CONSTI2_2ND WAVE CASE DIGESTS

1. SOLIVEN VS MACASIAR
167 SCRA 393 Political Law Constitutional Law
Presidents Immunity From Suit Must Be Invoked by the
President
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together
with others, was charged with libel by the then president
Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit
against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file
a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity
from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a
president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue
then the president would allow herself to be placed under the
courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to
be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president,
the president may not be able to appear in court to be a
witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by
Beltran, a person other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the officeholders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a
criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot
raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the
case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the
President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege

and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to

exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
2.
CRUZ VS PEOPLE
FACTS: On June 19, 1990, police officers arrested petitioner
without warrant for illegal possession of a .38 caliber revolver
with six (6) rounds of ammunition while waiting outside the
Manila Pavilion Hotel along U.N. Ave., Manila.
On June 25, 1990, Assistant Prosecutor Tranquil P. Salvador, Jr.
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila, an information[3]
against the accused for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866[4].
The trial court proceeded to try the case. After the prosecution
presented and formally offered its evidence, the trial court
issued an order admitting in evidence the gun and ammunition
seized from the accused, over his objections. After the
prosecution had rested its case, petitioner, on motion and upon
leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence. The trial court
denied the demurrer, and ordered the accused to present his
evidence. Instead, the petitioner filed an MR, which the trial
court denied
ISSUE: Whether the trial court made a reversible error in
admission of evidence against the petitioner.
HELD: The trial court, in resolving petitioners motion for
reconsideration, squarely addressed the latters
contentions. The trial court ruled that the seized evidence was
admissible, and that the evidence presented was sufficient to
sustain a conviction, if the accused presented no contrary
evidence.

We find neither error nor patent abuse of discretion in the

rulings of the trial court on these issues. Thus, upon the
denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, he may present his
evidence. After trial on the merits and the court issues a
verdict of conviction, petitioner may seasonably appeal such
decision, raising once again his defenses and objections.
The orderly procedure prescribed by the Revised Rules of
Court is for the accused to present his evidence, after which
the trial court, on its own assessment of the evidence
submitted, will then properly render its judgment of acquittal or
conviction. If judgment is rendered adversely against the
accused, he may appeal the judgment and raise the same
defenses and objections for review by the appellate court.
MENDOZA VS PEOPLE
Lim vs Felix 194 SCRA 292 ( 1991)
FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the
morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate
Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate
province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and
his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes,
Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed
by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of
Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot,
although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An
investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation,
the designated investigator filed an amended complaint with
the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr.
et al of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in
connection with the airport incident.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued
an order concluding that a probable cause has been

established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named

accused..
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder
against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no
bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana
Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue w/c was
authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTCt of Makati to
avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled to Branch
56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the
respondent court several motions and manifestations, among
others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the
initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation
conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the
best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima
facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of
guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that
no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have
himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.
Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the
motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest
against the accused including the petitioners herein.
ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest
without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification
and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the
Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally
determined probable cause. The determination is made by the
Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not
been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
Bache & Co. Inc. et al vs BIR Commissioner Vivencio Ruiz et al

Search and Seizure Personal Examination of the Judge

On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue,
wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a
search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of
the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof,
particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing
Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for
search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day,
de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the
search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case;
so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of
Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After
the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the
depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to
him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked
respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if
his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis,
he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons
application for search warrant and Logronios deposition. The
search was subsequently conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his
witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his
witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the
existence or non-existence of a probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific
offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four
distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled
in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities
committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of
the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue

but upon probable cause in connection with one specific

offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added
thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall
issue for more than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things
to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are
described in the Search Warrant
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals,
columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers
ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks
and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale;
telex and coded messages; business communications,
accounting and business records; checks and check stubs;
records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of
foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1,
of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the
things to be seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things
to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description
expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant
officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when
the things described are limited to those which bear direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
Alvarez vs COA - A Case Digest
158 SCRA57 G.R. No. L-59621 February 23, 1988
MAXIMILIANO ALVAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,ET AL

PADILLA, J.:
Issue:
Nature of the case:
Petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals
Facts:
Renato Ramos was charged with Double Homicide with
Multiple Serious Physical Injuries Through Reckless
Imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province.
After trial, the court rendered judgment against the accused.
The Court found him guilty and of negligence was senteced to
pay a fine and indemnities to the victims. Maximiliano Alvarez,
the employer of herein accused (Renato Ramos) was found to
be subsidiarily liable and to pay the amount above-mentioned
to the persons concerned jointly and severally with Renato
Ramos. The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but deleted
that part thereof making herein petitioner, as employer of
Renato Ramos, subsidiarily liable for payment of the adjudged
indemnities to the offended parties. After finality of the Court of
Appeals judgment, the private prosecutor filed a "Motion for
Issuance of Subsidiary Writ of Execution" after the writ of
execution against the accused was returned unsatisfied.
Petitioner opposed the Motion.
Consequently, on 29 November 1979, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of appeals, questioning the acts of
the respondent Judge and the Sheriff who had levied on his
properties pursuant to said subsidiary writ of execution. The
Court of appeals granted the petition and declared the Orders
of the respondent Judge and the Subsidiary Writ of Execution
null and void. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
The Motion was granted.

Whether or not an employer can be subsidiarily liable for the

wrongful acts of his employee;
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse
of discretion in the issuance of Subsidiary Writ of Execution.
Held:
Petition denied and the Resolutions affirmed. Respondent Court
has not committed any grave abuse of discretion in the issuance
of the questioned orders for such issuance has been made in
pursuance of law and jurisprudence.

Microsoft Corporation vs Maxicorp, Inc.

438 SCRA 224 Mercantile Law Intellectual Property Law
on Copyright Probable Cause in Issuing Search Warrant
In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a surveillance against
Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that Microsoft Softwares (Windows
Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged within
the premises of Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian
witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a computer unit
from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of
Windows. For their purchase, they were issued a receipt,
however, the receipt was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz.
Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the
RTC. He brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought
the computer unit they bought as evidence as well as the

receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto

Pante), a computer technician, who showed the judge that the
software in the computer unit bought by Samiano from
Maxicorp was pirated. The RTC judge, convinced that there is
a probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and
unfair competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the
corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the
warrant before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision it highlighted the
fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos or Sacriz
name hence the proceeding in the trial court was infirm from
the onset.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with
the object and documentary evidence they presented, are
sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From
what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that
Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair
competition to the prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent
Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the
counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within
Maxicorps premises, they were also produced, packaged and
in some cases, installed there.
The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos name
nor was it in Sacriz name does not render the issuance of the
warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause
requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule
for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in
the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.Thus, it
was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTCs
findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI
Agent Samianos purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his
name.

PEOPLE VS TEE
FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a
businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted
by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM)
at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence
yielded huge quantities of marijuana.
Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground
that it was too general and that the NBI had not complied with
the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The
pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the
appropriate charges against appellant. In an information dated
July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged
Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession of
marijuana.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the
description on the serach warrant which says an undetermined
amount of marijuana, was too general and hence makes the
warrant void for vagueness.
HELD: SC held that the appellants contention, has no leg to
stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable
particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily
meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1)
readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent
them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace
officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and
thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. What the

Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or

general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will
authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to
seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to an offense. However, it is not required that technical
precision of description be required, particularly, where by the
nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be
rather general, since the requirement of a technical description
would mean that no warrant could issue.

praying that the search and seizure be declared illegal and that
the seized articles be returned to him. MTCC ruled in favor of
the petitioner, however the Solicitor General alleged that
assuming that the seizure of the money had been invalid,
petitioner was not entitled to its return citing the rulings stating
that pending the determination of the legality of the seizure of
the articles, they should remain in custodia legis.

Tambasen vs People
FACTS: On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for
the issuance of a search warrant from the MTCC, alleging that
he received information that petitioner had in his possession at
his house at the North Capitol Road, Bacolod City, "M-16
Armalite Rifles (Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal.
Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and Subversive
Documents," which articles were "used or intended to be
used" for illegal purposes]. On the same day, the application
was granted by the MTCC with the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 365, which allowed the seizure of the items
specified in the application (Rollo, p. 15). At around 6:30 P.M.
of September 9, 1988, a police team searched the house of
petitioner and seized among others, 2 envelopes containing
cash in the total amount of Php 14,000.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for the return of the seized
articles. MTCC issued an order directing Sgt. Natuel to make a
return of the search warrant. The following day, Sgt. Natuel
submitted a report to the court. Not considering the report as a
"return in contemplation of law," petitioner filed another motion
praying that Sgt. Natuel be required to submit a complete and
verified inventory of the seized articles. Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel
manifested that although he was the applicant for the issuance
of the search warrant, he was not present when it was served.
On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed before the MTCC a motion

HELD: On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule

126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance
of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The
caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two
special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the AntiSubversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a
"scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void (People v. Court
of Appeals, 216 SCRA 101 [1992]). Moreover, by their seizure of
articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted
beyond the parameters of their authority under the search
warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires
that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to
be seized. "The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the
constitutionally protected rights of an individual (People v. Cruz,
231 SCRA 759)

ISSUE: Whether or not the SW was valid.

As the Court aptly puts it in Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA

614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the
use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors."
Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that
evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable

searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose

in any proceeding.
PEOPLE VS VELOSO
FACTS: In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization known
as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a
member of the House of Representatives. He was also the
manager of the club. The police of Manila had reliable
information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing
more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F.
Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the
club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923,
Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of
Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge
Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police
attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in
the afternoon. They found the doors to the premises closed
and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including
policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to
enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by
Townsend, broke in the outer door.
Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were
apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant
Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the
latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told
Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John
Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house.
Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe.
As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling
utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence
of the game. About five minutes was consumed in
conversation between the policemen and the accused the
policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting
in his refusal to submit to the search. Policeman Rosacker

took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit
Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another
part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely.
Through the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker,
Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of
paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were
taken from his pockets.
ISSUE: Whether the resistance of the police was justifiable on
account of the illegality of the John Doe search warrant.
HELD: No. John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from
what has already been said regarding the essential
requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons
accused, and about blank warrants, that a warrant for the
apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the
name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true
name in unknown," is void, without other and further
descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant
will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must,
in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be
obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this
description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper
person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and
should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his
occupation and place of residence, and any other
circumstances by means of which he can be identified.
Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a
"John Doe" warrant, on the other hand, the apprehension will
not be illegal, or the officer liable, because under such
circumstances it is not necessary that a warrant should have
been issued.
Yousef Al Ghoul vs CA

FACTS: Herein petitioners are detention prisoners who were

arrested and charged with illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives before the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City, Branch 123, as a consequence of the search
conducted pursuant to the search warrants issued by the RTC
of Kalookan City. After their arrest, petitioners filed a motion for
bail. However, the resolution of the same was held in
abeyance by the trial court pending the presentation of
evidence by the prosecution to enable the court to determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. Subsequently,
the trial court issued the Order dated February 19, 1996
denying petitioners motion for bail on the ground that the law
under which petitioners are charged prescribes a penalty of
reclusion perpetua and that the evidence of guilt is strong.
Thereafter, petitioners proceeded to file a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals, assailing the aforementioned
orders issued by the trial court admitting the evidence of the
prosecution and denying petitioners motion for bail. In its
Decision dated September 30, 1996, the CA affirmed the
assailed orders of trial court, hence this case. On October 30,
1997, petitioners filed a Manifestation with alleging that with
the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, amending P.D. 1866,
the penalty for the offenses under which petitioners are being
charged has been reduced from the penalty ranging from
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to only the penalty
ranging from prision mayor to reclusion temporal, hence,
petitioners are now entitled to bail regardless of the strength of
evidence against them.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner, thru the enactment of Republic Act
No. 8294, amending P.D. 1866 reducing the penalty for the
crime charge against him is now entitled to bail.
HELD: Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty
prescribed in Section 1 and 3 of P.D. 1866 for illegal

possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives under

which petitioners were charged, has now been reduced to
prision mayor in its minimum period[11] and prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal,[12] respectively.
Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail as a matter of right
prior to their conviction by the trial court pursuant to Section 4 of
SC Administrative Circular No. 12-94 which provides as follows:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right.x x x. (b) before conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule.
UY vs BIR
FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for
the search of the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation,
and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof.
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish
Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were
engaged in activities constituting violations of the National
Internal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to be a former
employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit alleging illegal
activities being practiced by the said company among others,
selling thousands of cartons of canned sardines w/o issuing
receipt.
On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the
Special Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied for several
search warrants.The application sought permission to search
the premises of Unifish.
On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR,
accompanied by members of the Philippine National Police, on
2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing
8

Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records

and documents of petitioner corporation. A return of said
search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of
Cebu , Branch 28.
Petitioner impugned the intrinsic validity of the SW stating that
it violates constitutional right to unreasonable search and
seizure.
xxxx
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals,
Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or
Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
xxxxx
ISSUE: WON the SW complied with the proper constitutional
mandates.
HELD: The SC AFFIRMED the order of the RTC insofar as
said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search
Warrants authorizing the seizure of the unregistered delivery
receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but
REVERSED with respect to the rest of the articles subject of
said warrants.
GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [206 SCRA 138; G.R. NO.
101837; 11 FEB 1992]
Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a
one-way street, almost had a collision with another vehicle.
Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the

other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was

able to take down petitioners plate number and reported the
same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for
petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself
in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police
detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought
against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case
to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without
preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner
has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been
posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested
without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and
Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to
situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition
for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and
files for a preliminary investigation.
Issues:
(1) WON warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
(2) WON petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary
investigation.
Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos,
wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid
effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses,
which however constituted continuing crimes, i.e. subversion,
membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no
lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is
because the arresting officers were not actually there during the
incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their
information regarding petitioner were derived from other
sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the
police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any

statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a

complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation
should have been scheduled to determine probable cause.
Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to
preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge,
where the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted,
prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial
for the criminal case is suspended pending result from
preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon
posting a bail bond.

PADILLA VS CA
PADILLA vs CA
Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992.
He was later on apprehended with the help pf a civilian
witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were
found in his possession:
1.
.357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition
2.
M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo
3.
.380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo
4.
6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver
Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit
and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal
Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994,
Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms
under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted
and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4
months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years
of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals
confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles
City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for
reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed
lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General

made a complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of

Comment praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro).
ISSUE:
1.
WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course
thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule
HELD: No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the
legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was
issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make
his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless
arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedurea peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in flagrante
delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo,
petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually
committing another offence in the presence of all those officers.
There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time
between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because
arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible.
Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is
valid:
?
Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which
are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in
which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b)
evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to
be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People
v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited by law
inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even
without a warrant)
?
Search of moving vehicle

10

?
Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest
recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and
by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search
(not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched
must be within arrestees custody or area of immediate control
and search contemporaneous with arrest.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest
by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were
not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree.
It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success
when law enforcers function in collaboration with private
citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled
jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an
arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.
2.
LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is
authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt,
to carry the subject firearms
No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two
requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the
subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned
or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond
dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized
from petitioners possession via a valid warrantless search,
identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second
element, the same was convincingly proven by the
prosecution. Indeed, petitioners purported Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more
formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous
review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and
issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift
from respondent courts incisive observation. Furthermore, the
Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as
required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary

of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform

personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP,
which would justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD
1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38
caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian.
3.
PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession
constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the
1987 Constitution
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court in
applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a nonsubversive context and adds that respondent court should have
applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of
firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D.
1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years
and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of
firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the
Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial
court and the respondent court are bound to apply the
governing law at the time of appellants commission of the
offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and
apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court
can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the
previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty
for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for
simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from
reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to
appellants erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does
not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the
statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we
note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of

11

the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the

Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as
in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been
upheld twice by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared
that the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are
not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution Appellants
grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not
be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the
wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls
exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them
and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The
only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and
apply the laws
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA
sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of the
crime of simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is
AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioners indeterminate penalty is
MODIFIED to 10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1
day, as maximum.
People v. Simon Doctrine: Although PD 1866 is a special law,
the penalties therein were taken from the RPC, hence the
rules in said code for graduating by degrees of determining the
proper period should be applied.
ESPANO VS CA
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January 16,
1995, 1 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convincing petitioner Rodolfo
Espano for violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
Petitioner was charged under the following information:
That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by

law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did then and

there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control twelve (12)
plastic cellophane (bags) containing crushed flowering
tops, marijuana weighing 5.5 grams which is a prohibited
drug.
Contrary to law. 2
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of
Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on July 14, 1991, at about
12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo
Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western
Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in
the area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to another
person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner,
identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search
yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When
asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more
in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they
found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner
was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged
with possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24, 1991, petitioner
posted bail 3 and the trial court issued his order of release on
July 29, 1991. 4
Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal
Investigation Laboratory Section, testified that the articles sent
to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding the apprehension of a
certain Rodolfo Espano for examination tested positive for
marijuana, with a total weight of 5.5 grams.
By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening, he
was sleeping in his house and was awakened only when the
policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen were
looking for his brother-in-law Lauro, and when they could not
find the latter, he was instead brought to the police station for

12

investigation and later indicted for possession of prohibited

drugs. His wife Myrna corroborated his story.
The trial court rejected petitioner's, defense as a "mere
afterthought" and found the version of the prosecution "more
credible and trustworthy."
Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision,
convicting petitioner of the crime charged, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE there being proof beyond reasonable
doubt, the court finds the accused Rodolfo Espano y
Valeria guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8,
Article II, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act
No. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179,
and pursuant to law hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years and to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of default plus costs.
The marijuana is declared forfeited in favor of
government and shall be turned over to the Dangerous
Drugs Board without delay.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, however, affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in
convicting him on the basis of the following: (a) the pieces of
evidence seized were inadmissible; (b) the superiority of his
constitutional right to be presumed innocent over the doctrine
of presumption of regularity, (c) he was denied the
constitutional right of confrontation and to compulsory process;
and (d) his conviction was based on evidence which was
irrelevant and not properly identified.

After a careful examination of the records of the case, this Court

finds no compelling reason sufficient to reverse the decisions of
the trial and appellate courts.
First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on
the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect.
Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial,
the trial judge is in a better position to determine the issue of
credibility and, thus, his findings will not be disturbed during
appeal in the absence of any clear showing that he had
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which could have
altered the conviction of the appellants. 6
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution
witnesses were more credible than those of the defense must
stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying
against him, was motivated by reasons other than his duty to
curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him
such a serious crime as possession of prohibited drugs. In the
absence of such ill motive, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duty must prevail.
In People v. Velasco, 7 this Court reiterated the doctrine of
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
which provides:
. . . Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the
other members of the buy-bust team are policemen
engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous activities who
were motivated either by the desire to extort money or
exact personal vengeance, or by sheer whim and
caprice, when they entrapped her. And in the absence of
proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to
falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, as
in this case, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, . . . , must prevail over the
self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that
she had been framed. 8

13

Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not

deserve any consideration. He simply contended that he was
in his house sleeping at the time of the incident. This Court
has consistently held that alibi is the weakest of all defenses;
and for it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving
that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission and that it was physically impossible for him to be
there. Moreover, the "claim of a 'frame-up', like alibi, is a
defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with
disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted but difficult to
prove, and is a common and standard line of defense in most
prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act." 9 No clear and convincing evidence was presented by
petitioner to prove his defense of alibi.
Second, petitioner contends that the prosecution's failure to
present the alleged informant in court cast a reasonable doubt
which warrants his acquittal. This is again without merit, since
failure of the prosecution to produce the informant in court is of
no moment especially when he is not even the best witness to
establish the fact that a buy-bust operation had indeed been
conducted. In this case, Pat. Pagilagan, one of the policemen
who apprehended petitioner, testified on the actual incident of
July 14, 1991, and identified him as the one they caught in
possession of prohibited drugs. Thus,
We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved
its case against appellants. There is no compelling
reason for us to overturn the finding of the trial court
that the testimony of Sgt. Gamboa, the lone witness for
the prosecution, was straightforward spontaneous and
convincing. The testimony of a sole witness, if credible
and positive and satisfies the court beyond reasonable
doubt, is sufficient to convict. 10
Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagan's testimony, the
prosecution was able to prove that petitioner indeed

committed the crime charged; consequently, the finding of

conviction was proper.
Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized
should likewise be ruled upon. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the
Rules of Court provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He
was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation
conducted by police officers on the basis of information received
regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora
and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner
handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left,
they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of
marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two
cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in
evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's
residence, however, the same are inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against
unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2
which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly

14

describing the place to be searched and the persons or

things to be seized.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 11 It
may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include
the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In
this case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at
petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora
Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua, 12 this Court held:
As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the
appellant's house, the trial court correctly ignored it
apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially
the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the
warrantless search made inside the appellant's house
became unlawful since the police operatives were not
armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall
under "search made incidental to a lawful arrest," the
same being limited to body search and to that point
within reach or control of the person arrested, or that
which may furnish him with the means of committing
violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant
was admittedly outside his house when he was
arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner
portion of his house was within his reach or control.
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid
under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest.
The warrantless search made in his house, however, which
yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful
since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant
at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of
petitioner.
In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Section 8, in

relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425, as

amended. Under the said provision, the penalty imposed is six
years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos. With the passage of
Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on December 31,
1993, the imposable penalty shall now depend on the quantity
of drugs recovered. Under the provisions of Republic Act No.
7629, Section 20, and as interpreted in People
v. Simon 13 and People v. Lara, 14 if the quantity of marijuana
involved is less than 750 grams, the imposable penalty ranges
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal. Taking into
consideration that petitioner is not a habitual delinquent, the
amendatory provision is favorable to him and the quantity of
marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty imposed
under Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied. There being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty
shall be prision correccional in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be
taken from the medium period of prision correccional, which is
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years
and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is one (1) month and one
(1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 13976
dated January 16, 1995 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that petitioner Rodolfo Espano is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4)
months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

15

PEOPLE V. MENGOTE [210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22

JUN 1992]
Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call
from an informer that there were three suspicious looking
persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard
in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was
forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men
looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen.
They approached the persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to
escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The
suspects were then searched. One of them the accusedappellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in
it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were
taken from them and they were turned over to the police
headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before
the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of
firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among
the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police
including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to
prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to
possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was
planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for
violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not
admissible as evidence against him because it had been
illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was
illegal.

Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and

seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as
provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of
the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when:
(a) the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the
offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has
committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from
a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at
bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused appellant
was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen,
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was
apparently no offense that has just been committed or was
being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote
in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and
frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained
suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is
acquitted.
Manalili vs CAFacts:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of CAs
decision in affirming TCs decision on convicting Manalili of
illegalpossession of prohibited drug violating RA 6425.Police
operatives Espiritu, Lumabas and driver Enriquez conducted
surveillance along the front of Kalookan Cemetery basedon the
information that drug addicts were roaming around in the area,
saw a man who appeared to be high on drugs andintroduced
themselves as policemen. Said man avoided them and tried to

16

resist, when they asked what the man washolding in his hand,
the man held out his wallet and allowed Espiritu to examine it,
who found what he suspected to becrushed mj leaves. The
man was brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit and turned out to
be Manalili. The substance found on
Manalilis wallet was sent to NBI Foresic Chemistry Section
and was confirmed as mj.Manalilis version of the story was
that early afternoon he was riding in a tricycle when 3
policemen stopped the tricycle
and informed them of the suspected possession of mj, the
policemen bodily searched both Manalili and the driver
andupon finding nothing illegal on their persons, let the driver
go but brought Manalili along to the police station.
Manaliliwhile on the way to the station saw a neighbor whom
he signaled to follow them and when he was again searched
in thestation, he was asked to strip his pants where they found
nothing illegal. Said neighbor then asked the policemen to
letManalili go seeing as they had not found anything illegal but
Manalili was put on a cell who was brought to a fiscal later
thatday and was told not to say anything despite his saying
that the policemen had not found mj on his person. Said
tricycledriver and neighbor testified on court as to
how the 2 searches yielded nothing illegal on Manalilis
person.
Issues:
1.
W/N evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is admissible.2.
W/N Manalilis actions constituted a waiver of his rights.
3.
W/N the evidence is sufficient to prove Manalilis guilt.

Ruling:
I.
I. In Terry vs Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the
vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a
citizenon the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons:
W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which
leadshim reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
heis dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself
asa policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
hisreasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct
acarefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used toassault
him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly
beintroduced in evidence against the person from whom
they were taken.It did not, however abandon the rule that the
police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances. As People
vs Lacernaenumerated 5 recognized exceptions to the rule
against warrantless searches and seizures: 1) search incidental
to lawfularrest; 2) search of moving vehicles; 3) seizure in plain
view; 4) customs search; 5) waiver of the accused of his rights
against
unreasonable searches and seizures. From Espiritus
experience as a member of the Anti
-Narcotics Unit of Caloocan City
Police, Manalilis suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug
addicts who were high.
II.

17

SGs contention that Manalili effectiv

ely waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained
when he failed toraise this issue or object during trial. A valid
waiver of right against unreasonable searches and seizures
require theconcurrence of these requisites: 1) the right to be
waived existed; 2) the person waiving it had knowledge; and
3) he/shehad actual intention to relinquish the right. In this
case however, it is deemed that Manalili has waived such right
for failureto raise its violation before the trial court, at the
earliest opportunity possible. Issues not raised below cannot
be pleadedfor the first time on appeal.
Manalilis contention that the charge was trumped up to extort
money and testimonies of the arresting officers were
inconsistent, it held that the tri
al courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
particularly when affirmed by CA is
accorded great weight and respect as it had opportunity to
observe their demeanor and deportment as they
testifiedbefore it.The elements of illegal possession of mj are:
a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be aprohibited drug; b) such possession is not
authorized by law; and c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said
drug. The substance found on Manalilis w
allet was identified as mj which was prohibited and knowingly
without authority.Considering that he was high and tried
to avoid and resist, such behavior clearly shows that he knew
he was holding mj andit was prohibited by law
PEOPLE VS COGAED
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects
through Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution is essential to
allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail
themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged compromise
with the battle against dangerous drugs is more apparent than
real. Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers

neglect to perform what could have been done to uphold the

Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this scourge of
society.
Squarely raised in this appeal1 is the admissibility of the
evidence seized as a result of a warrantless arrest. The police
officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that were
not based on their personal knowledge. The information as to
the accuseds whereabouts was sent through a text message.
The accusedwho never acted suspicious was identified by a
driver. The bag that allegedly contained the contraband was
required to be opened under intimidating circumstances and
without the accused having been fully apprised of his rights.
This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the
Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that would
allow a legitimate "stop and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of
rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and
without improper pressure or coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be
excluded consistent with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the
Constitution. There being no possible admissible evidence, the
accused should be acquitted.
I
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November
25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan)
of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union,
"received a text message from an unidentified civilian
informer"2 that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat)
"[would]be transporting marijuana"3 from Barangay LunOy, San
Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. 4
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the
suspect."5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr.
(SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set
up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San
Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.6 A passenger jeepney
from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatacs

18

checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to

SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were
carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the two
male passengers who were later identified as Victor
RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. 9 Cogaed was
carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a
yellow bag.10
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents
of their bags.11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that
they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a
favor for their barriomatenamed Marvin.12 After this exchange,
Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what
looked like marijuana.13 Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko
daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam ti nagyanna,"which
translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the
bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao
and brought them to the police station." 15 Cogaed and Dayao
"were still carrying their respective bags"16inside the station.17
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator
PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and
Dayao to empty their bags.18 Inside Cogaeds sack was "four
(4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops," 19 and
inside Dayaos yellow bag was a brick of suspected
marijuana.20
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory
testing.21 PSI Bayan personally delivered the suspected
marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory.22 Forensic Chemical
Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed
the tests and found that the objects obtained were indeed
marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from Cogaeds blue bag
had a total weight of 8,091.5 grams.24 The marijuana from
Cogaeds sack weighed 4,246.1 grams. 25 The marijuana
collected from Dayaos bag weighed 5,092 grams.26 A total of
17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaeds and Dayaos
bags.27

According to Cogaeds testimony during trial, he was at

Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a jeepney to take him" 28to the
Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide. 29 He
boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger brothers
friend.30 Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao
and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly
"asked for [Cogaeds] help in carrying his things, which included
a travelling bag and a sack."32 Cogaed agreed because they
were both going to the market.33 This was when SPO1
Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac asked
Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did
not know.34 SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however,
Cogaed was not privy to their conversation. 35Thereafter, SPO1
Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the
police station.36 These facts were corroborated by an
eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the
parking lot where Cogaed was apprehended. 37
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit
[him] on the head."38 The bags were also opened, but Cogaed
never knew what was inside.39
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana
when he and Dayao were charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165. 40 The
information against them states:
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the
Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y
SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN
DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their control,
custody and possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug,
with a total weight of seventeen thousand,four hundred twentynine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.

19

CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs),

Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002").41
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San
Fernando City, La Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not
guilty.43 The case was dismissed against Dayao because he
was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt from
criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006 or Republic Act No. 9344.44Trial against Cogaed ensued.
In a decision45 dated May 21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court
found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y
Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002")
and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and to pay a
fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).46
The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaeds arrest illegal
considering that "Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment
of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that hewas
about to do so or that had just done so. He just alighted from
the passenger jeepney and there was no outward indication
that called for his arrest."47 Since the arrest was illegal, the
warrantless search should also be considered
illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding
the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object to
such irregularity" 49 when "he did not protest when SPO1
Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his
bag."50
Cogaed appealed51 the trial courts decision.However, the
Court of Appeals denied his appeal and affirmed the trial
courts decision.52 The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed
waived his right against warrantless searches when "[w]ithout

any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his

bag."53 Hence, this appeal was filed.
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellants
brief:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF
AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS
DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND
EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS
DRUGS.54
For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there
was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the
appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained through the search
should be admitted; and (3) whether there was enough
evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a
discussion with respect to the requirements on the chain of
custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.55
We find for the accused.
II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by
implication in our Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of
its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of

20

unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of

the Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and
diligence whether searches and seizures are "reasonable." As
a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets
all the requirements of this provision are reasonable. This
warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only
be determined by a judge.56 The existence of probable cause
must be established by the judge after asking searching
questions and answers.57 Probable cause at this stage can
only exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also,
the warrant frames the searches done by the law enforcers.
There must be a particular description of the place and the
things to be searched.58
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable
even when warrantless.59 In the Rules of Court,
searchesincidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a
separate warrant.60 This court has taken into account the
"uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose
of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made,
the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured."61 The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable
warrantless searches and seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the

government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62 (Citations
omitted)
III
One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is
"stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches are often confused
with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of
Court.63 Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a
crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the person
arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as
to preserve the evidence.64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to
prevent the occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in
Posadas v. Court of Appeals65 was similar "to a stop and frisk
situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a
suspicious individual or to maintain the status quomomentarily
while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." 66 This
court stated that the "stop and frisk" search should be used
"[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal
situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to
secure . . . a search warrant." 67
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk"
search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of
reasonability required by the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as
Terrysearches68) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law

21

enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the

commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced
with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance
with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in
the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in.
This may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe
police officer. Experienced police officers have personal
experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.
Hence, they should have the ability to discern based on
facts that they themselves observe whether an individual is
acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would
be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge,
must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were
initially informed about a place frequented by people abusing
drugs.70 When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a
man with "reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying
manner."71 The suspicion increased when the man avoided the
police officers.72 These observations led the police officers to
conclude that the man was high on drugs.73 These were
sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to stop[the]
petitioner [and] investigate."74
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who
appeared drunk.76 This man was also "wearing a camouflage
uniform or a jungle suit."77 Upon seeing the police, the man
fled.78 His flight added to the suspicion.79After stopping him,
the police officers found an unlicensed "homemade
firearm"80 in his possession.81 This court ruled that "[u]nder the
circumstances, the government agents could not possibly
have procured a search warrant first."82 This was also a valid
search.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed
facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes
and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience,

is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A

drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as
well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger
carrying a bag and traveling aboarda jeepney. There was
nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney
or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made
by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver
who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:
COURT:
Q So you dont know what was the content while it was still
being carried by him in the passenger jeep?
WITNESS:
A Not yet, Your Honor.83
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:
COURT:
Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused,
did you have reason to believe that the accused were carrying
marijuana?
WITNESS:
A No, Your Honor.84
The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have
been identified by the police officers otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead
to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police
officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be
stopped and reasonably searched.85 Anything less than this
would be an infringementupon ones basic right to security of
ones person and effects.
IV
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer
an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable
cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals,86 one of the earliest

22

cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine

jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe suspicious
circumstances as probable cause:
The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was
a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in
the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to
inspect the same.87 (Emphasis supplied)
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a
reasonable ground of suspicionsupported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged."88
Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further.
It does not have to be probable cause,but it cannot be mere
suspicion.90 It has to be a "genuine reason"91 to serve the
purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:92
Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is
not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds
that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him.93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin
reminds us that police officers must not rely on a single
suspicious circumstance.95 There should be "presence of more
than oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken together,
warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." 96 The
Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures."97 Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious
circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable
search.98
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case,
and there was no approximation for the probable cause

requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was

noteven the person mentioned by the informant. The informant
gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was
Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by
saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still
remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been
enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a
valid search warrant.
V
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded
by this exception, unless there is compliance with the "genuine
reason" requirement and that the search serves the purpose of
protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:
[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
more pressing interest of safety and self-preservationwhich
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.99 (Emphasis supplied)
The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer
clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous
weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows "stop
and frisk" for cases involving dangerous drugs.
The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v.
Aruta.102 In that case, an informant told the police that a certain
"Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by
bus.103 At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared
themselves.104 The informant pointed at a woman crossing the
street105 and identified her as "Aling Rosa."106 The police
apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed

23

them to look inside her bag.107 The bag contained marijuana

leaves.108
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure
conducted was illegal.109 There were no suspicious
circumstances that preceded Arutas arrest and the
subsequent search and seizure.110 It was only the informant
that prompted the police to apprehend her.111 The evidence
obtained was not admissible because of the illegal
search.112 Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.113
Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the
jeepney driver, not the polices informant, who informed the
police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v.
Aminnudin.114 Here, the National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI)
acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing
drugs.115 The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted
Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat. 116 Like in
the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudins bag and found
bundles of what turnedout to be marijuana leaves. 117 The court
declared that the searchand seizure was illegal. 118 Aminnudin
was acquitted.119
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same
circumstances. In this case, the police had been receiving
information that the accused was distributing drugs in
"different karaoke bars in Angeles City." 121 One night, the
police received information that thisdrug dealer would be
dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a
stakeout.122 A car "arrived and parked"123 at the hotel.124The
informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was
dealing drugs.125 The man alighted from his car.126 He was
carrying a juice box.127 The police immediately apprehended
him and discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person
and in the juice box he was holding. 128
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or
suspicious about Chuas situation when the police

apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no validstop-andfrisk."129

VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to
allow the evidence to be admissible.The facts of this case do
not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches
incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there
should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless
arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer
or a private person may, withouta warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of
arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5
of the Rules of Court were present whenthe arrest was made. At
the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was
not committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in People v.
Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto be
affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to
bearrested must execute anovert act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done inthe presence or within

24

the view of the arresting officer." 130 Both elements were

missing when Cogaed was arrested.131 There were no overt
acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that
Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence,
he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless
arrest.
VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds constitutional rights
even if we assume that he did not object when the police
asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated:
Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to
such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there
was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee.132(Citations omitted) Cogaeds
silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction
to a coercive environment brought about by the police officers
excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution
and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a
constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and
free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be
presumed.
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the
police officer can be discerned again from the testimony of
SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:
ATTY. BINWAG:
Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them
what are the contents of their bags, is it not?
WITNESS:
A Yes, maam.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened
their bags, is it not?
A Yes, maam.

Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the
bags?
A None, maam.
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them
what were the contents ofthe bag, you have not seen any signs
of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?
A It seems they were frightened, maam.
Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation
from them in opening the bags, is it not?
A Yes, maam but when I went near them it seems that they
were surprised.133 (Emphasis supplied)
The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1
Taracatacs responses to Judge Florendos questions:
COURT:
....
Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I
observed that he was somewhat frightened.1wphi1 He was a
little apprehensive and when he was already stepping down and
he put down the bag I asked him, "whats that," and he
answered, "I dont know because Marvin only asked me to
carry."134
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional
right, it is not sufficient that the police officerintroduce himself or
herself, or be known as a police officer.1wphi1 The police
officer must also inform the person to be searched that any
inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of any of his or
her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a
reasonable search. The police officer must communicate this
clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to
waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be
anassurance given to the police officer that the accused fully
understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a
persons constitutional right to privacy requires no less.

25

VIII
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.135
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional provision originated
from Stonehill v. Diokno.136 This rule prohibits the issuance of
general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing
expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures
should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures." 137 It ensures
that the fundamental rights to ones person, houses, papers,
and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed
were founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of
the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left
to convict Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the
fight to eradicate this menace, law enforcers should be
equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties
better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our
societys fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution.
Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling the very
foundations of the society that we seek to protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union and of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby
REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR
COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
RELEASED from confinement unless he is being heldfor some
other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

FAJARDO VS PEOPLE
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the February 10,
2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed
with modification the August 29, 2006 decision [2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, finding petitioner
guilty of violating Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as
amended.
The facts:
Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were
charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended, before the
RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in the
morning, in Barangay Andagao,
Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan,
Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one
another, without authority of law, permit or
license, did then and there, knowingly,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
their possession, custody and control two
(2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel
[No.] M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and
Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced
serial number, two (2) pieces short
magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five
(35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56
caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live
caliber .45 ammunition, which items were
confiscated and recovered from their
possession during a search conducted by

26

members of the Provincial Intelligence

Special Operation Group, Aklan Police
Provincial Office, Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue
of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 issued by
OIC Executive Judge Dean Telan of the
Regional Trial Court of Aklan.[3]
When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged.[4] During pre-trial, they agreed to the
following stipulation of facts:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

The search warrant subject of this case

exists;
Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same
person subject of the search warrant in this
case who is a resident of Sampaguita Road,
Park Homes, Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan;
Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of
Elenita Fajardo in the evening of August 27,
2002 but does not live therein;
Both accused were not duly licensed
firearm holders;
The search warrant was served in the
house of accused Elenita Fajardo in the
morning of August 28, 2002; and
The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio
were not arrested immediately upon the
arrival of the military personnel despite the
fact that the latter allegedly saw them in
possession of a firearm in the evening of
August 27, 2002.[5]

As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC

and the CA,[6] these are the chain of events that led to the filing
of the information:

In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the

Provincial Intelligence Special Operations Group (PISOG) were
instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent Edgardo
Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of
concerned citizens residing on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita
Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay Andagao, Kalibo,
Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the residence of
petitioner were indiscriminately firing guns.
Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial
Office, the elements of the PISOG proceeded to the area. Upon
arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons scampered
and ran in different directions. The responding team saw Valerio
holding two .45 caliber pistols. He fired shots at the policemen
before entering the house of petitioner.
Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun
between her waist and the waistband of her shorts, after which,
she entered the house and locked the main door.
To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from
entering petitioners house but, in order to deter Valerio from
evading apprehension, they cordoned the perimeter of the
house as they waited for further instructions from P/Supt.
Mendoza. A few minutes later, petitioner went out of the house
and negotiated for the pull-out of the police troops. No
agreement materialized.
At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002,
Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio Nava (SPO2 Nava), who was
posted at the back portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge
twice on top of the house and throw something. The discarded
objects landed near the wall of petitioners house and inside the
compound of a neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava, together
with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega), radio

27

announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered the

discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2) receivers of .
45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with serial number
(SN) 763025, and model no. M1911A1 US, with a defaced
serial number. The recovered items were then surrendered to
SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1 Tan), Group Investigator, who
utilized them in applying for and obtaining a search warrant.
The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m.
Together with a barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and
members of the media, as witnesses, the police team
proceeded to search petitioners house. The team found and
was able to confiscate the following:
1.

Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite

Rifle;
2. Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56
Caliber; and
3. Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45
pistol.
Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any
documents showing their authority to possess the confiscated
firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal
information for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against them.
For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that
the issuance of the search warrant was defective because the
allegation contained in the application filed and signed by
SPO1 Tan was not based on his personal knowledge. They
quoted this pertinent portion of the application:
That this application was founded on
confidential information received by the

Provincial Director, Police Supt. Edgardo

Mendoza.[7]
They further asserted that the execution of the search
warrant was infirm since petitioner, who was inside the house at
the time of the search, was not asked to accompany the
policemen as they explored the place, but was instead ordered
to remain in the living room (sala).
Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to
sign the inventory/receipt prepared by the raiding team,
because the items allegedly belonged to her brother, Benito
Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked
in her waistband when the raiding team arrived. She averred
that such situation was implausible because she was wearing
garterized shorts and a spaghetti-strapped hanging blouse. [8]
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused,
holding that the same were already denied in the Orders dated
December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005, respectively denying
the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Demurrer to
Evidence. The said Orders were not appealed and have thus
attained finality. The RTC also ruled that petitioner and Valerio
were estopped from assailing the legality of their arrest since
they participated in the trial by presenting evidence for their
defense. Likewise, by applying for bail, they have effectively
waived such irregularities and defects.
In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of
firearms, the RTC explained:
Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita
Fajardo, is a former soldier, having served with the

28

Philippine Army prior to his separation from his

service for going on absence without leave
(AWOL). With his military background, it is safe
to conclude that Zaldy Valerio is familiar with and
knowledgeable about different types of firearms
and ammunitions. As a former soldier,
undoubtedly, he can assemble and disassemble
firearms.
It must not be de-emphasize[d] that the
residence of Elenita Fajardo is definitely not an
armory or arsenal which are the usual
depositories for firearms, explosives and
ammunition. Granting arguendo that those
firearms and ammunition were left behind by
Benito Fajardo, a member of the Philippine army,
the fact remains that it is a government property.
If it is so, the residence of Elenita Fajardo is not
the proper place to store those items. The logical
explanation is that those items are stolen
property.
xxxx
The rule is that ownership is not an
essential element of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. What the law requires
is merely possession which includes not only
actual physical possession but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to ones
control and management. This has to be so if the
manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The
same evils, the same perils to public security,
which the law penalizes exist whether the
unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its
owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of

this law[,] the proprietary concept of the

possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
xxxx
x x x. [I]n order that one may be found guilty
of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the
accused had no authority or license to possess a
firearm, and that he intended to possess the
same, even if such possession was made in good
faith and without criminal intent.
xxxx
To convict an accused for illegal possession
of firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866, as
amended, two (2) essential elements must be
indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of
the subject firearm ammunition or explosive which
may be proved by the presentation of the subject
firearm or explosive or by the testimony of
witnesses who saw accused in possession of the
same, and (b) the negative fact that the accused
has no license or permit to own or possess the
firearm, ammunition or explosive which fact may
be established by the testimony or certification of a
representative of the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or
permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive
(Exhibit G).
The judicial admission of the accused that
they do not have permit or license on the two (2)
receivers of caliber .45 pistol, model M1911A1 US
with SN 763025 and model M1911A1 of M16
Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16
ammunition, 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces

29

live caliber .45 ammunition confiscated and

recovered from their possession during the
search conducted by members of the PISOG,
Aklan Police Provincial Office by virtue of Search
Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 fall under Section 4 of
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. [9]
Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were convicted
of illegal possession of firearms and explosives, punishable
under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended
by R.A. No. 8294, which provides:
The penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the
firearm is classified as high powered firearm
which includes those with bores bigger in
diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such
as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser
calibered firearms but considered powerful such
as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire
magnum and other firearms with firing capability
of full automatic and by burst of two or three:
Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.
Both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
On September 1, 2006, only petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated October
25, 2006. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA.

The CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC,

but disagreed with its conclusions of law, and held that the
search warrant was void based on the following observations:
[A]t the time of applying for a search warrant,
SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan did not have personal
knowledge of the fact that appellants had no
license to possess firearms as required by law. For
one, he failed to make a categorical statement on
that point during the application. Also, he failed to
attach to the application a certification to that effect
from the Firearms and Explosives Office of the
Philippine National Police. x x x, this certification is
the best evidence obtainable to prove that
appellant indeed has no license or permit to
possess a firearm. There was also no explanation
given why said certification was not presented, or
even deemed no longer necessary, during the
application for the warrant. Such vital evidence
was simply ignored.[10]
Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside
petitioners residence were declared inadmissible in evidence.
However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen outside
the house of petitioner before the warrant was served were
admitted as evidence, pursuant to the plain view doctrine.
Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted
of illegal possession of a part of a firearm, punishable under
paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. They
were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) years,
six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days to five (5) years, four
(4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, and
ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine.

Ruling of the CA

30

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, [11] but the motion

was denied in the CA Resolution dated December 3, 2009.
[12]
Hence, the present recourse.
At the onset, it must be emphasized that the information
filed against petitioner and Valerio charged duplicitous
offenses contrary to Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, viz.:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint
or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses.
A reading of the information clearly shows that possession of
the enumerated articles confiscated from Valerio and petitioner
are punishable under separate provisions of Section 1, P.D.
No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294.[13] Illegal possession
of two (2) pieces of short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirtyfive (35) pieces of live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber, and
fourteen (14) pieces of live caliber .45 ammunition is
punishable under paragraph 2 of the said section, viz.:
The penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the
firearm is classified as high powered firearm
which includes those with bores bigger in
diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter
such as caliber .40, 41, .44, .45 and also lesser
calibered firearms but considered powerful such
as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire
magnum and other firearms with firing capability
of full automatic and by burst of two or three:

Provided, however, That no other crime was

committed by the person arrested.[14]
On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2)
receivers of a .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with
SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial
number, is penalized under paragraph 1, which states:
Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale,
acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms
or ammunition or instruments used or intended to
be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun,
.380 or .32 and other firearm of similar
firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to
be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was
committed.[15]
This is the necessary consequence of the amendment
introduced by R.A. No. 8294, which categorized the kinds of
firearms proscribed from being possessed without a license,
according to their firing power and caliber. R.A. No. 8294
likewise mandated different penalties for illegal possession of
firearm according to the above classification, unlike in the old
P.D. No. 1866 which set a standard penalty for the illegal
possession of any kind of firearm. Section 1 of the old law
reads:

31

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,

Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms of Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire
dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition. (Emphasis ours.)
By virtue of such changes, an information for illegal
possession of firearm should now particularly refer to the
paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized firearm is
classified, and should there be numerous guns confiscated,
each must be sorted and then grouped according to the
categories stated in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294, amending
P.D. No. 1866. It will no longer suffice to lump all of the seized
firearms in one information, and state Section 1, P.D. No. 1866
as the violated provision, as in the instant case, [16]because
different penalties are imposed by the law, depending on the
caliber of the weapon. To do so would result in duplicitous
charges.
Ordinarily, an information that charges multiple offenses
merits a quashal, but petitioner and Valerio failed to raise this
issue during arraignment. Their failure constitutes a waiver,
and they could be convicted of as many offenses as there
were charged in the information.[17] This accords propriety to
the diverse convictions handed down by the courts a quo.
Further, the charge of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294, including the validity of the search

warrant that led to their confiscation, is now beyond the province

of our review since, by virtue of the CAs Decision, petitioner and
Valerio have been effectively acquitted from the said charges.
The present review is consequently only with regard to the
conviction for illegal possession of a part of a firearm.
The Issues
Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the
discovery of the two (2) receivers does not come within the
purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid
intrusion was attendant and that no evidence was adduced to
prove that she was with Valerio when he threw the receivers.
Likewise absent is a positive showing that any of the two
receivers recovered by the policemen matched the .45 caliber
pistol allegedly seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts when
the police elements arrived. Neither is there any proof that
petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the alleged
throwing of the receivers.
Our Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers. We hold
that the receivers were seized in plain view, hence, admissible.
No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is
encapsulated in Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, which
states:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects

32

against unreasonable searches and seizures of

whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule
embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the
foregoing rule. Thus, evidence obtained through a warrantless
search and seizure may be admissible under any of the
following circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest;
(2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5)
when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.[18]
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain
view of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have
that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.[19] It applies when the following requisites concur: (a)
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which
he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be

evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to

seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion,
he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its
discovery inadvertent.[20]
Tested against these standards, we find that the seizure of the
two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol outside petitioners house
falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the
house and of the other law enforcers around the premises was
justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen
respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the
structure and sought refuge. The attendant circumstances and
the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio when the law
enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter
to believe that a crime was being committed. There was thus
sufficient probable cause for the policemen to cordon off the
house as they waited for daybreak to apply for a search warrant.
Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw,
on two different instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject
dwelling and throw suspicious objects. Lastly, considering the
earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had
reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown might be
contraband items, or evidence of the offense they were then
suspected of committing. Indeed, when subsequently
recovered, they turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber
pistol.
The pertinent portions of SPO2 Navas testimony are
elucidating:

33

Q When you arrived in that place, you saw policemen?

A Yes, sir.
Q What were they doing?
A They were cordoning the house.
Q You said that you asked your assistant team leader Deluso
about that incident. What did he tell you?
A Deluso told me that a person ran inside the house carrying
with him a gun.
Q And this house you are referring to is the house which you
mentioned is the police officers were surrounding?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, how long did you stay in that place, Mr. Witness?
A I stayed there when I arrived at past 10:00 oclock up to
12:00 oclock the following day.
Q At about 2:00 oclock in the early morning of August 28,
2002, can you recall where were you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was at the back of the house that is being cordoned by the
police.
Q While you were at the back of this house, do you recall any
unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court what was that incident?
A Yes, sir. A person went out at the top of the house and threw
something.
Q And did you see the person who threw something out of this
house?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court who was that person who
threw that something outside the house?
A It was Zaldy Valerio.

COURT: (to witness)

Q Before the incident, you know this person Zaldy Valerio?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know him?
A Because we were formerly members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
xxxx
PROS. PERALTA:
Q When you saw something thrown out at the top of the house,
did you do something if any?
A I shouted to seek cover.
xxxx
Q So, what else did you do if any after you shouted, take cover?
A I took hold of a flashlight after five minutes and focused the
beam of the flashlight on the place where something was
thrown.
Q What did you see if any?
A I saw there the lower [part] of the receiver of cal. 45.
xxxx
Q Mr. Witness, at around 4:00 oclock that early morning of
August 28, 2002, do you recall another unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q And can you tell us what was that incident?
A I saw a person throwing something there and the one that
was thrown fell on top of the roof of another house.
Q And you saw that person who again threw something from the
rooftop of the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was that person?
A Zaldy Valerio again.
xxxx
Q Where were you when you saw this Zaldy Valerio thr[o]w
something out of the house?

34

A I was on the road in front of the house.

Q Where was Zaldy Valerio when you saw him thr[o]w
something out of the house?
A He was on top of the house.
xxxx
Q Later on, were you able to know what was that something
thrown out?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A Another lower receiver of a cal. 45.
xxxx
Q And what did he tell you?
A It [was] on the wall of another house and it [could] be seen
right away.
xxxx
Q What did you do if any?
A We waited for the owner of the house to wake up.
xxxx
Q Who opened the fence for you?
A It was a lady who is the owner of the house.
Q When you entered the premises of the house of the lady,
what did you find?
A We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal. (sic)[21]
The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been
deliberate; nonetheless, their initial discovery was indubitably
inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized
contraband be identified and known to be so. The law merely
requires that the law enforcer observes that the seized
item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure.

Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two receivers were

admissible as evidence. The liability for their possession,
however, should fall only on Valerio and not on petitioner.
The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that
petitioner is not liable for illegal possession of part of a firearm.
In dissecting how and when liability for illegal possession
of firearms attaches, the following disquisitions in People v. De
Gracia[22] are instructive:
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
What the law requires is merely possession which
includes not only actual physical possession but
also constructive possession or the subjection of
the thing to one's control and management. This
has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to
be effective. The same evils, the same perils to
public security, which the law penalizes exist
whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited
weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish
the object of this law the proprietary concept of the
possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive
possession sufficient to convict a person for
unlawful possession of firearms or must there be
an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the
law? This query assumes significance since the
offense of illegal possession of firearms is
a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in
which case good faith and absence of criminal
intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special
law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not
necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the

35

intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the

special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent
to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A
person may not have consciously intended to
commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an
act, and that act is, by the very nature of things,
the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the
crime), there must be criminal intent; in the
second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough
that the prohibited act is done freely and
consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made
between criminal intent and intent to possess.
While mere possession, without criminal intent,
is sufficient to convict a person for illegal
possession of a firearm, it must still be shown
that there was animus possidendi or an intent to
possess on the part of the accused. Such intent
to possess is, however, without regard to any
other criminal or felonious intent which the
accused may have harbored in possessing the
firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the
intention of the accused to commit an offense
with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not
important in convicting a person under
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order
that one may be found guilty of a violation of the
decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no
authority or license to possess a firearm, and
that he intended to possess the same, even if
such possession was made in good faith and
without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental,
casual, or harmless possession or control of a
firearm cannot be considered a violation of a

statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of

weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Thus, although there is physical or constructive
possession, for as long as the animus
possidendi is absent, there is no offense
committed.[23]
Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a
firearm, is committed when the holder thereof:
(1)
(2)

possesses a firearm or a part thereof

lacks the authority or license to possess the
firearm.[24]

We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor

constructive possession of the subject receivers. The testimony
of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of
the house when the receivers were thrown. None of the
witnesses saw petitioner holding the receivers, before or during
their disposal.
At the very least, petitioners possession of the receivers was
merely incidental because Valerio, the one in actual physical
possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioners house.
Absent any evidence pointing to petitioners participation,
knowledge or consent in Valerios actions, she cannot be held
liable for illegal possession of the receivers.
Petitioners apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a
firearm can only proceed from the assumption that one of the
thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband
of her shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution
failed to convert such assumption into concrete evidence.

36

Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute

for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the offenses
are punishable under the Revised Penal Code, which
are mala in se, or in crimes, which are malum prohibitum by
virtue of special law.[25] The quantum of proof required by
law was not adequately met in this case in so far as petitioner
is concerned.
The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioners waistband
was not identified with sufficient particularity; as such, it is
impossible to match the same with any of the seized
receivers. Moreover, SPO1 Tan categorically stated that he
saw Valerio holding two guns when he and the rest of the
PISOG arrived in petitioners house. It is not unlikely then that
the receivers later on discarded were components of the two
(2) pistols seen with Valerio.
These findings also debunk the allegation in the
information that petitioner conspired with Valerio in committing
illegal possession of part of a firearm. There is no evidence
indubitably proving that petitioner participated in the decision
to commit the criminal act committed by Valerio.
Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner on
the ground of reasonable doubt. The constitutional
presumption of innocence in her favor was not adequately
overcome by the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal
possession of part of a firearm.
In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be
shown to exist: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b)

the fact that the accused who possessed the same does not
have the corresponding license for it. [26]
By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal
possession of part of a firearm must yield these requisites:
(a)
(b)

the existence of the part of the firearm; and

the accused who possessed the same does not
have the license for the firearm to which the seized
part/component corresponds.

In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond

reasonable doubt the
elements of the crime. The subject receivers - one with the
markings United States Property and the other bearing Serial
No. 763025 - were duly presented to the court as Exhibits E and
E-1, respectively. They were also identified by SPO2 Nava as
the firearm parts he retrieved af ter Valerio discarded them.
[27]
His testimony was corroborated by DYKR radio announcer
Vega, who witnessed the recovery of the receivers. [28]
Anent the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that, upon
verification, it was ascertained that Valerio is not a duly
licensed/registered firearm holder of any type, kind, or caliber of
firearms.[29] To substantiate his statement, he submitted a
certification[30] to that effect and identified the same in court.
[31]
The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the certification, would suffice
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element. [32]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10, 2009
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED with
respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo y Castro, who is
hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

37

Malacat v CA 283 SCRA 159 (December 12, 1997)

Facts:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response
to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu ofthe
Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the
Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3,
Quiapo,Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police
officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo,Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda.
They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with
eachgroup, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite
sides of the corner of
stop and frisk, where a warrant andseizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose
object is either to maintain the
status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain
more information
; and that the seizure of the grenade from
Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus
found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession
ofexplosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and
1day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than
30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18February
1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was
appealing to the Supreme Court. However, therecord of the
case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR
15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, theCourt of
Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court.
Quezon Boulevard -

near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting

suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. Yu and his
companions positioned themselves at strategic points and
observed both groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers
thenapproached one group of men, who then fled in different
directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and
apprehendedSammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized,
inasmuch as allegedly the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990,
likewise at PlazaMiranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt
to detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a
fragmentation grenade
tucked inside the latters front waist line. Yus companion,
police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from
whom a.
38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were
then brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an X mark at
the
bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.
Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly
recoveredfrom Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was
charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At
arraignment on 9October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel
de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the
charges and explained that heonly recently arrived in Manila.
However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him
with benches and guns. Petitioner wasonce again searched, but
nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court
when it was presented. In its decision dated 10February 1994
but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that
the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akinto a
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the
exception of stop and frisk.

38

Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is
that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same.The
Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests,
searches and seizures refers to those effected without avalidly
issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards
valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under
the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)has
been deno
minated as one in flagrante delicto, while that under
Section 5(b) has been described as a hotpursuit arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to
the following: (1) customs searches; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a
lawful arrest; and (6) a stop and frisk.
The concepts of a stop
-andfrisk and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest
must not be confused. These two types of warrantless
searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof
beforethey may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
precedent arrestdetermines the validity of the incidental
search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante
delicto or hot pursuitarrest preceding the search in light of the
lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting
officer, or an overtphysical act, on the part of Malacat,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going tobe committed. Plainly, the search
conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a
lawful arrest. On the

other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a

stop and frisk, it neverthe
less holds that mere suspicion or
a hunch will not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about
him. Finally, a stop
-andfrisk serves a two
-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underliesthe recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach aperson for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressinginterest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person withwhom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the stop
-andfrisk was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yus claim
that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to
bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is
neithersupported by any police report or record nor corroborated
by any other police officer who allegedly chased that
group.Second, there was nothing in Malaca
ts behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited
even mere suspicionother than that his eyes were moving very
fast
an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and
histeammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already
6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his
companionswere merely standing at the corner and were not

39

creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no

ground,probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was
armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as
he
admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the
front waistline of Malacat, and from all indications as to the
distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge,
assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could not
have
been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant
violations of Malacats rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections
2
and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

40

Malacat vs. Court of Appeals[GR 123595, 12 December

1997]Facts:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response
to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of
theWestern Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the
Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo,
Manila, was onfoot patrol with three other police officers (all of
them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila,
near the MercuryDrug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced
upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group,
comprised of three to fourmen, posted at opposite sides of the
corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store.
These men were actingsuspiciously with "their eyes moving
very fast." Yu and his companions positioned themselves at
strategic points and observedboth groups for about 30
minutes. The police officers then approached one group of
men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen
gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended
Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuchas
allegedly the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at
Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt
todetonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a
fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latter's "front waist
line."Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver
was recovered.Malacat and Casan were then brought to
Police Station 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of
the grenade andthereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did
not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered
from Malacat. On
30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3
of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October 199
0,petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of
not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and explained that he

onlyrecently arrived in Manila. However, severalother police

officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns.
Petitioner wasonce again searched, but nothing was found on
him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. In
its decisiondated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15
February 1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search
and seizure ofMalacat was akin to a "stop and frisk," where a
"warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by anarrest" and "whose object is either to maintain
the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to
obtain moreinformation"; and that the seizure of the grenade
from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court
thus foundMalacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of
explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to
suffer thepenalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30
years ofReclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February
1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was
appealing to theSupreme Court. However, the record of the
case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR
15988).In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with
theSupreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the
exception of stop and frisk.
Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is
that a warrant is needed in order to validly ef fect the same.
TheConstitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests,
searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly
issuedwarrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid
warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rulesof Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances

41

contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as

one "inflagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has
been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.Turning to valid
warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1)
customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3)seizure of
evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search
incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk."
Theconcepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to
a lawful arrest must not be confused. These two types of
warrantlesssearches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of
proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope. In asearch incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search. Here, there couldhave been no valid in flagrante
delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the
lack of personal knowledge on thepart of Yu, the arresting
officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat,
indicating that a crime had just been committed,was being
committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the search
conducted on Malacat could not have been oneincidental to a
lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it neverthelessholds that
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the policeofficer's
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed abouthim.
Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection,which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner,approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the morepressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the personwith whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against

to Yu's claim that Malacat was a member of the group which

attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2days earlier. This claim is
neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer whoallegedly chased
that group.Second, there was nothing in Malacat's behavior or
conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion otherthan that his eyes were "moving very fast"

an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his

teammates werenowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30
p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were
merely standingat the corner and were not creating any
commotion or trouble.Third, there was at all no ground, probable
or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly
weapon. None wasvisible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of Malacat,
and from allindications as to the distance between Yu and
Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was
indeed hiding a grenade,could not have been visible to Yu.
What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacat's
rights solemnly guaranteed inSections 2 and 12(1) of Article III
of the Constitution.
PEOPLE VS. MUSA [217 SCRA 597; G.,R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN
1993]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa
was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City.
Sgt. Ani wasordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to
conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian
informer guided Ani to Musas house and gave the description
42

of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried

marijuana for P10.00.
Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his

it may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and

right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani

seizure, as an incident to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend

proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned

beyond the person of the one arrested to include

themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position,

the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.

Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the

Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in

house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted

the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be

more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money.

presented asevidence. The plain view doctrine is usually

Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two

applied where a police officer is not searching

newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened

for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently

and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the

comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the

other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested

seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object

Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living

is not apparent from the plain view of the object.

room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife
who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the

In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of

kitchen and found a cellophane colored white and stripe

the police. They arrested the accused in the living room and

hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa about

moved into the kitchen insearch for other evidences where they

its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and

found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside

found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed

the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain

under arrest.

view of said object.

Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the
marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible
43

seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant

to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.
132 People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001]
Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur Facts: On 26
December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariias, Cavite, to
search the residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan
St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness
SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer,
he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit.
The sale took place in Salunguit's room, and Badua saw that
the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his
room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was
later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At about
10:30 p.m. of said day, a group of about 10 policemen, along
with one civilian informer, went to the residence of Salunguit to
serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked on
Salanguits door, but nobody opened it. They heard people
inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives
then forced the door open and entered the house. After
showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt.
Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found
12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a
white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a
white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves
which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having
a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the
items seized was prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it.
After the search, the police operatives took Salanguit with
them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with
the items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory
examination of the confiscated evidence. The white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those
contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams

were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing
425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be
marijuana. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for
violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of
shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q- 9564358, respectively) were filed on 28 December 1995. After
hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, convicting
Salanguit in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for
violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively, RA 6425, and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a
minimum of 6 months of arresto mayor and a maximum of 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, and reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00, respectively.
Salanguit appealed; contesting his conviction on the grounds
that (1) the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from
his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the
warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility in
evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Salanguit to the
"plain view" doctrine; and (3) the employment of unnecessary
force by the police in the execution of the warrant. Issue:
Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence
to support the seizure of drug Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) paraphernalia, and whether the
marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the plain
view doctrine. Held: The warrant authorized the seizure of
"undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia."
Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the
existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The
fact that there was no probable cause to support the application
for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be
material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the
police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search
warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void

44

only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia,

but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the
seizure of shabu from Salanguit's residence, Search Warrant
160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on
probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath
or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. With respect to, and in light of the "plain view
doctrine," the police failed to allege the time when the
marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or
whether it was recovered on Salanguit's person or in an area
within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had
been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1
Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed
the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.
People vs. Aminnudin [GR L-74860, 6 July 1988] First
Division, Cruz (J): 3 concur Facts: Idel Aminnudin y Ahni was
arrested on 25 June 1984, shortly after disembarking from the
M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 p.m., in Iloilo City. The PC officers
who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana
leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The
two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they
were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the
information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who
had also been arrested with him that same evening and
likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the

charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the

arresting officers absolving her after a "thorough investigation."
The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against
Aminnudin, who was eventually convicted, and Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 108 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) sentenced to
life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. Issue: Whether
there was ample opportunity to obtain a warrant of arrest
against Aminnudin, for alleged possession and transport of
illegal drugs. Held: It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by
the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had
no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag
he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had
earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who
reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat
with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they
received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest
(this was the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt.
Cipriano Querol, Jr.), another two weeks and a third "weeks
before June 25." There was no warrant of arrest or search
warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of
the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of
the government, Aminnudin was not caught in flagrante nor was
a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to
justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to
dispense with the obtention of the warrant. The present case
presented no urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the
PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within
which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its
arrival was certain. And from the information they had received,
they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of

45

Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who

was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his
own authority that "search warrant was not necessary."
People vs Mariacos Case Digest
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BELEN MARIACOS
GR NO. 188611 June 16 2010
FACTS:
October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with
secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who
informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in
a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the
poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1 plastic bag.
Further, the agent described a backpack bag with O.K.
marking. PO2 Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney and
positioned himself on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana
wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other passengers
about the owner of the bag, but no one know.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc
alighted together with other passengers. Unfortunately, he did
not noticed who took the black backpack from atop the
jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said
bag and 3 other bags were already being carried away by two
(2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced
himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under
arrest, but on the women got away.
DOCTRINES:

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the Judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH)
This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to
move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought.
This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the
absence of probable cause when a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless search
has been held to be valid only as long as officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the
search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
MALUM PROHIBITUM
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or
transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is
immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated
marijuana is not necessary.
Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid
defence. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not
exempting circumstances where the crime charge is malum
prohibitum

ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE

CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: The right of the People to be

46

PEOPLE VS. ARUTA [288 SCRA 626; G.R. NO. 120515; 13

APR 1998]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by
his informantthat a certain Aling Rosa will be arriving from
Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a

The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the

dangerous drugs of 1972

Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized

the drugs from the accused.

team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they
waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the informer
pointed out who Aling Rosa was, the team approached her
and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello
asked aling Rosa about the contents of her bag, the latter
handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves
packed in a plastic bag marked cash katutak.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a
demurrer to evidencealleging the illegality of the search and
seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed
that she had just come from Choice theatre where she
watched a movie Balweg. While about to cross the road an
old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag,
when she was later on arrested by the police. She has no
knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman
was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was
presented.

Held: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed

by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by
prevailing jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which
are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) "plain
view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the

47

government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces

The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant

expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public

and they did not do so. The seized marijuana was illegal and

thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion

inadmissible evidence.

amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a

criminal activity;
RULE 113, RULES OF COURT
4. Consented warrantless search;
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
5. Customs search;

officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a

person:

6. Stop and Frisk;

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an

offense;

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has

before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully

probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts

conducted.

or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed

it; and

The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has

was merely crossing the street and was not acting

escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is

suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was

serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case

committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect a

is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one

warrantless arrest of the accuseds bag, there was no

confinement to another.

probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person

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arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the

break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any

nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in

part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or

accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when

unlawfully detained therein.

RULE 126, RULES OF COURT

Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court;

return and proceedings thereon.

Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be

filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed with

(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the

the following:

judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory

thereof duly verified under oath.

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was

(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the

committed.

issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court

none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was

within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the

issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If

place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court

the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether

within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall

require that the property seized be delivered to him. The

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the

judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been

application shall only be made in the court where the criminal

complied with.

action is pending.

(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by
the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search.

enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions

The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed

of the judge.

search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may

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goods without search warrant issued by a competent

court, and that Papa denied the request of Magos
counsel that the bales be not opened and the goods not
examined.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.

Papa v. Mago
Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized member
of the Bureau of Customs, together with Alagao and other
elements of the counter-intelligence unit, seized 9 bales of
goods from two trucks. Said items, according to an
information, were misdeclared and undervalued. The cargo
owner, respondent in this case, claimed that the MPD seized
said goods without a search warrant.

The respondent judge issued an order restraining

petitioners from opening the nine bales in question.
However, some bales were already opened by examiners
of the BOC when the restraining order was received.

Respondent contended that, since the inventory of the

goods seized did not show any article of prohibited
importation, such articles should be released upon her
posting of the bond to be determined by court.
Petitioners contended however that most of the goods,
as shown in the inventory, were not declared and were
thus subject to forfeiture. Respondent judge issued an
order releasing the good upon the filing of the bond in the
amount of Php 40,000.00 to which the respondent
complied with.

Facts:

Petitioner Martin Alagao (head of the counterintelligence unit of the MPD), having received a reliable
information that a certain shipment of personal effects
were allegedly misdeclared and undervalued and were
to be released from the customs zone of the port of
Manila, conducted surveillance of said zone. With him
were petitioner Ricardo Papa, the Chief of Police of
Manila and a duly deputized member of the BOC, and
other elements of the counter-intelligence unit. The
information which reached Alagao specified that said
misdeclared and undervalued items were loaded on two
trucks.

The trucks left the gate where Alagaos group

conducted surveillance. However, such trucks were
later intercepted. The load of the two trucks consisted
of 9 bales of goods.

The cargo was owned by Remedios Mago while the

truck was owned by Valentin Lanopa. In their petition in
the CFI of Manila, they claimed that the MPD seized the

Issue: Is there a need to procure a warrant before search be

made?
Ruling:

The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction

over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of
the customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in possession or control, even if no warrant of
seizure or detention had previously been issued by the
Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and
forfeiture proceedings. In the case at bar, the moment
the BOC actually seized the goods in question, the BOC
acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of

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enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the

exclusion of the regular courts.

Petitioner Alagao and his companion policemen had

authority to effect the seizure without any search
warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and
Customs Code does not require said warrant in the
instant case. The Code authorizes persons having
police authority under Section 2203 to enter, pass
through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store
or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and
any trunk, package or envelope or any person on
board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited articles.

People v. Lo Ho Wing (alias Peter Lo), Lim Cheng Huat

(alias Antonio Lim) and Reynaldo Tia
Reynaldo Tia, a deep penetration agent of the SOG,
reported of his undercover activities on the suspected criminal
syndicate led by Lo and Lim. Moreover, Tia informed his
superior regarding their return to the country. Upon arrival in
the Philippines, Lo and Tia rode in one taxi cab while Lim rode
in another. They were pursued by the members of the
NARCOM and were stopped. With permission of Lo and Tia,
a tin can of tea was taken out of the red travel bag and, upon
examination by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory, contained
metamphetamine. Petitioner contend that a warrant was
needed.
Facts:

The Special Operations Group received a tip from one

of its informers about an organized group engaged in

the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband

goods and gunrunning. As part of the operations, the
recruitment of confidential men and deep penetration
agents was carried out to infiltrate the crime syndicate.
One of those recruited was Reynaldo Tia.

Tia was introduced to Lim Cheng Huat (Antonio Lim)

where the latter expressed a desire to hire a male travel
companion for his business trips abroad. Tia offered his
services and was hire. Together with Lim, Tia, in one of
the meetings in China, was introduced to Lo Ho Wing
(Peter Lo) whom tia found out to be the person he was to
accompany to China in lieu of Lim.

As deep penetration agent, Tia regularly submitted

reports of his undercover activities on the suspected
criminal syndicate to Capt. Luisito Palmera, head of
Oplan Sharon 887 the group created in order to bus the
suspected syndicate. Tia informed Palmera of their
return to the Philippines after they (Lo and Tia) left for
Hong Kong.

Upon arrival in the Philippines, they were met by Lim.

After Lim and Lo finished their conversation, Lo hailed a
taxicab. Lo and Tia boarded the taxicab while Lim
followed in another taxi cab. Meanwhile, the operatives
of the NARCOM (Narcotics Command), having been
notified by Palmera, stationed themselves in strategic
places around the arrival area. Upon seeing Lo and Tia
leave the airport, the operatives followed them. Along
Imelda Avenue, the car of the operatives overtook the
taxicab ridden by Lo and Tia and cut into its path which
forced the taxi driver to stop. The other tax cab carrying
Lim, however, sped away but was later caught on Retiro
Street, Quezon City.

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Going back to Lo and Tia, the operatives approached

the taxicab and asked the driver to open the baggage
compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved
from the back compartment of the vehicle. The
operatives requested from Lo and Tia permission to
search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of
the red travel bag owned by Lo. A certain Sgt.
Cayabyab, one of the operatives, pried the lid open,
pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and pressed it
in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline
white powder resembling crushed aluminium came out
of the bag. The sergeant then opened the tea bag and
examined its content more closely. He had the three
travel bags opened for inspection. From the red travel
bag, 6 tin cans were found, including the one previously
opened and nothing else was recovered from the other
bags.

The tea bag contained metamphetamine after

examination by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. One of
metamphetamines derivatives is metamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu/poor mans cocaine).

The three were charged with violation of Dangerous

Drugs Act of 1972.

Lo contends that the search and seizure was illegal.

He contends that the officers concerned could very well
have procured a search warrant since they had been
informed of the date and time of arrival of the accused
at the NAIA well ahead of time. Moreover, as claimed
by Lo, the fact that the search and seizure in question
were made on a moving vehicle does not automatically
make the warrantless search fall within the coverage of
exceptions of the necessity of a valid warrant to effect
search.

Ruling:

The search and seizure supported by a valid warrant is

not an absolute rule. As set forth in Manipon, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, there are at least 3 well-recognized
exceptions, namely: (a) a search incidental to an arrest,
(b) a search of a moving vehicle, and (c) seizure of
evidence in plain view. In the case at bar, there is a clear
showing that the search in question, having been made
in a moving vehicle, does not need a valid warrant to
effect search.

A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the

ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.
People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991] Third Division,
Bidin (J): 3 concur Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his
common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex,
Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita
Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to
them. Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to
a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract necessary
for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date
of shipment Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) and the name and address of the consignee, namely,
"WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland." Anita
Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the
former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves
and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's
representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown
corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the
packages, and sealed with masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's
box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
52

(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard

operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several
grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter
reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane
wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's packages was
opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried
marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and took
charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects. Thereupon, the
NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the
latter's stated address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter,
an Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special
Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX)
rendered the decision, convicting Marti of violation of Section 21
(b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i),
Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed. Issue: Whether an act of a
private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's
constitutional rights, be invoked against the State. Held: In the
absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The contraband
herein, having come into possession of the Government without the
latter transgressing the accused's rights against unreasonable search
and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should
not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense
charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and
seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at
that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that
which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof,
is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a

against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint

directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the
State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law
enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.

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