NO.

SNSP-037013 : SUPERIOR COURT

Hon. SHERIDAN L. MOORE : HOUSING SESSION
:
R.K.D. VENTURES II :
Plaintiff : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
V. : STAMFORD / NORWALK
: AT NORWALK
DELMO ZANETTE :
Defendant : JANURARY 29, 2010

DEFENDANT’S MOTION SEEKING RELIEF OF :

VACATING USE & OCCUPNANCY ORDER ;

TRANSFERANCE OF VENUE OR CONTINUANCE TO APRIL;

DISCHARGING OF COUNCIL;

AND SUMMARY DISMISSAL

1. Defendant, DELMO L. ZANNETTE, moves the Court for a summary dismissal, as is

pursuant to:

a) U&O was secured by an intentionally false statement: “we

100% own” the subject property in dispute.

b) The ‘Doctrine of Unclean Hands,’

c) ‘Fraud Upon the Court,’ by council to both parties.

d) Plaintiffs’ breaking into the subject premises to change the

locks during the course of this proceeding to illegally lock out defendant is

‘constructive eviction.’ And our law considers those who break the law to violate

another’s legal right, are denied standing in a court of law to pursue the one whose

rights you violated. In effect, jurisprudence dictates that you can’t expect the courts

to enforce your legal rights when you are simultaneously breaking the law (exh ).

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2. Defendant seeks TRANSFERANCE OF VENUE.to pending action FST-CV-09-

5009789-S(X09) in Superior Court in Stamford, where the cause of action is to decide the matter

of ownership. Since this is far from being a simple and uncomplicated action for possession

between an owner and his tenant, as the summary process is deemed applicable.

3. Rather this is an action between a non-disputed owner of 50% and those whose 50%

ownership is a product of statutory forgery and tile is a constructive trust. Since plaintiff never

paid a cent to buy the property, but looted over a million dollars of its equity already. As this

very court has turned a blind eye; by accepting and not challenging bizarre documentation

affirming legal right of possession; by being hostile to defendant; and by showing favoritism

towards plaintiff made possible their criminal enterprise of over five years.

The Appellate Court in Southland Corp. v. Vernon, 1 Conn. App. 439, 4711 A.2d
318 (1984), states: “if the judge determines that by the criteria set forth in Sigros
the action is of sufficient complexity, it will be transferred to the docket of the
appropriate judicial district court.

4. Essentially, plaintiff’s action is with the misuse of the Summary Process Action in a

manner that the legislators had not intended as:

“The purpose of summary process proceedings is to permit the landlord to recover

possession without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which he would be
subjected in a common law action. (Prevedini v. Mobil Oil Corp., 164 Conn.287,
320 A.2d 797 (1973). The process is a creature of statute and is (aligned to
provide an expeditious remedy to the landlord seeking possession. Mayron's Bake

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 Shops, Inc. v. Arrow Stores, Inc., 149 Conn. 149, 176 A.2d 574 1961). See, also,
Zitomer v. Palmer, 38 Conn.Sup. 341, 446 A.2d 1084 (1982).

5. The action of summary process has historically been limited to cases where (lie issue of
the expiration of the lease presents itself as a simple issue of fact and is not complicated by
questions as to the proper legal construction of the lease. Sigros v. Hygenic Restaurant, Inc.,
38 Conn.Sup. 518, 452 A.2d 943 (1982). In Sigros, the court set forth several criteria to be used
in defining this standard:
a) the complexity of the issues raised;
b) the length and terms of the lease;
c) the circumstances existing when the parties entered into the lease;
d) likely time requirement for trial;
e) the existence of buy and sell agreements or options to renew or buy concomitant
with the lease;
f) installment payments; and
g) the creation of equity property rights in the tenant.

6. It is now permissible to interpose an equitable defense in summary process actions.

C.G.S.A. § 47a-33a. See also Fellows v. Martin, 217 Conn. 57, 584 A.2d 458 (1991), appeal
after remand 223 Conn. 152, 611 A.2d 412 (1992). See also S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy, 37 Conn.
Sup. 579, A.2d 806 (1981), no error found 188 Conn. 503, 450 A.2d 351 (1982); Mark I
Enterprises, Inc. v. Sendele, 37 Conn.Sup. 569, 427 A.2d 1352 (1981); Steinegger v Kields, 37
Conn.Sup. 534, 425 A.2d 597 (1980).

7. Defendant seeks continuance, as this is with ‘cause,’ considering:

a) defendant has been deprived of the required discovery to prove

his position and impeach the oppositions bogus declarations;

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 b) defendant’s doctors strictly prohibit his traveling from Florida
until spring;
c) defendant is very ill at this time and in intense physical therapy.

8. Finally, defendant seeks to discharge Mark Katz (Katz) as council of record, and in lieu,

to allow defendant to precede pro-se, and through papers for the next two months. Insomuch as

defendant’s lawyer, Katz is in collusion with council for the opposition, Martha Cullina LLP,

through their lawyers of record, Stephan Phillips and Robert E. Kaelin.

9. Whereby, on December 15, 2009, hearing for U&O, plaintiff through council, Robert E.

Kaelin stated on record pleading to Judge Moore, upon opening oral argument said:

“MY CLIENT IS 100% OWNER OF THE PROPERTY THAT DEFENDANT

BROKE THE WINDOW TO ENTER, while defendant is 50% owner of the adjoining
property that he was eventually evicted from.”

This is a blatant bold face lie by Kaelin, to perpetrate a hoax on the court. In effect, it is

an artifice to scheme to achieve the misuse of the Court’s authority to force defendant to pay his

client $1,675 a month. Even though Kaelin has been pleading through all the prior housing

actions that his client own 50% of BOTH properties to justify that his clients are entitled to share

half of the equity produced after the sale of both properties with defendant. Moreover, Kaelin

knows his client has no legitimate right to demand under the color of defendant being a statutory

tenant. Essentially, this constitutes an indictable predicate act of a conspiracy in violation of

RICO as a racketeering element to further an ongoing enterprise.

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10, Clearly, this is a verifiable act of abusing the judicial process and the courts, as a devise

to extort money in violation of § 53a-156 Perjury. This was done by Kaelin’s intentional false

declaration of material facts, corresponding to the central issue in dispute to dupe the Court.

Specifically, to the disposition of legal right ownership; as in accordance to:

§ 53a-156 – Perjury: (Class D felony) – (a) A person is guilty of perjury if, in any
official proceeding, he intentionally, under oath, makes a false statement, swears, affirms
or testifies falsely, to a material statement which he does not believe to be true.

11. The objective accomplished by the Use & Occupancy Order, serves a far greater

objective to plaintiffs interests than the right to be paid rent. Rather, it is a catalyst to affect

constructive eviction through the mechanism of the judicial process. Specifically, plaintiff is

privileged with the knowledge that defendant is completely broke, has no credit and is deeply in

debt.

12. Thus, as established by the order schedule rulings of Judge Grogins (exh ) defendant

will be in contempt of the court’s ruling of paying the $1,675 by February 1st, since he has no

funds to allow him to be in compliance. Now with considering that according to Mark Katz,

Judge Grogin ruled that Dr. Michael Marlino of Greenwich Hospital of his medical condition is

admissible. This is where he reports that the cold weather can’t be tolerated by defendant. As a

result, judge Grogins insists on scheduling the trial on a date in February 25, since the tier will

not recognize that defendant is unable to appear in mid-winter. Albeit, defendant traveling to

Connecticut against medical determinations, he would willfully be putting his health in serious

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jeopardy. In effect, this is an unreasonable hardship and can’t be justified as a timely issue of

need.

Further, Kaelin said that plaintiff reported to the Police that defendant broke in through the

window to enter the home and the police refused to do anything, saying it was a civil matter.

13. However, if plaintiff could demonstrate 100% ownership the police would have no other

choice but to perform their duty. Since even if the police decided that due to defendant’s senility

he is not responsible for the crazy things he does, still their duty would be to have the actor even

if he is not consciously responsible for the breaking and entering removed, because his

occupancy constitutes criminal trespass and police have a duty to protect the public when they

are injured by an actor in the midst of perpetrating a criminal act. § 53a-180c – Falsely

reporting an incident in the second degree: (Class A misdemeanor)

14. Clearly, due to profound special circumstances surrounding this eviction action,

defendant must be provided with his day in court for the sake of justice. Since defendant is being

evicted by someone who never brought his property. Thus, plaintiff is not able to substantiate

legitimate right of tile, because deed showing 50% ownership is a product of statutory forgery.

Consequently, this is an instance where a litigant’s right to discovery and to be heard by

personally pleading his position in a court of equity must be made available.

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15. Insomuch as due to defendant’s handicap, he is unfairly prejudiced by this trial date and

would be irrevocably harmed, if it is not adjourned. Since defendant is unable to appear in court

for a scheduled date for trial, directly due to his disability. Insomuch as, defendant is in very poor

health and currently is quite frail. This makes him to ill travel. In fact exposure to the cold

weather at this time could cause catastrophic consequences to his health. In effect, defendant is

unable to appear and participate in court for trial at this time. However, it is our essential

guaranteed right to receive due process in State Courts, as this is granted by the 14th Amendment.

16. Moreover, Katz’s dereliction of the professional duty he owed defendant, amounted to

such a pervasive pattern that is so extreme and chronic, it can’t be explained by simply being

perceived as gross negligence or profound incompetence. Rather, it can only be explained as

validating the indication that Katz is working for the other side. Consequently, Katz is working

in consort with plaintiff to ensure the ‘law of the land’ is misdirected to defendant’s detriment

and perverted to further plaintiff’s scheme. In effect, plaintiff is misusing the courts and abusing

the judicial process to carry out unlawful conduct corresponding to a criminal enterprise.

Thereby, plaintiff is utilizing this court to further their scheme to defraud defendant by exploiting

the authority and powers of the courts as a device to obtain their goal of larcenous extortion.

17. Wherefore, a continuance is required for defendant’s ability to complete discovery in ten

weeks (of which to date, discovery has been totally neglected by Katz’s intentional professional

negligence). Since time for defendant’s completion of discovery is required for him to bring

forth admissible hard evidence, which can refute the plaintiff’s false declarations involving all

the central issues. Specifically, as to document as to who truly has legal right to possession.

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18. Since, due to the particular nature of this case, the Court must decide as to which party

has legitimate right to ownership in this legal dispute. Thus a determination as to who legally

owns the property in dispute is central to know who has legal right to benefit and control the

property. Whereby, such a determination requires for both sides to be fully heard in this matter,

as this is not only necessary, but essential for a just determination. Since the tier of facts need to

know who legally owns the property, in order for it to make a determination as to legal right to

possession. Since, the question of which party has legal possession is the central matter to be

decided upon in all disputes in eviction proceedings.

19. Thereby, after discovery, defendants would be empowered with the ability to show to the

Court that plaintiff has no legitimate standing before the Court. Insomuch as verifying to the

veracity that plaintiff’s claim of right is fraudulent and is totally based on constructive fraud.

Since, when evidence of material facts can be brought to bear, it will refute all of plaintiff’s

claims of entitlement and ownership. In so dismissing this proceeding, would effectively serve to

place a bar on the progress to a scheme to defraud through plaintiff’s misuse of the courts. In

fact, plaintiff’s plan of extortion is right out in the open. This is where they know that plaintiff

has run out of money, maxed out his credit cards and his only source of income to survive is his

$618 social security check. At this time defendant is totally dependent on being supported by his

health aid and her husband whom he is now staying with in Florida. Since, defendant has $50

dollars a month to live on after paying off his car insurance.

20. Consequently, if this matter proceeds to trial when defendant is denied an opportunity to

plead his case would be a travesty of justice. Since defendant would be denied his ‘day in court,’

and this would unfairly favor plaintiff, since it would effectively shield him from being
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challenged and whatever he may fabricate would be viewed by the tier as a statement of fact.

Thus, it would be a trial when only on side’s position is effectively heard. Albeit to translate as

the court would have no alternative, but grant the relief that plaintiff seeks. Then with defendant

stranded in Florida for the next ten weeks, it would provide plaintiff with the window of

opportunity to carry out a threat he made to defendant on numerous times, but never carried out.

This was that if defendants did not move out all of his personal property from the buildings on

the property than, 6 men would come and throw it into garbage truck to take it away. Now, this

happening is more likely than ever before because all of the last three tenants on the property are

being evicted and Pecunies has a history of sadistically mistreating defendant with great

enthusiasm.

21. Thereby, with the court granting plaintiff’s petition would accomplish defendant’s

eviction from his home of forty four years, which would make him homeless and destitute.

Moreover, with considering that defendant’s doctors have warned him that he must be very

diligent to avoid stress at all cost, this would inhumanly place him in serious jeopardy. Since

stress could trigger a major attack that could abruptly terminate his life. In fact, one of

defendant’s doctors told him that he has to realize: “your life hangs on a thread.”

In effect, plaintiff has finally manipulated defendant’s situation in his golden years of his life to

where his back is up against the wall and he is scared. Since defendant is struggling with major

physical discomfort all the time, as this is compounded by continuous struggling with his

inability to breathe without great difficulties. Consequently, defendant’s current continued ability

to survive is precarious and the last thing he needs is this constant worrying. Since he is now

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entertaining now serious concerns that in April he would not be able to return to his home and all

his possessions will be trashed, when what he needs is quiet stability to heal.

12. Hence, before reading this brief, the author believes that the prior belief of plaintiff is that

they were on the threshold of finally closing their “business” dealings with defendant. Since they

must think that after the anticipated trial Tuesday, the facts and circumstances thereafter will

force defendant’s compliance. As with them considering that after the final judgment of eviction

is granted, defendant would be prevented from judicially dispute his eviction. Since, defendant is

without the ability to pay plaintiff the ‘use and occupancy’ required to give him the standing to

contest. All contributed to waiting out defendant for the last 5½ years, until the two year

contractual price lapsed after the first two years and through the last two years while property

prices in Greenwich plunged. Hence, plaintiff must of felt that their unrelenting campaign of

harassing and tormenting defendant was about to pay off.

13. Insomuch as, plaintiff must have believed that by sticking to their agenda of getting the

lion’s share if they agree to allow defendant to sell his property, he would eventually capitulate.

As a result, defendant would possess the money to have the roads built to his land in Maine to

finally have the land ready for the market. Insomuch as defendant was relying upon plaintiff to

live up to their purchase agreement of exclusivity to buy his land at the contractually stated

prices. That certainly could have accomplished over four years ago if defendant’s good faith was

not substituted by plaintiff’s bad faith... And plaintiff knew that defendant had in the interim

spent more than $120,000.00 of a $240,000.00 loan with a lean on his land, to get started with

preparing the infrastructure of the land for sub-division. Pecunies applied this knowledge as

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leverage over defendant. Since, apparently plaintiff believed that eventually defendant would

agree to what they were willing to give him, or face financial ruin.

14. The irony is that in 2007 when defendant offered for the contract to be consummated,

where plaintiff would walk away with a total of about a million dollars, yet, they said that it just

wasn’t enough money. Although, defendant thought at the time when he offered to give plaintiff

$600,000.00 cash to tear up the contract, it included returning to them $250,000.00. Since, by

Phillips accounting it showed each of them listed with $125,000 each and himself receiving

$113,000 (exh ). This is where this money is listed to Phillips as the “trustee” of the LLC’s and

identified as $125,000 as down flow for each plaintiffs. Since defendants lawyer Brown backed

up their lie that they each laid out $125,000 from their own funds to get the refinancing. Yet, the

truth of the matter was that at the time of the refinancing the money that was listed of $360,000

was the amount that they embezzled from the open ended loan of about $900,000.00 … that is

now all used up, leaving a two million lean, plus a major debt now owed by the property. Since

he believed their cover-up story that the property was penalized $400,000 because plaintiff

neglected to pay the mortgage for the first six months that they delayed before getting the

refinancing, while for years they were pocketing $6,700.00 of the monthly rental checks that

defendant signed over to them.

15. Consequently, if plaintiffs allowed the four million sale to go through to the buyer

defendant produced, everything would have been considered above board and long forgotten.

Now the matter of how much one party will pay the other will be determined in a court of law.

Not to mention, plaintiff & co. is subject to prosecution by the Feds for racketeering violations.

Since plaintiff is indictable under the Hobb’s Act for extortion, and Sherman’s Act for unfair and
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unreasonable interference in commerce. Whereas, our society is set up with laws to protect the

innocent from being victimized by evil doers, and hold those who choose to break these laws

accountable for their actions.

16. Essentially, this eviction is sought by plaintiff to be accomplished as an element to

further a systematic scheme to defraud through criminal acts of interference, harassment and

extortion. This is compounded by the ongoing conspirator activities of plaintiff’s counsel, Robert

E. Kailin (Kailin). As they act in consort with Katz’s planned intent at the upcoming trial, this is

when he certainly will do more of the same. Specifically, with Katz’s complicity with unlawful

furthering the opposition’s legal agenda, albeit is to the profound detriment of defendant.

17. In effect, Katz has perverted his position of defendant’s trust when defendant gave him

$7,500 to engage his professional services (a significant portion of the last of his savings). This is

when defendant expected Katz in return, would affirm prudent and zealous representation,

through applying his training, knowledge, aptitude and skill. Thereby, to insure defendant’s

prospective legal opportunities could be exploited to receive justice in a court of equity.

Unfortunately, Katz misapplied defendant’s appointment to affirm his legal interests and exploit

judicial opportunities, to be redounded into a better business opportunity through foul play.

18. Specifically, the double dealing perpetrated by Katz was with joining onto what he knew

was an ongoing criminal enterprise in full bloom, carried out by his legal adversary. Since the

plaintiff has actively been swindling big money out of his client for years, right out in public

view. Even though Katz’s knowledge of the law, according to the Code of Conduct, dictated that

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he is duty bound to inform the authorities that a major criminal enterprise was amidst. Yet

instead, he chose to participate as a conspirator.

19. The fact is that, Katz, unlike the newspapers that reported defendant was entrapped in a

contractual agreement of sale he wanted out of, Katz on the other hand, was empowered with

knowing all the relevant facts. Since he viewed all the documents, corresponding to defendant’s

case, heard all of the fact history and certainly had read the filed mortgage instruments. As the

plaintiff had always claimed legal title to the property, viewing what is town records is the first

step every attorney would accomplish with handlings this case. Yet, all of defendant’s attorneys

hid from him all the legal facts of relevancy and deceived him to believe he was in a weak legal

position, and tried to encourage him to settle.

20. Whereby, any lawyer, who would examine the documents corresponding to my case,

would know upon the first glance view of the documents many hundreds of thousands of dollars

have already been siphoned from defendant’s assets and another million dollar payday is

dangling in abeyance. This is upon plaintiff completing their intended sale of defendant’s

property. As such larcenous intent of plaintiff to be achieved through defendants’ compliance

has been brought front and center to this court’s attention. As where plaintiff in their pleadings

cry crocodile tears of being the aggrieved party

21. Whereas, with considering that just one of plaintiff’s two racketeering acts of bank fraud,

carries a maximum sentencing of 30 years and up to a million dollar fine, says, they have allot to

loose, but also allot to gain. Essentially, a lot of money is not only at stake, but a lot of money is

available to go around, thereby to buy participation for those without scruples or a moral
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compass. Those wanting to jump on board, to adjoin in a criminal conspiracy in violation of

RICO, who are committed to perform their role in support of furthering plaintiff’s ability to

obtaining their common goals; of which are focused on injuring defendant to facilitate plaintiffs’

ability to obtain unlawful financial enrichment at the expense of defendant’s loss of his financial

resources.

22. Consequently, plaintiff has an extensive group of individuals, like Katz, working on their

behalf to harass, deceive, and influence me to be manipulated to concede to their demands.

Particular, to achieving their final goal, this is where their activities are focused on intimidating

defendant to a point of desperation, due to being sign onto, a willful agreement that he wants

plaintiff to sell his property. This is where defendant agrees to accept half of whatever plaintiff

says is the net of whatever is left over after the debts of the LLCs are paid off.

23. Apparently, as constituted by their bold and brazen misconduct, plaintiff and those who

work in consort in their scheme to defraud defendant through extortion, view defendant as an

easy mark. Such as defendant being perceived as someone by plaintiffs and defendant’s past

attorneys as a vulnerable senior citizen, who is naive, gullible, passive, and easy to dominate and

control. (As such circumstantial evidence of collusion makes it absolutely evident had occurred

with defendant’s past lawyers, Demetrois Adamis, Donald Brown, Abrim Heisler, (whom

Donald Brown had recommended) and Mark Katz. Thereby, plaintiffs, and their council, Murtha

Cullina LLP, through professional misconduct have actively abused the judicial process. Albeit,

their legal agenda they unlawfully pursued, was to deprive defendant out of the quite enjoyment

of the property he owns and his right to its equity.

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24. Essentially, defendant is complaining this case have been corrupted by all the lawyers

handling this matter who have engaged in outrageous conduct in violations of cannons. Such that

their past submissions, oral arguments, and other professional conduct corresponding to the case

has been executed with criminal intent. Specifically, the lawyers for both sides, the defendant,

Kailin and plaintiff’s own Lawyer, Katz have egregiously violated RPC, Rule 8.4 Misconduct of

the Conn. Rules of Professional Conduct. The complained misconduct is applicable to sections

1-5 of the rule:

“(1) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly

assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;(2) Commit a
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (3) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (4) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice; (5) State or imply an ability to influence improperly a
government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct or other law…”

25. However, by the Court granting this movant would foil plaintiff’s goal of an illegitimate

eviction ruling that they are now seeking to accomplish through the deprivation of due process.

Albeit, achieved through eluding discovery, and defendant’s right to be heard in a court of law.

Since, the scheduled trial on Tuesday would be without the principal litigant affected by its

outcome, who is excluded due to his physical handicap; while his representation would be

working to further the legal agenda of the other side, and the opposition’s pleadings routinely

consists of bold faced fabrications of Herculean lies, making a mockery of our sacred principals

of justice.

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26. Historically, Katz’s handling of this case has been with his turning a blind eye to expose

or challenge any of plaintiff’ pleadings and testimony before this court are totally bogus. Even

though Katz is aware plaintiff’s presented position is propped up by constructive fraud. Yet, Katz

though his implied duty of responsibility was to prudently apply the facts and evidence at his

disposal to support the cause of his client to good effect. This was substituted with a situation

such a situation of Katz consistently providing defendant with ineffective representation. As such

malpractice is especially detrimental to defendant, since plaintiff is misusing this court as a

criminal enterprise to defraud him.

27. Consequently, plaintiffs’ pleadings are without legitimate standing. Since, they are

perpetrating a hoax on this court corresponding to all the central issues in dispute. This is where

all of their pleadings and testimonial evidence have existed as a palpable and tangential ranting’s

of outrageously false declarations, totally adverse to the truth. Consequently, the tier of facts is

so familiar with hearing up to this point, profound aberrations of the true facts that have not been

contested or refuted. This corresponds to just about all of plaintiffs’ past pleadings and

testimonies, with them saying they are the aggrieved party. Someone, who has been victimized

by plaintiff running roughshod over them by doing what he wants in disregard of contractual

agreements and the law to cause them devastating, hardships and losses as a result. This is

analogous to Hitler telling the Germans that the Jews are to blame for the Second World War.

28. Not to mention that plaintiff would endure no injury if this movant is granted. On the

other hand, defendant would endure irrevocable damages. Since he is subject to lose his right to

possession to his real and personal property if he is evicted, while he is stuck in Florida, due to

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his disability. In fact, according to defendant’s doctors’ medical determinations, after extensive

testing and examinations, it not just a matter of the cold climate being bad for his health. Rather,

due to the severity and seriousness of defendant’s pulmonary disability the physical shock of an

exposure to cold weather could trigger a repertory attack that would be fatal.

29. Especially with considering that defendant has been traumatized by being cruelly treated

by plaintiffs. This is by their constant and continuous acts over the last five years of harassing,

threatening and intimidating him that affected his physiological state. Essentially, defendant is

suffering from perpetual posttraumatic stress disorder. Consequently confronting Robert

Pecunies (Pecunies) or Kailin in court is extremely stressful on its own as an experience, since it

reactivates the living nightmare they imposed upon him.

30. Whereas defendant is legally recognized as handicapped by this state by it granting him a

handicap driver’s license. Thus, defendant is entitled to relief under the Americans with

Disabilities Act. . . that says special accommodations are to be extended to the handicapped

individual that are caused by his disability, beyond what may be offered the common class of

citizens. As the standards are the special accommodation is to be granted when extending such

accommodations are reasonable. Thus, allowing two months for discovery to be completed and

particularly when the cold weather is not imposing a threat on defendant. Thereby, defendant can

appear for trial when he will be back in ten weeks and proceed by papers in the interim.

31. Insomuch as defendant has the ability to show through unimpeachable evidence the

existence of despicable wrongdoings by defendants that is an ongoing criminal enterprise.

Thereby, defendant can establish at trial by verifying to the veracity that plaintiff’s claims of
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right to the title is a product of fraudulent conveyance; perpetrated by constructive fraud and

exists as a constructive trust. In effect, with refuting all their fraudulent claims of right will be

achieved, by not only through unimpeachable evidence, but through anticipated injunctive

rulings in Superior Court. Since an application seeking injunctive relief is being filed this week,

as an application in the Superior Court with the dismissal of Katz and to precede prose. “[this]

action corresponds to in some cases, injunctive relief may be awarded to a plaintiff”; see e.g.

Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Committee, 354 F.

32. Thereby, defendant, in the pending action in Superior Court will show through an

injunctive relief movant that Pecunies, as director of the LLC’s, has abused that privilege to act

with felonious intent. Consequently the law demands Pecunies must be removed as director of

the LLC’s as they are also moved to be dissolved. Since his performance as manager of the

LLC’s can be readily verified to exist as a palpable and pervasive pattern of outrageously

dishonest conduct. Whereby, such conduct is based on authority obtained by fraudulent methods

of deceit and where he exercises gross abuse of his discretionary authority that is extreme and

chronic. Whereas, Pecunies while acting under the authorization of Watson had perverted the

existence of the LLC’s as a criminal enterprise under RICO. Moreover, that the equity in the

property linked to the LLC’s has profoundly diminished as the causation of his intentional

misconduct through the perversion of his controlling authority.

34. Albeit, the LLCs are a sham corporation established and sustained by fraud and deceit

and the basis of a façade of legitimacy to racketeering activities. Specifically, with statutory

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forgery of the deed and title to real properties; bank and mortgage fraud; embezzlement,

conversion, extortion, threating, harassment, criminal misuse of the courts,

35. Consequently, pursuant to § 33-1090, defendant is entitled for Pecunies to be disqualified

as corporate director of the LLC's; and pursuant to § 33-896, defendant is entitled to the

dissolution of the LLC’s; and pursuant to § 33-897(c), defendant is entitled to this relief as an

injunction. Since, such relief is urgently required and necessary to protect himself from enduring

any further injury to the property he owns or to his person. Since the existence of the LLCs’

fraudulent claim to 50% of the properties defendant owns has linked him to be egregiously

abused by Pecunies and his powers and will to ruthlessly abuse him without exercising any

moral restraint.

36. Whereby, Pecunies activities during the course of being the “executor manager” of the

LLCs can not only be defined as being fraudulent, unlawful, and repressive; but can readily be

defined as tyrannical, unscrupulous, inequitable, underhanded, devious, and egregiously cruel.

Not to mention, Pecunies activities as manager are clearly in blatant violation of the terms set

forth in the ‘contract; that defendant extended the right for Pecunies to be manager in the first

place; as in accordance to business law under contracts.

37. § 33-896 Judicial Dissolution of Corporation

The superior court for the judicial district where the corporation's principal office or, if none in
this state, its registered office, is located may dissolve a corporation:

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 1) In a proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that (A) The directors or those in
control of the corporation have acted, are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal,
oppressive or fraudulent; or (B) the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted;

38. § 33-897 (c) Procedure for judicial dissolution.

“(c) A court in a proceeding brought to dissolve a corporation may issue injunctions, appoint
a receiver or custodian pendente lite with all powers and duties the court directs, take other
action required to preserve the corporate assets wherever located and carry on the business of the
corporation until a full hearing can be held.

39. § 33-1090 Removal of Corporate Director of Non-stock Corporation

1) If a corporate director engages in fraudulent or dishonest conduct, or gross abuse of

authority or discretion, with respect to the corporation; and
2) removal of that director would be in the best interest of the corporation;
3) then either the corporation, or a group consisting of at least 10 percent of the
corporate members;
4) may commence a judicial proceeding for the removal of that director.

40. § 33-899 Decree of dissolution.

(a) If after a hearing the court determines that one or more grounds for judicial

dissolution described in section 33-896 exist, it may, in the case of the grounds specified

in subsection (a) of said section, and shall, in the case of grounds specified in subsection

(b) of said section, enter a decree dissolving the corporation and specifying the effective

date of the dissolution, and the clerk of the court shall deliver a certified copy of the

decree to the Secretary of the State, who shall file it.

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41. § 895, 903, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93766 (D. Del. 1973). Whereas the following

relief is about to be sought:

1) Order pursuant to § 53-398(a),(1) “prohibiting the defendant from transferring,

depleting or otherwise alienating or diminishing the property; and (4) Any other
order, consistent with due process of law, that the court deems to be reasonable and
necessary to protect the rights of [plaintiff as] any innocent person.”

2) Order defendants have no right to list properties for sale.

3) Order defendants have no right to sell properties.

4) Order defendants have no right to collect rents from the properties.

5) Order defendants, or their agents, have no right to manage properties.

6) Order defendants, or their agents, have no right to set foot onto the properties.

7) Order defendants or their agents to ‘cease and desist’ from perpetrating any

act against plaintiff that can be construed as being coercing, threatening, or harassing.

(This can be as a Temporary Restraining Order if the court so determines).

42. Whereby, defendant will seek equitable remedies through these injunctions to place a

bar on the ongoing criminal activities of defendant threatening to cause irrevocable damages.

Moreover, plaintiff is entitled to relief because he can unequivocally show the anticipated

success on the merits and that the continuation of the status quo will cause him to endure

irreparable injury.

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43. Consequently, the pivotal issue in this proceeding is on the threshold of being determined

in the higher court. As this is the court of jurisdiction to make a determination and subsequently

ruling as to who has legal right to tile and possession to the premises in dispute.

MERITS IN SUPPORT OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF BEING GRANTED

44. Since defendant can prove his entitlement for preliminary injunctive relief; and can

show the balance of hardships with considering the parties legitimate rights, tips completely in

his favor. This is contributed to plaintiff bringing to bear, clear and convincing evidence

supporting his ability to prevail. Thus, with this Court’s granting the injunctive relief sought, is

in accordance to where courts of equity have realized that extraordinary remedies are justified in

extraordinary cases. Thereby, this Court can prevent an obvious wrong from continuing and

protect a litigant who is being victimized by unlawful misconduct perpetrated by evil doers.

45. The cease and desist element of the relief sought (no. 6) would put the brakes on

defendants continuing with their campaign of perpetrating overt acts constituting harassment of

plaintiff. This is to intimidate plaintiff to move all his furnishings off the property that contain

many valuable antiques (November- December 2009). Such as by defendants sending their

“security guard” Anthony Camadello, without giving any prior notice to demand plaintiff lets

him into his home.

46. Yet, after defendant exercised his legal right to refuse to allow Camadello to enter his

apartment, as a response Camadello told him: “ Then I am just going to break the window to go

22
in through the window (expressed intent was stopped upon cell call to police); or by defendant’s

representation, Kaelin, threatening defendant over the phone by telling his lawyer, Katz, that if

he does not willfully move out his furniture in three days they are going to send six men over and

a garbage truck to trash it; or Camadello saying that a dumpster will be arriving on the property

to dispose of his furniture; or without any legitimate justification breaking into plaintiff’s home

to change the lock on the outside and then breaking the lock on the inside to change that also.

(Although, plaintiffs may lie that they were justified to do so, the fact of the matter was that

defendant was not notified by his cell when he could have made arrangements to have his agent

give them access if they only asked).

47. The last criminal act of harassing occurred on December 15, 2009, when plaintiffs

forcibly broke in to the apartment to change the locks and take plaintiffs property. This was

under the color of spinning a web of lies to create a façade of being justified, due to emergency

circumstances.

48. Consequently, from plaintiffs pattern of harassment the granting the’ no. 5’ relief is

required to bar defendants and their agents from entering plaintiff’s property. Thereby, this will

help to mitigate the anxiety defendants wantonly imposed upon plaintiff to fear they will carry

out their threat of trashing his personal property. Even though, they have no legitimate right to be

on defendant’s property. Yet, they have made their intentions known of doing criminal mischief

on his property. Moreover, after each incident occurred when defendants’ agents would break

Connecticut laws of ‘threatening,’ and when plaintiff would call the police for them to

investigate the matter. However, plaintiffs’ agents would deny that they did what they did, only

23
to do it again at another time because the police refuse to acknowledge any of these acts are

criminal conduct.

49. Yet, even after all the preliminary injunctive relief requested is granted, although it

would stop a great injustice in its tracks, and turn things around for plaintiff, but still it would

just be the initial step. This is with facilitating defendant’s progress on a steep road to recovery

towards becoming whole once again. Since, after plaintiffs have ran roughshod over defendant’s

property rights to steal the equity in his property he is without funds. Consequently, as a

causation of this looting the properties that owed only a Million in debts and was solvent when

defendants started, now owes 2.3 million and has gone into foreclosure.

50. Thus, it is of great urgency the restoring of the status quo ante; that is, to protect the

defendant from the continued victimization from the criminal evil doings perpetrated by the

plaintiffs. . .that through fraud, extortion and praying on the week and vulnerable mind of an

elderly person of 79 years, they have been actively extracting the potential equity created from

his property. Consequently, this court’s intervention is required to affirm the legitimate rights of

defendant, and is essential to the concept of fairness, of which serves societal interests.

51. Specifically, the injunction relief requested is of the greatest urgency to put a halt on

plaintiffs’ usurpation of the rental revenues. Insomuch as, due to plaintiffs’ stealing about

$400,000 that they leveraged against the property and almost all of the rental revenue that they

misappropriated for their own use and benefit for 5 ½ years, instead of applying these funds to

the property’s debts, defendant ‘s property has gone into foreclosure. However, plaintiffs'

24
privilege to receive the rents to be applied to the properties debts was on the contractual basis

that defendant had authorized that right to ensure it was up to date with its debts. (exh. )

MERITS OF DEFENSE AND COUNTERCLAIM

52. Consequently, now that foreclosure is pending, plaintiffs are using this as a ploy to

extort another million out of plaintiff. Currently, this is being attempted by coercing defendant to

authorize for them to sell his property on the condition that they take half of the revenue the sale

creates. Such as by having plaintiff’s last lawyer (who was just discharged due to his apparent

collusion with the plaintiffs) write to plaintiff telling him that if he doesn’t capitulate to

defendants demands that he allows them to sell his property: “you will lose everything” (exh ).

This is after the revenue the sale creates pays off their conspirators who activity played a major

role in participating in their scheme to defraud plaintiff … that is about $300,000 (real estate

agent and lawyers).

53. Essentially, the court must grant the relief requested to correct an obvious wrong,

which has been established by fraud and a brazen disregard of the law by defendants. Such as

where they imposed their dominance over plaintiff’s right for the quite enjoyment of the property

he owns, through their misuse of the judicial process and use of extortionist tactics.

54. Wherefore, pursuant to the ‘doctrine of unclean hands,’ plaintiffs’ continued

misconduct must not be tolerated by this court to continue until this case is adjudicated. This is

because the sited conduct of the defendants is totally reprehensible to constitute felonious

25
activities of racketeering. Such as where plaintiffs acted with exercising egregious bad faith by

violating plaintiff’s trust with their despicable behavior of being outrageously dishonest,

inequitable, unfair and deceitful.

55. Not to mention, plaintiffs contrived all their litigation activity against plaintiff through

making outrageously false declarations of material fact before the courts. Such as where they

claim they put a major amount of their own money into respondent’s property, when in actuality

they not only contributed nothing, but embezzled over a half a million. While the truth of the

matter is when they acquired their authority on a contract to buy respondent’s property, they not

only perverted the contract as a devise for extortion, but redounded it into a criminal enterprise

… involving activities of theft, fraud & deceit, and extortion. (see exh. )

56. Consequently due to plaintiffs’ unclean hands, as this tenet of the law commands they

are not entitled to any consideration of relief in equity. Since, plaintiffs defrauded respondent on

all major matters corresponding to his property, they are not entitled to assert any so-called legal

right for entitlement and relief in any legal action. Insomuch as, they are without standing to

have this court judicially enforce their alleged rights contested by plaintiff involving his property

57. Currently, plaintiffs have petitioned plaintiff to evict him from his domicile on the

property he legitimately fully owns from his home by misuse of the authority of this court to

misappropriate respondents’ right to continue occupancy. Yet, plaintiffs are now spinning a web

of lies to perpetrate a fraud upon the court for plaintiff’s rights to occupy his property to be

denied through his eviction by the LLC’s. Even though they have terrorized and defrauded

plaintiff for over five years to extort from him the equity in his property.
26
58. Not to mention, defendant can’t substantiate the slightest claim of right by any

evidence that could create a facade of a taint of legitimacy, since their claim of entitlement is

based on fraud. On the other hand, respondent has the ability to bring forth evidence that could

not only validate defendant’s association to the properties is totally fraudulent, but the evidence

is of such weight to guarantee their felony convictions as violations under RICO could be

obtained under indictment by the Conn. District Attorney.

59. Whereas, petitioner will bring forth before this court the fact history corresponding to the

issues in dispute between parties that shocks the conscience. Since, plaintiffs’ wrong doings is of

such extraordinary circumstances of outrageous disregard of human decency. Yet, up to this

point in time, the authority of the courts has been egregiously misused by the defendants as a

scheme and artifice to further their activity of defrauding plaintiff. As all of defendants’ prior

litigation was essentially a palpable fraud upon the court, involving all the central matters of

issue in dispute.

60. Moreover, all of the plaintiff’s palpable lies have until now been unchallenged by the

intentional extreme and chronic dereliction of duty by plaintiff’s own councils; “e.g.’ Aldamis

excluded plaintiff from being present at trial to hear opposition’s perjuries and testify in rebuttal.

Clearly, this is the result of the ineptness of defendant’s lawyers to advocate and argue his

position constituted by their gross omissions to perform; yet ironically, whenever they were

assertive it was of great benefit to support the legal agenda of defendants. Albeit was always

totally averse to what defendant had communicated what was their legal plan of action and

27
position that he wanted presented. Consequently, defendant’s lawyers have clearly validated that

they are working for the other side; most certainly the result of bribery. (see exh. )

61. Thus, as a causation of the corrupt conduct of defendant lawyers, he consistently has been

deprived of exposing the major criminal activity and Herculean falsehoods of the opposition.

Moreover, not only have his own lawyers stifled him from refuting the fraudulent claims of the

other side, but also a judge denied him the right to testify and plead his case. As when the matter

was before the Superior Court of Norwalk to vacate a stipulation that was the product of coercion

and misrepresentation by defendant’s lawyer.

62. This was right after the Judge hearing the matter of the prior eviction action based on

falsehoods, allowed the defendants to testify to their fraudulent claims. Such as with the business

arrangement and fiduciary obligations, but blocked the defendant from presenting his position.

Even though plaintiff’s testimony was essential for him to establish his cause of action to justify

vacating the stipulation, as to the state of his mind at the time when he signed the stipulation, . . .

as this was the pivotal issue to be decided upon. Since the matter before the court was whether

plaintiff’s signing of the stipulation was through his own volition, or was the product of

misconduct and/or misrepresentations.

63. Specifically, defendant had no interest to sign the stipulation, but his lawyer Donald

Brown pressured him to sign out of fear, by telling him that: “if you don’t sign it they’re going to

suck out all the equity in your property and you will end up with nothing.” Moreover, Brown

said it doesn’t matter if you sign it because I am going to bring an action soon in Superior Court.

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64. Consequently, what occurred is that defendant did not sign under his own volition, rather

he only agreed to sign the stipulation as byproduct of his lawyers coercion and fraudulent

statements. Thereby, such interference is in accordance to Court Practice and Procedure, title

52, ch. 900, §52-212 II. Grounds For Relief, in 52-212 §58 Fruad and 52-212 §59 Duress,

where statues say:

“In making its factual determination whether stipulated judgment should be opened,
pursuant to C.G.S.A. § 52-212a, trial court must inquire into whether decree itself was
obtained by fraud, duress, accident or mistake. (Jenks v. Jenks (1995) 657 A.2d 1107, 232
Conn. 750, on remand 663 A.2d 1123, 39 Conn. App. 139).

“To conclude that stipulated judgment resulted from duress, finder of fact must
determine that misconduct of one party induced party seeking to avoid stipulated
judgment to manifest assent thereto, not as exercise of that party's free will, but
because that party had no reasonable alternative in light of circumstances as that party
perceived them to be. (Jenks v. Jenks (1995) 657 A.2d 1107, 232 Conn. 750, on remand
663 A.2d 1123, 39 Conn.App. 139).

65. Consequently, from defendant being denied the right to testify it ensured the status quo,

of acknowledgment of defendant’s fraudulent claims to be legitimate, by the records absence of

any rebuttal to contest the veracity of their fabrications to deceive the tier of facts.. This was after

all the past lost opportunities caused by defendant’s lawyers’ intentional neglect to expose the

criminal conduct of the adverse party. As where Brown told plaintiff he could not raise any issue

besides the lease and his rental payments in the eviction action, such as with fraud and other

misconduct.

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66. Consequently up to now, plaintiff has never been able to contradict plaintiffs’ outrageous

falsehoods, which are the very antithesis of the truth; such as where defendants testify to being

the aggrieved party . . . that should have been identified as bold faced lies that could have readily

been refuted by evidence. Whereas, instead of defendant’s lawyers refuting the lies of the

opposition, they would explained to him that it was never the time or place; and other ridiculous

reasons to justify them being ineffective representation.

67. Plaintiffs ‘claim of legitimate right of ownership to the ‘property’ is totally fraudulent, as

is applicable to Connecticut Law of property wrongfully obtained through security fraud. This

is pursuant to C.G.S. §53-394 (a): “Racketeering activity. . . (15) § 36b-34: inclusive, relating to

securities fraud and related offenses.” Specifically, defendants’ have established through entered

evidence of record (exh A ) that their title of 50% ownership, springs out from an agreement with

plaintiff, dated May 27, 2004 (the ‘contract’).

68. Yet, although the ‘contract’ is by its nature is a purchase contract (restricted to two years),

it has been willfully egregiously breeched by plaintiffs (probably motivated by their

considering defendant’s advanced age of 79 years, makes him week minded and

vulnerable). Thus, the ‘contract’ and any product of equity that came about from the

contract, such as the title of 50% ownership, is not only unenforceable in a court of law,

but exists as a construct trust. Since, the only payment that was fulfilled was identified on

the ‘contract’ as a $40,000.00 loan from plaintiff to defendant. Of which on the contract

states is to be applied to a mortgage upon plaintiff’s own property (which had an equity

valuation of about 2.5 million at the time).

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69. Whereby, contained in the mortgage instrument, defendant is identified as “Original

Borrower,” under ‘RECITALS’ for a “40,000.00 Open-End Mortgage Deed Loan.”

Further, the LLC’s as “New Borrower” lists its address on the property, and Pecunies and

Watson are collectively named as the “Lender.” Thus, the “lender” is assuming the

liability for the $40,000 note by mortgaging the property, while the instrument states:

“original buyer desires to sell transfer, and new buyer desires to acquire all of the right

title, and interest of the original borrower in and to the original Borrower’s fee interest in

the property, which sale, transfer, and conveyance requires the consent of the lender under

the Loan Documents.” (exh. )

70. Here lies the mortgage as an artifice to plaintiffs’ scheme to defraud defendant through

extortion by manner of interfering with his ability to have control of his own property. Yet,

plaintiff was duped to believe that he was only signing papers for a $40,000.00 personal

loan from Pecunies and to authorize the refinancing to get a better rate. In effect, plaintiffs

can’t claim their benefit from the ‘contract’ is to be legally viewed as a matter of

‘inexcusable trustfulness’ of plaintiff. Such as where he may have entered into a contract

that compromises his business potential and interests, but this is due to the neglect of

affirming his duty to self. As this is where defendants may claim what matters is not if a

contract is a good or bad agreement, but that the signer is bound by what is agreed in a

contract. However, contract law states:

31
 “Economic inadequacy may constitute some circumstantial evidence of fraud, duress,

over-reaching, undue influence, mistake or that the detriment was not bargained for.”

See J. Calamari & J. Petrillo, “Contracts” (4th Ed. 1998) § 4.4, pp. 172-75.

71. Moreover, the ‘contract’ on its face is unlawful. Insomuch as the performance terms of

plaintiffs’ bargain in the ‘contract’ is in violation of the following:

Securities Exchange Act (Title 15, Chapter 2B, § 78o–1. “Brokers deemed to be registered”)
and Connecticut Real Estate Laws. Since, defendant Pecunies is not a licensed mortgage
broker or agent of a financial institution ;

neither did Pecunies have the authority to be contracted as a “manger” of the property without a
real estate license ;

or have exclusive right to be a middleman between plaintiff the seller and a prospective buyer, as
such a business venture is a violation of required real estate licensing requirement and
laws, (set forth in chapter 392, § 20-312 (a) (b) and § 20-325: “Engaging in [real estate]
business without license”).

72. In addition, defendants’ claim of right to title and subsequent 50% ownership of the

property is in violation of the CT Civil, Title 52, of “Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act” :

§52-552(d) Value (a) “Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for
the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or
satisfied ; and §52-552(e) Transfers fraudulent as to present creditors (a) “A transfer
made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, if the creditor's
claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred and if the debtor
made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1) With actual intent to hinder, delay or

32
 defraud any creditor of the debtor; or (2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor (A) was engaged or was
about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor
were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction, or (B) intended to
incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond
his ability to pay as they became due.”

73. Whereby, not only was no “fair consideration” of cash given by plaintiffs as a

reasonable amount in exchange for the title conveyance, but they did not pay out even a cent.

Then, plaintiffs added insult to injury, by stealing from defendant about $400,000 in the process

of them filing a fraudulent conveyance. Since, the title transfer and open-end credit was done

without authorization or right given by the defendant as the owner, to do anything but obtain the

refinancing that was agreed in the ‘contract’. Yet, plaintiffs through trickery had transferred title

to the LLC’s in April and November 2004 and imposed a debt upon the property to embezzle

$380,000 at that time and also impose about $17,000 in closing costs.

74. Thereafter, plaintiffs drew down from the $500,000 open end credit from the two

million lean on the property through more embezzlement and the rest was applied it to the

interest payments, and the harsh default penalties on the note they neglected. This was due to

plaintiffs pocketing the $5,000.00 to $10,000 in monthly rental revenue that they collected.

Whereas, these funds was agreed on the ‘contract’ would be directed towards paying off the

property’s debts.

75. Not to mention, that the very basis of justification for refinancing presented by

defendants to plaintiff was for them to reduce plaintiff’s 8.5% mortgage to 4.75%. Yet,

33
defendants transformed a note that was owed $960,000 at the time of the ‘contract’ to be

substituted with 11 ½ % usury rate, with a Two Million dollar lean. Of which from their reneging

on their obligation under the contract, the property that owed less than a million at the time

plaintiff signed the ‘contract’ now owes well over two million and is going into foreclosure.

76. While plaintiffs have deprived the defendant from receiving about $400,000 in rental

revenue that plaintiffs’ stole and after evicting defendant. This forced him to live for off the

property for six months in miserable accommodations. In addition to plaintiffs forcing defendant

out of doing business in his store to have to resort to operating under a canopy far off the road,

on the driveway of his home. This is where he earned a small fraction of what his store

generated, which plaintiffs closed. Yet, due to defendant’s impoverished state, he had to work

under this canopy for the last half a year before the winter, every day for eight hours to make

about $50 per day.

77. Moreover, in spite of the afore-stated facts, plaintiffs in the Norwich Housing Court

received $24,000.00 from plaintiff (which he had to borrow at high interest), and thereafter

evicted him anyway after a few months; even though defendant was regularly paying his rent

and turning over $6,700.00 in monthly rents that he was collecting. Yet, they lied by saying he

was in default of paying his rent in time. The $24,000 check was abused as leverage to get

defendant to willfully move out or forfeit it as a penalty and be judiciously evicted anyway.

78. On the other hand, plaintiff collected the rents written out to his name that he then

signed over to the LLC’s. Yet defendants didn’t deposit the funds in the account of the LLC’s,

34
which does not have a business account. Rather, Pecunies and Watson co-mingled these rent

checks by depositing them in their own personal business accounts (Mercedes Benz and Watson

Enterprises). Ironically, plaintiffs have falsely pleaded that plaintiff collected all the rents over

the years and that they were stuck paying off all the bills that the property accrued.

79. Wherefore, the complained wrongdoings that the plaintiffs perpetrated, is with their

unlawful taking over control of defendant’s property to steal its equity. This is with equity

skimming of over $700,000, which occurred from June 2004 until the present and their intended

act of grand larceny to fraudulently misappropriate for themselves about a million dollars upon

the sale of defendant’s property (that they unlawfully control). This ambition to extracting a

million dollars when defendant sells his property is verifiable as an unimpeachable material fact.

Such as where Pecunies established on record in his testimony, before the Norwalk CT Court, in

March of 2008, when Pecunies said :

“And Mr. Zanette keeps saying the bills are paid by rents. That’s totally untrue.
Certain bills that he’s talking about, he may pay and deduct them from the rents.
But we’re paying the mortgages. We’re paying the notes. We’re paying insurance.
We are paying the large bills.”

80. Then, defendant’s own lawyer Heisler, asked Pecunies a question, totally averse to

what plaintiff told him, and verifies his collusion with the opposition, by asking:

“since you’ve raised the question you are paying all these bills that your paying.
Wasn’t that a consideration for this agreement that you signed with Mr. Zanette,
This LLC that you formed, that you would finance the property and in exchange
You would get fifty percent of the profits from the sale of the property?”

Then, Pecunies said:

35
 “That’s true and that’s exactly what we did. We took two defaulted mortgages
that Mr. Zanete was in foreclosure on which we have all the paperwork for.
We bailed him out of those two mortgages. We personally loaned him forty
thousand dollars to go buy his gardening supplies, and so on, and so forth,
and we took over all of the debt of the debt ridden property and we carried
it for almost four years”. . .”I believe the property will bring somewhere
between, even in this market, between three million two and three million
five. And after everything is paid off on the property, I believe Mr. Zannete
will walk away with approximately a million dollars for his interest.”

81. Pecunies following testimony speaks of fraudulently putting his name on defendant’s

property and mortgages as the controlling principal; yet instead of “funding it,’ he is extracting

its equity. Moreover, the properties loss of revenue is the product of defendants’ interference to

block defendant’s expressed intent and ability, to sell the property for 4 Million prior to his

testimony. Pecunies said:

“I took out two mortgages on the property originally. That's about three years ago and they
were three year loans, and I took out two personal notes to fund the rest of the monies
required, and they are all past due on an extension now of sixty days, which that sixty days
is almost up, and the property presently cash flowing is losing about ten thousand five
hundred dollars per month, so its going in debt every month further, and at the same time,
the real estate market is changing, so I'm trying to put a deal together and keep a deal
together that makes sense for this piece of property. Delmo Zanette is a fifty percent owner.
He will come out the same as I will come out when it’s sold, and it’s crazy the way it’s going.
I'm the only one funding it.”

82. However, the true facts are that plaintiff agreed to the three million sale of the

properties on the encouragement that he could still operate his farm store and reside above it. (As

36
Pecunies said in court testimony that when he first struck a deal with defendant he promised that

he could still continue with operating his farm stand. Yet, plaintiff knew his property was

appraised to be worth four million, so he had defendant’s write into the contract that if they

didn’t buy the property, but it was sold to an outsider for what he knew it was worth, then they

would each get $500,000.00. This meant that instead of plaintiff receiving the 1.9 million net

equity payment promised in the ‘contract,’ that he would get 2.4 million, while defendants would

receive $500,000. This $500,000 that plaintiff contractually promised to defendants was

essentially for just handling the paperwork for the refinancing.

83. Then in 2007, after plaintiff found two developers who were interested in paying $4

Million and he offered to pay defendants $600,000 as pure profit, yet they refused. This is when

they said that this was just not enough money for them to approve the sale. Further, plaintiff was

annoyed after the first year, when Pecunies insulted his intelligence. This is when Pecunies told

plaintiff that he had good news that he has a buyer for the properties. A buyer who offered to pay

more than what both properties were worth and plaintiff would receive $800,000.000. To wit,

plaintiff said that the ‘contract’ stated he would get $1.9 million (net payment) and that amount

was what he was expected.

84. It appears the low payment by plaintiffs was because he knew defendant had just spent

S120,000.00 on preliminary engineering and needed at least $200,000.00 more to finish the

infrastructure work. This work was necessary to divide up a large parcel of vacation land into

smaller parcels to be placed on the market. Since, plaintiff had taken out a $240.000.00 mortgage

on the property and needed the revenue from the property’s sale to complete the required work.

37
Clearly, this is an example where defendant used the ‘contract’s’ existence for extortion.

Insomuch as, this is by defendants intimidating plaintiff to fear economic loss if he does not

capitulate to their demands he allows himself to be cheated by them.

85. Consequently, as the causational result of plaintiffs’ wanton acts of bad faith by

capriciously refusing to uphold the terms of the contract to allow the Four Million sale to go

through, defendant is out millions. Specifically, defendant’s vacation land that was appraised to

be worth 3.2 million in 2006 when he wanted to sell the land after making it ready for the market

is now worth about half. And the subject properties have gone down perhaps as much as 38%.

Not to mention, that plaintiff is now almost broke, deeply in debt and quite anxious about his

current financial disposition. In addition, plaintiff feels downtrodden and depressed, from being

egregiously abused by defendants’ outrageous mistreatment, in disregard of his frail health and

any sense of exercising ethical restraint.

86. Whereas, the plaintiffs exploited defendant’s unbridled trust, along with his gracious

concessions of profoundly compromising his business interests for their financial benefit. Since

the defendant had generously extended good will towards plaintiffs by accommodating them for

whatever they asked (except for a co-venture agreement, which he refused and stated he was

only interested in selling the property); such graciousness that only a father would extend

towards a son in a business arrangement.

87. Yet, plaintiffs abused the altruistic good will that defendant had extended to them, and

turned his belief in their trustworthiness to victimize him with outrageous acts of criminal

38
simulation. This is furthered through constructive fraud and conspiracy. Thereby, plaintiff

committed a breach of all the fiduciary duties that they contractually owed defendant, such as

being entrusted to be the manager of his property. Since defendants perverted their fiduciary

relationship with defendant; albeit was based on defendant’s confidence in their ability to

appreciate all the concessions he made that they redounded to perpetrate numerous acts of

conversion.

88. Insomuch as the plaintiffs had willfully and intentionally violated defendant’s

confidence in their professional integrity to consummate fraudulent transactions, which abused

their position of trust to the extreme detriment of defendant. This is where their claim of right of

ownership of defendant’s property exists as a constructive trust, which is the product of fraud

and deceit . . . that is furthered by misusing the state courts and apparent bribery of defendant’s

lawyers to perform in support of their legal agendas

89. The basis of plaintiffs’ scheme was built upon having deceived defendant to sign onto

documents corresponding to what the defendants placed before him. Whereas, all the documents

plaintiff signed were egregiously misrepresented . . . that was to such a degree that defendant

would never had signed them if not but for plaintiffs’ major verbal misrepresentations of what he

was signing. Since, the contract was actually the third contract that defendant signed

90. In addition these signed documents could have been later altered with addition text

added, or were the product of forgery. Since plaintiffs filed the transference of title of the deeds

from his name to defendants’ half ownership, yet this was never presented to defendant would

39
occur, and defendant’s witness to all the business meetings at the time would certainly have

taken notice.

91. On the other hand, defendant relied on plaintiffs’ verbal promises, intentionally made

in bad faith to induce defendant to sign the ‘contract’ where what was verbally promised was not

stated. Yet, even the terms contained in this one sided ‘contract,’ were intentionally not adhered

to by the plaintiffs although defendant was in full compliance. The agreement ‘contract’ was

drawn up by defendants’, lawyer, Stephan Phillips. This is where plaintiffs promised defendant

that they would still allow him to maintain possession and residential occupancy of the building

Purdy’s Farms building. (Later, defendant was told until the property was sold and he expected it

would fetch Four Million). This is where he could live above the Purdy’s farm store, in exchange

for paying $1,000.00 a month towards the taxes. While in the past defendant had refused all

those who asked if he wanted to sell because he did not want to abandon his way of life with

farming his land and interacting with the public in his farm store.

92. Whereby, the agreement reached by parties with a verbal promise of buying the land,

but keeping defendant on as a tenant. This type of creative arrangement had never been offered

before which deterred defendant from ever advertising his property, or seeking out those who

had approached him in the past. This is when before plaintiff had approached defendant with a

promise he could continue operating his farm store and live above it, he always said he was not

interested in selling. Thus, in effect, plaintiffs used the tactic of “bait and switch” to start the

contractual process of the sale of the property. Consequently, plaintiffs were the only entity that

40
defendant had ever considered, even though he was once offered 3.2 million in 2001 just for the

farm land to build a hotel.

93. Contributed to plaintiffs’ fraudulent misconduct, their acquisition of 50% ownership is

devoid of any consent or quid quo pro; but rather as shown by the ‘contract,’ contained

phenomenally inappropriate accommodations. This is with terms clearly detrimental to

defendant’s reasonable business expectations readily obtainable in the free market place.

Essentially, the plaintiffs extended generous concessions compromising his self-interests in the

‘contract,’ because the plaintiffs made various verbal promises that they had no intention to

perform.

94. In addition, plaintiffs made numerous verbal promises that were not incorporated in the

contract or were intentionally promised would not be in the ‘contract’, yet were incorporated in

the contract. This is because the plaintiffs observed that with the prior contracts, defendant could

be manipulated to sign the contract at the time it was presented to him without reading it first.

Since contributed to defendant’s blind trust, he accepted whatever plaintiffs’ said as being

truthful. Consequently, due to defendant not reading the contract before signing it, terms that

were agreed would not be in the contract were incorporated, such as term he would only get

$200,000 at the time of the sale and a hundred thousand each year thereafter. This was in spite of

defendant having rejected that term as being totally unacceptable and Pecunies subsequently

promising it would not be in the contract.

41
95. In fact the loan was never a loan because the money was mortgaged from own property

a material misrepresentation of what Pecunies told defendant, of him to facilitate their business

interests for the property purchase to be the most profitable venture. However, they abused

defendant’s good faith accommodations as an opportunity to usurp his rights and powers of

owning his property to be substituted with their exclusive control.

96. In effect, the plaintiffs acted to defraud defendant by getting him to sign onto an

agreement to sell his property to them in the ‘contract.’ This agreement was presented to

defendant by the plaintiffs as to allow them to manage his property in the interim while they

made preparations to buy his property within a two year period (exh. ). Yet without putting up

any money it gave them exclusivity to buy in a robust market that had increased all over the last

year period. While the consensus of the experts at the time was that this property appreciation

was expected to continue; as it did substantially by double digits over the next two years.

97. In effect, plaintiffs acted with evil intent to achieve their goal of looting the equity in

defendant’s property through criminal activity that §1962(c) defines as a pattern of racketeering.

Since they got control through fraud and deceit and then maintained their control through

coercion. Currently, the plaintiffs are pursuing a buyer for defendant’s property and established

their intention is to take half of the revenue its sale would create after the property’s debts of well

over a million that they created is deducted.

98. Essentially, through constructive fraud the plaintiffs coerced the defendant under duress

to accept their domination over controlling his property according to their will. The tortious

42
activities of plaintiffs are dedicated to intimidate defendant to fear he can’t benefit from his

property if he does not cooperate with what they want. Since they convinced defendant to believe

he can’t do anything with his property without their consent; and insist they have the right to do

whatever they want with his property without even giving him notification and can call the

police to have him removed as a trespasser.

99. Except with plaintiffs acknowledging the legally requirement of notification of plaintiff

for him to approve a sale of his property with their equal share after its sale. (Such as where

without consulting plaintiffs to have rewarded the father of plaintiff’s double dealing attorney,

Donald Brown; being paid by both sides for the real estate listing to sell defendant’s property for

a three digit commission. Ironically, Donald Browns father, Donald Brown Sr. who was

unknown to defendant engaged him in a conversation about his legal dispute and gave him the

business card of his son and promised defendant that his son would provide excellent legal

support. This is received by Defendants’ broker Elsie Peorin who has produced totally false

testimonial evidence for the Newark Housing Court to further defendant’s scheme to deceive the

court. And Pecunies has the audacity to expect plaintiff to pay a triple digital payoff as an inside

seller of his property as the trusted broker.

100. Essentially, the defendants effectively imposed upon defendant that they will only

allow his authority to be restricted to where he is required to approve the sale of his property.

(This would be with signing away his last right associated to his possession corresponding to co-

owning the LLCs). Hence, plaintiff’s only option to obtain revenue from his property is to allow

43
the sale that they want, since they have maliciously interfered with his ability to benefit from his

property.

101. Currently, the defendants have not applied the approximate $10,000.00 monthly

revenue the property was producing to pay the mortgage. (Since they had deprived defendant

from receiving these rents and directed it to themselves that they co-mingled with their own

funds). Rather, they conducted a scheme to manipulate defendant’s property to be going into

foreclosure as a circumstance to coerce his submission to their demands.

102. Clearly, these are willful and wanton acts of extortion to force defendant’s compliance

to what defendants want by his capitulation to their self-dealing designs. This was achieved by

his signing an agreement on May 27th, 2004 for Pecunies and Watson to manage his property.

Thereafter, Pecunies in 2005 or 2006 had the audacity to tell plaintiff that he would be able to

give him $800,000 for the bother properties instead of the $1.9 million promised in the

agreement or $2.4 if someone would be willing to buy the property for $4 million as what did

occur in 2006 from two different parties who approached plaintiff. This is when defendant

attempted to buy them out in 2006 for offers of $100,000.00 and thereafter for $600,000.00, they

refused. The $600,000.00 buyout was before the property was listed and plaintiff found two

parties who offered him $4,000,000.00 in 2006.

103. Yet, although defendants did nothing constructive, only pocketing many tens of

thousands in rental revenue in addition to$380,000.00 embezzlement, they still said $600,000.00

wasn’t enough money for them to allow the sale to go through. (Noteworthy was that the

44
$380,000.00 was explained to plaintiff by his own lawyer Aldamis to correspond to penalties that

he accepted and did not consider in the buy-out equation. Specifically, plaintiff was duped to

believe the penalty occurred from the six months that the p-defendants waited to pay the

mortgage after taking over management in May 2004. Consequently, the buyout would have

been more around 1.2 million that they refused)

104. In effect, through fraudulent misrepresentation of material facts, defendants’ deceived

defendant into believing that he was helpless before their proclaimed power of legal right . . . that

was confirmed by defendant’s lawyers who were in collusion. While all the time was

unbeknownst to the defendant, until October 2009, that fraudulent conveyances of titles to the

LCC’s they controlled were filed in November 10th 2004. Since, the quit-claims were produced

without defendant’s consent or knowledge. Then with refinancing, instead of the p-defendants

securing a new fixed mortgage for 4.75% as promised they got an open-end mortgage in the

form of a deed trust for 11.5% and clandestinely transferred ownership of his property to the

LLC’s through the bogus quit claims.

105. Defendant’s explanation to defendant for the setting up the LLC’s was confined for the

only purpose to get refinancing before they purchased the property. Thereafter, defendant was

tricked and the good faith he extended was transformed into a criminal enterprise of extortion.

Thereby, from p-defendants pursuit to obtain ill-gotten gains at the expense of plaintiff, they

have acted to deprive him of receiving millions by selling his property on the open market.

TORTIOUS ACTS UNDER STATE CIVIL LAW

45
106. § 52-577 Civil Conspiracy
“The elements of a civil action for conspiracy are:
1) A combination between two or more persons;
2) to do a criminal or an unlawful act or a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means;
3) an act done by one or more of the conspirators pursuant to the scheme and in
furtherance of the object;
4) which act results in damage to the plaintiff. (American Diamond Exchange, Inc. v.
Alpert, 101 Conn. App. 83, 99-100 (2007).

Defendants conducted a Breech of Contract (dated May 27th 2004), in accordance to:

107. § 52-576 Actions for account or on simple or implied contracts :

“No action for an account, or on any simple or implied contract, or on any contract in
writing, shall be brought but within six years after the right of action accrues . . .”

"[I]n analyzing whether a declaratory judgment action is barred by a particular statutory

period of limitations, a court must examine the underlying claim or right on which the
declaratory action is based." Wilson v. Kelley, 224 Conn. 110, 116 (1992).

As such, since the wrongful acts perpetrated by the defendants flowed out from the ‘contract’ the

appropriate statue of limitations period is the six-year statute for written contracts.

108. Anticipatory Breach of Contract

An action for anticipatory breach of contract requires proof that:
1) One party to a contract has repudiated his duty under the terms of the agreement;
2) before the time for performance has arrived;
3) causing damages to the non-repudiating party.(Seligson v. Brower, 109 Conn. App.
749, 755 n.5 (2008).

46
109. § 52-576 (a) Conversion - Conversion activity is applicable upon the ‘contract’ and the

LLC agreement. Whereby, plaintiff redounded upon the ‘contract’ with acts of conversion.

Thereby, to conduct unauthorized acts to deprive plaintiff of his rights to his property for an

indefinite time and embezzle funds; as:

“Conversion is some unauthorized act which deprives another of his property

permanently or for an indefinite time; some unauthorized assumption and exercise of the
powers of the owner to his harm. The essence of the wrong is that the property rights of
the plaintiff have been dealt with in a manner adverse to him, inconsistent with his right
of dominion and to his harm.” (Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291,
329 (2004).

110. Consequently, plaintiff can fulfill showing the criteria required for :

“The elements of civil theft are identical to the elements of conversion, with the exception
that civil theft requires an additional showing of intent.” (Sullivan v. Delisa, 101 Conn.
App. 605, 620, cert, denied, 283 Conn. 908 (2007)).

“To establish a cause of action for conversion, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:
1) “The defendant, without authorization;
2) assumed and exercised ownership over property belonging to another;
3) to the exclusion of the owner's rights.” (News America Marketing In-Store, Inc. v.
Marquis, 86 Conn. App. 527 (2004), aff'd, 276 Conn. 310 (2005).

“To establish a prima facie case of conversion, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that (1) the
material at issue belonged to the plaintiff, (2) that Marquis deprived the plaintiff of that
material for an indefinite period of time, (3) that Marquis' conduct was unauthorized and
(4) that Marquis' conduct harmed the plaintiff. (Discover Leasing, Inc. v. Murphy, 33
Conn. App. 303, 309, 635 A.2d 843 (1993)).

111. § 3.15-3 Tortious Interference with a Business Expectancy

47
 Whereby, plaintiff constantly and continuously acted in a chronic and extreme manner with

malicious interference with defendant’s ability to achieve reasonable business expectancies.

Such as when they interfered when he wanted to sell his property for four million dollars to an

outside buyer as was agreed in the contact. See Sportsmen's Boating Corp. v. Hensley, 192 Conn.

747, 753-54 (1984).

In order to prevail on a claim for intentional interference with a business relationship, a

plaintiff must prove the following elements:
1) A business relationship between the plaintiff and another party;
2) that the defendant intentionally interfered with that relationship while knowing of the
relationship's existence; and
3) actual loss as a result of the defendant's interference. Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-
Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20, 27 (2000).

112. Interference with Performance of Contract

“A claim for tortious interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to establish:
1) The existence of a contractual or beneficial relationship,
2) the defendant's knowledge of that relationship,
3) the defendant's intent to interfere with the relationship,
4) the interference was tortuous ; and
5) a loss suffered by the plaintiff that was caused by the defendant's tortious conduct.
Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 212-13 (2000).
.
“A plaintiff can prove that the defendant's conduct was in fact tortuous by showing "that
the defendant was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation or molestation ... or
that the defendant acted maliciously." (Blake v. Levy, 191 Conn. 257, 260-61 (1983).

113. § 3.12-1 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

48
Whereby, plaintiffs in a willful, and wanton manner engaged in misconduct to impose the

infliction of emotional distress upon plaintiff. This was with outrageous misbehavior that

exceeds all the bounds usually tolerated by decent society. In fact, the plaintiffs’ misconduct has

been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

Whereby, with showing that they had no moral compass to deviate from conduct dedicated to

drive defendant into an early grave, to be redounded for their financial enrichment

“Whether a defendant's conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme

and outrageous and whether the plaintiff's distress is sufficient to satisfy the requirement
of severe emotional distress are initially questions for the court to determine. Only where
reasonable minds could differ do they become issues for the jury.” Bell v. Board of
Education, 55 Conn. App. 400, 409-10 (1999).

“To prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove
four elements:
1) That the actor intended to inflict emotional distress; or that he knew or should have
known that emotional distress was a likely result of his conduct;
2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous;
3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause the plaintiff's distress; and
4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe. DeLaurentis v. New
Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 266-67 (1991). Statute of Limitations

“Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds
"all bounds usually tolerated by decent society ... ." (Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 254,
n.5 (1986). "Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to

49
 be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the
case is one in which the recitation of facts to an average member of the community would
arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous" (Carrol v.
Allstate Ins., 262 Conn. 433, 443 (2003).

114. § 3.13-8 Abuse of Process

Whereby, plaintiffs’ outrageous misuse of the courts and the perversion of the judicial process
leads defendant to seek to recovery for the damages caused from plaintiffs’ abuse of process.
Under our law, a person commits an abuse of process when (he/she) uses a legal process against
another person primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed. In light of this
definition, defendant can readily prove two essential elements by an overwhelming
preponderance of the evidence to verify a Herculean abuse of process.

“An action for abuse of process lies against any person who:
1) Uses a legal process against another;
2) in an improper manner or to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed.
Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 494 (1987).

“Unlike actions for malicious prosecution or vexatious litigation, the action for abuse of
process does not require proof of:
1) the termination of the original proceeding;
2) the lack of probable cause, or;
3) malice.”(Shaeffer v. O.K. Tool Co., 110 Conn. 528 (1930).

115. § 3.9-22 Private Nuisance - Injury to Property

Whereby, defendant has been profoundly injured by defendants’ misconduct with being a private

nuisance. This was perpetrated as unbridled conduct, which was neither checked by law or

human decency, dedicated to interference with the defendant’s use and enjoyment of (his/her)
50
property. The conduct was of a malicious nature to terrorize plaintiff so he would vacate his

property and intimidate him to agree to selling his property to defendants at a fraction of its value

TORTIOUS ACTS UNDER STATE PENAL LAW

116. § 17b-450f Elder Abuse occurred by plaintiffs’ willful infliction of financial injury and

mental anguish upon plaintiff, an elderly person of 79 years over the last five years. This was

enthusiastically conducted in a pervasive pattern harassment, coercion and threatening to achieve

his exploitation for their monetary gain. In effect, defendants utilized defendants’ frail health and

chronic life threating condition to their strategic advantage. This is where plaintiffs’ have

engaged in a ruthless campaign of pressuring the defendant to capitulate to their demands.

Thereby, plaintiffs’ activities are dedicated to achieve their goal that defendant willfully allow

them to cheat him out of most of the equity in his property; albeit achieved through criminal

conduct.

117. § 53a-139. Forgery in the second degree (Class D Felony, 4 acts). (a) A person is

guilty of forgery in the second degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he

falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument or issues or possesses any written

instrument which he knows to be forged, which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to

become or represent if completed: (1) A deed, will, codicil, contract, assignment, commercial

instrument or other instrument which does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate or

otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation or status; or (2) a public record or an instrument

filed or required or authorized by law to be filed in or with a public office or public servant;

51
118. § 52-552 Fraudulent Conveyance of Property (2 acts) occurred on two falsified

‘Quit-Claims’; dated April 22, 2004 and November 3, 2004… that were known to exist by

plaintiff, but were filed by p-defendants with the County Clerk on April 27, 2004 and November

10, 2004. Yet, without the authorization and knowledge of the defendant, at best they tricked him

to sign additional papers. Their existence was without his caretaker’s knowledge; who had

accompanied the defendant to the business meetings whose sure she would have identified.

“To prove constructive fraud, for purpose showing a fraudulent conveyance, a plaintiff

must show that the conveyance was made without substantial consideration and that

the conveyance rendered the transferor unable to meet an obligation to the plaintiff.

(Gaudio v. Guadio (1990) 580 A.2d 1212, 23 Conn. App. 287, certification denied 584

A.2d 471, 217 Conn, 803)

119. In fact, defendant only first learned that the tile of his property was transferred to the

LC’s in the middle of October 2009. The reason to explain this is because he relied on all of his

four lawyers to perform due-diligence to establish his legal position. Whereby, the circumstances

and evidence validates that these lawyers were working for the opposition. Even though by first

glance of the case gives a foregone conclusion of bribery. Insomuch as, Demetrois Aldamis,

Donald M. Brown, Abrim Heisler and Mark Katz’s representation was with intentional gross

negligence and professional misconduct. In effect, defendant’s own lawyers willfully and

wantonly acted to deprive defendant from benefiting from his legal opportunities to prevail.

120. Accordingly, defendant has absolutely no recollection of ever signing anything except

documents represented by plaintiff as corresponding to refinancing and a loan. (In addition,

52
plaintiff was accompanied by his care taker who witnessed all the business meetings and

signings. Thus, she certainly would have taken notice if at any time it was mentioned that

plaintiff was to willfully transfer title from his possession). This was for two $20,000 loans he

was to receive that were transferred into mortgages on his property. The refinancing was for a

new mortgage for the LC’s to get the rate reduced from approximately 8.5% to less than 5%.

As the circumstances is according to what the second circuit court says:

“Actual fraudulent intent, as required to support liability in fraudulent

conveyance action, under both New York and Connecticut law, may be inferred
from the circumstances surrounding the transaction, including the relationship
among the parties and the secrecy, haste, or unusual nature of the transaction.
(National Council on Compensation Ins., Inc. v. Caro & Graifman, P.C.,
D.Conn.2003, 259 F.Supp.2d 172).

121. Whereby, Philips either tricked plaintiff to sign the conveyance of tile to the

defendants, or the words ‘quit-claim’ were inserted thereafter, or plaintiff’s signature was the

product of forgery. Essentially this was where plaintiff transferred his ownership to the LCCs.

Whereby, the LLCs were owned: 25% by Pecunies, 25% by Watson, while the defendant owns

the other 50%.

122. However, the 50% ownership by Pecunies and Watson was promised to plaintiff was

only to be temporary, until refinancing was achieved and then defendant would own 100%. Since

Pecunies explained to the defendant it was for the one purpose for him and Watson to get to get

the lowest rate possible from their AAA credit than if plaintiff’s credit considered.

53
123. Consequently, on the basis of the oral bargain the defendant agreed before assigning

the 50% to Pecunies and Watson was under a false pretext. This was that as soon as the new

mortgage was granted the ownership in the LLCs’ would be changed to him owning 100%.

However, when plaintiff asked Pecunies and Watson for assignment of 100% as promised right

after the refinancing was done in 2007 (exh ), yet they both outright refused. Consequently,

plaintiff then realized he was dealing with immoral and dishonest individuals who were out to

cheat him by exploiting the good faith he extended to them.

124. § 53a -122 – Larceny in the first degree: (Class B felony) – defendants obtained funds

belonging to plaintiff in excess of $600,000.00 with criminal conduct, as is defined in section

53a-119: with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a

third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner as by :

(1) Embezzlement – Defendants wrongfully appropriated to themselves property of

plaintiff while it was in their care or custody. In effect, the amount of revenue

misappropriated to Pecunies and Watson’s personal benefit from rental revenue they

collected. Specifically, that was in excess of what was directed to paying the note of $4,

monthly, taxes of $5, annually

(2) Obtaining property by false pretenses – Plaintiffs obtained and maintained

control of defendant’s property by false pretenses when, by any false token, pretense or

device, they obtained from defendant his property, with intent to defraud him.

54
 (3) Obtaining property by false promise – Plaintiff obtained defendants real estate

property and funds from it by false promises when, pursuant to a scheme to defraud, they

obtained property of defendants by means of a purchase contract, that Pecunies and

Watson would buy or sell defendant’s real estate in two years. Yet, they did not intend to

buy the property or allow it sale, as their noncompliance is verifiable as willful act of

exercising bad faith.

(5) Extortion –Plaintiff constructively blocked defendant from selling his property

unless they receive appreciably more than half of its equity for them to allow its sale.

Since they have maintained control of defendant’s real estate property through extortion

by means of instilling in him a fear of economic loss that (B) cause damage to property;

or (C) engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or (G) testify or provide information

or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or

(H) use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act within or related

to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner

as to affect some person adversely; or (I) inflict any other harm which would not benefit

the actor.

125. § 53a-122, 53a-119 (5) (b) and 53a-49 – Attempt to commit larceny in the first

degree – Plaintiff attempted to commit crimes with the kind of mental state required for

commission of the crime. Whereby at this time the records of the court verifies that the intention

of’ plaintiff is to deprive defendants of about a million dollars upon the sale of his property, by

55
misappropriating this money for themselves. Since plaintiffs are actively pursuing this by

engaging in prohibited conduct as is defined in 53a-49 (2) : by intentionally does or omits to do

anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission

constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of

the crime; (5) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are

specially designed for such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under

the circumstances; (6) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the

commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such

possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the

circumstances; (7) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of

the crime.

126. Attempted larceny was perpetrated by the defendants by:

a) intent to make available as preapproved the addition extended credit.

This in the form of an open-ended mortgage that cannot be justified by any innocent

explanations since the interest rate was usury at 11½ %, as opposed to the 5% rate that was

obtainable at the time--since the property was able to generate $10,000 in revenue per month and

its value was about 3 to 4 million.

b). intent to collect half of the revenue produced after they sold the

property.

c). intent to collect additional rents beyond the $ they collected

that was agreed to go to defendant as stated below in no. 4.

56
127. § 53a-51 –Conspiracy: (class B felony) – Plaintiff acted in consort with the intent of

committing overt acts constituting crimes that would further their goals of defrauding defendant.

128. § 53a-62 – Threatening in the First Degree : (Class D Felony) –Anthony Carmardello

and Robert E. Kailin threatened defendant in accordance with (2) of this statue - threats to

commit any violent crime, intended to terrorize another, to cause evacuation of a building, . . ,

and (3) threats to commit such crimes, made in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such

terror or inconvenience.

129. § 53a-183 – Harassment in the Second Degree : (Class C misdemeanor) –Defendants

Anthony Carmardello, Donald M. Brown, Mark Katz, and Robert E. Kailin acted: 2) with intent

to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he communicates with a person by mail, and or (3)

made a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, in a manner likely to cause

annoyance or alarm.

130. § 53a-147 – Bribery: (Class C felony) (a) A person is guilty of bribery if he promises,
offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a public servant or a person selected to be a
public servant, any benefit as consideration for the recipient's decision, opinion,
recommendation or vote as a public servant or a person selected to be a public servant.
Whereby, the official action of Judge Jack Grogins refusing to allow plaintiff to testify
during the course of a hearing to vacate a stipulation was not only not justified to the
circumstances, but was averse to the required performance of his official duty.

131. § 53a-149 – Bribery of a witness: (Class C felony) – (a) A person is guilty of bribery
of a witness if he offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a witness any benefit to

57
 influence the testimony or conduct of such witness in, or in relation to, an official
proceeding.

132. 53a-151 – Tampering with a witness: (Class C felony) – (a) A person is guilty of
tampering with a witness if, believing that an official proceeding is pending or about to
be instituted, he induces or attempts to induce a witness to testify falsely, withhold
testimony, elude legal process summoning him to testify or absent himself from any
official proceeding.

133. § 53a-155 – Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence: (Class D felony) – (a)
A person is guilty of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence if, believing that an
official proceeding is pending, or about to be instituted, he: (1) Alters, destroys, conceals
or removes any record, document or thing with purpose to impair its verity or availability
in such proceeding; or (2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing
knowing it to be false and with purpose to mislead a public servant who is or may be
engaged in such official proceeding.

134. § 53a-156 – Perjury: (Class D felony) – (a) A person is guilty of perjury if, in any
official proceeding, he intentionally, under oath, makes a false statement, swears, affirms
or testifies falsely, to a material statement which he does not believe to be true

135. § 53a-157b – False statement in the second degree: (Class A misdemeanor) – (a) A
person is guilty of false statement in the second degree when he intentionally makes a
false written statement under oath or pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by
law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable, which he does not
believe to be true and which statement is intended to mislead a public servant in the
performance of his official function

136. § 53a-166 – Hindering prosecution in the second degree: (Class C felony) – (a) A
person is guilty of hindering prosecution in the second degree when such person renders
criminal assistance to another person who has committed a class A or class B felony or an

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 unclassified felony for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for more than ten
years.

137. § 53a-167 – Hindering prosecution in the third degree: (Class D felony) – (a) A
person is guilty of hindering prosecution in the third degree when such person renders
criminal assistance to another person who has committed a class C or class D felony or an
unclassified felony for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for ten years or less
but more than one year

138. § 53a-180c – Falsely reporting an incident in the second degree: (Class A

misdemeanor) – (a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the second
degree when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or
baseless, such person gratuitously reports to a law enforcement officer or agency (1) the
alleged occurrence of an offense or incident which did not in fact occur, (2) an allegedly
impending occurrence of an offense or incident which in fact is not about to occur, or (3)
false information relating to an actual offense or incident or to the alleged implication of
some person therein.

139. Whereby, on December 15, 2009, Kaelin testified that his clients called the police to

report plaintiff had entered the building on 1353 on his property by breaking and entering. When

in fact plaintiff entered with his key and had a lawful right to enter and occupy the premises.

This was during the course of a proceeding in Norwalk Housing Court where the LLCs are

petitioning to evict plaintiff from his place of domicile of 44 years

140. § 53a-192 – Coercion: (Class A misdemeanor or class D felony) – (a) A person is guilty
of coercion when he compels or induces another person to engage in conduct which such
other person has a legal right to abstain from engaging in, or to abstain from engaging in
conduct in which such other person has a legal right to engage, by means of instilling in
such other person a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the actor or another

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 will: (1) Commit any criminal offense; or (2) accuse any person of a criminal offense; or
(4) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action.

141. § 53a-28a – Enforcement of orders of financial restitution – All financial obligations

ordered pursuant to subsection (c) of section 53a-28 may be enforced in the same manner
as a judgment in a civil action by the party or entity to whom the obligation is owed.
Such obligations may be enforced at any time during the ten-year period following the
offender's release from confinement or within ten years of the entry of the order and
sentence, whichever is longer.

Whereby, the determination of the law enforcement agencies after having received all the

relevant documents was that nothing that the defendants did was criminal; rather they stated the

complained wrongdoings were of a civil matter. Thus, plaintiffs deprived defendant of the option

of financial restitution set forth in this statue.

VIOLATIONS UNDER FEDERAL PENAL LAW

142. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 - Bank Fraud (2acts) occurred on November 17th. This is where

defendants fraudulently misappropriated $360,000.00 was and retained for their own use and

benefit. As this distribution is verified by according to Steven Philips own accounting $125,000,

Pecunies, $125,000.000 Watson and $113 to Seven Philips under the color of being corporate

funds that he is in charge of as is in accordance to his position of the trustee for the LLC’s.

143. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) - Extortion and racketeering (b) (2) - extortion obtaining

property from another with his consent induced, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened

force fear.. or under the color of official right.

"The purpose of the Racketeering Act . . . is to eliminate the infiltration and illegal

acquisition of legitimate economic enterprise by racketeering practices and the use of

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 legal and illegal enterprises to further criminal activities." (New Mexico v Andy Rael,

Op. no. 1999-NMCA-068)

144. Whereby, plaintiffs acted in conspiracy to further the common goal of restraining

defendant from the ability to benefit from a market value return from the equity in his property.

This is through malicious conduct of interference and illegitimately imposing their control and

pecuniary involvement to benefit by fraudulent claims of right, based on agreements, contracts

the and misuse of the State Courts. This was vigorously perpetrated with activities to affect an

illegal restraint with trade by plaintiffs interfering with free competition in business with his

property and its commercial transactions.

145. 18 U.S.C. § 2 - Monopolizing Trade ;

“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine

or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States… shall be deemed guilty of a
felony.”

146. Whereby, the plaintiffs without any legitimate business justification have imposed their

dominance to maintain a monopoly position to control the sale of defendant’s property. This was

achieved over the last 3½ years, through methods constituting a “coercive monopoly,” made

possible by the collusion of defendants’ lawyers. In fact, all of the plaintiffs’ claim of right is

bogus and is fraudulently based on the existence of the LCCs . . . that came about through a

breeched contractual agreement to buy or sell defendant’s property by May 2006; and the

subsequent intended sale of the property involves interstate commerce.

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147. Essentially, the offended conduct of plaintiffs is in a conspiracy under the auspices of the

LCCs’ for the furtherance of the LLCs’ intent of establishment to create interference with trade.

Specifically, this interference is where the agenda of the LLCs’ existence is applied as a

constructive trust to impose a restraint in defendants’ ability to sell his own property.

148. This is where the contractual agreement between opposing parties had set up the LCCs

as a 50-50 partnership, which is in effect a trust corpus exploited to act in bad faith of the

‘contract.’ Thereby, to undermine, block, and usurp defendant from exercising his rights,

privileges and desire to sell his property himself on the “open market” independent of their

dreaded involvement. This would be in accordance to defendant’s independent will and

legitimate rights to engage in trade unfettered by the plaintiffs’ dominance and exclusive control

under the color of the LLCs.

149. Yet, even if the best light scenario was considered on the face of the LLCs being 50-50

owned between parties, such as ‘e.g.’ if there was equal investment. Still plaintiffs conduct with

the shutting out defendant from having any say or involvement with the sale of his property, or

administration thereof, is in violation of our guaranteed rights to the equity we own.

150. Not to mention, plaintiffs conduct is averse to the principals of corporate and contract

law. Since they require defendant must be adjoined in any decision made. Whereby, mutual

consent is required for any decisions concerning any property equally owned by two parties.

However, the ongoing and present situation of the 50-50 partnership is where plaintiffs’ act

independent of defendant’s expressed interests of what he wants. In fact, once defendant signed

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as a member of the LCCs, no other inclusion ever occurred, neither was he sent the filed reports,

only fist seeing them in January 2010. In fact it can be said that all the conduct of plaintiff

with doing business with defendant is averse to the laws of the land.

151. Consequently, it appears all of plaintiffs’ activities under the auspices of the ‘contract’

and in the name of the LCCs, is to force defendant to yield their evil and malicious intentions.

Since through extortionist conduct, they have clearly defined their intentions to extract the lion’s

share of the equity out of defendant’s property. Such as, to illegitimately receive proceeds from

the sale from the defendant’s property. This is from by having positioned themselves to maintain

total control of its ability to be the only privileged party to collect rents-even if they are not

applying it to the property debts as contractual agreed under the contract. Essentially, plaintiffs’

act with perverting the law as artifice to exploit for extortion and to control its sale as if they

were the rightful owners.

152. Thereafter its sale, it is a material fact of record that they intend to misappropriate to

themselves half of the revenue the property produces upon its sale through fraud and deceit. (Not

to mention they are in a position to impose a sale with a kickback to themselves if they so desire;

and are paying off one of their conspirators with a real estate commission at plaintiff’s expense).

153. In effect, the plaintiff’s, under the color of the existence of the LCCs refer to this as the

basis for them to usurp plaintiff’s rights and powers to control his own property. Whereby,

Pecunies and all four of defendant’s lawyers gave false declarations to harm his legal position

and fraudulently support the case of his opposition. This is verified by the record of the Norwalk

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Court. Where everyone except plaintiff played fast and loose with the truth. Such as saying p-

defendant promised for in return for plaintiff saving property from foreclosure was that after the

property was sold they would be entitled to half of what it could be sold for. Thereby plaintiff

would have half of the equity created upon the sale of his property in return for their

involvement.

154. § 5 Federal Trade Commission Act – “Unfair methods of competition is outlawed,”

(but does not define unfair, restraint in trade, or monopoly). The Supreme Court ruled violations

of the Sherman Act are violations of Section 5 of FTC laws. This is under:

Title 15, Chapter 2, subchapter 1, §45 ;

“Unfair methods of competition that is unlawful ;

(a) Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices;

(2) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons,

partnerships, or corporations, . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or

affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”

“An act or practice is deceptive if it involves a representation, omission, or practice that is

likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and the
representation, omission, or practice is material.” (Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C.
110, 164-65 (1984); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Minuteman Press, 53 F. Supp. 2d 248,
258 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).

155. Whereby, the plaintiffs conducted a “coercive monopoly” to prohibit defendant

from selling his property independent of their fiduciary involvement (which was self-dealing).

This is with “unfair methods of competition [and] with unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” in

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or affecting [interstate] commerce. Consequently according to this law, their business conduct as

persons, the ‘contract,’ and the LLCs as a functioning corporation, engaged in conduct that

egregiously violates the antitrust laws.

156. Plaintiffs acted in a systematic manner to unlawfully monopolize defendant’s approach to

the real estate market to require they get a share of any money he receives that they arbitrarily

determine. Essentially, they ran roughshod over the principals of fair play and the laws

protecting his rights. Thereby, to force defendant’s compliance to their demands, they used

tactics of harassment, threats, and intimidation. Although, the greatest pressure that plaintiffs’

are bringing to bear on plaintiff is with abusing the authority of the LLCs to make him homeless

and destitute. Since, plaintiff violated the agreement made before the contract that defendant

could live off the $2,600.00 monthly revenue from collected rents. This is where plaintiffs

would receive $6,700.00 monthly rents to pay of the properties debts (mostly embezzled) and

plaintiff could collect the rest. Yet, they forced these tenants who were paying rent to defendant

to quit in April 2009, by imposing such a demand; yet this was with defendant’s primary income.

157. Insomuch as under the Sherman Act, the prohibited activities perpetrated by plaintiffs

was with material misconduct executed by “persons, partnerships, and corporations.” This is

where defendants utilized these afore stated entities to carry out unfair methods of competition,

in or affecting commerce to cause defendant to sustain injury. Whereby, the plaintiffs

acted in consort to defraud defendant, by applying a palpable degree of deceitful conduct and

with unconscionable business practices to coerce his compliance.

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158. In effect, the prohibited activities of plaintiffs’ were dedicated to ensure they financially

benefited from when defendant’s property was sold. Thus, through racketeering activities they

acted to guarantee they would share in his financial windfall. This was acted out in a scheme to

deprive plaintiff of exercising the option to sell his property independent of defendants control

and involvement. Most noteworthy is that Pecunies laid bare his intentions in 2008 to cheat

plaintiff. This is when he testified on the Norwalk court record and said: “And after everything is

paid off on the property, I believe Mr. Zannete will walk away with approximately a million

dollars for his interest.”

159. This purposed one million compensation to defendant for his property is in sharp contrast

to the amount he would have received if not but for his signing the ‘contract’; and the subsequent

imposed control of the LLC’s. (This is with considering the property’s production of $9,000.00

monthly rental revenue applied towards covering the property’s debts from May 2004, instead of

going into plaintiffs’ bottomless pockets). Insomuch as the four million sale in 2006 was

interfered by the LLCs without any legitimate justification. Consequently, defendant would have

netted about three million without defendants’ involvement, based on a deviously deigned sales

agreement composed with ill intent.

160. Not to mention, the purposed sale of defendant’s property through the ‘contract’ and the

LLCs produced absolutely no benefit for defendant whatsoever, only creating emotional distress.

Since the ‘contract’ was presented by the plaintiffs in bad faith to gain an unfair advantage to

exploit and mistreat defendant. Thereby, through the ‘contract’s’ creation of the LLCs, it was

applied as an artifice to a scheme to impose financial losses upon defendant. Thereafter, the lost

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revenue of defendant could then be directed towards plaintiffs’ benefit and agenda to obtain ill-

gotten financial enrichment at defendant’s expense. This appears to be by any means possible;

even with driving him to an early grave where he would not be able to contest their fraudulent

claims.

161. Wherefore, defendant was maliciously injured by plaintiffs’ violation of antitrust laws.

Specifically, by their outrageous misuse and intentional perversion of the ‘contract,’ presented

as a purchase agreement, and their activities in the operation of the corporation LCCs. Whereby,

as persons they acted as empowered by right under the color of the existence of the “contract’

and the LLCs as corporations. This is with their abuse to establish the basis for defendants’

dominion over defendant’s right to sell his property and privilege to benefit from its potential

equity, such as its rental income.

162. In effect, plaintiff’s control and interference is contributed to their material misconduct

with constructive fraud and extortion . . . that was intended to create a coercive monopoly and

restrain plaintiff from benefiting from selling his property in the open marketplace.

THE CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE

163. Whereby, defendants can state and validate facts to establish :

“(i) the existence of an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce; (ii) that

Plaintiff were employed by or associated with the enterprise; (iii) that the plaintiff

participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct or the affairs of the enterprise; and (iv)

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 that defendants participated through a pattern of racketeering activity with numerous

racketeering acts. (Sedima, S.P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).

164. In accordance to §1961(4), the LLCs’ can be defined as a RICO ‘enterprise’ and all the

defendants are involved with the LLCs as associated in fact. Outside of plaintiff having 50%

ownership in the LLCs, he has been completely shut out from having any say or involvement in

all of its business. Rather, the LLCs’ affairs and activities have been under the total purview of

the defendants. In effect, the LLCs from its conception has existed as essentially plaintiffs’

color of right to empower them with the authority (albeit bogus) to dominate over defendant’s

and trump his expressed interests and wants.

165. The fact history with the circumstances and evidence indicates the defendants function

as a continuing unit; and that the LLC’s are utilized as their platform. Thereby, the LLCs’

existence has cloaked the defendants with an appearance of legitimacy. Since the activities of the

defendants in doing business with defendant in the name of the LLCs is with conducting a

criminal enterprise.

166. Essentially, the existence of the LLCs is what plaintiffs’ utilize as a “structure” to base

their operations upon that is a separate entity apart from their pattern of criminal activity.

Essentially, the LLCs are a façade of legitimacy, fabricated with bad faith intentions from fraud

and deceit. Consequently, plaintiffs’ in the name of the LLCs perpetrated criminal acts,

constituting a pattern of racketeering activity. Since the activity by plaintiffs in the name of the

LLCs involved similar purposes, results, participants and targeted defendant as its victim.

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167. In effect, the plaintiff actions to support the agenda of the enterprise involved deception

and an extortion scheme perpetrated against defendant. This is where plaintiffs’ continued to use

wrongful threats and some members acted surreptitiously to support the interests of the

enterprise. Not to mention, deceit was material to the success of the conspiracy. Consequently,

the result of all of the acts of misconduct by the defendants is that through intimidation, for over

five years, they have extorted defendant out of exercising and benefiting from the rights to his

property. As the predicate acts plaintiffs perpetrated conspiracy to further the extortion involve

theft, bribery and various types of fraud done in a palpable and pervasive pattern.

168. Consequently, the LLCs can be viewed as an enterprise that is associated with all of the

defendants’ actions. Essentially, the LLCs’ exists with an established hierarchical structure, as

where the plaintiffs maintain a role of authority. This is where the plaintiffs can be assumed to

have the authority for decision-making and controlling and directing group affairs on what

performance is expected from Pecunies and Watson.

169. Thus, the overall relationship of a criminal conspiracy exists and their collective actions

constitutes an ongoing organization which had organized framework for making decisions and

overseeing and coordinating the commission of various predicate offenses. Furthermore, the

wrongful activities in the name of LLCs have existed as an ongoing and continuous basis rather

than ad hoc basis. (See Ricobene, 709 F.2d at 222).

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170. The prohibited activities, set forth by §1962, is where plaintiff conspired in a criminal

conspiracy in violation of §1962. Insomuch as they unlawfully received income derived directly,

or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity to steal from defendant. This is where they

redirected funds that defendant was legally entitled to receive for their own use and benefit; such

as from the rental revenue generated by defendants property. Since the plaintiffs utilized the

LLCs as an enterprise to unlawfully demanded rent from the tenants in a pattern of racketeering.

Specifically the most obscene instance is where they boldly interfered even without the slightest

justification they could refer to in a constructive context of right. In a nutshell, the indictable

criminal activities of a RICO nature, perpetrated by defendants are brazen acts of antitrust,

extortion, embezzlement, and bank fraud.

171. 18 U.S.C. §1014 - making false statements on loan applications

172. 18 U.S.C § 2 Principals Plaintiff is in a conspiracy that according to committed

offenses against the laws of the United States Criminal Code. This is where they acted in concert

to further the goals of the conspiracy by aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, to induce or

procure its commission. Furthermore, all of the plaintiff willfully and intentionally caused the

criminal acts produced by the conspiracy to be done. Consequently all participants perpetrating

wrongful acts in furtherance of the goals of the conspiracy are punishable as the principal

wrongdoers.

173. Defendant is complaining of plaintiffs’ "racketeering activity", as defined in section

1961 (l) and in the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951); where they acted in a conspiracy to further the

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plaintiffs activities of deception, extortion and terrorization. This is by plaintiffs usurping

defendant’s rights and powers to his property, under the color of law and right, as:

"Generally under section 1961 (1) racketeering activity consist of no more or less than

the commission of a predicate act." (Selma, SPRL v Imrex Co., Inc, 473 U.S. 479,495

[1985]).

174. Plaintiff, has harmed defendant by their engaging in a criminal enterprise through

“racketeering activity” to violate § 1961 (1) (A). Whereas, their activities constituted crimes of

attempted robbery and attempted extortion and consummated acts of robbery and extortion.

Moreover, defendants committed specific penal violations under § 1961 (1) (B) of Title 18 of the

U.S. Code that are listed below…and with consideration of the circumstances and the evidence

can be considered as indictable:

175. According to plaintiff’s own accounting Philips received $103,000 under the pretext of

being a trustee that was unlawfully debited upon defendant and to date is applied to his use and

benefit. (exh ) Consequently, this can be concluded that it was to influenced Philips to commit

fraudulent notarization on the authenticity of instruments that he had to have known were

fraudulent, This was where he applied official acts of being a notary to aid in committing, or

collude in, or allow, or make opportunity for the commission of a fraud, on the United States; via

the County clerk who participated with exercising her official duty. This was manifested by

accepting the filling of the fraudulent quit claims and derivative lean on plaintiff’s property.

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176. Whereby, through a scheme to defraud the defendants obtained funds "under the

custody or control of" a bank that were debited upon plaintiff on or about November 17, 2004.

This was achieved by defendant authorizing release of funds from a bank to cover refinancing

with a new mortgage. Yet, plaintiffs violated this authorization and took $380,000 more for their

own use and benefit; plus they opened a line of credit of another $520,000.00 by putting a 2

million lean on defendants property. To wit now the $520,000.000 line of credit is now

exhausted by P&G’s neglect to apply the approximately $6,700.00 monthly rental revenue they

collected that they directed into their own pockets.

177. Thereafter, in April 2009, the LLCs sent notice to the tenants on the property to quit

paying rent to plaintiffs and to direct the payments to them (exh. ). Consequently, all of these

tenants were intimidated to immediately quit paying their rent to plaintiff that I was collecting a

total of $3,600. Thereby this malicious act cut of his major source of income that he was

dependent upon to meet his cost of living expenses; as he has no savings and is now deeply in

debt.

178. Thereby, perpetrating two acts of fraud involving bank fraud by their unlawful securing

and profiting from an open-end mortgage they secured in 2004. Although the open end total

amount of approximately $900,000.00 was not drawn upon, they clandestinely stole $380,000.00

of the excess cash generated from their refinancing the mortgage. Since the plaintiffs

misrepresented to defendant that the refinancing that they had him authorize was only to obtain a

lower mortgage rate. Insomuch as duped defendant into believing that his authorizing the

refinancing and the setting up of the LLCs was only for that purpose.

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179. Whereby, the open-end mortgage that the plaintiffs obtained is a security instrument,

subject to being traded, not the type of note corresponding to a common mortgage. This loan was

absolutely not authorized by plaintiff, rather defendant was duped to cooperate with signing the

documents they wanted under the falsehood it was to reduce the mortgage rate from 8½ % to

below 5%. However, they obtained a usury rate of 11 ½ %, established a note that is as a deed

trust and a derivative that leveraged $2,000.000 on plaintiff property.

180. Wherefore, plaintiffs’ exploited the LLCs as an enterprise for the commission of the

stated embezzlement, which involved interstate commerce. This is by the financial institution of

M&T Real Trust, located in Buffalo New York, requiring a wire transfer of funds between states.

Whereas according to statues, plaintiffs embezzlement on face constitutes wire and mail fraud in

violation of RICO.

181. The hundreds in thousands in rents that plaintiffs collected did not go towards paying

the mortgage as was agreed instead this money was mostly embezzled by them. Consequently,

the $520,000 balance was applied from the open-end credit in lieu of mortgage payments for the

property to now be in default and foreclosure. In addition, it can be concluded that these ill-

gotten funds plaintiffs obtained from the mortgage derivative and rental revenue were applied to

maintain their RICO enterprise. Since, these were funds that directly or indirectly, could be used

to maintain their interest and control of the enterprise; such as with the court costs in housing

court and compensating the participating lawyers.

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 “Defendants RICO liability is predicated on activity found to be "extortion" by causation
of fear which prevented plaintiff from exercising his property rights, such as right to
make business decisions free from wrongfully imposed outside pressures is violation of
18 USCS § 1951. (Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v McMonagle (1988, ED Pa) 689 F
Supp 465.

182. In fact, defendant was routinely subjected to mental dominance and emotional abuse by

his lawyer, defendant, Donald Brown. Brown’s mistreatment of plaintiff constituted elder abuse,

since he shamelessly bullied defendant to coerce compliance to his demands. Such as when

Brown would dictate to defendant what he has to do, say or sign something he frequently would

scream ‘fuc*ing’ profanities to coerce defendant’s compliance to his demands through his own

will, averse to defendants expressed volition.

183. Shamelessly, defendant’s lawyer, Donald Brown, bullied and exploited his

vulnerability to be easily subjected to comply with coercion to force compliance. This was by his

dominating his will to eventually overpower the weak and timid mind of plaintiff. Thereby,

Brown routinely pressured defendant into arbitrary compliance, such as with coercing him to

sign the stipulation by unrelentingly badgering him until he complied. Moreover, Brown

misrepresented to defendant that it was of importune necessity and urgency he sign the

stipulation, by saying: “if you don’t agree to the stipulation and settle they would be able to suck

out all the equity out of his property and you will lose everything.” Thus, defendant was tricked

to have feared that if he did not comply with the demands of his lawyer to sign the stipulation

this would cause him to endure a devastating economic disaster as a result.

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184. Plaintiffs were outrageously cruel in the manner they mistreated plaintiff to achieve

their goal of illegitimately taking over defendant’s property and terrorize him to cause a

premature death. Since, defendant’s early death would clearly support the evil designs

defendants have implemented as a scheme and artifices to extort plaintiff.

185. This was done in a palpable and pervasive pattern of dishonesty, sustained by a myriad

of fraudulent misrepresentations including falsified instruments of the court. Consequently, it is

clear that plaintiffs are engaged in a criminal enterprise where each conspirator carried out

specific acts in its furtherance. This was with acts of collusion of defendants, own lawyers with

plaintiff’s lawyers for fraud upon the court. Since all the lawyers performed the important steps

in execution to guarantee the materialization of plaintiffs’ criminal objectives. Thus, their

conduct verifies the existence of a conspiracy engaged in an enterprise to deprive the defendant

out of the rights to his property. The issue of fraud upon the court has been determined as a

matter of law by the 10th and 7th Circuit Courts that say:

“Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court,

he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court. . . Fraud upon the court is fraud which is

directed to the judicial machinery itself. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted

or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial

function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted."

(Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985)). . . [It] embrace(s) that

species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated

by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can’t perform in the usual manner

its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication a decision

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 produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes

final.” (Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968)).

186. At the time of November 3rd 2004, Philips tricked defendant into signing on to the

second quit-claim on the fraudulent pretext it was paperwork for a $20,000.00 loan. Thereafter,

Philips signed onto this instrument in his official capacity as Stephan G. Philips, Commissioner

of the Superior Court, Fairfield County, Connecticut (exh,). This quit claim accompanied other

instruments filed with the County Clerk, misrepresented to defendant to be for refinancing of an

approximately one million mortgage on his two properties. This is where the two properties had

a combined mortgages believed to be somewhere around 8½% and the two mortgage notes

placed a constructive lean of about a million dollars.

187. Yet, the new mortgaged plaintiffs filed with the county clerk along with the second

quit-claim transformed the mortgage on the two properties to be 11½% and imposed

$2,000,000.00 lean. It is comical that years later when plaintiff was told by a real estate friend

that there was a two million dollar lean on his property, and had subsequently asked Phillips

about it, he said: “it was placed on the property for our own protection.

188. This can be verified as a material fact by his health-aid Joanne Gramacy. Since she was

present and a witness to the material fact that plaintiff was tricked by sham loans to unknowingly

sign away title to his properties. This is for four acres in Greenwich, surrounded by mansions

that are each worth well over a million.

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189. Consequently, a forensic appraisal of November 2004 is expected to verify that plaintiff

could have netted $3,000,000.000 on the open market for what he signed over for $40,000.00 in

exchange. This is where Johanna’s presence is verifiable on the April 21st signing onto the quit-

claim as a witness to the $20,000.00 mortgage.

190. Yet, Joanne Gramacy was deceived on the November 3rd signing of the quit claim.

Since she was present to be a witness to what she was always against plaintiff singing anything

whatsoever with Pecunies, Watson and Philips. . . that it was a meeting for defendant’s

personal loan and refinancing, and certainly not for defendant to transfer away ownership of his

property without him receiving anything in return. This signing occurred in the Mercedes Benz

office in Greenwich with ‘QUIT CLAIM DEED’ written in bold type, and signed “in the

presence of:” and witness to John L Cox (account for Mercedes Benz of Greenwich and Lauren

Cositore, alleged to be an employee of the same Mercedes Benz dealership). Consequently, it is

reasonable to consider the possibility that QUIT CLAIM was added after plaintiff signed the

instrument, especially since plaintiff was accompanied by his companion

191. In addition, Phillips identified himself on a document that was a proposed instrument of

an accounting that he had received $103,000 under the color of being the Trustee of the LCC’s

(exh.). Yet, in actuality Philips was a trustee de son tort, since Del is lawfully 50% owner of the

two LCC’s that Philips is the trustee and the LCC never had one meeting. Thus Del along with

the other principals was required to appoint any new member and the assigning Philips as a

trustee would not be legal, due to conflict of interest rules.

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192. In effect, the plaintiffs achieved authorization from defendant to refinance by

promising him of securing a mortgage rate of less than 5%. This was consistent to what was

available on the mortgage market at the time. Yet, the refinancing was transformed into a

security note, a fungible, negotiable instrument representing financial value of two million

dollars. This is on the basis of M & T Real Estate putting up $1, 480, 000, and 00.00 to set up the

derivative. This clearly was not a mortgage refinancing, rather a negotiable instrument

representing a financial value of two million that could be sold as financial paper.

193. It shocks the conscience that the rate of the note was set at 11 & 1/2% for 2 years of

only interest, which was ½ % below the maxim legal rate of the usury 12% for high risk. Yet,

this is in spite of the fact that the legal rate at the time was 8%, and interest rates of 4.75% fixed

for 2 years were readily available. Especially since the amount obtained was about 38% of the

true appraised value of the property. Consequently, obtaining a low rate of 4.75 or better for 2

years could have been easily secured as a normal mortgage without any consequential lean

placed on the properties.

194. Noteworthy, is that the commercially published statistics of the National Monthly

Averages of in Nov, 2004: 5.26% 15 year FRM ; 5.83% 30 years FRM ; and 4.23% 1 year

ARM.

195. Whereby, when Steven Philips signed on to the two quit-claims, he abused and

perverted his power, authority and the public’s trust of sovereignty to attest to the genuineness of

documents. Since, by Philips signing onto the quit-claims he implemented his official power as a

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certified notary. Consequently, he committed two incorporated offenses to constitute a predicate

act under 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) and under § 1951 by his extortion of plaintiff under color of

official right. This was consummated by Philips filing under the color of law, two instruments

with the County Clerk that he misused the clerk’s discretionary authority without her knowledge.

Not to mention Phillips has limited power of attorney for defendant (exh)

196. Plaintiffs’ misconduct constituted various proscribed activities of extortion; this was

achieved by fraudulently attesting to right of total control of the property, depriving defendant of

having any rights whatsoever. In effect, mental dominance of defendant to block him from

affirming his expressed wishes of vigorous adjudication of the matter. Consequently, plaintiffs

usurped defendant’s rights to his equity and powers inherent to owning property by substituting

his rights with theirs. Such as by plaintiffs collecting numerous hundreds of thousands of its

equity for their own use and benefit.

197. Plaintiffs even evicted defendant from his own property by misuse of the judicial

process. Defendant’s own lawyers participated with the opposition’s perpetration of a fraud upon

the court. Consequently, defendant was forced to live in a cheap hotel for 6 months until he

gained enough self-confidence to move back into his previous home on 1357 King. In effect,

Defendant moved back onto his other property than the one he was evicted from occupying

seven months ago

198. By using the key he had to open the door. Since this building was the one he was able

to collect rents from until last April when plaintiffs interfered. Thus, he did not break in as they

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claim but exercised the right that any citizen has to the quite enjoyment in the property that you

own.

WHEREFORE, the defendant seeks:

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1. VACATING ‘Use and Occupancy’ from being obtained by ‘unclean hands’ as a product of

‘fraud upon the court.’

2. DISMISSAL of Mark Katz, as council of record. In lieu of defendant pro-se; and

3. TRANSFERANCE OF VENUE to pending action FST-CV-09-5009789-S(X09) in Superior

Court in Stamford, where the cause of action is to decide the matter of ownership

Transference to pending action in Superior Court, or in lieu continuance, with setting next

appearance to be 10 weeks, or thereafter; and

4. SUMMARY DISMISSAL of this summary process action; and

5. ORDER Mark F. Katz to turn over defendant’s entire file in his possession to defendant’s

agent, Robert Hutchins ; and

6. ORDER Abrim Heisler to turn over defendant’s entire file in his possession to defendant’s

agent, Robert Hutchins.

Dated: January 29, 2010

Defendant, Delmo L. Zanette, pro-se

____________________________
1353 King St
Greenwich, Connecticut 06830
914-844-0244

To: Robert Kaelin Defendant’s residing until April 3, 2009

Dena M. Castricone Delmo Zannette
Murtha Cullina LLp c/o Steven Gramacy
CItyPLace I-185 Asylan Streeet 127 Bird of Paradise
Hartford, Connecticut 06103 Palm Coast, FL 32137
Tel: 860-240-6000 914-844-0244
Fax: 860-240-6150

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