IV Sententiae d. 15, q.

3
Concerning Fasting
deinde quaeritur de jejunio; et circa hoc
quaeruntur quatuor: 1 quid sit jejunium;
2 quis teneatur ad jejunium; 3 de
tempore jejunii; 4 de solventibus ipsum.

Next, we consider fasting, concerning which four

questions are examined: 1. What is fasting? 2. Who is
obliged to keep the fast? 3. Concerning its time (in
which it is observed) and 4. its ending.

utrum isidorus convenienter jejunium

definiat.

Article 1: Whether Isidore appropriately defines

fasting?

ad primum sic proceditur. videtur quod

isidorus inconvenienter definiat
jejunium, dicens: jejunium est
parsimonia victus, abstinentiaque
ciborum.

Sub-article 1: It would seem that Isidore does not

appropriately define fasting when he states: "Fasting is
frugality of sustenance, and abstinence of food."

parsimonia enim a parsi praeterito hujus Objection 1: "Frugality" (parsimonia) comes from the
verbi parco venit. est enim parcere, inter past participle "parsum" of the verb "parco" ("to use
alia quae habet significata, idem quod frugally or sparingly"). Among the other meanings of
abstinere. ergo idem videtur esse
this word, "parcere" is identical to "abstinere" ("to
parsimonia victus et abstinentia ciborum; refrain or abstain from something"). Therefore,
et sic alterum superfluit.
"parsimonia victus" ("frugality of sustenance") would
seem to signify the same thing as "abstinentia
ciborum" ("abstinence of food"), making the latter
(formulation of Isidore's definition) superfluous.
praeterea, matth. 17, super illud: hoc
genus daemoniorum etc., dicit
hieronymus: jejunium est non solum ab
escis, sed a cunctis illecebris abstinere.
cum ergo isidorus definiat jejunium
tantum per abstinentiam ab escis,
videtur quod incompetens sit assignatio.

Objection 2: Furthermore, there is that (text from)

Matthew 17 (quoted) above (in the Lombar''s text):
"This kind of demon..." (concerning which) St. Jerome
states: "Fasting is not only from food, but to abstain
from all enticements." Therefore, when Isidore defines
fasting only by means of abstinence from food, it would
seem that this assignation is inaccurate.

praeterea, ad observationem jejunii

videtur non solum pertinere abstinere a
cibis, sed etiam lugere, et unguento non
uti, ut patet dan. 10, 2: in diebus illis
lugebam ego daniel trium
hebdomadarum diebus. sed de his non
fit mentio in praedicta assignatione. ergo
insufficiens est.

Objection 3: Furthermore, in the observance of the fast,

it would seem to pertain not only to an abstinence from
food, but also to mourn and not to annoint oneself with
oil, as is clear from Daniel 10:2 "In those days I Daniel
mourned the days of three weeks." But mention of
these matters is not made in the aforementioned
assignation. Therefore, it is insufficient.

praeterea, multi servant parsimoniam in

victu et abstinentiam in cibis, qui tamen
pluries in die manducant. sed tales non
dicuntur jejunantes. ergo definitio
praedicta non convertitur cum jejunio.

Objection 4: Furthermore, many observe frugality in

sustenance and abstinence with respect to food, but
nonetheless eat several times during the day. Such
people are not said to be those who fast. Therefore,
the aforesaid definition is not convertible with fasting.

praeterea, nullus est jejunus nisi jejunio, Objection 5: Furthermore, there are none who are said
sicut nec albus nisi albedine. sed aliquis to fast apart from the practice of fasting, just as there

etiam immoderate cibis utens, est

quandoque jejunus antequam comedat.
ergo tali non competit definitio assignata
jejunii; ergo est incompetens.

are none who are white apart from whiteness. But

someone who immoderately takes food is one who
sometimes fasts before he eats. Therefore, such a
person does not correspond to the definition of fasting
assigned. Therefore, it is inaccurate.

ulterius. videtur quod jejunium non sit

actus virtutis.

Sub-article 2: It would seem that fasting is not an act of

virtue.

virtus enim sicut abundanti, ita et

diminuto corrumpitur. sed jejunium
importat diminutionem a cibo, in quo
conservari potest medium virtutis. ergo
jejunium non est virtutis actus.

Objection 1: For just as virtue exists in one who has a

abundance (of goodness, etc.), so too is it destroyed
when that person is diminished. But fasting denotes a
diminishment of food in which the mean of virtue is
able to be preserved. Therefore, fasting is not an act of
virtue.

praeterea, omnis virtutis actus est in

aliquid operando. sed jejunium dicit
cessationem ab actu. ergo non est
virtutis actus.

Objection 2: Furthermore, every act of virtue is in

someone through his activity. But fasting denotes a
cessation from activity. Therefore, it is not an act of
virtue.

praeterea, jejunium consistit non solum Objection 3: Furthermore, fasting consists not only in
in abstinendo a superfluis cibis, quia hoc abstaining from an excess of food (for this is
est de necessitate virtutis, sed etiam a
necessarily said of the virtue), but also (to abstain)
necessariis. sed qui subtrahit
from (that food which is) necessary. But he who
necessarium cibum, dat sibi occasionem withdraws from food which is necessary, places
mortis; non autem, ut hieronymus dicit, himself in death's path; however, as St. Jerome states
differt utrum magno vel parvo tempore te "It makes no difference whether you kill yourself over a
interimas. ergo cum nulli liceat seipsum great or a small period of time." Therefore, since it is in
occidere, videtur quod nulli liceat
no way licit to kill oneself, it would seem that it is in no
jejunare; et sic jejunium non erit actus
way licit to fast. And so, fasting will not be an act of
virtutis.
virtue.
praeterea, sicut dicit augustinus in 10
Objection 4: Furthermore, as Augustine says in the
confess., alimentum sic sumi debet ut
tenth book of his Confessions that nourishment ought
famis medicamentum. sed magis infirmo to be taken as an antidote to (the pains of) hunger
minus est medicina subtrahenda. cum (Book X, Chapter 31). But the more infirm one is, the
ergo in primo statu adam peccasset si
less are antidotes (or medicines) to be withdrawn.
cibo abstinuisset donec praeoccuparetur Therefore, since Adam, in his pre-fallen state, would
fame, ut in 2 lib., dist. 19, quaest. 1, art. 2 have sinned if he had abstained from food when he
ad 3, dictum est, videtur quod etiam
was gripped by hunger, as was said in Book II, d. 19,
nunc jejunando peccat homo, cum
q. 1, a. 2, ad. 3 (of our present work), it would seem
natura humana sit infirmior; et sic
that even now man sins when he fasts, since human
jejunium non erit virtutis actus.
nature is more infirm (than Adam's). And so, fasting
will not be an act of virtue.
sed contra est quod hieronymus dicit:
jejunium non est perfecta virtus, sed
ceterarum virtutum fundamentum.

First on the contrary: There is what Jerome states:

"Fasting is not a perfect virtue, but rather the
foundation of the virtues."

praeterea, isidorus dicit, jejunium esse

abstinentiam, ut ex definitione
praemissa apparet. sed abstinentia est
virtus. ergo jejunium est actus virtutis.

Second on the contrary: Isidore states that fasting is

abstinence, as is clear from the aforesaid definition.
But abstinence is a virtue. Therefore, fasting is an act
of virtue.

ulterius. videtur quod jejunium non sit

actus temperantiae.

Sub-article 3: It would seem that fasting is not an act of

temperance.

quia canon dicit de consecr., dist. 5:

jejunium quadragesimale est decima
totius anni. sed dare decimam est actus
justitiae. ergo et jejunare; non igitur
temperantiae.

Objection 1: For the Canon concerning Consecration

(Distinction 5) states that "The Lenten fast is one's
tithing for the entire year." But to give a tithe is an act of
justice. Therefore to fast (is an act of justice), and
therefore not (to be considered as a part) of
temperance.

praeterea, ad fortitudinem pertinet

molestias perferre. sed hoc accidit in
jejunio. ergo jejunium est actus
fortitudinis; non ergo temperantiae.

Objection 2: It belongs to fortitude to endure

annoyance. But this happens while one fasts.
Therefore fasting is an act of fortitude, and not of
temperance.

praeterea, prudentiae pars est cautela,

ut in 3 lib., dist. 33, qu. 3, art. 1,
quaestiunc. 3, dictum est. sed jejunium
ad cautelam peccatorum carnis
inductum est. ergo est actus prudentiae.

Objection 3: Caution is a part of prudence, as was said

in Book III, d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qq. 3. But fasting leads to
caution concerning the sins of the flesh. It is therefore
an act of prudence (and not of temperance).

sed contra, materia propria temperantiae

sunt delectabilia tactus, ut dicitur in 3
ethic.. sed circa hujusmodi est jejunium,
quia est circa cibos. ergo jejunium est
actus temperantiae.

First on the contrary: The proper subject matter of

temperance is the pleasures of touch, as is said in the
3rd. book of the Nicomachean Ethics. But fasting
concerns such things because it concerns food.
Therefore, fasting is an act of temperance.

praeterea, abstinentia est species

Second on the contrary: Abstinence is a species of
temperantiae. sed jejunium est
temperance. But fasting is abstinence. Therefore, it is
abstinentia. ergo est temperantiae actus. an act of temperance.
ulterius. videtur quod jejunium non cadat Sub-article 4: It would seem that fasting does not fall
in praecepto.
under a precept.
nam super illud psalm. 44: omnis gloria
ejus filiae regis ab intus, dicit glossa
augustini, quod gloria ecclesiae in
interioribus virtutibus consistit, sicut
fides, spes, caritas. sed omne
praeceptum ecclesiae ad gloriam
ecclesiae ordinatur. ergo de jejunio
exteriori non potest esse praeceptum.

Objection 1: For Psalm 44 speaks of this: "All the glory

of the king's daughter is within." Augustine's gloss
says that the glory of the Church consists in the interior
virtues, such as faith, hope and love. But every precept
of the church is ordered to the glory of the Church.
Therefore, there cannot be a precept concerning the
external (matters pertaining to) fasting.

praeterea, ea quae sunt

Objection 2: Furthermore, those things which are of
supererogationis, ad consilium pertinent, supererogation belong to counsel, to which no one is
ad quod nullus obligatur nisi ex voto.
bound except by reason of a solemn promise. But
sed jejunium est hujusmodi. ergo non
fasting is of such a kind. Therefore one is not bound to
obligatur ad ipsum aliquis ex praecepto. take such a practice upon himself by reason of a
precept.
praeterea, quicumque transgreditur
praeceptum, peccat mortaliter. si ergo
jejunium institutum ab ecclesia cadit sub
praecepto, tunc si aliquis unum diem
tantum frangeret quadragesimae,

Objection 3: Furthermore, whoever transgresses a

precept sins mortally. Therefore, if fasting instituted by
the Church falls under precept, then if someone breaks
the Lenten fast for only one day, he sins mortally,
which would seem to indicate (that the precept is

mortaliter peccaret; quod videtur grave

dicere.
sed contra, statutum ecclesiae obligat
per modum praecepti, sicut praeceptum
dei; quia dominus discipulis suis dixit,
luc. 10, 16: qui vos audit, me audit. sed
ad illud jejunium obligamur ex statuto
ecclesiae. ergo cadit sub praecepto.

unreasonably) burdensome.

praeterea, majoris perfectionis est lex

nova quam vetus, et magis a carnalibus
desideriis abstrahens. sed in lege veteri
erat jejunium in praecepto. ergo multo
fortius in lege nova.

Second on the contrary: The New Law is of greater

perfection than the Old, drawing one away from the
carnal desires in a greater way. But in the Old Law,
fasting was under a precept. Therefore all the more is
it in the New Law.

ulterius. videtur quod jejunium non sit

satisfactorium.

Sub-article 5: It would seem that fasting is not the way

to make amends.

First on the contrary: the law of the Church binds in the

way a precept does, just as the precept of God (does).
For the Lord said to His disciples at Luke 10:16 that
"He who listens to you, listens to me." But we are
bound to that fast by reason of the law of the Church.
Therefore, it falls under a precept.

quia satisfactio est justitiae actus, ut

Objection 1: For reparation is an act of justice, as was
prius dictum est. sed jejunium est actus said previously. But fasting is an act of temperance.
temperantiae. ergo non est
Therefore it is not reparative.
satisfactorium.
praeterea, illud ad quod ex praecepto
astringimur, non est satisfactorium, sed
satisfactionem praecedit, sicut de
eleemosyna dictum est. sed quoddam
jejunium cadit sub praecepto, ut dictum
est. ergo ad minus illud non est
satisfactorium.

Objection 2: Furthermore, that to which we are bound

by reason of a precept is not reparative, but precedes
reparation, as was said (in the previous question)
concerning alms. But a certain kind of fasting falls
under a precept as was said. Therefore, much less it is
reparative.

praeterea, satisfactio debet fieri ab eo

Objection 3: Furthermore, reparation ought to be made
qui peccavit. sed anima est quae peccat; by he who has sinned. But the soul is that which sins.
jejunium autem non est animae, sed
Fasting, however, is not of the soul, but, rather, of the
corporis. ergo non est satisfactorium pro body. Therefore, it is not reparative for sin.
peccato.
praeterea, sicut contingit peccare ex
superfluitate cibi, ita ex subtractione. sed
contra subtractionem cibi non datur, ut
satisfactio, cibi abundantia. ergo nec
contra abundantiam dari debet, ut
satisfactorium, cibi subtractio per
jejunium.

Objection 4: Just as one sins by reason of an excess

of food, so too (does one sin) by reason of
diminishment. But an abundance of food is not offered,
as reparation for the diminishment of food. Therefore
the diminishment of food through fasting ought not to
be offered as reparation for an abundance.

praeterea, 1 timoth., 4, 8: corporalis

exercitatio ad modicum utilis est. sed
jejunium est hujusmodi. ergo non est
satisfactorium pro peccato.

Objection 5: Furthermore, 1 Timothy 4:8 states "Bodily

exercise is profitable to little." But fasting is of such a
kind. Therefore, it is not reparative on behalf of sin.

sed contra, opera satisfactoria oportet

esse poenalia. sed jejunium habet
magis rationem poenae quam
eleemosyna. cum ergo eleemosyna sit
satisfactoria, ut ex dictis patet, et

First on the contrary: Reparative works ought to be

penal. But fasting has more of the nature of penalty
than does alms giving. Therefore, since alms-giving is
reparative, as is plain from the previous discussion,
fasting too ought to be reparative.

jejunium debet esse satisfactorium.

praeterea, satisfacere est peccatorum
causas excidere. sed jejunio aliquis
abscindit peccatorum causas; quia
maxime jejunio reprimitur caro, quae ad
peccata incitat. ergo etc..

Second on the contrary: To make reparation is to

remove the causes of sin. But by fasting, one cuts
away the causes of sin. For the flesh, which incites
one to sin, is best restrained by fasting. Therefore,
(fasting is reparative).

respondeo dicendum ad primam

quaestionem, quod jejunium dupliciter
dicitur; scilicet jejunium naturae, et
jejunium ecclesiae. a primo jejunio
dicitur aliquis quolibet die jejunus
antequam cibum sumat; a secundo
autem dicitur jejunans, quasi ordinatam
ab ecclesia propter peccatorum
satisfactionem abstinentiam servans. in
satisfactionem autem peccatorum non
solum oportet quod ab illis homo
abstineat quae lex virtutis prohibet, sed
etiam ab illis quibus salva virtute uti
possemus; quia qui illicita commisit,
oportet etiam a licitis abstinere, ut
augustinus dicit. unde jejunium ab
ecclesia institutum supponit
abstinentiam illam quae ad virtutem
exigitur, et addit abstinentiam quamdam
ab illis quae medium virtutis non
corrumpunt. et ideo isidorus haec duo in
praedicta definitione jejunii
comprehendit; scilicet abstinentiam ab
illis quae virtutem corrumpunt, in hoc
quod dicit, parsimonia victus; et ab illis
quibus salva virtute alias uti liceret, in
hoc quod dicit, abstinentiaque ciborum.

I respond to the 1st. question (sub-article 1) saying that

fasting is spoken of in two ways, namely the fasting of
nature, and the fasting of the Church. By the former is
meant the fasting that one does on any day
whatsoever before the taking of food. By the latter, one
is said to fast when one maintains the abstinence
ordained by the Church as reparation for one's sins.
However, in reparation for one's sins, it is not only
appropriate that man abstain from those things which
the law of virtue prohibits, but even from those which
we are able to take without the violation of virtue. For
he who has committed an illicit act, ought even to
abstain from actions which are licit, as Augustine says.
Therefore, fasting instituted by the Church includes
that abstinence required for virtue, and adds an
abstinence from those things which do not destroy the
mean of virtue. Thus does Isidore understand these
two in the aforesaid definition of fasting, namely as an
abstinence from those things which destroy virtue
(when he says "frugal nourishment") and (an
abstinence) from those things which can be used licitly
without the violation of virtue (when he says "and
abstinence from food").

ad primum ergo patet ex dictis solutio.

Response to the first objection: Therefore, the solution

to the first objection is clear from what has been said.

ad secundum dicendum, quod definitio

illa hieronymi intelligitur de jejunio
spirituali, et non de jejunio corporali.

Response to the second objection: The definition

understood of Jerome concerns spiritual fasting and
not corporeal fasting.

ad tertium dicendum, quod jejunium ex

suo nomine directe importat
abstinentiam in cibis; unde illae
observationes quae a jejunantibus
patribus observatae leguntur, non sunt
de essentia jejunii, sed ad modum
jejunandi pertinent; et propter hoc non
oportet quod in definitione jejunii mentio
de eis fieret.

Response to the third objection: By reason of its name,

fasting directly implies an abstinence from food. Hence
those practices taken from the fasting practices of the
Fathers, are not of the essence of fasting, but pertain,
rather, to the manner of fasting. Because of this, it is
not fit that mention of these be made in the definition of
fasting.

ad quartum dicendum, quod intelligenda

est in praedicta definitione talis
abstinentia a cibis, alias licitis, qualem
ecclesia jejunantibus determinat; et sic
objectio cessat.
ad quintum dicendum, quod praedicta
definitio non datur de jejunio quo aliquis
dicitur jejunus, sed de jejunio ecclesiae,
ut dictum est.

Response to the fourth objection: What is to be

understood in the definition mentioned earlier is the
kind of abstention from food, allowable at other times,
in the measure that the Church determines for those
fasting. And so the objection ceases.
Response to the fifth objection: The aforesaid
definition is not given concerning the fasting which
one is said (to take up naturally), but of the fast of the
Church, as was said above.

ad secundam quaestionem dicendum,

quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis
actus qui in sua ratione includit aliquid
quod ad modum virtutis pertineat, actus
virtutis dici potest, quantum est de se;
quamvis possit et bene et male fieri ob
hoc quod forte non includit in sui ratione
omne illud quod ad virtutem exigitur.
quia autem virtus infirmitati naturae
subvenit, quae ad malum de facili
inclinatur; ideo omnium virtutum circa
delectationes corporales existentium, ex
quarum superabundantia praecipue
peccatum contingit propter
connaturalitatem nostri ad eas, modus
est in retrahendo ab eis, sicut patet in
temperantia, et in omnibus partibus ei
assignatis. quia ergo nomine jejunii
actus nobis quidam exprimitur quo quis
a delectationibus tactus, scilicet cibis, se
abstrahit, constat quod in ratione sua
modum virtutis importat; et ideo actus
virtutis dici debet.

I respond to the 2nd. question (sub-article 2) saying

that, as was previously mentioned, every act which
includes in its description something pertaining to a
mode of virtue can be called an act of virtue with
respect to itself. It can, although, be realized well and
badly, for this reason that perhaps it does not include
in its description all that is required for virtue. Since
virtue comes to the assistance of the weakness of
nature [by which (weakness, our nature) is inclined
easily to evil; therefore in all of the virtues which arise
concerning the corporeal pleasures, sin especially
arises from a superabundance of these (pleasures) on
account of a connaturality of us to them], there is a
mode (in these virtues) of drawing (us) away from
these (pleasures), as is clear in (the virtue of)
temperance, and in all of the parts assigned to it.
Therefore, since in the name "fasting" an act is
designated in us by which one draws oneself away
from the delights of touch, namely of food, it is
established that the mode of virtue is included in its
description, and thus ought to be called an act of
virtue.

ad primum ergo dicendum, quod

Response to the first objection: The mean of virtue is
medium virtutis non est medium
not a mean according to an equal distance between
secundum aequidistantiam ab extremis, the extremes, but is determined according to right
sed accipitur secundum rationem
reason. And thus, it is fitting that what is too little for
rectam; et ideo contingit id quod est
one, may be sufficient for another, just as what is too
parum uni, esse satis alteri; sicut quod little in food for (one's) health, may be sufficient for the
est parum sano in cibis, esse satis
sick who should be healed through abstinence. The
infirmo qui per abstinentiam curari debet. cure of spiritual sickness is related more to virtue, than
curatio autem spiritualis morbi affinior
to the cure of bodily illness. Hence that which would
est virtuti quam curatio morbi corporalis; otherwise be slight, or less than is due, is nevertheless
unde et illud quod alias esset modicum, enough for one who wishes that (his) wound of sin be
vel minus debito, tamen volenti vulnus healed. And so, fasting does not destroy the mean of
peccati curare, satis est; et sic jejunium virtue. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the mean
medium virtutis non corrumpit. tamen
of virtue does not consist in the indivisible, but has
sciendum, quod medium virtutis non
some breadth in which virtue is preserved, although
consistit in indivisibili, sed habet
the boundaries of that breadth, which it is not licit to

aliquam latitudinem in qua virtus

salvatur, quamvis termini illius
latitudinis, quos praetergredi salva
virtute non licet, non possunt sermone
determinari; et ideo qui dimittit aliquid
quo licite posset uti, non oportet quod
statim a medio virtutis discedat.

transgress when virtue is (being) preserved, cannot be

determined in word. And thus, he who lets go of
something which he could licitly use, does not
immediately depart from the mean of virtue.

ad secundum dicendum, quod jejunium

a quo quis jejunus dicitur, non nominat
aliquem actum, sed privationem
praecedentis cibi; et ideo secundum
ipsum non dicitur aliquis jejunare. sed
jejunium ecclesiae nominat actum
quemdam, secundum quem in cibis
sumendis se regulat aliquis secundum
ecclesiae statutum; et secundum hoc
jejunium dicitur aliquis jejunare; et ideo
hoc jejunium potest esse actus virtutis.

Response to the second objection: That fasting by

which someone is said to be hungry (before one's
regularly taken meal), does not denominate an act but
rather a privation of food preceding (this meal).
Therefore, according to this (meaning), one is not said
to fast. But the fast of the Church denominates a
certain act according to which one regulates oneself in
the taking of food according to the law of the Church.
And according to this (meaning) of fasting, one is said
to fast. Therefore this kind of fasting can be an act of
virtue..

ad tertium dicendum, quod necessarium Response to the third objection: The necessary (taking
dupliciter accipitur in cibis. primo ad
of) food is understood in a two-fold way. First, for the
conservationem vitae; et tale
conservation of life. It is not licit to deny this sort of
necessarium non licet subtrahere per
necessity through fasting, just as it is not licit to kill
jejunium, sicut nec interimere seipsum. oneself. But this necessity is exceedingly small. For
sed hoc necessarium est valde
nature is satisfied by a little (bit of food). The second
modicum, quia modicis natura contenta way in which necessity is understood is for the
est. alio modo dicitur necessarium ad
conservation of the condition of the body, which is
conservandam valetudinem corporis:
found in a two-fold state. The first is according to a
quae quidem accipitur in duplici statu.
sufficiency in having a regard to those things which
primo secundum sufficientiam habito
are incumbent upon one because of one's duty, or the
respectu ad ea quae incumbunt ex
things that of necessity need to be done by reason of
officio, vel ex societate eorum ad quos the society of those with whom one lives; and even
convivit, necessario agenda; et tale
this sort of necessity ought not to be withdrawn, for this
etiam necessarium subtrahi non debet; would be to offer a fast comprised of stolen goods if
hoc enim esset de rapina jejunii offerre, someone, following a fast, were impeded from other
si aliquis propter jejunium impediretur ab activities to which he was obliged on behalf of others.
aliis operibus ad quae alias obligatur.
Hence Jerome states: "He who offers a stolen
unde hieronymus dicit: de rapina
holocaust, foods from extreme want, chewed foods, or
holocaustum offert qui vel ciborum nimia want of sleep, immoderately afflicts the body." Even if
egestate, vel manducandi vel somni
there were an abstinence so great that a man were
penuria immoderate corpus affligit. si
impeded from more useful work, then however much
etiam sit tanta abstinentia quod homo ab he is not obliged to those (works) of necessity, his
operibus utilioribus impediatur, quamvis fasting is undistinguished even if it is not illicit. Hence
ad ea de necessitate non teneatur,
Jerome, in the same text, states: "A man of reason
indiscretum est jejunium, etsi non sit
loses his dignity who prefers fasting to love, or a vigil
illicitum. unde hieronymus dicit ubi
to he integrity of his senses."
supra: rationalis homo dignitatem amittit,
qui jejunium caritati, vel vigilias sensus

integritati praefert.
secundo accipitur valetudo corporis
secundum optimam corporis
dispositionem; et quia caro in suo robore
consistens, difficilius spiritui subditur,
ideo necessarium ad valetudinem sic
acceptam etsi licite accipi possit, tamen
laudabiliter subtrahi potest; et talis
subtractio non multum mortem accelerat,
cum corpus humanum inveniatur
frequentius ex superfluitate quam ex
defectu mortales aegritudines incurrere;
unde etiam galenus dicit quod summa
medicina est abstinentia. inveniuntur
etiam ad sensum, abstinentes ut
frequenter diutius vivere; et ideo
praedicta subtractio non potest dici
mortis occasio, cum se habeat ad
utrumque, scilicet ad prolongandum et
breviandum vitam. subtractio autem ejus
quod non est necessarium, nec hoc nec
illo modo est de necessitate virtutis
temperantiae.

The condition of the body is understood in the second

way according to the optimum disposition of the body.
And since the flesh, abiding in its strength, is more
difficult to subdue to the spirit, for this reason that
which is necessary for (the body's) condition so
understood, even if it can be taken licitly, nevertheless
can be denied laudably. And this sort of denial does
not hasten death (all that) much since the human body
is found more frequently to incur mortal illnesses by
reason of excess than from denial. Hence Galen also
says that the whole of medicine is abstinence. For
those who fast are found frequently to live longer. Thus
the above mentioned denial cannot be called the
occasion of death when it is related to both, namely to
the prolonging and shortening of life. However, the
denial of that which is not necessary, neither this nor
that mode is of necessity of the virtue of temperance.

ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis

homo post statum peccati magis
infirmetur quantum ad passibilitatem
corporis, ex qua fames causatur, cui per
alimentum subvenitur; tamen ex altera
parte est gravior infirmitas et
periculosior, cui jejunium subvenit;
scilicet concupiscentiae morbus, qui in
statu innocentiae non erat; et ideo ad
hunc morbum extirpandum magis
intendere oportet, sicut etiam medici
periculosiori morbo sollicitius
subveniunt.

Response to the fourth objection: Although man, after

the state of sin, is weaker with respect to the passibility
of the body, by which hunger is caused which is
remedied through nourishment, nevertheless, on the
other hand, the weakness that is more grave and
dangerous is remedied by fasting, namely, the ailment
of concupiscence which was not experienced in the
state of innocence. Therefore it is more fitting to intend
to eliminate this ailment, just as doctors more
anxiously aid those more in danger of death.

ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod

quamvis aliquis actus a pluribus
virtutibus possit procedere, sicut ab
imperantibus ipsum vel dirigentibus ad
eum, vel quocumque modo ad ipsum
juvantibus; tamen illius virtutis proprie
actus dicitur quae elicit ipsum, a qua
scilicet procedit formaliter quasi in
similitudinem speciei, sicut calefactio a
calore. sed tam virtutes quam actus
virtutum penes objecta distinguuntur; et

I respond to the 3rd. question (sub-article 3) saying

saying that although an act can proceed from several
virtues, for instance from those (virtues) that command
that very act, or that lead to it, or that only help it
withersoever it goes, nevertheless, an act is properly
said to be of that virtue which elicits that act, from
which, namely, formally results, as it were, a likeness
of kind, just as heating (arises) from heat. But virtues,
as much as acts of virtues, are distinguished according
to (their) objects. For this reason, an act is elicited from
that virtue which agrees with itself in the proper aspect

ideo actus ab illa virtute elicitur quae

of its object. Since fasting agrees in its object with
secum convenit in propria ratione
temperance as to that part of temperance which is
objecti. et quia jejunium in objecto cum called abstinence, for this reason, its proper act is
temperantia convenit quantum ad illam fasting, although it can also result from the other
temperantiae partem quae abstinentia
virtues through the ways previously mentioned.
dicitur; ideo ejus actus proprie jejunium
est, quamvis ab aliis virtutibus procedere
per dictos modos etiam possit.
ad primum ergo dicendum, quod actus Response to the first objection: An act of justice pays a
justitiae est reddere debitum. non autem debt. However, it is not a debt to give a tenth of one's
est debitum facere decimam de tempore, time, but, rather, to give in some way of one's
sed de rebus possessis aliquo modo.
possessions. The fasting of a tenth of the whole year,
dicitur autem jejunium decima totius
however, is understood through a sort of adaptation.
anni per quamdam adaptationem; et
Thus it is not fitting that it be an act of justice.
ideo non oportet quod sit actus justitiae.
ad secundum dicendum, quod
fortitudinis est perferre molestias ab
exteriori illatas: hoc autem non est in
jejunio.

Response to the second objection: It is of fortitude to

bear troubles suffered by external circumstances. This,
however, is not in fasting ('s description or experience
or essence).

ad tertium dicendum, quod in omnibus

virtutibus moralibus actus dirigitur
prudentia, ut in 3 lib., dist. 38, quaest. 2,
art. 5, dictum est; et sic actus aliarum
virtutum sunt etiam prudentiae.

Response to the third objection: In every moral virtue,

one's activity is directed by prudence, as was said in
Book III, d. 38, q. 2, a. 5. And so, the activities of the
other virtues are also (directed by) prudence.

ad quartam quaestionem dicendum,

I respond to the 4th. question (sub-article 4) saying that
quod duplex est praeceptum, scilicet
there are two kinds of precepts, namely of the natural
juris naturalis et juris positivi. praecepto and of the positive law. By the precepts of the natural
juris naturalis prohibentur ea quae sunt law, those things which are evil in themselves are
secundum se mala; sed praeceptis juris prohibited, while by the precepts of the positive law,
positivi prohibentur ea quae possunt
those things which can be occasions of evil are
esse occasiones malorum; vel
prohibited; or, some acts ordered to virtue are ordered
praecipiuntur aliqua ordinantia ad
(through the positive law) which the legislator intends
virtutem, quam legis positor inducere
to instill (in those over whom he rules). On account of
intendit; et propter hoc, jus positivum, ut this, the positive law, as Tullius says, is derived from
dicit tullius, est a naturali derivatum;
the natural law. Hence, it belongs to the positive law,
unde ad legem positivam pertinet, ut
as the Philosopher states in Book X of the
dicit philosophus in 10 ethic., ordinare
Nicomachean Ethics, to order the diet of the young
nutritiones juvenum et adinventiones
and the innovations, that is to say, the works and
virorum, idest opera et studia, ut
studies, of men, so that they be prevented from doing
arceantur a malis, et perducantur ad
evil deeds, and encouraged to perform good ones.
bona. in jejunio ergo est aliquid quod ad Therefore, with respect to fasting, there is something
praeceptum juris naturalis pertinet,
which belongs to the precepts of the natural law,
scilicet tantam abstinentiam carni
namely, to employ complete abstinence from meat so
adhibere ne spiritui rebellet. temperantia that one might not rebel against the spirit of
enim, ut dicit philosophus in 3 ethic.,
temperance which, as the Philosopher says in Book III
mensuram accipit ex conservatione
of his Nicomachean Ethics, takes its mean from the
salutis corporalis; unde multo magis ex conservation of the body's health. Hence much more
conservatione salutis spiritualis. medium does it take its mean from the conservation of the

autem temperantiae non excedere, ad

jus naturale pertinet; sed determinatio
talis abstinentiae secundum
determinatum tempus et determinata
cibaria, ad jus positivum pertinet, quod
moderatur hominum actus; et hoc modo
jejunium sub praecepto ecclesiae cadit.
ad primum ergo dicendum, quod decor
ecclesiae principaliter in interioribus
consistit; sed etiam exteriores actus ad
eumdem decorem pertinent, inquantum
ab interiori progrediuntur, et inquantum
interiorem decorem conservant; et sic
jejunium ad decorem ecclesiae
ordinatur.

spirit's health. However, not to exceed the mean of

temperance pertains to the natural law. But the
determination of that sort of abstinence according to a
determined time, and a certain kind of food, this
pertains to the positive law which regulates human
acts. This way of fasting falls under the precepts of the
Church.
Response to the first objection: The beauty of the
Church consists principally in interior things. But
external acts also pertain to the same beauty insofar
as they come forth from the interior things, and as they
preserve this interior beauty. Thus, fasting is ordered
to the beauty of the Church.

ad secundum dicendum, quod duplex

est genus supererogationis. quoddam
quod totaliter excedit necessitatem
salutis; et hoc non potest cadere sub
praecepto, sed sub consilio; 1 corinth. 7,
25: de virginibus autem praeceptum
domini non habeo, consilium autem do.
aliud genus supererogationis est quod
aliquo modo ad necessitatem salutis
pertinet, quamvis non secundum hunc
vel illum modum, sicut de jejunio ex
dictis patet, et ideo determinatio modi in
talibus potest cadere sub praecepto
ecclesiae vel cujuscumque legislatoris.

Response to the second objection: The genus of

supererogation is two-fold. First, there is that which
wholly exceeds the necessity of health. This does not
fall under the precept but under counsel: 1 Corinthians
7:25 "Now concerning virgins, I have no precept of the
Lord; but I give counsel." The other genus of
supererogation is that which in some way pertains to
the necessity of heath, although not in this or that way,
as is clear from what has been said concerning
fasting, and thus the determination of mode in such
matters can fall under the precept of the Church or of a
law giver.

ad tertium dicendum, quod praecepta

juris positivi magis obligant ex intentione
legislatoris quam ex ipsis verbis; et ideo
transgressor talis praecepti magis est
reputandus qui obviat intentioni
legislatoris quam qui deviat in aliquo a
legis ordinatione. intentioni autem
legislatoris obviat qui ex contemptu vel
sine aliqua rationabili causa
ordinationem non servat. si autem in
aliquo casu non servat in quo
probabiliter credi potest, si legislator
adesset, eum obligare non velle, talis
non est reputandus praecepti
transgressor. et ideo non est
necessarium quod quicumque aliquem
diem ab ecclesia institutum jejunare
omittit, mortaliter peccet: potest enim hoc
aliquando omnino sine peccato

Response to the third objection: Precepts of the

positive law oblige more by reason of the intention of
the legislator than by the words themselves. Therefore,
a transgressor of this sort of precept is more to be
considered one who opposes the intent of the
legislator than one who deviates in some way from the
ordaining of the law. He who opposes the intention of
the legislator by reason of contempt or without a
reasonable cause does not preserve the ordaining (of
the law). If, however, in a certain instance, he does not
preserve (the ordaining of the law) in whom he can be
believed credibly (not to oppose the intention of the
legislator), then if the legislator is favorable (and does)
not want to hold him (to the consequences of the law
transgressed), this sort (of person) is not to be
considered a transgressor of the precept. Therefore, it
is not of necessity that anyone who neglects to fast on
a certain day instituted by the Church, sins mortally.
For this can sometimes happen wholly without sin; at

contingere, aliquando sine mortali cum

veniali, aliquando etiam cum mortali; et
hoc secundum diversas occasiones
quibus homo inducitur ad jejunium
frangendum.
ad quintam quaestionem dicendum,
quod jejunium actus satisfactorius est:
quia et pro libidine peccati praeteriti
subtractionem delectationis
recompensat, afflictionem etiam addens;
et futura peccata impedit,
concupiscentiam debilitans.

other times without mortal sin but with venial sin, and
at still other times even with mortal sin, and these
according to the diverse occasions into which a man is
drawn to break his fast.

ad primum ergo dicendum, quod

jejunium quamvis elicitive sit actus
temperantiae, tamen a justitia imperari
potest, et sic erit satisfactorium; sicut
etiam adulterium intemperantiam
admixtam injustitiae habet.

Response to the first objection: Although fasting, freely

chosen, is an act of temperance, nevertheless it can
be commanded by justice, and thus will be reparative,
just as the intemperance of adultery has an admixture
of injustice.

I respond to the 5th. question (sub-article 5) saying that

the act of fasting is more reparative because the denial
of pleasure offers recompense for the desire of the
previously committed sin, even adding an affliction. (It
is also more reparative since) it impedes future sins,
weakening concupiscence.

ad secundum dicendum, quod

Response to the second objection: The precept is not
praeceptum legis naturae non est nisi de of the natural law except concerning that which is of
eo quod est necessarium ad salutem; et necessity to health. Therefore what falls under this sort
ideo quod sub tali praecepto cadit, non of precept is not reparative but is required for
est satisfactorium, sed ad satisfactionem reparation. And so it is concerning alms-giving insofar
exigitur; et sic est de eleemosyna,
as it falls under precept. But the Church's precept can
secundum quod cadit sub praecepto.
be ordered to the same thing to which reparation is
sed praeceptum ecclesiae potest ad
ordained. And thus, fasting which falls under the
idem ordinari ad quod ordinatur
precept of the Church can be reparative.
satisfactio; et ideo jejunium quod sub
praecepto ecclesiae cadit, satisfactorium
esse potest.
ad tertium dicendum, quod neque
Response to the third objection: Neither body nor soul
corpus peccat neque anima, proprie
sins, properly speaking. Instead (it is) man (himself
loquendo, sed homo; et ideo ipse qui
who sins). And thus he himself who sins is punished
peccat, punitur, sive sit poena corporalis, either through a corporeal or spiritual penalty.
sive spiritualis. tamen etiam poena
Nevertheless, even a corporeal punishment redounds
corporalis in animam redundat, quae
to the soul which the latter senses, just as through the
ipsam sentit, sicut et per corpus
body it enjoyed the illicit pleasure in sin.
delectatione illicita fruebatur in peccato.
ad quartum dicendum, quod
superabundantia cibi non habet
poenam, et est inordinata; et ideo non
potest esse satisfactoria, sicut jejunium.

Response to the fourth objection: A superabundance

of food does not incur punishment, (but does when) it
is used inordinately. Thus, it cannot be reparatory, as
is fasting.

ad quintum dicendum, quod intelligitur

ad modicum valere corporalis exercitatio
in comparatione ad pietatem: vel quia ad
unum tantum valet, scilicet ad
concupiscentiam domandam.

Response to the fifth objection: A little bit of bodily

exercise is to be understood in comparison with piety;
or because it strengthens to a specific thing, namely to
concupiscence which is to be controlled.

 Stephen Loughlin
(sjl1@desales.edu)

The Aquinas Translation Project

(http://www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/loughlin/ATP/index.html)