Object (real) Evidence

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs Reyes

ISSUE: In affirming the decision of the trial court holding BPI liable for the amount of P100,000.00
representing an alleged additional deposit of respondents, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion by resolving the issue based on a conjecture and ignoring physical evidence in favor of testimonial
evidence.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and cannot
be reviewed on appeal by this Court, as long as they are borne out by the record or are based on substantial
evidence.[10] Such rule however is not absolute, but is subject to well-established exceptions, which are: 1)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the
judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6)
when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and those findings are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the
trial court; 8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; 9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of fact of the
CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[11] We hold
that this case falls under exception Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 9 which constrain us to resolve the factual issue.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative allegations by the
degree of evidence required by law.[12] In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish
his case by preponderance of evidence,[13] or that evidence which is of greater weight or is more
convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the
testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on
one side than on the other.[14]
Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her daughter, that the former
deposited P100,000.00 cash in addition to the fund transfer of P100,000.00, is not established by physical
evidence. While the duplicate copy of the deposit slip[30] was in the amount of P200,000.00 and bore the
stamp mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show that there was a cash deposit
of P100,000.00. An examination of the deposit slip shows that it did not contain any entry in the breakdown
portion for the specific denominations of the cash deposit. This demolishes the testimonies of respondent
Jesusa and her daughter Joan.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence.[38] We have, on many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in
ascertaining the truth. Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of
the prosecution witnesses, we consistently rule that the physical evidence should prevail.[39]
In fine, respondents failed to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence.
(physical evid) Use of Fluorescent Powder
People vs. Amansec
Amansecs arguments are untenable. As we have held before, [i]t is for the party to plan its own strategy
and to choose which witnesses to call and what evidence to submit to support its own cause.
Besides, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain unless it can be
shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence. Amansec bears the burden of showing
the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity,
and that they properly discharged their duties.[47] This, Amansec failed to do.
Use of Fluorescent Powder:
The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buy-bust money is not an indication that
the buy-bust operation was a sham. The use of initials to mark the money used in [a] buy-bust operation
has been accepted by this Court.[38] In People v. Rivera,[39] we declared:

It was x x x the prerogative of the prosecution to choose the manner of marking the money to be used in
the buy-bust operation, and the fact that it was not dusted with fluorescent powder did not render the
exhibit inadmissible. Indeed, the use of initials to mark the money used in the buy-bust operation has been
accepted by this Court in numerous cases.[40]
The successful prosecution of the sale of dangerous drugs case depends on the satisfaction of the following
elements:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. [56]
To elucidate on the foregoing elements, this Court has said that [i]n prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu,
what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence.[57]
It is evident in the case at bar that the prosecution was able to establish the said elements.[58]
Amansec was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses, as the person who sold to the poseur-buyer
a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. He had been caught red-handed in the
entrapment operation conducted by the SDEU of the La Loma Police. Such positive identification must prevail
over Amansecs uncorroborated and weak defense of denial, and unsubstantiated defense of frame-up.
Obscene Material or Pornographic Files
Nogales vs. People
To stress, P.D. No. 969 mandates the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials involved in the
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, even if the accused was acquitted.
Taking into account all the circumstances of this case, the Court holds that the destruction of the hard disks
and the softwares used in any way in the violation of the subject law addresses the purpose of minimizing if
not totally eradicating pornography. This will serve as a lesson for those engaged in any way in the
proliferation of pornography or obscenity in this country. The Court is not unmindful of the concerns of
petitioners but their supposed property rights must be balanced with the welfare of the public in general.
Chain of Custody Rule on Drug Cases
People vs. Alejandro
Reasonable Doubt on the Corpus Delicti
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. What is material in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been
committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.[26] In prosecutions involving
narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and proof of its existence
is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[27] To remove any doubt or
uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, the evidence must definitely show that the illegal
drug presented in court is the very same illicit drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.[28]
a.

The Chain of Custody Rule and the Marking Requirement

Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165, defines chain of
custody as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of

seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for

destruction.
In Junie Malillin y Lopez v. People,[29] we explained the importance of establishing the chain of custody of
the confiscated drugs, in this wise:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to
obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is
not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or
when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the
evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other
words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering - without regard to whether
the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of
custody rule.[30]
Thus, crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking means the placing by the apprehending
officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. [31] Long before Congress
passed R.A. No. 9165, this Court has consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark
the seized drugs casts reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.[32] Marking after seizure is
the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked
because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence
from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal
proceedings, thus preventing switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.[33]
In the present case, the records do not show that the apprehending team marked the seized items with their
initials immediately upon confiscation. In Sanchez,[34] we explained that consistency with the chain of
custody rule requires that the marking of the seized items be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation. We clarified in People v. Manuel Resurreccion[35] that
[m]arking upon immediate confiscation does not exclude the possibility that marking can be at the police
station or office of the apprehending team. In the present case, the testimonies of the apprehending officers
do not indicate that they ever marked the seized items, either at the place of seizure or at the police station.
Rule on DNA Evidence (A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC)
People vs. Andal
Second. The proposed DNA testing of the semen found on the victim Nancy Siscar is not ground to re-open
the final judgment in the case at bar. It is not only late and the probability that it will bring about the
acquittal of appellants is at best, arguable. The conviction of the accused is based on nothing less than the
testimony of an aye-witness whose credibility has been passed upon by the trial court and this Court.
Indeed, we have ruled that 'a witness' testimony ought to be entitled to great weight when the accusing
words are directed against a close relative."2 [Antonio vs. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 328.] And in the case
at bar, witness Olimpio Corales is a brother-in-law of two of the accused.
We stress that the guilt of an accused should he established beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond absolute
doubt. By our applicable rules of evidence, we find that the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Nonetheless petitioners may raise the foregoing issues, especially the
need for DNA test, in a plea for clemency addressed to the President of the Philippines who under the
Constitution, is vested with the pardoning power.

People vs. Vallejo

ISSUE: Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court reiterated that
even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the accused considering that it
corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay case.
The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and for the first time
recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus:
DNA is an organic substance found in a persons cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for
identical twins, each persons DNA profile is distinct and unique.
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victims body for
the suspects DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference
sample taken from the suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and
the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their
profile. The test may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion). This
conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar DNA types
(inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation, contamination, or failure of
some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a
different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a case, the
samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the
Similarity.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others things,
the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination
of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests.
Documentary Evidence
Republic vs. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation
The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by respondent neither show that its predecessors possession
and occupation of the subject land is for the period or duration required by law. The earliest date of the Tax
Declarations presented in evidence by respondent is 1965, the others being 1973, 1980, 1992 and 1993.
Respondent failed to present any credible explanation why the realty taxes due on the subject property were
only paid starting in 1965. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute
proof of claim of ownership.[13] In the present case, the payment of realty taxes starting 1965 gives rise to
the presumption that respondents predecessors-in-interest claimed ownership or possession of the subject
lot only in that year.
Settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show
by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the
nature and duration required by law.[14] Unfortunately, as petitioner contends, the pieces of evidence
presented by respondent do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible proof necessary in cases of this
nature.
It is settled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute
proof of the facts stated therein.[19] In the present case, Hanovers President and General Manager, who
identified the CENRO Certification, is a private individual. He was not the one who prepared the Certification.
The government official who issued the Certification was not presented before the RTC so that he could have
testified regarding its contents.Hence, the RTC should not have accepted the contents of the Certification as
proof of the facts stated therein. The contents of the Certification are hearsay, because Hanovers President
and General Manager was incompetent to testify on the truth of the contents of such Certification. Even if

the subject Certification is presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, it has no probative value in
establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
Philippine Hawk Corporation vs. Lee
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the award by the trial court for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased Silvino Tan, moral damages for his death, and actual damages, although the amount of the latter
award was modified.
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for by Article 2206 of the Civil Code.
[34] Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money.
[35]
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity.[36] By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily
wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.[37]
However, no documentary evidence was presented regarding the income derived from their copra business;
hence, the testimony of respondent as regards such income cannot be considered.
In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered;
that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings or income, less
living and other incidental expenses.[39] In the absence of documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg
necessary expenses for the lease and operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross income,
and peg living expenses at 50 percent of the net income (gross income less necessary expenses).
Not yet read
IBM vs. NLRC
Petitioners argue that the computer print-outs submitted by them need not be identified or authenticated
according to the rules of procedure in regular courts in order for the same to be admissible in evidence.
They contend that technical rules of evidence do not apply to administrative/labor cases and because of a
relaxation of the rules of evidence, private respondent was in fact allowed by the labor arbiter to adduce
additional evidence even after a decision had been rendered.It is indeed true that administrative agencies,
such as the NLRC, are not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence in the adjudication of
cases. This was the reason private respondent was allowed to submit additional evidence even after the case
was deemed submitted for resolution by the labor arbiter. The practice of admitting additional evidence on
appeal in labor cases has been sanctioned by this Court. However, the liberality of procedure in
administrative actions is subject to limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process.
As this Court said in Ang Tibay vs. CIR,[24] the provision for flexibility in administrative procedure "does not
go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative value." More specifically,
as held in Uichico vs. NLRC: It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not
bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However, this procedural rule should
not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. While the rules of evidence
prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the evidence
presented before it must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value.
The Statement of Profit and Losses submitted by Crispa, Inc. to prove its alleged losses, without the
accompanying signature of a certified public accountant or audited by an independent auditor, are nothing
but self-serving documents which ought to be treated as a mere scrap of paper devoid of any probative
value. The computer print-outs, which constitute the only evidence of petitioners, afford no assurance of
their authenticity because they are unsigned. The decisions of this Court, while adhering to a liberal view in
the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required some
proof of authenticity or reliability as condition for the admission of documents.
In Rizal Workers Union vs. Ferrer-Calleja, this Court struck down the decision of the Director of Labor
Relations which was based on an unsigned and unidentified manifesto. It was held: From even a perfunctory
assessment, it becomes apparent that the "evidence" upon which said decision is professedly based does not

come up to that standard of substantiality. It is of course also a sound and settled rule that administrative
agencies performing quasi-judicial functions are unfettered by the rigid technicalities of procedure observed
in the courts of law, and this so that disputes brought before such bodies may be resolved in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner possible. But what is involved here transcends mere procedural
technicality and concerns the more paramount principles and requirements of due process, which may not
be sacrificed to speed or expediency. The clear message of [Article 291 of the Labor Code] is that even in
the disposition of labor cases, due process must never be subordinated to expediency or dispatch. Upon this
principle, the unidentified documents relied upon by respondent Director must be seen and taken for what
they are, mere inadmissible hearsay. They cannot, by any stretch of reasoning, be deemed substantial
evidence of the election frauds complained of.
Likewise, in the case of EMS Manpower & Placement Services vs. NLRC, the employer submitted a photocopy
of a telex which supposedly shows that the employee was guilty of "serious misconduct" and which became
the basis of her dismissal. This Court ruled that the telex, a "single document, totally uncorroborated and
easily concocted or fabricated to suit one's personal interest and purpose," was insufficient to uphold the
employer's defense.
In Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. vs. NLRC, this Court held as incompetent unsigned daily time
records presented to prove that the employee was neglectful of his duties: Indeed, the DTRs annexed to the
present petition would tend to establish private respondent's neglectful attitude towards his work duties as
shown by repeated and habitual absences and tardiness and propensity for working undertime for the year
1992. But the problem with these DTRs is that they are neither originals nor certified true copies. They are
plain photocopies of the originals, if the latter do exist. More importantly, they are not even signed by
private respondent nor by any of the employer's representatives.
Guadines vs. Sandiganbayan
Well-entrenched is the rule that factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except
where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts and the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[22] Petitioner failed to establish any of the
foregoing exceptional circumstances.
On the contrary, the evidence on record clearly showed petitioners participation in the anomalous
disbursement of government funds in favor of a private contractor for lumber which have been validly seized
by CENR forest rangers. The inspection of deliveries and acceptance by the provincial government through
Ayuma and Escara who certified in the Inspection Report that lumber delivered by petitioner were found to
be in good order and condition relates only to the physical aspect and compliance with specifications as to
quality, quantity and size of the materials. Said certification did not state whether the lumber delivered by
petitioner have been cut or gathered in accordance with existing forestry laws, rules and
regulations. Petitioner could have readily substantiated her defense by producing documents, such as
permits and Certificate of Timber/Lumber Origin, allegedly secured by persons from whom she bought the
lumber, or presenting as witnesses those workers who supposedly cut the trees and hauled the logs. But
none of these were presented at the trial. Hence, the prosecution evidence showing the lumber delivered by
petitioner to have been illegally cut and gathered, stands unrebutted.
Marquez vs. Espejo
When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether these documents
adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look
beyond these instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to
determine such intent.
Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for
the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or
ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and
defeat the very purpose of agreements.
Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states
that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original
documentitself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as

a general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the
document.[42]
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no
dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties that the respondents Deed of
Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further described as located in Barangay Murong.
The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the
true intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to
TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T62836).
As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836 (corresponding to the Lantap
property) reflects the true intention of RBBI and the petitioners, and the reference to Barangay Murong was
a typographical error. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the reference to Barangay Murong reflects
their true intention, while the reference to TCT No. T-62836 was a mere error. This dispute reflects an
intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the instruments to adequately
express the true intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of
the instruments.
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary, add
to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA actually
applied in its assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol
Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms of the two
contracts and refused to admit any other evidence that would contradict such terms.
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first place,
respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the
written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as
between the parties and their successors-in-interest. The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at
least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in question,
and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.[44]
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap
property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to the
petitioners. This may be seen from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Marcos
Lastly, petitioner argues that the assailed RTC Orders were based solely on their own evidence and that
respondents offered no evidence to show that they were qualified to serve as executors.[45] It is basic that
one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. [46] Consequently,
it was the burden of petitioner (not respondents) to substantiate the grounds upon which it claims that
respondents should be disqualified to serve as executors, and having failed in doing so, its petition must
necessarily fail.