G.R. No.

L-62339 October 27, 1983

SPOUSES MARIA LUISA P. MORATA AND JULIUS MORATA, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES VICTOR GO and FLORA C. GO and HON. VALERIANO P. TOMOL, JR.,
Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI, respondents.
Amado G. Olis for petitioners.
Paul G. Gorres for private respondents.

ESCOLIN., J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the Court is called upon to determine the classes of actions which fall
within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1508, 1 otherwise known as
Katarungang Pambarangay Law. This law requires the compulsory process of
arbitration at the Barangay level as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court,
Petitioners contend that said legislation is so broad and all-embracing as to apply to
actions cognizable not only by the city and municipal courts, now known as the
metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts, but also by the courts of first
instance, now the regional trial courts. Upon the other hand, respondents would limit
its coverage only to those cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts.
The antecedent facts are not disputed. On August 5, 1982, respondents Victor Go
and Flora D. Go filed in the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided by
respondent Judge Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr., a complaint against petitioners Julius
Morata and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages
amounting to P49,400.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-22154.
On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-litigants are all
residents of Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds therefor,
the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay
conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by
the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached
by the parties. The motion was opposed by private respondents.
On September 2, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to
dismiss.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in an order
dated October 3, 1982, as follows:
Considering the specific reference to City or Municipal Courts in the
provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of P.D. No. 1508, as the Courts to
which the dispute settled or arbitrated by the Lupon Chairman or
the Pangkat, shall be elevated for nullification of the award or for
execution of the same, and considering that from the provision of
Section 14 of the same law, the pre- condition to the filing of a
complaint as provided for in Section 6 thereof, is specifically
referred to, it is the considered opinion of this Court that the
provision of Section 6 of the law applies only to cases cognizable
by the inferior courts mentioned in Sections 11 and 12 of the law.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration filed by the
defendants, of the order of September 2. 1982, denying their
motion to dismiss, is hereby denied. [Annex 'G', p. 36, Rollo].
From this order, petitioners came to Us thru this petition. In a resolution dated
December 2, 1982, We required respondents to file an answer, and likewise granted
a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent judge from requiring petitioners to
file their answer and enter into trial in Civil Case No. R-22154.
We find the petition impressed with merit. Section 6 of P.D. 1508 reads as follows:
SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. No
complaint, petition, action for proceeding involving any matter within
the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be
filed or instituted in court or any other government office for
adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or
the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman,
or unless the settlement has been repudiated. However, the parties
may go directly to court in the following cases:
[1] Where the accused is under detention;
[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived
of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus
proceedings;
[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies
such as preliminary injunction, attachment,

delivery of personal property and support

pendente lite; and
[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by
the Statute of Limitations
Section 2 of the law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus:
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.The Lupon
of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes except:
[1] Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute
relates to the performance of his official functions;
[3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a
fine exceeding P200.00;
[4] Offenses where there is no private offended party;
[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in
the interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon
has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually
reside in the same city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction
whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised
at the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon by
paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal cases. In fact, in
defining the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law employed the universal and
comprehensive term "all", to which usage We should neither add nor subtract in
consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory construction that "where the law
does not distinguish, We should not distinguish. 2 By compelling the disputants to
settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay leader and other
respected members of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court
litigations between members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity
and cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation process at
the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in

court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the
quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited
to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective.
Worse, it would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would stop a party, say in
an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from bloating up his
claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court and
thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed, should the
law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and not in the
regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the
lawmakers could not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation.
The objectives of the law are set forth in its preamble thus:
WHEREAS, the perpetuation and official recognition of the timehonored tradition of amicably settling disputes among family and
barangay level without judicial resources would promote the speedy
administration of justice and implement the constitutional mandate
to preserve and develop Filipino culture and to strengthen the
family as a basic social institution;
WHEREAS, the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts of justice
contributes heavily and unjustifiably to the congestion of court
dockets, thus causing a deterioration in the quality of justice;
WHEREAS, in order to help relieve the courts of such docket
congestion and thereby enhance the quality of justice dispensed by
the courts, it is deemed desirable to formally organize and
institutionalize a system of amicably settling disputes at the
barangay level.
There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon "the authority
to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes, ... ," its obvious intendment was to grant to the
Lupon as broad and comprehensive an authority as possible as would bring about the
optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be halfmet and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.
Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases
cognizable by the inferior courts, then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof
the following rule on Venue, to wit:

Section 3. Venue. ... However, all disputes which involve real

property or any interest therein shall be brought in the Barangay
where the real property or and part thereof is situated.
for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically, jurisdiction over cases
involving real property or any interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer
cases, has always been vested in the courts of first instance [now regional trial court].
But it is pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections 11, 3 12, 4 and 14, 5 of the
law speak of the city and/or municipal courts as the forum for the nullification or
execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. We hold that
this circumstance cannot be construed as a limitation of the scope of authority of the
Lupon. As heretofore stated, the authority of the Lupon is clearly established in
Section 2 of the law; whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent
judge, deal with the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards
obtained at the barangay level. These sections conferred upon the city and municipal
courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification or
enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon, regardless of the
amount involved or the nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the
context of said sections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in
other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts.
Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22 issued by
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, 6 the full text of which is quoted as follows:
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE,
CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS COURTS, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS,
CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF
COURT
SUBJECT: Implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of
Local Government and Community Development that all the
barangays within your respective jurisdictions have organized their
Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise
known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation
of the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby
directed to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or
proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons.
Circular No. 12 dated October 20, 1978, issued by the late Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro is to that extent modified.

This Circular takes effect immediately.

It is significant that the above-quoted circular embodying the directive "to desist from
receiving complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling within the
authority of said Lupons," has been addressed not only to judges of city and
municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the courts of first instance, circuit
criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations, now
known as regional trial courts under B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted by
president Ferdinand E. Marcos in a Letter of Implementation, dated November 12,
1979, the first paragraph of which reads as follows: "with the view to easing up the
log-jam of cases and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of all government
offices involved in the investigation, trial and adjudication of cases, it is hereby
ordered that immediate implementation be made by all government officials and
offices concerned of the system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level as
provided for in the Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No. 1508]."
Therefore, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, We now declare that the
conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition
for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling under the
exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions
cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, and the order of respondent judge denying
petitioners' motion to dismiss is hereby set aside. Respondent judge is restrained
from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-22154, except to dismiss the
case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The instant petition draws its origin from an Action4 for recovery of possession of real
property situated in Sitio Abatan, Barrio Dagdag, Sagada filed by herein petitioner
before the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province on 9 November 1994, against
the spouses Leoncio and Florentina Manacnes, the predecessors-in-interest of herein
respondent.
On 23 February 1995, during the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through their
respective counsels, agreed to refer the matter to the Barangay Lupon (Lupon) of
Dagdag, Sagada for arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.5 Consequently, the proceedings before the MCTC were
suspended, and the case was remanded to the Lupon for resolution.6
Thereafter, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due to
the refusal of the Manacnes spouses to enter into an Agreement for Arbitration and
their insistence that the case should go to court. On 8 March 1995, the Certification,
as well as the records of the case, were forwarded to the MCTC.
An Order was issued by the MCTC on 7 April 1995, once more remanding the matter
for conciliation by the Lupon and ordering the Lupon to render an Arbitration Award
thereon. According to the MCTC, based on the records of the case, an Agreement for
Arbitration was executed by the parties concerned; however, the Lupon failed to issue
an Arbitration Award as provided under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, so that,
the case must be returned to the Lupon until an Arbitration Award is rendered.

G.R. No. 167261

March 2, 2007

ROSARIA LUPITAN PANG-ET, Petitioner,

vs.
CATHERINE MANACNES-DAO-AS, Heir of LEONCIO MANACNES and
FLORENTINA MANACNES,Respondent.

In compliance with the MCTC Order, the Lupon rendered an Arbitration Award on 10
May 1995 ordering herein petitioner to retrieve the land upon payment to the spouses
Manacnes of the amount of P8,000.00 for the improvements on the land. Aggrieved,
Leoncios widow,7 Florentina Manacnes, repudiated the Arbitration Award but her
repudiation was rejected by the Lupon. Thereafter, the MCTC was furnished with
copies of the Arbitration Award.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

On 1 June 1995, herein petitioner filed with the Lupon a Motion for Execution of the
Arbitration Award. On the other hand, Florentina Manacnes filed a Motion with the
MCTC for the resumption of the proceedings in the original case for recovery of
possession and praying that the MCTC consider her repudiation of the Arbitration
Award issued by the Lupon.

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019,
dated 9 February 2005, which reversed and set aside the Judgment2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36, Bontoc, Mountain Province, and reinstated the
Resolution3 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Besao-Sagada, Mountain
Province dismissing herein petitioners action for Enforcement of Arbitration Award
and Damages.

Subsequently, the MCTC heard the Motion of Florentina Manacnes notwithstanding

the latters failure to appear before the court despite notice. The MCTC denied
Florentina Manacnes Motion to repudiate the Arbitration Award elucidating that since
the movant failed to take any action within the 10-day reglementary period provided
for under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, the arbitration award has become final
and executory. Furthermore, upon motion of herein petitioner Pang-et, the MCTC
issued an Order remanding the records of the case to the Lupon for the execution of

DECISION

the Arbitration Award. On 31 August 1995, the then incumbent Punong Barangay of
Dagdag issued a Notice of Execution of the Award.
Said Notice of Execution was never implemented. Thus, on 16 October 2001, herein
petitioner Pang-et filed with the MCTC an action for enforcement of the Arbitration
Award which was sought to be dismissed by the heir of the Manacnes spouses.8 The
heir of the Manacnes spouses argues that the Agreement for Arbitration and the
Arbitration Award are void, the Agreement for Arbitration not having been personally
signed by the spouses Manacnes, and the Arbitration Award having been written in
English a language not understood by the parties.

Unfortunately, in this case, it was not respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who signed

the agreement to arbitrate as plaintiff herself admitted but another person. Thus, it is
very clear that the mandatory provisos of Section 413 and 415 of RA 7160 are
violated. Granting arguendo that it was Catherine who signed the agreement per
instruction of her parents, will it cure the violation? The answer must still be in the
negative. As provided for by the cited provisos of RA 7160, if ever a party is entitled to
an assistance, it shall be done only when the party concerned is a minor or
incompetent. Here, there is no showing that the spouses [Manacnis] were
incompetent. Perhaps very old but not incompetent. Likewise, what the law provides
is assistance, not signing of agreements or settlements.

x x x Are defendants estopped from questioning the proceedings before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa concerned?

Just suppose the spouses [Manacnis] executed a special power of attorney in favor of
their daughter Catherine to attend the proceedings and to sign the agreement to
arbitrate? The more that it is proscribed by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
specifically Section 415 of RA 7160 which mandates the personal appearance of the
parties before the lupon and likewise prohibits the appearance of representatives.

The defendants having put in issue the validity of the proceedings before the lupon
concerned and the products thereof, they are not estopped. It is a hornbook rule that
a null and void act could always be questioned at any time as the action or defense
based upon it is imprescriptible.

In view of the foregoing, it could now be safely concluded that the questioned
agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious for being violative of the mandatory provisions
of RA 7160 particularly sections 413 and 415 thereof as it was not the respondentsspouses [Manacnis] who signed it.

The second issue: Is the agreement to Arbitrate null and void? Let us peruse the
pertinent law dealing on this matter which is Section 413 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (RA 7160), to wit:

The third issue: Is the Arbitration Award now sought to be enforced effective? Much to
be desired, the natural flow of events must follow as a consequence. Considering that
the agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious as earlier declared, it follows that the
arbitration award which emanated from it is also inefficacious. Further, the Arbitration
Award by itself, granting arguendo that the agreement to arbitrate is valid, will readily
show that it does not also conform with the mandate of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law particularly Section 411 thereto which provides:

In its Resolution dated 20 August 2002, the MCTC dismissed the Petition for
Enforcement of Arbitration Award in this wise:

"Section 413 (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing
that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat. x
x x"
The foregoing should be taken together with Section 415 of the same code which
provides:
"Section 415. Appearance of parties in person. In all katarungang pambarangay
proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or
representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their
next-of-kin who are not lawyers."
It is very clear from the foregoing that personal appearance of the parties in
conciliation proceedings before a Lupon Tagapamayapa is mandatory. Likewise, the
execution of the agreement to arbitrate must be done personally by the parties
themselves so that they themselves are mandated to sign the agreement.

"Sec. 411. Form of Settlement All amicable settlements shall be in writing in a

language or dialect known to the parties x x x. When the parties to the dispute do not
use the same language or dialect, the settlement shall be written in the language
known to them."
Likewise, the implementing rules thereof, particularly Section 13 provides:
"Sec. 13 Form of Settlement and Award. All settlements, whether by mediation,
conciliation or arbitration, shall be in writing, in a language or dialect known to the
parties. x x x"
It is of no dispute that the parties concerned belong to and are natives of the scenic
and serene community of Sagada, Mt. Province who speak the Kankanaey language.
Thus, the Arbitration Award should have been written in the Kankanaey language.

However, as shown by the Arbitration Award, it is written in English language which

the parties do not speak and therefore a further violation of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.
IN THE LIGHT of all the foregoing considerations, the above-entitled case is hereby
dismissed.9
Petitioner Pang-ets Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, she filed an
Appeal before the RTC which reversed and set aside the Resolution of the MCTC
and remanded the case to the MCTC for further proceedings. According to the RTC:
As it appears on its face, the Agreement for Arbitration in point found on page 51 of
the expediente, dated Feb. 6, 1995, and attested by the Pangkat Chairman of the
Office of the Barangay Lupon of Dagdag, Sagada was signed by the
respondents/defendants spouses Manacnis. The representative of the Appellee in the
instant case assails such Agreement claiming that the signatures of her aforesaid
predecessors-in-interest therein were not personally affixed by the latter or are
falsified-which in effect is an attack on the validity of the document on the ground that
the consent of the defendants spouses Manacnis is vitiated by fraud. Indulging the
Appellee Heirs of Manacnis its contention that such indeed is the truth of the matter,
the fact still remains as borne out by the circumstances, that neither did said original
defendants nor did any of such heirs effectively repudiate the Agreement in question
in accordance with the procedure outlined by the law, within five (5) days from Feb. 6,
1995, on the ground as above-stated (Secs. 413 (a), 418, RA 7160; Secs. 7, 13, KP
Law; Sec. 12, Rule IV, KP Rules). As mandated, such failure is deemed a waiver on
the part of the defendants spouses Manacnis to challenge the Agreement for
Arbitration on the ground that their consent thereto is obtained and vitiated by fraud
(Sec. 12, Par. 3, KP Rules). Corollarily, the Appellee Heirs being privy to the now
deceased original defendants should have not been permitted by the court a quo
under the equitable principle of estoppel, to raise the matter in issue for the first time
in the present case (Lopez vs. Ochoa, 103 Phil. 94).
The Arbitration Award relative to Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) dated May 10, 1995,
written in English, attested by the Punong Barangay of Dagdag and found on page 4
of the record is likewise assailed by the Appellee as void on the ground that the
English language is not known by the defendants spouses Manacnis who are Igorots.
Said Appellee contends that the document should have been written in Kankana-ey,
the dialect known to the party (Sec. 413 (b), RA 7160; Sec. 7, Par. 2, KP law, Sec. 11,
KP Rules). On this score, the court a quo presumptuously concluded on the basis of
the self-serving mere say-so of the representative of the Appellee that her
predecessors did not speak or understand English. As a matter of judicial notice,
American Episcopalian Missionaries had been in Sagada, Mountain Province as early
as 1902 and continuously stayed in the place by turns, co-mingling with the
indigenous people thereat, instructing and educating them, and converting most to

the Christian faith, among other things, until the former left about twenty years ago.
By constant association with the white folks, the natives too old to go to school
somehow learned the Kings English by ear and can effectively speak and
communicate in that language. Any which way, even granting arguendo that the
defendants spouses Manacnis were the exceptions and indeed totally ignorant of
English, no petition to nullify the Arbitration award in issue on such ground as
advanced was filed by the party or any of the Appellee Heirs with the MCTC of
Besao-Sagada, within ten (10) days from May 10, 1995, the date of the document.
Thus, upon the expiration thereof, the Arbitration Award acquired the force and effect
of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 416, RA 7160; Sec. 11, KP Law; Sec. 13, KP
Rules); conclusive upon the original defendants in Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) and the
Appellee Heirs herein privy to said defendants.
In the light thereof, the collateral attack of the Appellee on the Agreement for
Arbitration and Arbitration Award re Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) should not have in the
first place been given due course by the court a quo. In which case, it would not have
in the logical flow of things declared both documents "inefficacious"; without which
pronouncements, said court would not have dismissed the case at bar.
Wherefore, Judgment is hereby rendered Reversing and Setting Aside the Resolution
appealed from, and ordering the record of the case subject thereof remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings.10
Aggrieved by the reversal of the RTC, herein respondent filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC Judgment. On 9 February 2005, the
appellate court rendered the herein assailed Decision, to wit:
After thoroughly reviewing through the record, We find nothing that would show that
the spouses Manacnes were ever amenable to any compromise with respondent
Pang-et. Thus, We are at a loss as to the basis of the Arbitration Award sought to be
enforced by respondent Pang-ets subsequent action before the MCTC.
There is no dispute that the proceeding in Civil Case No. 83 was suspended and the
same remanded to the Lupon on account of the Agreement to Arbitrate which was
allegedly not signed by the parties but agreed upon by their respective counsels
during the pre-trial conference. In the meeting before the Lupon, it would seem that
the agreement to arbitrate was not signed by the spouses Manacnes. More
importantly, when the pangkat chairman asked the spouses Manacnes to sign or affix
their thumbmarks in the agreement, they refused and insisted that the case should
instead go to court. Thus, the Lupon had no other recourse but to issue a certificate to
file action. Unfortunately, the case was again remanded to the Lupon to "render an
arbitration award". This time, the Lupon heard the voice tape of the late Beket
Padonay affirming respondent Pang-ets right to the disputed property. While Pang-et
offered to pay P8,000.00 for the improvements made by the spouses Manacnes, the

latter refused to accept the same and insisted on their right to the subject property.
Despite this, the Lupon on May 10, 1995 issued an Arbitration award which favored
respondent Pang-et.
From the time the case was first referred to the Lupon to the time the same was again
remanded to it, the Spouses Manacnes remained firm in not entering into any
compromise with respondent Pang-et. This was made clear in both the minutes of the
Arbitration Hearing on 26 February 1995 and on 9 April 1995. With the foregoing, We
find it evident that the spouses Manacnes never intended to submit the case for
arbitration.
Moreover, the award itself is riddled with flaws. First of all there is no showing that the
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was duly constituted in accordance with Rule V of the
Katarungan Pambarangay Rules. And after constituting of the Pangkat, Rule VI,
thereof the Punong Barangay and the Pangkat must proceed to hear the case.
However, according to the minutes of the hearing before the lupon on 9 April 1995,
the pangkat Chairman and another pangkat member were absent for the hearing.
Finally, Section 13 of the same Rule requires that the Punong Barangay or the
Pangkat Chairman should attest that parties freely and voluntarily agreed to the
settlement arrived at. But how can this be possible when the minutes of the two
hearings show that the spouses Manacnes neither freely nor voluntarily agreed to
anything.
While RA 7160 and the Katarungan Pambarangay rules provide for a period to
repudiate the Arbitration Award, the same is neither applicable nor necessary since
the Agreement to Arbitrate or the Arbitration Award were never freely nor voluntarily
entered into by one of the parties to the dispute. In short, there is no agreement
validly concluded that needs to be repudiated.
With all the foregoing, estoppel may not be applied against petitioners for an action or
defense against a null and void act does not prescribe. With this, We cannot but
agree with the MCTC that the very agreement to arbitrate is null and void. Similarly,
the arbitration award which was but the off shoot of the agreement is also void.
WHEREFORE, the RTC judgment of 2 June 2003 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
the MCTC Resolution DISMISSING the Civil Case No. 118 for enforcement of
Arbitration Award is REINSTATED.11
Vehemently disagreeing with the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner Pang-et
filed the instant petition. Petitioner maintains that the appellate court overlooked
material facts that resulted in reversible errors in the assailed Decision. According to
petitioner, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the original parties, as
represented by their respective counsels in Civil Case No. 83, mutually agreed to

submit the case for arbitration by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dagdag.
Petitioner insists that the parties must be bound by the initial agreement by their
counsels during pre-trial to an amicable settlement as any representation made by
the lawyers are deemed made with the conformity of their clients. Furthermore,
petitioner maintains that if indeed the spouses Manacnes did not want to enter into an
amicable settlement, then they should have raised their opposition at the first
instance, which was at the pre-trial on Civil Case No. 83 when the MCTC ordered that
the case be remanded to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for arbitration.
We do not agree with the petitioner.
First and foremost, in order to resolve the case before us, it is pivotal to stress that,
during the initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, the spouses Manacnes
declined to sign the Agreement for Arbitration and were adamant that the proceedings
before the MCTC in Civil Case No. 83 must continue. As reflected in the Minutes12 of
the Arbitration Hearing held on 26 February 1995, the legality of the signature of
Catherine Manacnes, daughter of the Manacnes spouses, who signed the Agreement
for Arbitration on behalf of her parents, was assailed on the ground that it should be
the spouses Manacnes themselves who should have signed such agreement. To
resolve the issue, the Pangkat Chairman then asked the spouses Manacnes that if
they wanted the arbitration proceedings to continue, they must signify their intention
in the Agreement for Arbitration form. However, as stated earlier, the Manacnes
spouses did not want to sign such agreement and instead insisted that the case go to
court.
Consequently, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995
due to the refusal of the Manacnes spouses. Indicated in said Certification are the
following: 1) that there was personal confrontation between the parties before the
Punong Barangay but conciliation failed and 2) that the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo
was constituted but the personal confrontation before the Pangkat failed likewise
because respondents do not want to submit this case for arbitration and insist that
said case will go to court.13Nevertheless, upon receipt of said certification and the
records of the case, the MCTC ordered that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa and for the latter to render an arbitration award, explaining that:
Going over the documents submitted to the court by the office of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa of Dagdag, Sagada, Mountain Province, the court observed that an
"Agreement for Arbitration" was executed by the parties anent the above-entitled
case. However, said Lupon did not make any arbitration award as mandated by the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law but instead made a finding that the case may now
be brought to the court. This is violative of the KP Law, which cannot be sanctioned
by the court.14

At this juncture, it must be stressed that the object of the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law is the amicable settlement of disputes through conciliation proceedings
voluntarily and freely entered into by the parties.15Through this mechanism, the
parties are encouraged to settle their disputes without enduring the rigors of court
litigation. Nonetheless, the disputing parties are not compelled to settle their
controversy during the barangay proceedings before the Lupon or the Pangkat, as
they are free to instead find recourse in the courts16 in the event that no true
compromise is reached.
The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement of the parties to
submit the dispute for adjudication either by the Lupon or the Pangkat, whose award
or decision shall be binding upon them with the force and effect of a final judgment of
a court.17 Absent this voluntary submission by the parties to submit their dispute to
arbitration under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, there cannot be a binding
settlement arrived at effectively resolving the case. Hence, we fail to see why the
MCTC further remanded the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and insisted that
the arbitration proceedings continue, despite the clear showing that the spouses
Manacnes refused to submit the controversy for arbitration.
It would seem from the Order of the MCTC, which again remanded the case for
arbitration to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, that it is compulsory on the part of the
parties to submit the case for arbitration until an arbitration award is rendered by the
Lupon. This, to our minds, is contrary to the very nature of the proceedings under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law which espouses the principle of voluntary
acquiescence of the disputing parties to amicable settlement.
What is compulsory under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is that there be a
confrontation between the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and that
a certification be issued that no conciliation or settlement has been reached, as
attested to by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, before a case falling within the
authority of the Lupon may be instituted in court or any other government office for
adjudication. 18 In other words, the only necessary pre-condition before any case
falling within the authority of the Lupon or the Pangkat may be filed before a court is
that there has been personal confrontation between the parties but despite earnest
efforts to conciliate, there was a failure to amicably settle the dispute. It should be
emphasized that while the spouses Manacnes appeared before the Lupon during the
initial hearing for the conciliation proceedings, they refused to sign the Agreement for
Arbitration form, which would have signified their consent to submit the case for
arbitration. Therefore, upon certification by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa that the
confrontation before the Pangkat failed because the spouses Manacnes refused to
submit the case for arbitration and insisted that the case should go to court, the
MCTC should have continued with the proceedings in the case for recovery of

possession which it suspended in order to give way for the possible amicable
resolution of the case through arbitration before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa.
Petitioners assertion that the parties must be bound by their respective counsels
agreement to submit the case for arbitration and thereafter enter into an amicable
settlement is imprecise. What was agreed to by the parties respective counsels was
the remand of the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for conciliation proceedings
and not the actual amicable settlement of the case. As stated earlier, the parties may
only be compelled to appear before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for the necessary
confrontation, but not to enter into any amicable settlement, or in the case at bar, to
sign the Agreement for Arbitration. Thus, when the Manacnes spouses personally
appeared during the initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, they had
already complied with the agreement during the pre-trial to submit the case for
conciliation proceedings. Their presence during said hearing is already their
acquiescence to the order of the MCTC remanding the case to the Lupon for
conciliation proceedings, as there has been an actual confrontation between the
parties despite the fact that no amicable settlement was reached due to the spouses
Manacnes refusal to sign the Agreement for Arbitration.
Furthermore, the MCTC should not have persisted in ordering the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa to render an arbitration award upon the refusal of the spouses
Manacnes to submit the case for arbitration since such arbitration award will not bind
the spouses. As reflected in Section 413 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law, in order that a party may be bound by an arbitration award, said party must have
agreed in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the Lupon or the
Pangkat. Like in any other contract, parties who have not signed an agreement to
arbitrate will not be bound by said agreement since it is axiomatic that a contract
cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to
it.19 In view of the fact that upon verification by the Pangkat Chairman, in order to
settle the issue of whether or not they intend to submit the matter for arbitration, the
spouses Manacnes refused to affix their signature or thumb mark on the Agreement
for Arbitration Form, the Manacnes spouses cannot be bound by the Agreement for
Arbitration and the ensuing arbitration award since they never became privy to any
agreement submitting the case for arbitration by the Pangkat.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019 is hereby AFFIRMED. The
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province, is hereby
ORDERED to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 83 for Recovery of Possession
of Real Property, and the immediate resolution of the same with deliberate dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

DANTE M. PASCUAL, represented by

REYMEL R. SAGARIO,
Petitioner,

-versus-

MARILOU M. PASCUAL,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 157830

Present:
PANGANIBAN, Chairman,
SANDOVAL- GUTIERREZ,*
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:

November 17, 2005

Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271657 of Isabela and Deed of
x----------------------------------------------------------------x

Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages.[2]

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

To the Complaint the defendant-herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual filed a Motion

to Dismiss[3] on two grounds one of which was non-compliance with the requirement

On challenge via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the February 10, 2003 Order of

under Section 412 of the Local Government Code, [4] she contending that there is no

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela, Branch 23 at Roxas dismissing, on motion

showing that the dispute was referred to the barangay court before the case was filed

of herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual, the complaint filed against her by her

in court.

brother-herein petitioner Dante M. Pascual, represented by his attorney-in-fact

Reymel R. Sagario (Sagario), for non-compliance with the conciliation provision-pre

By the assailed Order of February 10, 2003,[5] Branch 23 of the Isabela RTC at Roxas

condition to filing of complaint in court under R.A. 7160 (the Local Government Code).

granted respondents Motion to Dismiss in this wise:

Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States of America, appointed Sagario

as his attorney-in-fact by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated April 10, 2002:
1. To file a case for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-271656 issued in the name of Marilou M. Pascual as well as
the Deed of Sale of Registered Land (Dec. No. 639; Page No. 52;
Book No. XXI; Series of 1994) and/or Reconveyance at the
appropriate court;
2. To collect the monthly rentals from the tenant;
3. To enter into amicable settlement with Marilou M. Pascual or any
other mode of payment/and/or dispute resolution;
4. To execute and sign any and all papers, contracts/documents
which may be necessary relative to the above acts.
x x x[1]

. . . RA 7160 repealing P.D. 1508 otherwise known as the Revised

Katarungang Pambarangay provides under Section 409 All disputes
involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is
situated. Hence, the reliance of the plaintiff on Section 408 of R.A.
7160 is incorrect. When real property or any interest therein is
involved, the dispute shall be filed before the barangay where the
property is located, regardless of the residence of the parties.
Besides, it is incorrect to say that the parties are not residents of
the same place, Vira, Roxas, Isabela. The Attorney-in-fact of the
plaintiff in the person of Reymel R. Sagario is a resident of
Vira, Roxas, Isabela, and he substitute (sic) Dante Pascual by
virtue of said Special Power of Attorney. Hence, said Attorneyin-fact should have brought the dispute before barangay Vira,
Roxas, Isabela, where the property is located. In the case of
Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 127 SCRA 470, Ordinarily,
non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D.
1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and
make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of
cause of action or prematurity.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Pursuant to the SPA, Sagario filed on October 14, 2002 before the Isabela RTC at
Roxas a complaint entitled Dante M. Pascual, plaintiff v. Marilou M. Pascual and
Register of Deeds, Defendants, docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 23-713-02, for

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[7] of the above-said order was denied by Order
of March 24, 2003:[8]

That attorney-in-fact Sagario is a resident of the same barangay as that of hers,

xxx
respondent argues in any event, brings the matter under the jurisdiction of the lupon,
Consequently, the Court is [of] the opinion that the said Attorneyin-fact shall be deemed to be the real party in interest, reading
from the tenor of the provisions of the Special Power of
Attorney. Being a real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact is
therefore obliged to bring this case first before the Barangay Court.
Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that Where the action
is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be
included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real
party in interest.
xxx
Being the real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact may therefore
bring the necessary complaint before the Lupon Tagapayapa
and appear in person as if he is the owner of the land.[9]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

for Sagario, following Section 3 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides:
Sec. 3. Representative as parties. - Where the action is allowed to
be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting
in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of
the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A
representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an
executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these
Rules. An agent acting in his own name for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the
principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the
principal,

being a substitute, becomes the real party-in-interest.

Hence, the present petition questioning the palpable legal errors of the RTC.
Respondents submissions do not lie.
Petitioner argues that since he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario, is the real party in
interest, and since he actually resides abroad, the lupon would have no jurisdiction to

The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code read:

pass upon the dispute involving real property, he citing Agbayani v. Belen.[10]

Respondent submits, on the other hand, that Section 408, paragraph (f), of the Local
Government Code, is qualified by paragraph (c) of Section 409 of the same Code the
latter of which provides that [a]ll disputes involving real property or any interest
therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property is located, hence, the
use of the word shall makes it mandatory for the bringing of the dispute before
the lupon.

SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception

Thereto. The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute
relates to the performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or
a fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different

cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit
their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of
different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units
adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; and
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may
determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority
of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before
trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for
amicable settlement. (Emphasis supplied)

no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the lupon as provided for in Section
6 vis a vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law).
[B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have
no
jurisdiction
over
disputes
where the parties are
not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where
the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other.
(Underscoring supplied)

In the 2000 case of Vercide v. Hernandez,[12] this Court, noting that the Tavora ruling,

SEC. 409. Venue. (a) Disputes between persons actually

residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable
settlement before the lupon of said barangay .

reiterated in other cases including the 1996 case of Agbayani[13] cited by petitioner,

(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within

the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay
where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at
the election of the complainant.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall
be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger
portion thereof is situated.

which were, except for some modifications, echoed in Sections 408-409 of the Local

(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are
employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for
study shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or
institution is located.

To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the

Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings

before the punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed
waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong
barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be
submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated
representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding. (Emphasis
supplied)

was decided under the provisions of P.D. No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay) Law

Government Code which took effect on January 1, 1992, held that the Tavora ruling
remained.

attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate the

meaning of a real party in interest as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3[14] of the 1997
Rules of Court vis a vis Section 3 of the same Rule which was earlier quoted but
misread and misunderstood by respondent.

In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an actual
resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the
In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso,[11] this Court held that where the parties are
not actual residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is

local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for
conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.

The RTC thus erred in dismissing petitioners complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed February 10, 2003 Order, as well
as the March 24, 2003 Order denying reconsideration of the first, of Branch 23 of the
Regional Trial Court of Isabela at Roxas is SET ASIDE. Said court is accordingly
directed to reinstate Civil Case No. 23-713-02 to its docket and take appropriate
action thereon with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO,

Complainant,

A.C. No. 6296

Present:

- versus -

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES and

GARCIA, JJ.
ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Promulgated:
Respondent.
November 22, 2005
x----------------------------------------x

Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation,

tending to prove that respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings
before the Punong Barangay, acted as Inos Lorenzos counsel instead of as his
attorney-in-fact. This is what complainant said in her complaint: [2]

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J.:

In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of the Integrated Bar of

5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the

subject matter of the complaint. A heated argument took place
because Lorencito Inos said that [complainants brother] Melencio
Magno, Jr. made alterations in the lagoon . Afterwards Atty. Olivia
Jacoba . . . returned to the barangay hall to have the incident
recorded in the barangay blotter.... attached as Annex A

the Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty. Olivia
Velasco-Jacoba, a member of the same IBP provincial chapter, with willful violation of
(a) Section 415 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her

6. That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo Inos appeared before

the hearing also with the assistance of [respondent]. When the
minutes of the proceeding (sic) was read, [respondent] averred that
the minutes is partial in favor of the complainant because only her
statements were recorded for which reason, marginal insertions
were made to include what [respondent] wanted to be put on
record. She also signed as saksi in the minutes .

uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to
have the stand-off between them settled, complainant addressed a letter,
styled Sumbong,[1] to Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual,
Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings
conducted on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special Power of
Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter, accompanied by his son,

7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong) sent to the

Punong Barangay dated December 22, 2002, she signed
representing herself as Family Legal Counsel of Inos Family, a
copy of the letter is attached as Annex C . . . . (Words in bracket
added.)

Lorenzito. Complainants objection to respondents appearance elicited the response

that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as complainant
is herself a lawyer. And as to complainants retort that her being a lawyer is merely
coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not
as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.

In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director for
Bar Discipline, directed the respondent to submit, within fifteen (15) days from notice,
her answer to the complaint, otherwise she will be considered as in default.[3]

The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to Commissioner

the Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is

hereby ADMONISHED.

Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, who admitted respondents answer notwithstanding her

earlier order of July 15, 2003, declaring respondent in default for failure to file an
answer in due time.[4]
This resolution is now before us for confirmation.
In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed
with

the

Office

of

the Punong

Barangay, instead

of

before

the Lupong

Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead

Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay,

provides:

of the collegial Lupon or a conciliation panel known as pangkat. Prescinding from this
premise, respondent submits that the prohibition against a lawyer appearing to assist
a client in katarungan pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she argued
that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.

In her report dated October 6, 2003,[5] Commissioner Maala stated that the

Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all

katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in
person without the assistance of the counsel or representative,
except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their
next of kin who are not lawyers.

charge of complainant has been established by clear preponderance of evidence and,

on that basis, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of her
profession for a period of six (6) months. On the other hand, the Board of Governors,
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, while agreeing with the inculpatory finding of the

The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the

investigating commissioner, recommended in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-235,[6] a

parties in katarungan pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel

lighter penalty, to wit:

or representative. The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement is to

enable the lupon to secure first hand and direct information about the facts and
issues,[8] the exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties.
There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby

ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering
respondent's actuations was in violation of Section 415 which
expressly prohibits the presence and representation by lawyers in

settle their disputes between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling
assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse
issues.[9] Worse still, the participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their
analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite settlement of
the case.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby FINED in the amount of

The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation
proceedings was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the
aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since complainant addressed

Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for willful violation of Section 415 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 with WARNING that commission of similar acts of
impropriety on her part in the future will be dealt with more severely.

her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter proceeded
to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that complainant

SO ORDERED.

wrote her Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay
justice. That she addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little
moment since the latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.[10]

Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all katarungan

barangay proceedings. Section 412(a)[11] the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation
process either before the lupon chairman or the lupon or pangkat.

As what

happened in this case, the punong barangay, as chairman of the Lupon

Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes
between the two parties.

Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in
its determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section

[G.R. No. L-63277. November 29, 1983.]

415 of the LGC. However, its recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to

PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO, Petitioner, v. HON. JULIAN B. POGOY,

Municipality/City Trial Court of Cebu City, and ATTY. RICARDO
REYES, Respondents.

be modified. Doubtless, respondents conduct tended to undermine the laudable

purpose of the katarungan pambarangay system. What compounded matters was
when respondent repeatedly ignored complainants protestation against her continued

Antonio T. Uy for Petitioner.

Numeriano G. Estenzo for Respondents.

appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; ACTIONS FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER; PRESCRIPTIVE

PERIOD; ACTION NOT BARRED IN THE CASE AT BAR. Under Article 1147 of the
Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, and
this period is counted from demand to vacate the premises. (Desbarat v. Vda. de
Laureano, 18 SCRA 116, Calubayan v. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146, Development Bank of
the Philippines v. Canonoy, 35 SCRA 197) In the case at bar, the letter-demand was
dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed in court on
September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed,
thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive period provided for
in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD
1508, the time needed for the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman
and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Giving private respondent nine
(9) months-ample time indeed- within which to bring his case before the proper court
should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted, as private
respondent would want Us to believe, that his case would be barred by the Statute of
Limitations if he had to course his action to the Barangay Lupon.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SECTION 4 (A) OF P.D. No. 1508; CONSTRUED. Under
Section 4(a) of PD 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only
where the parties thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single human
being as contrasted with a social group or institution." Obviously, the law applies only
to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical
person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate,
estate, etc.
3. ID.; JURIDICAL PERSON; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; REFERRAL TO
BARANGAY LUPON, NOT REQUIRED. In Civil Case No. R-239l5, plaintiff Ricardo
Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito
Borromeo. while it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the
administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit
the action is presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in
Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration. Since the said
estate is a juridical person (Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776) plaintiff
administrator may file the complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed
to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.

On August 28, 1982, private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the
estate and a resident of Cebu City, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she
pay the overdue rentals corresponding to the period from March to September 1982,
and thereafter to vacate the premises. As petitioner failed to do so, Atty. Reyes
instituted on September 16, 1982 an ejectment case against the former in the
Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R23915 and assigned to the sala of respondent judge.
On November 12, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case, advancing, among
others, the want of jurisdiction of the trial court. Pointing out that the parties are
residents of the same city, as alleged in the complaint, petitioner contended that the
court could not exercise jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondent Atty. Reyes
to refer the dispute to the Barangay Court, as required by PD No. 1508, otherwise
known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. He justified the order in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Clerk of Court when this case was filed accepted for filing same. That from the
acceptance from (sic) filing, with the plaintiff having paid the docket fee to show that
the case was docketed in the civil division of this court could be considered as
meeting the requirement or precondition for were it not so, the Clerk of Court would
not have accepted the filing of the case especially that there is a standing circular
from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court without even mentioning the Letter of
Instruction of the President of the Philippines that civil cases and criminal cases with
certain exceptions must not be filed without passing the barangay court." (Order
dated December 14, 1982, Annex "c", P. 13, Rollo).
Unable to secure a reconsideration of said order, petitioner came to this Court
through this petition for certiorari. In both his comment and memorandum, private
respondent admitted not having availed himself of the barangay conciliation process,
but justified such omission by citing paragraph 4, section 6 of PD 1508 which allows
the direct filing of an action in court where the same may otherwise be barred by the
Statute of Limitations, as applying to the case at bar.
The excuse advanced by private respondent is unsatisfactory. Under Article 1147 of
the Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, 1
and this period is counted from demand to vacate the premises. 2

DECISION

ESCOLIN, J.:

Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the Municipal
Trial Court of Cebu City from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the
plaintiff to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation.
The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of a building bearing the
deceaseds name, located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City. Said building has been leased
and occupied by petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo at a monthly rental of P500.00
payable in advance within the first five days of the month.

In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint
for ejectment was filed in court on September 16, 1982. Between these two dates,
less than a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full months of the
prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the procedure
outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, 3 the time needed for the conciliation proceeding
before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days.
Giving private respondent nine (9) months ample time indeed within which to
bring his case before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot
be truthfully asserted, as private respondent would want Us to believe, that his case
would be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the
Barangay Lupon.

With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay
level a condition precedent for filing of actions in those instances where said law
applies. For this reason, Circular No. 22 addressed to "ALL JUDGES OF THE
COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY
COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT" was issued by
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on November 9, 1979. Said Circular
reads:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government
and Community Development that all the barangays within your respective
jurisdictions have organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No.
1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of
the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from
receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the
authority of said Lupons."cralaw virtua1aw library
While respondent acknowledged said Circular in his order of December 14, 1982, he
nevertheless chose to overlook the failure of the complaint in Civil Case No. R-23915
to allege compliance with the requirement of PD 1508. Neither did he cite any
circumstance as would place the suit outside the operation of said law. Instead, he
insisted on relying upon the pro tanto presumption of regularity in the performance by
the clerk of court of his official duty, which to Our mind has been sufficiently overcome
by the disclosure by the Clerk of Court that there was no certification to file action
from the Lupon or Pangkat secretary attached to the complaint. 4
Be that as it may, the instant petition should be dismissed. Under Section 4(a) of PD
No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the
parties thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as
contrasted with a social group or institution." 5 Obviously, the law applies only to
cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person
such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.
In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is
suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section 3,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued
without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is
indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate
estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person 6 plaintiff
administrator may file the complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed
to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.

G.R. No. 83907. September 13, 1989.*

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. Respondent judge is ordered to try

and decide Civil Case No. R-23915 without unnecessary delay. No costs.

NAPOLEON GEGARE, petitioner

SO ORDERED.

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (ELEVENTH DIVISION) AND ARMIE
ELMA, respondents.

Camilo Cario Dionio, Jr. for petitioner.

March 13, 1981, the Board denied the protest because the case had already been
decided by the court.

Cedo, Ferrer & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The familiar story in the Old Testament is of how King Solomon settled the dispute
between two women over a child by deciding that the child be cut into two for them to
share. The real mother full of love implored that the King not kill the child and give the
child to the other woman. The latter asked the King not to give it to either of them and
to go on, cut the child into two.

However, a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent was favorably

considered by the Board in Resolution No. 233, Series of 1981 dated July 8, 1981.
Thus, the Board directed the chief of LASEDECO to investigate the occupancy and
area of the lot. In this investigation, it was found that only private respondent was the
actual occupant so the LASEDECO chief recommended the division of the property
between petitioner and private respondent.
On August 14, 1981, the Board passed Resolution No. 272, Series of 1981 approving
said recommendation by dividing the lot equally between the parties at 135.5 square
meters each to be disposed to them by negotiated sale.

This case involves a small piece of land. The decision was to cut it into two between
the parties. But the parallel ends there. The petitioner wants the whole lot. Private
respondent is happy with his half. This is the impasse that must be resolved.

Both parties appealed to the Office of the President but in a decision dated March 25,
1984, both appeals were dismissed. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
was denied on May 29,1984.

The center of controversy is Lot 5989, Ts-217 with an area of about 270 square
meters situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City. This lot was titled in the name of
Paulino Elma under Original Certificate of Title No. (P-29947) (P-11503) P-1987
issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of General Santos City and
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-635. A reversion case was filed by the Republic of
the Philippines against Paulino Elma in the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato
docketed as Civil Case No. 950, wherein in due course a decision was rendered on
January 29, 1973 declaring the title of Paulino Elma null and void and the same was
ordered cancelled. The lot was reverted to the mass of public domain subject to
disposition and giving preferential right to its actual occupant, Napoleon Gegare.

Private respondent paid for the value of 1/2 of the lot and applied for the issuance of a
patent. In Resolution No. 185, Series of 1985 adopted on October 7, 1985, the Board
gave due course to the application of private respondent and for the issuance of a
patent to 1/2 portion of the lot. Petitioner was also advised to file his application and
pay for his portion. Thus, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 4261 and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-5139 were issued to private respondent.

This decision was affirmed by this Court when We dismissed the petition for review on
certiorari filed by the heirs of Elma on March 13, 1974 in G.R. No. L-38069.
Thereafter, the writ of execution was issued and the title of Elma to the property was
cancelled.
Both petitioner and private respondent filed an application for this lot in the Board of
Liquidators (Board for short) in 1975. On June 15, 1976, Resolution No. 606, Series
of 1976 was passed by the Board disposing of the lot in favor of petitioner by way of a
negotiated sale in conformity with the decision in Civil Case No. 950. Private
respondent protested against the application of petitioner and on August 8, 1978, the
Board adopted Resolution No. 611, Series of 1978 denying private respondent's
protest for the same reason. A request for reconsideration of private respondent was
referred by the Board to Mr. Artemio Garlit, liquidator-designee, General Santos
Branch, for verification and investigation. After hearings, Mr. Garlit submitted a report
to the Manila office recommending division of the lot to the parties. Nevertheless, on

On November 27, 1985, petitioner filed an action for "Annulment and Cancellation of
Partition of Lot 5989, Ts-217, situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City and
Annulment of Resolutions No. 272 and 185 and/or to Declare them Null and Void"
against private respondent and the Board. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No.
3270 in the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City.
On February 11, 1985, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) petitioner has
no capacity to sue; (3) petitioner is not a real party-in-interest; and (4) the action is
barred by prior judgment. Private respondent added another ground (5) lack of
conciliation efforts pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508. The motion
was granted in an order dated March 18, 1986.
On April 3, 1986, petitioner moved for a reconsideration thereof to which an
opposition was filed by private respondent. The motion for reconsideration was
granted in an order of April 21, 1986 and private respondent was required to file his
responsive pleading. Private respondent filed his answer. On July 10, 1986, private
respondent asked for a preliminary hearing of the grounds for the motion to dismiss in
his affirmative defenses. This was denied on July 24, 1986.

Hence, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of
Appeals questioning the said orders of the trial court dated April 21, 1986 and July 24,
1986. In due course, a decision was rendered by the appellate court on March 16,
1988 granting the petition, declaring the questioned orders null and void, and
directing the trial court to dismiss the civil case for lack of jurisdiction, without
pronouncement as to costs. An urgent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
was denied in a resolution dated May 31, 1988. 1
Thus, the herein petition wherein petitioner raises the following issues--FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
DECIDING CA-G.R. SP NO.
12183 WITHOUTFIRST SERVING SUMMONS
AND A COPY OF THE PETITION TO THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE SAID CASE
(NOW PETITIONER IN THE INSTANT CASE),
THUS, DEPRIVING HIM OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING
DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION OF ARMIE
ELMA IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 12183 IN SPITE OF
THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) ORDERS
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PETITION
ARE INTERLOCUTORY IN NATURE.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 3270.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
HAVE DISMISSED CIVIL CASE NO. 3270 FOR
FAILURE OF THE PLAINTIFF TO COMPLY

WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P.D. NO. 1508

BEFORE FILING HIS COMPLAINT IN COURT. 2
The petition is devoid of any merit.
Under the first assigned error, petitioner alleges that he was not served summons and
a copy of the petition so that he was deprived of due process and the respondent
court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person.
Private respondent disputes this claim by showing that it was at the address of
petitioner appearing in the petition at Liwayway Disco Restaurant and Disco Pub,
Ilang-Ilang Street, General Santos City, where petitioner was served a copy of private
respondent's "Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution. 3 Petitioner's counsel
was also served a copy of the resolution dated June 28, 1987, 4 "Motion for
Restraining Order" dated July 28, 1987 and Manifestation dated December 1,
1987. 5 Indeed, petitioner's counsel filed a motion dated April 4, 1988 seeking a
reconsideration of the decision of respondent court 6 which was denied on May 31,
1988. Obviously, petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the respondent
court and was never deprived of due process. 7
Under the second and third assigned errors, petitioner contends that the appellate
court erred in giving due course to the petition that assailed the two orders of the
court a quo which are interlocutory in character and in holding that the trial court has
no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3270.
It is precisely to correct the lower court when in the course of proceedings it acts
without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or if the trial court judge otherwise acted with
grave abuse of discretion that the extraordinary writ of certiorari or prohibition is
afforded to parties as a relief. Such writ is available even in respect to interlocutory
orders. 8
The appellate court correctly ruled that courts of justice will not interfere with purely
administrative matters rendered by administrative bodies or officials acting within the
scope of their power and authority. The discretionary power vested in the proper
executive official in the absence of arbitrariness or grave abuse so as to go beyond
the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or control of the courts
and is treated with finality. 9
When Board Resolution No. 272 was passed in 1981, petitioner appealed to the
Office of the President. After his appeal was denied on March 26, 1984, he did not file
a petition for review in this court. Thus, the said decision became final and it was duly
implemented. We agree that when petitioner filed Civil Case No. 3270, the trial court
should have refrained from interfering with said administrative disposition of the chief

executive absent any showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of

discretion.
Moreover, petitioner had no capacity to file the questioned suit in the lower court. The
real party-in-interest who can seek the nullification of the land grant is the government
or the state. 10
Under the fourth and last assigned error, petitioner argues that it was erroneous for
the appellate court to hold that the case should be dismissed by the lower court for
failure to comply with a provision of Presidential Decree No. 1508 before filing the
complaint. He alleges that this rule is not applicable in said case for one of the parties
therein is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof which is
excepted from this requirement under Section 2 of said law.
True it is that the Board is a government instrumentality but the petitioner and private
respondent who are also contending parties in the case are residents of the same
barangay so Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 should apply to them as it
provides--Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within
the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be
filed or instituted in court or any other government office for
adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or
the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman,
or unless the settlement has been repudiated.
The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to settle their differences
amicably. If the other only contending party is the government or its instrumentality or
subdivision the case falls within the exception but when it is only one of the
contending parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken among the other
parties.

[G.R. No. 137359. September 13, 2004]

EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner, vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA, respondent.
DECISION

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

CARPIO, J.:
SO ORDERED.
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals
Resolutions[2] dated 2 July 1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor,
Cavite (RTC), denying petitioner Edwin N. Tribianas (Edwin) motion to dismiss the

petition for habeas corpus filed against him by respondent Lourdes Tribiana
(Lourdes).
Antecedent Facts
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996
but formalized their union only on 28 October 1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a
petition for habeas corpus before the RTC claiming that Edwin left their conjugal
home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana (Khriza). Edwin has since deprived
Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four (4)
months of age. Later, it turned out that Khriza was being held by Edwins mother,
Rosalina Tribiana (Rosalina). Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes petition on the ground
that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made
before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.
On 20 May 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss
claiming that there were prior efforts at a compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached
to her opposition a copy of the Certification to File Action from their Barangay dated 1
May 1998.
On 18 May 1998, the RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss and reiterated a
previous order requiring Edwin and his mother, Rosalina to bring Khriza before the
RTC. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, Edwin filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The appellate court denied Edwins petition on 2 July 1998. The appellate
court also denied Edwins motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
The RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss on the ground that the Certification to
File Action attached by Lourdes to her opposition clearly indicates that the parties
attempted to reach a compromise but failed.
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and added that under Section
412 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code, conciliation proceedings before the
barangay are not required in petitions for habeas corpus.
The Issue
Edwin seeks a reversal and raises the following issue for resolution:

WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD HAVE

DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND
OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITION PRECEDENT
UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Edwin argues that Lourdes failure to indicate in her petition for habeas
corpus that the parties exerted prior efforts to reach a compromise and that such
efforts failed is a ground for the petitions dismissal under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[4] Edwin maintains that under Article 151 of the Family
Code, an earnest effort to reach a compromise is an indispensable condition
precedent. Article 151 provides:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear
from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in
fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under
the Civil Code.
Edwins arguments do not persuade us.
It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that
she resorted to compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her
opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to
File Action dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not dispute the authenticity of the
Barangay Certification and its contents. This effectively established that the parties
tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts. However, Edwin would
have the petition dismissed despite the existence of the Barangay Certification, which
he does not even dispute.
Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151
of the Family Code. A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if
there is a failure to comply with a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is
a mere failure to allege compliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is
not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[5] It would have been a different matter if Edwin
had asserted that no efforts to arrive at a compromise have been made at all.

In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a

jurisdictional defect.[6] Such defect does not place the controversy beyond the courts
power to resolve. If a party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such
defect is deemed waived.[7] Such defect is curable by amendment as a matter of right
without leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive pleading. [8] A motion to
dismiss is not a responsive pleading.[9] More importantly, an amendment alleging
compliance with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional matter. Neither does it
alter the cause of action of a petition for habeas corpus. We have held that in cases
where the defect consists of the failure to state compliance with a condition
precedent, the trial court should order the amendment of the complaint. [10] Courts
should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits
and to present the real controversies between the parties.[11]
Moreover, in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a
child of tender age, the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who
has legal custody of the child. Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving
such child of tender age full protection. [12] This rule has sound statutory basis in Article
213 of the Family Code, which states, No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. In this case, the child (Khriza) was only one year and four months when
taken away from the mother.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Edwins contentions by citing as an additional
ground the exception in Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) on
barangay conciliation, which states:
(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. the parties may go directly to court in
the following instances:
xxx
2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty
calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
xxx.
Under Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may resort to a habeas
corpus proceeding in two instances. The first is when any person is deprived of liberty
either through illegal confinement or through detention. The second instance is when
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to such custody. The most
common case falling under the second instance involves children who are taken away
from a parent by another parent or by a relative. The case filed by Lourdes falls under
this category.

The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the LGC does not apply
to habeas corpus proceedings where a person is deprived of personal liberty. In such
a case, Section 412 expressly authorizes the parties to go directly to court without
need of any conciliation proceedings. There is deprivation of personal liberty
warranting a petition for habeas corpuswhere the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.[13] Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err
when it dismissed Edwins contentions on the additional ground that Section 412
exempts petitions for habeas corpus from the barangay conciliation requirement.
The petition for certiorari filed by Edwin questioning the RTCs denial of his
motion to dismiss merely states a blanket allegation of grave abuse of discretion. An
order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and is not a proper subject of a
petition for certiorari.[14] Even in the face of an error of judgment on the part of a judge
denying the motion to dismiss, certiorari will not lie. Certiorari is not a remedy to
correct errors of procedure.[15] The proper remedy against an order denying a motion
to dismiss is to file an answer and interpose as affirmative defenses the objections
raised in the motion to dismiss. It is only in the presence of extraordinary
circumstances evincing a patent disregard of justice and fair play where resort to a
petition for certiorari is proper.[16]
The litigation of substantive issues must not rest on a prolonged contest on
technicalities. This is precisely what has happened in this case. The circumstances
are devoid of any hint of the slightest abuse of discretion by the RTC or the Court of
Appeals. A party must not be allowed to delay litigation by the sheer expediency of
filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on scant allegations of grave abuse.
More importantly, any matter involving the custody of a child of tender age deserves
immediate resolution to protect the childs welfare.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM
the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 2 July 1998 and 18 January 1999 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite is
ordered to act with dispatch in resolving the petition for habeas corpus pending before
it. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.

Berba then filed a complaint for eviction and collection of unpaid rentals only against
ESTELA L. BERBA, G.R. No. 160032
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and

Pablo in the Office of the Punong Barangay. On June 5, 1999, Berba and Pablo
executed an Agreement approved by the pangkat, as follows:
Ako si Josephine Pablo, naninirahan sa 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta.
Ana, Manila, na nasasakop ng Barangay 873, Zone 96, ay
nangangako kay GG Robert Berba na nagmamay-ari ng aking
tinitirahan ay maghuhulog ng halagang Tatlong Libong
Piso P3,000.00 kada ika-sampu ng buwan bilang hulog sa aking
pagkakautang kay GG Berba na umaabot sa halagang P81,818.00
na ang nasabing halagang ito ay aking huhulugan hanggang aking
mabayaran ng buo ang aking pagkakautang. Ako rin, si Josephine
Pablo, ay nangangako na ang hindi ko pagsunod o pagbayad ng
buwanang hulog, ako ay kusang aalis sa aking tinitirahan. Bukod
pa sa hulog sa aking pagkakautang, ako rin ay magbabayad ng
halagang P3,450.00 bilang aking upa sa aking tinitirahan.[3]

CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
JOSEPHINE PABLO and THE Promulgated:
HEIRS OF CARLOS PALANCA,
Respondents. November 11, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

By May 2000, Pablo and the lessees still had a balance of P71,716.00. As of May 1,
[1]

Assailed before the Court on a petition for review on certiorari is the Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73531, affirming the Decision [2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 170639.

2001, the total arrearages of the lessees amounted to P135,115.63.[4] On May 2,

2001, Berba, through counsel, wrote the lessees, demanding payment of the said
amount and to vacate the house within 30 days from notice, otherwise she will sue

Estela L. Berba, a resident of 978 Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila, was the owner of

them.[5] The lessees ignored the demand. On June 21, 2001, Berba filed a

a parcel of land located at No. 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, Manila covered by

complaint[6] against Josephine Pablo and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca in the

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63726. A house was constructed on the lot,

Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila for unlawful detainer. She prayed that, after

which she leased to Josephine Pablo * and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca sometime in

due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed for that
judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff ordering defendant (sic)

1976. The lease was covered by a lease contract. Upon its expiration, the lessees
continued leasing the house on a month-to-month basis.

By 1999, the monthly rental on the property was P3,450.00. The lessees
failed to pay the rentals due, and by May 1999, their arrears amounted to P81,818.00.

a) to vacate the premises situated at 2338 M.

Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, City of Manila;
b) to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred ThirtyFive Thousand One Hundred Fifteen and
63/100 Pesos (P135,115.63) representing
monthly rentals in arrears to the present;
c) to pay plaintiff the amount of Four Thousand
Five Hundred Sixty-Two and 63/100 Pesos

(P4,562.63)
per
month
representing
monthly rent on the premises for the year
2001 until finality of the judgment;
d) to pay plaintiff the sum of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) by way of attorneys
fees;
e) to reimburse plaintiff all expenses for litigation
estimated in the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos;
f) to pay costs of suit.

the Lupon,[10] duly approved by the Pangkat. She also appended a Statement of
Account indicating that the defendants back rentals amounted to P135,115.63.[11]

In their position paper, the defendants insisted that the dispute did not go
through the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa prior to the filing of the complaint; hence,

Other reliefs just and equitable are, likewise, prayed for under the
premises.[7]

Berbas complaint was premature. They also averred that the increase in the rental
rates imposed by the plaintiff was unjustified and illegal.

Berba, however, failed to append to her complaint a certification from the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa that no conciliation or settlement had been reached.

In her reply, the plaintiff alleged that there was no more need for her to
secure a Certificate to File Action because she was a resident of No. 978 Maligaya

In their answer to the complaint, the defendants admitted to have stopped

paying rentals because of financial distress. They also alleged that they were not
certain if the plaintiff was the owner of the property. By way of special and affirmative
defenses, they averred that the plaintiff had no cause of action against them as she
failed to secure a Certificate to File Action from the Lupon.[8]

During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested to the court that,
despite earnest efforts, no amicable settlement was reached. They defined the main
issue as whether or not the plaintiff had a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer
against the defendants.[9]

Street, Malate, Manila, while the defendants were residing in Barangay 873, Zone 6 in
Sta. Ana, Manila.

On March 14, 2002, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of Berba. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them
to vacate the premises at 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila and
restore possession thereof to the plaintiff. Ordering the defendant to
pay the amount of P135,115.63 representing monthly rentals since
1999 until December 2000. Ordering the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P4,562.63 per month beginning January 2001
and for the succeeding months until finally vacated. Ordering the
defendant to pay the reduced amount ofP10,000.00 as attorneys
fees plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[12]

In her position paper, Berba appended an Agreement dated June 5, 1999 between
her

and

Pablo,

which

appeared

to

have

been

approved

by Punong

The defendants appealed the decision to the RTC. On motion of the plaintiff,

Barangay Cayetano L. Gonzales of Barangay 873, as well as other members of

the RTC issued an order for the execution of the decision pending appeal. [13] The

defendants filed a motion for the recall of the Order,[14] but before the court could

Berba filed a motion for the reconsideration[22] of the decision, which the RTC denied

resolve the motion, the Sheriff turned over the physical possession of the property to

in its Order[23] dated October 2, 2002. She then elevated the case to the

Berba on May 20, 2002.[15]

CA via petition for review, where she averred:

In their Appeal Memorandum, Pablo and the heirs of Palanca insisted that Berbas
action in the MTC was premature because of the absence of Certificate to File Action
issued by the Lupon. They also claimed that Berba unlawfully increased the rentals

a) The raising of other affirmative defenses apart from the nonreferral to the Barangay Court by the respondents constitute a
waiver of such requirement; and
b) There was substantial compliance on the part of the petitioner
with
respect
to
referring
her
complaint
before
the Barangay Court.[24]

for the house.[16] Berba, on the other hand, averred that there was no need of a prior
referral to theLupon before filing her complaint. The petitioner cited Section 408(f) of

Citing the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals,[25] Berba claimed that Section

the Local Government Code, pointing out that she resided in a Barangay in Malate, 8

408 of the Local Government Code should be construed liberally together with

kilometers away from Barangay 873 in Sta. Ana, where Pablo and the Palanca heirs

Section 412. She further averred that she had complied substantially with the

resided.[17]

requisites

On August 20, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting the appeal and setting
aside the appealed decision. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court a quo is ordered
set aside. The complaint is also ordered DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. The Writ of Execution issued by the Court a
quo pending appeal is also set aside.

of

the

law,

and

recalls

that

conciliation

proceedings

before

the Lupon resulted in the execution of an Agreement on June 5, 1999. Upon failure to
comply with the agreement, all chances of amicable settlement were effectively
foreclosed. Hence, Pablo and the Heirs of Palanca were estopped from claiming that
she failed to comply with the Local Government Codes requirement of prior referral of
their dispute to the Lupon.

SO ORDERED.[18]
After due proceedings, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition
The RTC ruled that under Section 408 of the Local Government Code,
parties who reside in the same city or municipality although in different barangays are

and affirming the RTC decision. Berba moved for a reconsideration of the decision,
which proved futile.

mandated to go through conciliation proceedings in the Lupon.[19] The court cited the
rulings of this Court in Morata v. Go,[20] and Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy.[21]

In the instant petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner alleges that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE DECISION OF THIS

HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF DIU VS. COURT OF

APPEALS (251 SCRA 478) AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE
WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF
PD 1508 (NOW R.A. 7160) WITH RESPECT TO PRIOR
REFERRAL TO THE BARANGAY COURT, THEREBY DECIDING
THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE COURT.[26]

In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioner
was estopped from relying on the June 5, 1999 Agreement between her and
respondent Josephine Pablo before the Lupon because the respondent Heirs of

The petitioner avers that she is a sickly widow, in the twilight of her years,

Carlos Palanca were not parties thereto. The respondents maintained that the

and whose only source of income are the rentals generated from the property, which

petitioner must bear the blame for her failure to comply with the Local Government

she also uses to pay her medical expenses. She avers that the continued denial of

Code. At first, she insisted that there was no need for prior referral of the dispute to

her right to the fruits of the subject property is highly unjust and contrary to the spirit

the Lupon, claiming that she resided in abarangay other than where the respondents

behind the enactment of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508.[27]

resided. Thereafter, she made a volte face and invoked the June 5, 1999 Agreement
between her and respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the respondents aver, the

The petitioner also points out that, for her to pay obeisance to the decision of
MTC had no jurisdiction over the petitioners action for unlawful detainer because it
the CA, she would have to go through the tedious, not to mention horrendous,
was filed only on June 21, 2001, or more than one year from June 5, 1999 when the
process of going back to square one; that is, referring the dispute to
petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed the agreement. As such, the
the barangay which, in all likelihood, would be rendered useless considering that
action should be one for recovery of possession of property (accion publiciana).
respondents had already been validly and effectively ejected from the leased
premises. She would then have to go through the rungs of the judicial ladder a
second time to vindicate her trampled rights. She further claims that the CAs
affirmation of the RTC decision is equivalent to sanctioning a legal anomaly. She
points out that the very purpose of barangay conciliation is to abbreviate disputes
between members of the same or adjacent barangays to the end that their disputes

On June 2, 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda.[29] The parties complied.

The Court rules that the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the decision of
the RTC reversing the decision of the MTC and ordering the dismissal of the
complaint for unlawful detainer without prejudice.

will not reach the doors of the courts. Clearly, it does not contemplate a protracted
process as suggested by the RTC ruling and affirmed by the CA.[28]

The records show that petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed an
Agreement on June 5, 1999, which was approved by the Lupon. Respondent
Josephine Pablo did not repudiate the agreement; hence, such agreement of the

parties settling the case had the force and effect of a final judgment. As the Court
declared in Vidal v. Escueta,[30] the settlement of the parties may be enforced by
the Lupon, through the punong barangay, within six months; and if the settlement is

Section 417 of the LGC grants a period of six months to

enforce the amicable settlement by the Lupon through the Punong
Barangay before such party may resort to filing an action with the
MTC to enforce the settlement. The raison detre of the law is to
afford the parties during the six-month time line, a simple, speedy
and less expensive enforcement of their settlement before
the Lupon.[31]

not enforced after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced by an action in the
In the present case, respondent Josephine Pablo failed to comply with her obligation
proper city or municipal court, as provided in Section 417 of the Local Government
of repaying the back rentals of P81,818.00 and the current rentals for the house.
Code:
We also agree that the Secretary of the Lupon is
mandated to transmit the settlement to the appropriate city or
municipal court within the time frame under Section 418 of the LGC
and to furnish the parties and the Lupon Chairman with copies
thereof. The amicable settlement which is not repudiated within the
period therefor may be enforced by execution by the Luponthrough
the Punong Barangay within a time line of six months, and if the
settlement is not so enforced by the Lupon after the lapse of said
period, it may be enforced only by an action in the proper city or
municipal court as provided for in Section 417 of the LGC of 1991,
as amended, which reads:
SEC. 417. Execution. The amicable settlement
or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by
the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the
settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement
may be enforced by action in the proper city or municipal
court. (Italics supplied).
Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides a
mechanism for the enforcement of a settlement of the parties
before the Lupon. It provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement
of an amicable settlement executed by the parties before
the Lupon, namely, (a) by execution of the Punong Barangay which
is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the
party/parties entitled thereto; and (b) by an action in regular form,
which remedy is judicial. Under the first remedy, the proceedings
are
covered
by
the
LGC
and
the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Punong
Barangay is called upon during the hearing to determine solely the
fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement and to give
the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his
obligation under the settlement. Under the second remedy, the
proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court, as amended. The
cause of action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by
operation of law, has the force and effect of a final judgment.

Hence, the petitioner had the right to enforce the Agreement against her and move for
her eviction from the premises. However, instead of filing a motion before
the Lupon for the enforcement of the agreement, or (after six months), an action in
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) for the enforcement of the settlement, the
petitioner filed an action against respondent Josephine Pablo for unlawful detainer
and the collection of unpaid rentals, inclusive of those already due before the June 5,
1999 Agreement was executed. The action of the petitioner against respondent Pablo
was barred by the Agreement of June 5, 1999.

The Court notes that the petitioner even submitted with the MTC a copy of her June
5, 1999 Agreement with respondent Josephine Pablo. Instead of dismissing the
complaint as against such respondent, the MTC rendered judgment against her and
ordered her eviction from the leased premises.
The Court thus rules that the petitioners complaint against respondent Heirs
of Carlos Palanca was premature. It bears stressing that they were not impleaded by
the petitioner as parties-respondents before the Lupon. The petitioner filed her
complaint solely against respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the said respondent

heirs were not privy to the said agreement, and, as such, were not bound by it.

(a) Where one party is the government or any

subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

Section 412 of the Local Government Code, sets forth the precondition to filing of

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and

the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;

complaints in court, to wit:

SEC. 412 Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of
complaint in court. No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding
involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed
or instituted directly in court or any other government office for
adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the
parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by
the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by
the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement
has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties
may go directly to court in the following instances:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies
such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal
property, and support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the
statute of limitations.
(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural
communities. The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural
communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members
of the cultural communities.

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one

(1) year or a fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in
different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to
submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside
in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where
such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President
may determine in the interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the
authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time
before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the luponconcerned for
amicable settlement.

If the complainant/plaintiff fails to comply with the requirements of the Local

Government Code, such complaint filed with the court may be dismissed for failure to
exhaust all administrative remedies.[32]

Under Sec. 408 of the same Code, parties actually residing in the same city
or

municipality

are

bound

to

submit

their

disputes

to

the Lupon for

conciliation/amicable settlement, unless otherwise provided therein:

SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception
Thereto. The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality
for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

The petitioners reliance on the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of

Appeals[33] is misplaced. In that case, there was a confrontation by the parties before
the BarangayChairman and no agreement was reached. Although no pangkat was
formed, the Court held in that instance that there was substantial compliance with the
law. In any event, the issue in that case was whether the failure to specifically allege

that there was no compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a

by the Rule on Summary Procedure are concerned. This Court has no authority to do

waiver of that defense. Moreover, no such confrontation before the Lupon occurred

that.[35]

with respect to the unlawful detainer suit against Josephine Pablo before the MTC.[34]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED.
In this case, the petitioner and the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca
SO ORDERED.
resided in the City of Manila, albeit in different barangays. The dispute between the
petitioner and the respondent heirs was thus a matter within the authority of
the Lupon. Hence, the petitioners complaint for unlawful detainer and the collection of
back rentals should have been first filed before the Lupon for mandatory conciliation,
to afford the parties an opportunity to settle the case amicably. However, the petitioner
filed her complaint against the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca directly with the
MTC. Clearly then, her complaint was premature. The execution of the June 5, 1999
Agreement between petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo does not amount to
substantial compliance to the requirements of the Local Government Code on
mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings.

Indeed, considering that the MTC had already rendered a decision on the
merits of the case, it is not without reluctance that the Court reaches this conclusion
which would require the petitioner to start again from the beginning. The facts of the
present case, however, do not leave us any choice. To grant the petition under these
circumstances would amount to refusal to give effect to the Local Government Code
and to wiping it off the statute books insofar as ejectment and other cases governed

G.R. No. 81006 May 12, 1989

VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
WINAI PERMSKUL and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for review was denied
on September 29, 1987, as so too was his motion for reconsideration, on December
1, 1987. 4 He is now before us to fault the respondent court, principally for sustaining
the memorandum decision of the regional trial court. His contention is that it violates
Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
This provision reads as follows:

CRUZ, J.:
An important constitutional question has been injected in this case which started out
as an ordinary complaint for a sum of money. The question squarely presented to the
Court is the validity of the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P.
Blg. 129 in the light of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the private
respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month.
Pursuant to the lease contract, the private respondent deposited with the petitioner
the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased
premises except when caused by reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the
private respondent vacated the property. He thereafter requested the refund of his
deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten
days of his occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this
request. He said the lessee still owed him for other charges, including the electricity
and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the leased premises to
restore them to their original condition. 1
The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. After the
submission of position papers by the parties, a summary judgment was rendered on
October 11, 1985, sustaining the complainant and holding that the repainting was not
chargeable to him. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P7,750.00, representing the balance of the deposit after deducting the water and
electricity charges. The plaintiff was also awarded the sum of P1,250.00 as attorney's
fees, plus the Costs. 2
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was affirmed by
Judge Jose C. de la Rama on January 14, 1987. This was done in a memorandum
decision reading in full as follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of the
records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and
finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. 3

Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without

expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the
legal basis therefor.
Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the present charter,
Section 14 has been in force since the Constitution of 1935. The provision was recast
in affirmative terms in the 1973 Constitution but has been virtually restored to its
original form in the Constitution of 1987, to apply to all courts, including the municipal
courts. The purpose has always been the same, viz., to inform the person reading the
decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after
consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws.
The parties are entitled to no less than this explanation if only to assure them that the
court rendering the decision actually studied the case before pronouncing its
judgment. But there are more substantial reasons. For one thing, the losing party
must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if permitted, he may
elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For another,
the decision, if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its
merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the
litigation with a useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of
the facts and the law on which they are based, especially those coming from the
Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve as useful
references and even as precedents in the resolution of future controversies. As the
Court said in Rosales v. Court of First Instance. 5
Precedents are helpful in deciding cases when they are on all fours
or at least substantially Identical with previous
litigations. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. Earlier decisions are
guideposts that can lead us in the right direction as we tread the
highways and byways of the law in the search for truth and justice.
These pronouncements represent the wisdom of the past. They are
the voice of vanished judges talking to the future. Except where
there is a need to reverse them because of an emergent viewpoint
or an altered situation, they urge us strongly that, indeed, the
trodden path is best.

According to the petitioner, the memorandum decision rendered by the regional trial
court should be revoked for non-compliance with the above-quoted constitutional
mandate. He asks that the case be remanded to the regional trial court for a full blown
hearing on the merits, to be followed by a decision stating therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For his part, the private
respondent demurs. He justifies the memorandum decision as authorized by B.P. Blg.
129 and invokes the ruling of this Court in Romero v. Court of Appeals, 6 Which
sustained the said law.
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as follows:
Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. Every decision or
final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and
distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on
which it is based which may be contained in the decision or final
resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in the
decision, order or resolution appealed from.
The above section was applied in the Romero case, together with a similar rule
embodied in Section 18 of P.D. No. 946, providing that:
All cases of the Court of Agrarian Relations now pending before the
Court of Appeals shall remain in the Division to which they have
been assigned, and shall be decided within sixty (60) days from the
effectivity of this Decree; Provided, however, That if the decision or
order be an affirmance in toto of the dispositive conclusion of the
judgment appealed from, then the Court of Appeals may, instead of
rendering an extended opinion, indicate clearly the trial court's
findings of fact and pronouncements of law which have been
adopted as basis for the affirmance.
In the said case, Justice Jose Y. Feria, speaking for a unanimous Court, declared:
As previously stated, the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations
consisted of thirteen pages, single space. The above-quoted
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals consists of four pages,
three of which contains verbatim the dispositive portion of the
decision appealed from. The remaining page is devoted to an
explanation of why "for judicial convenience and expediency,
therefore, We hereby adopt, by way of reference, the findings of
facts and conclusions of the court a quo spread in its decision, as
integral part of this Our decision." The said decision may be
considered as substantial compliance with the above-quoted
provisions in Section 18 of P.D. No. 946 and Section 40 of B.P. Blg.
129.
Nevertheless, he was quick to add a tenable misgiving and to express the following
reservation:

The authority given the appellate court to adopt by reference the

findings of fact and conclusions of law from those set forth in the
appealed decisions should be exercised with caution and prudence,
because the tendency would be to follow the line of least resistance
by just adopting the findings and conclusions of the lower court
without thoroughly studying the appealed case.
This caveat was necessary because, as he correctly observed:
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that just as important as the
intrinsic validity of a decision is the perception by the partieslitigants that they have been accorded a fair opportunity to be heard
by a fair and responsible magistrate before judgment is rendered. It
is this perception, coupled with a clear conscience, which enables
the members of the judiciary to discharge the awesome
responsibility of sitting in judgment on their fellowmen.
There is no question that the purpose of the law in authorizing the memorandum
decision is to expedite the termination of litigations for the benefit of the parties as
well as the courts themselves.
Concerned with the mounting problem of delay in the administration of justice, the
Constitution now contains a number of provisions aimed at correcting this serious
difficulty that has caused much disaffection among the people. Thus, Section 16 of
the Bill of Rights reiterates the original provision in the 1973 Constitution
guaranteeing to all persons "the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies." Section 14(2) of the same Article III
retains the rule that the accused shall be entitled to a trial that shall not only be public
and impartial but also speedy. In Article VIII, Section 5(3), the Supreme Court is
expressly permitted to temporarily assign a judge from one station to another when
the public interest so requires, as when there is a necessity for less occupied judge to
help a busier colleague dispose of his cases. In paragraph 5 of the same section, it is
stressed that the rules of court to be promulgated by the Supreme Court "shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases."
In Section 15, of the same article, maximum periods are prescribed for the decision or
resolution of cases, to wit, twenty-four months in the case of Supreme Court and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts
and three months for all other lower courts.
The courts of justice are really hard put at coping with the tremendous number of
cases in their dockets which, to make matters worse, continues to grow by the day
despite the efforts being taken to reduce it. In the Supreme Court alone, an average
of 400 cases is received every month as against the average of 300 cases disposed
of during the same month, leaving a difference of 100 cases monthly that is added to
some 5,000 still unresolved cases that have accumulated during the last two decades
or so. At this rate, the backlog will increase by 1,200 cases every year on top of the
earlier balance, much of which, despite its age, is still viable and have still to be
resolved. Considering that the Court spends four days of the week for studying and
deliberating on these cases in its en banc and division sessions, one can appreciate
the limited time allowed its members for the actual writing of its decisions. (This

particular decision, while extended, happens fortunately to be less complicated than

many of the other cases submitted to it, which require more time to write, not to
mention the antecedent research that may have to be made.)
Viewed in the light of these practical considerations, the memorandum decision can
be welcomed indeed as an acceptable method of dealing expeditiously with the case
load of the courts of justice, But expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot
excuse non-compliance with the Constitution; or to put it more familiarly, the end does
not justify the means. It is plain that if Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 is unconstitutional, it
must be struck down.
In the case at bar, we find that a judgment was made by the metropolitan trial court in
compliance with the rule on summary procedure. The decision consisted of three
typewritten pages, single space, and stated clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it was based. It was a concise and well-written decision, and a correct one
to boot, for which Judge Paciano B. Balita is to be commended.
The problem, though, as the petitioner sees it, is that in affirming this judgment, the
regional trial court of Makati rendered a mere memorandum decision that simply
adopted by reference the findings of fact and law made by Judge Balita and then
concluded, without saying more, that "there was no cogent reason to disturb the
same." It is claimed that as Judge de la Rama did not make his own statement of the
facts and the law as required by the Constitution, his memorandum decision was a
total nullity. Worse, when the appeal was taken to the respondent court, what it
reviewed was not the memorandum decision of the regional trial court but the
decision rendered by the metropolitan trial court which, legally speaking, was not
before the appellate court.
It is not really correct to say that the Court of Appeals did not review the
memorandum decision of the regional trial court which was the subject of the petition
for review. A reading of its own decision will show that it dealt extensively with the
memorandum decision and discussed it at some length in the light of the observations
and reservations of this Court in the Romero case. Moreover, in reviewing the
decision of the metropolitan trial court, the Court of Appeals was actually reviewing
the decision of the regional trial court, which had incorporated by reference the earlier
decision rendered by Judge Balita.
The question, of course, is whether such incorporation by reference was a valid act
that effectively elevated the decision of the metropolitan trial court for examination by
the Court of Appeals.
To be fair, let it be said that when Judge dela Rama availed himself of the
convenience offered by Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, he was only acting in accordance
with the ruling announced in Romero permitting the use of the memorandum decision.
It must also be observed that even if the respondent court appeared to be partial to
the reservation rather than the rule in the said case, it nevertheless had the duty
which it discharged to abide by the doctrine announced therein by the highest
tribunal of the land. The respondent court could not have acted otherwise.

This Court is not hampered by such inhibitions. As we may re-examine our own
rulings and modify or reverse them whenever warranted, we take a second look at the
memorandum decision and the Romero case and test them on the touchstone of the
Constitution.
The law does not define the memorandum decision and simply suggests that the
court may adopt by reference the findings of fact and the conclusions of law stated in
the decision, order or resolution on appeal before it. No particular form is prescribed;
the conditions for its use are not indicated. In fact, B.P. Blg. 129 does not even
employ the term "memorandum decision" in Section 40 or elsewhere in the rest of the
statute. This phrase appears to have been introduced in this jurisdiction not by that
law but by Section 24 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, reading as follows:
Sec. 24. Memorandum decisions. -The judgment or final
resolution of a court in appealed cases may adopt by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision or
final order appealed from.
It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually reproduces the
findings of fact or the conclusions of law of the court below, it is not a memorandum
decision as envisioned in the above provision. The distinctive features of the
memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, and second, it
incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in
the decision, order or ruling under review. Most likely, the purpose is to affirm the
decision, although it is not impossible that the approval of the findings of fact by the
lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court. At any rate,
the reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the
cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the
decision of the higher court. The Idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the
latter decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are being
approved or adopted anyway.
Parenthetically, the memorandum decision is also allowed in the United States, but its
form (at least) differs from the one under consideration in this case. Such a decision
is rendered in that country upon a previous' determination by the judge that there is
no need for a published opinion and that it will have no precedential effect. The
judgment is usually limited to the dispositive portion but a memorandum is attached
containing a brief statement of the facts and the law involved, mainly for the
information of the parties to the case.
When a law is questioned before the Court, we employ the presumption in favor of its
constitutionality. As we said in Peralta v. Commission of Elections, "to justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication." 7 Courts will bend over
backward to sustain that presumption. In case of doubt, it is the duty of the judiciary to
exert every effort to prevent the invalidation of the law and the nullification of the will
of the legislature that enacted it and the executive that approved it. This norm is
based on a becoming respect that the judiciary is expected to accord the political
departments of the government which, it must be assumed in fairness, thoroughly

studied the measure under challenge and assured themselves of its constitutionality
before agreeing to enact it.
The Court has deliberated extensively on the challenge posed against the
memorandum decision as now authorized by law. Taking into account the salutary
purpose for which it is allowed, and bearing in mind the above-discussed restraint we
must observe when a law is challenged before us, we have come to the conclusion
that Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, as we shall interpret it here, is not unconstitutional.
What is questioned about the law is the permission it gives for the appellate court to
merely adopt by reference in its own decision the judgment of the lower court on
appeal. It is easy to understand that this device may feed the suspicion feared by
Justice Feria that the court has not given the appeal the attention it deserved and
thus deprived the parties of due process. True or not, this impression is likely to
undermine popular faith in the judiciary as an impartial forum which hears before it
decides and bases its decision on the established facts and the applicable law.
No less objectionable is the inconvenience involved in having to search for the
decision referred to, which, having been incorporated by reference only, does not
have to be attached to the memorandum decision. The Court had occasion earlier to
complain about this difficulty in the case of Gindoy v. Tapucar, 8 where we said:
. . . True it is that the Court of First Instance may adopt in toto either
expressly or impliedly the findings and conclusions of the inferior
court, and as a rule, such adoption would amount to a substantial
compliance with the constitutional mandate discussed herein, but
where, as in this case, the specific arguments presented against
the decision of the inferior court are of such nature that a blanket
affirmance of said decision does not in fact adequately dispose of
the strictures against it, it is but proper, if only to facilitate the action
to be taken by the appellate court on the petition for review, that the
concrete bases of the impugned decision should appear on its face,
instead of the appellate court having to dig into the records to find
out how the inferior court resolved the issues of the case.
As to this problem, the Solicitor General correctly points out that it does not exist in
the case at bar because the decision of the Court of Appeals extensively quoted from
the decision of the metropolitan trial court. Although only incorporated by reference in
the memorandum decision of the regional trial court, Judge Balita's decision was
nevertheless available to the Court of Appeals. It is this circumstance, or even
happenstance, if you will, that has validated the memorandum decision challenged in
this case and spared it from constitutional infirmity.
That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the following
requirement, as a condition for the proper application of Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129.
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and
the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say
that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person
reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed,
it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must

be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the

memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually
embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex
attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of
the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a
proper examination of the facts and the law on which it was based. The proximity at
least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been
undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should,
to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or
adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be
sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional
condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases
where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the
judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended
discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in
simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is
obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.
Despite the convenience afforded by the memorandum decision, it is still desirable
that the appellate judge exert some effort in restating in his own words the findings of
fact of the lower court and presenting his own interpretation of the law instead of
merely parroting the language of the court a quo as if he cannot do any better. There
must be less intellectual indolence and more pride of authorship in the writing of a
decision, especially if it comes from an appellate court.
It ill becomes an appellate judge to write his rulings with a pair of scissors and a pot of
paste as if he were a mere researcher. He is an innovator, not an echo. The case
usually becomes progressively simpler as it passes through the various levels of
appeal and many issues become unimportant or moot and drop along the way. The
appellate judge should prune the cluttered record to make the issues clearer. He
cannot usually do this by simply mimicking the lower court. He must use his own
perceptiveness in unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in discovering the law.
No less importantly, he must use his own language in laying down his judgment. And
in doing so, he should also guard against torpidity lest his pronouncements excite no
more fascination than a technical tract on the values of horse manure as a fertilizer. A
little style will help liven the opinion trapped in the tortuous lexicon of the law with all
its whereases and wherefores. A judicial decision does not have to be a bore.
The interpretation we make today will not apply retroactively to the memorandum
decision rendered by the regional trial court in the case at bar, or to the decision of
the respondent court such decision on the strength ofRomero v. Court of Appeals. As
earlier observed, there was substancial compliance with Section 40 because of the
direct availability and actual review of the decision of Judge Balita incorporated by
reference in the memorandum decision of Judge de la Rama. The memorandum
decision as then understood under the Romero decision was a valid act at the time it
was rendered by Judge de la Rama and produced binding legal effect. We also affirm

the finding of the respondent court that the summary judgment without a formal trial
was in accord with the Rule on Summary Procedure and that the award of attorney's
fees is not improper.
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set
forth both as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered.
Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. This decision
is immediately executory. It is so ordered.

[G.R. No. 110844. April 27, 2000]

ALFREDO CHING, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ZOSIMO Z.
ANGELES, RTC - BR. 58, MAKATI, METRO MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Confronting the Court in this instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is
the task of resolving the issue of whether the pendency of a civil action for damages
and declaration of nullity of documents, specifically trust receipts, warrants the
suspension of criminal proceedings instituted for violation of Article 315 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to P.D. 115, otherwise known as the "Trust Receipts
Law".xl-aw
Petitioner Alfredo Ching challenges before us the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 27 January 1993 in CA G.R. SP No. 28912, dismissing his "Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order/ Preliminary Injunction", on the ground of lack of merit.
Assailed similarly is the resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 28 June 1993
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
As borne by the records, the controversy arose from the following facts:
On 04 February 1992,[3] petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (RTC- Makati), Branch 58, with four counts of estafa punishable under Article
315 par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree 115,
otherwise known as the "Trust Receipts Law".
The four separate informations[4] which were couched in similar language except for
the date, subject goods and amount thereof, charged herein petitioner in this wise:
"That on or about the (18th day of May 1981; 3rd day of June 1981;
24th day of June 1981 and 24th day of June 1981), in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
having executed a trust receipt agreement in favor of Allied Banking
Corporation in consideration of the receipt by the said accused of
goods described as 12 Containers (200 M/T) Magtar Brand
Dolomites; 18 Containers (Zoom M/T) Magtar Brand Dolomites;
High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks; and High Fired
Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks for which there is now due the sum
of (P 278, 917.80; P 419,719.20; P 387, 551. 95; andP389, 085.14
respectively) under the terms of which the accused agreed to sell
the same for cash with the express obligation to remit to the

complainant bank the proceeds of the sale and/or to turn over the
goods, if not sold, on demand, but the accused, once in possession
of said goods, far from complying with his obligation and with grave
abuse of confidence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own
personal use and benefit the said goods and/or the proceeds of the
sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, failed and refused
and still fails and refuses, to account for and/or remit the proceeds
of sale thereof to the Allied Banking Corporation to the damage and
prejudice of the said complainant bank in the aforementioned
amount of ( P 278,917.80; P 419,719.20; P 387,551.95;
and P389,085.14)." x-sc
On 10 February 1992, an "Omnibus Motion[5] to Strike Out Information, or in the
Alternative to Require Public Prosecutor to Conduct Preliminary Investigation, and to
Suspend in the Meantime Further Proceedings in these Cases," was filed by the
petitioner.
In an order dated 13 February 1992, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58,
acting on the omnibus motion, required the prosecutors office to conduct a
preliminary investigation and suspended further proceedings in the criminal cases.
On 05 March 1992, petitioner Ching, together with Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc.,
filed a case[6] before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC-Manila), Branch 53, for
declaration of nullity of documents and for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 9260600, entitled "Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. et. al. vs. Allied Banking Corporation."
On 07 August 1992, Ching filed a petition[7] before the RTC-Makati, Branch 58, for the
suspension of the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question in a civil
action.
The prosecution then filed an opposition to the petition for suspension, against which
opposition, herein petitioner filed a reply.[8]
On 26 August 1992, the RTC-Makati issued an order[9] which denied the petition for
suspension and scheduled the arraignment and pre-trial of the criminal cases. As a
result, petitioner moved to reconsider[10] the order to which the prosecution filed an
opposition.
In an order[11] dated 04 September 1992, the RTC-Makati, before which the criminal
cases are pending, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and set the criminal
cases for arraignment and pre-trial.
Aggrieved by these orders[12] of the lower court in the criminal cases, petitioner
brought before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition which
sought to declare the nullity of the aforementioned orders and to prohibit the RTCMakati from conducting further proceedings in the criminal cases.
In denying the petition,[13] the Court of Appeals, in CA G.R. SP No. 28912, ruled:

"X X X Civil Case No. 90-60600 pending before the Manila

Regional Trial Court seeking(sic) the declaration of nullity of the
trust receipts in question is not a prejudicial question to Criminal
Case Nos. 92-0934 to 37 pending before the respondent court
charging the petitioner with four counts of violation of Article 315,
par. 1(b), RPC, in relation to PD 115 as to warrant the suspension
of the proceedings in the latter X X X." Sc
Consequently, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision which the
appellate court denied for lack of merit, via a resolution[14] dated 28 June 1993.
Notwithstanding the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, the RTC-Manila,
Branch 53 in an order dated 19 November 1993 in Civil Case No. 92-60600, admitted
petitioners amended complaint[15] which, inter alia, prayed the court for a judgment:
"X X X
"1. Declaring the Trust Receipts, annexes D, F, H and J hereof, null
and void, or otherwise annulling the same, for failure to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties;
"2. Declaring the transaction subject hereof as one of pure and
simple loan without any trust receipt agreement and/or not one
involving a trust receipt, and accordingly declaring all the
documents annexed hereto as mere loan documents
XXX"(emphasis ours)
In its amended answer,[16] herein private respondent Allied Banking Corporation
submitted in riposte that the transaction applied for was a "letter of credit/trust receipt
accommodation" and not a "pure and simple loan with the trust receipts as mere
additional or side documents", as asserted by herein petitioner in its amended
complaint.[17]
Through the expediency of Rule 45, petitioner seeks the intervention of this Court and
prays:
"After due consideration, to render judgment reversing the decision
and resolution, Annexes A and B hereof, respectively, and ordering
the suspension of Criminal Cases (sic) Nos. 92-0934 to 92-0937,
inclusive, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Ching"
pending before Branch 58 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila, until final determination of Civil Case No. 92-600
entitled Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc. and Alfredo Ching vs.
Allied Banking Corporation" pending before Branch 53 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila."
The instant petition is bereft of merit.

We agree with the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that
no prejudicial question exists in the present case. Scmis
As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the
case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal.[18]
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.[19] It comes into play
generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and
there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.[20]
More simply, for the court to appreciate the pendency of a prejudicial question, the
law,[21] in no uncertain terms, requires the concurrence of two essential requisites, to
wit:
a) The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and
b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
Verily, under the prevailing circumstances, the alleged prejudicial question in the civil
case for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages, does not juris et de
jure determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action for estafa.
Assuming arguendo that the court hearing the civil aspect of the case adjudicates that
the transaction entered into between the parties was not a trust receipt agreement,
nonetheless the guilt of the accused could still be established and his culpability
under penal laws determined by other evidence. To put it differently, even on the
assumption that the documents are declared null, it does not ipso facto follow that
such declaration of nullity shall exonerate the accused from criminal prosecution and
liability.
Accordingly, the prosecution may adduce evidence to prove the criminal liability of the
accused for estafa, specifically under Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code
which explicitly provides that said crime is committed: Missc
"X X X (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of
another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by
the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or any

other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return

the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property."
Applying the foregoing principles, the criminal liability of the accused for violation of
Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, may still be shown through the
presentation of evidence to the effect that: (a) the accused received the subject goods
in trust or under the obligation to sell the same and to remit the proceeds thereof to
Allied Banking Corporation, or to return the goods, if not sold; (b) that accused Ching
misappropriated or converted the goods and/or the proceeds of the sale; (c) that
accused Ching performed such acts with abuse of confidence to the damage and
prejudice of Allied Banking Corporation; and (d) that demand was made by the bank
to herein petitioner.
Presidential Decree 115, otherwise known as the "Trust Receipts Law", specifically
Section 13 thereof, provides:
"The failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of
the goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to
the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the
trust receipt or to return said goods, documents or instruments if
they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of
the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable
under the provisions of Article Three hundred fifteen, paragraph
one (b) of Act Numbered Three thousand eight hundred and fifteen,
as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code."
We must stress though, that an act violative of a trust receipt agreement is only one
mode of committing estafa under the abovementioned provision of the Revised Penal
Code. Stated differently, a violation of a trust receipt arrangement is not the sole basis
for incurring liability under Article 315 1(b) of the Code.
In Jimenez vs. Averia,[22] where the accused was likewise charged with estafa, this
Court had occasion to rule that a civil case contesting the validity of a certain receipt
is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of criminal
proceedings for estafa.
In the abovementioned case, a criminal charge for estafa was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Cavite against the two accused. The information alleged that the
accused, having received the amount of P20,000.00 from Manuel Jimenez for the
purchase of a fishing boat, with the obligation on the part of the former to return the
money in case the boat was not purchased, misappropriated the said amount to the
damage and prejudice of Jimenez.[23] Misspped
Before arraignment, the accused filed a civil case contesting the validity of a certain
receipt signed by them. In the receipt, the accused acknowledged having received the
aforesaid sum, in addition to the amount of P240.00 as agents commission. The
complaint, however, alleged that the accused never received any amount from

Jimenez and that the signatures on the questioned receipt were secured by means of
fraud, deceit and intimidation.
In ruling out the existence of prejudicial question, we declared:
"X X X It will be readily seen that the alleged prejudicial question is
not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the parties charged
with estafa, because even on the assumption that the execution of
the receipt whose annulment they sought in the civil case was
vitiated by fraud, duress or intimidation, their guilt could still be
established by other evidence showing, to the degree required by
law, that they had actually received from the complainant the sum
of P20,000.00 with which to buy for him a fishing boat, and that,
instead of doing so, they misappropriated the money and refused or
otherwise failed to return it to him upon demand. X X X "Spped
Furthermore, petitioner submits that the truth or falsity of the parties respective claims
as regards the true nature of the transactions and of the documents, shall have to be
first determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which is the court hearing the
civil case.
While this may be true, it is no less true that the Supreme Court may, on certain
exceptional instances, resolve the merits of a case on the basis of the records and
other evidence before it, most especially when the resolution of these issues would
best serve the ends of justice and promote the speedy disposition of cases.
Thus, considering the peculiar circumstances attendant in the instant case, this Court
sees the cogency to exercise its plenary power:
"It is a rule of procedure for the Supreme Court to strive to settle the
entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch
to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be
served if a case or the determination of an issue in a case is
remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to
the Court of Appeals and from there to the Supreme Court (citing
Board of Commissioners vs. Judge Joselito de la Rosa and Judge
Capulong, G.R. Nos. 95122-23).
"We have laid down the rule that the remand of the case or of an
issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the Court is in position to resolve the dispute
based on the records before it and particularly where the ends of
justice would not be subserved by the remand thereof (Escudero
vs. Dulay, 158 SCRA 69). Moreover, the Supreme Court is clothed
with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on
appeal if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a
just disposition of the case."[24]

On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and for the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding
them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would
not be subserved by the remand of the case.[25]
Inexorably, the records would show that petitioner signed and executed an application
and agreement for a commercial letter of credit to finance the purchase of imported
goods. Likewise, it is undisputed that petitioner signed and executed trust receipt
documents in favor of private respondent Allied Banking Corporation. Josp-ped
In its amended complaint, however, which notably was filed only after the Court of
Appeals rendered its assailed decision, petitioner urges that the transaction entered
into between the parties was one of "pure loan without any trust receipt agreement".
According to petitioner, the trust receipt documents were intended merely as
"additional or side documents covering the said loan" contrary to petitioners allegation
in his original complaint that the trust receipts were executed as collateral or security.
We do not agree. As Mr. Justice Story succinctly puts it: "Naked statements must be
entitled to little weight when the parties hold better evidence behind the scenes."[26]
Hence, with affirmance, we quote the findings of the Court of Appeals:
"The concept in which petitioner signed the trust receipts, that is
whether he signed the trust receipts as such trust receipts or as a
mere evidence of a pure and simple loan transaction is not decisive
because precisely, a trust receipt is a security agreement of an
indebtedness."
Contrary to petitioners assertions and in view of jurisprudence established in this
jurisdiction, a trust receipt is not merely an additional or side document to a principal
contract, which in the instant case is alleged by petitioner to be a pure and simple
loan.
As elucidated in Samo vs. People,[27] a trust receipt is considered a security
transaction intended to aid in financing importers and retail dealers who do not have
sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise,
and who may not be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral, of
the merchandise imported or purchased.
Further, a trust receipt is a document in which is expressed a security transaction
whereunder the lender, having no prior title in the goods on which the lien is to be
given and not having possession which remains in the borrower, lends his money to
the borrower on security of the goods which the borrower is privileged to sell clear of
the lien with an agreement to pay all or part of the proceeds of the sale to the lender.
[28]
It is a security agreement pursuant to which a bank acquires a "security interest" in
the goods. It secures an indebtedness and there can be no such thing as security
interest that secures no obligation.[29]

Clearly, a trust receipt partakes the nature of a security transaction. It could never be
a mere additional or side document as alleged by petitioner. Otherwise, a party to a
trust receipt agreement could easily renege on its obligations thereunder, thus
undermining the importance and defeating with impunity the purpose of such an
indispensable tool in commercial transactions. Spp-edjo
Of equal importance is the fact that in his complaint in Civil Case No. 92-60600, dated
05 March 1992, petitioner alleged that the trust receipts were executed and intended
as collateral or security. Pursuant to the rules, such particular allegation in the
complaint is tantamount to a judicial admission on the part of petitioner Ching to
which he must be bound.
Thus, the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated 28 June 1993, correctly observed:
"It was petitioner himself who acknowledged the trust receipts as
mere collateral and security for the payment of the loan but kept on
insisting that the real and true transaction was one of pure loan. X
X X"
"In his present motion, the petitioner alleges that the trust receipts
are evidence of a pure loan or that the same were additional or side
documents that actually stood as promissory notes and not a
collateral or security agreement. He cannot assume a position
inconsistent with his previous allegations in his civil complaint that
the trust receipts were intended as mere collateral or security X X
X."
Perhaps, realizing such flaw, petitioner, in a complete turn around,
filed a motion to admit amended complaint before the RTC-Manila.
Among others, the amended complaint alleged that the trust
receipts stood as additional or side documents, the real transaction
between the parties being that of a pure loan without any trust
receipt agreement.
In an order dated 19 November 1993, the RTC-Manila, Branch 53, admitted the
amended complaint. Accordingly, with the lower courts admission of the amended
complaint, the judicial admission made in the original complaint was, in effect,
superseded. Mi-so
Under the Rules, pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose
their status as pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions. While they may
nonetheless be utilized against the pleader as extrajudicial admissions, they must, in
order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence. If not offered in evidence,
the admission contained therein will not be considered.[30]
Consequently, the original complaint, having been amended, lost its character as a
judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an
extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal
offer.[31]

In virtue thereof, the amended complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is
regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading.
The original complaint no longer forms part of the record.[32]
Thus, in the instant case, the original complaint is deemed superseded by the
amended complaint. Corollarily, the judicial admissions in the original complaint are
considered abandoned. Nonetheless, we must stress that the actuations of petitioner,
as sanctioned by the RTC-Manila, Branch 53 through its order admitting the amended
complaint, demands stern rebuke from this Court.
Certainly, this Court is not unwary of the tactics employed by the petitioner specifically
in filing the amended complaint only after the promulgation of the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals. It bears noting that a lapse of almost eighteen months (from
March 1992 to September 1993), from the filing of the original complaint to the filing
of the amended complaint, is too lengthy a time sufficient to enkindle suspicion and
enflame doubts as to the true intentions of petitioner regarding the early disposition of
the pending cases. Ne-xold
Although the granting of leave to file amended pleadings is a matter peculiarly within
the sound discretion of the trial court and such discretion would not normally be
disturbed on appeal, it is also well to mention that this rule is relaxed when evident
abuse thereof is apparent.[33]
Hence, in certain instances we ruled that amendments are not proper and should be
denied when delay would arise,[34] or when the amendments would result in a change
of cause of action or defense or change the theory of the case,[35] or would be
inconsistent with the allegations in the original complaint.[36]
Applying the foregoing rules, petitioner, by filing the amended complaint, in effect,
altered the theory of his case. Likewise, the allegations embodied in the amended
complaint are inconsistent with that of the original complaint inasmuch as in the latter,
petitioner alleged that the trust receipts were intended as mere collateral or security,
the principal transaction being one of pure loan.
Yet, in the amended complaint, petitioner argued that the said trust receipts were
executed as additional or side documents, the transaction being strictly one of pure
loan without any trust receipt arrangement. Obviously these allegations are in
discord in relation to each other and therefore cannot stand in harmony.
These circumstances, taken as a whole, lead this Court to doubt the genuine purpose
of petitioner in filing the amended complaint. Again, we view petitioners actuations
with abhorrence and displeasure. Man-ikx
Moreover, petitioner contends that the transaction between Philippine Blooming Mills
(PBM) and private respondent Allied Banking Corporation does not fall under the
category of a trust receipt arrangement claiming that the goods were not to be sold
but were to be used, consumed and destroyed by the importer PBM.

To our mind, petitioners contention is a stealthy attempt to circumvent the principle

enunciated in the case of Allied Banking Corporation vs. Ordonez,[37] thus:
"X X X In an attempt to escape criminal liability, private respondent
claims P.D. 115 covers goods which are ultimately destined for sale
and not goods for use in manufacture. But the wording of Section
13 covers failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the
entrusted goods, or to return said goods if unsold or disposed of in
accordance with the terms of the trust receipts. Private respondent
claims that at the time of PBMs application for the issuance of the
LCs, it was not represented to the petitioner that the items were
intended for sale, hence, there was no deceit resulting in a violation
of the trust receipts which would constitute a criminal liability. Again
we cannot uphold this contention. The non-payment of the amount
covered by a trust receipt is an act violative of the entrustees
obligation to pay. There is no reason why the law should not apply
to all transactions covered by trust receipts, except those expressly
excluded (68 Am. Jur. 125).
"The Court takes judicial notice of customary banking and business
practices where trust receipts are used for importation of heavy
equipment, machineries and supplies used in manufacturing
operations. We are perplexed by the statements in the assailed
DOJ resolution that the goods subject of the instant case are
outside the ambit of the provisions of PD 115 albeit covered by trust
receipt agreements ( 17 February 1988 resolution) and that not all
transactions covered by trust receipts may be considered as trust
receipt transactions defined and penalized under P.D. 115 (11
January 1988 resolution). A construction should be avoided when it
affords an opportunity to defeat compliance with the terms of a
statute. Manik-s
xxx......xxx......xxx
"The penal provision of P.D. 115 encompasses any act violative of
an obligation covered by the trust receipt; it is not limited to
transactions in goods which are to be sold (retailed), reshipped,
stored or processed as a component of a product ultimately sold."
An examination of P.D. 115 shows the growing importance of trust receipts in
Philippine business, the need to provide for the rights and obligations of parties to a
trust receipt transaction, the study of the problems involved and the action by
monetary authorities, and the necessity of regulating the enforcement of rights arising
from default or violations of trust receipt agreements. The legislative intent to meet a
pressing need is clearly expressed.[38]
In fine, we reiterate that the civil action for declaration of nullity of documents and for
damages does not constitute a prejudicial question to the criminal cases for estafa
filed against petitioner Ching.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision and resolution of the

Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, is hereby
directed to proceed with the hearing and trial on the merits of Criminal Case Nos. 920934 to 92-0937, inclusive, and to expedite proceedings therein, without prejudice to
the right of the accused to due process.
SO ORDERED. Man-ikan

that the complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article was
printed and first published.
G.R. No. 145022 September 23, 2005
ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
vs.
LUCIO TAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure are the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 19 April 2000 that
affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 56, in Civil
Case No. 98-2288, dated 19 April 1999, admitting respondent Lucio Tans Amended
Complaint for Damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations against
him in two (2) articles of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and its Resolution2 dated 15
September 2000 denying petitioners Armand Nocum and The Philippine Daily
Inquirer, Inc.s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are summarized by the Court of Appeals.
On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum,
Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
docketed as Civil Case No. 98-2288,seeking moral and exemplary damages for the
alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
INQUIRER and NOCUM filed their joint answer, dated October 27, 1998, wherein
they alleged that: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; (2) the
defamatory statements alleged in the complaint were general conclusions without
factual premises; (3) the questioned news report constituted fair and true report on
the matters of public interest concerning a public figure and therefore, was privileged
in nature; and (4) malice on their part was negated by the publication in the same
article of plaintiffs or PALs side of the dispute with the pilots union.
ALPAP and UMALI likewise filed their joint answer, dated October 31, 1998, and
alleged therein that: (1) the complaint stated no cause of action; (2) venue was
improperly laid; and (3) plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a real party in interest. It appeared

Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an Order dated February 10, 1999,
dismissing the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus
Motion dated February 24, 1999, seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and
admission of the amended complaint. Inpar. 2.01.1 of the amended complaint, it is
alleged that "This article was printed and first published in the City of Makati" (p. 53,
Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 55192), and in par. 2.04.1, that "This caricature was printed
and first published in the City of Makati" (p. 55, id.).
The lower court, after having the case dismissed for improper venue, admitted the
amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal, supra,
stating, inter alia, that:
"The mistake or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been cured
in the Amended Complaint which can still be properly admitted, pursuant to Rule 10 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the Order of dismissal is not yet final.
Besides, there is no substantial amendment in the Amended Complaint which would
affect the defendants defenses and their Answers. The Amendment is merely formal,
contrary to the contention of the defendants that it is substantial."
Dissatisfied, petitioners, together with defendants Capt. Florendo Umali and the
Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc. (ALPAP), appealed the RTC decision
to the Court of Appeals. Two petitions for certiorari were filed, one filed by petitioners
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55192, and the other by defendants Umali
and ALPAP which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54894. The two petitions were
consolidated.
On 19 April 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE
and DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.
The motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners and by defendants Umali and
ALPAP were likewise denied in a resolution dated 15 September 2000.
Both petitioners and defendants Umali and ALPAP appealed to this Court. Under
consideration is the petition for review filed by petitioners.

On 11 December 2000, the Court required respondent Tan to comment on the petition
filed by petitioners.3
Respondent filed his comment on 22 January 20014 to which petitioners filed a reply
on 26 April 2001.5
In a Manifestation filed on 19 February 2001, respondent stated that the petition6 filed
by defendants Umali and ALPAP has already been denied by the Court in a resolution
dated 17 January 2001.7
On 20 August 2003, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from
notice.8 Both petitioners and respondent complied.9
Petitioners assigned the following as errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING (1) THAT THE LOWER COURT
HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE (ON THE BASIS OF THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT) NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD
EARLIER DISMISSED THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR ITS FAILURE TO
CONFER JURISDICTION UPON THJE COURT; AND (2) THAT THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED OR ADMITTED BECAUSE THE LOWER
COURT WAS "NEVER DIVESTED" OF JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT WAS AMENDED PURPOSELY TO CONFER
UPON THE LOWER COURT JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.10
Petitioners state that Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code vests jurisdiction over all
civil and criminal complaints for libel on the RTC of the place: (1) where the libelous
article was printed and first published; or (2) where the complainant, if a private
person, resides; or (3) where the complainant, if a public official, holds office. They
argue that since the original complaint only contained the office address of
respondent and not the latters actual residence or the place where the allegedly
offending news reports were printed and first published, the original complaint, by
reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, failed to confer jurisdiction on the lower
court.
The question to be resolved is: Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil
case upon the filing of the original complaint for damages?
We rule in the affirmative.

It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the
complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.11In the case at bar, after examining the
original complaint, we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the
case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondents cause of action is
for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it is a Court of First Instance12 that is
specifically designated to try a libel case.13
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former colleague, the Hon. Florenz
D. Regalado,14differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the
authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be
heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law;
(c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter;
venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and,
(d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be
conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article
and the caricature were printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only
to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional allegations would
neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondents failure to include the
same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the case.
Respondents failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon
motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not properly
laid.
In Laquian v. Baltazar,15 this Court construed the term "jurisdiction" in Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code as referring to the place where actions for libel shall be filed
or "venue."
In Escribano v. Avila,16 pursuant to Republic Act No. 4363,17 we laid down the
following rules on the venue of the criminal and civil actions in written defamations.
1. General rule: The action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
2. If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila at the time the offense
was committed, the venue is Manila or the city or province where the libelous article is
printed and first published.

3. Where an offended party is a public official with office outside of Manila, the venue
is the province or the city where he held office at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published.
4. If an offended party is a private person, the venue is his place of residence at the
time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether the offended party is a
public officer or a private person, he has always the option to file the action in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed or
first published.
We further restated18 the rules on venue in Article 360 as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office
at the time of the commission of the offense.
We fully agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled:
We note that the amended complaint or amendment to the complaint was not
intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court, where originally it had none. The
amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. It is a wellestablished rule that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal
actions. Assuming that venue were properly laid in the court where the action was
instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In fact, in civil
cases, venue may be waived.

Consequently, by dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue, the lower
court had jurisdiction over the case. Apparently, the herein petitioners recognized this
jurisdiction by filing their answers to the complaint, albeit, questioning the propriety of
venue, instead of a motion to dismiss.
...
We so hold that dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was proper considering
that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed to allege neither the residence of the
complainant nor the place where the libelous article was printed and first published.
Nevertheless, before the finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amended as in
fact the amended complaint was admitted, in view of the court a quosjurisdiction, of
which it was never divested. In so doing, the court acted properly and without any
grave abuse of discretion.19
It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be
waived since they do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is
procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over
the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to
jurisdiction.20 It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of
trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and
not to the jurisdiction of the court.21 It is meant to provide convenience to the parties,
rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.22 In
contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an
essential element of jurisdiction.23
Petitioners argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because
respondent failed to allege the place where the libelous articles were printed and first
published would have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. The failure
of the original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because this fact
involves the issue of venue which goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This
is not to be because the case before us is a civil action where venue is not
jurisdictional.
The cases24 cited by petitioners are not applicable here. These cases involve
amendments on complaints that confer jurisdiction on courts over which they
originally had none. This is not true in the case at bar. As discussed above, the RTC
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter upon the filing of the original complaint. It
did not lose jurisdiction over the same when it dismissed it on the ground of improper
venue. The amendment merely laid down the proper venue of the case.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
19 April 2000 is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
A conflict of jurisdiction between the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) and the regular trial courts is at the core of the present case.
Petitioners question the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated February 7, 2005, in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 83873, which upheld the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the
DARAB in cases involving the use or possession of lands covered by agrarian laws.
The facts, as culled from the record, are as follows:
On June 29, 1976, respondent Paul Pelaez and his wife mortgaged their agricultural
lands bearing Original Certificates of Title Nos. 0-10343, 0-10344 and 0-10345,
situated in Barrio Kodia, Madridejos, Cebu, to the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) Bogo Branch, Cebu. For failure of the Pelaez spouses to pay their
mortgage obligation, the properties were foreclosed and subsequently sold at public
auction.
The purported tenants of the property, Anastacio Alob, Francisco Alob, Jesus
Cordova, Manuel Sanchez, Elia Giltendez, Flora dela Pea, Eliseo Rayco, Benjamin
Santillan, Pascual Gilbuena, Jesus Alob, Renaldo Grande, and Julieto Manzueto, filed
an action to annul the mortgage, foreclosure and sale of the properties, claiming that
they are the owners thereof under Presidential Decree No. 27. the case was docketed
as Reg. Case No. VII-76-C-90.
In the meantime, on May 10, 1988, petitioners filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry
with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,2 docketed as Civil Case
No. 79, with the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bantayan, Cebu, against
respondent and a certain Elesio Monteseven. The complaint averred that plaintiffs
(petitioners herein) are the owners and actual possessors of the subject landholding
and that defendants, having entered the property through stealth and strategy,
unlawfully deprived plaintiffs of possession thereof.

G.R. No. 170478

May 22, 2008

SPS. TERESITO Y. VILLACASTIN and LOURDES FUA VILLACASTIN, petitioners,

vs.
PAUL PELAEZ, respondent.

Respondent countered that he is the owner of the subject property, which was
foreclosed by the DBP and later purchased by petitioners at an auction sale.
Petitioners, however, were allegedly never in possession of the subject property as
they failed to apply for a writ of possession therefor. Respondent further claimed that
he had redeemed the property on March 3, 1988 and accordingly reacquired
possession thereof.3
Meanwhile, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in Cebu rendered a decision in
Reg. Case No. VII-76-C-90 dated February 15, 1993, in favor of the tenants, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing view, DECISION is hereby

rendered as follows:
1. Declaring complainants herein with the exception of Silbino Arranquez[,]
Jr. and Claro Gilbuela who earlier withdraw from this case as bonafide
tenant farmers of the parcels in question covered by P.D. [No.] 27;
2. Declaring the mortgage executed by Sps. Paul and Elnora Pelaez to
respondent DBP and the subsequent foreclosure and eventual sale thereof
to Sps. Teresito and Lourdes Villacastin as null and void ab initio as it is
contrary to law, public order and public policy;
3. Declaring complainants herein to properly account their deposited
shares/lease rentals before the DAR office of Bantayan[,] Cebu and deliver
the said deposited [share/lease] rentals including the forthcoming harvest
thereon to respondent landowners Sps. Paul and Elnora Pelaez with the
assistance of the MARO of Bantayan, Madridejos, Cebu.
4. No pronouncement as to cost.4
This decision was affirmed by the DARAB in a Decision5 dated February 22, 2000.
On January 6, 2000, the MCTC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 79 in favor of
petitioners and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant is hereby ordered:
a) To return to plaintiffs possession of the parcel of land above-described
and vacate the premises;
b) To pay the costs of litigation;
c) Moral and exemplary damages not recoverable in ejectment suit is
denied;
d) Expenses claimed not duly proven are disallowed;
e) To release in favor of the plaintiffs the cash bond the sum of P5,000.00
deposited pursuant to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction.6
In a Decision7 dated March 10, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dakit, Bogo,
Cebu, Branch 61, affirmed the MCTC decision.

The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that regular courts should respect the primary
jurisdiction vested upon the DARAB in cases involving agricultural lands such as the
property subject of this case. Accordingly, it set aside the decision rendered by the
RTC and the MCTC, and dismissed the complaint for forcible entry filed by petitioners
in this case.
The appellate court denied reconsideration in its Resolution8 dated November 11,
2005.
Petitioners contend that Civil Case No. 79 did not involve any agrarian matter and
thus, the MCTC correctly exercised jurisdiction over the case.
In his Comment9 dated March 21, 2006, respondent underscores the fact that the
parcels of land subject of this case are tenanted agricultural lands. Before judgment
was rendered in the forcible entry case, the tenants of the property already filed a suit
with the DARAB for the annulment of the real estate mortgage executed by
respondent over the same in favor of DBP and the subsequent foreclosure and
auction sale in favor of petitioners. The DARAB's decision declaring the mortgage,
foreclosure and auction sale null and void became final as regards petitioners who did
not appeal from the decision. Respondent asserts that the complaint for forcible entry
filed by petitioners had lost its legal basis after the DARAB declared that the
foreclosure and auction sale of the subject property were null and void.
Petitioners filed a Reply10 dated July 28, 2006, insisting that the tenant-farmers
involved in the DARAB case were not parties to the forcible entry case, the only
defendant therein being respondent in this case. Respondent, in turn, raised the
defense of ownership, thereby joining the issues regarding possession and
ownership.
Petitioners further note their argument in their Motion for Reconsideration11 of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals that the subject property had been declared as
wilderness area and the same had been classified as alienable and disposable on
December 22, 1987. In support of this contention, they submitted a Department of
Agrarian Reform Order12 dated September 12, 1997 to the effect that the subject
property falls within the administrative authority or competence of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The order directed the PARO of Cebu
and the MARO of Bantayan, Cebu to cease and desist from further activities affecting
the subject property under Operation Land Transfer, and to refer the matter to the
DENR.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint.13 In ascertaining, for instance, whether an action is one for forcible entry
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the averments of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be examined.14

A review of the complaint reveals that the pertinent allegations thereof sufficiently vest
jurisdiction over the action on the MCTC. The complaint alleges as follows:
III
That the plaintiffs are the owners and legal as well as actual possessors of a
parcel of agricultural land more particularly described as follows:
xxx
IV
That the defendant, sometime in the second week of March 1988, by
strategy and through stealth entered the above-described land of the
plaintiffs and took possession thereof; thus, depriving said plaintiffs of the
possession thereof;
V
That several demands were made the plaintiffs upon the defendants to
restore to them the possession of the above-described parcel of land; but,
defendants refused and still refuse to restore possession of said property to
the plaintiffs;15
It has not escaped our notice that no landowner-tenant vinculum juris or juridical tie
was alleged between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would

characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute.16 Rule II of the DARAB

Rules17 provides that the DARAB "shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies,
and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and
129-A, Republic Act No, 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential
Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations."
Petitioners' action is clearly for the recovery of physical or material possession of the
subject property only, a question which both the MCTC and the RTC ruled petitioners
are entitled to. It does not involve the adjudication of an agrarian reform matter, nor
an agrarian dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public or private
agricultural lands to determine the issue of physical possession as this issue is
independent of the question of disposition and alienation of such lands which should
be threshed out in the DAR.18 Thus, jurisdiction was rightfully exercised by the MCTC
and the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP. No. 83873 dated February 7, 2005, and its Resolution dated November 11,
2005, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dakit, Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61, dated March 10, 2004, affirming the decision of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bantayan, Cebu, dated June 6, 2000, is REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.