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when
she
died
intestate
on
June
5,
1921,
when,
in
fact,
the
latter
was
survived
by
her
three
sons,
Santiago,
Pedro
and
Vicente.
Pedro
Sepulveda,
Sr.
also
executed
a
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale[5]
on
July
24,
1968
over
the
property
covered
by
T.D.
No.
19804
(T.D.
No.
35090)
in
favor
of
the
City
of
Danao
for
P7,492.00.
According
to
the
private
respondent,
his
granduncle
received
this
amount
without
his
(private
respondents)
knowledge.
The
private
respondent
prayed
that,
after
due
hearing,
judgment
be
rendered
in
his
favor,
thus:
ON
THE
FIRST
CAUSE
OF
ACTION:
1.
Declaring
the
plaintiff
the
absolute
owner
of
ONE-HALF
(1/2)
portion
of
the
TWO
(2)
parcels
of
land
described
in
paragraph
2
of
the
complaint;
2.
Declaring
the
plaintiff
the
absolute
owner
of
the
ONE-THIRD
(1/3)
portion
of
the
NINE
(9)
parcels
of
land
described
in
paragraph
3
of
the
complaint;
3.
Ordering
the
defendant
to
deliver
to
the
plaintiff
the
latters
ONE-THIRD
(1/3)
share
of
the
SEVEN
THOUSAND
FOUR
HUNDRED
NINETY-TWO
PESOS
(P7,492.00)
representing
the
purchase
price
of
the
parcel
of
land
described
in
paragraph
3(a)
of
the
complaint
with
interest
thereon
until
the
amount
is
fully
paid;
ON
THE
SECOND
CAUSE
OF
ACTION:
1.
Ordering
the
partition
and
segregation
of
the
ONE-HALF
(1/2)
portion
belonging
to
the
plaintiff
of
the
TWO
(2)
parcels
of
land
described
in
paragraph
2
of
the
complaint;
2.
Ordering
the
partition
and
segregation
of
the
ONE-THIRD
(1/3)
portion
belonging
to
the
plaintiff
of
the
remaining
EIGHT
(8)
parcels
of
land
described
in
paragraph
3
of
the
complaint;
COMMON
TO
THE
FIRST
AND
SECOND
CAUSES
OF
ACTION:
1.
Ordering
the
defendant
to
pay
the
plaintiff
the
amount
of
FIFTY
THOUSAND
PESOS
(P50,000.00)
as
moral
damages;
2.
Ordering
the
defendant
to
pay
the
plaintiff
exemplary
damages
the
amount
of
which
is
left
to
the
discretion
of
this
Honorable
Court;
3.
Ordering
the
defendant
to
deliver
to
the
plaintiff
the
latters
share
of
the
fruits
of
the
ELEVEN
(11)
parcels
of
land
subject-matter
of
this
complaint,
the
value
of
which
will
be
proven
during
the
trial;
4.
Ordering
the
defendant
to
pay
the
plaintiff
actual
litigation
expenses,
the
value
of
which
will
be
proven
during
the
trial;
5.
Ordering
the
defendant
to
pay
attorneys
fee
in
the
amount
of
TWELVE
THOUSAND
PESOS
(P12,000.00);
6.
Granting
to
the
plaintiff
such
other
reliefs
and
remedies
as
he
may
be
entitled
to
in
accordance
with
law
and
equity.[6]
In
his
answer
to
the
complaint,
Pedro
Sepulveda,
Sr.
admitted
having
executed
a
deed
of
sale
over
the
parcel
of
land
covered
by
T.D.
No.
19804
in
favor
of
Danao
City,
but
averred
that
the
latter
failed
to
pay
the
purchase
price
thereof;
besides,
the
private
respondent
had
no
right
to
share
in
the
proceeds
of
the
said
sale.
He
likewise
denied
having
received
any
demand
for
the
delivery
of
Dulces
share
of
the
subject
properties
from
the
latters
mother
Carlota,
or
from
the
private
respondent.
During
the
trial,
Pedro
Sepulveda,
Sr.
died
intestate.
A
petition
for
the
settlement
of
his
estate
was
filed
on
May
8,
1975
with
the
RTC
of
Cebu,
docketed
as
Special
Proceeding
No.
SF-37.
His
daughter,
petitioner
Socorro
Sepulveda
Lawas,
was
appointed
administratrix
of
his
estate
in
July
1976.
In
compliance
with
the
decision
of
this
Court
in
Lawas
v.
Court
of
Appeals,[7]
docketed
as
G.R.
No.
L-45809
and
promulgated
on
December
12,
1986,
the
deceased
was
substituted
by
the
petitioner.
To
prove
the
delivery
of
Dulces
share
under
the
project
of
partition,
the
petitioner
presented
the
Affidavit
of
Consolidation
she
executed
in
October
1940
covering
thirteen
(13)
of
the
twenty-five
(25)
parcels
of
land
which
were
deeded
to
her
under
the
Project
of
Partition,[8]
as
well
as
the
Order[9]
dated
March
24,
1962
of
the
then
CFI
in
Special
Proceeding
No.
778-R,
denying
Carlotas
motion
for
the
reconstitution
of
the
records
of
the
said
case,
and
for
the
delivery
of
Dulces
share
in
the
eleven
parcels
of
land.
The
court
likewise
declared
therein
that
Dulce,
through
her
grandchildren
and
her
mother,
Carlota,
had
already
received
her
share
of
the
estate
from
Pedro
Sepulveda,
Sr.
as
early
as
January
10,
1938.
According
to
the
petitioner,
Dulce
and
Pedro
Sepulveda,
Sr.
had
a
verbal
agreement
wherein
the
eleven
parcels
of
land
covered
by
the
complaint
would
serve
as
the
latters
compensation
for
his
services
as
administrator
of
Dionisias
estate.
Thus,
upon
the
termination
of
Special
Proceeding
No.
778-0,
and
subsequent
to
the
distribution
of
the
shares
of
Dionisias
heirs,
Pedro
Sepulveda,
Sr.
then
became
the
sole
owner
of
Dulces
shares.
The
petitioner
likewise
adduced
evidence
that
Santiago
Sepulveda
died
intestate
and
was
survived
by
his
wife,
Paz
Velez
Sepulveda
and
their
then
minor
children.[10]
It
was
pointed
out
that
the
private
respondent
failed
to
implead
Paz
Sepulveda
and
her
minor
children
as
parties-defendants
in
the
complaint.
It
was
further
claimed
that
Pedro
Sepulveda,
Sr.
declared
the
property
covered
by
T.D.
No.
18199[11]
under
his
name
for
taxation
purposes
since
the
beginning
of
1948.[12]
It
was
likewise
alleged
that
the
eleven
(11)
parcels
of
land
deeded
to
Dulce
under
the
Project
of
Partition
had
been
declared
for
taxation
purposes
under
the
name
of
Pedro
Sepulveda
since
1974,
and
that
he
and
his
heirs
paid
the
realty
taxes
thereon.[13]
On
June
7,
1993,
the
trial
court
rendered
judgment[14]
in
favor
of
the
private
respondent.
The
fallo
of
the
decision
reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
judgment
is
hereby
rendered
in
favor
of
plaintiff
and
against
the
defendant
by
declaring
that
the
plaintiff
is
legally
and
rightfully
entitled
to
the
one
half
(1/2)
portion
of
the
two
(2)
parcels
of
land
described
in
paragraph
2
of
the
Complaint
and
to
the
one
third
(1/3)
portion
of
the
nine
(9)
parcels
of
land
described
in
paragraph
3
of
the
complaint
as
co-
owner
thereof,
and
ordering
the
partition
and
segregation
of
the
said
one
half
(1/2)
portion
of
the
said
two
(2)
parcels
of
land
and
of
the
said
one
third
(1/3)
portion
of
the
nine
(9)
parcels
of
land,
and
in
the
partition
thereof,
the
mechanics
of
partition
outlined
in
Rule
69
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court
must
be
followed
(Magallon
vs.
Montejo,
146
SCRA
282);
ordering
the
defendant
Socorro
Article
996
of
the
New
Civil
Code,[17]
Rodolfo
Pelaez,
as
surviving
spouse,
is
entitled
to
a
portion
in
usufruct
equal
to
that
corresponding
by
way
of
legitime
to
each
of
the
legitimate
children
who
has
not
received
any
betterment.
The
rights
of
the
usufructuary
are
provided
in
Articles
471
to
490
of
the
old
Civil
Code.[18]
In
Gamis
v.
Court
of
Appeals,[19]
we
held
that:
Under
articles
807
and
834
of
the
old
Civil
Code
the
surviving
spouse
is
a
forced
heir
and
entitled
to
a
share
in
usufruct
in
the
estate
of
the
deceased
spouse
equal
to
that
which
by
way
of
legitime
corresponds
or
belongs
to
each
of
the
legitimate
children
or
descendants
who
have
not
been
bettered
or
have
not
received
any
share
in
the
one-third
share
destined
for
betterment.
The
right
of
the
surviving
spouse
to
have
a
share
in
usufruct
in
the
estate
of
the
deceased
spouse
is
provided
by
law
of
which
such
spouse
cannot
be
deprived
and
which
cannot
be
ignored.
Of
course,
the
spouse
may
waive
it
but
the
waiver
must
be
express.
Section
1,
Rule
69
of
the
Rules
of
Court
provides
that
in
an
action
for
partition,
all
persons
interested
in
the
property
shall
be
joined
as
defendants.
Section
1.
Complaint
in
action
for
partition
of
real
estate.-
A
person
having
the
right
to
compel
the
partition
of
real
estate
may
do
so
as
in
this
rule
prescribed,
setting
forth
in
his
complaint
the
nature
and
extent
of
his
title
and
an
adequate
description
of
the
real
estate
of
which
partition
is
demanded
and
joining
as
defendants
all
the
other
persons
interested
in
the
property.
Thus,
all
the
co-heirs
and
persons
having
an
interest
in
the
property
are
indispensable
parties;
as
such,
an
action
for
partition
will
not
lie
without
the
joinder
of
the
said
parties.[20]
The
mere
fact
that
Pedro
Sepulveda,
Sr.
has
repudiated
the
co-ownership
between
him
and
the
respondent
does
not
deprive
the
trial
court
of
jurisdiction
to
take
cognizance
of
the
action
for
partition,
for,
in
a
complaint
for
partition,
the
plaintiff
seeks,
first,
a
declaration
that
he
is
a
co-
owner
of
the
subject
property;
and,
second,
the
conveyance
of
his
lawful
shares.[21]
As
the
Court
ruled
in
De
Mesa
v.
Court
of
Appeals:[22]
The
first
stage
of
an
action
for
judicial
partition
and/or
accounting
is
concerned
with
the
determination
of
whether
or
not
a
co-ownership
in
fact
exists
and
a
partition
is
proper,
that
is,
it
is
not
otherwise
legally
proscribed
and
may
be
made
by
voluntary
agreement
of
all
the
parties
interested
in
the
property.
This
phase
may
end
in
a
declaration
that
plaintiff
is
not
entitled
to
the
desired
partition
either
because
a
co-ownership
does
not
exist
or
a
partition
is
legally
prohibited.
It
may
also
end,
on
the
other
hand,
with
an
adjudgment
that
a
co-
ownership
does
in
truth
exist,
that
partition
is
proper
in
the
premises,
and
that
an
accounting
of
rents
and
profits
received
by
the
defendant
from
the
real
estate
in
question
is
in
order.
In
the
latter
case,
the
parties
may,
if
they
are
able
to
agree,
make
partition
among
themselves
by
proper
instruments
of
conveyance,
and
the
court
shall
confirm
the
partition
so
agreed
upon
by
all
the
parties.
In
either
case,
whether
the
action
is
dismissed
or
partition
and/or
accounting
is
decreed,
the
order
is
a
final
one
and
may
be
appealed
by
any
party
aggrieved
thereby.
The
second
stage
commences
when
the
parties
are
unable
to
agree
upon
the
partition
ordered
by
the
court.
In
that
event,
partition
shall
be
effected
for
the
parties
by
the
court
with
the
assistance
of
not
more
than
three
(3)
commissioners.
This
second
phase
may
also
deal
with
the
rendition
of
the
accounting
itself
and
its
approval
by
the
Court
after
the
parties
have
been
accorded
the
opportunity
to
be
heard
thereon,
and
an
award
for
the
recovery
by
the
party
or
parties
thereto
entitled
of
their
just
shares
in
the
rents
and
profits
of
the
real
estate
in
question.[23]
In
the
present
action,
the
private
respondent,
as
the
plaintiff
in
the
trial
court,
failed
to
implead
the
following
indispensable
parties:
his
father,
Rodolfo
Pelaez;
the
heirs
of
Santiago
Sepulveda,
namely,
Paz
Sepulveda
and
their
children;
and
the
City
of
Danao
which
purchased
the
property
covered
by
T.D.
19804
(T.D.
No.
35090)
from
Pedro
Sepulveda,
Sr.
and
maintained
that
it
had
failed
to
pay
for
the
purchase
price
of
the
property.
Rodolfo
Pelaez
is
an
indispensable
party
he
being
entitled
to
a
share
in
usufruct,
equal
to
the
share
of
the
respondent
in
the
subject
properties.
There
is
no
showing
that
Rodolfo
Pelaez
had
waived
his
right
to
usufruct.
Section
7,
Rule
3
of
the
Rules
of
Court
reads:
SEC.
7.
Compulsory
joinder
of
indispensable
parties.
Parties
in
interest
without
whom
no
final
determination
can
be
had
of
an
action
shall
be
joined
either
as
plaintiffs
or
defendants.
Indeed,
the
presence
of
all
indispensable
parties
is
a
condition
sine
qua
non
for
the
exercise
of
judicial
power.
It
is
precisely
when
an
indispensable
party
is
not
before
the
court
that
the
action
should
be
dismissed.
Thus,
the
plaintiff
is
mandated
to
implead
all
the
indispensable
parties,
considering
that
the
absence
of
one
such
party
renders
all
subsequent
actions
of
the
court
null
and
void
for
want
of
authority
to
act,
not
only
as
to
the
absent
parties
but
even
as
to
those
present.[24]
One
who
is
a
party
to
a
case
is
not
bound
by
any
decision
of
the
court,
otherwise,
he
will
be
deprived
of
his
right
to
due
process.
Without
the
presence
of
all
the
other
heirs
as
plaintiffs,
the
trial
court
could
not
validly
render
judgment
and
grant
relief
in
favor
of
the
private
respondent.
The
failure
of
the
private
respondent
to
implead
the
other
heirs
as
parties-plaintiffs
constituted
a
legal
obstacle
to
the
trial
court
and
the
appellate
courts
exercise
of
judicial
power
over
the
said
case,
and
rendered
any
orders
or
judgments
rendered
therein
a
nullity.[25]
To
reiterate,
the
absence
of
an
indispensable
party
renders
all
subsequent
actions
of
the
court
null
and
void
for
want
of
authority
to
act,
not
only
as
to
the
absent
parties
but
even
as
to
those
present.[26]
Hence,
the
trial
court
should
have
ordered
the
dismissal
of
the
complaint.[27]
IN
LIGHT
OF
ALL
THE
FOREGOING,
the
petition
is
GRANTED.
The
Decisions
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
CA-G.R.
CV
No.
43758
and
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
are
SET
ASIDE.
The
Regional
Trial
Court
is
ORDERED
to
dismiss
the
complaint
without
prejudice.
No
pronouncement
as
to
costs.
SO
ORDERED.
acted
without
jurisdiction
as
the
complaint
shows
nothing
when
the
verbal
demand
to
remove
the
houses
on
the
lot
of
the
petitioner
was
made
on
the
private
respondents.
(Decision
of
the
RTC,
p.
13,
Rollo).
Petitioner
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration
of
the
order
of
dismissal
on
April
21,
1988
which
was
denied
on
June
25,
1988.
Not
satisfied,
this
petition
was
filed
on
July
12,
1988.
On
March
15,
1989,
this
Court
in
a
minute
resolution
gave
due
course
to
the
petition.
Petitioner
claims
that
the
Regional
Trial
Court
erred
in
dismissing
Civil
Case
No.
616
for
lack
of
jurisdiction
of
the
Municipal
Trial
Court.
On
the
other
hand,
private
respondents
contended
that
the
petition
was
filed
out
of
time;
that
the
petition
was
filed
with
the
wrong
court;
that
the
Municipal
Trial
Court
has
no
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
of
the
action;
and
that
there
was
no
allegation
in
the
complaint
of
prior
physical
possession
of
the
land
by
the
petitioner.
The
petition
is
impressed
with
merit.
The
records
show
that
the
complaint
explicitly
alleged
that
"plaintiff
verbally
asked
the
defendants
to
remove
their
houses
on
the
lot
of
the
former
but
the
latter
refused
and
still
refuse
to
do
so
without
just
and
lawful
grounds."
(p.
44,
Rollo)
Such
is
sufficient
compliance
with
the
jurisdictional
requirements,
in
accordance
with
the
doctrine
laid
down
in
the
case
of
Hautea
v.
Magallon,
12
SCRA
514,
to
wit:
An
allegation
in
an
original
complaint
for
illegal
detainer
that
in
spite
of
demands
made
by
the
plaintiff
the
defendants
had
refused
to
restore
the
land,
is
considered
sufficient
compliance
with
the
jurisdictional
requirement
of
previous
demand.
As
to
whether
or
not
the
demand
was
brought
within
the
one
year
period,
this
We
have
to
say.
As
a
general
rule,
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
of
a
case
may
be
objected
to
at
any
stage
of
the
proceeding
even
on
appeal,
but
this
is
not
without
exception.
In
the
case
of
Tijam
v.
Sibonghanoy,
23
SCRA
30,
cited
in
Tejones
v.
Cironella,
159
SCRA
104,
We
held:
It
is
not
right
for
a
party
who
has
affirmed
and
invoked
the
jurisdiction
of
a
court
in
a
particular
matter
to
secure
an
affirmative
relief
to
afterwards
deny
that
same
jurisdiction
to
escape
penalty.
Upon
this
same
principle
is
what
we
said
.
.
.
to
the
effect
that
we
frown
upon
the
undesirable
practice
of
a
party
submitting
his
case
for
decision
and
then
accepting
the
judgment
only
if
favorable
and
attacking
it
for
lack
of
jurisdiction.
Nowhere
in
the
Answer
of
respondents
contain
an
allegation
attacking
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Municipal
Trial
Court
based
on
the
issue
on
demand.
Again,
in
PNB
v.
Intermediate
Appellate
Court,
143
SCRA
305,
We
held:
While
petitioners
could
have
prevented
the
trial
court
from
exercising
jurisdiction
over
the
case
by
seasonably
taking
exception
thereto,
they
instead
invoke
the
very
same
jurisdiction
by
filing
an
answer
and
seeking
affirmative
relief
from
it.
What
is
more,
they
participated
in
the
trial
of
the
case
by
cross-
examining
respondent
Planas.
Upon
that
premise,
petitioners
cannot
now
be
allowed
belatedly
to
adopt
an
inconsistent
posture
by
attacking
the
jurisdiction
of
the
court
to
which
they
had
submitted
themselves
voluntarily.
(p.
48,
Rollo)
Another
reason
for
the
lower
court's
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
as
alleged
by
the
respondents
in
their
answer
to
the
complaint
filed
with
the
Municipal
Trial
Court,
was
that
said
court
has
no
jurisdiction
to
try
the
case
as
they
are
tenants-farmers
and
that
as
such
they
cannot
be
ejected
from
their
farmholdings
without
a
certification
by
the
Secretary
of
Agrarian
Reform
that
the
case
is
proper
for
hearing.
On
the
other
hand,
petitioners
argue
that
when
the
Municipal
Trial
Court
required
them
to
submit
their
respective
position
papers,
respondent
did
not
raise
this
particular
issue
anymore
but
instead
centered
on
the
issue
of
actual
possession
and
the
elements
of
forcible
entry
and
illegal
detainer.
Petitioners,
in
their
position
paper,
attached
the
report
of
Mr.
Maines
of
the
Agrarian
Office
which
categorically
states
that
there
is
no
evidence
whatsoever
to
show
that
the
subject
land
is
devoted
to
the
production
of
rice
and
corn;
that
the
occupants
are
not
sharing
with
the
present
landowner,
hence,
they
are
classified
as
illegal
occupants;
that
the
subject
land
is
not
tenanted,
not
devoted
to
the
production
of
palay
and/or
corn,
hence,
not
covered
by
P.D.
No-27
or
the
Operation
Land
Transfer
of
the
government
(p.
47,
Rollo).
Considering
the
report
of
said
office,
the
assumption
of
jurisdiction
by
the
Municipal
Trial
Court
of
San
Mateo,
Rizal
was
proper.
Respondents
contend
that
the
petition
was
filed
out
of
time.
They
allege
that
when
petitioner
received
the
decision
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
on
April
20,
1988
and
the
appeal
to
this
Court
was
filed
only
on
July
12,
1988
or
only
after
a
3
month
period,
such
appeal
was
definitely
outside
the
15
day
reglementary
period
within
which
to
appeal.
Respondents
added
that
the
motion
for
reconsideration
filed
with
said
Regional
Trial
Court
did
not
stop
the
running
of
the
period
within
which
to
validly
file
his
appeal.
The
instant
case,
being
an
ejectment
case
was
prosecuted
under
the
Rule
on
Summary
Procedure
where
it
expressly
prohibits
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration.
(Memorandum
for
private
respondents,
p.
49,
Rollo).
Respondents
are
in
error.
The
Rule
on
Summary
Procedure
applies
only
in
cases
filed
before
the
Metropolitan
Trial
Court
and
Municipal
Trial
Courts,
pursuant
to
Section
36
of
Batas
Pambansa
Blg.
129.
Summary
procedures
have
no
application
to
cases
before
the
Regional
Trial
Courts.
Hence,
when
the
respondents
appealed
the
decision
of
the
Municipal
Trial
Court
to
the
Regional
Trial
Court,
the
applicable
rules
are
those
of
the
latter
court.
Respondents
likewise
contend
that
the
petition
was
filed
with
the
wrong
court.
Again,
they
are
mistaken.
In
the
case
of
Lacsamana
v.
Second
Special
Cases
Division
of
the
Intermediate
Appellate
Court,
143
SCRA
643,
We
held
that
the
final
judgment
or
order
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
in
an
appeal
from
the
final
judgment
or
order
of
the
Metropolitan
Trial
Court,
Municipal
Trial
Court
and
Municipal
Circuit
Trial
Court,
may
be
appealed
to
the
Court
of
Appeals
through
a
petition
for
review
in
accordance
with
Section
22
of
the
Interim
Rules,
or
to
the
Supreme
Court
through
a
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
in
accordance
with
Rule
45
of
the
Rules
of
Court
and
Section
25
of
the
Interim
Rules.
Clearly,
the
petitioners
filed
this
appeal
with
a
proper
court.
PREMISES
CONSIDERED,
the
petition
is
hereby
GRANTED.
The
decision
dated
April
8,
1988
and
the
order
dated
June
25,
1988
both
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court,
Branch
76,
San
Mateo,
Rizal,
in
Civil
Case
No.
415,
are
hereby
SET
ASIDE.
The
decision
of
the
Municipal
Trial
Court
of
San
Mateo,
Rizal,
dated
December
22,
1987
in
Civil
Case
No.
616
is
hereby
REINSTATED.
SO
ORDERED.
of
serving
said
notices
on
the
tenant
by
registered
mail
with
return
card
so
that
the
registry
receipt
and
the
receipt
thereof
by
the
addressee
through
the
return
card
could
be
presented
in
evidence
to
prove
the
fact
of
delivery,
in
the
event
of
a
litigation.
We
agree
and
in
our
opinion
the
facts
in
the
instant
case
indicate
personal
service
on
the
lessee.
In
arriving
at
this
conclusion,
we
have
been
greatly
aided
by
respondent's
citation
of
American
cases
which,
by
and
large,
represents
a
practical,
if
not
realistic,
approach
to
the
problem.
In
the
cases
of
Nunlist
vs.
Motter,
2
and
Gehring
vs.
Swoll
3
the
Court
held
that
where
the
notice
to
leave
the
premises
is
transmitted
by
registered
mail
with
a
return
card
and
thereafter
the
receipt
bearing
the
signature
of
the
defendant
was
returned,
a
prima
facie
case
is
established
of
the
fact
of
delivery
of
said
notice
to
the
defendant
personally
by
the
Postal
Office
Department
although
he
refused
to
accept
the
same.
4
Indeed,
notice
by
registered
mail
is
considered
an
effective
service
on
the
person
concerned.
It
cannot
be
avoided
by
the
mere
expediency
of
declining
to
accept
delivery
after
notification
thereof.
The
service
is
deemed
complete
regardless
of
such
refusal
to
accept
if
the
addressee
fails
to
claim
his
mail
from
the
postal
office
after
the
lapse
of
five
(5)
days
from
the
date
of
the
first
notice
of
the
postmaster.
5
In
conclusion,
we
stress
that
the
notice
to
vacate
the
leased
premises,
required
by
the
Rules
to
be
served
on
the
tenant
before
a
forcible
entry
or
unlawful
detainer
action
can
be
commenced
against
him,
may
be
served
by
registered
mail.
This
is
a
substantial
compliance
with
the
modes
of
service
enumerated
under
Section
2,
Rule
70
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court.
At
this
juncture
it
bears
repeating
that
actions
for
forcible
entry
and
unlawful
detainer
are
summary
in
nature
because
they
involve
a
disturbance
of
social
order
which
must
be
abated
as
promptly
as
possible
without
any
undue
reliance
on
technical
and
procedural
rules
which
only
cause
delays.
In
the
ultimate
analysis,
it
matters
not
how
the
notice
to
vacate
was
conveyed,
so
long
as
the
lessee
or
his
agent
has
personally
received
the
written
demand,
whether
handed
to
him
by
the
lessor,
his
attorney,
a
messenger
or
even
a
postman.
The
undisputed
facts
in
the
instant
case
show
that
the
Manila
Times
Publishing
Company,
through
its
manager,
had
informed
petitioner
that
Plaza
Arcade
Inc.
was
the
new
owner
of
the
subject
building;
that
on
October
18,
1979,
a
demand
letter
was
sent
to
petitioner
advising
him
to
leave
the
premises
but
petitioner
refused
to
receive
the
letter;
that
a
second
demand
on
January
12,
1981
elicited
the
same
reaction;
that
a
final
demand
dated
November
16,
1981
was
sent
to
petitioner
by
registered
mail
which
he
again
refused.
And
even
on
the
supposition
that
there
was
no
personal
service
as
claimed
by
petitioner,
this
could
only
be
due
to
petitioner's
blatant
attempts
at
evasion
which
compelled
the
new
landlord
to
resort
to
registered
mail.
The
Court
cannot
countenance
an
unfair
situation
where
the
plaintiff
in
an
eviction
case
suffers
further
injustice
by
the
unwarranted
delay
resulting
from
the
obstinate
refusal
of
the
defendant
to
acknowledge
the
existence
of
a
valid
demand.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
denied
for
lack
of
merit
and
the
assailed
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
reversing
the
dismissal
order
of
the
trial
court
is
affirmed.
Civil
Case
No.
071279-CV
is
hereby
ordered
reinstated
in
the
Metropolitan
Trial
Court
of
Manila,
Branch
7.
This
decision
is
immediately
executory.
Costs
against
petitioner.
So
ordered.
VICKY
C.
MABANTO,
Adm.
Matter
No.
MTJ-04-1533
Petitioner,
-
versus
-
PUNO,
C.J.,
Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
X
DECISION
AZCUNA,
J.:
This
is
an
administrative
complaint
filed
by
Vicky
Mabanto
against
Judge
Mamerto
Y.
Coliflores
of
the
Municipal
Trial
Court
in
Cities
(MTCC),
Branch
1,
Cebu
City,
charging
him
with
Serious
Misconduct,
Inefficiency,
Gross
Ignorance
of
the
Law
and
Violation
of
Section
3(e)
of
the
Anti-Graft
and
Corrupt
Practices
Act
(R.A.
No.
3019)
in
connection
with
her
supersedeas
bond
in
Civil
Case
No.
R-
35618.
The
antecedents
are
as
follows:[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif]
Complainant
was
the
defendant
in
Civil
Case
No.
R-35618
for
ejectment.
Judgment
was
rendered
against
her
and
she
appealed
the
decision
to
the
Regional
Trial
Court
(RTC)
of
Cebu
City.
She
posted
a
supersedeas
bond
in
the
amount
of
P45,000
to
stay
the
execution
of
the
judgment.
On
February
17,
1997,
the
RTC
resolved
the
appeal
and
remanded
the
case
to
the
MTCC
for
re-trial.
Complainants
counsel
filed
a
motion
to
withdraw
the
supersedeas
bond.
On
May
19,
1997,
complainant
learned
from
the
Clerk
of
Court
of
MTCC,
Cebu
City
that
respondent,
in
an
Order
dated
September
23,
1996,
granted
plaintiffs
ex-parte
motion
to
withdraw
rental
deposit
under
the
bond
and
release
the
same
to
plaintiff,
hence,
the
latter
withdrew
it
on
said
date.
Complainant
claimed
that
respondent
concealed
from
her
and
her
counsel
plaintiffs
motion
to
release
the
deposit
under
the
supersedeas
bond
as
they
were
not
notified
of
the
motion
or
the
approval
of
the
same.
Respondent,
in
his
Comment,[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif]
denied
having
concealed
from
complainant
and
her
counsel
his
Order
dated
September
23,
2006.
Respondent
stated
that
complainants
counsel,
Atty.
Cynthia
M.
Matural,
was
furnished
a
copy
of
the
Order.
He
likewise
explained
that
he
directed
the
release
of
the
bond
upon
plaintiffs
ex-parte
motion
because
the
bond
would
be
applied
to
the
back
rentals
owing
to
the
latter.
He
added
that
from
the
amount
of
P45,000
withdrawn,
P15,000
was
returned
to
the
court
by
plaintiffs
on
September
25,
1996,
which
amount
remained
as
complainants
supersedeas
bond.
Complainant
replied
that
she
and
her
counsel
never
received
a
copy
of
the
aforestated
motion
and
order.
Her
counsel
filed
several
motions
for
the
release
of
the
supersedeas
bond
expecting
that
the
same
was
still
intact.
Complainant
likewise
insisted
that
respondent
had
no
basis
for
issuing
the
assailed
order
because
the
purpose
of
the
supersedeas
bond
is
to
guarantee
the
performance
of
the
judgment
appealed
from
if
affirmed
by
the
appellate
court,
and
this
did
not
happen
in
this
case
because
the
RTC
remanded
the
case
for
re-
trial.
On
January
10,
2005,
the
case
was
referred
to
the
Office
of
the
Court
Administrator
(OCA).
In
a
Memorandum
dated
July
12,
2005,
the
OCA
recommended
that
respondent
be
fined
in
the
amount
of
P2,000
to
be
deducted
from
his
retirement
benefits.
The
OCA
considered
the
fact
that
no
malice
attended
respondents
action,
and
that
the
offense
took
place
prior
to
the
amendment
of
Rule
140
of
the
Rules
of
Court
by
A.M.
No.
01-8-10-SC
which
imposes
a
heavier
penalty
for
gross
ignorance
of
the
law.
The
Court
finds
the
recommendation
of
the
OCA
to
be
well
taken.
A
supersedeas
bond
in
ejectment
cases
is
conditioned
upon
the
performance
of
the
judgment
or
order
appealed
from
in
case
it
be
affirmed
wholly
or
in
part
by
the
appellate
court.
It
should
therefore
subsist
as
security
for
the
liability
of
the
defendant
to
the
plaintiff.[if
!supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Section
19(2)
(3),
Rule
70
of
the
Rules
of
Court
requires
that
all
moneys
deposited
by
the
defendant
to
stay
execution
of
the
judgment
shall
be
held
until
the
final
disposition
of
the
appeal,
and
shall
be
disposed
of
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
judgment.
It
likewise
provides
that
the
plaintiff
will
be
allowed
to
withdraw
the
money
when
the
defendant
agrees
or
fails
to
oppose
plaintiffs
petition.
The
purpose
of
this
is
to
avoid
damage
that
the
defendant
may
suffer
if
plaintiff
should
be
allowed
to
withdraw
the
money
deposited
when
the
plaintiffs
right
to
collect
the
money
is
in
issue.[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif]
Here,
complainant
failed
to
oppose
the
motion
because
of
the
lower
courts
failure
to
inform
her.
Indeed,
Mr.
Jose
Legaspi,
Clerk
of
Court
of
MTCC,
Branch
1,
Cebu
City,
stated
that
complainant
was
not
notified
about
the
motion
to
release
the
supersedeas
bond
and
the
Order
allowing
the
release
of
the
bond.
The
court
interpreter,
Ms.
Rebecca
L.
Alesna,
also
confirmed
that
she
prepared
the
notice
for
complainant
upon
the
instruction
of
respondent
but
due
to
inadvertence,
she
was
not
able
to
send
the
same
to
the
parties.[if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Section
4,
Rule
13
of
the
Rules
of
Court
requires
that
adverse
parties
be
served
copies
of
pleadings
and
processes.
A
motion
without
a
notice
of
hearing
addressed
to
the
parties
is
a
mere
scrap
of
paper.[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif]
In
Cui
v.
Madayag,[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif]
this
Court
held
that
motions
that
do
not
contain
proof
of
service
of
notice
to
the
other
party
are
not
entitled
to
judicial
cognizance.
Without
any
proof
of
service
having
been
made
upon
complainant,
respondent
erred
in
granting
the
motion
to
withdraw
the
deposit
under
the
bond,
and
is,
thus,
guilty
of
gross
ignorance
of
the
law.
Gross
ignorance
of
the
law
is
a
serious
charge
which
is
penalized
with
either
dismissal
from
service,
suspension
for
three
(3)
months
without
salary
and
benefits
or
a
fine
of
not
less
than
P20,000
but
not
more
than
P40,000.
The
administrative
offense,
however,
took
place
prior
to
the
amendment
of
Rule
140
of
the
Rules
of
Court
by
A.M.
No.
01-8-10-SC
on
September
11,
2001.
In
Dayawon
v.
Judge
Maximino
A.
Badilla,[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Padua
v.
Judge
Eufemio
R.
Molina,[if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif]
Dizon
v.
Judge
Demetrio
D.
Calimag,[if
!supportFootnotes][10][endif]
and
Prosecutor
Contreras
v.
Judge
Eddie
P.
Monserate,[if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif]
citing
gross
ignorance
of
the
law
but
taking
into
account
that
no
nefarious
motive
on
the
part
of
respondents
had
been
shown,
this
Court
imposed
a
fine
of
P2,000
with
a
warning.
Thus,
consistent
with
the
sanctions
imposed
in
the
aforementioned
cases,
this
Court
agrees
with
the
recommendation
of
the
OCA.
WHEREFORE,
respondent
Judge
Mamerto
Y.
Coliflores
is
found
GUILTY
OF
GROSS
IGNORANCE
OF
THE
LAW
for
which
he
is
FINED
P2,000
to
be
deducted
from
his
retirement
benefits.
SO
ORDERED.
Capunong,
Bellie
Morales
and
Carlos
Munion
had
also
violated
the
aforementioned
order
upon
the
prodding
and
inducement
of
Lisayan
and
Lebeste.
Respondent
claimed
that
these
surrounding
events
were
enough
reasons
for
affiants
to
be
brought
to
court
and
to
show
cause
why
they
should
not
be
held
for
contempt.
He
contended
that
since
Civil
Case
185-H
is
covered
by
the
Rules
on
Summary
Procedure,
the
summary
issuance
of
the
warrants
by
virtue
of
the
affidavit
filed
by
the
Lacasa
Barangay
Council
and
the
aforementioned
circumstances
was
justified
and
not
unjust,
arbitrary,
or
despotic.
Respondent
further
claimed
that
summary
hearings
were
held
in
his
chambers,
and
after
the
parties
had
given
their
explanations
on
why
they
should
not
be
held
in
contempt,
he
concluded
that
only
Lisayan
and
Lebeste
had
indeed
defied
the
writ
of
preliminary
mandatory
injunction
and
not
the
9
other
affiants.
Respondent
subsequently
lifted
the
orders
of
arrest
against
these
9
individuals,
while
Lisayan
and
Lebeste
were
committed
at
the
municipal
jail
for
3
days
as
a
punitive
lesson
for
their
defiance.
Respondent
also
alleged
that
the
imputation
made
by
complainant
that
affiants
were
all
detained
as
of
September
9,
1997
is
absolutely
bereft
of
truth.
In
fact,
the
9
individuals
were
not
even
arrested
despite
the
orders
of
arrest
as
seen
in
the
indorsement
warrant
of
arrest
issued
by
the
warrant
officer
of
the
Office
of
the
Chief
of
Police
of
Hinatuan-PNP
and
duly
confirmed
by
a
certification
from
the
officer-in-charge
of
the
same
office.
Lastly,
respondent
disputed
complainants
allegation
that
he
is
no
longer
physically
and
mentally
fit
to
maintain
his
position,
claiming
that
he
has
been
regularly
attending
to
his
official
duties
in
his
station
in
Hinatuan
every
Wednesday
an
Thursday,
in
his
sub-station
at
Tagbina
which
is
27
kilometers
from
Hinatuan,
every
Friday,
and
as
judge-designate
of
the
8th
MCTC
of
Bislig-
Lingap
at
Bislig
which
is
approximately
55
kilometers
from
Hinatuan,
every
Monday
and
Tuesday.
Respondent
claimed
that
he
shuttles
through
the
poor
third-class
gravel
road
which
is
tattered
with
potholes
riding
in
passenger
jeeps,
or
at
times,
even
only
on
two-wheel
motorcycles.
Respondent
argued
that
this
weekly
travel
through
long
distances
cannot
be
made
by
one
who
is
said
to
be
almost
completely
paralyzed.
Both
complainant
and
respondent
were
required
by
the
Court
on
February
21,
2000
to
manifest
whether
they
were
willing
to
submit
the
case
for
resolution
on
the
basis
of
the
pleadings
filed,
but
no
response
was
made
by
them
despite
proper
service
of
notice.
Further
arguments
were,
therefore,
deemed
waived.
In
the
report
and
recommendation
dated
January
19,
2000
submitted
by
then
Court
Administrator
Alfredo
L.
Benipayo,
it
was
pertinently
observed
that
respondent
is
liable
for
issuing
unjust
orders
of
arrest
and
of
gross
ignorance
of
the
law.
We
agree.
Respondent
is
liable
for
issuing
unjust
orders
of
arrest
in
that
he
failed
to
observe
the
proper
procedure
laid
down
in
the
Rules
of
Civil
procedure,
specifically
the
provisions
on
contempt.
It
must
be
noted
that
affiants
were
charged
with
direct
contempt
for
having
violated
the
writ
of
preliminary
mandatory
injunction
issued
by
respondent.
This
is
contrary
to
Section
1,
rule
71
of
the
Rules
of
Court
which
defines
direct
contempt
as,
misbehavior
in
the
presence
of
or
so
near
a
court
as
to
obstruct
or
interrupt
the
proceedings
before
the
same
x
x
x.
Clearly,
the
supposed
contemptuous
acts
of
affiants
fall
under
the
definition
of
indirect
contempt
as
explained
in
the
case
of
Industrial
&
Transport
Equipment,
Inc.
vs.
National
Labor
Relations
Commission
(284
SCRA
144
[1998]),
that:
There
is
no
question
that
disobedience
to
a
lawful
writ,
process,
order,
judgment
or
command
of
a
court
or
injunction
granted
by
a
court
or
judge
constitutes
indirect
contempt
punishable
under
Rule
71
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
Moreover,
respondent
almost
simultaneously
issued
the
orders
of
arrest
after
the
members
of
the
Barangay
Kagawad
filed
their
joint
affidavit
and
gave
their
oral
report
that
the
persons
later
disobeyed
the
writ
of
preliminary
mandatory
injunction.
This
is
in
direct
violation
of
Section
3,
Rule
71
of
the
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
which
provides:
After
a
charge
in
writing
has
been
filed
and
an
opportunity
given
to
the
respondent
to
comment
thereon
within
such
period
as
may
be
fixed
by
the
court
and
to
be
heard
by
himself
or
counsel,
a
person
guilty
of
any
of
the
following
acts
may
be
punished
for
indirect
contempt....
The
records
of
the
case
makes
no
mention
of
the
fact
that
prior
to
the
issuance
of
the
orders
of
arrest,
affiants
were
given
the
opportunity
to
comment
on
the
charge.
Respondent
tried
to
justify
his
actions
by
claiming
that
affiants
were
not
deprived
of
due
process
since
a
summary
hearing
was
conducted
in
his
chambers
wherein
the
individuals
were
given
the
chance
to
be
heard
on
their
positions
and
justifications
on
why
they
should
not
be
held
in
contempt.
What
respondent
fails
to
realize
is
that
for
indirect
contempt
charges,
a
different
procedure
is
laid
down
by
the
law.
According
to
Section
4,
Rule
71:
If
the
contempt
charges
arose
out
of
or
are
related
to
a
principal
action
pending
in
the
court,
the
petition
for
contempt
shall
be
docketed,
heard
and
decided
separately,
unless
the
court
in
its
discretion
orders
the
consolidation
of
the
contempt
charge
and
the
principal
action
for
joint
hearing
an
decision.
In
the
instant
case,
no
docketing
was
done
by
respondent
nor
was
a
formal
hearing
conducted
as
required.
Veritably,
assuming
for
the
sake
of
argument
that
a
proper
charge
in
writing
accusing
the
affiants
with
committing
acts
constituting
indirect
contempt
was
filed,
this
fact
will
not
cure
the
proceedings
of
the
taint
of
irregularity
because
the
record
show
that
no
previous
hearing
was
afforded
to
petitioner.
To
restate
what
was
pointed
out
earlier,
in
cases
of
indirect
contempt,
the
contemnor
may
be
punished
only
after
a
charge
in
writing
is
filed
and
an
opportunity
given
to
the
accused
to
be
heard
by
himself
or
counsel,
and
without
a
hearing
,
an
order
citing
a
person
in
contempt
violates
the
persons
right
to
due
process
(Salome
D.
Caas
vs.
Lerio
C.
Castigador,
G.R.
No.
139844,
December
15,
2000).
Respondents
actions
also
visibly
indicate
his
lack
of
sufficient
grasp
of
the
law.
No
less
than
the
Code
of
Judicial
Conduct
mandates
that
a
judge
shall
be
faithful
to
the
laws
and
maintain
professional
competence
(Canon
3,
Rule
3.01,
Code
of
Judicial
Conduct).
Indeed,
competence
is
a
mark
of
a
good
judge.
When
a
judge
displays
an
utter
lack
of
familiarity
with
the
rules,
he
erodes
the
publics
confidence
in
the
competence
of
our
courts.
Such
is
gross
ignorance
of
the
law.
Having
accepted
the
exalted
position
of
a
judge,
he
owes
the
public
and
the
court
the
duty
to
be
proficient
in
the
law.
Unfamiliarity
with
the
Rules
of
Court
is
a
sign
of
incompetence.
Basic
rules
must
be
at
the
palm
of
his
hands.
A
judge
must
be
acquainted
with
legal
norms
an
precepts
as
well
as
with
procedural
rules
(Jovenal
Oporto,
Jr.
vs.
Judge
Eddie
P.
Monserate,
A.M.
No.
MTJ-96-1109,
April
16,
2001).
Thus,
this
court
has
consistently
held
that:
A
judge
is
presumed
to
know
the
law
an
when
the
law
is
so
elementary,
not
to
be
aware
of
it
constitutes
gross
ignorance
of
the
law
(Agunday
vs.
Tresvalles,
319
SCRA
134
[1999]).
Verily,
failure
to
follow
basic
legal
commands
embodied
in
the
law
and
the
Rules
constitutes
gross
ignorance
of
the
law,
from
which
no
one
is
excused,
and
surely
not
a
judge
(De
Austria
vs.
Beltran,
313
SCRA
443
[1999]).
However,
with
regard
to
the
question
of
whether
respondent
caused
the
detention
of
the
11
affiants
as
claimed
by
complainant,
the
Court
finds
for
respondent
who
has
indubitably
shown
that
9
of
11
individuals
were
not
even
arrested.
Indeed,
it
can
be
plainly
seen
through
the
indorsement
on
the
warrant
issued
by
the
office
of
the
chief
of
police
of
Hinatuan-PNP
on
September
8,
1997
that
the
9
individuals
were
not
arrested.
This
fact
is
further
bolstered
by
the
certification
given
by
the
officer-in-charge
of
the
Hinatuan-PNP
on
February
25,
1998
to
the
effect
that
the
9
individuals
were
never
arrested
or
detained.
As
regards
respondents
physical
condition,
inasmuch
as
both
complainant
and
respondent
failed
to
present
medical
evidence
to
support
their
respective
claims,
this
Court
finds
it
unnecessary
to
discuss
the
same.
Lastly,
it
is
worthy
to
note
that
aside
from
the
instant
complaint,
respondent
has
six
other
administrative
complaints
currently
pending
before
the
Office
of
the
Court
Administrator.
WHEREFORE,
Judge
Antonio
K.
Caon
is
hereby
found
guilty
of
issuing
unjust
orders
and
of
gross
of
ignorance
of
the
law.
He
is
ordered
to
pay
a
fine
in
the
amount
of
Ten
Thousand
Pesos
(P10,000.00)
with
a
stern
warning
that
a
repetition
of
the
same
or
similar
act
would
be
dealt
with
more
severely.
SO
ORDERED.
[G.R.
No.
142649.
September
13,
2001]
ANTONIO
C.
SAN
LUIS,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
HON.
NELSON
BAYOT,
as
Presiding
Judge,
RTC,
Pasay
City,
Branch
118,
and
T.N.
LAL
&
CO.,
LTD.,
respondents.
D
E
C
I
S
I
O
N
DAVIDE,
JR.,
C.J.:
Challenged
in
the
petition
for
review
in
this
case
is
the
Resolution[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif]
of
24
January
2000
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
CA
G.R.
SP
No.
56549,
which
dismissed
petitioners
special
civil
action
for
certiorari
for
having
been
filed
out
of
time,
as
well
as
its
Resolution
of
13
March
2000,
denying
the
motion
for
reconsideration
of
the
former.
The
record
discloses
that
private
respondent
T.N.
Lal
&
Co.,
Ltd.
filed
a
petition
for
indirect
contempt
against
herein
petitioner,
Antonio
C.
San
Luis,
Administrator
of
the
Light
Rail
Transit
Authority
(LRTA),
before
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Pasay
City.
The
petition
was
docketed
as
Civil
Case
No.
99-0480
and
raffled
to
Branch
118
of
said
court.
The
action
arose
from
the
alleged
failure
or
refusal
of
petitioner
to
comply
with
the
order
of
7
April
1999
of
Hon.
Ernesto
A.
Reyes,
presiding
judge
of
Branch
111
of
said
court
in
Civil
Case
No.
97-0423.
The
order
directed
the
LRTA
to
immediately
restore
the
power
supply
of
private
respondents
sound
system
in
all
places,
sites
and
locations
in
its
area
of
responsibility
within
24
hours
from
receipt
of
the
same.[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif]
Petitioner
filed
a
motion
to
dismiss
the
petition
for
indirect
contempt
on
the
ground
that
it
states
no
cause
of
action
and
private
respondent,
as
petitioner
therein,
was
guilty
of
forum-shopping.[if
!supportFootnotes][3][endif]
On
15
July
1999,
public
respondent
Hon.
Nelson
Bayot,
presiding
judge
of
Branch
118,
issued
an
order,
a
copy
of
which
was
received
by
petitioner
on
9
August
1999,
directing
that
the
petition
for
indirect
contempt,
Civil
Case
No.
99-
0480,
be
transferred
to
Branch
111
for
disposition
and
appropriate
action,
since
it
was
that
branch
which
issued
the
order
of
7
April
1999
and
against
which
the
contemptuous
act
was
committed;
hence,
Branch
111
was
in
a
better
position
to
determine
whether
or
not
the
order
of
7
April
1999
had
been
violated.[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif]
On
18
August
1999,
petitioner
moved
to
reconsider
the
15
July
1999
order
of
Judge
Bayot.
The
latter
issued
an
order
on
22
October
1999,
stating
that
the
records
of
the
case
had
already
been
transferred
to
Branch
111
and
that
he
believed
the
assailed
order
was
correct
and
proper.
Accordingly,
he
would
not
act
anymore
on
the
motion
for
reconsideration.[if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif]
A
copy
of
said
order
was
received
by
petitioner
on
8
November
1999.
On
7
January
2000,
petitioner
filed
with
the
Court
of
Appeals
a
petition
for
certiorari
and
mandamus
under
Rule
65
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
In
the
petition,
which
was
docketed
as
CA-G.R.
SP
No.
56549,
petitioner
sought
to
annul
Judge
Bayots
orders
of
15
July
1999
and
22
October
1999
on
the
ground
that
the
latter
acted
without
or
in
excess
of
jurisdiction
and/or
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion
when
he
did
not
act
on
petitioners
motion
to
dismiss
and
motion
for
reconsideration
and,
instead,
transferred
the
case
to
Branch
111
of
the
court
below.[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif]
In
its
Resolution
of
24
January
2000,
the
Court
of
Appeals
dismissed
the
petition
for
having
been
filed
out
of
time.[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Forthwith,
petitioner
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration
as
well
as
a
Motion
to
Admit
Petition
for
Certiorari
and
Mandamus
and
to
Relax
Strict
Rules
on
Procedure,
both
of
which
the
Court
of
Appeals
denied
in
its
Resolution
of
13
March
2000.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Petitioner
is
now
before
us,
asking
for
a
liberal
application
of
the
procedural
rules.
He
raises
the
following
issues
for
resolution:
1.
WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
GRAVELY
ABUSED
ITS
DISCRETION
IN
DENYING
PETITIONERS
PETITION
FOR
CERTIORARI
AND
MANDAMUS
AND
CONSEQUENTLY
DISMISSED
THE
SAME
FOR
ITS
FAILURE
TO
FILE
THE
SAID
PETITION
ON
TIME,
OVERLOOKING
THE
FACT
THAT
THE
FAILURE
TO
FILE
THE
SAME
WAS
DUE
TO
AN
HONEST
MISTAKE
AND
HUMAN
ERROR
IN
COMPUTING
THE
PERIOD
FOR
FILING
THE
INSTANT
PETITION
BY
HANDLING
COUNSEL.
2.
WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
INSTANT
CASE
IS
WARRANTED
SO
THAT
PETITIONERS
PETITION
FOR
CERTIORARI
AND
MANDAMUS
WITH
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
COULD
BE
REINSTATED
AND
PROCEED
IN
DUE
COURSE
IN
ORDER
NOT
TO
DEPRIVE
PETITIONER
OF
ITS
[SIC]
RIGHT
TO
PROSECUTE
HIS
CASE
BEFORE
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
SO
THAT
IT
CAN
BE
DECIDED
ON
THE
MERITS
AND
NOT
ON
ITS
TECHNICALITY
ASPECT.[if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif]
petition
shall
be
granted
except
for
the
most
compelling
reason
and
in
no
case
exceeding
fifteen
(15)
days.
The
Court
of
Appeals
reckoned
the
counting
of
the
60-day
period
from
petitioners
receipt
on
9
August
1999
of
a
copy
of
the
assailed
15
July
1999
order,
considered
the
interruption
of
the
running
of
the
period
by
the
filing
on
18
August
1999
of
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration,
and
held
that
the
remaining
period
resumed
to
run
on
8
November
1999,
the
date
petitioner
received
the
22
October
1999
order.
Accordingly,
petitioner
should
have
filed
the
petition
on
or
before
29
December
1999.
He
filed
the
petition
only
on
7
January
2000,
or
nine
days
after
the
expiration
of
the
period.
It
must
be
pointed
out,
however,
that
Section
4,
Rule
65
of
the
1997
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
was
subsequently
amended
in
the
Courts
Resolution
in
A.M.
No.
00-2-03-SC,
which
took
effect
on
1
September
2000.
As
amended,
said
section
reads
as
follows:
Sec.
4.
When
and
where
petition
filed.
--
The
petition
shall
be
filed
not
later
than
sixty
(60)
days
from
notice
of
the
judgment,
order
or
resolution.
In
case
a
motion
for
reconsideration
or
new
trial
is
timely
filed,
whether
such
motion
is
required
or
not,
the
sixty
(60)
day
period
shall
be
counted
from
notice
of
the
denial
of
said
motion.
The
petition
shall
be
filed
in
the
Supreme
Court
or,
if
it
relates
to
the
acts
or
omissions
of
a
lower
court
or
of
a
corporation,
board,
officer
or
person,
in
the
Regional
Trial
Court
exercising
jurisdiction
over
the
territorial
area
as
defined
by
the
Supreme
Court.
It
may
also
be
filed
in
the
Court
of
Appeals
whether
or
not
the
same
is
in
aid
of
its
appellate
jurisdiction
or
in
the
Sandiganbayan
if
it
is
in
aid
of
its
appellate
jurisdiction.
If
it
involves
the
acts
or
omissions
of
a
quasi-
judicial
agency,
unless
otherwise
provided
by
law
or
these
rules,
the
petition
shall
be
filed
in
and
cognizable
only
by
the
Court
of
Appeals.
No
extension
of
time
to
file
the
petition
shall
be
granted
except
for
compelling
reason
and
in
no
case
exceeding
fifteen
(15)
days.
Under
this
amendment,
the
60-day
period
within
which
to
file
the
petition
starts
to
run
from
receipt
of
notice
of
the
denial
of
the
motion
for
reconsideration,
if
one
is
filed.
In
our
decision
in
Systems
Factors
Corporation
and
Modesto
Dean
vs.
NLRC,
et
al.,[if
!supportFootnotes][10][endif]
reiterated
in
Unity
Fishing
Development
Corp.
and/or
Antonio
Dee
vs.
Court
of
Appeals,
et
al.,[if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif]
the
new
period
was
made
applicable
to
pending
cases,
such
as
in
the
case
at
bar.
Settled
is
the
rule
that
remedial
statutes
or
statutes
relating
to
remedies
or
modes
of
procedure,
which
do
not
create
new
rights
or
take
away
vested
rights
but
only
operate
in
furtherance
of
the
remedy
or
confirmation
of
rights
already
existing,
do
not
come
within
the
purview
of
the
general
rule
against
the
retroactive
operation
of
statutes.
Procedural
laws
are
construed
to
be
applicable
to
actions
pending
and
undetermined
at
the
time
of
their
passage,
and
are
deemed
retroactive
in
that
sense
and
to
that
extent.
As
a
general
rule,
the
retroactive
application
of
procedural
laws
cannot
be
considered
violative
of
any
personal
rights
because
no
vested
right
may
attach
to
nor
arise
therefrom.
Conformably
with
Section
4
of
Rule
65,
as
amended,
the
60-day
period
of
petitioner
to
file
the
petition
for
certiorari
should
be
counted
from
his
receipt
on
8
November
1999
of
the
Resolution
of
22
October
1999,
denying
his
motion
for
reconsideration.
Hence,
the
petition
for
certiorari
having
been
filed
on
7
January
2000,
the
last
day
of
the
reglementary
period,
the
Court
of
Appeals
should
not
have
dismissed
the
same
on
ground
of
late
filing.
In
view
of
the
foregoing,
our
next
logical
step
would
be
to
direct
the
Court
of
Appeals
to
resolve
on
its
merit
CA-G.R.
SP
No.
56549
by
determining
the
issue
raised
therein
on
whether
Judge
Bayot
committed
grave
abuse
of
discretion
or
acted
without
or
in
excess
of
jurisdiction
in
transferring
the
case
for
indirect
contempt
to
Branch
111
of
the
court
below.
Such
step
would,
however,
unduly
prolong
the
disposition
of
the
main
action.
We
shall
act
on
said
petition,
considering
that
the
lone
issue
raised
is
one
of
law.[if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif]
It
is
already
an
accepted
rule
of
procedure
for
us
to
strive
to
settle
the
entire
controversy
in
a
single
proceeding,
leaving
no
root
or
branch
to
bear
the
seeds
of
future
litigation.[if
!supportFootnotes][13][endif]
If,
based
on
the
records,
the
pleadings,
and
other
evidence,
the
dispute
can
be
resolved
by
us,
we
will
do
so
to
serve
the
ends
of
justice,
instead
of
remanding
the
case
to
the
lower
court
for
further
proceedings.[if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif]
In
his
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
before
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
CA-
G.R.
SP
No.
56549,
petitioner
contended
that
Judge
Bayot
committed
grave
abuse
of
discretion
in
refusing
to
act
on
his
motion
to
dismiss
the
indirect
contempt
case
and
on
his
motion
for
reconsideration,
and,
instead,
referred
the
case
to
Branch
111
of
the
court
below,
the
court
which
issued
the
order
subject
of
the
case
for
indirect
contempt.
The
pertinent
rules
on
the
matter
are
Sections
4
and
5,
Rule
71
of
the
Rules
of
Court,
which
read:
SEC.
4.
How
proceedings
commenced.
--
Proceedings
for
indirect
contempt
may
be
initiated
motu
proprio
by
the
court
against
which
the
contempt
was
committed
by
an
order
or
any
other
formal
charge
requiring
the
respondent
to
show
cause
why
he
should
not
be
punished
for
contempt.
In
all
other
cases,
charges
for
indirect
contempt
shall
be
commenced
by
a
verified
petition
with
supporting
particulars
and
certified
true
copies
of
documents
or
papers
involved
therein,
and
upon
full
compliance
with
the
requirements
for
filing
initiatory
pleadings
for
civil
actions
in
the
court
concerned.
If
the
contempt
charges
arose
out
of
or
are
related
to
a
principal
action
pending
in
the
court,
the
petition
for
contempt
shall
allege
that
fact
but
said
petition
shall
be
docketed,
heard
and
decided
separately,
unless
the
court
in
its
discretion
orders
the
consolidation
of
the
contempt
charge
and
the
principal
action
for
joint
hearing
and
decision.
SEC.
5.
Where
charge
to
be
filed.
--
Where
the
charge
for
indirect
contempt
has
been
committed
against
a
Regional
Trial
Court
or
a
court
of
equivalent
or
higher
rank,
or
against
an
officer
appointed
by
it,
the
charge
may
be
filed
with
such
court.
Where
such
contempt
has
been
committed
against
a
lower
court,
the
charge
may
be
filed
with
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
the
place
in
which
the
lower
court
is
sitting;
but
the
proceedings
may
also
be
instituted
in
such
lower
court
subject
to
appeal
to
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
such
place
in
the
same
manner
G.R.
No.
177703
January
28,
2008
VILMA
G.
ARRIOLA
and
ANTHONY
RONALD
G.
ARRIOLA,
petitioners,
vs.
JOHN
NABOR
C.
ARRIOLA,
respondent.
D
E
C
I
S
I
O
N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before
this
Court
is
a
Petition
for
Review
on
Certiorari
under
Rule
45
of
the
Rules
of
Court,
assailing
the
November
30,
2006
Decision1
and
April
30,
2007
Resolution2
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
CA-G.R.
SP
No.
93570.
The
relevant
facts
are
culled
from
the
records.
John
Nabor
C.
Arriola
(respondent)
filed
Special
Civil
Action
No.
03-0010
with
the
Regional
Trial
Court,
Branch
254,
Las
Pias
City
(RTC)
against
Vilma
G.
Arriola
and
Anthony
Ronald
G.
Arriola
(petitioners)
for
judicial
partition
of
the
properties
of
decedent
Fidel
Arriola
(the
decedent
Fidel).
Respondent
is
the
son
of
decedent
Fidel
with
his
first
wife
Victoria
C.
Calabia,
while
petitioner
Anthony
is
the
son
of
decedent
Fidel
with
his
second
wife,
petitioner
Vilma.
On
February
16,
2004,
the
RTC
rendered
a
Decision,
the
dispositive
portion
of
which
reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
judgment
is
hereby
rendered:
1.
Ordering
the
partition
of
the
parcel
of
land
covered
by
Transfer
Certificate
of
Title
No.
383714
(84191)
left
by
the
decedent
Fidel
S.
Arriola
by
and
among
his
heirs
John
Nabor
C.
Arriola,
Vilma
G.
Arriola
and
Anthony
Ronald
G.
Arriola
in
equal
shares
of
one-third
(1/3)
each
without
prejudice
to
the
rights
of
creditors
or
mortgagees
thereon,
if
any;
2.
Attorney's
fees
in
the
amount
of
TEN
THOUSAND
(P10,000.00)
PESOS
is
hereby
awarded
to
be
reimbursed
by
the
defendants
to
the
plaintiff;
3.
Costs
against
the
defendants.
SO
ORDERED.3
The
decision
became
final
on
March
15,
2004.4
As
the
parties
failed
to
agree
on
how
to
partition
among
them
the
land
covered
by
TCT
No.
383714
(subject
land),
respondent
sought
its
sale
through
public
auction,
and
petitioners
acceded
to
it.5
Accordingly,
the
RTC
ordered
the
public
auction
of
the
subject
land.6
The
public
auction
sale
was
scheduled
on
May
31,
2003
but
it
had
to
be
reset
when
petitioners
refused
to
include
in
the
auction
the
house
(subject
house)
standing
on
the
subject
land.7
This
prompted
respondent
to
file
with
the
RTC
an
Urgent
Manifestation
and
Motion
for
Contempt
of
Court,8
praying
that
petitioners
be
declared
in
contempt.
The
RTC
denied
the
motion
in
an
Order9
dated
August
30,
2005,
for
the
reason
that
petitioners
were
justified
in
refusing
to
have
the
subject
house
included
in
the
auction,
thus:
The
defendants
[petitioners]
are
correct
in
holding
that
the
house
or
improvement
erected
on
the
property
should
not
be
included
in
the
auction
sale.
A
cursory
reading
of
the
aforementioned
Decision
and
of
the
evidence
adduced
during
the
ex-parte
hearing
clearly
show
that
nothing
was
mentioned
about
the
house
existing
on
the
land
subject
matter
of
the
case.
In
fact,
even
plaintiff's
[respondent's]
initiatory
Complaint
likewise
did
not
mention
anything
about
the
house.
Undoubtedly
therefore,
the
Court
did
not
include
the
house
in
its
adjudication
of
the
subject
land
because
it
was
plaintiff
himself
who
failed
to
allege
the
same.
It
is
a
well-settled
rule
that
the
court
can
not
give
a
relief
to
that
which
is
not
alleged
and
prayed
for
in
the
complaint.
To
hold,
as
plaintiff
argued,
that
the
house
is
considered
accessory
to
the
land
on
which
it
is
built
is
in
effect
to
add
to
plaintiff's
[a]
right
which
has
never
been
considered
or
passed
upon
during
the
trial
on
the
merits.
In
the
absence
of
any
other
declaration,
obvious
or
otherwise,
only
the
land
should
be
partitioned
in
accordance
to[sic]
the
aforementioned
Decision
as
the
house
can
not
be
said
to
have
been
necessarily
adjudicated
therein.
Thus,
plaintiff
can
not
be
declared
as
a
co-owner
of
the
same
house
without
evidence
thereof
and
due
hearing
thereon.
The
Decision
of
the
Court
having
attained
its
finality,
as
correctly
pointed
out,
judgment
must
stand
even
at
the
risk
that
it
might
be
erroneous.
WHEREFORE,
the
Urgent
Manifestation
and
Motion
for
Contempt
of
Court
filed
by
plaintiff
is
hereby
DENIED
for
lack
of
merit.
SO
ORDERED.10
The
RTC,
in
its
Order
dated
January
3,
2006,
denied
respondent's
Motion
for
Reconsideration.11
Respondent
filed
with
the
CA
a
Petition
for
Certiorari12
where
he
sought
to
have
the
RTC
Orders
set
aside,
and
prayed
that
he
be
allowed
to
proceed
with
the
auction
of
the
subject
land
including
the
subject
house.
In
its
November
30,
2006
Decision,
the
CA
granted
the
Petition
for
Certiorari,
to
wit:
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
GRANTED.
The
assailed
orders
dated
August
30,
2005
and
January
3,
2006
issued
by
the
RTC,
in
Civil
Case
No.
SCA
03-0010,
are
REVERSED
and
SET
ASIDE,
and
the
sheriff
is
ordered
to
proceed
with
the
public
auction
sale
of
the
subject
lot
covered
by
TCT
No.
383714,
including
the
house
constructed
thereon.
SO
ORDERED.13
(Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioners
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration
but
the
CA
denied
the
same
in
its
Resolution14
of
April
30,
2007.
Hence,
the
present
petition
on
the
sole
ground
that
the
CA
erred
in
holding
that
the
RTC
committed
grave
abuse
of
discretion
in
denying
the
motion
for
contempt
of
court.
The
assailed
CA
Decision
and
Resolution
must
be
modified
for
reasons
other
than
those
advanced
by
petitioners.
The
contempt
proceeding
initiated
by
respondent
was
one
for
indirect
contempt.
Section
4,
Rule
71
of
the
Rules
of
Court
prescribes
the
procedure
for
the
institution
of
proceedings
for
indirect
contempt,
viz:
Sec.
4.
How
proceedings
commenced.
Proceedings
for
indirect
contempt
may
be
initiated
motu
proprio
by
the
court
against
which
the
contempt
was
committed
by
an
order
or
any
other
formal
charge
requiring
the
respondent
to
show
cause
why
he
should
not
be
punished
for
contempt.
What
is
settled
thus
far
is
only
the
fact
that
the
subject
house
is
under
the
co-
ownership
of
the
parties,
and
therefore
susceptible
of
partition
among
them.
Whether
the
subject
house
should
be
sold
at
public
auction
as
ordered
by
the
RTC
is
an
entirely
different
matter,
depending
on
the
exact
nature
of
the
subject
house.
Respondent
claims
that
the
subject
house
was
built
by
decedent
Fidel
on
his
exclusive
property.29
Petitioners
add
that
said
house
has
been
their
residence
for
20
years.30
Taken
together,
these
averments
on
record
establish
that
the
subject
house
is
a
family
home
within
the
contemplation
of
the
provisions
of
The
Family
Code,
particularly:
Article
152.
The
family
home,
constituted
jointly
by
the
husband
and
the
wife
or
by
an
unmarried
head
of
a
family,
is
the
dwelling
house
where
they
and
their
family
reside,
and
the
land
on
which
it
is
situated.
Article
153.
The
family
home
is
deemed
constituted
on
a
house
and
lot
from
the
time
it
is
occupied
as
a
family
residence.
From
the
time
of
its
constitution
and
so
long
as
any
of
its
beneficiaries
actually
resides
therein,
the
family
home
continues
to
be
such
and
is
exempt
from
execution,
forced
sale
or
attachment
except
as
hereinafter
provided
and
to
the
extent
of
the
value
allowed
by
law.
(Emphasis
supplied.)
One
significant
innovation
introduced
by
The
Family
Code
is
the
automatic
constitution
of
the
family
home
from
the
time
of
its
occupation
as
a
family
residence,
without
need
anymore
for
the
judicial
or
extrajudicial
processes
provided
under
the
defunct
Articles
224
to
251
of
the
Civil
Code
and
Rule
106
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
Furthermore,
Articles
152
and
153
specifically
extend
the
scope
of
the
family
home
not
just
to
the
dwelling
structure
in
which
the
family
resides
but
also
to
the
lot
on
which
it
stands.
Thus,
applying
these
concepts,
the
subject
house
as
well
as
the
specific
portion
of
the
subject
land
on
which
it
stands
are
deemed
constituted
as
a
family
home
by
the
deceased
and
petitioner
Vilma
from
the
moment
they
began
occupying
the
same
as
a
family
residence
20
years
back.31
It
being
settled
that
the
subject
house
(and
the
subject
lot
on
which
it
stands)
is
the
family
home
of
the
deceased
and
his
heirs,
the
same
is
shielded
from
immediate
partition
under
Article
159
of
The
Family
Code,
viz:
Article
159.
The
family
home
shall
continue
despite
the
death
of
one
or
both
spouses
or
of
the
unmarried
head
of
the
family
for
a
period
of
ten
years
or
for
as
long
as
there
is
a
minor
beneficiary,
and
the
heirs
cannot
partition
the
same
unless
the
court
finds
compelling
reasons
therefor.
This
rule
shall
apply
regardless
of
whoever
owns
the
property
or
constituted
the
family
home.
(Emphasis
supplied.)
The
purpose
of
Article
159
is
to
avert
the
disintegration
of
the
family
unit
following
the
death
of
its
head.
To
this
end,
it
preserves
the
family
home
as
the
physical
symbol
of
family
love,
security
and
unity
by
imposing
the
following
restrictions
on
its
partition:
first,
that
the
heirs
cannot
extra-judicially
partition
it
for
a
period
of
10
years
from
the
death
of
one
or
both
spouses
or
of
the
unmarried
head
of
the
family,
or
for
a
longer
period,
if
there
is
still
a
minor
beneficiary
residing
therein;
and
second,
that
the
heirs
cannot
judicially
partition
it
during
the
aforesaid
periods
unless
the
court
finds
compelling
reasons
therefor.
No
compelling
reason
has
been
alleged
by
the
parties;
nor
has
the
RTC
found
any
compelling
reason
to
order
the
partition
of
the
family
home,
either
by
physical
segregation
or
assignment
to
any
of
the
heirs
or
through
auction
sale
as
suggested
by
the
parties.
More
importantly,
Article
159
imposes
the
proscription
against
the
immediate
partition
of
the
family
home
regardless
of
its
ownership.
This
signifies
that
even
if
the
family
home
has
passed
by
succession
to
the
co-ownership
of
the
heirs,
or
has
been
willed
to
any
one
of
them,
this
fact
alone
cannot
transform
the
family
home
into
an
ordinary
property,
much
less
dispel
the
protection
cast
upon
it
by
the
law.
The
rights
of
the
individual
co-owner
or
owner
of
the
family
home
cannot
subjugate
the
rights
granted
under
Article
159
to
the
beneficiaries
of
the
family
home.
Set
against
the
foregoing
rules,
the
family
home
--
consisting
of
the
subject
house
and
lot
on
which
it
stands
--
cannot
be
partitioned
at
this
time,
even
if
it
has
passed
to
the
co-ownership
of
his
heirs,
the
parties
herein.
Decedent
Fidel
died
on
March
10,
2003.32
Thus,
for
10
years
from
said
date
or
until
March
10,
2013,
or
for
a
longer
period,
if
there
is
still
a
minor
beneficiary
residing
therein,
the
family
home
he
constituted
cannot
be
partitioned,
much
less
when
no
compelling
reason
exists
for
the
court
to
otherwise
set
aside
the
restriction
and
order
the
partition
of
the
property.
The
Court
ruled
in
Honrado
v.
Court
of
Appeals33
that
a
claim
for
exception
from
execution
or
forced
sale
under
Article
153
should
be
set
up
and
proved
to
the
Sheriff
before
the
sale
of
the
property
at
public
auction.
Herein
petitioners
timely
objected
to
the
inclusion
of
the
subject
house
although
for
a
different
reason.
To
recapitulate,
the
evidence
of
record
sustain
the
CA
ruling
that
the
subject
house
is
part
of
the
judgment
of
co-ownership
and
partition.
The
same
evidence
also
establishes
that
the
subject
house
and
the
portion
of
the
subject
land
on
which
it
is
standing
have
been
constituted
as
the
family
home
of
decedent
Fidel
and
his
heirs.
Consequently,
its
actual
and
immediate
partition
cannot
be
sanctioned
until
the
lapse
of
a
period
of
10
years
from
the
death
of
Fidel
Arriola,
or
until
March
10,
2013.
It
bears
emphasis,
however,
that
in
the
meantime,
there
is
no
obstacle
to
the
immediate
public
auction
of
the
portion
of
the
subject
land
covered
by
TCT
No.
383714,
which
falls
outside
the
specific
area
of
the
family
home.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
PARTLY
GRANTED
and
the
November
30,
2006
Decision
and
April
30,
2007
Resolution
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
are
MODIFIED
in
that
the
house
standing
on
the
land
covered
by
Transfer
Certificate
of
Title
No.
383714
is
DECLARED
part
of
the
co-ownership
of
the
parties
John
Nabor
C.
Arriola,
Vilma
G.
Arriola
and
Anthony
Ronald
G.
Arriola
but
EXEMPTED
from
partition
by
public
auction
within
the
period
provided
for
in
Article
159
of
the
Family
Code.
No
costs.
SO
ORDERED.
[G.R.
No.
158971.
August
25,
2005]
MARIANO
Y.
SIY,
in
his
personal
capacity,
as
well
as
in
his
capacity
as
owner
of
PHILIPPINE
AGRI
TRADING
CENTER,
petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
and
ELENA
EMBANG,
respondents.
R
E
S
O
L
U
T
I
O
N
CORONA,
J.:
For
resolution
is
private
respondent
Elena
Embangs
motion
to
cite
Atty.
Frederico
P.
Quevedo,
counsel
of
petitioner
Mariano
Y.
Siy,
in
contempt
of
court
for
delaying
this
case
and
impeding
the
execution
of
the
judgment
rendered
herein,
in
violation
of
Canon
12[1]
and
Rule
12.04[2]
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility.
This
case
originated
from
a
complaint
for
illegal
dismissal
and
non-payment
of
holiday
pay
and
holiday
premium
pay
filed
by
Embang
against
petitioner
and
Philippine
Agri
Trading
Center.
The
labor
arbiter
ruled
in
favor
of
Embang.
The
dispositive
portion
of
his
September
29,
2000
decision[3]
read:
WHEREFORE,
judgment
is
hereby
rendered
declaring
[Embang]
to
be
a
regular
employee
of
the
PHIL-AGRI
TRADING
CENTER
and
ordering
the
latter
to
reinstate
her
to
her
former
position
and
pay
her
backwages
from
the
date
of
her
dismissal
on
February
18,
2000
until
her
reinstatement
which
computed
as
of
today
amounts
to
P37,771.50
(P5881
x
6.5
months)
plus
1/12
thereof
or
the
amount
of
P3,147.62
as
corresponding
13th
month
pay
for
the
period.
An
additional
award
of
5%
of
the
total
award
is
also
rendered
since
[,]
compelled
to
litigate
[,]
[Embang]
had
to
engage
the
services
of
counsel.
All
other
claims
are
DISMISSED
for
lack
of
merit.
SO
ORDERED.
On
March
8,
2002,
the
Third
Division
of
the
National
Labor
Relations
Commission
(NLRC)
denied
petitioners
appeal
and
affirmed
the
decision
of
the
labor
arbiter
with
modification.
Thus:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
appeal
is
DENIED
for
lack
of
merit
and
the
Decision
dated
September
29,
2000
is
hereby
AFFIRMED
with
MODIFICATION
in
[that
Mariano
Y.
Siy]
should
be
made
jointly
and
severally
liable
together
with
Phil.
Agri
Trading
Center
and
that
[Embang]
is
entitled
only
[to]
the
ten
(10%)
percent
of
his
awarded
13th
month
pay
as
attorneys
fees.
SO
ORDERED.[4]
After
the
NLRC
refused
to
reconsider
its
March
8,
2002
resolution,
petitioner
elevated
the
case
to
the
Court
of
Appeals
(CA)
by
way
of
a
petition
for
certiorari.
Finding
the
petition
to
be
without
merit,
the
appellate
court
dismissed
the
same.[5]
The
motion
for
reconsideration
filed
by
petitioner
was
likewise
denied.[6]
Undaunted,
petitioner
filed
a
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
before
this
Court
questioning
the
CAs
decision
(dismissing
his
petition)
and
resolution
(denying
his
motion
for
reconsideration).
Since
we
found
no
reversible
error
on
the
part
of
the
appellate
court,
we
denied
the
petition
in
our
September
22,
2003
resolution.
Petitioner
sought
a
reconsideration
of
our
resolution
but
we
resolved
to
deny
the
same
with
finality.
Thereafter,
entry
of
judgment
was
made
The
appellate
court
brushed
it
aside
and
found
neither
factual
nor
legal
merit
in
the
petition.
The
matter
was
again
raised
in
petitioners
June
3,
2003
motion
for
reconsideration
which
was
denied
on
the
ground
that
the
basic
issues
had
already
been
previously
considered
by
the
court.
Embangs
alleged
refusal
to
be
reinstated
was
also
alleged
in
the
petition
for
review
on
certiorari
filed
by
petitioner
before
this
Court.
We
denied
it
for
failing
to
show
that
a
reversible
error
had
been
committed
by
the
CA.
Atty.
Quevedos
client
was
bound
by
the
finality
of
our
affirmance
of
the
modified
decision
of
the
labor
arbiter.
He
should
not
have
tried,
under
the
guise
of
a
flimsy
appeal
to
the
NLRC,
to
reopen
a
case
already
decided
with
finality.
Nor
should
he
have
raised
anew
matters
previously
considered
and
issues
already
laid
to
rest.
Atty.
Quevedos
act
of
filing
a
baseless
appeal
with
the
NLRC
was
obviously
intended
to
defeat
the
implementation
of
a
final
and
executory
decision.
Elementary
is
the
rule
that
an
order
granting
a
motion
for
a
writ
of
execution
is
not
appealable.[20]
Thus,
Atty.
Quevedos
deceptively
innocent
appeal
constituted
either
a
willful
disregard
or
gross
ignorance
of
basic
rules
of
procedure
resulting
in
the
obstruction
of
justice.
By
his
acts,
Atty.
Quevedo
has
tried
to
prevent
Embang
from
enjoying
the
fruits
of
her
hard
earned
legal
victory.
In
effect,
he
has
been
tying
the
hands
of
justice
and
preventing
it
from
taking
its
due
course.
His
conduct
has
thwarted
the
due
execution
of
a
final
and
executory
decision.
By
appealing
an
order
which
he
knew
to
be
unappealable,
he
abused
court
processes
and
hindered
the
dispensation
of
justice.
His
dilatory
tactics
were
an
affront
to
the
dignity
of
the
Court,
clearly
constituting
indirect
contempt.
We
note
that
the
ground
cited
in
the
motion
to
cite
Atty.
Quevedo
in
contempt
of
court
was
his
violation
of
Canon
12
and
Rule
12.04
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility.
While
a
lawyers
violation
of
his
duties
as
an
officer
of
the
court
may
also
constitute
contempt,
the
grounds
for
holding
a
person
in
contempt
and
for
holding
him
administratively
liable
for
the
violation
of
his
lawyers
oath
are
distinct
and
separate
from
each
other.
They
are
specified
in
Rule
71
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
A
finding
of
contempt
on
the
part
of
a
lawyer
does
not
preclude
the
imposition
of
disciplinary
sanctions
against
him
for
his
contravention
of
the
ethics
of
the
legal
profession.
Thus:
x
x
x
the
power
to
punish
for
contempt
and
the
power
to
disbar
are
separate
and
distinct,
and
that
the
exercise
of
one
does
not
exclude
the
exercise
of
the
other.
A
contempt
proceeding
for
misbehavior
in
court
is
designed
to
vindicate
the
authority
of
the
court;
on
the
other
hand,
the
object
of
a
disciplinary
proceeding
is
to
deal
with
the
fitness
of
the
courts
officer
to
continue
in
that
office,
to
preserve
and
protect
the
court
and
the
public
from
the
official
ministrations
of
persons
unfit
or
unworthy
to
hold
such
office.
The
principal
purpose
of
the
exercise
of
the
power
to
cite
for
contempt
is
to
safeguard
the
functions
of
the
court
[while
that]
of
the
exercise
of
disciplinary
authority
by
the
Supreme
Court
is
to
assure
respect
for
orders
of
such
court
by
attorneys
who,
as
much
as
judges,
are
responsible
for
the
orderly
administration
of
justice.
Moreover,
it
has
been
held
that
the
imposition
of
a
fine
as
a
penalty
in
a