Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
w/c was denied. The RTC ruled, finding for R but against the Ps, the
RTC however declared that Ps are entitled to be indemnified by RV.
8. Ps appealed to the CA, contending that the RTC erred when it applied
the Civil Code instead of NIL, since the subject was a PN, further that
the sale was null and void since there was no delivery of the vehicle;
That R was also aware that Ps didnt have the vehicle since the PN it
received in its Cebu Branch proves the same.
9. CA ruled that the PN was a NIL, but faulted Ps for not impleading
VMSC, thereby setting aside the RTCs ruling holding RV as liable.
10. SC set aside insofar as they dismissed w/o prejudice the 3 rd party
complaint of Ps against RV, the decision of the RTC was reinstated and
affirmed.
11. In the present recourse, on its face, (a) the Promissory Note is
complete and regular; (b) the Promissory Note was endorsed by the
VMSC in favor of the Appellee; (c) the Appellee, when it accepted the
Note, acted in good faith and for value; (d) the Appellee was never
informed, before and at the time the Promissory Note was endorsed
to the Appellee, that the vehicle sold to the Defendants-Appellants
was not delivered to the latter and that VMSC had already previously
sold the vehicle to Esmeraldo Violago. Although Jose Olvido
mortgaged the vehicle to Generoso Lopez, who assigned his rights to
the BA Finance Corporation (Cebu Branch), the same occurred only on
May 8, 1987, much later than August 4, 1983, when VMSC assigned
its rights over the Chattel Mortgage by the Defendants-Appellants to
the Appellee. Hence, Appellee was a holder in due course.
12. A holder in due course, however, holds the instrument free from any
defect of title of prior parties and from defenses available to prior
parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of the
instrument for the full amount thereof. Since BA Finance is a holder in
due course, petitioners cannot raise the defense of non-delivery of
the object and nullity of the sale against the corporation. The NIL
considers every negotiable instrument prima facie to have been
issued for a valuable consideration.
13. In Salas, 181 SCRA 296 (1990), we held that a party holding an
instrument may enforce payment of the instrument for the full
amount thereof. As such, the maker cannot set up the defense of
nullity of the contract of sale. Thus, petitioners are liable to
Respondent Corporation for the payment of the amount stated in the
instrument.
14. The fact that VMSC was not included as defendant in petitioners
third party complaint does not preclude recovery by petitioners from
Avelino; neither would such non-inclusion constitute a bar to the
application of the piercing-of-the-corporate-veil doctrine. We
suggested as much in Arcilla v. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 120
6. Far East Bank & Trust Co. (P) v. Gold Palace Jewelry Co. (R
[represented by Judy L. Yang-Go and Kho Soon Huat]) | 562 SCRA
604, 2008 | Negotiable Instruments | Nachura, J p:
1. Sometime 6.98, a foreigner Samuel Tagoe (ST) purchased from R
several pieces of jewelry in the amount of 258K as payment ST
payed in Foreign Draft (FD) issued by United Overseas Bank of
Malaysia (UOB) addressed to Land Bank Phils. (LBP) and payable to
RCo worth 380K.
2. P Bank was also a tenant on the mall (SM North Edsa), R went to P to
ask about the FD, P informed R that it is as good as a Managers
Check (MC), though, P advised R not to release the jewelry until the
draft had been cleared, following the advice, R (Yang) issued a Cash
Invoice to the foreigner, asked him to come back, and informed him
that said jewelry would be released after clearance of the FD.
3. R Yang consequently deposited the FD in the companys account w/ P
on 6.2.98. P then presented the FD to LBP, w/c cleared the FD and
credited said amount to Rs account.
4. ST then claimed the jewelry and because the FDs value was larger
than the price, she issued as change a Check from P worth 122K, w/c
was later cashed by P.
5. On 6.26.98, LBP informed P that the amount in the FD was forged
from 300 to 380K, and that it was returning the same, this after UOB
informed LBP when it tried to credit back the amount.
6. R meanwhile, have already used up the amount in their account w/ P.
on 7.20.98, w/ Rs account having a standing balance of 168K P
debited the same w/o prior written notice, and only informed thru
phone R. On 8.12.98, P demanded the additional amount required to
debit the FDs value at 211.9K. R didnt heed to the demand, resulting
to P suing R in RTC Makati. In their answer R denied all allegations
claiming innocence in the forgery.
7. RTC ruled in favor of P. CA reversed and awarded Rs counterclaim. It
ruled in the main that Far East failed to undergo the proceedings on
the protest of the foreign draft or to notify Gold Palace of the drafts
dishonor; thus, Far East could not charge Gold Palace on its secondary
liability as an endorser. The appellate court further ruled that the
drawee bank had cleared the check, and its remedy should be against
the party responsible for the alteration. Hence this.
8. Petition denied. Act No. 2031, or NIL explicitly provides that the
acceptor, by accepting the instrument, engages that he will pay it
according to the tenor of his acceptance. This provision applies with
equal force in case the drawee pays a bill without having previously
accepted it. His actual payment of the amount in the check implies
not only his assent to the order of the drawer and a recognition of his
corresponding obligation to pay the aforementioned sum, but also, his
11. Bank of America NT&SA (P) v. Philippine Racing Club (R) | 594
SCRA 301, 2009 | Negotiable Instruments | Leonardo-De Castro, J
p:
1. R is a domestic corporation, maintaining several accounts w/ different
banks, one of which is P their authorized joint signatories were its
president Antonio Reyes (AR) and VP for Finance Gregorio Reyes (GR).
2. On 12.88 AR and GR, were scheduled for a business trip not to
disrupt business transactions, they pre-signed several checks w/ their
current account w/ P; entrusting the same to their accountant w/
instruction to make use of the same as the need arose.
3. On 12.16.99, a JOHN DOE (Clarita Mesina, later criminally sued)
presented to P for encashment a couple of the checks totaling to 220K
w/c were the pre-signed ones, payable to CASH. P w/o verifying
and/or confirming the legitimacy of the checks encashed them. R
demanded from P to pay them back, P didnt heed.
4. RTC ruled in favor of R, CA affirmed, hence this. Hence this. Petitioner
insists that it merely fulfilled its obligation under law and contract
when it encashed the aforesaid checks. Invoking Sections 1267 and
1858 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), petitioner claims that
its duty as a drawee bank to a drawer-client maintaining a checking
account with it is to pay orders for checks bearing the drawer-clients
genuine signatures.
5. SC Affirmed w/ modifications, altering down to 60% Ps liability. The
genuine signatures of the clients duly authorized signatories affixed
on the checks signify the order for payment. Thus, pursuant to the
said obligation, the drawee bank has the duty to determine whether
the signatures appearing on the check are the drawer-clients or its
duly authorized signatories. If the signatures are genuine, the bank
has the unavoidable legal and contractual duty to pay. If the
signatures are forged and falsified, the drawee bank has the corollary,
but equally unavoidable legal and contractual, duty not to pay.
6. It is well-settled that banks are engaged in a business impressed with
public interest, and it is their duty to protect in return their many
clients and depositors who transact business with them. They have
the obligation to treat their clients account meticulously and with the
highest degree of care, considering the fiduciary nature of their
relationship. The diligence required of banks, therefore, is more than
that of a good father of a family.
7. A material alteration is defined in Section 125 of the NIL to be one
which changes the date, the sum payable, the time or place of
payment, the number or relations of the parties, the currency in which
payment is to be made or one which adds a place of payment where
no place of payment is specified, or any other change or addition
which alters the effect of the instrument in any respect. With respect
to the checks at issue, petitioner points out that they do not contain
any material alteration. This is a fact which was affirmed by the trial
court itself.
8. Taking this with the testimony of petitioners operations manager that
in case of an irregularity on the face of the check (such as when
blanks were not properly filled out) the bank may or may not call the
client depending on how busy the bank is on a particular day, we are
even more convinced that petitioners safeguards to protect clients
from check fraud are arbitrary and subjective. Every client should be
treated equally by a banking institution regardless of the amount of
his deposits and each client has the right to expect that every
centavo he entrusts to a bank would be handled with the same
degree of care as the accounts of other clients. Perforce, we find that
petitioner plainly failed to adhere to the high standard of diligence
expected of it as a banking institution.
9. Even if we assume that both parties were guilty of negligent acts that
led to the loss, petitioner will still emerge as the party foremost liable
in this case. In instances where both parties are at fault, this Court
has consistently applied the doctrine of last clear chance in order to
assign liability. In Westmont Bank v. Ong, 375 SCRA 212 (2002), we
ruled: [I]t is petitioner [bank] which had the last clear chance to
stop the fraudulent encashment of the subject checks had it exercised
due diligence and followed the proper and regular banking procedures
in clearing checks. As we had earlier ruled, the one who had a last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so is
chargeable with the consequences thereof.
12. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (P) v. BA Finance and Malayan
Insurance (R) | 604 SCRA 620, 2009 | Negotiable Instruments |
Carpio-Morales, J p:
1. L. Bitanga (LB) obtained from R a 329.2K loan, mortgaging his car.
2. The car was stolen. On LBs claim, Malayan Insurance (MI) issued a
check payable to the order of R and LB for 224.5K drawn against
China Bank crossed w/ the notation For Deposit Payees Account
Only.
3. LB, w/o Rs indorsement or authority, deposited the check to his
account w/ P (Asiabank now FEBTC thru merger), and subsequently
withdrew the entire proceeds of the check. LBs loan then became past
due, and after demands he failed to settle it. R eventually learned of
the cars loss and issuance by MI of the check. Thereafter R sued P
and LB.
4. P then made a counterclaim against R, claiming bad faith to coerce
them to pay the entire amount; A cross claim against LB alleging
fraudulent transaction; A third-party complaint against MI for
negligence in issuing the check payable to LB and R.
5. RTC found P and LB jointly and severally liable to R in accordance w/
Sec. 41 of NIL all other claims by Asiabank and Bitanga were
dismissed. CA affirmed, hence this.
6. SC Affirmed. Section 41 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides:
Where an instrument is payable to the order of two or more payees or
indorsees who are not partners, all must indorse unless the one
indorsing has authority to indorse for the others. Bitanga alone
endorsed the crossed check, and petitioner allowed the deposit and
release of the proceeds thereof, despite the absence of authority of
Bitangas co-payee. Clearly, petitioner, through its employee, was
negligent when it allowed the deposit of the crossed check, despite
the lone endorsement of Bitanga, ostensibly ignoring the fact that the
check did not, it bears repeating, carry the indorsement of BA
Finance.
7. To be sure, a collecting bank, Asianbank in this case, where a check is
deposited and which indorses the check upon presentment with the
drawee bank, is an indorser. This is because in indorsing a check to
the drawee bank, a collecting bank stamps the back of the check with
the phrase all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement
guaranteed and, for all intents and purposes, treats the check as a
negotiable instrument, hence, assumes the warranty of an indorser.
Without Asianbanks warranty, the drawee bank (China Bank in this
case) would not have paid the value of the subject check. Petitioner,
as the collecting bank or last indorser, generally suffers the loss
because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior
indorsements considering that the act of presenting the check for
13. Annabelle dela Pea & Adrian Villareal (P) v. CA & Rural Bank
of Bolinao (R) | 579 SCRA 396, 2009 | Negotiable Instruments |
Nachura, J. p:
1. On 10.20.83, RB extended a 81K loan to Ps, evidenced by a PN, and
payable on or before 10.14.84 Ps failed to pay their obligation in full
Collection case followed.
2. On pre-trial set on 10.17.95 Ps didnt appear, consequently, upon
motion, trial moved ex-parte, and Ps were considered in default MTC
decided. On appeal at the RTC, w/c remanded the case back to the
MTC, it held that the complaint was not material to the allegations in
Paragraph 2 of the PN (Date issues).
3. With LOC, R amended its complaint to conform w/ the PN and was
admitted again, Ps failed to appear trial went on ex-parte, and MTC
decided again, reiterating the same ruling as before; Ps again
appealed to the RTC w/c again, remanded the case to MTC holding
that the MTC did not adhere to the RTC order to conduct further
proceedings. Despite its earlier ruling setting aside the declaration of
default against the petitioners, the MTC did not require petitioners to
file their answer and the MTC did not set the case anew for pre-trial
and presentation of evidence from both parties.
4. Upon remand Respondent caused the re-service of the summons to Ps
whom filed their answer on 7.7.03 where Ps admitted obtaining a
loan, but alleged substantial payment. After a series of postponement
and reschedule, and upon motion by respondent, MTC allowed the
presentation of its evidence ex parte, and motioned to render
judgment. Ps moved for reconsideration, averring that they were
unable to attend because they got sick, and was unable to inform the
court because there is no possibility to contact the court, and finally
averred that they have a meritorious defense, which was fruitless.
5. Appealing again to the RTC, holding that the form and substance of
the MTCs decision did not state the law on w/c the findings were
based from. RTC again set-aside the MTCs decision and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
6. Dissatisfied R went to the CA w/c reversed the RTCs decision, hence
this. Petitioners fault the CA for reversing the RTC, and for reinstating
and upholding the MTC decision. Reiterating their arguments before
the RTC, they assert that the MTC decision is null and void for it does
not conform to the requirement of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution and of the Rules of Court.
7. SC upheld CAs decision. As we held in Sierra v. Court of Appeals, 211
SCRA 785 (1992), and recently in Henry dela Rama Co v. Admiral
United Savings Bank, 551 SCRA 472 (2008): A promissory note is a
solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal commitment to repay
it on the date and under the conditions agreed upon by the borrower
accommodation party and as such only lent his name and credit to
the spouses Panlilio. While not exonerating his solidary liability,
Gonzales has a right to be properly apprised of the default or
delinquency of the loan precisely because he is a co-signatory of the
promissory notes and of his solidary liability.
8. We find PCIB negligent in not properly informing Gonzales, who is an
accommodation party, about the default and the exact outstanding
periodic interest dues. Without being properly apprised, Gonzales was
not given the opportunity to properly act on them. The business of
banking is impressed with public interest and great reliance is made
on the banks sworn profession of diligence and meticulousness in
giving irreproachable service.
9. Gonzales is liable for the loans covered by the above promissory
notes. First, Gonzales admitted that he is an accommodation party
which PCIB did not dispute. In his testimony, Gonzales admitted that
he merely accommodated the spouses Panlilio at the suggestion of
Ocampo, who was then handling his accounts, in order to facilitate
the fast release of the loan.
place, two persons, in their own right, must first be creditors and
debtors of each other. We see no legal merit in PCIBs claim that legal
compensation took place between it and Ramos, thereby warranting
the automatic deduction from Ramos bank account. For legal
compensation to take place, two persons, in their own right, must first
be creditors and debtors of each other. While PCIB, as the depositary
bank, is Ramos debtor in the amount of his deposits, Ramos is not
PCIBs debtor under the evidence the PCIB adduced. PCIB thus had no
basis, in fact or in law, to automatically debit from Ramos bank
account.
16. J.E. Cayanan (P) v. North Star International Travel (R) | 658
SCRA 644, 2011 | Negotiable Instruments | Villarama, Jr. J, p:
1. R is a travel agency business, P is the owner/GM of JEAC International
Management and Contractor Services (recruitment agency).
2. On 3.17.94, V. Balagtas (VB) GM of R in accommodation and upon the
instruction of its client, P sent the amount of $60,000 to View Sea
Ventures, Ltd., (VSV) in Nigeria from her personal account in Citibank
Makati. On 3.29.94, VB again sent $40,000 to VSV by telegraphic
transfer w/ $15,000 coming from petitioner. Likewise on various
dates, R extended credit to petitioner for the airplane tickets of his
clients, w/ the total amount of such indebtedness under the credit
extensions eventually reaching PhP. 510K. To cover payment P issued
several checks to R.
3. Some Checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, while 3 were
for stop payment order from petitioner. R informed and demanded
payment to P, but failed to settle the obligations hence the institution
of a criminal case, charging P w/ BP22. P was found guilty. The RTC,
acquitted petitioner both criminally and on civil liabilities. Aggrieved,
R went to the CA and reversed the order of the RTC and held P liable
as for the value of the checks. Hence this.
4. P argues that since North Star did not give any valuable consideration
for the checks. He insists that the US$85,000 sent to View Sea
Ventures was not sent for the account of North Star but for the
account of Virginia as her investment. He points out that said amount
was taken from Virginias personal dollar account in Citibank and not
from North Stars corporate account. P on the other hand, counters
that petitioner is liable for the value of the five subject checks as they
were issued for value. Respondent insists that petitioner owes North
Star P2.5M plus interest of P264K, and that the P220K petitioner paid
to North Star is conclusive proof that the checks were issued for
value.
5. Petition Denied. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same
was issued for valuable consideration which may consist either in
some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes
the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or
undertaken by the other side.
6. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, it is presumed that every
party to an instrument acquires the same for a consideration or for
value. As petitioner alleged that there was no consideration for the
issuance of the subject checks, it devolved upon him to present
convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption and prove that the
checks were in fact issued without valuable consideration. Sadly,
17. RCBC (P) v. Hi-Tri Development Co. & L. Bakunawa (R) | 675
SCRA 514, 2012 | Negotiable Instruments | Sereno, J. p:
1. R, together with his husband, were registered owners of 6 parcels of
land, in 1990 a certain T. Milan through representative J.
Montemayor (JM) offered to buy said lots for 6.7M. Thereafter they
arranged that TM will take care of all obstacles, then Rs gave the
original TCTs to TM, and TM gave 1M as advance payment then after
a while, TM was unable to facilitate no, then Rs moved to rescind the
contract, and offered to return the payment made TM refused,
consequently Rs through their company Hi-Tri, took out on 10.28.91 a
managers check, payable to TMs company Rosmil realty and
devt., c/o TM, then the suing. All through out litigation, TM was made
aware that the check was available for pick up if they wish to settle.
2. During the pendency of the trial and w/o notice P reported the
existing check to the Bureau of Treasury as among its unclaimed
balances as of 1.31.03. On 12.14.06, Republic, through SOLGEN filed
w/ the RTC the action below for Escheat to said cash.
3. On 4.30.08, R settled amicably their dispute w/ TM and to pay for 3M.
On their attempt to withdraw the check to add to the 3M, and to their
surprise it was already subject to an escheat proceedings before the
RTC w/c was won by the government. RTC denied their motion to be
parties. RTC explained that the Republic had proven compliance with
the requirements of publication and notice, which served as notice to
all those who may be affected and prejudiced by the Complaint for
Escheat.
4. CA reversed the the RTC, ruling that, RCBC failed to prove that the
latter had communicated with the purchaser of the Managers Check
(Hi-Tri and/or Spouses Bakunawa) or the designated payee (Rosmil)
immediately before the bank filed its Sworn Statement on the
dormant accounts held therein. Hence this.
5. Petition denied. Affirmed. There was no contention that they were the
procurers of the Managers Check. It is undisputed that there was no
effective delivery of the check, rendering the instrument incomplete.
In addition, we have already settled that respondents retained
ownership of the funds. As it is obvious from their foregoing actions
that they have not abandoned their claim over the fund, we rule that
the allocated deposit, subject of the Managers Check, should be
excluded from the escheat proceedings. We reiterate our
pronouncement that the objective of escheat proceedings is state
forfeiture of unclaimed balances
6. Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state,
by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims abandoned, left
vacant, or unclaimed property, without there being an interested
person having a legal claim thereto. In the case of dormant accounts,
the state inquires into the status, custody, and ownership of the
unclaimed balance to determine whether the inactivity was brought
about by the fact of death or absence of or abandonment by the
depositor. If after the proceedings the property remains without a
lawful owner interested to claim it, the property shall be reverted to
the state to forestall an open invitation to self-service by the first
comers. However, if interested parties have come forward and lain
claim to the property, the courts shall determine whether the credit or
deposit should pass to the claimants or be forfeited in favor of the
state.
7. In case the bank complies with the provisions of the law and the
unclaimed balances are eventually escheated to the Republic, the
bank shall not thereafter be liable to any person for the same and
any action which may be brought by any person against in any bank
xxx for unclaimed balances so deposited xxx shall be defended by the
Solicitor General without cost to such bank. Otherwise, should it fail
to comply with the legally outlined procedure to the prejudice of the
depositor, the bank may not raise the defense provided under Section
5 of Act No. 3936, as amended.
18. Fideliza J. Aglibot (P) v. Ingersol L. San-Tia (R) | 687 SCRA 283,
2012 | Negotiable Instruments | Reyes, J. p:
1. R loaned to Pacific Lending & Capital Co. (PLCC) the amount of 2.5M,
thru its manager P, evidenced by a PN issued by P on behalf of PLCC
payable in 1 year subject to a 24% interest per annum. Allegedly as a
guaranty/security, P also issued and delivered to R 11 post dated
personal checks drawn from her own demand account maintained at
Metro Bank.
2. Upon presentment, the checks were dishonored for having been
drawn against insufficient funds or closed account. R demanded
payment to no avail, consequently 11 BP22 charges were made; In its
counterclaim, P did admit that they took a loan from P, but did it in
the name of PLCC, further claimed that although they have already
payed the loan, and after demands of returning the checks, R didnt
do so.
3. MTCC sided w/ P and acquitted her of BP22 but was ordered to pay
3M representing the total face value of the 11 checks plus interest.
On appeal, the RTC further absolved Aglibot of the civil liability. Hence
this.
4. Petition Denied. It is settled that the liability of the guarantor is only
subsidiary, and all the properties of the principal debtor, the PLCC in
this case, must first be exhausted before the guarantor may be held
answerable for the debt. Thus, the creditor may hold the guarantor
liable only after judgment has been obtained against the principal
debtor and the latter is unable to pay.
5. Concerning a guaranty agreement, which is a promise to answer for
the debt or default of another, the law clearly requires that it, or some
note or memorandum thereof, be in writing. Otherwise, it would be
unenforceable unless ratified, although under Article 1358 of the Civil
Code, a contract of guaranty does not have to appear in a public
document.
6. The relation between an accommodation party and the party
accommodated is, in effect, one of principal and suretythe
accommodation party being the surety. It is a settled rule that a
19. People (P) v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas (R) | 705 SCRA 17, 2013 |
Negotiable Instruments | Bersmin, J. p:
1. Allegedly, On 5.8.97 R issued a BPI check to A. Ligaray (AL)in the
amount of 200K, w/c bounced. R admitted during trial that there was
insufficient funds in the account. Said check was used to pay for the
200 bags of rice sold to Rs by AL, whom was convinced by Rs after
persuasion that they have sufficient funds to pay. On Cross
examination AL admitted that he and R didnt meet personally and
only transacted thru phone, and surrendered the bags of rice to its
cousin Canada; R on the other hand claims and said he didnt issue
the checks to AL, instead to his cousin for purposes of buying a parcel
of land w/c didnt push thru, thereafter didnt fund the check
anymore.
2. Prosecution presented evidence a letter made by R to ALs counsel
admitting owing AL 200K, R admitted the letter but insisted that it
was Canada who had transacted w/ Ligaray.
3. RTC held R guilty, by issuing the post-dated checks and by then failing
to deposit the sufficient amount to cover the. R moved for
reconsideration and reopening for newly discovered evidence
(testimony of Canada) RTC denied, hence this, thru notice of appeal.
4. R insists that he and Ligaray were neither friends nor personally
known to one other; that it was highly incredible that Ligaray, a
businessman, would have entered into a transaction with him
involving a huge amount of money only over the telephone; that on
the contrary, the evidence pointed to Caada as the person with
whom Ligaray had transacted, considering that the delivery receipt,
which had been signed by Caada, indicated that the goods had been
Ordered by ROBERT CAADA.
5. SC acquitted R, but ordered him to pay AL for actual damages and
interest. In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision,
the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. In other words, the
Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was
delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it
not for the issuance of the check by the offender.
6. In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the
crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable
doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the
check.
7. The check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the
Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the
bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of
an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had
issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Caada,
his brother-inlaw, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly,
Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the
time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the
person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Caada.
8. It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged,
must have used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What
the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the
worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply
because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray.
9. An accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable
where the preponderance of the established facts so warrants. Wagas
as the admitted drawer of the check was legally liable to pay the
amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course. Consequently, we
pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the
dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the
finality of this decision.