Rafael Macailing et. al.

, vs Tomas Andrada
G.R No. L-21607
30 January 1970
Sanchez, J.:
Facts:

There was a dispute over a four parcel of lands located in Lebak, Cotabato between two parties,
wherein the Petitioners, Rafael Macailing Et. Al and claiming a bigger parcel sale of the said lot.
They instituted an action to the District Land officer of Cotabato where in the said officer ruled
in favour of the plaintiffs, Rafael Macailing et. al., the Director of Lands however reversed the
ruling and ruled in favour of the defendant Andrada. An appeal have been insitutued to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and ruled reversing the said ruling of the
Director of Land where defendants again filed a motion for reconsideration having been said that
the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has become final and
executory and that the office has no more jurisdiction over the matter. The defendants having
read of the decision of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, they sought to file again
an appeal to the office of the President. The office of the President through Assistant Executive
Enrique C. Quema has reversed the decision of the SANR. Hence the petition, that petitioner
claims that the SANR decision has become final and executory and again decision was reversed,
hence the petition.

Issue:
Whether the Decision of the Office of the President was binding and valid despite the finality of
the decision of the SANR?

Held:
In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially provide for
such judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that
judicial review is unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes; appeal,

petition for review or a writ of certiorari. No general rule applies to all the various
administrative agencies. Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary
remedies in the Rules of Court are still available.2
Deducible from the foregoing is that where administrative agencies have original jurisdiction in
the premises, the court's interference with administrative action is necessarily limited. A review
thereof cannot be done through an ordinary civil action if constitutional or legislative authority
therefor is wanting. The remedies that can be availed of where the statute is silent, as in the
present case, are the special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and/ormandamus specified in
the Rules of Court. In this case, therefore, we have no alternative but to hold that the plaintiffs'
appropriate remedy is certiorari, not an ordinary civil action.
Defendants did not move to reconsider or appeal from the Secretary's decision of October 27,
1956 within 30 days from their receipt thereof. Indeed, they attempted to appeal only on
October 23, 1957. They merely contend that their appeal was but 9 days after October 14, 1957,
the date defendants received the September 12, 1957 ruling of the Secretary denying their second
motion for reconsideration. That ruling, it must be remembered, drew attention to the fact that
the Secretary's decision "had long become final and executory." By reason of which, declaration
was made that "this (Secretary's) Office had no more jurisdiction to entertain the said motion.
Hospicio Nilo vs Court of Appeals
G.R No. L-34586
2 April 1984
Gutierrez, JR.., J.:

Facts:

Hospicio Nilo is the tenant of a parcel of land of Gatchalian located in San Rafael, Bulacan.
Gatchalian instituted an ejectment suit against Hospicio Nilo on the ground of personal
cultivation. Petitioner alleged that the ejectment suit was but an act of reprisal and retaliation
because he has elected personal culitivation. The court of Agrarian Reform ruled in favour of
Gatchalian, and that this court stated that there was no justification to unduly interfere with the
desire of Gatchalian to personally cultivate his land. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that the said law has been amended by a new one and that the
personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment of an agricultural lessee has been eliminated.

Issue:
Whether new Land Reform Act has retroactive effect and personal cultivation has been
eliminated?

Held:
Article 3 of the old Civil Code (now Article 4 of the New Civil Code) provides that: "Laws shall
not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." According to this provision of
law, in order that a law may have retroactive effect it is necessary that an express provision to
this effect be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be understood which is not embodied in
the law. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that a law is a rule established to guide our
actions with no binding effect until it is enacted, wherefore, it has no application to past times but
only to future time, and that is why it is said that the law looks to the future only and has no
retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal
provisions.
This Court would be thwarting and not promoting the objectives of Congress if we rule against
the small landowners in this case. The national goal of having independent and self reliant
farmers tilling their own small landholdings would not be achieved if persons who own only two
hectares or 6,941 square meters of land as in the instant cases cannot be allowed to work their
land themselves but must be compelled to perpetuate a lessor-lessee relationship. The desire of
Congress to achieve a "dignified existence for the small farmers" is not served if two families
one landowner and one tenant must share the measly produce from 6,941 square meters of
land. Land reform and agrarian reform were intended to equalize opportunities for land
ownership, to enable a diffusion and sharing of wealth and not a sharing of poverty or a
fragmentation of tenanted farms into non-economic sizes. The questioned decision of the court of
appeals has been sustained and the petition is denied for lack of merit.

Mauricio Cruz vs Stanton Youngberg, Director of Bureau of Animal Industry

G.R No. L-34674
26 October 1931
Ostrand, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of enacted law which prohibits the importation of cattles,
among others. The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts
sufficient to institute a cause of action. The court sustained the demurred and dismiss the
petition. The appellee contends that even if the act be declared unconstitutional, still the
petitioner cannot be allowed to import such cattles for another act which prohibits importation of
cattles without permit would become effective. The petitioner herein contends that there was
undue delegation of legislative powers to the Governor General to suspend or not, at his
discretion, the prohibition provided in the act.

Issue:
Whether the Governor General, in suspending or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided
on a certain act, is undue delegation of his legislative power?

Held:
The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion
as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter no valid objection can be made.
There was no undue delegation of legislative power by the Governor General.

Marshall Field and Co. vs Clark

143 us 649

Facts:
It is admitted that an enrolled act thus authenticated is sufficient evidence of itself -- nothing to
the contrary appearing upon its face -- that it passed Congress. But the contention is that it cannot
be regarded as a law of the United States if the journal of either house fails to show that it passed
in the precise form in which it was signed by the presiding officers of the two houses and
approved by the President. It is said that under any other view, it becomes possible for the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate to impose upon the
people as a law a bill that was never passed by Congress. But this possibility is too remote to be
seriously considered in the present inquiry. It suggests a deliberate conspiracy to which the
presiding officers, the committees on enrolled bills, and the clerks of the two houses must
necessarily be parties, all acting with a common purpose to defeat an expression of the popular
will in the mode prescribed by the Constitution. Judicial action based upon such a suggestion is
forbidden by the respect due to a coordinate branch of the government. The evils that may result
from the recognition of the principle that an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State,
attested by the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress and the
approval of the President, is conclusive evidence that it was passed by Congress according to the
forms of the Constitution would be far less than those that would certainly result from a rule
making the validity of congressional enactments depend upon the manner in which the journals
of the respective houses are kept by the subordinate officers charged with the duty of keeping
them. The contention of the appellants is that this enrolled act, in the custody of the Secretary of
State and appearing upon its face, to have become a law in the mode prescribed by the
Constitution, is to be deemed an absolute nullity in all its parts, because -- such is the allegation
-- it is shown by the congressional records of proceedings, reports of committees of each house,
reports of committees of conference, and other papers printed by authority of Congress, and
having reference to House Bill 9416, that a section of the bill, as it finally passed, was not in the
bill authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers of the respective houses of Congress
and approved by the President.

Issue:
Whether there was undue delegation of powers?

Held:
The signing by the Speaker of the HOR and by the President of the Senate of an enrolled bill is
an official attestation by the two houses that such bill is the one that has passed Congress. When

the bill thus attested is signed by the President and deposited in the archives, its authentication as
a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. That Congress
cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to
the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution. The Act
of October i, 18go, in the particular under consideration, is not inconsistent with that principle. It
does not, in any real sense, invest the President with the power of legislation .