Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
qualia are universals, in the sense of being recognized from one to another experience, they
must be distinguished from the properties of
objects. Confusion of these two is characteristic of many historical conceptions, as well as of
current essence-theories. The quale is directly
intuited, given, and is not the subject of any
possible error because it is purely subjective.
Denitions
Daniel Dennett identies four properties that are commonly ascribed to qualia. According to these, qualia are:
There are recognizable qualitative characters of the given, which may be repeated in different experiences, and are thus a sort of universals; I call these qualia. But although such
to know one experiences a quale, and to know all consciousness has an essentially subjective character, a
there is to know about that quale.
what-it-is-like aspect. He states that an organism has
conscious mental states if and only if there is something
If qualia of this sort exist, then a normally sighted person that it is like to be that organismsomething it is like for
[5]
who sees red would be unable to describe the experience the organism. Nagel also suggests that the subjective
of this perception in such a way that a listener who has aspect of the mind may not ever be suciently accounted
never experienced color will be able to know everything for by the objective methods of reductionistic science. He
there is to know about that experience. Though it is pos- claims that "[i]f we acknowledge that a physical theory of
sible to make an analogy, such as red looks hot, or to mind must account for the subjective character of expeprovide a description of the conditions under which the rience, we must admit that no presently available concep[6]
experience occurs, such as its the color you see when tion gives us a clue how this could be done. Furtherlight of 700-nm wavelength is directed at you, support- more, he states that it seems unlikely that any physical
ers of this kind of qualia contend that such a description theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought
is incapable of providing a complete description of the has been given to the general problem of subjective and
objective.[6]
experience.
Another way of dening qualia is as raw feels. A raw
feel is a perception in and of itself, considered entirely in 2.2 The inverted spectrum argument
isolation from any eect it might have on behavior and
behavioral disposition. In contrast, a cooked feel is that Main article: Inverted spectrum
perception seen as existing in terms of its eects. For ex- The inverted spectrum thought experiment, originally
ample, the perception of the taste of wine is an ineable,
raw feel, while the experience of warmth or bitterness
caused by that taste of wine would be a cooked feel. A
cooked feel is not qualia.
According to an argument put forth by Saul Kripke in
his paper Identity and Necessity (1971), one key consequence of the claim that such things as raw feels can
be meaningfully discussedthat qualia existis that it
leads to the logical possibility of two entities exhibiting
identical behavior in all ways despite one of them entirely lacking qualia. While very few ever claim that such
an entity, called a philosophical zombie, actually exists,
the mere possibility is claimed to be sucient to refute Inverted qualia
physicalism.
developed by John Locke,[7] invites us to imagine that
we wake up one morning and nd that for some unknown
2 Arguments for the existence of reason all the colors in the world have been inverted. Furthermore, we discover that no physical changes have ocqualia
curred in our brains or bodies that would explain this phenomenon. Supporters of the existence of qualia argue
that since we can imagine this happening without conSee also: Hard problem of consciousness
tradiction, it follows that we are imagining a change in a
property that determines the way things look to us, but
Since it is by denition impossible to convey qualia verthat has no physical basis.[8][9] In more detail:
bally, it is also impossible to demonstrate them directly
in an argument; so a more tangential approach is needed.
1. Metaphysical identity holds of necessity.
Arguments for qualia generally come in the form of
thought experiments designed to lead one to the conclu2. If something is possibly false, it is not necessary.
sion that qualia exist.
3. It is conceivable that qualia could have a dierent
relationship to physical brain-states.
2.1
5. Since it is possible for qualia to have a dierent relationship with physical brain-states, they cannot be
identical to brain states (by 1).
6. Therefore, qualia are non-physical.
2.5
The argument thus claims that if we nd the inverted there is still an explanatory problem.
spectrum plausible, we must admit that qualia exist (and
are non-physical). Some philosophers nd it absurd that
While I think this materialist response is
an armchair argument can prove something to exist, and
right in the end, it does not suce to put
the detailed argument does involve a lot of assumptions
the mind-body problem to rest. Even if conabout conceivability and possibility, which are open to
ceivability considerations do not establish that
criticism. Perhaps it is not possible for a given brain state
the mind is in fact distinct from the body, or
to produce anything other than a given quale in our unithat mental properties are metaphysically irverse, and that is all that matters.
reducible to physical properties, still they do
demonstrate that we lack an explanation of the
The idea that an inverted spectrum would be undemental in terms of the physical.
tectable in practice is also open to criticism on more scientic grounds (see main article).[8][9] There is an actual experimentalbeit somewhat obscurethat parallels the inverted spectrum argument. Karl H. Pribram
emeritus professor of psychology and psychiatry at Stanford Universityhad some of his students perform an experiment in which they wore special prism glasses that
caused the external world to appear upside down.[10][11]
After a few days of continually wearing the glasses,
an adaptation occurred and the external world appeared
righted. When the glasses were removed, the external
world again appeared inverted. After a similar period,
perception of the external world returned to the normal
perceptual state. If this argument provides indicia that
qualia exist, it does not necessarily follow that they must
be non-physical, because that distinction should be considered a separate epistemological issue.
2.3
However, such an epistemological or explanatory problem might indicate an underlying metaphysical issue
the non-physicality of qualia, even if not proven by conceivability arguments is far from ruled out.
In the end, we are right back where we
started. The explanatory gap argument doesn't
demonstrate a gap in nature, but a gap in our
understanding of nature. Of course a plausible explanation for there being a gap in our understanding of nature is that there is a genuine
gap in nature. But so long as we have countervailing reasons for doubting the latter, we
have to look elsewhere for an explanation of
the former.[12]
3 CRITICS OF QUALIA
Daniel Dennett
Daniel Dennett
Critics of qualia
3.2
Paul Churchland
Dennett attempts to show that we cannot satisfy (a) either through introspection or through observation, and
that qualias very denition undermines its chances of satisfying (b).
Supporters of qualia could point out that in order for you
to notice a change in qualia, you must compare your current qualia with your memories of past qualia. Arguably,
such a comparison would involve immediate apprehension of your current qualia and your memories of past
qualia, but not the past qualia itself. Furthermore, modern functional brain imaging has increasingly suggested
that the memory of an experience is processed in similar ways and in similar zones of the brain as those originally involved in the original perception. This may mean
that there would be asymmetry in outcomes between altering the mechanism of perception of qualia and altering
their memories. If the diabolical neurosurgery altered the
immediate perception of qualia, you might not even notice the inversion directly, since the brain zones which reprocess the memories would themselves invert the qualia
remembered. On the other hand, alteration of the qualia
memories themselves would be processed without inversion, and thus you would perceive them as an inversion.
Thus, you might know immediately if memory of your
qualia had been altered, but might not know if immediate
qualia were inverted or whether the diabolical neurosurgeons had done a sham procedure (Ungerleider, 1995).
5
non-color-locked robots when they look at a red tomato,
and see exactly how they react and what kinds of impulses occur. RoboMary can also construct a simulation
of her own brain, unlock the simulations color-lock and,
with reference to the other robots, simulate exactly how
this simulation of herself reacts to seeing a red tomato.
RoboMary naturally has control over all of her internal
states except for the color-lock. With the knowledge of
her simulations internal states upon seeing a red tomato,
RoboMary can put her own internal states directly into
the states they would be in upon seeing a red tomato. In
this way, without ever seeing a red tomato through her
cameras, she will know exactly what it is like to see a red
tomato.
Dennett uses this example to show us that Marys allencompassing physical knowledge makes her own internal states as transparent as those of a robot or computer,
and it is almost straightforward for her to gure out exactly how it feels to see red.
Perhaps Marys failure to learn exactly what seeing red
feels like is simply a failure of language, or a failure of
our ability to describe experiences. An alien race with a
dierent method of communication or description might
be perfectly able to teach their version of Mary exactly
how seeing the color red would feel. Perhaps it is simply
a uniquely human failing to communicate rst-person experiences from a third-person perspective. Dennett suggests that the description might even be possible using
English. He uses a simpler version of the Mary thought
experiment to show how this might work. What if Mary
was in a room without triangles and was prevented from
seeing or making any triangles? An English-language description of just a few words would be sucient for her to
imagine what it is like to see a triangleshe can simply
and directly visualize a triangle in her mind. Similarly,
Dennett proposes, it is perfectly, logically possible that
the quale of what it is like to see red could eventually be
described in an English-language description of millions
or billions of words.
Dennett also has a response to the Mary the color scientist thought experiment. He argues that Mary would
not, in fact, learn something new if she stepped out of
her black and white room to see the color red. Dennett
asserts that if she already truly knew everything about
color, that knowledge would include a deep understanding of why and how human neurology causes us to sense
the quale of color. Mary would therefore already know
exactly what to expect of seeing red, before ever leaving
the room. Dennett argues that the misleading aspect of
the story is that Mary is supposed to not merely be knowledgeable about color but to actually know all the physical
facts about it, which would be a knowledge so deep that it In Are we explaining consciousness yet?" (2001), Denexceeds what can be imagined, and twists our intuitions. nett approves of an account of qualia dened as the deep,
If Mary really does know everything physical there is to rich collection of individual neural responses that are too
know about the experience of color, then this eectively ne-grained for language to capture. For instance, a pergrants her almost omniscient powers of knowledge. Us- son might have an alarming reaction to yellow because
ing this, she will be able to deduce her own reaction, and of a yellow car that hit her previously, and someone else
gure out exactly what the experience of seeing red will might have a nostalgic reaction to a comfort food. These
eects are too individual-specic to be captured by Enfeel like.
Dennett nds that many people nd it dicult to see this, glish words. If one dubs this inevitable residue qualia,
then qualia are guaranteed to exist, but they are just more
so he uses the case of RoboMary to further illustrate what
that have not yet
it would be like for Mary to possess such a vast knowledge of the same, dispositional properties
been entered in the catalog [...].[15]
of the physical workings of the human brain and color vision. RoboMary is an intelligent robot who, instead of the
ordinary color camera-eyes, has a software lock such that
she is only able to perceive black and white and shades 3.2 Paul Churchland
in-between.
According to Paul Churchland, Mary might be considRoboMary can examine the computer brain of similar
ered to be like a feral child. Feral children have suered
3 CRITICS OF QUALIA
3.4
David Lewis
David Lewis has an argument that introduces a new hypothesis about types of knowledge and their transmission in qualia cases. Lewis agrees that Mary cannot learn
what red looks like through her monochrome physicalist
studies. But he proposes that this doesn't matter. Learning transmits information, but experiencing qualia doesn't
transmit information; instead it communicates abilities.
When Mary sees red, she doesn't get any new information.
She gains new abilitiesnow she can remember what red
looks like, imagine what other red things might look like
and recognize further instances of redness. Lewis states
that Jacksons thought experiment uses the Phenomenal Information Hypothesisthat is, the new knowledge
that Mary gains upon seeing red is phenomenal information. Lewis then proposes a dierent Ability Hypothesis that dierentiates between two types of knowledge:
knowledge that (information) and knowledge how (abilities). Normally the two are entangled; ordinary learning
is also an experience of the subject concerned, and people both learn information (for instance, that Freud was
a psychologist) and gain ability (to recognize images of
Freud). However in the thought experiment, Mary can
Marvin Minsky
7
use for complex rearrangement of our disposition of resources.[20]
3.6
Michael Tye
4 Proponents of qualia
Michael Tye
David Chalmers
David Chalmers formulated the hard problem of consciousness, raising the issue of qualia to a new level of
importance and acceptance in the eld. In his denitive
paper Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia,
he also argued for what he called the principle of organizational invariance. In this paper, he argues that if a
system such as one of appropriately congured computer
chips reproduces the functional organization of the brain,
it will also reproduce the qualia associated with the brain.
4.2 E. J. Lowe
Jonathan Lowe, of Durham University, denies that holding to indirect realism (in which we have access only to
sensory features internal to the brain) necessarily implies
Tye propose that phenomenal experience has ve basic a Cartesian dualism. He agrees with Bertrand Russell that
8
our retinal imagesthat is, the distributions across our
retinasare connected to patterns of neural activity in
the cortex (Lowe 1986). He defends a version of the
Causal Theory of Perception in which a causal path can be
traced between the external object and the perception of
it. He is careful to deny that we do any inferring from the
sensory eld, a view which he believes allows us to found
an access to knowledge on that causal connection. In a
later work he moves closer to the non-epistemic theory in
that he postulates a wholly non-conceptual component
of perceptual experience,[26] but he refrains from analyzing the relation between the perceptual and the nonconceptual. Most recently he has drawn attention to the
problems that hallucination raises for the direct realist
and to their disinclination to enter the discussion on the
topic.[27]
PROPONENTS OF QUALIA
sequence. The interesting aspect of this list is that, although it would give a comprehensive and point-by-pointdetailed description of the state of the screen, nowhere in
that list would there be a mention of English sentences
or a 7-Up can.
What this makes clear is that there are two ways to describe such a screen, (1) the commonsense one, in
which publicly recognizable objects are mentioned, and
(2) an accurate point-by-point account of the actual state
of the eld, but makes no mention of what any passer-by
would or would not make of it. This second description
would be non-epistemic from the common sense point of
view, since no objects are mentioned in the print-out, but
perfectly acceptable from the engineers point of view.
Note that, if one carries this analysis across to human
sensing and perceiving, this rules out Daniel Dennetts
claim that all qualiaphiles must regard qualia as ineable, for at this second level they are in principle quite
4.3 J. B. Maund
eableindeed, it is not ruled out that some neuroJohn Barry Maund, an Australian philosopher of percep- physiologist of the future might be able to describe the
tion at the University of Western Australia, is noteworthy neural detail of qualia at this level.
in being the rst to draw attention to a key distinction Maund has also extended his argument particularly with
which had been ignored in the current debate on qualia. reference of color.[29] Color he sees as a dispositional
Qualia are open to being described on two levels, a fact property, not an objective one, an approach which allows
that he refers to as dual coding. Using the Television for the facts of dierence between person and person, and
Analogy (which, as the non-epistemic argument shows, also leaves aside the claim that external objects are colcan be shorn of its objectionable aspects), he points out ored. Colors are therefore virtual properties, in that it
that, if asked what we see on a television screen there are is as if things possessed them; although the nave view attwo answers that we might give:
tributes them to objects, they are intrinsic, non-relational
The states of the screen during a football match are un- inner experiences.
questionably dierent from those of the screen during a
chess game, but there is no way available to us of de4.4 Moreland Perkins
scribing the ways in which they are dierent except by
[28]
reference to the play, moves and pieces in each game.
In his book Sensing the World,[30] Moreland Perkins arHe has rened the explanation by shifting to the exam- gues that qualia need not be identied with their objecple of a "Movitype" screen, often used for advertisements tive sources: a smell, for instance, bears no direct resemand announcements in public places. A Movitype screen blance to the molecular shape that gives rise to it, nor is a
consists of a matrixor raster as the neuroscientists toothache actually in the tooth. He is also like Hobbes in
prefer to call it (from the Latin rastrum, a rake"; think of being able to view the process of sensing as being somethe lines on a TV screen as raked across)that is made thing complete in itself; as he puts it, it is not like kickup of an array of tiny light-sources. A computer-led in- ing a football where an external object is requiredit is
put can excite these lights so as to give the impression of more like kicking a kick, an explanation which entirely
letters passing from right to left, or even, on the more ad- avoids the familiar Homunculus Objection, as adhered to,
vanced forms now commonly used in advertisements, to for example, by Gilbert Ryle. Ryle was quite unable even
show moving pictures. Maunds point is as follows. It is to entertain this possibility, protesting that in eect it
obvious that there are two ways of describing what you explained the having of sensations as the not having of
are seeing. We could either adopt the everyday public sensations.[31] However, A.J. Ayer in a rejoinder idenlanguage and say I saw some sentences, followed by a tied this objection as very weak as it betrayed an inpicture of a 7-Up can. Although that is a perfectly ad- ability to detach the notion of eyes, indeed any sensory
equate way of describing the sight, nevertheless, there is organ, from the neural sensory experience.[32]
a scientic way of describing it which bears no relation
whatsoever to this commonsense description. One could
ask the electronics engineer to provide us with a com- 4.5 Ramachandran and Hirstein
puter print-out staged across the seconds that you were
watching it of the point-states of the raster of lights. This V. S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein[33] proposed
would no doubt be a long and complex document, with three laws of qualia (with a fourth later added), which
the state of each tiny light-source given its place in the are functional criteria that need to be fullled in order
4.6
9
closely linked. You need attention to
fulll criterion number two; to choose.
A study of circuits involved in attention,
therefore, will shed much light on the riddle of qualia.[34]
They proposed that the phenomenal nature of qualia
could be communicated (as in oh that is what salt tastes
like) if brains could be appropriately connected with a
cable of neurons.[33] If this turned out to be possible
this would scientically prove or objectively demonstrate
the existence and the nature of qualia.
10
PROPONENTS OF QUALIA
logue, a faith that has priority over what has before been
taken to be the key virtues of language, such as sincerity, truth, and objectivity. Indeed, he considers that
to prioritize them over faith is to move into superstition.
4.7
Edmond Wright
Edmond Wright is a philosopher who considers the intersubjective aspect of perception.[37][38] From Locke onwards it had been normal to frame perception problems
in terms of a single subject S looking at a single entity E
with a property p. However, if we begin with the facts
of the dierences in sensory registration from person to
person, coupled with the dierences in the criteria we
have learned for distinguishing what we together call the
same things, then a problem arises of how two persons
align their dierences on these two levels so that they
can still get a practical overlap on parts of the real about
themand, in particular, update each other about them.
Wright mentions being struck with the hearing dierence between himself and his son, discovering that his
son could hear sounds up to nearly 20 kilohertz while his
range only reached to 14 kHz or so. This implies that a
dierence in qualia could emerge in human action (for
example, the son could warn the father of a high-pitched
escape of a dangerous gas kept under pressure, the soundwaves of which would be producing no qualia evidence
at all for the latter). The relevance for language thus becomes critical, for an informative statement can best be
understood as an updating of a perceptionand this may
involve a radical re-selection from the qualia elds viewed
as non-epistemic, even perhaps of the presumed singularity of the referent, a fortiori if that referent is the self.
Here he distinguishes his view from that of Revonsuo,
who too readily makes his virtual space egocentric.
Wrights particular emphasis has been on what he asserts
is a core feature of communication, that, in order for an
updating to be set up and made possible, both speaker and
hearer have to behave as if they have identied the same
singular thing, which, he notes, partakes of the structure of a joke or a story.[37] Wright says that this systematic ambiguity seems to opponents of qualia to be a sign
of fallacy in the argument (as ambiguity is in pure logic)
whereas, on the contrary, it is signin talk about what
is perceivedof something those speaking to each other
have to learn to take advantage of. In extending this analysis, he has been led to argue for an important feature
of human communication being the degree and character of the faith maintained by the participants in the dia-
5.2
Roger Orpwood
5.1
Rodolfo Llins
5.2
Roger Orpwood
11
result of that particular information structure. Modication of the information structure changes the meaning of
the information message, but the message itself cannot be
directly altered.
Local cortical networks have the capacity to receive feedback from their own output information structures. This
form of local feedback continuously cycles part of the
networks output structures as its next input information
structure. Since the output structure must represent the
information message derived from the input structure,
each consecutive cycle that is fed-back will represent the
output structure the network just generated. As the network of mechanisms cannot recognize the information
message, but only the input information structure, the network is unaware that it is representing its own previous
outputs. The neural mechanisms are merely completing
their instructional tasks and outputting any recognizable
information structures. Orpwood proposes that these local networks come into an attractor state that consistently
outputs exactly the same information structure as the input structure. Instead of only representing the information message derived from the input structure, the network will now represent its own output and thereby its
own information message. As the input structures are
fed-back, the network identies the previous information
structure as being a previous representation of the information message. As Orpwood states,
Once an attractor state has been established, the output [of a network] is a representation of its own identity to the network.[41]:4
Representation of the networks own output structures,
by which represents its own information message, is Orpwoods explanation that grounds the manifestation of
qualia via neurobiological mechanisms. These mechanisms are particular to networks of pyramidal neurons.
Although computational neuroscience still has much to
investigate regarding pyramidal neurons, their complex
circuitry is relatively unique. Research shows that the
complexity of pyramidal neuron networks is directly related to the increase in the functional capabilities of a
species.[42] When human pyramidal networks are compared with other primate species and species with less intricate behavioral and social interactions, the complexity
of these neural networks drastically decline. The complexity of these networks are also increased in frontal
brain regions. These regions are often associated with
conscious assessment and modication of ones immediate environment; often referred to as executive functions.
Sensory input is necessary to gain information from the
environment, and perception of that input is necessary for
navigating and modifying interactions with the environment. This suggests that frontal regions containing more
complex pyramidal networks are associated with an increased perceptive capacity. As perception is necessary
for conscious thought to occur, and since the experience
of qualia is derived from consciously recognizing some
12
6 OTHER ISSUES
perception, qualia may indeed be specic to the functional capacity of pyramidal networks. This derives Orpwoods notion that the mechanisms of re-entrant feedback may not only create qualia, but also be the foundation to consciousness.
6
6.1
Other issues
Indeterminacy
pixels on a television screen, those tiny elements that provide all the distributions of color that go to make up the
picture. It would not suce as an answer to say that they
are the redness of an evening sky as it appears on the
screen. We would protest that their real character was
being ignored. One can see that relying on the list above
assumes that we must tie sensations not only to the notion
of given objects in the world (the head, wine, an
evening sky), but also to the properties with which we
characterize the experiences themselves (redness, for
example).
Nor is it satisfactory to print a little red square as at the
top of the article, for, since each person has a slightly different registration of the light-rays,[44] it confusingly suggests that we all have the same response. Imagine in a
television shop seeing a red square on twenty screens at
once, each slightly dierentsomething of vital importance would be overlooked if a single example were to be
taken as dening them all.
13
To maintain a philosophical balance, the argument for
raw feels needs to be set side by side with the claim
above. Viewing sensations as raw feels implies that
initially they have not yetto carry on the metaphor
been cooked, that is, unied into things and persons, which is something the mind does after the sensation has responded to the blank input, that response
driven by motivation, that is, initially by pain and pleasure, and subsequently, when memories have been implanted, by desire and fear. Such a raw-feel state has
been more formally identied as non-epistemic". In support of this view, the theorists cite a range of empirical
facts. The following can be taken as representative. There
are brain-damaged persons, known as agnosics (literally
not-knowing) who still have vivid visual sensations but
are quite unable to identify any entity before them, including parts of their own body. There is also the similar
predicament of persons, formerly blind, who are given
sight for the rst timeand consider what it is a newborn baby must experience. A German psychologist of
the 19th century, Hermann von Helmholtz, proposed a
simple experiment to demonstrate the non-epistemic nature of qualia: his instructions were to stand in front of a
familiar landscape, turn your back on it, bend down and
look at the landscape between your legsyou will nd it
dicult in the upside-down view to recognize what you
found familiar before.[47]
These examples suggest that a bare presencethat is,
knowledgeless sensation that is no more than evidence
may really occur. Present supporters of the nonepistemic theory thus regard sensations as only data in
the sense that they are given (Latin datum, given)
and fundamentally involuntary, which is a good reason
for not regarding them as basically mental. In the last
century they were called sense-data by the proponents
of qualia, but this led to the confusion that they carried
with them reliable proofs of objective causal origins. For
instance, one supporter of qualia was happy to speak of
the redness and bulginess of a cricket ball as a typical
sense-datum,[48] though not all of them were happy to
dene qualia by their relation to external entities (see
Roy Wood Sellars[49] ). The modern argument, following
Sellars lead, centers on how we learn under the regime
of motivation to interpret the sensory evidence in terms
of things, persons, and selves through a continuing
process of feedback.
The denition of qualia thus is governed by ones point
of view, and that inevitably brings with it philosophical
and neurophysiological presuppositions. The question,
therefore, of what qualia can be raises profound issues
in the philosophy of mind, since some materialists want
to deny their existence altogether: on the other hand, if
they are accepted, they cannot be easily accounted for as
they raise the dicult problem of consciousness. There
are committed dualists such as Richard L. Amoroso or
John Hagelin who believe that the mental and the material are two distinct aspects of physical reality like the dis-
7 See also
Cognitive closure
Consciousness
David Chalmers
Dualism (philosophy of mind)
Form constant
Hard problem of consciousness
Ideaesthesia
Mind body problem
New mysterianism
Philosophy of mind
Self-reference
Subjectivity
Subject-object problem
Synesthesia
8 Notes
[1] Dennett, D. ''Quining Qualia''". Ase.tufts.edu. 1985-1121. Retrieved 2010-12-03.
[2] Schrdinger, Erwin (2001). What is life? : the physical
aspects of the living cell. (Repr. ed.). Cambridge [u.a.]:
Cambridge Univ. Press. ISBN 0521427088.
[3] Chris Eliasmith (2004-05-11). Dictionary of Philosophy
of Mind - qualia. Philosophy.uwaterloo.ca. Retrieved
2010-12-03.
[4] Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? 'The Philosophical Review', Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 435450
[5] Nagel, Thomas (1974), What is it Like to Be a Bat?",
Philosophical Review, 83, 43550; see p. 436.
[6] Tye, Michael (2000), p. 450.
[7] Locke, John (1689/1975), Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, xxxii, 15. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
[8] "''Inverted Qualia'', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Plato.stanford.edu. Retrieved 2010-12-03.
14
8 NOTES
[29] Maund, J.B. (1995), Colours: Their Nature and Representation, Cambridge University Press; (2003), Perception,
Chesham, Acumen Pub. Ltd.
[10] George M. Stratton, Some preliminary experiments on vision. Psychological Review, 1896
[30] Perkins, Moreland (1983), Sensing the World, Indianapolis, USA, Hackett Pub. Co.
[12] Joseph Levine, Conceivability, Identity, and the Explanatory Gap. Cognet.mit.edu. 2000-09-26. Retrieved
2010-12-03.
[13] Jackson, Frank (1982), Epiphenomenal Qualia, Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 12736.
[14] Dennett, Daniel (1991). London: Penguin Books; (1988)
[15] Daniel Dennett (Apr 2001).
Are we explaining
consciousness yet?".
Cognition 79 (1-2): 221
237.
doi:10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00130-X. PMID
11164029.
[16] Churchland, Paul (2004), Knowing qualia: A reply to
Jackson (with postscript 1997), in Theres Something
about Mary, Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa and Daniel
Stoljar (eds.). Cambridge MA: MIT Press, pp. 16378.
[17] Drescher, Gary, Good and Real, MIT Press, 2006. Pages
8182.
[18] Tye, Michael (2000), p. 82
[19] Lewis, David (2004), What experience teaches, in Theres
Something about Mary, Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa
and Daniel Stoljar (eds.). Cambridge MA: MIT Press,
pp. 77103.
[20] Edge interview with Marvin Minsky. Edge.org. 199802-26. Retrieved 2010-12-03.
[21] Tye, Michael (2000), Consciousness, Color and Content.
Cambridge MA: MIT Press, p. 46.
[22] Tye, Michael (2000), p. 47.
[23] Tye, Michael (2000), p. 48.
[24] Tye, Michael (2000), p. 63.
[25] Tye (1991) The Imagery Debate, Cambridge MA: MIT
Press; (1995) Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind, Cambridge
MA: MIT Press
[26] Lowe, E.J. (1996), Subjects of Experience. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, p. 101
[27] Lowe, E.J. (2008), Illusions and hallucinations as evidence for sense-data, in The Case for Qualia, Edmond
Wright (ed.), Cambridge MA: MIT Press, pp. 5972.
[28] Maund, J.B. (1975), The representative theory of perception, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 5:1, 4455; see
p. 48.
[32] Ayer, A.J. (1957), The Problem of Knowledge, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, p. 107
[33] Ramachandran, V.S. and Hirstein, W. (1997), Three
laws of qualia; What neurology tells us about the biological functions of consciousness, Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 4:56, 42957.
[34] Ramachandran, V.S. and Hubbard, E.M. (2001),
Synaesthesia a window into perception, thought and
language, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, 334
(PDF). Retrieved 2010-12-03.
[35] Robinson, Howard (1982), Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge University
Press; (1994), Perception, London, Routledge
[36] Robinson, William (2004), Understanding Phenomenal
Consciousness, Cambridge University Press.
[37] Wright, Edmond (ed.) (2008), The Case for Qualia, MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
[38] Wright, Edmond (2008) ''Narrative, Perception, Language, and Faith'', Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Palgrave.com. 2005-11-16. Retrieved 2010-12-03.
[39] Orpwood, Roger. Neurobiological Mechanisms Underlying Qualia. Journal of Integrative Neuroscience 06.04
(2007): 523-33
[40] Orpwood, Roger D. Perceptual Qualia and Local Network Behavior In The Cerebral Cortex. Journal of Integrative Neuroscience 09.02 (2010): 123-31.
[41] Orpwood, Roger. Qualia Could Arise from Information
Processing in Local Cortical Networks. Frontiers in Psychology 4 (2013): 1-10.
[42] Elston, G. N. Cortex, Cognition and the Cell: New Insights into the Pyramidal Neuron and Prefrontal Function. Cerebral Cortex 13.11 (2003): 124-138.
[43] Epiphenomenalism has few friends. It has been deemed
thoughtless and incoherent Taylor, A. (1927). Plato:
The Man and his Work, New York, MacVeagh, p. 198;
unintelligible Benecke, E.C. (1901) On the Aspect
Theory of the Relation of Mind to Body, Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 19001901 n.s. 1: 1844; truly incredible McLaughlin, B. (1994). Epiphenomenalism,
A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, ed. S. Guttenplan, 277288. Oxford: Blackwell.
[44] Hardin, C.L. (1988), Color for Philosophers. Indianapolis
IN: Hackett Pub. Co.
[45] McDowell, John (1994), Mind and World. Cambridge
MA: Harvard University Press, p. 42.
15
References
Online papers on qualia, by various authors, compiled by David Chalmers
Absent Qualia, Dancing Qualia, Fading Qualia, by
David Chalmers
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind
The Knowledge Argument, by Torin Alter
Qualia Realism., by William Robinson.
Qualia! (Now Showing at a Theatre Near You), by
Eric Lormand. A response to Dennett.
Quining Qualia, by Daniel Dennett
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Inverted Qualia, by Alex Byrne.
Qualia, by Michael Tye.
Qualia: The Knowledge Argument, by Martine Nida-Rmelin.
Three Laws of Qualia, by Ramachandran and
Hirstein (biological perspective).
Brainy Mind (qualia and the sensation of time) by
Richard Gregory
10
Further reading
Mroczko-Wsowicz, A.; Nikoli, D. (2014). Semantic mechanisms may be responsible for developing synesthesia. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
8: 509.
11
External links
16
12
12
12.1
12.2
Images
File:Crystal_Clear_app_kedit.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e8/Crystal_Clear_app_kedit.svg License: LGPL Contributors: Sabine MINICONI Original artist: Sabine MINICONI
File:Daniel_dennett_Oct2008.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/21/Daniel_dennett_Oct2008.JPG License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work (own photo) Original artist: User:Mathias Schindler
File:David_Chalmers.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a3/David_Chalmers.jpg License: CC-BY-SA3.0 Contributors: en:Image:Sea8.jpg, from David Chalmers website: http://consc.net/chalmers/ with permission. Original artist: ?
File:Inverted_qualia_of_colour_strawberry.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b2/Inverted_qualia_of_
colour_strawberry.jpg License: CC BY-SA 2.5 Contributors: Original strawberrys image is from Image:Fragaria_Fruit_Close-up.jpg uploaded by User:FoeNyx,
Original artist: made by Was a bee.
File:Marvin_Minsky_at_OLPCb.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/28/Marvin_Minsky_at_OLPCb.jpg
License: CC BY 3.0 Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia; transferred to Commons by User:Mardetanha using CommonsHelper.
Original artist: Original uploader was Sethwoodworth at en.wikipedia, taken by Bcjordan
File:Michael_Tye_TASC2008.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1d/Michael_Tye_TASC2008.JPG License: CC BY 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Zereshk
File:Question_book-new.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/99/Question_book-new.svg License: Cc-by-sa-3.0
Contributors:
Created from scratch in Adobe Illustrator. Based on Image:Question book.png created by User:Equazcion Original artist:
Tkgd2007
File:Red.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/25/Red.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work
Original artist: Drini
File:Socrates.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cd/Socrates.png License: Public domain Contributors:
Transferred from en.wikipedia to Commons. Original artist: The original uploader was Magnus Manske at English Wikipedia Later versions
were uploaded by Optimager at en.wikipedia.
File:Vilayanur_S_Ramachandran_2011_Shankbone.JPG
Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a5/
Vilayanur_S_Ramachandran_2011_Shankbone.JPG License: CC BY 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: David Shankbone
12.3
Content license