T H E O R I A E T H I S TO R I A S C I E N T I A R U M , V O L .

X I
Ed. Nicolaus Copernicus University 2014
First published online 31.01.2015

http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/ths-2014-004

Ines Adornetti
Department ofPhilosophy, Communication and Visual Arts
Roma Tre University
&
Department ofHuman Sciences
University ofLAquila
ines.adornetti@uniroma3.it

Francesco Ferretti
Department ofPhilosophy, Communication and Visual Arts
Roma Tre University
francesco.ferretti@uniroma3.it

The pragmatic foundations ofcommunication:

An action-oriented model ofthe origin oflanguage
Abstract. In this paper we propose an action-oriented model oflanguage origins that
iscompatible with theembodied perspective ofmind. Specifically, we suggest that
acrucial issue for theinvestigation ofthe origin ofhuman communication ishow
language isgrounded inthe context. Insupport ofourproposal, we maintain that:
a)thegrounding oflanguage istied to aspecific aspect ofthe embodied mind, namely
theaspect that emphasizes theembedded character ofcognition; b) theemphasis
posed on this particular character fits well with amodel oflanguage origins founded
on gesture. Theconnection ofembedded cognition and thegestural model allows us
to propose an explanation oflanguage origin capable ofovercoming theproblems
inthe classical symbolic framework ofcognitive sciences.
Keywords: embodied cognition, gestural origin of language, grounding, mirror
neurons, pragmatics

Ines Adornetti, Francesco Ferretti

64

1. Introduction1
In this paper we propose anaturalistic model oflanguage based on an actionoriented paradigm. By suggesting such a model, we intend to overcome
the conceptual contradictions that the classical symbolic framework,
ofwhich Chomskys Universal Grammar (hereafter UG) isaparadigmatic
example, have with the Darwinian perspective. Contrary to the classical
symbolic point ofview, we maintain that anaturalistic model oflanguage has
to be evolutionary plausible. Inorder to justify theevolutionary plausibility
ofour proposal ofanaturalistic model oflanguage, we highlight thestrong
connection between theembedded perspective elaborated within thegeneral
framework ofembodied cognition and thegestural theory oflanguage origins.
Specifically, our argument isthat theorigin ofhuman verbal skills must be
interpreted inreference to theability oflanguage to be grounded (anchored)
incontext and that thecapacities that ensure thegrounding oflanguage
in context are associated with a specific aspect of the motor foundation
ofhuman communication tied to theembeddedness ofthe organism inthe
surrounding environment.

2. Beyond Universal Grammar

A naturalistic perspective oflanguage isatheoretical approach that considers
human verbal skills (as well as any other ability) as aspecific feature ofan
animal as other animals. To adopt apoint ofview ofthis type means denying
that human beings are exceptional in nature: all abilities that characterize
individuals of our species (even those that make us unique among other
animals) must be interpreted inreference to thespecificity that characterizes
human beings, never to their supposed status of specialty in nature
(Ferretti 2007). As itis easy to realize, an approach ofthis kind isatribute
to thetenet ofDarwin (1871), according to which thedifferences, however
great, between themost intelligent animal and themost foolish human being
are always amatter ofquantity and never ofquality. From this point ofview,

This paper isthe outcome ofacollaborative effort between thetwo authors. For
thespecific concerns ofthe Italian Academy, we specify that I. Adornetti wrote sections 4 and
5 and F. Ferretti wrote sections 2 and 3 for thefinal draft. Both authors wrote theIntroduction
and theConclusion.

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65

anaturalistic model oflanguage isamodel compatible with theDarwinian

perspective from theoutset.
Following these considerations, we propose that to be properly
naturalistic, a model of language must be compatible with the general
framework ofthe theory ofevolution. An assumption ofthis kind, which might
appear to be simply acommon sense intuition for those who analyze language
from anaturalistic perspective, isasource ofmany disputes incontemporary
debate. Chomsky and with him thegroup ofthe neo-Cartesian proponents
of the standard position of cognitive science (e.g., Fodor 2001, 2008)
while showing great attention to the issue of cognitive plausibility, has
always revealed astrong skepticism regarding theevolutionary explanations
of language and mind (e.g., Bolhuis etal. 2014; Chomsky 2005: 5859;
Hauser etal. 2014).
The Chomskyan model of language is still the dominant paradigm
within cognitive sciences. Beyond its cognitive plausibility which is,
inany event an open question (see Evans and Levinson 2009; Evans 2014;
Tomasello 2009) UG does not acquire evolutionary plausibility despite
the attempts made by some authors to darwinize it (Pinker and Bloom
1990). Chomskys skepticism regarding language as abiological adaptation
depends on UGs incompatibility with natural selection. Inspite ofthe broad
debate created bythis position (e.g., Botha 2003; Calvin and Bickerton 2000;
Christiansen and Chater 2008; Corballis 2011, 2013), Chomsky continues
to state that the human language faculty emerged suddenly inevolutionary
time and has not evolved since (Berwick etal. 2013: 89, our emphasis).
Specifically, he maintains that because language has no external reference
(this is a very important point for our purpose to which we will return
later), itcannot have evolved through natural selection and, therefore, must
have emerged inasingle step, perhaps as aresult ofafortuitous mutation
(Chomsky 2010: 59). As Corballis (2013) highlighted, this position smacks
ofthe miraculous because from an evolutionary point ofview thenotion
that afaculty as complex as language could have emerged inasingle step
isdeeply implausible (Corballis 2013: 35). These considerations (strongly
inspired from dualistic conceptions) are fully consistent with theCartesian
intent to demonstrate mental superiority and human uniqueness, but constitute
aserious obstacle to any real attempt ofnaturalization ofhuman language
(for adiscussions, see Ferretti and Adornetti 2014). But thats not all.
Beyond this general problem, UG remains incompatible with thetheory
ofevolution because oftwo additional specific difficulties. Thefirst critical
point isthat UG requires acommon code (the languages used bycommunities
of speakers) to function appropriately. In fact, the device at the basis

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oflanguage operates only assuming theright environmental input: without

acommon code, UG islike asystem for viewing aroom without light because
it is a device innately specialized for language. However, the existence
ofacode strongly depends on theexistence ofUG: infact, inChomskys
opinion, natural languages are just superficial products ofUG functioning.
If we exclude thereference to thepreformism hypothesis, therelationship
between linguistic code and UG is highly problematic. On the one hand,
analyzing theorigin oflanguage assuming theexistence ofalinguistic code
(a code isexactly what itis missing inthe early stages oflanguage) isnot
possible; on theother hand, assuming that brains are predisposed to language
before humans are able to exploit thesymbolic code used bythecommunity
of speakers in which they live makes little sense. What follows is that,
from an evolutionary point of view, UG rests on a vicious circle (Ferretti
2013). Thesolution to this problem, as we see inthe next section, isoffered
bytheadherence to themodel ofcommunication based on clues proposed
bySperber and Wilson (1986/1995).
The critical point at the basis of the incompatibility of Chomskys
model of language with the theory of evolution is the notion that UG
isadevice inside themind that iscompletely detached from thesurrounding
environment (cf. Ferretti and Adornetti 2014). Even though Chomsky
has radically changed his conception of UG over time, from UGs first
formulation in the fifties to the recent Minimalist Program (Chomsky
1995), a consistent element in his thought is that language is the device
that makes possible the combination of symbols whose functioning
iscompletely independent ofthe relationship they establish with thereality
they represent: according to thegenerative perspective, what isimportant
is how symbols combine with one another, not how they are related to
theexternal world about which they talk.
Chomsky represents the more orthodox tradition within cognitive
science: the tradition in which the mind is considered in reference to
themetaphor ofacomputer and which conceives thought as aform
ofmental sentences themain character ofwhich isthe respect ofthe
principle of formality (Fodor 1975; Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; Pylyshyn
1985). Indeed, thenotion that language competence isadevice that analyzes
theshape ofsymbols regardless oftheir content and therelationship between
theuttered expression and its context ispart ofabroader conception ofhow
to analyze thestudy ofthe mind inclassical cognitive science (Fodor 1975).
To be properly scientific, the notion that analysis of the mind should be
driven bytheprinciple offormality and bymethodological solipsism (Fodor
1980) continues to be very strong insome interpretative models based on

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67

theclassical perspective, despite thefact that thecomputer metaphor that

inspired them isnow insharp decline. Inour opinion, proposing amodel
of language (and mind) completely detached from reality is equivalent
to talking about the nature of an organism without referring to its
relationship with its external environment. Thedisembodied and detached
nature of language that Chomsky introduced makes it a useful tool for
disembodied angels, but hardly for human beings inthe flesh. To overcome
this problem, we move toward an embodied perspective, and specifically
to those interpretative models that within theembodied approach consider
the embedded (or situated) nature of cognition to be an essential and
fundamental characteristic.

3. Against thecode model ofcommunication

The notion of language as a disembodied tool is tied to a specific notion
ofcommunication: thecode model (Shannon and Weaver 1949). According
to thecode model, thespeaker encodes thought (the message) inasuccession
of sounds that the listener decodes to be able to share the thought (the
message) that thespeaker intended to communicate. Adherence to thecode
model, that Fodor (1975: 106) considered not just natural but inevitable,
means adherence to aform ofparallelism between thought and language.
Fodors notion isthat language can express thought because language and
thought share thesame logical form. From this point ofview, thedevice that
processes linguistic information must be capable ofprocessing thelogical
form of the utterances: the logical form of statements is a necessary and
sufficient condition for language comprehension. Adherence to this position
isclearly at odds with thepragmatic theories ofcommunication that focus
on context and the speakers intention. Indeed, in the classical symbolic
framework everything necessary for thecomprehension ofwhat thespeaker
said (in the statement actually uttered) is presentthe information content
isentirely encoded inthe utterance (Fodor 1983). For this reason, thecode
model works perfectly with thetheory ofliteral meaning and isclosely linked
to thelogical form.
How well does a language model of this type actually work?
To communicate efficiently, is it sufficient to correctly combine symbols
into sentences that reflect thestructure and constituents ofthought? Agood
starting point to answer this question isan interesting reflection made byUta
Frith (1989: 115) concerning thecommunication skills ofRuth, an autistic
girl stuck on theliteral meaning.

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Faithful conveying ofinformation isnot atrivial accomplishment.
Itcalls for accurate encoding and decoding ofspeech at input
and output stages. Ruth does this. Echolalic children do ittoo.
Nevertheless, ineveryday communication one rarely expects that
alistener will have to receive and then transmit abare message
as an exact copy. On the contrary, on expects listeners to know
that messages are not bare, but usually contain something more.
What really matters ineveryday communication isthe point ofthe
message rather than themessage itself. Inother words, as listeners,
we need to know why thespeaker conveys this thought (rather than
another), and as speakers we need to be sure we are understood
inthe way we want to be understood. We have elaborate verbal and
nonverbal signals for getting across these intentions.

What emerges inthis passage isthat thegirl isnot able to communicate

effectively, even if she respects the requirements of the code model.
Specifically, Ruths problem isnot understanding what aspeaker says, but
understanding why thespeaker issaying what she says. Autism isfrequently
studied incognitive pragmatics (e.g., Happ 1993; Pexman etal. 2011) as
evidence in favor of the role of the speakers intentions in the processes
of language production and comprehension, assuming that a speakers
thought isnot explicitly coded inlinguistic expressions (Grice 1968). Friths
quote encourages us to think that, inaddition to theassessment ofthe role
ofintention, theevaluation ofwhy thespeaker issaying what she says also
involves theevaluation ofthe consonance ofwhat thespeaker says with
respect to thecontextual situation. From aperspective on communication
inwhich what really matters iswhy someone issaying something and not what
someone says, theexpressive code assumes arole ofsecondary importance.
Aview that fits very well with this perspective isthe model ofcommunication
based on clues with Relevance Theory proposed by Sperber and Wilson
(1986/1995). According to theauthors, incommunication thespeaker simply
offers the listener evidence (a clue) of what she intends to communicate
(Sperber and Wilson 1986, 2002; Origgi and Sperber 2000).
Inferential communication isamatter ofreconstructing
the communicators informative intention on the basis of the
evidence she provides byher utterance. Successful communication
does not depend, then, on thecommunicator and addressee having
exactly the same representation of the utterance, but on having
theutterance, however represented, seen as evidence for thesame
intended conclusion (Origgi and Sperber 2000: 167).

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For the purpose of our argument, what is important to note is that

thequestion ofwhy thespeaker issaying what she says isclosely related
to thequestion ofhow language isgrounded insituation. Indeed, showing
that language production and comprehension rely on theevaluation ofwhy
a speaker says what she says means referring to one of the cornerstones
ofapragmatic perspective on language: evaluation ofhow expressions are
linked to their context. Such aconsideration has profound consequences for
theorigins oflanguage. Inour opinion, theevaluation ofwhy thespeaker
is saying what she says precedes (logically and temporally) the question
ofwhat she issaying. Indeed, inthe early stages ofhuman communication
(i.e., in the absence of a code through which to express the content to be
said), what regulates theprocesses ofproduction and comprehension isthe
analysis ofwhy someone issaying something at agiven time. As Grdenfors
(2004: 244, our emphasis) claimed when communication first appears, itis
thecommunicative act initself and thecontext inwhich itoccurs that are
most important, not the expressive form of the act (see also Grdenfors
2014).
The assumption underlying our argument is that anchoring language
to context represents aspecific case ofthe more general grounding of the
organism to theenvironment. Starting from this assumption, and inorder to
explain thequestion oflanguage origins, inwhat follows we propose atwostep argument. Thefirst step shows that theanalysis ofthe grounding problem
has to be considered inreference to theembedded (or situated) model ofthe
embodied theory ofmind (cf. Cantwell Smith 1999). Thesecond step shows
that thetheories oflanguage elaborated within theembodied perspective
are inaccord with thegestural models oflanguage origins. As aresult
ofthis two-step argument, we maintain that theembodied model represents
the conceptual bridge of the grounding and the origins problems, without
which no naturalistic perspective oflanguage ispossible.

4. Embedded cognition and action-based language

The conceptual foundation ofour perspective can be tracked to theecologic
approach elaborated byGibson (1979). Criticizing theidealistic conception
of vision, Gibson proposed that perception is strongly connected to
themovement ofthe organism inthe environment and that, as aconsequence,
perception is in itself a form of acting. Gibsons approach represents one
ofthe main theoretical points ofreference for theperspectives ofembodied
cognition (EC) (e.g., Barsalou 2008; Engel etal. 2013; Lakoff and Johnson

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Ines Adornetti, Francesco Ferretti

1999; Wilson 2002). The main assumption of EC is that cognition is not

arepresentation ofthe world but isstrongly tied to action inthe world (Clark
1997; Varela etal. 1991). As Engel and colleagues (2013: 206) maintain,
cognition is fundamentally action-bound, subserving the planning,
selection, anticipation, and performance of actions. Thus, cognition and
action are not only closely interrelated cognition seems fundamentally
grounded inaction. From such aperspective, for example, knowing what
an object is does not automatically imply having an internal abstract and
amodal representation of the object but having sensorimotor skills and
possible actions to use theobject.
We do not intend to discuss the validity of EC compared to classical
computational models and thevarious formulations ofembodied theories (see
Wilson 2002). For our argument, what isimportant to note isthat thecentral
assumption ofEC isthe rejection ofthe symbolic framework, according to
which thecognitive processing requires asmall set ofrules that operate on
avast set ofarbitrary, amodal and abstract symbols: and themind isconceived
as a computational system of abstract symbols detached from the reality
they represent (cf. Fodor 1975; Pylyshyn 1985; Turing 1950). As we noted
by discussing Chomskys and Fodors positions, within the computational
framework therelevant aspects oflinguistic (and ingeneral mental) processes
concern how symbols combine with one another, not how they relate to
external reality. As Meteyard and colleagues (2012: 789) stressed:
the thorny problem ofhow symbolic representations refer to things
in the world was explicitly recognized (Fodor 1987; Pylyshyn
1985; Newell 1980) but never explained within the symbolic
framework. Determining the organization of cognitive processes
was more important than establishing its content.

Putting aside the question of whether such criticism is valid for all
the authors who Meteyard and colleagues cite, it must be stressed that,
contrary to thesymbolic paradigm supporters, theauthors moving within
thetheoretical framework ofEC consider thesymbol grounding problem as
thecentral issue to account for thenature ofhuman language and cognition.
Originally formulated by Harnad (1990), the symbol grounding problem
isposed to answer to thefollowing question: how can themeaning ofthe
meaningless symbol tokens (as those postulated by the symbolic models
ofthe mind), manipulated solely on thebasis oftheir arbitrary shapes, be
grounded inanything but other meaningless symbols?
Regarding this issue there are two considerations. Thefirst isthat even
though in Harnads original formulation, and in the debate that followed,

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the symbol grounding problem posed a typical semantic problem, in this

paper we propose acognitive-pragmatic notion ofgrounding. Theissue
of using language in a manner contextually appropriate, namely in a way
consonant to thesituation, ineffect, isall we need for amodel offunctioning
(see section 3) and origin oflanguage (see section 5) elaborated within EC.
Thesecond consideration isthat, inline with theimportance ofthe problem
ofthe grounding oflanguage to context as aspecific case ofthe relationship
between organism and environment, our adhesion to EC isinthe first place
an adhesion to theaction-oriented models which exalt theembedded nature
ofcognition (Shapiro 2010). Indeed, such models, as Pouw and colleagues
(2014) emphasize, could be considered more embodied because ofthe fact
that they conceive cognition as being on-line, that is, being tightly coupled
with, embedded in, if not extended over, thebody and theenvironment (Pouw
etal. 2014: 1). Indeed, theaspect more relevant to theembedded perspective
is situatedness: the organisms immediate environment has a central role
inits behavior; such environment isnot only arich source ofconstraints and
opportunities for theorganism, but also acontext that gives meaning to its
actions (Beer 2014). So much for thegrounding problem. Now we have to
take into account thesecond point ofour argument: theability ofthe actionoriented models to explain theorigin oflanguage with reference to gesture.
Obviously, the embedded perspectives (insofar as they are more
embodied), first and foremost, are action-oriented models of cognition.
Itisexactly theattention to action that illuminates thelink existing between
such embodied-embedded perspectives and thegestural theories. Thestarting
point is the link between action and language. The problem of creating
contextually-appropriate behaviour is not only a linguistic issue, but it is
also an issue endemic to action systems (Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Glenberg
and Gallese 2012). Themotor system has solved theproblem ofproducing
contextually-appropriate behaviour bybeing functionally organized interms
ofgoal-directed motor acts, and not interms ofmovement (cf. next section)
(Rizzolatti etal. 2000). According to Glenberg and Gallese (2012: 911)
the brain takes advantage ofthe solution ofone difficult problem, namely
contextually-appropriate action, to solve another difficult problem, namely
contextually-appropriate language. This bond between aspects oflanguage
processing and theorganization and activity ofthe human motor cortex has
been demonstrated bynumerous neuroscientific and behavioral studies (for
areview, see Meteyard etal. 2012). For example, Pulvermller (2005) found
that when subjects simply read theword signifying an action, themotor system
activates and represents its meaning: verbs for head, arm, and leg actions
produce head, arm, and leg simulation inthe respective areas ofthe motor

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Ines Adornetti, Francesco Ferretti

system. Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) found that participants more quickly
responded to sentences if theresponse was compatible with thedirection
ofthe action implied inthe sentence (sentence: open thedrawer; action:
hand moves toward thebody). Similar results also came from patients with
brain injury. For example, ithas been shown that subjects with motor neuron
disease or lesions inthe left inferior frontal cortex have deficits inactionverb comprehension and in understanding pictures depicting actions (Bak
etal. 2001, 2006). The connections between action systems and language
processing characterize not only the processing of single words or single
sentences, but also the processing of discourse and narratives (e.g., Chow
etal. 2014; Kurby and Zacks 2013). The comprehension of stories might
lead to theformation ofmodality-specific grounded representations: readers
activated sensorimotor regions relevant to theperceptual information
described inthe text (i.e., secondary somatosensory and premotor cortex were
associated with thereading ofclauses that imply motor information [Kurby
and Zacks 2013]). Studies of this type highlight that our understanding
of linguistic expressions is not solely an epistemic attitude; it is first and
foremost apragmatic attitude toward action (Glenberg and Gallese 2012:
96, our emphasis).

5. Action-based communication and gestural origin oflanguage

In theprevious section we considered ageneric relationship between
language and action. Now itis time to deal with evolutionary issues showing
therelationship between action-oriented models ofcognition and gestural
models of language origin. Indeed, the recognition that the motor system
has acrucial role (beyond, ofcourse, that tied to themotor control) inhigher
cognitive function and, specifically, in language comprehension and
production, has also provided new views on theinvolvement ofmotor system
inlanguage evolution, supporting thehypothesis that human language first
originated inagestural-based system ofcommunication (for areview, see
Fogassi and Ferrari 2012).
Particularly relevant inthis scenario isthe discovery ofmirror neurons,
a specific class of sensorimotor neurons found for the first time in the F5
area ofthe premotor cortex ofmacaques brain (di Pellegrino etal. 1992;
Gallese etal. 1996), and then inarea PFG inthe rostral part ofthe inferior
parietal lobule (e.g. Gallese etal. 2002). Thepresence ofamirror system
has also been established inthe human brain (Grafton etal., 1996; Mukamel
etal., 2010). These neurons are defined as mirror because they allow akind

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of mirroring between perception and action. Specifically, they discharge

when a monkey performs an intentional, goal-oriented act with the hands
or themouth (such as attempting to grasp, bite and tear an object) and when
it observes another individual (human or monkey) accomplish a similar
intentional act. This activity of the mirror neurons is unlike the so-called
canonical neurons, which respond only to the presentation of the object.
What isimportant to stress isthat according to this perspective, themotor
system isnot involved inmovement, but inaction: Unlike movement, action
isdefined byagoal and byexpectancy. Movements are thefinal outcome
ofaction and are programmed and controlled as such only when action isset
(Rizzolatti etal. 2000). Inthis sense, through its links between action and
perception, themirror system provides amapping ofexternal reality onto our
own internal representations (Aziz-Zadeh and Ivry 2009).
The functional role ofmirror neurons isrelevant to theorigin
of language. Several authors noted that the primary function of mirror
neurons isrelated to an implicit, pragmatic, and non-reflective understanding
ofmanual actions (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008). Theidea isthat when an
individual observes an action performed byanother, there isan activation
ofthe neurons that represent (through simulation) that action inthe premotor
cortex. This (motor) simulation ofthe observed action induces therecovery
of the internal motor circuit that represents that action. The consequence
ofthis recovery isthat theobserver acquires theknowledge ofthe objective
associated with theaction. Themirror system, inthis way, transforms visual
information into knowledge (Rizzolatti etal. 2001). This process may
underlie some aspects ofcommunication. Indeed, acommunicative gesture
made byan individual (the sender) retrieves inthe observer (the receiver)
theneural circuit encoding themotor representation ofthe same gesture and,
inthis way, allows thereceivers to grasp themessage (gesture) ofthe sender
(Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998). Because of the mirror systems functional
role, it was proposed that it may have played a key role in the evolution
ofacommunication system based on hand gestures that paved theway to
human language (Arbib 2005; Corballis 2010; Gentilucci and Corballis
2006; Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998; Zlatev 2014). One ofthe key elements at
thebasis ofthis hypothesis isthe fact that area F5 ofthe ventral premotor
cortex of the macaque brain is homologous to Brocas area in humans
(specifically to thedysgranular area 44, theposterior part ofBrocas area)
(Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998), traditionally considered as aspeech area (Broca
1861; Embick etal. 2000), but also involved inmotor function unrelated
to speech (e.g., complex hand movements and sensorimotor learning and
integration, Binkofski and Buccino 2004). As Brocas area developed from

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Ines Adornetti, Francesco Ferretti

an area originally involved inthe processing ofaction, from this perspective

it is assumed that the ability to recognize and perform actions related to
praxis, such as those involving the manipulation of objects, provided
the basis for the development of the ability to perform and recognize
communicative hand gestures that, inturn, provided theevolutionary basis
for thedevelopment ofthe brain mechanisms that support spoken language.
Theextension ofthe brain systems at thebasis ofspoken language has been
aconsequence ofthe fact that theprecursor ofBrocas area was equipped,
before speech, with amechanism for recognizing actions made byothers.
This mechanism was the neural prerequisite for the development of the
inter-individual communication, first based on hand-gesture, and finally on
speech (Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998: 190).
This gesture-first account isconfirmed byseveral studies on monkeys
and apes that have shown the existence of significant differences
between vocal and gestural communication (and, more generally, bodily
communication) among these animals. Specifically, it is widely attested
that, in nonhuman primates, gestural communication systems are more
flexible than vocal ones. Thevocalizations ofnonhuman primates are, for
themost part, genetically determined. Each species has arelatively limited
repertoire ofcalls whose acoustic characteristics are mainly fixed at birth
and show minimal change during development (Cheney and Seyfarth 2010;
Hammerschmidt and Fischer 2008). In addition, neurological evidence
suggests that the vocal productions of monkeys and apes are mainly
related to their emotional states (e.g., fear, excitement, etc) and this fact
limits thecommunicative power ofvocal calls (although see e.g., Clay and
Zuberbhler 2014). In contrast, hand gestures in nonhuman primates can
be produced voluntarily by the animals and because of this they can be
used in a more flexible way than vocalizations. Great apes use gestures
in different contexts to communicate different things (cf. Pollick and de
Waal 2007). Apes gesture production takes into account the attentional
state of the recipient: visual gestures (gestures that are not accompanied
byany sound) are frequently used when thereceiver ispaying attention to
theindicator (Tomasello and Call 2007), while auditory and tactile gestures
are produced to attract theattention ofan individual who are not looking
at the signaller (Tomasello etal. 1994). So, although vocalizations are
an important mode ofcommunication for most primates and despite that,
thevocal mode ofcommunication intuitively isoften considered aprecursor
ofspeech, thevocalizations ofnonhuman primates have little incommon
with human language (Eberl 2010; Hammerschmidt and Fischer 2008;
Ploog 2002; Tomasello 2008).

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75

The experimental evidence and thetheoretical arguments discussed

in this section allow us to maintain that the embodied mind (specifically,
theattention to action that characterizes this approach to cognition) represents
a plausible conceptual framework to account for the gestural foundation
oflanguage inaphylogenetic perspective. Inaccord with this result, we can
say that even thesecond step ofour argument becomes clearly plausible.

6. Conclusion
In this paper we showed that theinterplay between thegrounding problem
and thetheories ofgestural origins oflanguage can be used to elaborate
anaturalistic model ofhuman communication. Ina model oflanguage
that conforms with the principle of evolutionary plausibility, in fact,
therelationship oflanguage with external environment isafundamental
characteristic (a specific characteristic of the more general relationship
between organism and environment). From this point ofview, theembedded
model ofcognition offers afruitful conceptual framework for anaturalistic
approach to the study of language. Given the close relationship between
the embedded model and the gestural theories, it is possible to argue that
theembodied cognition represents theconceptual bridge to put together
thegestural origins oflanguage with thegrounding problem. Such astandpoint
opens theway to atruly naturalistic perspective ofhuman language.

Acknowledgments
We want to thank Sawomir Wacewicz and one anonymous reviewer for
helpful comments and suggestions.

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