I extend my definition of sanctions to
include non-economic policy instruments that are routinely part of the sanctions
package that are placed target states. In this respect I follow the definition of
sanctions employed by Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Economic Sanctions and
International Peace and Security, p. 347 (footnote 3).
4 Nikolay Marinov, cf. Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?, p.
565-566.
Jeremy Rees

Sanctions have traditionally been considered a middle ground between

diplomatic protest and military force 5. The need to intervene in the affairs
of other states is due to the fact that high levels of interdependence mean
states must take an interest in activities beyond their own borders. For
coercion to work, the costs to the target of sanctions should outweigh the
costs of conceding6. For this reason, it is generally stipulated that
sanctions can achieve only modest objectives 7. From this, one could
conclude that sanctions are rarely likely to work. Targeted states are
generally highly motivated and difficult to influence, whereas sender
states usually have weaker motivations 8 and disparate interests amongst
themselves. In this respect, studies have often concluded that sanctions
are best used as part of a package of instruments to coerce a target,
5 David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic Case
of Iraq, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 2, Spring 1999, p. 737;
Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?, p. 565.
However, others have suggested that sanctions may have just as devastating
consequences as those of war. Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions
Feasible?, p. 399. For instance, the death toll during the sanctions against Iraq
far exceeded those suffered during the Gulf War.
6 These costs need not be purely economic. As Marinov argues (see below), often the
most important costs are those endured by the political leadership from the resulting
political instability that sanctions cause, rather than a straight cost-benefit analysis in
economic terms to the target state. This idea underpins the reasoning behind smart
sanctions discussed below. See Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize
Country Leaders?, p. 566. Also see the discussion of economic versus political costs for
target states in William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, Unilateral Versus Multilateral
International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective, International Studies Quarterly, 43,
1999, p. 40-44, 51-55.

7 Kimberly Ann Elliott, The Sanctions Glass: Hall Full or Completely Empty?,
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1998, p. 56.
8 Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Economic Sanctions and International Peace and
Security, p. 338.
Jeremy Rees

particularly in conjunction with the ultimate threat of military force if the

target should fail to comply9. However, this assertion begs to question, if
sanctions are considerably more effective if backed up by the threat of
military force, to what extent can successful cases of compulsion be
attributed to sanctions as opposed to military force?
Sanctions can be either unilateral or multilateral, the latter not necessarily
requiring the approval of the UNSC. Elliott estimates that, in the case of
unilateral US sanctions, unilateral sanctions have a poor record of
success10. This view has generally been considered as self-evident 11.
Unilateral

sanctions

have

been

referred

to

as

costly

and

even

counterproductive12. The reason for this is that increased international

economic integration has the effect of heightening the impact of economic
sanctions on a target countrys domestic economy, thus rendering them
more vulnerable to economic coercion. However, this is only the case if

9 Kimberly Ann Elliott, The Sanctions Glass: Hall Full or Completely Empty?, p.
58; Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Economic Sanctions and International Peace and
Security, p. 340.
10 She examines 39 instances of unilateral sanctions imposed by the US from
1970-1990, and concludes that these were successful in a mere 5 cases.
Kimberly Ann Elliott, The Sanctions Glass: Hall Full or Completely Empty?, p. 58.
11 For instance, Haas concludes that multilateral support for sanctions should
constitute a prerequisite for their introduction by the United States. Richard N.
Haass, Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 1998), p. 208.
12 For a critique of the prevalence and centrality of unilateral sanctions in US
foreign policy (extending even to local and state level) see Richard N. Haass,
Sanctioning Madness, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, Nov-Dec 1997, available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/53580/richard-n-haass/sanctioningmadness?page=show.
Jeremy Rees

these sanctions

are

comprehensively

applied by

the international

community. Alternatively, the globalization of economic activity means

there are likewise many more suppliers of most goods and services and
many more potential markets for a targets exports. Thus, if sender states
should cheat on the sanctions regime or refuse to join it in the first place,
the sanctions regime will lack the robustness to inflict the necessary
severity on the target, and thus fail to compel it to concede to the
senders demands13. Marinov finds that sanctions imposed by institutions,
and thus multilateral, are more effective than unilateral sanctions, for the
reasons discussed above14. However, multilateral sanctions are also more
difficult

to

organise

and

sustain15.

Multilateral

sanctions

require

cooperation between a number of states. Sanctions may fail because the

primary sender is unable to enforce the application of sanctions.
Backsliding states may intentionally fail to enforce sanctions regimes that
they find costly or contrary to their perceived interests 16. Moreover,
private rent-seeking actors (sanctions busters) may find ways to
clandestinely overcome sanctions regimes. This is especially the case
when the potential rents are large, and the goods are small, high-value,
13 Kimberly Ann Elliott, The Sanctions Glass: Hall Full or Completely Empty?, p.
60.
14 Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?, p.
571, 573.
15 Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Economic Sanctions and International Peace and
Security, p. 338.
16 Daniel W. Drezner, Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions:
When is Cooperation Counterproductive?, p. 75, 86.
Jeremy Rees

and homogeneous on world markets, such as oil 17. Some sanctions

regimes are just too technical or expensive to be adequately implemented
by some states18, particularly by developing countries, which may often
neighbour the target state. Current multilateral sanctions regimes fail to
offer adequate compensation to third-parties that will bear the brunt of
the sanctions, giving them little incentive to comply with the sanctions
regime19. Kaempfer and Lowenberg find that unilateral sanctions may be
more effective, especially if the sanctioning state has close political,
cultural and economic ties with the target20. Drezner finds that multilateral
sanctions regimes imposed by international organisations are more likely
to be effective as they have mechanisms to prevent countries backsliding
and can combat free-rider problems21.
Sanctions regimes have changed in character over time. From WWII until
the mid-1990s, sanctions were comprehensive in scope, generally
targeting all facets of a states economy 22. However, from the mid-1990s,
and especially following the perceived failures of sanctions imposed
17 Ibid. p. 76; William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, Unilateral Versus Multilateral
International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective, p. 44.

18 Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, p. 378, 398.
19 Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, p. 378.
20 William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, Unilateral Versus Multilateral
International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective, p. 36.
21 Daniel W. Drezner, Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions:
When is Cooperation Counterproductive?, p. 95.
22 Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Economic Sanctions and International Peace and
Security, p. 335-338.
Jeremy Rees

against Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Iraq in the early 1990s, a new approach
known as smart (or targeted) sanctions 23 developed that has come to be
the norm in sanctions regimes24. Smart sanctions were developed
following the realisation that targeting elites in power, and their
supportive constituencies, would be more likely to yield results, as elites,
particularly in autocratic regimes, were often sheltered from the negative
effects of sanctions. Moreover, they were intended to be more humane,
targeting those (generally unelected) persons directly responsible for
violating international standards of behaviour, rather than the target
states

civilian

population25.

Smart

sanctions

include

an

array

of

mechanisms, most important of which are arms embargoes 26, financial

23 These may be targeted either at individuals such as members of the ruling

elite and their families, or against specific economic activities and commodities.
Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano, & Mikael Eriksson, Making Targeted
Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for Implementation of UN Policy Options,
(Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2003), p. 68.
24 Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Economic Sanctions and International Peace and
Security, p. 339-340.
25 Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, p. 379.
26 For a discussion see Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions
Feasible?, p. 383-385; Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano, & Mikael Eriksson,
Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for Implementation of UN Policy
Options, p. 70-72, 104-110.
Jeremy Rees

sanctions27, travel restrictions28, aviation bans29, as well as economic

sanctions or embargos on specific products or industry, or trade with
certain individuals.
Due to their technical complexity smart sanctions are more difficult to
implement than comprehensive sanctions30. They are more demanding
because they very smartness of sanctions heightens the level of
sophistication needed in management and enforcement31. Moreover, they
generally required considerable information regarding the targeted
regime, their financial links, middle men or front companies who act on
their behalf, etc. The level of information required is generally beyond that
available to the UNSC, and public debate gives the target time to take
measures to reduce the impact of such measures. Often, smart sanctions
are most effective when done unilateral and without warning for
27 These may include suspension of aid from national governments or
international institutions, denial of access to international financial markets, or
bans on capital investment in the target state. For a discussion of the problems
of effective enforcement see Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions
Feasible?, p. 385-389; Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano, & Mikael Eriksson,
Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for Implementation of UN Policy
Options, p. 72-73.
28 Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, p. 390-394;
Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano, & Mikael Eriksson, Making Targeted
Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for Implementation of UN Policy Options, p. 7467.
29 Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano, & Mikael Eriksson, Making Targeted
Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for Implementation of UN Policy Options, p. 7678.
30 Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano, & Mikael Eriksson, Making Targeted
Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for Implementation of UN Policy Options, p. 55.
31 Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, p. 397.
Jeremy Rees

maximum impact on the target. Thus, whilst in theory smart sanctions are
an attractive option; in reality they may not be practically feasible 32.
The logic behind most sanctions is generally about creating either political
instability or regime change in the target state 33. To this end, Marinov has
conducted a study based on the data of Hufbauer et al. in an attempt to
find the correlation between leadership change and sanctions. He finds
that sanctions, on average, increase the likelihood that an incumbent will
lose power by 28% in a year that sanctions are imposed on the
incumbents state compared to a normal year34.
Some states are also more likely to be susceptible to sanctions than
others. Marinov finds this to be the case with democracies, as opposed to
autocracies which appear better able to resist sanctions efforts 35. Likewise,
countries with low or no economic growth are more susceptible to
sanctions, as are smaller, more open economies where foreign trade
makes up a greater percentage of GDP, as these countries are less able to
absorb the impact of economic pressure 36. States that are highly
dependent on another country in terms of the percentage of their total

32 Ibid. p. 402.
33 Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, p. 375.
34 Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?, p.
572.
35 Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?, p.
573; Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, p. 377.
36 Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?, p.
572.
Jeremy Rees

foreign trade are also more susceptible to unilateral sanctions imposed by

that country37.
Finally, the issue of the morality of sanctions has been questioned,
particularly in regard to the sanctions imposed on Iraq. Leaders of target
states may not value human life in the same way in which sender states
do38. Comprehensive sanctions are essentially function as a form of
collective punishment by the international community. Whereas in war,
states are legally bound to follow the principles of distinction between
military

personnel

and

assets

and

civilian

populations,

and

of

proportionality of response, international humanitarian law does not

currently apply to sanctions regimes, although they both might be equally
as devastating to civilians39.Some people have justified sanctions as a
means of avoiding war; however, others have cited the just as devastating
effects of sanctions40, or concluded that sanctions make war even more
likely41.

37 Ibid.
38 Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, p. 375.
39 David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic Case of Iraq,
p. 740; Joy Gordon, A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic
Sanctions, Ethics and International Affairs: Annual Journal of the Carnegie Council on
Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 13, 1999,
http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/cceia/cceia_99goj01.html. The reason for this absence is the
fact that whilst force is a positive act, sanctions are a negative act, that is, a refusal to
engage in trade, etc.

40 Joy Gordon, A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic

Sanctions.
41 Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work, p. 78.
Jeremy Rees

Current Data: Results & Problems

Under appropriate circumstances, sanctions can be advocated by any
theory of international relations, thus the current divide over the
effectiveness of sanctions amongst scholars cannot be attributed to
differences

in

ideology

or

fundamentally

different

theoretical

orientations42. Rather, most disagreement over sanctions resides in

accurately measuring the effectiveness of sanctions regimes. The most
prominent study conducted to date, is that by Hufbauer, Schott and
Elliott43. This study reviews 115 cases of economic sanctions from 1914199044. Of these 115 cases, the authors conclude that 40 or 34% of the
total were successful. Whilst this study has become the starting point for
nearly all other studies on sanctions, significant criticism has been
levelled at the assumptions underlying the data45. Pape, after reexamining the 40 successful cases, concludes that sanctions were
effective in only 5 cases (or approximately 4% of the time) 46, suggesting
that it is the level of threat of military force that ultimately determines the

42 David Baldwin, The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice, p. 80.
43 Hereon referred to as HSE.
44 The study is in no way exhaustive of all instances of sanctions.
45 See Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, International Security,
Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall 1997; Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work,
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1998.

46 He attributes 18 cases of success to the threat or use of force, 8 cases as

failures, 3 as indeterminate, and 6 as not instances of sanctions, Robert A. Pape,
Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work, p. 66.
Jeremy Rees

target states willingness to compromise. Other problems also exist. These

include selection bias, counterfactuals & invisible effects, sanctions as
symbols, and comparison failure. I will examine each of these in turn.
Selection bias takes two forms. First, it may refer to the definition of
success which is used to determine whether sanctions have been effective
or not. In the words of Hufbauer et al., the success rate importantly
depends on the type of policy or governmental change sought 47. That is,
if policy-makers announce a set of objectives to be achieved by which a
particular sanctions regime can be judged, the success or failure of the
sanctions can be determined merely by adjusting the ambitiousness of the
goals to be achieved. In this regard, political leaders often have an
interest in publicly declaring a low standard by which to measure success
even if in private their goals are more ambitious 48. This is because
appearing to be successful may matter more to political leaders than
determining whether sanctions are effective at achieving the states
national interests. Second, selection bias in the statistics results from the
fact that sanctions are presumably more likely to be used in cases where
they are considered to most likely be effective 49. If they were implemented
47 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffery J. Schott, & Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered, vol. 1, p. 92-93.
48 David Baldwin, The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice, p. 88-89; with
reference to Iraq see Philip Shenon, A Low Ceiling on U.S. Aims: Modest Goals
Point to Easier Victories, New York Times, February 18, 1998, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/18/world/standoff-with-iraq-the-tactics-lowceiling-on-us-aims.html?scp=1&sq=philip%20shenon%20february
%2018%201998&st=cse.
49 David Baldwin, The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice, p. 97.
Jeremy Rees

in all cases of attempted coercion, this would more accurately reflect their
coercive ability. However, rational policy makers are presumably more
likely to implement sanctions when they think there is a reasonable
chance of success, thus justifying the forgone economic benefits that
sanctions would lead to. This then, would presumably lead to a bias in the
data showing a higher rate of success than would otherwise been the
case, were sanctions applied in all instances of attempted coercion.
Counterfactuals, as in any case of causal analysis, cause problems in
assessing the success of sanctions. This is because it is difficult to know
the outcome should a different policy choice have been made 50. The
sanctions data include only instances when sanctions were implemented,
not when they were merely threatened. For more accurate data, all cases
of threatened, as well as actual coercion, should be included. Invisible
effects refer to the possibility of the potential of sanctions conditioning the
behaviour of states. For instance, because of the negative effects of
sanctions, potential targets may pursue policies congruent with the
senders preferences, without ever crossing the threshold of pressure even
being applied and sanctions threatened51. States know that they can act
within certain boundaries of action without being punished, thus often
they conform to a certain standard of behaviour, without even being
asked to do so.

50 David Baldwin, The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice, p. 100-102.
51 Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?, p.
565.
Jeremy Rees

Most literature on the effectiveness of sanctions is based on a

fundamental assumption, that is, that sanctions are in fact intended to
achieve something vis--vis the target state. There is no reason why this
should necessarily be true however. Policy-makers often have a range of
objectives, of which pressuring a target state to concede is but one.
Sanctions can play a role in achieving other objectives of policy-makers,
such as appeasing domestic audiences or a specific constituency. This, of
course, makes it far more difficult to measure the effectiveness of
sanctions in compelling target states 52, as the aim of the sanctions regime
may have little to do with the achievement of this goal, and the sender
state may be well aware that the sanctions are not going to affect the
target states actions even before they implement the sanctions 53. Apart
from domestic audiences, sender states may wish to send a signal about
what sort of behaviour will not be tolerated in future. They may also wish
to signal resolve, especially concerning a willingness to use military force
should the status quo continue. Leaders of states frequently use
threatening rhetoric against other states, but whereas talk is cheap, a
willingness to impose sanctions and thus incur costs demonstrates a
greater resolve to affect the targets behaviour 54. Moreover, a broader,
52 Ibid. p. 568.
53 McGillivray & Stam argue that long-term sanctions regimes are often
maintained long after their ineffectiveness has been demonstrated. Rather they
are maintained or withdrawn according to the pressures of competing domestic
groups. Fiona McGillivray & Alan C. Stam, Political Institutions, Coercive
Diplomacy and the Duration of Economic Sanctions, The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 2, April 2004, p. 155.
54 David Baldwin, The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice, p. 90.
Jeremy Rees

more intangible set of objectives, often difficult to measure, which develop

slowly over time, may be pursued in an attempt to affect peoples ideas
and expectations of what sort of behaviour is acceptable in international
relations. Influencing international norms may be a broader objective
when states impose sanctions regimes55.
Finally, as Baldwin notes, policy-makers are not only interested in whether
sanctions work per se, they are interested in the whether sanctions work
in comparison to other potential forms of action. Whilst military force is
often advocated as the most effective form coercion, success rates for
military force are highly contested, falling in the range of 40% to 72% 56. In
fact, Marinov finds to his surprise that the use of force actually increases a
leaders hold on office57. When the costs of military versus non-military
coercion are compared, even if military coercion is more likely to achieve
the desired policy change in the target state, sanctions are the preferable
option if the cost differential between the two is large enough that there is

55 This may take time to develop, is difficult to measure, and is debatable if it

even has any affect, as the continuing debate between realists and
constructivists demonstrates.
56 Ibid. p. 93-94. Baldwin suggests that actual figure is probably lower.
57 Marinov concludes that force likely generates two types of effects. First, it
may weaken a leader. Second, it may generates a rally-round-the-flag effect.
His findings, he suggests, indicate that the latter is the predominant factor of the
two. Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?, p.
571, 573.
Jeremy Rees

a higher net gain through sanctions than through military force 58. Baldwin
sums this point up well:
What rational policymakers really want to know is: How effective will they be,
with respect to which goals and targets, at what cost, and in comparison with
which policy alternatives?59

Case Study: Iraq

History
Sanctions were originally imposed on Iraq in August 1990 under UNSC
Resolution 661, in preparation for the January 1991 invasion. This
resolution banned all trade and financial transactions, froze Iraqi financial
assets,

introduced

arms

and

oil

embargoes,

and

suspended

all

international flights. It also called upon member states to enforce naval

and air blockades against Iraq60. The immediate impact was most
apparent on food availability, as Iraq depended on imports for 70-80% of
its food consumption61. The effectiveness of the embargo was so much so
that it shut off 90% of Iraqs imports, and 97% of its exports 62. The war
58 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap, (New Haven, Conn: Yale University
Press, 1981), p. 183. Mesquita is here speaking of diplomacy, however, the same
logic equally applies to sanctions.
59 David Baldwin, The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice, p. 86.
60 S/RES/661 (1990), esp. paragraphs 3-6. Available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16b24.html
61 Abbas Alnasrawi, Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990-2000, Third
World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2001, p. 209.

62 Ibid.
Jeremy Rees

itself led to considerable damage to Iraqi infrastructure. For instance,

Iraqs electricity output was reduced to 4% of its pre-war level63.
In April 1991 the UNSC adopted Resolution 687, which re-affirmed the
previous resolutions and set out in detail the terms under which sanctions
would be lifted64. It also modified the previous resolution in that it allowed
Iraq to import foodstuffs. As Iraq was still not able to sell oil however, this
modification proved to be of little relevance. It set up a review process,
under which every 60 days the UNSC would determine whether to lift or
modify the sanctions regime. Finally, it stated that exceptions to the oil
embargo would be approved on a case-by-case basis, when it was
determined adequate financial resources were needed to provide for
essential civilian needs65.
In August and September 1992, UNSC Resolutions 706 & 712 were passed
respectively, authorising Iraq to export $1.6 billion USD of oil over a sixmonth period, with Iraq set to receive approximately $1 billion (the rest
being earmarked for the Compensation Fund, to fund UN operations in
Iraq, and to pay oil transit fees to Turkey) 66. All payments out of this
account were to be scrutinised and approved by the UN Secretariat. The

63 Ibid. p. 210.
64 S/RES/687 (1991). Available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/23/IMG/NR059623.pdf?OpenElement.
65 United Nations, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996
(New York: UN, 1996), p. 29-33.
66 Abbas Alnasrawi, Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990-2000, p.
211-212.
Jeremy Rees

purpose of the resolution was to reduce the deteriorating situation of the

civilian population; however, neither resolution was implemented.
The oil-for-food regime was revisited again in April 1995 under UNSC
Resolution 986. Essentially, the same as Resolutions 706 and 712 in
substance, this resolution raised the amount of oil Iraq was able to sell to
$2 billion, with $1.3 billion going to Iraq. This amount was estimated to be
insignificant

relative

to

civilian,

and

was

rejected

by

the

Iraqi

government67. The Iraqi leadership saw the program as the basis for the
UNSC maintaining sanctions on it indefinitely 68. They hoped that the
continuing suffering of the Iraqi people would eventually lead to cracks in
the international consensus69. Only in January 1996 did the Iraqi
government

enter

into

negotiations

with

the

UNSC

over

the

implementation of the resolution following a severe bout of hyperinflation,

and it was not until December 1996 that Iraqi oil finally reached the world
market.
In February 1998, the UNSC raised the amount of permissible oil sales to
$5.2 billion every six months70, as it became clear that the previous figure
was too small to meet minimum needs. In December 1999, the ceiling on
oil exports was abolished altogether, but all other parts of the program
67 Abbas Alnasrawi, Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990-2000, p.
212.
68 David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic Case
of Iraq, p. 744.
69 Ibid. p. 745.
70 S/RES/1153 (1998) paragraph 2. Available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16044.html.
Jeremy Rees

were kept71. By July 2000, a total of $32.3 billion worth of Iraqi oil had
been exported, and the government had received $20.8 billion of this
amount.
In July 2001, the US and the UK tabled a joint resolution to modify
sanctions the comprehensive sanctions regimes against Iraq to a smart
sanction regime. However, Russia threatened to veto it, so the oil-for-food
program was extended72. In 2002, a tougher monitoring regime was
adopted, whilst the strict arms embargo remained in place, but
restrictions on civilian imports were lifted, excepting potential dual-use
items73.
Analysis

Among the literature on sanctions there is no scholarly consensus on

whether the sanctions regime against Iraq was effective. Elliott counts the
case of Iraq as a success74, as do Cortright and Lopez after revising their

71 S/RES/1284 (1999), section C. Available at

http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Keyresolutions/sres99-1284.htm.
72 Barbara Crossette, Efforts to Recast Iraq Oil Sanctions is Halted for Now,
New York Times, July 3, 2001, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/03/world/effort-to-recast-iraq-oil-sanctions-ishalted-for-now.html?scp=2&sq=barbara%20crossette%20july
%203%202001&st=cse.
73 David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked, Foreign
Affairs, July/August, 2004, p. 100.

74 Kimberly Ann Elliott, The Sanctions Glass: Hall Full or Completely Empty?, p.
59.
Jeremy Rees

previous opinion75; Baldwin credits it as a qualified success 76. Pape counts

it as failure77, as does Marinov78, Tostensen and Bull79, Jonge Oudraat80,
and Kaempfer and Lowenberg81.
Iraq is an atypical example of a sanctions regime82. It was unprecedented
in terms of comprehensiveness, severity, length 83. In the early stages of
the regime, under Resolution 661, some even contended that the UNSC
was using famine and starvation as potential weapons to force Iraq into
submission84. It certainly appears that sanctions were intended to be
75 David Cortright, & George A. Lopez, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Workedp. 92.
Cf. avid Cortright & George A. Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic Case
of Iraq, p. 755.
76 David Baldwin, The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice, p. 105.
77 Pape, Robert A., Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, p. 110.
78 Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?, p.
575.
79 Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, p. 376.
80 Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Economic Sanctions and International Peace and
Security, p. 339-340.
81 William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, Unilateral Versus Multilateral
International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective, p. 51.
82 Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?, p.
575.
83 Abbas Alnasrawi, Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990-2000, p.
213. Also see Pape, Robert A., Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, p. 106.
84 Lawrence Freedman & Ephraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991:
Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1993), p. 191-193.
Jeremy Rees

purely punitive, rather than coercive85. As Cortright and Lopez show,

although Iraq did in fact partially comply with the UNSCs requirements
regarding its weapons programs86, the UNSC refused, due to pressure from
the US and the UK, to reciprocate Iraqs partial concessions. In November
1997, President Bill Clinton remarked that sanctions will be there until the
end of time, or as long as [Hussein] lasts 87. Thus, the intention of the
sanctions moved from its stated goals in Resolution 687 of forcing Iraq to
withdraw from Kuwait and give up its weapons programs, to one intended
solely at regime change and containment. Not surprisingly, this had the
effective

of

reducing

any

Iraqi

incentive

to

continue

to

make

concessions88, especially as it regarded its weapons programs as crucial to

its defence.
Although one of the main goals of the sanctions regime was regime
change in Iraq, the oil-for-food program served to increase the Iraqi
leaderships control over Iraqi society, whilst failing to change the

85 Coercive sanctions are those intended to produce a conscious change in

policy on behalf of the target, whereas punitive sanctions are maintained
irrespective of the policy of target and are aimed at either destabilising or
containing the target. For a discussion see Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, Patricia Davis &
Benjamin Radcliff, On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions:
An Empirical Analysis, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 2, April
1997, p. 610-611.
86 David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic Case
of Iraq, p. 747.
87 Quoted in David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The
Problematic Case of Iraq, p. 749.
88 Ibid.
Jeremy Rees

conditions of Iraqs deteriorating economic prospects 89. The oil-for-food

program, by channelling the revenues from Iraqi oil sales from the UN
straight to the Iraqi government served to give the government a
monopoly on international trade. Not only did this make people more
beholden to the government should they want to receive benefits from
this activity, but it removed another potentially powerful force in Iraqi
society. The class of traders, who could accumulate wealth independent of
the government and through such resources pose a threat to the ruling
elites, was decimated by the ban on foreign transactions. Thus sanctions
not only failed to produce the desired change in leadership and acted only
to empower Iraqs dictatorship90, but removed a potential form of
domestic opposition. Moreover, the brunt of the sanctions was not felt by
the Iraqi leadership91 or the massive army and internal security apparatus
it maintained to hold power, and other political loyalists 92. Instead, the
regime directed the severest suffering onto its political opponents such as

89 Abbas Alnasrawi, Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990-2000, p.

213.
90 Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?, p.
575. Writing in 1999, Cortright & Lopez stressed that the sanctions regime would
not by itself force leadership change or force a drastic change in Iraqi policy.
David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic Case of
Iraq, p. 748-749.
91 Saddam Hussein marshalled resources for constructing dozens of palaces
and erecting monuments glorifying his leadership.
92 Abbas Alnasrawi, Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990-2000, p.
214-215; David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The
Problematic Case of Iraq, p. 744.
Jeremy Rees

the marsh Arabs of southern Iraq93. Moreover, domestic Iraqi anger, as

well as international blame was directed more towards the UNSC for
imposing the sanctions than at the corrupt and autocratic Iraqi leadership.
The UN struggled to win the propaganda war over who was responsible
for the civilian populations dire situation94.
Aside from the failure to remove Saddam Hussein from power however,
the sanctions regime was quite effective at both eliminating Iraqs
weapons capabilities and at containment of potential Iraqi aggression.
This was demonstrated in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war 95. Despite
the fact that the sanctions regime was widely seen as a failure during the
1990s96, the sanctions regime worked incredibly well, depending on the
criteria that is used to measure success. From 1991 to 1998, the UN
Special Commission (UNSCOM) it identified and dismantled almost all of
Iraqs prohibited weapons. By November 1997, UNSCOM reported that
there was no longer any weapon-usable nuclear material in Iraq, and no
evidence of prohibited weapons, equipment or capabilities 97. When

93 David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic Case
of Iraq, p. 747.
94 Lancet, Editorial: Iraqs Children, Vol 355, No. 9218, May 27, 2000.
95 David Cortright, & George A. Lopez, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked, p.
91.
96 Ibid.
97 David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic Case
of Iraq, p. 747.
Jeremy Rees

inspections resumed in 2002-2003 this situation had not changed 98. Much
of Iraqs chemical weapons capabilities were located and destroyed 99, as
was its biological weapons capabilities100. When the United Nations
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) inspectors
entered Iraq in 2002, they found no evidence of renewed chemical or
biological weapons programs101. Iraqs ballistic missile program was also
halted. All but two of the 819 banned Scud missiles known to have existed
prior to 1990 were accounted for by UNSCOM. Although, Iraq had obtained
some dual-use technology and attempted to import Russian guidance
systems, no evidence was found that such weapons had been developed
or tested. In 2002, UNMOVIC found that Iraqs As-Samoud II missile
exceeded the permitted range of 150km and eradication of these was
underway when the 2003 invasion began102.

98 David Cortright, & George A. Lopez, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked, p.

93.
99 48,000 litres of live chemical agent and more than 3,000 tons of precursor
chemicals were disposed of. The prime development and production complexes
were dismantled, and other identified sites were put under monitoring. David
Cortright & George A. Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic Case of Iraq,
p. 747; David Cortright, & George A. Lopez, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked,
p. 93.
100 The large scale production and weaponization of anthrax, botulinum toxin,
and aflatoxin was known of. Although not entirely accounted for or destroyed the
main production facility at Al-Hakam was demolished by UNSCOM in 1996. David
Cortright & George A. Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic Case of Iraq,
p. 747; David Cortright, & George A. Lopez, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked,
p. 93.
101 David Cortright, & George A. Lopez, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked, p.
93.
Jeremy Rees

Not only were Iraqs WMD and ballistic missile capabilities eradicated or
reduced through the monitoring and sanctions regime, but the Iraqi
military was left severely weakened. Following the Iran-Iraq war, and then
the Gulf War, Iraqs military had been decimated. However, the sanctions
regime, by denying Iraq the opportunity to purchase new weapons and
equipment through the arms embargo, and by denying it the ability to pay
for such purchases or develop indigenous equivalents through the oil
embargo, prevented Iraq from rebuilding and replenishing its military
capacity. The final revenue figures from oil sales from the oil-for-food
program totalled $64.2 billion, of which the Iraqi government received
approximately one third. Although it is estimated by the US General
Accounting Office that Iraq earned $1.5-2.5 billion per year from oilsmuggling and kickbacks (such as the AWB scandal), it concluded that
from 1997-2002 Iraq earned only $10.1 billion from illegal it is estimated
that the cost to Iraq of oil revenue denied was approximately $250 billion
over the entire period103. Not only did this severely limit Iraqs ability to
maintain let alone expand its oil production 104, it also severely curtailed
the resources that were available for military spending. In 1989, Iraqi
military spending and arms imports were estimated at $15 billion.
However, this figure average $1.4 billion annually throughout the 1990s,

102 David Cortright, & George A. Lopez, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked, p.
93.
103 Ibid. 97.
104 For a discussion on the impact of sanctions on Iraqs oil sector see Abbas
Alnasrawi, Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990-2000, p. 215-217.
Jeremy Rees

approximately 10% of its previous level 105. This left the Iraqi army with
decaying and obsolete weapons. Sanctions successively depleted the Iraqi
militarys capabilities, and thus reduced the potential for any Iraqi
aggression106. The parlous state of the Iraqi army was demonstrated by
the 2003 invasion, which lasted a mere 3 weeks. Sanctions left Saddams
once-vaunted war machine in a state of utter disrepair 107. The shear
length and severity of the sanctions regime was perhaps the single
greatest contributing factor in containing Iraq.
The UNSCOM inspections also provided a great deal of intelligence on Iraqi
capabilities, and the regime itself. Following the expulsion of the
inspectors, the intelligence community reverted back to worst-case
scenario estimates of Iraqs capabilities, and relied on faulty intelligence
from regime defectors108. By mistaking Iraqi intentions for capabilities,
their conclusions led to the erroneous assumptions on which the 2003
invasion was based.
The human toll of the sanctions regime however, should not be
discounted. The Iraqi government argued that the sanctions constituted a
105 David Cortright, & George A. Lopez, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Workedp.
98.
106 In fact, it is likely given the poor state of Iraqs military defences that
Saddam Hussein acted rationally by expelling UNSCOM and maintaining an
ambiguity over Iraqs WMD capabilities. This may have been seen as a potential
deterrent against future Iranian or American attacks, to make up for the lack of
actual defensive capabilities.
107 David Cortright, & George A. Lopez, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Workedp.
99.
108 Ibid.
Jeremy Rees

form of genocide109. The Iraqi government estimated by December 2001,

upward of 1.6 million people had died as a result of the sanctions
regime110. Moreover, the long-term effects of the sanctions are also
significant. The infant mortality rate was more than triple from its 1960
rate at 125 per 1000, school attendance fell, leading the literacy rate to
decline from 80% to 58%, malnutrition rose severely amongst the
population, per capita GDP was lower than in 1950, and oil production has
only just risen to its pre-1980 capacity 111. These effects will prove a severe
handicap in the future for those now attempted to build a stable peaceful
and democracy in Iraq. The costs in terms of human life and economic
development were severe indeed.
Ultimately, deciding how effective the sanctions in Iraq were depends on
what goals one chooses to evaluate the data under, at what cost, and the
compared to which alternatives. The sanctions regime proved completely
ineffective,

and

some

say

even

counter-productive,

at

producing

leadership change. Although not an explicit objective of the sanctions

regime as set out in Resolution 687, it was certainly an important aim of
109 Note verbale dated January 29, 1996, from the Permanent Mission of the
Republic of Iraq to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Centre
for Human Rights (E/CN.4/1996/140). Available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/bf9e522573094a3f8025
674c00525b3d?Opendocument.
110 Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, p. 376. Other
figures are similarly high. Alnasrawi estimates 1.5 million, Iraq: economic
sanctions and consequences, 1990-2000, p. 214. UNICEF estimated
approximately 500,000 of those were children,
http://www.unicef.org/newsline/99pr29.htm.
111 Abbas Alnasrawi, Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990-2000,
p. 214-215.
Jeremy Rees

those countries, particularly the US and the UK, that were fundamental in
instituting the sanctions regime. Likewise, the cost in terms of human
suffering was colossal. However, when these aims are compared to the
alternative of the use of force it is debatable whether these costs were not
equally as high as they would have been in the alternative situation. The
removal of Saddam Hussein from power took two wars to accomplish.
Likewise, the cost in terms of civilian deaths following the 2003 invasion,
although a matter of debate, was probably lower, although the sanctions
regime avoided the cost to the coalition in terms of military causalities
from the war. Whereas, the sanctions campaign was fairly low cost, easy
to keep in place indefinitely, and effective at denying Iraq military
hardware, the 2003 invasion was costly for the US and its allies. With
regard to economic cost, certainly from the view of the US the sanctions
regime was far less costly than the use of force, due to the sheer size of
cost of the invasion, stabilisation (as yet by no means assured) and
reconstruction. Non-economic costs should also be taken into account,
such as the diplomatic costs to the US and its coalition partners, and antiWestern sentiment. In terms of containing Iraq and denying it advanced,
ballistic and nuclear weapons, the sanctions regime appears to have been
highly successful, as was its ability to impose severe costs on Iraq relative
to the costs imposed on the sender states. Finally, the maintenance of
such comprehensive sanctions over such a long period of time reflects the
success of the US in particular at achieving and sustaining support of its
sanctions regime.

Jeremy Rees

Lessons from Iraq Case Study

The key features to take out of the sanctions regime in Iraq is that it was
effective at containing Iraq, and limiting Iraqs access to weapons,
advanced military technologies, and WMD. It was ineffective at regime
inducing regime change. In terms of economic costs, these were relatively
low for the sender states, but exceedingly high for Iraq, as was the human
cost. Success can be contributed to the length and comprehensiveness of
the general sanctions. But targeted sanctions appear to have failed to
result in policy changes from the Iraqi leadership.
Future usage of sanctions would benefit from acknowledging these
lessons, although any future sanctions regime should take account of the
particular factors pertinent to the specific case. For instance, the current
sanctions against Iran are unlikely to yield results if, assuming Iran does
intend to develop nuclear weapons capabilities (whether potential or
actual), it deems the acquisition of such weapons as necessary for regime
survival, and sanctions as less costly to the regime than not attaining such
capabilities (given Irans own perceived threats from other nuclear states
such as Israel or the US). Moreover, sanctions failed to produce regime
change in Iraq due to the autocratic nature of its government. Given Iran
is a mixed-regime type, combining both democratic and autocratic
elements, sanctions may be more likely to achieve regime change than in
Iraq, however, the potential of a rally-round-the-flag effect is a distinct
possibility.
Conclusion
Jeremy Rees

The sanctions literature is generally agreed regarding the empirical results

on the effectiveness of sanctions. However, there is considerable variation
in the interpretation of these results. Moreover, various studies have
demonstrated the nuances variation between different forms of sanctions,
such as unilateral and multilateral sanctions, or comprehensive and smart
sanctions.
The sanctions regime in Iraq appears to have been a qualified success.
The

regime

successfully

contained

Iraq,

and

denied

it

weapons

technology. However, it failed to achieve regime change, and led to

considerable suffering in the targeted state.

Jeremy Rees

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Jeremy Rees