Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; GR No.

119347, March 17, 1999

(Civil Procedures Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation)
Facts: Petitioners discovered a public document, which is a declaration of
heirs and deed of confirmation of a previous oral agreement, of partition,
affecting the land executed by and among the respondents whereby
respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of
petitioners who are entitled thereto as legal heirs also.
Petitioners filed a complaint, denominated DECLARATION OF NULLITY
AND PARTITION against defendants with the RTC claiming that the
document was false and perjurious as the private respondents were not the
only heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been
made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be
declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all
the heirs.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of
the subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the MTC.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC
has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as
amended.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case.
Held: Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is one
incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said
court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or
in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the

claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance
(now Regional Trial Courts).
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and
void the document in question. While the complaint also prays for the
partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the
declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims asserted therein.

Case Digest: Lu vs. Ym, Sr.

CARPIO

MORALES,

J.:

FACTS:
The three consolidated cases stemmed from the complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership and Dissolution filed on August 14,
2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City by David Lu, et al.
against Paterno Lu Ym, Sr. and sons (Lu Ym father and sons) and LLDC.

That a judgment must become final at some definite point at the risk of
occasional error cannot be appreciated in a case that embroils not only a
general allegation of occasional error but also a serious accusation of a
violation of the Constitution, viz., that doctrines or principles of law were
modified or reversed by the Courts Special Third Division August 4, 2009
Resolution.
GRANTED.

The RTC ruled in favor of David et al. by annulling the issuance of the shares
of stock subscribed and paid by Lu Ym father and sons at less than par
value, and ordering the dissolution and asset liquidation of LLDC.
In G.R. No. 157381 wherein Lu Ym father and sons challenged the appellate
courts resolution restraining the trial court from proceeding with their motion
to lift the receivership order which was filed during the pendency of G.R. No.
153690, the Court, by Decision of August 26, 2008 resolved that the issue
was mooted by the amendment of the complaint and by the trial courts
decision
on
the
merits.
The Court, in a turnaround, by Resolution of August 4, 2009, reconsidered its
position on the matter of docket fees. It ruled that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case for David Lu, et al.s failure to pay the
correct docket fees, hence, all interlocutory matters and incidents subject of
the
present
petitions
must
consequently
be
denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolutions have become final and immutable.
HELD:
The
CIVIL

petition
LAW:

is
Immutability

meritorious.
of

decisions

The doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only to final and executory

decisions. Since the present cases may involve a modification or reversal of
a Court-ordained doctrine or principle, the judgment rendered by the Special
Third Division may be considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never
become
final.

Darma Maslag vs Elizabeth Monzon, William Geston, and Registry of Deeds

of Benguet

GR. No. 174908

June 17, 2013

FACTS:

In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with

declaration of nullity of original certificate of title against respondents. The
Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court.
After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an
OCT over petitioners property.
Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the MTC
without jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action. The presiding judge
declared that it will take cognizance of the case pursuant to Section 8, Rule
40 of the Rules of Court which provides for appeal from orders dismissing the
case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.
RTC thereafter reversed the decision of the MTC, prompting the petitioner to
file a Notice of Appeal.

Since the assessed value of the disputed property is only P12,400, MTC has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
In fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the proceedings
that originated from the MTC. It was a judgment issued by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by law and it is not within the courts, let alone the parties, to
themselves determine or conveniently set aside. Neither would the active
participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and
exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate
jurisdiction over the case.
The present court looks at what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by
the RTC, and not into what type of jurisdiction the RTC should have
exercised.
Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case is a
question that already involves the merits of the appeal, but the court
obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was improper to
begin with.
Wherefore, Petition for Review is denied for lack of merit. The Court affirms
the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the
respondents contention that the proper remedy is a Petition for Review
under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners ordinary appeal is the proper remedy
HELD:
No. The CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have
been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and not an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property,
original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC,
depending on the assessed value of the subject property.

Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg Leasing Corp.

Facts:Cyborg Leasing Corp filed before the MTC of Manila a case captioned "Damages
withprayer for a writ Replevin" against Conpac and Movers. It was alleged that pursuant toa
lease agreement, Cyborg had delivered one forklift to Conpac. The lease
agreementstipulated a monthly rental of P11,000.00 for the use of the equipment. Conpac
failedand refused to pay the stipulated rentals. Petitioner took control of the
operations ofConpac and seized all the cargoes and equipment in ludi g the subject
porklift.Petitioner ignored Cyborg's demand for the return to it of the equipment and the
formaldisclaimer of ownership made by Conpac. A Writ of Replevin was issued.Petitioner
was served with a copy of the summons and the latter filed a motion todismiss the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the of MTC sincethe
complaint had asked for the actual market value of the equipment, actual
damage,,exemplary damages and atty's fees. MTC dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.Cyborg filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injuction againstMTC Judge, COnpac and Movers before the RTC f
Manila. RTC granted Cyborg'sapplication for premininary injunction. Petitiner assails the
decision of RTC. Hence thispetition.Issue: WON, MTC has jurisdiction over the
complaint?Held: NOMTC's jurisdiction over the action filed by Cyborg is the
concern
of
the
case.
The jurisdiction of the court and the nature of the action must be determined
by theaverments in the complaints and the character of the relief sought. The complaint
filedby Cyborg with the MTC prayed for the return of the Nissan Forklift to it as the owner orin
the alternative for the payment of 150T plus damages, amount of unpaid lease andatty's
fees.It would be incorrect to argue that the actual damages in the form of unpaid
rentalswere just in incident of the action for the return of the forklift considering
that privaterespondent specifically sought in the complaint not only seizure of the forklift
frompetitioner Movers but also payment of unpaid and outstanding rentals.
MTC's dismissing the complaint was properly decreed, Petition for review is granted

Facts: Respondent Serquina filed a complaint for damages with the RTC
against petitioners Mangaliag and Solano. This complaint alleges that the
Serquina and his co-passengers sustained serious injuries and permanent
deformities from the collision of their tricycle with the petitioners dump truck
and the gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence of the petitioners in
driving the dump truck. Respondents seek damages in the form of medical
expenses amounting to P71,392.00. Respondents also claim P500,000.00 by
way of moral damages, as a further result of his hospitalization, lost income
of P25,000.00 or the nominal damages, and attorneys fees.

Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim. After pre-trial conference,

trial on the merits ensued. After the respondent rested his case, petitioners
testified in their defense. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. They alleged that
since the principal amount prayed for, in the amount of P71,392.00, falls
within the jurisdiction of MTC. Petitioners maintain that the courts jurisdiction
should be based exclusively on the amount of actual damages, excluding
therefrom the amounts claimed as moral, exemplary, nominal damages and
attorneys fee, etc.

The respondent opposed the motion saying that since the claim for damages
is the main action, the totality of the damages sought to be recovered should
be considered in determining jurisdiction. He relied on Administrative Circular
No. 09-94 which provides that in cases where the claim for damages is the
main cause of action. . . the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court Also, the petitioners defense of lack
of jurisdiction has already been barred by estoppel and laches. He contends
that after actively taking part in the trial proceedings and presenting a witness
to seek exoneration, it would be unfair and legally improper for petitioners to
seek the dismissal of the case.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed an MR which was denied.

Subsequently, they filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.
Mangaliag v. Pastoral

Issues: (1) Whether petitioners are barred from raising the defense of the
RTCs lack of jurisdiction? NO
(2) Whether it is the amount of P71,392.00 as medical expenses, excluding
moral, nominal damages and attorneys fees, which determines jurisdiction,
hence it is MTC which has jurisdiction? NO

Ruling:
(1) On the matter of estoppel and laches: In the present case, no judgment
has yet been rendered by the RTC. As a matter of fact, as soon as the
petitioners discovered the alleged jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or
neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal
element of laches to be absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not control
the present controversy. What happened in the Sibonghanoy, the party
invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when
the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an
exceptional case because of the presence of laches. But in this case, there is
no laches. Thus, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioners are
not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.
(2) On the issue which of the amounts is determinative of jurisdiction: The
well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint
and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all
or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. In the present case, the
allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent seeks to
recover not only his medical expenses, lost income but also damages for
physical suffering and mental anguish due to permanent facial deformity from
injuries sustained in the vehicular accident. Viewed as an action for quasidelict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2),
which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-delict
causing physical injuries.
Private respondents claim for moral damages of P500,000.00 cannot be
considered as merely incidental to or a consequence of the claim for actual
damages. It is a separate and distinct cause of action or an independent
actionable tort. It springs from the right of a person to the physical integrity of

his or her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and
assessable. Hence, the demand for moral damages must be considered as
a separate cause of action, independent of the claim for actual damages and
must be included in determining the jurisdictional amount.

If the rule were otherwise, i.e., the courts jurisdiction in a case of quasi-delict
causing physical injuries would only be based on the claim for actual
damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it can only award moral
damages in an amount within its jurisdictional limitations, a situation not
intended by the framers of the law.

(3) (Not really an issue raised by the respondent himself, but was
nonetheless discussed by the SC) On the issue whether a direct
recourse by petition for certiorari to the SC from the order of RTC:
Generally a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper, for it violates the
established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
Although this Court, the RTCs and the CA have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.
Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest
and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy
of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.

Be that as it may, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It

generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this
reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to
determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of
the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for
decision cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are
not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of
courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts
do not involve factual but legal questions.

In the present case, petitioners submit a pure question of law involving the
interpretation and application of paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No.
09-94. This legal question and in order to avoid further delay are compelling
enough reasons to allow petitioners invocation of this Courts jurisdiction in
the first instance.

(Maybe it is important to note that the petition for certiorari was filed from the
denial of the RTC of the petitioners motion to dismiss. There is no final
adjudication yet as to the complaint for damages.)

Medical Plaza vs Cullen Facts: Respondent Robert H. Cullen purchased from

MLHI condominium Unit No. 1201 of the Medical Plaza Makati covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 45808 of the Register of Deeds of
Makati. Said title was later cancelled and Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 64218 was issued in the name of respondent. On September 19, 2002,
petitioner, through its corporate secretary, Dr. Jose Giovanni E. Dimayuga,
demanded from respondent payment for alleged unpaid association dues
and assessments amounting to P145,567.42. Respondent disputed this
demand claiming that he had been religiously paying his dues shown by the
fact that he was previously elected president and director of petitioner.4
Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed that respondents obligation was a
carry-over of that of MLHI.5 Consequently, respondent was prevented from
exercising his right to vote and be voted for during the 2002 election of
petitioners Board of Directors.6 Respondent thus clarified from MLHI the
veracity of petitioners claim, but MLHI allegedly claimed that the same had
already been settled.7 This prompted respondent to demand from petitioner
an explanation why he was considered a delinquent payer despite the
settlement of the obligation. Petitioner failed to make such explanation.

Hence, the Complaint for Damages8 filed by respondent against petitioner

and MLHI,

Case Digest: MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. REYNALDO B.

DAWAY, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CATERPILLAR, INC.,
respondents. (G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004)
See more

Case Title:
MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in his
capacityas Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents.
(G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004)
Facts:The petitioner, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes
Manufactuirng Corporation,allegedly sold or offers the sale of garment
product using the trademark Caterpillar to the prejudice of Caterpillar, Inc.,
private respondent in this case. The respondent filed the case withthe RTC.
The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense
chargedcontending that the case should be filed with the MTC because
violation of unfair competition is penalized with imprisonment not exceeding 6
years under RA 7691.Issue:Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil
cases for violation of intellectual propertyrights?Ruling of the Court:The SC
held that under Section 163 of the IPC, actions for unfair competition shall be
brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing
laws. The law contemplatedin Section 163 of IPC is RA 166 otherwise known
as the Trademark Law. Section 27 of theTrademark Law provides that
jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks,
unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or
representation, is lodged with theCourt of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court). Since RA 7691 is a general law and IPC inrelation to Trademark
Law is a special law, the latter shall prevail. Actions for unfair
competitiontherefore should be filed with the RTC.
Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, Aug. 16, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were

married and had one daughter. After 3 years, the woman grew restless and
bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return to her old job as GRO in a
nightclub. One day, the woman left the family home together with their
daughter and told her servants that she was going to Basilan. The husband
filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati
City but was dismissed because the child was in Basilan. When he went to
Basilan, he didnt find them and the barangay office issued a certification that
respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner filed another petition for
habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable
in the entire country. The petition was denied by CA on the ground that it did
not have jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of
1997) gave family courts exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas
corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of
CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)

ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases

involving custody of minors in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family
courts exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.

HELD: Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because

nothing in RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors. The reasoning of CA cant be affirmed because it
will result to iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining
custody. The minor could be transferred from one place to another and
habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy since family courts take
cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction. Literal interpretation would
render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and contradiction. The
literal interpretation of exclusive will result in grave injustice and negate the
policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of children.

Madrinan vs. Madrinan, 527 SCRA 487, GR No. 159374, July 12, 2007
Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012

(Special Proceedings Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has concurrent

jurisdiction with the family courts of Habeas Corpus involving custody of
minors)
Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel,
petitioner left the conjugal abode bringing with him their three sons (2 of
which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna subsequently.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their
their 2 minor sons on the ground that petitioners act disrupted their
education and deprived them of their mothers care.
Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take
custody of their children and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas
corpus filed by respondent.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take
cognizance and ruling, that under the Family Code, respondent was entitled
to custody of the minors.
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition
for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the
family courts under RA 8369.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
involving custody of minors.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The
Court of Appeals should has cognizance of this case since there is nothing in
RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving
the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors.

The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with
family courts in said cases was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC
(April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ
of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family
Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines.

Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code which allows an award of damages
incident to an employer-employee relation, the damages awarded were not
proper as she is not an employee, but merely the wife of an employee.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction
over
petitioners
action.
(2) Whether or not the monetary award granted by the Labor arbiter has
already
reached
finality.

EVELYN TOLOSA VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R.
No.
149578.
April
10,
2003
Facts: Captain Virgilio Tolosa was master of the vessel M/V Donna owned by
Quana-Kaiun, and was hired through its manning agent, Asia Bulk Transport
Phils., Inc. (Asia Bulk). During channeling activities upon the vessels
departure from Yokohama on November 6, 1992, Capt. Tolosa was drenched
with rainwater. Subsequently, he contracted fever on November 11 which
was later on accompanied by loose bowel movement for the succeeding 12
days. His condition was reported to Asia Bulk and the US Coast Guard
Headquarters in Hawaii on November 15. However, before he could be
evacuated,
he
died
on
November
18,
1992.
Evelyn Tolosa, the widow, filed a complaint before the POEA for damages
against Pedro Garate, Chief Mate of the vessel, Mario Asis, Second Mate,
Asia Bulk and Quana-Kaiun. The case was transferred to the NLRC. The
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the widow, awarding actual damages plus legal
interest, as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On
appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was vacated and the
complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action pursuant to the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended. Sustaining
the NLRC, the CA ruled that the labor commission had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action filed by petitioner. Her cause did not arise
from an employer-employee relation, but from a quasi-delict or tort. Under

Held: (1) The Court affirmed that the claim for damages was filed not for
claiming damages under the Labor Code but under the Civil Code. The Court
was convinced that the allegations were based on a quasi-delict or tort. Also,
she had claimed for actual damages for loss of earning capacity based on a
life expectancy of 65 years, which is cognizable under the Civil Code and can
be recovered in an action based on a quasi-delict. Though damages under a
quasi-delict may be recoverable under the jurisdiction of labor arbiters and
the NLRC, the relief must be based on an action that has reasonable casual
connection with the Labor Code, labor statutes or CBAs. It must be noted
that a workers loss of earning capacity and backlisting are not to be equated
with wages, overtime compensation or separation pay, and other labor
benefits that are generally cognized in labor disputes. The loss of earning
capacity is a relief or claim resulting from a quasi-delict or a similar cause
within the realm of Civil Law. In the present case, Evelyn Tolosas claim for
damages is not related to any other claim under Article 217, other labor
statutes, or CBAs. She cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of
the Labor Code, which does not grant or specify a claim or relief. This
provision is only a safety and health standard under Book IV of the same
Code. The enforcement of this labor standard rests with the labor secretary. It
is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over action for
damages, in which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and
in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation
such
as
a
tort.
(2) On the finality of the award, the Court ruled that issues not raised in the
court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, the issue
being not brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals first, this cannot be
considered by the Supreme Court. It would be tantamount to denial of the
right to due process against the respondents to do so.

as the manager, however, it refused to comply with its undertaking to employ

Todaro on a permanent basis.
Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately
moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states,
among others, that the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of Forum Non-Conveniens a valid
PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES, INC. et. al. vs. ANTONIO D.
TODARO
G.R. No. 154830,

June 8, 2007,

ground for dismissing a complaint.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
RULING:
This

FACTS:

Court

enunciated

that the

doctrine

of forum

non

conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because

Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a

On January 16, 1998, herein respondent Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro)

ground. This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial

filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, a complaint for Sum

court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so

of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment against Pioneer

only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special

International Limited (PIL), Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI),

circumstances require the courts desistance; and that the propriety of

Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald)

dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a

and Philip J. Klepzig.

factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of

Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing

under the laws of Australia and is principally engaged in the ready-mix
concrete and concrete aggregates business. PIL and Todaro came to an
agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter
as a consultant for two to three months, after which, he would be employed

defense.

EN BANC[G.R. No. 149578. April 10, 2003]EVELYN TOLOSA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,QWANA KAIUN (through its resident-agent, FUMIO
NAKAGAWA), ASIA BULKTRANSPORT PHILS. INC., PEDRO GARATE and MARIO
ASIS, respondents.
FACTSEvelyn Tolosa, was the widow of Captain Virgilio Tolosa who was
hired by Qwana-Kaiun,through its manning agent, Asia Bulk, to be the master
of the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona.CAPT. TOLOSA had a monthly
compensation of US$1700, plus US$400.00 monthly overtimeallowance. His
contract officially began on November 1, 1992, as supported by his contract
of employment
when
he assumed
command of
the
vessel in
Yokohama, Japan. The vesseldeparted for Long Beach California, passing
by Hawaii in the middle of the voyage. At the timeof embarkation, CAPT.
TOLOSA was allegedly shown to be in good health.

During channeling activities upon the vessels departure from

Yokohama sometime onNovember 6, 1992, CAPT. TOLOSA was drenched
with rainwater. The following day, November7, 1992, he had a slight fever
and in the succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidlydeteriorated
resulting in his death on November 18, 1992. It was alleged that the request
foremergency evacuation of Capt Tolosa was too late.Because of the death
of CAPT. TOLOSA, his wife, EVELYN, as petitioner, filed aComplaint/Position
Paper before the POEA against Qwana-Kaiun, thru its resident-agent,

Mr.Fumio Nakagawa, ASIA BULK, Pedro Garate and Mario Asis, as

respondents. The case washowever transferred to the NLRC, when the
amendatory legislation expanding its jurisdiction,and removing overseas
employment related claims from the ambit of POEA jurisdiction.Petitioner
argues that her cause of action is not predicated on a quasi delict or tort, but
on thefailure of private respondents -- as employers of her husband (Captain
Tolosa) -- to provide himwith timely, adequate and competent medical
services under Article 161 of the Labor Code.Respondents aver that the
Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, since hercause did
not arise from an employer-employee relation, but from a quasi delict or
tort.Further, there is no reasonable causal connection between her suit for
damages and her claimunder Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code, which
allows an award of damages incident to anemployer-employee
relation.ISSUEWhether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the
subject matter.HELDThe SC held that the NLRC and the labor arbiter had no
jurisdiction over petitioners claim fordamages, because that ruling was
based on a quasi delict or tort per Article 2176 of the CivilCode. After
carefully examining the complaint/position paper of petitioner, we are
convinced that theallegations therein are in the nature of an action based on
a quasidelict or tort. It is evident that she sued Pedro Garate and Mario Asis
for gross negligence. Petitioners complaint/positionpaper refers to and
extensively discusses the negligent acts of shipmates Garate and Asis,
whohad no employer-employee relation with Captain Tolosa. The SC
stressed that the case does not involve the adjudication of a labor dispute,
but the recovery of damages based on a quasidelict. The jurisdiction of labor
tribunals is limited to disputes arising from employer-employeerelations.Not
every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only
labor arbitersand the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC
under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited todisputes arising from an
employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved byreference to
the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining
agreement.